Volume VI
The New Stage
August 1937–1938

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MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Revolutionary Writings 1912·1949



Stuart R. Schram, Editor

Nancy J. Hodes, Associate Editor

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"March forward resolutely, fight Japan, and save China." (Inscription for the Second Congress of the Northwest Youth National Salvation Association, November, 1938)

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Stuart R. Schram, Editor

Nancy J. Hodes, Associate Editor

An East Gate Book

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Nancy Hodes, associate editor of the series until her departure for Soka Gakkai University in 2000, was involved in all aspects of the work on the present volume. She played a major role in the revision and annotation of the translations, and in checking the final versions against the Chinese originals. She also drafted some translations. In particular, she prepared the initial drafts of all Mao's poems, which were then revised in collaboration with Stuart Schram. Final responsibility for the accuracy and literary quality of the work as a whole rests with him as editor.

This project was launched by Roderick MacFarquhar, Director of the Fairbank Center until June 30, 1992. Without his organizing ability, forceful advocacy, and fund-raising, it would never have come into being, and his continuing active participation has been vital to its success. His successor, Professor James L. Watson, took a serious interest in our work, as did Professor Ezra Vogel, Director of the Center from July 1995 to June 1999. Professor Elizabeth Perry, Director from July 1999 to June 2002, and the current Director, Wilt Idema, have continued to provide moral and on occasion material support.

The editor, Stuart Schram, wishes to acknowledge his very great indebtedness to Benjamin Schwartz, a pioneer in the study of Mao Zedong's thought. Professor

Schwartz carefully read the manuscripts of earlier volumes of this series, and made stimulating and thoughtful criticisms of the introductions. Subsequently, he continued, so long as his health allowed, to offer insightful comments on the themes raised by the materials translated. For any remaining errors and inadequacies, the fault lies once again with the editor.

General Introduction

Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949

Mao Zedong stands out as one of the dominant figures of the twentieth century. Guerrilla leader, strategist, conqueror, ruler, poet, and philosopher, he placed his imprint on China, and on the world. This edition of Mao's writings provides abundant documentation in his own words regarding both his life and his thought. Because of the central role of Mao's ideas and actions in the turbulent course of the Chinese revolution, it thus offers a rich body of historical data about China in the first half of the twentieth century.

The process of change and upheaval in China which Mao sought to master had been going on for roughly a century by the time he was born in 1893. Its origins lay in the incapacity of the old order to cope with the population explosion at the end of the eighteenth century and with other economic and social problems, as well as in the shock administered by the Opium War of 1840 and further European aggression and expansion thereafter.

Mao's native Hunan Province was crucially involved both in the struggles of the Qing dynasty to maintain its authority and in the radical ferment which led to successive challenges to the imperial system. Thus, on the one hand, the Hunan Army of the great conservative viceroy Zeng Guofan was the main instrument for putting down the Taiping Rebellion and saving the dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth century. But, on the other hand, the most radical of the late nineteenth-century reformers, and the only one to lay down his life in 1898, Tan Sitong, was also a Hunanese, as was Huang Xing, whose contribution to the revolution of 1911 was arguably as great as that of Sun Yatsen.[1] In his youth, Mao profoundly admired all three of these men, though they stood for very different things: Zeng for the empire and the Confucian values which sustained it, Tan for defying tradition and seeking inspiration in the West, Huang for Western-style constitutional democracy.

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[1] Abundant references to all three of these figures are to be found in Mao's writings, especially those of the early period contained in Volume I of this series (regarding Zeng, see pp. 10, 72, and 131; on Tan, see "Zhang Kundi's Record of Two Talks with Mao Zedong," September 1917, p. 139; on Huang, see "Letter to Miyazaki Toten," March 1917, pp. 111–12).

Apart from Mao's strong Hunanese patriotism, which inclined him to admire eminent figures from his own province, he undoubtedly saw these three as forceful and effective leaders who, each in his own way, fought to assure the future of China. Any sense that they were contradictory symbols would have been diminished by the fact that from an early age Mao never advocated exclusive reliance on either Chinese or Western values but repeatedly sought a synthesis of the two. In August 1917, Mao Zedong expressed the view that despite the "antiquated" and otherwise undesirable traits of the Chinese mentality, "Western thought is not necessarily all correct either; very many parts of it should be transformed at the same time as Oriental thought."[2] In a sense, this sentence sums up the problem he sought to resolve throughout his whole career: How could China develop an advanced civilization and become rich and powerful, while remaining Chinese?

As shown by the texts contained in Volume I, Mao's early exposure to "Westernizing" influences was not limited to Marxism. Other currents of European thought played a significant role in his development. Whether he was dealing with liberalism or Leninism, however, Mao tenaciously sought to adapt and transform these ideologies, even as he espoused them and learned from them.

Mao Zedong played an active and significant role in the movement for political and intellectual renewal which developed in the aftermath of the patriotic student demonstrations of May 4, 1919, against the transfer of German concessions in China to Japan. This "new thought tide," which had begun to manifest itself at least as early as 1915, dominated the scene from 1919 onward and prepared the ground for the triumph of radicalism and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. But though Mao enthusiastically supported the call of Chen Duxiu, who later became the Party's first leader, for the Western values incarnated by "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy," he never wholly endorsed the total negation of Chinese culture advocated by many people during the May Fourth period. His condemnations of the old thought as backward and slavish are nearly always balanced by a call to learn from both Eastern and Western thought and to develop something new out of these twin sources.

In 1919 and 1920, Mao leaned toward anarchism rather than socialism. Only in January 1921 did he at last draw the explicit conclusion that anarchism would not work and that Russia's proletarian dictatorship represented the model which must be followed.[3] Half the remaining fifty-five years of his life were devoted to creating such a dictatorship and the other half to deciding what to do with it and how to overcome the defects which he perceived in it. From the beginning to the end of this process, Mao drew upon Chinese experience and Chinese civilization in revising and reforming this Western import.

To the extent that, from the 1920s onward, Mao was a committed Leninist, his understanding of the doctrine shaped his vision of the world. But to the extent that, although he was a Communist revolutionary, he always "planted his backside on the body of China,"[4] ideology alone did not exhaustively determine his outlook. One of Mao Zedong's most remarkable attributes was the extent to which he linked theory and practice. He was in some respects not a very good Marxist, but few men have ever applied so well Marx's dictum that the vocation of the philosopher is not merely to understand the world but to change it.

It is reliably reported that Mao's close collaborators tried in vain, during the Yan'an period, to interest him in writings by Marx such as *The 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.* To such detailed historical analyses based on economic and social facts, he preferred *The Communist Manifesto,* of which he saw the message as "*Jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng!*" (Class struggle, class struggle, class struggle!). In other words, for Mao the essence of Marxism resided in the fundamental idea of the struggle between oppressor and oppressed as the motive force of history.

Such a perspective offered many advantages. It opened the door to the immediate pursuit of revolutionary goals, since even though China did not have a very large urban proletariat, there was no lack of oppressed people to be found there. It thus eliminated the need for the Chinese to feel inferior or to await salvation from without, just because their country was still stuck in some precapitalist stage of development (whether "Asiatic" or "feudal"). And, by placing the polarity "oppressor/oppressed" at the heart of the revolutionary ideology itself, this approach pointed toward a conception in which landlord oppression and the oppression of China by the imperialists were perceived as the two key targets of the struggle.

Mao displayed, in any case, a remarkably acute perception of the realities of Chinese society, and consistently adapted his ideas to those realities, at least during the struggle for power. In the early years after its foundation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party sought support primarily from the working class in the cities and adopted a strategy based on a "united front" or alliance with Sun Yatsen's Guomindang. Mao threw himself into this enterprise with enthusiasm, serving first as a labor union organizer in Hunan in 1922–1923 and then as a high official within the Guomindang organization in 1923–1926. Soon, however, he moved away from this perspective, and even before urban-based revolution was put down in blood by Chiang Kaishek in 1927, he asserted that the real center of gravity of Chinese society was in the countryside. From this fact, he drew the conclusion that the decisive blows against the existing reactionary order must be struck in the countryside by the peasants.

By August 1927, Mao had concluded that mobilizing the peasant masses was not enough. A red army was also necessary to serve as the spearhead of revolution, and so he put forward the slogan: "Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun."[5] In the mountain fastness of the Jinggangshan base area in Jiangxi Province, to which he retreated at the end of 1927 with the remnants of his forces, he began to elaborate a comprehensive strategy for rural revolution, combining land reform with the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In this he was aided by Zhu De, a professional soldier who had joined the Chinese Communist Party and soon became known as the "commander-in-chief." This pattern of revolution rapidly achieved a considerable measure of success. The "Chinese Soviet Republic," established in 1931 in a larger and more populous area of Jiangxi, survived for several years, though when Chiang Kaishek finally devised the right strategy and mobilized his crack troops against it, the Communists were defeated and forced in 1934 to embark on the Long March.

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[2] Letter of August 1917 to Li Jinxi, Volume I, p. 132.

[3] See his letter of January 21, 1921, to Cai Hesen, Volume II, pp. 35–36.

[4] Mao Zedong, "Ruhe yanjiu Zhonggong dangshi" (How to Study the History of the Chinese Communist Party), talk of March 30, 1942, to a Central Committee study group, in *Mao Zedong wenji,* vol. 2, pp. 399–408.

There were periods during the years 1931–1934 when Mao Zedong was reduced virtually to the position of a figurehead by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, dominated in substantial measure by the Moscow-trained members of the so-called "Internationalist" faction. At other times, he was able to maintain a substantial measure of control over the military tactics of the Red Army and to develop his skills both as a theorist and as a practitioner of the art of war. Even when he was effectively barred from that domain, he continued to pursue the investigations of rural conditions which had long been one of his trademarks.[6] Such inquiries into the conditions in a particular area served as the foundation for an approach to revolution stressing the need to adapt the Party's tactics to the concrete realities of the society in which it was operating.

The defeat of 1934 weakened the position of Mao's rivals for the leadership. In meetings of the Politburo held in December 1934, in the course of the Long March, Mao was supported for the first time in over two years by a majority of the participants.[7] At the conference held at Zunyi in January 1935, Mao began his comeback in earnest. Soon he once again played a dominant role in decisions regarding military operations, though his rise to unquestioned dominance in the Party was a long process which reached its culmination only in 1945.

In the course of the northward march from Zunyi to Shaanxi Province, Mao was driven at times by the continuing threat from Chiang Kaishek's campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" to advocate that the Red Army should fight its way to the borders of the Soviet Union, in order to obtain Soviet aid and protection.[8] Once the survivors of the Red Army had established themselves in Shaanxi Province in 1936, Mao's perspective began to change, and a vision of the Chinese people as a whole as the victim of oppression came progressively into play. For a time, Mao's line called for overthrowing the traitorous running dog Chiang Kaishek in order to fight Japan, but soon the growing threat of Japanese aggression and strong Soviet pressure in favor of collaboration with the Guomindang led to a fundamental change in the Party's policy. The Xi'an Incident of December 1936, in which Chiang Kaishek was kidnapped in order to force him to oppose the invader, was the catalyst which finally produced a second "united front." Without it, Mao Zedong and the forces he led might well have remained a side current in the remote and backward region of Northwest China or even been exterminated altogether. As it was, the collaboration of 1937–1945, however perfunctory and opportunistic on both sides, gave Mao the occasion to establish himself as a patriotic national leader. Above all, the resulting context of guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines allowed the Communists to build a foundation of political and military power throughout wide areas of Northern and Central China.

During the years in Yan'an, from 1937 to 1946, Mao Zedong also finally consolidated his own dominant position in the Chinese Communist Party and in particular his role as the ideological mentor of the Party. Beginning in November 1936, he seized the opportunity to read a number of writings by Chinese Marxists, and Soviet works in Chinese translation, which had been published a few years earlier while he was struggling for survival. These provided the stimulus for the elaboration of his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and in particular for his theory of contradictions. As noted above, another of the main features of his thought, the emphasis on practice as the source of knowledge, had long been in evidence and had found expression in the sociological surveys in the countryside which he himself carried out beginning as early as 1926.

Although Mao attained a dominant and unchallengeable position in the Party only in the mid-1940s, the year 1938 was of crucial importance in his rise to power. In May and June, he produced two of his most important and influential military writings, "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" and "On Protracted War." Meanwhile, it had been decided in March 1938 to send an emissary to Moscow to seek instructions from the Comintern in the face of the acute rivalry between Mao and Wang Ming, who had recently returned to China. In September the reply came back that the leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party, "with Mao Zedong as their head," should strive for close unity. Having been thus annointed by Georgi Dimitrov, speaking on behalf of Stalin, Mao delivered in October 1938 his report "On the New Stage," in which he put forward the call for the "Sinification of Marxism," making it very plain that he was the one who best understood this imperative. By this term he meant the modification not only of the language but of the substance of Marxism in order to adapt it to Chinese culture and to Chinese realities.

In 1939 and 1940, while paying lip service to the role of the Guomindang in China's struggle against Japanese imperialism, Mao began increasingly to suggest that a successful Chinese revolution would be possible only under Communist leadership. By 1941, he made plain that, in his view, no one else was capable of carrying out this enterprise and attacked those in the Party who preferred to translate ready-made formulas from the Soviet Union. The "Rectification Campaign" of 1942–1943 was designed in large measure to change the thinking of such "Internationalists" or to eliminate them from positions of influence.

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[5] See the relevant passages of the texts of August 7 and August 18, 1927, in Volume III, pp. 31 and 36.

[6] See, in particular, in Volume III, the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations, pp. 296–418 and 594–655, and in Volume IV, the circular of April 2, 1931, on investigating the situation regarding land and population, pp. 54–55, and the texts of 1933 on the "Land Investigation Movement," pp. 408–526 *passim.*

[7] See Volume IV, pp. xciii–xciv.

[8] See below, the Introduction to this volume, and also in Volume V, "Resolution of the Central Committee on Problems of Military Strategy," December 23, 1935.

When Mao was elected chairman of the Politburo and of the Secretariat in March 1943, the terms of his appointment to this second post contained a curious provision: Mao alone, as chairman, could outvote the other two members of the Secretariat in case of disagreement. This was the first step toward setting Mao above and apart from all other Party members and thereby opening the way to the subsequent cult. At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 came apotheosis: Mao Zedong's thought was written into the Party statutes as the guide to all work, and Mao was hailed as the greatest theoretical genius in China's history for his achievement in creating such a remarkable doctrine.

In 1939–1940, Mao had put forward the slogan of "New Democracy" and defined it as a régime in which proletariat (read Communist Party) and bourgeoisie (read Guomindang) would jointly exercise dictatorship over reactionary and pro-Japanese elements in Chinese society. Moreover, as late as 1945, when the Communists were still in a weaker position than the Guomindang, Mao indicated that this form of rule would be based on free elections with universal suffrage. Later, when the Communist Party had military victory within its grasp and was in a position to do things entirely in its own way, Mao would state forthrightly, in "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," that such a dictatorship could in fact just as well be called a "People's Democratic Autocracy." In other words, it was to be democratic only in the sense that it served the people's interests; in form, it was to exercise its authority through a "powerful state apparatus."

In 1946, when the failure of General George Marshall's attempts at mediation led to renewed civil war, Mao and his comrades revived the policies of land reform which had been suspended during the alliance with the Guomindang and thereby recreated a climate of agrarian revolution. Thus national and social revolution were interwoven in the strategy which ultimately brought final victory in 1949.

In March 1949, Mao declared that, though the Chinese revolution had previously taken the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, henceforth the building of socialism would take place in the orthodox way, with leadership and enlightenment radiating outward from the cities to the countryside. Looking at the twenty-seven years under Mao's leadership after 1949, however, the two most striking developments—the chiliastic hopes of instant plenty which characterized the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, and the anxiety about the corrupting effects of material progress, coupled with a nostalgia for "military communism," which underlay the Cultural Revolution—both bore the mark of rural utopianism. Thus Mao's road to power, though it led to total victory over the Nationalists, also cultivated in Mao himself and in the Party attitudes which would subsequently engender great problems.

Revolution in its Leninist guise loomed large in the world for most of the twentieth century, and the Chinese revolution was, with the Russian revolution, one of its two most important manifestations. The Bolshevik revolution set a pattern long regarded as the only standard of communist orthodoxy, but the revolutionary process in China was in some respects even more remarkable. Although communism now appears bankrupt throughout much of the world, Mao's impact is still a living reality in China nearly three decades after his death. Particularly since the Tiananmen events of June 1989, the continuing relevance of Mao's political and ideological heritage has been heavily stressed by the Chinese leadership.

Though the ultimate impact of these recent trends remains uncertain, the problem of how to come to terms with the modern world while retaining China's own identity still represents one of the greatest challenges facing the Chinese. Mao did not solve it, but he boldly grappled with the political and intellectual challenge of the West as no Chinese ruler before him had done. If Lenin has suffered the ultimate insult of being replaced by Peter the Great as the symbol of Russian national identity, it could be argued that Mao cannot, like Lenin, be supplanted by a figure analogous to Peter because he himself played the role of China's first modernizing and Westernizing autocrat. However misguided many of Mao's ideas, and however flawed his performance, his efforts in this direction will remain a benchmark to a people still struggling to define their place in the community of nations.

Introduction

The Writings of Mao Zedong, August 1937–1938

This volume covers only a year and a half, from the summer of 1937 to the end of 1938, but it could be argued that this brief span saw more important developments in Mao Zedong's thought than any comparable period in his life before the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949. These modifications took shape against a background of substantial changes in the objective situation, affecting Mao's own political role and the balance of forces within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the relations between the Communists and the Guomindang. Broadly speaking, the period in question saw the transition, not only in theory but in fact, from civil war against the Guomindang to limited albeit real cooperation in the war against Japan, in the context of the Second United Front. As this change was taking place, Mao elaborated new military tactics, as well as political ideas which served as the justification for the shift from social revolution to national revolution as the main task until victory over Japan was won. Central to this enterprise was the theme of the "Sinification of Marxism," which came to define the main thrust of his theoretical endeavors and served to buttress Mao's claim to leadership of the Party and of the country.

Mao and Marxism

As noted in the introduction to Volume V, despite the dramatic events surrounding the Xi'an Incident, Mao had found the time in late 1936 and early 1937 to undertake a serious study of Marxist writings for the first time in many years.[1] In addition to the writings of Marx himself, he was able to read Soviet works in Chinese translation as well as books by Chinese Marxist philosophers, making copious annotations in the margins.[2] He then proceeded, in the summer of 1937, to deliver

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[1] See Volume V, pp. ci–cii.

[2] The Chinese texts of these annotations, of which the first and most important were made between November 1936 and June 1937, have been published in a volume entitled *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji* (Mao Zedong's Philosophical Annotations), ed. Department for Research on Party Literature under the Central Committee (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988) (hereafter Mao, *Philosophical Annotations*).

deliver a series of lectures on dialectical materialism, of which the final sections, in revised form, have come to be known as "On Practice" and "On Contradiction." A complete translation of these texts appears below. Because of the close relationship between the notes and the lectures, they have been placed together in a separate section toward the end of this volume, which also includes Mao's annotations of early 1938 to Li Da's *Shehuixue dagang* (Outline of Sociology).

These materials occupy a central place in Mao's intellectual development and in what came to be called "Mao Zedong Thought" and must therefore be given proper attention in this Introduction. At the same time, they are so extensive, totaling some two-hundred pages, and raise so many complicated issues that they cannot be dealt with exhaustively here. Further comments regarding many important points of detail will be found in the notes to the texts themselves, and fortunately there is an entire volume devoted to the subject, which provides a valuable perspective on Mao's first major steps as a Marxist philosopher.[3]

Mao had earlier read some Marx in translation, both as a student in Changsha and while he was a responsible official of the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang during the First United Front, but the translations of works by the influential Soviet scholars Mitin and Shirokov were his first introduction to the latest and most authoritative interpretations of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. He began reading and annotating these two volumes in November 1936 and finished this task in June 1937. Thus he was able to draw on what he had learned from them in the lectures he delivered in July and August of that year.

The volume containing these annotations published in Beijing shows the relevant passages from the text of the books Mao read and his marginal comments on them in parallel columns, and our translation appears in the same format. Many of Mao's notes are summaries or paraphrases of the argument in the Soviet text, but a few develop or call into question the arguments of Shirokov and Mitin. Equally interesting and significant are the notes illustrating the points made in the books Mao was reading by examples drawn from Chinese history, both ancient and modern, and developing the implications of the arguments in the original works for the policy of the Chinese Communist Party. Another point, to which sufficient attention has perhaps not previously been paid, relates to the portions of the two books which Mao annotated. Mao's notes appear on only about a quarter of the 581 pages of the Shirokov volume and about the same proportion of the approximately 180 pages of the contribution by Mitin. Obviously, one would not have expected him to annotate every page, but it turns out that the pages that he did annotate are almost entirely those related to the arguments of those portions of his lectures which subsequently became "On Practice" and "On Contradiction." Clearly, Mao was more interested in these topics than in the discussion, in general terms, of other aspects of Marxist philosophy, and its historical roots, that occupied the rest of the two Soviet volumes.

This fact is relevant to the controversy as to whether or not Mao's 1937 lectures were based largely on plagiarism from the writings of Mitin, Shirokov, and others on dialectical materialism. Mao, interviewed by Edgar Snow in 1965, denied that he had written anything on this subject in 1937, apart from those portions of his lectures revised in 1950–1952 for inclusion in his *Selected Works,* and some foreign scholars took this denial at face value. Even before Mao's death, however, the full text of his lectures had been published for internal use, and in recent years its authenticity has been openly accepted in Beijing and the relationship between it and Mao's Soviet sources commented upon. Indisputably, Mao often copied whole paragraphs word for word, or with only minor changes, from the translations of Soviet texts. This point was first made by Karl Wittfogel in an article of 1963.[4] Nick Knight, who takes a very positive view of Mao's contribution to Marxist dialectics, deals quite frankly with the problem of the relationship between Mao's lectures and the materials he had been reading and annotating, and provides the most detailed and precise information hitherto published on the sources copied or paraphrased by Mao.[5]

Such borrowing can be found in "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," but it is most extensive in the earlier parts of Mao's lectures, devoted to the history of materialist thought and the basic principles of dialectical materialism. This is not surprising, for there was little Mao could add to what his Soviet sources said about Heraclitus and Bacon, or about the history of Western philosophy in general, and his audience was probably little interested in such matters. Mao, therefore, did not bother to annotate those portions because he had nothing particular to say about them. For the same reason, he contented himself, when he came to write his lectures, with summarizing the accounts in the Soviet manuals he had been reading. Practice, especially the practice of the Chinese revolution, and contradictions, especially the contradictions in Chinese society, were far more meaningful to Mao and to his comrades, and it was therefore natural that Mao should have annotated most heavily those portions of his sources relating to these topics.

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[3] See Nick Knight (ed.), *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writings on Philosophy, 1937* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990) (hereafter Knight, *Mao on Dialectical Materialism*). As explained in greater detail in the source notes to Mao's philosophical writings of 1937, Professor Knight has kindly allowed us to use his translations of many of these materials as the basis for the versions included in this volume. His book also contains a long and thoughtful introduction dealing with Mao's contribution to Marxist thought. The reader who consults this work will soon discover that there are very considerable differences of opinion on many points between Professor Knight and the editor of this series. That is undoubtedly a good thing rather than a bad thing, for the issues raised by these writings are so complex that it is desirable to view them from more than one perspective.

[4] Karl A. Wittfogel, "Some Remarks on Mao's Handling of Concepts and Problems of Dialectics," *Studies in Soviet Thought* III, 4 (December 1963), pp. 251–77. See also S. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung as a Marxist Dialectician," *China Quarterly,* no. 29 (January–March 1969), pp. 155–65.

[5] See Knight, *Mao on Dialectical Materialism,* pp. 30–48, and the tables on pp. 74 and 80–83.

In addition to the two Soviet texts of which Mao's annotated copies have survived, he was also strongly influenced, as he developed his own interpretation of Marxist theory, by the writings of two Chinese philosophers, Li Da and Ai Siqi. All these works were, however, as Nick Knight has aptly pointed out, essentially similar in style and content because "Soviet and Chinese philosophers alike were constrained to operate within an emerging orthodoxy," of which the limits had been set by Stalin.[6] It is against this background of the "pervasive influence of Soviet philosophy" that one should view the substance of Mao's 1937 lectures.

Although the first part of Mao's lectures (Chapter 1, and sections 1–10 of Chapter 2) is less important than the balance (Chapter 2, section 11, and Chapter 3, section 1), which became "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," some points deserve to be mentioned here. The opening section in Mitin's *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism,* one of the first two Soviet works read by Mao in early 1937, is entitled "The Two Lines in Philosophy."[7] The first section in Mao's lectures is entitled "The Battle Between Two Armies in Philosophy." Too much should not be made of this verbal difference, but it does constitute a striking manifestation of the centrality of war, and of military metaphors, in Mao's thought.

Another significant detail is Mao's statement, in Chapter 1, section 1, that "the tasks of philosophy during the present stage in China are subordinate to the general tasks of overthrowing imperialism and the semifeudal system, the thorough realization of bourgeois democracy, the establishment of a completely new Chinese democratic republic, and preparing the transformation by peaceful means to a socialist and a communist society." Here one can see a prefiguration of the "New Democracy" which Mao would promote in the 1940s. On the other hand, a striking paragraph in Chapter 2, section 2, goes entirely against the grain of a position Mao was to take in 1938 and never subsequently abandoned:

> Because of the backwardness of the evolution of Chinese society, the philosophical current of dialectical materialism developing in China today has resulted not from taking over and reforming our own philosophical heritage, but from the study of Marxism-Leninism. Nevertheless, if we wish to make the dialectical materialist current of thought penetrate deeply and continue to develop in China, give firm direction to the Chinese revolution, and lead it onto the road of complete victory, then we must struggle with all the outworn philosophies now existing in China, raise the flag of criticism on the ideological front throughout the whole country, and thereby liquidate the philosophical heritage of ancient China. Only thus can we attain our goal.

This argument is obviously in total contradiction with the slogan of the "Sinification of Marxism" Mao put forward only one year later. The reasons for this about-face are considered below. Meanwhile, let us move on, in this discussion of Mao's philosophical writings of 1937, to "On Practice," which was originally section 11 of Chapter 2 of the lectures on dialectical materialism.

"On Practice" underwent far fewer and less extensive revisions and additions than "On Contradiction" in preparing the post-1949 edition of the *Selected Works.* This has been pointed out most authoritatively by Gong Yuzhi, former deputy head of the Department for Research on Party Literature, which edited the volume of Mao Zedong's philosophical annotations.[8] In fact, Mao found it so hard to revise "On Contradiction" to his own satisfaction that he decided to let Vol. 1 of his *Selected Works* go to press without it, so it originally appeared in Vol. 2. (The resulting anomaly was rectified in subsequent printings of the two volumes.)

This difference in the difficulty of the problems encountered by Mao in dealing with the two essays is not surprising. From his earliest days, Mao had placed great emphasis on learning from revolutionary practice and had himself conducted local surveys, a number of which have appeared in earlier volumes of this edition.[9] Many of the variants which do exist between the original version of this text and the current official version result simply from the removal of references to concrete circumstances of the mid-1930s which would have seemed out of place after 1949. For example, near the beginning of "On Practice," a statement regarding the Guomindang inspection team which Mao had welcomed to Yan'an on May 29, 1937, was replaced by a vague reference to visitors from outside.[10] Regarding matters of greater substance, the chief difference between the account of the process of cognition in the Soviet texts and Mao's view, as expressed in his notes to those texts and further elaborated in "On Practice," lies in Mao's emphasis on the importance of testing and refining knowledge in an ongoing process of revolutionary practice.[11]

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[6] Knight, *Mao on Dialectical Materialism,* pp. 60–61.

[7] M. B. Mitin et al., *Bianzheng weiwulun yu lishi weiwulun* (On Dialectical and Historical Materialism), in *Zhexue xuanji,* trans. Ai Siqi (n.p., Jiefang she, 1939), p. 39.

[8] See Gong Yuzhi, "'On Practice': Three Historical Problems," translated in a special issue entitled *The Philosophical Thought of Mao Zedong: Studies from China, 1981–1989,* edited by Nick Knight, *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* (Spring–Summer 1992), pp. 144–67. This article begins with a historical account of all the versions of Mao's 1937 lectures issued between 1937 and 1946 which disposes so thoroughly of the views put forward by various Western and Soviet scholars to the effect that Mao did not write, and could not have written, "On Practice" in 1937 that it is unnecessary to deal with this question here. It also includes a concise listing of the main substantive changes Mao made in "On Practice" in preparing it for the *Selected Works.*

[9] See, in particular, apart from the celebrated "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (Volume I, pp. 429–464), "An Example of the Chinese Tenant-Peasant's Life" (ibid., pp. 478–83), the Xunwu, Xingguo, Dongtang, and Mukou investigations (Volume III, pp. 296–418, 594–655, 658–66, and 691–93), the Changgang investigation (Volume IV, pp. 584–622), and, in more general terms, "Oppose Bookism" (Volume III, pp. 419–26), in which Mao put forward the slogan "Without investigation, there is no right to speak."

[10] See the text of Mao's address of welcome in Volume V, pp. 673–75.

[11] On this point, see Shi Zhongquan, "A New Document for the Study of Mao Zedong's Philosophical Thought: Introducing *The Philosophical Annotations of Mao Zedong,*" *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* (Spring–Summer 1992), pp. 132–37, and, below in this volume, the corresponding portions of the notes on Shirokov, as well as "On Dialectical Materialism," Chapter 2, section 11.

"On Contradiction" presented much more complicated problems. In the end, Mao added six or eight pages of new text, made extensive changes throughout the essay, and deleted numerous passages, including all of section 1, par. B, on "The Law of Identity in Formal Logic and the Law of Contradiction in Dialectics."[12] As a result, no more than half the text as published in the *Selected Works* was the same, or nearly the same, as the 1937 version.

The text printed below, which includes the whole of both the 1937 and 1952 versions, is much too long and complex to be analyzed in detail here. It will be immediately apparent that many of the passages added in the *Selected Works* version summarize and pay homage to the latest Soviet contributions to Marxist theory, while many of those deleted from the original text contain references to Chinese history and Chinese literature. One particularly striking instance of this can be found toward the end of section 1, par. D, of Chapter 3 of "On Dialectical Materialism," where a citation from an essay by Su Dongpo seen by Mao as illustrating the relationship between the universality and the particularity of contradiction has been removed and a passage from Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism* inserted instead. A brief summary of the main points of originality in Mao's treatment of the subject of contradictions can be found in Shi Zhongquan's article cited above.[13]

One final comment is perhaps in order regarding the question of why Mao attached so much importance to these lectures and devoted so much time to them. Apart from delivering the lectures in four-hour sessions on Tuesday and Thursday mornings totaling some 110 hours, Mao himself also attended discussion sessions in the afternoons.[14] He undoubtedly thought that Marxism was important and that he had grasped some central ideas which should be imparted to others. It may also be assumed, however, that—confronted as he was by rivals who were inclined to denigrate him as a guerrilla leader and peasant revolutionary without much understanding of the finer points of theory and policy—Mao was resolved to demonstrate his mastery in this domain as well.

Toward a New United Front

Volume V ended with July 1937, when the July 7 Japanese attack on the Marco Polo Bridge had given a new impetus to the efforts to create a united front between

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[12] He did so because he had changed his views on formal logic after reading Stalin's *Marxism and Questions of Linguistics* and taking note of the ensuing discussion in Soviet philosophical circles (information from Gong Yuzhi, in a conversation with Stuart Schram).

[13] Shi, "A New Document," pp. 138–39.

[14] See *Mao Zedong nianpu* (Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong), ed. Pang Xianzhi (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), Vol. 1, pp. 671–72 (3 vols.). Since Mao Zedong is the central figure in our edition, the short title for this work is simply *Nianpu*; in the case of similar chronological biographies of other figures, such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, our short title includes the name of the subject. Material relevant to the present volume is to be found in Vol. 2 of the *Nianpu*, covering the period July 1937–August 1945.

the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang, but no formal agreement had yet been concluded. An accord was finally reached on August 22, but the terms of the statements by the two sides both before and after that date made it abundantly clear that differences and tensions remained. The very first item in the present volume, Mao's speech of August 1, 1937, vividly illustrates this point. In it, after asserting that the soviet areas are the model for the whole nation in fighting Japan, Mao states that, despite repeated exhortations by the Communists, "they" had never made up their minds to fight Japan resolutely, and the fall of Beiping and Tianjin had been caused by their vacillation. Although "they" are not named, and Mao proceeds to direct his criticism at the authorities in North China, it is obvious that the culprits referred to here are, in the first instance, Chiang Kaishek and other leaders of the Guomindang.[15]

In the days that followed, Mao declared that the importance of reaching an agreement with the Guomindang made it appropriate for Zhou Enlai and others to go to Nanjing and submit the Communists' plan for national defense in person.[16] But, at the same time, he stressed that no more than half to two-thirds of the Red Army's forces should be committed to the struggle against Japan, the rest being retained to defend the base area, and Chiang should not be informed of the percentages, since it was his intention to set up a "warlord stronghold." Once the main Communist forces had left the "reliable rear" of Shaanxi and Gansu, Chiang would occupy it with the ten divisions he still had there.[17]

In these circumstances, the Red Army should assist the operations of the "friendly forces" by engaging in guerrilla warfare on the flanks of the enemy, but should do so independently "under overall strategic command."[18] Asked by Nym Wales, in a brief but pithy interview of August 13, 1937, whether the Red Army was being reorganized for the anti-Japanese war, Mao replied bluntly that it was not, because Chiang Kaishek had delayed dealing with this question, had refused to allow the publication of the political program put forward by the Communists, and had not appointed a commander-in-chief of the Communist forces, though he had given them a number as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army. Moreover, Nanjing had failed to accept other Communist demands, such as freeing political prisoners and freedom of speech and the press. Asked why Chiang was delaying publication of the manifesto, Mao said the reason was no doubt fear of the Japanese reaction;

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[15] See below, "Speech at the 'August 1' Rally of the Campaign to Mobilize for the War of Resistance."

[16] See below, the text of August 3, 1937.

[17] See below, the text of August 5, 1937.

[18] See the telegrams of August 4, 5, and 10, 1937. Regarding this point, see Gao Hua, *Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqide* (How the Red Sun Arose) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2000), pp. 123–25. The allusion is to the song "The East Is Red," in which Mao Zedong is identified with the "Red Sun."

consequently, it could appear only after fighting had broken out. For its part, Mao said, the Chinese Communist Party demanded "immediate war" with Japan.[19]

Fierce fighting between Chiang Kaishek's best troops and the Japanese had, in fact, begun in Shanghai on the day Mao gave this interview, and it was in this context that Chiang had finally agreed to give the Communist forces a "number"—that of the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army—and to allow the appointment of Zhu De as commander-in-chief and Peng Dehuai as deputy commander-in-chief. Mao continued to suspect, however, that as soon as the former Red Army was on the move, Chiang Kaishek might refuse to allow the issuance of a declaration, and even eliminate the Soviet Area.[20]

At this point, an enlarged plenary session of the Politburo was held from August 22 to 25 in Luochuan, some 45 miles south of Yan'an. Mao Zedong delivered reports on military affairs, and on relations between the Communist Party and the Guomindang, as well as concluding remarks. Unfortunately, the texts of these speeches are not available, but the key points are included in the outline, dated August 25, which Mao drafted for the Propaganda Department regarding the situation and the Party's tasks. This text, and the "Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country" incorporated into it, while commending the positive changes in Nationalist policies since the Xi'an Incident, criticized the Guomindang once again for its unwillingness to lift the ban on popular anti-Japanese movements, or to carry out political reforms, and for its insincerity in dealing with the Communist Party. Only by carrying out the Ten-Point Program and waging a war of "total resistance," Mao argued, could the motherland be defended and the Japanese aggressors be defeated.[21]

This relatively hard and skeptical line toward the Guomindang was not entirely accepted by all the leading figures in the Communist Party present in Yan'an.[22] In any case, despite his reservations, on August 25 Mao ordered the reorganization of the Red Army along the lines agreed with the Guomindang. In order to meet the requirement that the Communist-led forces should total no more than three divisions, armies, army groups, and front armies were renamed downward as constituent parts of the 115th, 120th, and 129th divisions of the Eighth Route Army. Divisions were changed into battalions, regiments were changed into companies, and companies were changed into platoons.[23] While Mao and other leading figures in the Chinese Communist Party accepted such formal and symbolic changes, some of Chiang Kaishek's other proposals they did not accept. Thus, on August 30, Mao rejected Kang Ze's suggestion that Ding Weifen, recently vice president of the Guomindang Control Yuan, should be appointed chairman of the Border Region government; this post, he insisted, must go to Lin Boqu.[24]

At a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo on August 27, Mao stressed that the political and organizational level of the proletariat was superior to that of the bourgeoisie; consequently, it was the proletariat which had proposed the united front. Under the conditions of joint resistance against Japan, the national revolution and the social revolution must be linked. During the period of the united front, the Guomindang would seek to draw in the Communist Party; the Communists must be vigilant and strive in turn to attract the waverers in the Guomindang.[25] He made very similar points in a report of September 1, 1937, to Party activists. The goal, he said, was to "set up a democratic republic of the workers, peasants, and bourgeoisie during the war, and prepare for the transition to socialism." Meanwhile, a crucial problem was whether the Guomindang should be allowed to draw in the Communist Party or the Communist Party would draw in the Guomindang.[26]

It is in this context that Mao wrote his well-known essay "Combat Liberalism," which appears in the *Selected Works* with only very slight changes. The manifestations of "liberalism" denounced in this piece are, in fact, largely manifestations of selfishness, self-indulgence, and a traditional Chinese concern with face, rather than of liberalism as commonly understood. The essay does, however, make it extremely clear that Mao was opposed not only to laissez-aller but to liberalism as a political philosophy. "We stand for active ideological struggle because it is the weapon for ensuring unity within the Party and the revolutionary organizations in the interest of our fight," runs the opening sentence. Liberalism, he explained, "robs the revolutionary ranks of compact organization and strict discipline," and thereby "prevents policies from being carried through."[27]

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[19] See below, the interview of August 13, 1937.

[20] See below, the text of August 18, 1937.

[21] See below, "For the Mobilization of All Our Forces to Achieve Victory in the War of Resistance," August 25, 1937.

[22] See, in particular, Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* pp. 122–26.

[23] See below, "Order Concerning the Reorganization of the Red Army . . ." and "Telegram Ordering the Reorganization of Various Independent Red Armies and Divisions in Northern Shaanxi," August 25, 1937.

[24] See *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 17.

Kang Ze (1904–1967), a native of Sichuan, was a graduate of the Huangpu Academy and had long been one of Chiang Kaishek's closest advisers. Chiang had apparently proposed in July 1937 that Kang be named deputy director of the Eighth Route Army Political Department. For further details, see the relevant note to the text of July 28, 1937, in Volume V, p. 711.

Lin Boqu (1886–1960), also known as Lin Zuhan, a native of Hunan, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. He had been commissar for finance in the Jiangxi Soviet Government, had participated in the Long March, and had already been serving as chairman of the Border Region government since its inception.

[25] See *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, pp. 16–17.

[26] See below, the outline of this report, entitled "The Situation and Our Tasks After the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War," September 1, 1937, and also the account in *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 18.

[27] See below, the text of September 7, 1937.

On September 22, the Guomindang Central News Agency published the "Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Cooperation Between the Communists and the Guomindang" of July 8, 1937.[28] On the following day, Chiang Kaishek issued from Lushan a talk of his own, stressing the necessity of unity and recognizing the legality of the Chinese Communist Party. In a telegram of September 25 to Zhou Enlai, Mao declared that the appearance of these two documents "proclaimed the success of the united front and established the necessary foundation for unity between the two parties in order to save the country."[29] But although some improvement in Guomindang-Communist relations had taken place, real confidence had by no means been established.

In early September, Mao expressed concern at the efforts of the Guomindang to send the Red Army to the front as soon as possible. While acknowledging that they might not understand how inappropriate it was to send a big army to wage guerrilla warfare in a narrow region, he wondered whether they were not bent on deliberately sending the Red Army to fight difficult campaigns. Nanjing, he argued, should only make strategic decisions, leaving the Red Army complete freedom to carry them out.[30] He also noted that, in the context of the united front, a local Party could "easily fall into right opportunism," a trend which had already become "the principal danger for the Party."[31]

As for military tactics, at this time Mao still held that there was only one "excellent kind of warfare" at which the Red Army was particularly adept: "truly independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountanous regions (not mobile warfare)." "Dividing up to conduct mass work" was the only way in which the Communist forces could defeat the enemy and assist the friendly armies. The situation was not at all the same as during the Civil War period, and the Red Army should not concentrate its forces for battle as it had in the past.[32]

On September 25, Mao asserted that the declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party dated July 15, 1937, which had finally been released by the Guomindang authorities, would not only provide the basis for unity between the Communist Party and the Guomindang, but would define the basic orientation of the grand national unity of the people of the whole country. Chiang Kaishek's statement of July 17, Mao added, although it established the legitimate status of the Communist Party, showed "arrogance and lack of self-criticism."[33] In another telegram to Zhou on the same date, Mao reiterated his view that all the Communists' work in North China should be oriented solely toward guerrilla warfare. "If the regular warfare in North China ends in defeat," he wrote, "we shall not be held responsible, but if guerrilla warfare fails, we must assume a heavy responsibility."[34]

On this same date of September 25, Mao announced that he had "new views on strategy,"[35] and at Pingxingguan Lin Biao won the first Chinese victory of the war against Japan.[36] Neither Mao's new views nor Lin Biao's victory marked, however, a substantial departure from the tactics of guerrilla warfare, involving concealment and the skillful use of relatively small forces in a limited area, which had already been laid down.[37]

Even in the midst of this new war, Mao was still pondering his earlier experience and wrote a preface to the rural surveys he had conducted in 1928–1930, though the volume for which it was intended did not appear until 1941.[38] In another echo of that same early period, he confirmed the death sentence on Huang Kegong, who had joined the Red Army on the Jinggangshan, for killing a young woman because she had refused to marry him. He felt very sorry, he said, but the Communist Party and Red Army must impose stricter discipline on their members and soldiers than on ordinary civilians.[39] In another brief comment on the relationship between punishment and class, Mao laid down that, in dealing with Chinese traitors, the property of big landlords should be resolutely confiscated. The property of middle-level elements who had become traitors should not be confiscated in a hurry before the approval of the popular masses had been obtained, and workers and peasants who had been forced to become Chinese traitors should be treated leniently, with the emphasis on persuasion and education.[40]

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[28] This text was quoted *in extenso* in Mao's statement of July 23, 1937, which appears in Volume V of this edition.

[29] See below, "Our Declaration and Chiang's Statement Have Proclaimed the Establishment of the United Front," September 25, 1937.

[30] See below, the telegram of September 12, 1937, to Peng Dehuai.

[31] See below, the text of September 14, 1937.

[32] See below, the telegram of September 21, 1937, to Peng Dehuai.

[33] See Mao's telegram of September 25, 1937, to Zhou Enlai, entitled "Our Declaration and Chiang's Statement Have Proclaimed the Establishment of the United Front." Zhou had drafted the declaration, which had been sent to the Guomindang on July 15, but had been published by the Guomindang Central News Agency only on September 22, 1937. The text of the declaration can be found in Tony Saich (ed.), *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis, 1920–1949.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 771–73. (Hereafter Saich, *Rise to Power.*). For extracts from Chiang's statement calling for a War of Resistance, see the text of July 23, 1937, in Volume V, pp. 704–5.

[34] See below, "Guerrilla Warfare Should Be the Only Orientation of All the Work in North China."

[35] See below, his two telegrams to Zhu De and others, including Lin Biao.

[36] For a brief but very clear assessment of this battle, see the *Cambridge History of China* (hereafter CHOC), Vol. 13, pp. 639–40.

[37] For Mao's own assessment at the time, see his telegram of October 1, 1937. Although Lin Biao's forces had captured 82 trucks and killed more than a thousand enemy troops, while suffering 400 casualties, thus earning a telegram of congratulations from Chiang Kaishek, many of the enemy troops had escaped.

[38] See below, "First Preface to *Rural Surveys,*" October 6, 1937.

[39] See below, his message to the chief judge in this case, dated October 10, 1937.

Divergences Regarding Policy Toward the Guomindang

Although a formal agreement had been reached with the Guomindang regarding the establishment of a new united front, there were, as noted above, significant differences within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party regarding the attitude which should be adopted in dealing with Chiang Kaishek. Mao's attitude continued to be relatively firm. It is well illustrated by his statement of September 29, 1937, in which, although citing Chiang Kaishek's recent call for putting aside "personal grudges and prejudices" and uniting to realize the Three People's Principles, he argued that Chiang had not in fact "abandoned his Guomindang arrogance" or made any self-criticism, still less accepted the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan proposed by the Communist Party on August 25.[41]

In an interview with the British journalist James Bertram, Mao dealt with several fundamental questions. Asked what effects the war had produced so far, Mao replied that, by seizing Chinese territory, raping, plundering, burning, and massacring, Japan had finally brought the Chinese people face to face with the danger of national subjugation and made them understand that the crisis could not be overcome unless the popular masses and the government waged the War of Resistance together. Guomindang-Communist cooperation provided a basis for unity, and the war had aroused the sympathy of international public opinion. At the same time, China's weaknesses had been exposed, especially in the lack of unity between government and people. The present government must be transformed into a united front government which would carry out the necessary revolutionary policies. In the military domain, the Eighth Route Army was undertaking "mobile guerrilla warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands." It was also skilled in political work. In conclusion, Mao called for democratic centralism and for the convening of a new National Assembly.[42]

In a report delivered in October 1937, after three months of combat, Mao declared that the situation was now wholly different from what it had been after the Japanese aggression of 1931. This time, China had carried out a "resolute, brave war of national self-defense," overcoming the "fear of Japan disease" of the past. To be sure, there had been defeats, as might be expected in a war between a semicolonial country and an imperialist country, but the "decisive force" within the resistance faction, Chiang Kaishek, continued to advocate a resolute War of Resistance. China was capable of winning in the end after a protracted war. For the time being, the goal should be "resisting Japan above all else"; Democracy and the People's Livelihood were both secondary to this. But at the same time, it was essential to set up a strong Communist Party across all of China and to seize every opportunity to "come down from the mountains."[43]

After the fall of Taiyuan, Mao argued in a report to Party activists that regular warfare in which the Guomindang played the chief role had ended and guerrilla warfare in which the chief role fell to the Communist Party had become primary. In this situation, the political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army was spreading "fast and far," the movement of the popular masses had developed a step further, the national bourgeoisie was leaning toward the left, and the forces favoring reforms were growing within the Guomindang. Other key factors were the strength of the worker and peasant masses and assistance from the Soviet Union. In relations with the Guomindang, the Communists must still guard against "Left" closed-doorism, but, at the same time, the united front must be based on the execution of a definite program. Otherwise, cooperation would become "unprincipled and a manifestation of capitulationism." The key to leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war to victory was to uphold the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front."[44]

Meanwhile, Wang Ming [Chen Shaoyu], who had spent six years in Moscow and was a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, set out for China on November 14 and arrived in Yan'an on November 29, accompanied by Kang Sheng and Chen Yun.[45] Wang, who agreed with Stalin's view that a united China under Chiang Kaishek's leadership offered the best prospects both for China and the Soviet Union, was not at all pleased to learn that Mao had persuaded the Chinese Communist Party to adopt his much more skeptical approach and immediately arranged for a Politburo meeting (commonly known as the "December Conference"), which took place on December 9. On this occasion, Wang Ming delivered a long report in which he transmitted the latest Comintern instructions and discussed the way to win victory over Japan. He advocated closer cooperation with Chiang Kaishek and criticized the decisions of the Luochuan Conference of August 1937 and Mao's speech of November 12. Apart from the fact that he had long been a high official of the Comintern and was also a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, Wang had been

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[40] See below, the telegram to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ren Bishi dated October 15, 1937.

[41] See below, "Urgent Tasks of the Chinese Revolution Following the Establishment of Guomindang-Communist Cooperation," September 29, 1937.

[42] See below, Mao's interview with James Bertram, October 25, 1937.

[43] See below, "Outline for a Report on the Current Situation in the War of Resistance and the Party's Tasks," dated October 1937.

[44] See below, "The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan," November 12, 1937.

[45] See Thomas Kampen, *Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 88–89 (hereafter, Kampen, *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Leadership*); Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose*, p. 136.

received by Stalin and Georgi Dimitrov a few days before his departure for China and regarded himself as their spokesman.[46] In any case, he quickly became the Party's *de facto* number two leader. Together with Kang Sheng and Chen Yun, he and his supporters occupied three of the five posts on the Secretariat. Mao subsequently declared that, after Wang Ming's return, "my authority didn't extend beyond my cave." That was undoubtedly an exaggeration, but for some nine months Mao was not as much in control of Party affairs as previously.[47] As Frederick Teiwes has put it, "Wang Ming's interpretation of the united front was more attuned to Stalin's vision of Chiang Kaishek's armies as the bulwark of China's resistance to Japan than was Mao's emphasis on protracted guerrilla warfare designed to expand CCP-controlled base areas."[48]

Some of Mao's writings immediately after the "December Conference" appear to reflect a certain degree of acceptance of Wang Ming's insistence on treating the Guomindang with respect. For example, a telegram to leading cadres in the Central Shaanxi Plain declared that, "because of the enemy's instigation," as well as because of the "narrow-minded views of some comrades," some kind of friction had arisen with the "friendly party and the friendly army." In order to expand the united front, great efforts should be made to persuade these Guomindang friends to accept the ideas of the Communists, "in the interests of the War of Resistance," but if they did not agree, "temporary concessions" should be made to them. Toward the shortcomings of the friendly parties and armies, the Communists "should adopt an attitude of well-meaning criticism and suggestion instead of laughing at them or ridiculing them."[49]

In January 1938, Mao declared in a letter to Ai Siqi: "I am beginning to study military questions, but for the time being I still cannot write articles."[50] As we have seen, during the half-year since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, Mao had repeatedly expressed definite views regarding the military tactics which should be followed, but perhaps he felt that he was not yet ready to put forward a systematic analysis in this domain. Instead, underscoring the continuity between the tasks of the Communists during the Civil War period and those of the anti-Japanese war, he revised and published an excerpt from a pamphlet entitled *Guerrilla Warfare,* which he had written in 1934.[51] The following brief passage sums up Mao's

view at this time of the relation between guerrilla operations and the War of Resistance as a whole:

> The overall objectives of the surprise attack in guerrilla warfare are to eliminate the small enemy, weaken the large enemy, harass enemy flanks and rear areas, coordinate with the political work of guerrilla troops, wreck enemy political power, arouse the popular masses to resist the enemy, and preserve or restore anti-Japanese political power, so as to create guerrilla bases for the Anti-Japanese War. This complements the fighting by regular armies, because the capture of weapons gradually develops guerrilla units into regular anti-Japanese armies.

If Mao felt he still had something to learn in the military domain, he had no such doubts about his grasp of political issues, although he was well aware that his views were not necessarily shared by a majority of comrades either in Moscow or in China. In early 1938, he made a number of forceful statements in which a central theme was the problem of relations between the Communist Party and the Guomindang. One of the most interesting and revealing documents is an interview of February 1938 on the issue of one-party dictatorship.[52] Dealing first with the Soviet Union, Mao argued, quoting Stalin at great length, that what existed there was not a party dictatorship but a class dictatorship. If only the Communist Party existed there, it was because the working class and the Russian people had withdrawn their support from all other parties. Germany and Italy, in contrast, could not be said to practice a one-party dictatorship because "the Social Democrats, the Communists, and all other parties and groups that support democracy and oppose the fascist dictatorship are all fighting heroically underground."

As for China, the Guomindang's attempt, during the previous decade, to destroy other parties and groups had ended in failure, and the Chinese Communist Party had also failed in its attempt to create a régime led by a single party "under the conditions now existing." Thus the only solution was the establishment of an anti-Japanese national united front on the basis of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Rejecting the argument that the Three People's Principles were incompatible with communism, Mao declared the willingness of his Party to struggle, together with the comrades of the Guomindang, for the unfinished revolutionary cause of Sun Yatsen. Quoting Sun Yatsen, who wrote in *The Three People's Principles:* "What is the Principle of Livelihood? It is communism and it is socialism. . . . Communism is a very high ideal of social reconstruction," Mao argued that it was possible to "create political and military unity unprecedented during the past several decades," and that this was "the only hope of survival for the Chinese nation."

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[46] See Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* pp. 136–41, and Kampen, *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Leadership,* p. 90.

[47] See Frederick C. Teiwes, *The Formation of the Maoist Leadership: From the Return of Wang Ming to the Seventh Party Congress* (London: SOAS, 1994), pp. 5–8.

[48] Ibid., pp. 26–27.

[49] See below, "We Should Resolutely Uphold the Principle of the United Front in the Territory of Friendly Armies," December 24, 1937.

[50] See below, the letter to Ai dated January 12, 1938.

[51] See below, "On the Basic Tactic of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare—The Surprise Attack," published on January 11, 1938.

[52] See below, "Interview with a Correspondent of *New China News* in Yan'an," February 2, 1938.

It is hardly necessary to add that Chiang Kaishek did not take quite the same view of this issue as that expressed by Sun Yatsen, but for the time being relations between the two parties were relatively smooth, so Mao had some grounds for referring to a "Chinese united front" against Japan. The "world united front" of which he spoke in early 1938 was a somewhat more dubious concept; many countries disapproved of Japanese behavior in China, but few were prepared to take concrete steps against Japan. And the "united front against [Japanese] aggression" which Mao said "a majority of the popular masses in Japan" were forming was obviously in large measure a fantasy.[53] Whether Mao himself actually held this view of "unprecedented internal conflicts inside Japan" or it was merely a part of his effort to reassure and encourage Chinese popular opinion is impossible to say.

Meanwhile, Mao continued to give thought to issues of military strategy and tactics. In a February 1938 interview, he argued that, by employing a combination of mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare, China could force the Japanese armies into a very difficult position. Positional warfare should not be the primary form of combat for the present because of China's technological weakness, but national defense industries must be established to produce high-quality weapons for positional warfare. Guerrilla warfare, he said, was always secondary to other forms of warfare, but in wars of national liberation in semicolonial countries it played a crucial strategic role.[54] In a telegram of late February, he called for a force of "at least 200,000 fighting men" to enable the Eighth Route Army to carry out mobile warfare.[55]

On December 18, 1937, following the "December Conference," a delegation including Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu had left for Wuhan, where they met with the members of the Yangzi Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. It was decided to combine the two groups and to call them the Chinese Communist Delegation in dealings with people outside the Party and the Yangzi Bureau within the Party. Wang Ming regarded this organization as coequal with the Politburo and succeeded in forcing Mao to hold a meeting of the Politburo in Yan'an from February 27 to March 1, 1938. This gathering, known as the "March Conference," saw a sharp clash between Mao, supported by Ren Bishi and Zhang Wentian, on the one hand, and Wang Ming, supported by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Zhang Guotao, on the other, with no clear victory by either side. Mao proposed that Wang Ming remain in Yan'an, but in this he was unsuccessful, so for some months there were two rival centers of the Chinese Communist Party.[56]

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[53] See below Mao's "Speech at the Yan'an Mass Rally Against Aggression," February 11, 1938.

[54] See below, "Interview with United Press Reporter Wang Gongda," February 1938.

[55] See below, the telegram to Zhu De and others, February 23, 1938.

[56] For a brief summary, see Kampen, *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Leadership,* pp. 91–93. A more detailed account can be found in Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* pp. 147–53.

In March 1938, displaying the continuing interest in education and the role of young people which had characterized him ever since he was principal of a primary school in Changsha two decades earlier, Mao gave a talk to graduating students of the North Shaanxi Public School. Some of them, he said, would work to develop the mass movement in the rear areas. The others would settle in the "bean curd cubes" or small areas near the big cities and main highways occupied by the Japanese. Regarding the overall situation, he spoke once more of the "three united fronts"—the international united front, the Chinese united front, and the united front in Japan—which together could defeat Japanese imperialism. He also stressed the advantages of China's size. Spain's territory, he said, was small, so they had been obliged to adopt the strategy of resolutely defending Madrid. China, in contrast, was "as large as seventeen or eighteen Frances put together." Thus the Chinese had space and time to drive the Japanese devils out.[57]

At this time, Mao stressed repeatedly the importance of fighting the enemy in concert with the Guomindang forces.[58] He also continued to praise Sun Yatsen as a revolutionary precursor and an advocate of uniting with the Communists, and even ended his speech on the thirteenth anniversary of Sun's death with "a special salute to our national leader, and the commander-in-chief of the War of Liberation, Chairman Chiang."[59]

By the spring of 1938, the Eighth Route Army had become known and respected to such an extent that, when it seemed likely that the main force of this army would be redeployed elsewhere in the not-too-distant future, Mao ordered that guerrilla corps, bearing the name of the Guerrilla Contingent of the Eighth Route Army and strengthened by one or two companies from the Eighth Route Army with combat experience, be organized.[60] Speaking once again at the North Shaanxi Public School, this time at the opening ceremony for the second session, Mao declared that the students had come running there because of their high regard for the Chinese Communist Party, which had a correct political orientation and a work-style of hard struggle and was traveling down the road to national liberation.[61] A few days later, he spoke in similar terms at the opening day ceremony for the fourth session of the Anti-Japanese University. Although they would study there for only a few months, instead of a few years as at other universities, the students would, he said, learn one very important thing: the purpose of resisting Japan and saving the country. They must learn to become cadres who would create organized contingents, without which it would be impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism, for "without organization, there is no power." They must abandon hope of riches or high office and resolve to sacrifice their lives for their 450 million compatriots.[62]

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[57] See below, "Parting Words of Advice to the Graduates of the North Shaanxi Public School," dated March 3, 1938.

[58] See below, the telegrams of March 6 and 9, 1938, to Zhu De.

[59] See below, the text of March 12, 1938.

[60] See below, "Immediately Organize Guerrilla Detachments Which Operate Using the Name of the Eighth Route Army," March 24, 1938.

[61] See below, the speech of April 1, 1938, on this occasion.

Returning to the "central problem" of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, Mao declared that the national contradiction between Japan and China had become the principal contradiction, which determined the character and tasks of the revolution. As a result, the China-Japan contradiction outweighed the Guomindang-Communist contradiction. Without the united front, it would be impossible to resist Japan, so it must be consolidated and expanded. In order to do this, there must be a common program and mutual respect. The Guomindang, he said, should expand to at least ten million members and the Communist Party to one million. "Love and protect the Communist Party; make it develop and expand. Do the same for the Guomindang," was his conclusion.[63] Returning to this topic a few weeks later, Mao said that cooperation between the two parties was a problem for the future, not the present. For the time being, the situation was stable, but would the Guomindang and the Communist Party continue to cooperate after the overthrow of Japanese imperialism? Mao declared his conviction that the two parties would not fight. The Guomindang could not possibly want to fight a civil war, since no good had resulted from this in the past.[64]

Apart from the problem of the united front with the Guomindang, Mao also referred on occasion to the need to establish good relations with China's national minorities, especially the Mongols. Already in a proclamation of December 1935, he had called on the Mongols to show that the "descendants of Genghis Khan" could not be bullied.[65] Now, finding himself very close to Inner Mongolia, and only some 400 miles from Mongolia, an independent republic with strong links to Moscow which offered access to the Soviet Union, Mao several times called for better relations with the Mongols. In November 1937, while noting that the Japanese were seeking to create a puppet government in Inner Mongolia, "taking advantage of Prince De and Prince Sha," he called for an effort to create an anti-Japanese united front with "the upper levels of the various banners," under the slogan "Let the two nationalities of Mongols and Hans unite as one to resist the Japanese."[66] In June 1938, he called again for cooperation with the Mongols.[67] In November 1938, finally, he proposed that in seeking to establish a guerrilla base area near Outer Mongolia, attempts should be made "out of consideration for the national consciousness of the Mongols, and the Mongols' faith in the nobility," to win over Prince De, then ruling there under the protection of the Japanese, and persuade him to "turn around and resist Japan." The customs, habits, and religion of the Mongols must, he declared, be respected.[68]

Mao also devoted considerable attention to cultural matters. In a brief statement of February 1938 regarding the founding of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts, he declared: "The arts—drama, music, fine arts, and literature—are the most effective weapons in propagandizing, inspiring, and organizing the masses. Artistic workers are an indispensable force in the current War of Resistance." In order to train cadres specialized in artistic work, it had been decided to establish this academy and name it after China's greatest writer.[69] Speaking there two months later, he declared that the Communists believed in realism in art, but romanticism in art was by no means entirely wrong. Revolutionary romanticism, which meant imagining the future with revolutionary enthusiasm, had been a progressive force in history. "Simultaneously to discover defects in the present and the hope and glory of the future—this is the revolutionary spirit," he declared.[70]

Although half a year earlier Mao had declared that he "could not write articles" about military questions, May and June 1938 saw the appearance of two of his most important military writings. The first, "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War," was published in *Jiefang,* no. 40, dated May 30. The second, "On Protracted War," was a speech delivered at the Yan'an Symposium on the War of Resistance to Japan, delivered between May 26 and June 3. It is impossible in this introduction to offer a detailed analysis of these two long works, but some essential points must be underscored.

The article about problems of strategy was written by Mao for a small volume entitled *All the Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,* which also contained contributions by four other writers. Although it has been suggested in the past that Mao edited these other texts, there is no evidence of this, so they are not included here.[71] Mao's contribution begins with a topic which, as we have already noted, he stressed repeatedly: that of the singularity of the Chinese case. In China, just as everywhere else, regular warfare was primary and guerrilla warfare secondary. Why, then, raise the question of strategy? If China were a small country in which guerrilla warfare served only to give direct support over short distances to regular army campaigns, there would be only tactical problems concerning it. If

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[62] See below, the text of April 9, 1938.

[63] See below, the text of April 5, 1938.

[64] See below, "Both Sides Will Benefit If We Cooperate, Both Sides Will Suffer If We Split," May 4, 1938.

[65] See, in Volume V, pp. 70–72, the "Proclamation of the Central Soviet Government to the People of Inner Mongolia."

[66] See the telegram of November 16, 1937, to Gao Gang.

[67] See the telegram of June 11, 1938, to Zhu De and others.

[68] See below, "Persist in Long-Term Guerrilla Warfare in the Daqing Mountains," November 24, 1938.

[69] See below, "An Account of the Founding of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts," February 1938.

[70] See below, Mao's "Speech at the Lu Xun Academy of Arts," dated April 28, 1938. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958, Mao would once again advocate "revolutionary romanticism."

[71] See below, the document dated May 30, 1938.

China were as strong as the Soviet Union, so the enemy could not occupy extensive areas, guerrilla warfare would once again play only a supporting role. The question of strategy in guerrilla warfare did arise, however, because China was both a large and a weak country, under attack from a small and strong country. Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consisted primarily of independent operations on exterior lines, and the warfare was large-scale. "For all these reasons, China's anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy." Such extensive and protracted guerrilla warfare is "quite new in the entire history of wars within the human race."

The basic orientation of guerrilla warfare must be the offensive, which took the form of surprise attacks, by concentrating a large force to strike at a small section of the enemy force. Japanese imperialism could be driven out only through the cumulative effect of many victories in offensive actions. The question of the initiative was vital. It was not ready-made, but something that required conscious effort and resulted from flexibility in dispersal, concentration, and shifts of position. Planning was vital; without it, victories in guerrilla warfare were impossible. Coordination with regular warfare in strategy, campaigns, and battles was vital. Since the war was protracted and ruthless, guerrilla warfare could adapt itself only by developing into mobile warfare. In the process, guerrilla units would undergo the necessary steeling and gradually transform themselves into regular army forces, increasing in numbers and improving in quality. Guerrilla warfare required some centralized command, but excessive centralization would restrict its flexibility and sap its vitality.

As compared to the text on strategy in guerrilla war, Mao's "On Protracted War" is much longer, and much more general in character, dealing not only with military tactics but with politics and even with the philosophy of history. In it, Mao addresses the questions of whether China can win victory and, if the war will necessarily be protracted, how such a war should be waged. He characterizes his lecture as a contribution to "two great anniversaries": that of the War of Resistance, which had begun approximately a year before, and that of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party, on July 1, 1921.[72]

The experience of ten months of the War of Resistance, Mao declared, has sufficed to explode both the theory of national subjugation and the theory of quick victory. The first of these gives rise to the tendency to compromise, and the latter to the tendency to underestimate the enemy. Both are subjective, one-sided, and unscientific. China will not be subjugated and will win final victory, but the War of Resistance will be a protracted one. To demonstrate that he had taken a basically similar view two years earlier, Mao proceeded to quote from his interview of July 16, 1936, with Edgar Snow.[73] Summing up, he declared that, although Japan had great military, economic, and political power, its war was reactionary and barbarous, its manpower and material resources inadequate, and its international position unfavorable. China, in contrast, had less military, economic, and political power, but was in its era of progress, its war was just, and it was a big country, so it could sustain a protracted war. China was also supported by most countries and peoples of the world. Thus the final victory would go to China.

Yet, the exponents of quick victory were likewise wrong. We recognize, Mao said, that the two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation both exist, although liberation is the dominant possibility. In the course of the war, the factors working to the enemy's disadvantage and the factors working to China's advantage will both develop, and eventually a great change will take place, leading to the enemy's defeat and our victory. Concretely, he argued, the protracted war between China and Japan would be played out in three stages: the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defense; the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counteroffensive; and our strategic counteroffensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. Those who did not believe in this progression were adherents of the theory that "weapons decide everything." Weapons, Mao conceded, are important, but the decisive factor is people, not things. It is possible, Mao said, that the enemy will occupy more than half of China proper, plus the Three Northeastern Provinces, but within this large part of China, the Japanese could actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of transportation, and some of the plains, while the greater part would be taken up by the guerrilla areas that would grow up everywhere. Thus the rural areas would be transformed into regions of "progress and light," while the enemy-occupied areas and the big cities would temporarily become "regions of backwardness and darkness." The people of all China should "consciously throw themselves into this war of a jigsaw puzzle."

At this point in his argument, Mao raised the theme of the fight for perpetual peace. Never, he argued, in the several-hundred-thousand-year history of humanity, had this goal been so near as it was at present. During the first of the two long eras in human history, production was extremely poor, and the only thing one could do was to wage war against nature; wars between human beings were "unnecessary and impossible." During the second era, from the end of clan society to the present, because of the development of production and the appearance of social divisions, the era of the warlike life of humanity had arrived. In the imperialist epoch of capitalist society, wars were particularly extensive and particularly ruthless. The present war was historically unprecedented and came close to being the final war, leading to perpetual peace for humanity. The present war, he said, would lead to a second world war, and this war would result, "not in the salvation of capitalism but in its collapse." Because of the existence of the Soviet Union, "great revolutionary wars" would undoubtedly emerge from the coming conflict, giving this war "the character of a struggle for perpetual peace." Thereafter, "the third era in the life of humanity would emerge, an era of peaceful life that will be forever without wars." Mao did not say explicitly that this transformation would involve

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[72] See below, "On Protracted War," May 26, 1938.

[73] For the relevant passage, see Volume V, pp. 259–66 *passim*.

the total destruction of capitalism and its replacement by socialist régimes throughout the world, but this was the clear implication of his argument.

Protracted war and final victory required human action, and effective action required "conscious activity," a characteristic that distinguished human beings from things. Conscious activity, he added, "is displayed by human beings in all of their actions, but nowhere so strongly as in war. . . . The stage of action for commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but on that stage they can direct the performance of many living dramas, full of sound and color, power and grandeur. . . . War is politics by other means."

There follows an extensive discussion of strategy and tactics, too long to be summarized here. In the course of his argument, Mao refers twice as often to examples drawn from Chinese history as to modern warfare in the rest of the world, but he does cite also the victories of Napoleon, Hindenberg, the civil war in the Soviet Union, and French tactics during the First World War. The key to victory, Mao declared in conclusion, was "extensive political mobilization of the whole army and the whole people." The War of Resistance would be a protracted war, but final victory would be China's.

Despite his preoccupation with military tactics at this time, Mao Zedong did not neglect politics. In the spring of 1938, the Guomindang government had announced the creation of a People's Political Council. This was an appointed but widely representative body, including a number of Communists. It met for the first time in early July, and on this occasion Mao sent a congratulatory telegram to the speaker of the council, Wang Jingwei, and published a joint statement with the other Communist members. In his telegram, Mao said he was unable to come and listen to everyone's "eloquent speeches and profound comments" because he was caught up in "so many trivial tasks," but he had asked his other comrades to express his "humble ideas" regarding the anti-Japanese war and building the country.[74] In a joint statement with the other six Communist members, he hailed the meeting of the council as "a further step in the political life of our country toward a democratic system." Even though it was "by no means a perfect plenipotentiary representative organ of the people in terms of the way it has been established or in terms of its functions and powers," these defects would not deprive it of its utility and significance. Therefore, the Communists would participate in the council "with the most active, most enthusiastic, and most sincere attitude."[75]

As regards military strategy, Mao declared that the key to the defense of Wuhan was to mobilize the popular masses. The emphasis must be placed on attacking the enemy's flanks and rear, while avoiding "any disadvantageous decisive battle with the enemy." "Once it becomes impossible to defend Wuhan, we should not hesitate to give it up." The capitulationists might take advantage of this to attack Chiang Kaishek, and the overall orientation of the Communists should be "to consolidate Chiang's position." But the preservation of military strength was the foundation for carrying out this orientation.[76] Once more he called for the "regularization" of the guerrilla forces in eastern Hebei and other areas, by sending units of the regular army, regiments or battalions, to merge with the guerrilla units and serve as their "backbone." Local guerrilla units should also be drawn into the Eighth Route Army.[77] At this time, Mao also gave thought to monetary problems. The border region, he argued, must maintain the value of its currency so as to be prepared to carry on a protracted struggle against the Japanese invaders.[78]

A Turning Point in the Struggle for the Leadership

Since the end of the Long March, Mao had striven to assert his primacy in the Party. Zhang Guotao, who had previously been his most threatening rival, had eventually arrived at Mao's base in the Northwest in the autumn of 1936 very seriously weakened by a series of military defeats. Although he occupied several nominally important posts, he never thereafter exercised any real power.[79] Frustrated by this situation, Zhang took advantage of a mission to Xi'an in April 1938 to continue his journey to Hankou and place himself under the protection of the Guomindang. Meanwhile, after his return to China in November 1937, Wang Ming had become, as noted above, a skillful and threatening challenger to Mao for the effective leadership of the Party. Because of the stalemate between the factions of the Politburo, it was decided in March 1938 to send Ren Bishi to Moscow for instructions. Ren duly reported to the Comintern, which made a decision in June, and precise instructions were given to Wang Jiaxiang, who returned to China to deliver them. At a meeting of the Politburo on September 14, 1938, he communicated the directives of the Comintern as laid down by Georgi Dimitrov: "The leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party, with Mao Zedong as their head, should resolve the problems of the united front, and the leading organs should be penetrated by an atmosphere of close unity."[80] This was the first official confirmation from Moscow of the fact that Mao, rather than Wang Ming or any of his other remaining rivals, was to be henceforth the undisputed leader of the Party.[81]

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[74] See below, the telegram of July 5, 1938.

[75] See below, "Our Views on the People's Political Council," July 5, 1938.

[76] See below, the telegram of August 6, 1938, to Chen Shaoyu and others.

[77] See below, "The Situation in Eastern Hebei and the Rapid Regularization of the Guerrilla Forces in Eastern Hebei," September 10, 1938, and "The Creation of a Base in the Hebei-Rehe Border Region Is of Strategic Significance," October 2, 1938.

[78] See below, "The Monetary Policy of the Border Region," August 17, 1938.

[79] On these developments, see the Introduction to Volume V, *passim.*

[80] *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 90.

[81] In addition to *Nianpu,* see also Kampen, *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Leadership,* p. 93; Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* pp. 161–71; and Teiwes, *The Formation of the Maoist Leadership,* pp. 29–31.

It was in this context that Mao delivered, from October 12 to 14, his report to the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, under the title "On the New Stage."

Not all of this long document is of equal interest and importance. Parts of it merely repeat or rephrase arguments Mao had already advanced, but elsewhere he put forward entirely novel ideas which add significant dimensions to his thought. At the outset, he reiterated that defeating Japan would require three conditions: progress by China, which was primary; difficulties for Japan; and international support. Thus, the war would be protracted, but at the same time defeatist talk was entirely unfounded. "Ultimately," Mao asserted, "victory or defeat in a war is determined mainly by people rather than by things." He then proceeded to quote Chairman Chiang to the same effect: "The war for independence and survival . . . does not depend upon weapons and military preparation, but relies instead on a strong and unyielding revolutionary spirit, and a strong and unshakable national consciousness."[82]

The Sino-Japanese war, Mao argued, would fall into the category of three-stage wars. First, the more powerful enemy would attack and China would be on the defensive; then, there would be a long period of stalemate; and finally, thanks to China's progress and to international support, would come China's victorious counteroffensive.[83] The stage of stalemate, Mao argued, was the pivot of the war. "Whether China becomes a colony or is liberated does not depend on the loss of the big cities and important lines of communication in the first stage but, rather, on the level of effort of the whole nation."[84] Following the principle of giving up territory to preserve military strength, the Chinese must avoid big and unprofitable decisive battles during the first and second stages. Summing up his argument on this theme, Mao asserted: "The enemy occupies the cities and we occupy the countryside, so the war is protracted, but, in the end, the countryside is capable of defeating the cities." Such a protracted peasant war in the countryside against the cities was, Mao said, inconceivable in countries such as Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy, and it was also impossible in a small semicolonial country. Three interrelated conditions were required to make it possible. First, it must be a semicolonial country. In such a country, the cities cannot rule the countryside completely, for they are too small, and it is the countryside that contains the vast human and material resources. Second, it must be a big country, so if you lose part of it, another part remains. Third, it must, like China, have progressed and seen the emergence of new political parties, new armies, and new people, who constitute the basic force for defeating the enemy. Once again he quoted Chiang Kaishek: "The heart of China's protracted War of Resistance, the source of her ultimate victory, is to be found neither in Nanjing nor in any other big city, but lies in reality in the villages of the whole country and in the firmness of heart of the people."[85]

During this stage of stalemate, Mao asserted, guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear would become, temporarily, the major form of struggle, but it would develop in a new guise. In some of the important strategic regions, there would be a savage offensive by the enemy, making it difficult to maintain large bodies of troops in the plains, so the hilly regions would become the main base areas. Guerrilla warfare would be much more difficult, but it could be sustained.[86]

The present time, when the War of Resistance against Japan had developed to a new stage was also, Mao declared, the time when the Anti-Japanese National United Front had developed to a new stage. He began the discussion of this topic by declaring that the Guomindang had a brilliant future:

> The Guomindang and the Communist Party are the foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, but of these two it is the Guomindang that is the first great party. . . . The Guomindang has its own glorious history, of which the main achievements are the overthrow of the Qing, the establishment of the Republic, opposition to Yuan Shikai, . . . and carrying out the Great Revolution of 1926–27. Today it is once more leading the great War of Resistance against Japan. It enjoys the historic heritage of the Three People's Principles; it has had two great leaders in succession—Mr. Sun Yatsen and Mr. Chiang Kaishek; and it has a great number of loyal and patriotic party members. . . . In the conduct of the War of Resistance against Japan and the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front the Guomindang occupies the position of leader and backbone. . . . Provided only that it acts in accordance with the great premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, one can foresee a bright future for the Guomindang.

But after this lavish tribute came a warning. Many people, Mao said, are suspicious of the Guomindang. The issues which arouse their suspicion are "whether it can continue the War of Resistance, whether it can continue to progress, and whether it can become a national union in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the country." Elaborating on the third of these points, Mao called for "the democratization of the organizational form of the Guomindang, so that it may itself be transformed into a national alliance for resisting Japan and building the country, and the best organizational form for the Anti-Japanese National United Front." And he added: "If the Guomindang refuses to open its doors to the broad popular masses, and to accept all the patriotic parties and factions, as well as the patriotic individuals, in a great organization, it will be impossible for it to fulfill the difficult task of continuing the War of Resistance and defeating the enemy."

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[82] "On the New Stage," Section II, par. 2 and 3.

[83] Section III, par. 3.

[84] Section III, par. 6.

[85] Section III, par. 14.

[86] Section III, par. 16.

The Communist Party, he declared, had "opened its doors wide to all the revolutionary comrades." The Guomindang should do likewise.[87]

In a later section of the report, Mao dealt in greater detail with the organizational form of long-term cooperation with the Guomindang. Reproducing his statement in praise of the Three People's Principles in a report of May 3, 1937,[88] Mao reiterated that the Communist Party was ready to fight for their complete realization, because they were "the general objectives the people of the whole country want to achieve." Only when they had been thoroughly fulfilled would it be possible for China to develop into the "future period of great ideals" envisaged by the Communists.[89] That being the case, there was a basis for collaboration between the Guomindang, the Communists, and other anti-Japanese parties or factions, which should find expression in an Anti-Japanese National United Front. Such a front might take one of three organizational forms. In the first, the Guomindang itself would become a "national league." Members of all anti-Japanese parties could join it, but Communists would do so openly, and a list of their names would be handed over to the Guomindang. Alternatively, all the parties together could organize a national union, with Chiang Kaishek as supreme leader. This, Mao added, had been proposed long ago by the Communists, but unfortunately it had not been adopted. The third method was the existing system of ad hoc negotiations among the various parties about any problems which arose. This Mao did not regard as advantageous, but if the first and second methods were impossible, it would have to suffice for the time being.[90] Not surprisingly, Chiang Kaishek saw Mao's first two methods as representing a Trojan horse strategy and rejected them out of hand.[91]

All the sections summarized above are omitted from the version of Mao's report included in the *Selected Works,* which consists exclusively of section VII, on the place of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war. The changes made in this portion of the report are numerous but, on the whole, not of great significance. Paragraph 13, on the topic of study, is a striking exception. Here the variants raise issues which Mao had previously never dealt with explicitly, and which throw a revealing light on his thought as a whole.

The theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, declared Mao, are "universally applicable," but they should be regarded not as dogma but as a guide to action. We should, he said, study not the letter of Marxism-Leninism but, rather, the standpoints and methods by which Marx and Lenin observed and resolved problems. "The study of theory," he concluded, "is the condition for victory" in the anti-Japanese war.

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[87] Section III, par. 17 and 18.

[88] See Volume V, pp. 644–45.

[89] Section V, par. 4.

[90] Section V, par. 5.

[91] See Chiang Kaishek, *Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up at Seventy* (London: Harrap, 1957), pp. 87–88.

At the same time, Mao stressed the importance of studying China's historical heritage and summing it up critically. This crucial passage continues as follows:

> The history of this *great* nation of ours goes back several thousand years. *It has its own laws of development,* its own *national* characteristics, and many precious treasures. As regards all this, we are mere schoolboys. Today's China is an outgrowth of historic China. We are Marxist historicists; we must not mutilate history. From Confucius to Sun Yatsen, we must sum it up critically, and we must constitute ourselves the heirs to this precious legacy. *Conversely, the assimilation of this legacy itself becomes a method that* aids considerably in guiding the present great movement. A Communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be put into practice.[92] *There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used.* If a Chinese Communist, who is a part of the great Chinese people, bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty abstraction. Consequently, the *sinification of Marxism*[93]—that is to say, making certain that in all its manifestations it is imbued with Chinese characteristics, using it according to Chinese peculiarities—becomes a problem that must be understood and solved by the whole Party without delay. We must put an end to foreign formalism. There must be less repeating of empty and abstract refrains; we must discard our dogmatism and replace it with a new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people. To separate internationalist content from national form is the way of those who understand nothing of internationalism, and we must link the two inseparably. As regards this question, serious shortcomings still persist in our ranks and must be resolutely eliminated.

The implications of this brief text are extremely weighty. China, Mao states, "has its own laws of development." We are "Marxist historicists," and therefore we must not mutilate our unique history. The translators of the *Selected Works,* to avoid the awkward question of what Mao meant by calling himself a historicist, render the clause *Women shi Makesizhuyi de lishizhuyizhe* as "We are Marxist in our historical approach." This reading is so noncommittal as to be meaningless. The term "historicism" has been given a range of meanings, some of which imply that the history of a given society is the only factor determining its development.

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[92] Marxism must take on a national form before it can be put into practice → We can put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific characteristics of our country, and acquires a definite national form. The great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its integration with the concrete revolutionary practice of all countries. For the Chinese Communist Party, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of China. (Please refer to "Note on Sources and Conventions" for an explanation on use of italics and arrows.)

[93] The sinification of Marxism → Applying Marxism concretely in China

As a Marxist revolutionary, Mao obviously could not share that view. But he did call on his compatriots to "sum up Chinese history from Confucius to Sun Yatsen, and constitute ourselves the heirs to this precious legacy," and, in a clause deleted from the revised text, he added that "the assimilation of this legacy itself becomes a method" that aids in guiding the present great movement. In other words, the Chinese Communists should make use of the two methods at their disposal: the Marxist method, and another method or approach rooted in Chinese history. In the synthesis of these two approaches, Marxism remained in his view preeminent, so the outcome would be sinified Marxism, not marxified Chinese thought. But to separate "internationalist content" from national form was the way of "those who understand nothing of internationalism" or of the correct application of Marxism in non-European societies.

The concept of the Sinification of Marxism was to loom larger and larger in the theories and rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party for over a decade. It played a central role in the increasing glorification of Mao Zedong for his theoretical contributions of genius, from the Rectification Campaign of 1942 to the Seventh Party Congress of 1945, when Liu Shaoqi hailed his thought as "an admirable model of the nationalization of Marxism" and declared that it was "the highest expression of the wisdom of the Chinese nation, and its highest theoretical achievement."[94] These developments, which played a central role in Mao's ascension to a position far above any of his colleagues, will be fully documented in Volume VIII of this edition. In the early 1950s, with the publication of the new official edition of Mao's *Selected Works,* the term "Sinification" disappeared from the scene, manifestly because Stalin and his representatives who participated in the editing of this series found it offensive as an affirmation of China's uniqueness and of Mao's refusal blindly to copy the Soviet Union. For a third of a century it was never used, but in the mid-1980s it appeared occasionally in scholarly writing. In 1991 the authentic original text of "On the New Stage" containing the term was reproduced in an official documentary collection.[95] An extremely detailed and lucid monograph appeared in 1994, and finally, in December 1998, on the occasion of the 105th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth, a symposium on the topic was held, with the participation of many high-ranking Party experts.[96] It would be inappropriate to discuss these recent works here, but their appearance after an interval of nearly half a century forcefully underscores the importance of Mao's introduction of the concept.

On November 5, 1938, Mao delivered concluding remarks to the Sixth Plenum. "For the sake of long-term cooperation," he said, "it is necessary for all political parties and groups in the united front to help one another and make mutual concessions. . . . Each side refrains from undermining the other and from organizing secret [party] branches within the other's party, government, and army. . . . To sustain a long war by long-term cooperation or, in other words, to subordinate the class struggle to the present national struggle against Japan—such is the fundamental principle of the united front." At the same time, he declared that the slogan "Everything through the united front" was wrong. For some things, the Communists should secure prior consent from the Guomindang; for other things, such as the expansion of their forces to over 200,000 men, they should act first and report afterward. Continuing his remarks on November 6, he declared: "Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be settled without armed force. . . . The fact that the whole nation is rising in armed resistance in the war against Japan should inculcate a better understanding of the importance of this question in the whole Party, and every Party member should be prepared to take up arms and go to the front at any moment. . . . Every Communist must grasp this truth: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. . . . Everything in Yan'an has been created from the barrels of guns. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power." In the present period, he declared, guerrilla warfare was primary; the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare against Japan belonged to the future development of the war, so there was no need to discuss it now.[97] Thus Mao rejected categorically the view, which had been defended in 1937–1938 by Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, and others, and which he had himself been obliged to accept as recently as May 1938, that at present positional warfare should play the decisive role in the strategy of the Chinese Communist Party.

At this time, Mao advocated not simply guerrilla warfare, but "long-term guerrilla warfare," leading to the establishment of guerrilla base areas, and even "high-level contacts" with "large groups of bandits or spontaneous anti-Japanese troops of a semi-bandit nature." Out of consideration for the Mongols, and their faith in the nobility, he went so far as to call for attempts to win over the pro-Japanese Prince De.[98] But though he was flexible in tactics, to a point which might even be called opportunist, his strategic vision was clear and unbending. On the one hand, he sought to strengthen the position of the Communist Party vis-à-vis the Guomindang. Yet, at the same time, he aimed to bolster his own role as the leader of the Party. During the three years from 1939 to 1941, he laid the foundations for the cult of his own personality which was to prevail for the ensuing thirty-five years, as will be chronicled in Volume VII of this series. His rivalry with Chiang Kaishek would not be so easily or quickly resolved.

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[94] For extracts from Liu Shaoqi's speech of May 1945 on this theme, see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, *Marxism and Asia* (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 259–61.

[95] *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* (Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), Vol. 11 (Beijing: Central Party School, 1991), pp. 557–662.

[96] See Yang Kuisong, *Makesizhuyi zhongguohua de lishi jincheng* (The Historical Course of the Sinification of Marxism) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1994); and *Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping yu Makesizhuyi de zhongguohua* (Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and the Sinification of Marxism) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999).

[97] See below, "The Question of Independence and Autonomy Within the United Front," November 5, and "Problems of War and Strategy," November 6, 1938.

[98] See "Persist in Long-term Guerrilla Warfare in the Daqing Mountains," November 24, 1938.

Note on Sources and Conventions

This edition of Mao Zedong's writings in English translation aims to serve a dual audience, comprising not only China specialists but those interested in Mao from other perspectives. In terms of content and presentation, we have done our best to make it useful and accessible to both these groups.

Scope. This is a complete edition in the sense that it will include a translation of every item of which the Chinese text can be obtained. It cannot be absolutely complete because some materials are still kept under tight control in the archives of the Chinese Communist Party. The situation has, however, changed dramatically since Mao's death, as a result of the publication in China, either openly or for restricted circulation (*neibu*), of a number of important texts.

Although the Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (Department for Research on Party Literature), which is the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party responsible for the publication of Mao's writings, has always disclaimed any intention of producing his complete pre-1949 works, it appeared at one time that an edition containing a very full selection was in fact on the way, at least for a part of his early career. An advertising leaflet dated December 20, 1988, announced the appearance, in the spring of 1989, of two volumes, *Mao Zedong zaoqi zhuzuo ji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong from the Early Period) and *Jiandang he da geming shiqi Mao Zedong zhuzuo ji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong During the Period of Establishing the Party and of the Great Revolution [of 1924–1927]), and invited advance orders for both volumes. The events of June 4, 1989, led, first, to the postponement of publication and, then, to the decision to issue only the first of these volumes, for internal circulation, under the new title of *Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao, 1912.6–1920.11* (Draft Writings by Mao Zedong for the Early Period, June 1912–November 1920).

Until June 1989, further volumes in a similar format were in preparation. These plans have now been set aside, and no complete Chinese edition can be expected unless there is a radical change in the political situation. But, as forecast in Volume I, the corpus of available materials has now been substantially expanded by the publication in Beijing of two major series to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of Mao's birth. These are *Mao Zedong wenji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), of which the first two volumes, for the years 1921–1942, appeared in December 1993; three more, covering the period 1943—September 1949 came out in August 1996; and three volumes, for the years 1949–1975, in 1999. A six-volume edition of Mao's military writings, *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* (Collected Military Writings of Mao Zedong), published in December 1993, also contains an abundance of new materials, many of which are not of purely military interest.

Sources. Despite the appearance of these two important collections, there is still no complete, or nearly complete, Chinese edition of Mao's writings from December 1920 onward. This and all subsequent volumes of our edition must therefore be drawn from a variety of materials.

The twenty volumes of *Mao Zedong ji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong) and *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong. Supplement), edited by Professor Takeuchi Minoru and published in Tokyo in the 1970s and 1980s, still constitute the most important single collection of Mao's pre-1949 writings available outside China. (For details on this and other sources cited below, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.) Apart from the *Selected Works* of the 1950s (discussed below), other official Chinese editions of Mao's works, especially the two centenary series described above, contain a large number of important new items. The various specialized volumes issued in the 1980s to commemorate Mao's ninetieth birthday also provide useful materials from the pre-1949 period. Those drawn on in this volume include *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* (Selected Correspondence of Mao Zedong) and *Mao Zedong xinwen zhuzuo wenxuan* (Selected Materials Regarding Mao Zedong's Journalistic Work), both of which appeared in 1983.

As already indicated, all of these recent publications of the Party center are selective. Fortunately, we have been able to supplement them with materials drawn from an extremely wide range of sources, including contemporary newspapers and periodicals, individual texts published in China for restricted circulation, and facsimiles of handwritten materials.

Information regarding the source we have followed is given in an unnumbered footnote at the beginning of each text. We have also included in these source notes information about the first publication, or the earliest known version, of the writing in question, whenever available. To avoid ambiguity, all works referred to in these notes are designated by their Chinese titles, sometimes in a shortened version. (For indications regarding short titles, and for full bibliographical details regarding all works cited, including those mentioned above, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.)

Other things being equal, we have commonly referred the reader who wishes to consult the Chinese text to *Mao Zedong ji* and *Bujuan* whenever the item in question appears there, because this series offers the convenience of a large quantity of materials in compact form. There are, however, many instances in which the version contained in recent official Chinese publications is more accurate or more complete, and we have accordingly taken it as the basis for our translation. In such cases, the nature of the more significant differences is indicated in notes to the text in question, but we have not sought to show the variants systematically. That has been done only in dealing with changes made in the original text of Mao's writings when they were revised for inclusion in the official edition of his *Selected Works.*

Variants. While there are some differences between the various versions of texts by Mao published in the 1930s and 1940s, these are on the whole minor. Systematic revision of his pre-1949 writings was undertaken only from 1950 onward, in preparing the four-volume edition of *Mao Zedong xuanji,* translated into English as the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.* This problem did not arise in our Volume I because its coverage ended in 1920, and the earliest item in the *Selected Works* is the "Analysis of All the Classes in Chinese Society," written in 1925. Apart from this text, Volume II contained the well-known "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" of February 1927. Volumes III and IV each included four texts of this kind, and Volume V included six. In the present volume, the number has increased to twelve, including such important works as "On Protracted War" and "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War."

Much ink has been spilled regarding the question of which version of the texts included in the official canon is more authentic or more authoritative. Despite the passions formerly aroused by this issue, the answer seems rather obvious. For purposes of the historical record, only the text as originally written (when it is available) can tell us what Mao actually said in the 1920s and thereafter. For the study of Mao Zedong's thought, both versions have their uses in documenting how his ideas evolved over time. For purposes of defining ideological orthodoxy under the People's Republic, the *Selected Works* version is, of course, the ultimate standard.

In any case, the purpose of this edition is not to lay down which was the "real" Mao but to enable the reader to distinguish between what Mao wrote at any given moment in his life and the revised texts produced in the 1950s under Mao's close supervision, and often with his own active participation. As in previous volumes of this edition, we have endeavored to do this in the following manner:

1. The translations that appear here correspond to the earliest available version of the text in question.
2. Words and passages from this original version that have been deleted in *Xuanji* are printed in italics.
3. Substantive and significant changes in the text, including additions made by Mao or under his authority, in the 1950s, are shown in the footnotes. *Mao Zedong ji* indicates meticulously *all* changes, including those that involve only matters of punctuation or style (such as the frequent replacement of the somewhat more literary conjunction *yu* by the more colloquial *he,* both meaning "and"). We have shown in the English version only those changes that appeared to us to have a significant impact on the meaning of the text. Any such judgment is, of course, in some degree subjective. We have sought to err on the side of showing too many variants, rather than too few, even when there was monotonous repetition in the changes, but we have not hesitated to leave out variants we regarded as trivial.

In footnotes of this kind, the words that appear *before* the arrow reproduce enough of the original text to identify what has been changed. The words that appear *after* the arrow correspond to what has been added or revised in *Xuanji.* Because, in the rewriting of the 1950s, sentences and whole passages have often been substantially recast, it would take up far too much space, and make our text unreadable, to show every variant in detail. In some instances, it has been possible to show the new version in the form of complete sentences, but frequently we include only enough of the new wording to make plain the main thrust of the changes.

Because the official translation of the *Selected Works* has been available for four decades, and has been widely quoted in the literature, we have taken this version as our starting point, but have modified or corrected it as we judged appropriate, both to improve the accuracy of the translation and to bring it into conformity with the conventions adopted in this edition. In those few instances where other materials in this book had already been published in English, we have made our own translations, comparing them subsequently with existing versions.

Annotation. So that any attentive reader will be able to follow the details of Mao's argument in each case, we have assumed no knowledge of anything relating to China. Persons, institutions, places, and events are briefly characterized at the point where Mao first refers to them. Some individuals of secondary importance, especially those who appear only as names in a long list, are not included in the notes. We have also ruled out, with rare exceptions, annotations regarding people or events in the West. Despite these limitations, the reader will soon discover that the personages who appear in these pages are as numerous as the characters in a traditional Chinese novel.

To keep the notes within reasonable compass, we have generally restricted those regarding Mao's contemporaries to their lives down to the period covered by each volume. To make it easier to locate information, references have been inserted indicating where the first note about a given individual appears in the volume or in previous volumes.

In most biographical notes, dates of birth and death, separated by a hyphen, are given immediately after the name. A blank following the hyphen should, in principle, signify that the person in question is still living. In the case of individuals born in the nineteenth century, this is obviously unlikely, but in some instances even the editors working in Beijing have not been able to ascertain the facts. We have done our best to fill these gaps, but have not always succeeded. Sometimes a Chinese source ends with the word "deceased" (*yigu*), without giving the date of death. Here we have inserted a question mark after the hyphen, and have mentioned the fact in the note. It should not be assumed that all those born in the 1900s for whom no second date is given are already dead; some of them are still very much alive as of today.

As pointed out in Volumes III and IV, Mao's writings regarding military operations for the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi Soviet periods contain references to an extremely large number of places, many of them of no particular significance. To annotate all of the place names mentioned would have imposed an intolerable burden on the printer and on the reader. We therefore provided notes regarding geography, or the terrain, only in exceptional cases. At that time, however, the action took place primarily in a relatively limited area of Jiangxi, Fujian, and neighboring provinces, so it was possible to include in the two previous volumes maps showing the principal localities mentioned by Mao, in order to facilitate the understanding of the text. Because of the extremely extensive area in which the Red Army operated both during and after the Long March, the present and succeeding volumes would have required a large number of maps to cover the terrain in sufficient detail, and we must therefore refer the reader to an atlas of China—preferably one showing the place names in use before 1949.

The introductions to the volumes in this series should be considered in a very real sense as an extension of the notes. These texts will, we hope, help readers unfamiliar with Mao Zedong, or with twentieth-century China, find their *own* way through Mao's writings of the pre-1949 period. Any controversial or provocative statements which they may contain are intended to stimulate reflection, not to impose a particular interpretation on the reader. This is a collection of historical source material, not a volume of interpretation.

Use of Chinese Terms. On the whole, we have sought to render all Chinese expressions in accurate and readable English, but in some cases it has seemed simpler and less ambiguous to use the Chinese word. These instances include, to begin with, *zi* (courtesy name) and *hao* (literary name). Because both Mao, and the authors he cited, frequently employ these alternative appellations instead of the *ming* (given name) of the individual to whom they are referring, information regarding them is essential to the intelligence of the text. The English word "style" is sometimes used here, but because it may stand either for *zi* or for *hao,* it does not offer a satisfactory solution. The Chinese terms have, in any case, long been used in Western-language biographical dictionaries of China, as well as in Chinese works.

Similarly, in the case of second- or provincial-level, and third- or metropolitan-level graduates of the old examination system, we have chosen to use the Chinese terms, respectively, *juren* and *jinshi.* We have also preferred *xian* to "county" for the administrative subdivision which constituted the lowest level of the imperial bureaucracy and still exists in China today. Apart from the Western connotations of "county," there is the problem that *xian* is also often translated "district" (as in the expression "district magistrate"), and "district" itself is ambiguous in the Chinese context. We have also preferred to use the Chinese word *li* rather than to translate "Chinese league" (or simply "league"), or to give the equivalent in miles or kilometers.

Presentation. In the previous five volumes of this series, Mao's writings have been arranged in a single chronological series, according to the date of composition. The only exception to this pattern occurred in Volume IV, where the forty laws to which Mao had put his signature as the chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic appeared in an appendix and in a smaller size type, because it seemed unlikely that he had actually written these documents himself. In the present volume, the diverse nature of the materials included made it seem appropriate to arrange the texts by category. The first of these contains the bulk of Mao's writings in chronological order. The second consists of his notes for lectures on dialectical materialism, delivered in July and August 1937, and the third of his notes on writings by Soviet and Chinese Marxist thinkers which he read between 1936 and 1938 and on which he drew in developing his own ideas on the subject. The fourth category, finally, is made up of brief notes and inscriptions which are neither lengthy enough nor important enough to justify presenting them individually as separate documents, but are of sufficient interest to justify their appearance here. (The very brief items piously reproduced in Chinese sources even though they say nothing significant have not been included.)

As already indicated, we have tried to turn Mao's Chinese into good English. At the same time, since this is a work of reference, we have sometimes followed Mao in directions which do not accord with English usage. Mao frequently emphasized words or phrases by placing dots or circles next to each of the characters involved. In this edition, the corresponding text has been set in boldface. Usually we have also added a note explicitly pointing this out, but it should be clearly stated that all such highlighting is Mao's, not ours. Also, some of the Chinese texts we have translated contain omissions because the editors in Tokyo, or even those in Beijing, did not have access to a complete version of the document in question or could not read a few characters. When the number of missing characters is small, each one is commonly represented in the printed Chinese text by a hollow square occupying the space which would normally be taken up by a single character. In our English version, each such square has been represented by the symbol [X], so that the reader of the translation can see how much is missing. Where the gap is a long one, we have dispensed with this procedure and conveyed the necessary information in a footnote.

Finally, like many Chinese writers, Mao tended to produce very long paragraphs, sometimes extending to several pages. Although this may seem monotonous to the English reader, we have generally followed his paragraphing exactly, because it must be presumed to reflect Mao's own sense of where the crucial turning points in his argument are to be found. We have not followed this pattern rigidly; on occasion, massive blocks of text containing figures and other data have been turned into tables, which are easier to follow. For the most part, however, the translations in this volume seek to reproduce Mao's original in form as well as in substance.

Part I: Texts

1937

Speech at the "August 1" Rally of the Campaign to Mobilize for the War of Resistance

(August 1, 1937)

Comrades, the Japanese imperialists are extending the war to North China! Beiping and Tianjin have fallen! If we fail to mobilize for the War of Resistance, the Japanese imperialists will soon be attacking us right here! Do not imagine that Beiping and Tianjin are far, far away from here. Out there lies Shanxi, bordering on our area, and beyond Shanxi are Beiping and Tianjin, which are being bombarded at this moment by Japanese airplanes and big guns. Therefore, the people of the whole country, wherever they are, must be mobilized urgently. The soviet areas are the model areas for the whole nation in fighting Japan, so it is of the highest significance that we are holding this rally of the campaign to mobilize for the War of Resistance here, at this critical moment, when North China is threatened, and the Chinese nation has arrived at a decisive pass. We want to set ourselves up as an example and hereby express our determination to prosecute the War of Resistance. A long while ago, we talked to them[1] over and over again, expressing our hope that they would commit themselves to resolute participation in the War of Resistance, but they did not listen to us. From beginning to end they wavered and never made up their minds to fight the War of Resistance resolutely. The fall of Beiping and Tianjin this time was actually caused by their vacillation and lack of determination in fighting the War of Resistance. The authorities of North China from the very start resorted to the tortuous pursuit of compromise, without making sufficient preparations militarily. Unnecessarily wary of the popular masses, they made no effort to arouse the popular masses or to expand the patriotic movements of the popular masses. On the contrary, they put up public notices enforcing martial law and told the popular masses to remain "calm," thus making it impossible for the popular masses, who were patriotic and seething with enthusiasm, to take any action. The result of this behavior was that they lost Beiping and Tianjin! I hope

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This speech was first published on August 2, 1937, in a special supplementary issue of *Xin Zhonghua bao*. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 5, pp. 93–94, which reproduces this text.

[1] The deliberately vague term "they"/"them," with no antecedent, clearly refers to Chiang Kaishek, the Guomindang in general, and other powerful military commanders, whom Mao chose not to denounce by name at this time.

that the officers and men throughout the country who are fighting to safeguard our territory and resisting aggression will heed this tragic lesson! We now have only one policy orientation, and it is to fight Japan resolutely! Immediately mobilize the popular masses of the whole country—workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers—people of all parties, all factions, and all social strata. Let them all unite and wage a life-and-death struggle against the Japanese imperialists! That is the one and only policy for our national independence and liberation!

The rally of the campaign to mobilize for the War of Resistance we are holding today is a step toward this orientation. This rally is not simply for the purpose of competition in the campaign; we want to mobilize the people for the War of Resistance. We want to mobilize the popular masses of the whole country for the defense of the country and its territory. Comrades, get ready to go to Hebei. Get ready to go to the front lines in the battle of resistance to Japan. Take the policy orientation and methods which we are applying here to the other parts of the country! Take our resolve to the front lines in the battle of resistance to Japan!

Let us loudly shout:

Down with Japanese imperialism!
Recover Beiping and Tianjin!
Safeguard North China!
Recover the Four Eastern Provinces![2]
Long live the August 1 Campaign Rally!
Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

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[2] By "the Four Eastern Provinces," Mao was referring to Liaoning, Jilin (formerly Kirin), Rehe (formerly Jehol), and Heilongjiang, that is, to what was formerly known as Manchuria. When, in the numerous references to this area to be found in this volume, he sometimes spoke of the "Three Eastern Provinces," he was probably lumping together Liaoning and Jilin. In editing Mao's writings for the *Selected Works,* both in Chinese and in English, those responsible changed "eastern provinces" to "northeastern provinces," no doubt because they assumed that some readers might think "eastern" referred to the coast, from Beijing to Shanghai. This change was made, however, only in a relatively small proportion of Mao's total output, and in any case, our practice in this edition is to translate Mao's writings in the form he originally gave them.

On the Operational Principles of the Red Army

(August 1, 1937)[1]

Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu],[2] Lin [Boqu][3]:

As regards the operations of the Red Army, on the basis of the present situation on the enemy's side as well as on our own, we think that we should resolutely adhere to the following two principles:

1. In accordance with our overall strategic orientation, we should carry out independent, self-reliant, and dispersed guerrilla warfare, and not positional warfare, nor should we concentrate our forces for a campaign. Consequently, we cannot allow ourselves to be restricted in campaigns and tactics. Only in this way can we bring into full play the professional skills of the Red Army and strike appropriate blows against the Japanese invaders.

2. According to the above principle, during the initial stage it is appropriate for the Red Army to use one-third of its forces. If too large a force is used, it will not be able to fight a guerrilla war and can, on the contrary, easily suffer a concentrated attack by the enemy. As for the rest of the forces, they should be brought into play gradually as the war develops.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 20–21, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] It is indicated at the end of this document by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 5:00 and 7:00 P.M.

[2] Qin Bangxian (1907–1946), whose pseudonym was Bo Gu, had been the dominant figure in the Party during the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic. Although he lost that position at the time of the Zunyi conference in January 1935, he continued to play a significant role. For details, see the numerous references to him in Volume V. At this time, he had recently been sent to Nanjing to serve as a liaison officer with the Guomindang.

[3] Lin Boqu (1886–1960), also known as Lin Zuhan, a native of Hunan, had been commander of the First Army Corps during the Jiangxi Soviet period. At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, he became commander of the 115th division of the Eighth Route Army.

Please discuss the above principles with the various comrades, and be prepared to inform the Guomindang.

Luo [Fu][4] Mao [Zedong]

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[4] Luo Fu was the pseudonym of Zhang Wentian (1900–1976), a native of Nanhui, Shanghai. Zhang had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925, and thereafter spent four years studying in the Soviet Union. Returning to China at the end of 1930, he became one of the leading members of the "International Faction" in the Party. In 1934, he supplanted Mao as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In January 1935 at Zunyi, he threw his support behind Mao, and as a result became "the person with overall responsibility" for the leadership of the Party, although he did not assume the formal title of Secretary General. At this time he was head of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

Concerning the Submission in Person to Nanjing of the Plan for National Defense and Other Matters

(August 3, 1937)[1]

Zhou, Bo (and to be transmitted to Ye)[2]:

1. It would be appropriate for Zhou, Zhu [De], and Ye to go and submit the plan for national defense in person. It is not appropriate to send it by telegram.

2. We are just now considering the plan. Please inform us today by telegram of your agreed views on this matter, as well as on the operational guidelines for the Red Army and the measures to be taken.

3. Telegrams have been sent separately to the soldiers[3] and the Secretariat about the danger of the westward advance by the Japanese invaders, Sino-Soviet relations, and the need of the Red Army for Soviet coordination in the fight against Japan.[4]

4. In your present trip to Nanjing, seek to solve the following problems in one package:

a. Publication of the declaration;
b. Formulation of the political program;
c. Ratification of the plan for national defense;
d. Announcement of the command system of the Red Army and the number of the initial reinforcements for the Red Army;
e. Guidelines for the operations of the Red Army.

Luo [Fu] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Wenxian he yanjiu,* 1985, no. 4 (pp. 220–21 of the annual volume).

[1] It is indicated at the end of this document by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M.

[2] The reference is to Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu (i.e., Qin Bangxian), and Ye Jianying.

[3] A note to the available Chinese text states that the reference here is not clear.

[4] Regarding Mao Zedong's emphasis during and after the Long March on the importance of obtaining material support from the Soviet Union, see in particular the resolution of December 23, 1935, on problems of military strategy, in which Mao wrote: "'Fighting a way through to the Soviet Union' should be taken as the central [strategic] task" (Volume V, pp. 77–83), and various references to this theme in the Introduction to Volume V.

Our Views Regarding the Problem of National Defense[1]

(August 4, 1937)

To Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], and Ye [Jianying], and also for the information of Bo [Gu], Lin [Boqu], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Liu [Bocheng], Zhang [Hao],[2] He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], Chen [Guang], Nie [Rongzhen], Xu [Haidong], Cheng [Zihua], Chen [Zaidao], Wang [Hongkun], Xiao [Ke], and Guo [Shushen]:

Regarding the question of national defense, our opinions are as follows:

1. The first defensive front should run through places such as Zhangjiakou, Zuozhou, Jinghai, and Qingdao. The emphasis should be on Zhangjiakou, and we should concentrate enough military forces for the first decisive campaign.

2. The second defensive front should run through places such as Datong, Baoding, Machang, and Weixian. We should concentrate an advantageous number of troops, to reinforce the first defensive front at the appropriate time while at the same time preparing for the decisive campaign along the second front.

3. As far as Taiyuan, Shijiazhuang, Cangzhou, and other places are concerned, they can only be used as the third defensive front. We must absolutely not pay attention only to this front and not concentrate our forces on the first and second fronts.

4. The key at present is the first front.

5. For the time being, the general strategic orientation should be offensive defense. We must launch a destructive counteroffensive against the advancing enemy and must absolutely not conduct a pure defense. In the future we should prepare to switch to the strategic offensive and to recover lost territory.

6. In combining regular warfare with guerrilla warfare, the Red Army and the other appropriate armed forces and people's armed forces may participate in guerrilla warfare. Under the general strategic dispositions, they should be allowed to exercise the power of command independently and with the initiative in their own hands.

7. Those units which are responsible for guerrilla warfare should use their troops properly in accordance with the topography and the situation on the battlefield. In accordance with the nature of guerrilla warfare, the troops should in principle be used separately instead of collectively.

8. According to the present situation, the Red Army should contribute one-third of its forces, use the area where the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan come together as the center, aim at the enemy troops which are moving westward along the Ping-Sui railway line and southward along the Ping-Han railway line, and carry on guerrilla warfare from the flanks. Apart from that, send another unit to be active in the Rehe-Hebei-Chahar Border Region and threaten the enemy's rear (this force should not exceed one regiment). The Red Army should provide it with the necessary reinforcements.

9. The mobilization of a people's campaign of armed self-defense is a central link in guaranteeing the victory of the army. Vacillation regarding this orientation will lead to certain defeat.

10. You may come up with other ideas as opportunity offers, but not too many, and firmly grasp the essentials.

Luo [Fu] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 22–24, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] In late July 1937, Chiang Kaishek convened a meeting of the National Military Council and invited the Chinese Communist Party to send representatives to participate. At the beginning of August, the Communist Party Central Committee decided to send Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Ye Jianying to Nanjing for this purpose. This telegram was addressed to them by Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) and Mao Zedong.

[2] Zhang Hao was an alternate name for Lin Yuying (1897–1942), a delegate to the Communist International who played an important role in communications between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party in 1935–1937. See Volume V, p. lii and note 62, and numerous other references to him in that volume.

The Red Army's Operational Tasks, and Principles Relating to the Use of Our Troops

(August 5, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu], Lin [Boqu], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

Your telegram sent between 3:00 and 5:00 on August 4 has been received. Our reply is as follows:

1. The question of taking responsibility for operations on one front. The Red Army is responsible for the task of suppressing the majority of the enemy forces and eliminating part of them by engaging in mobile guerrilla warfare independently and with the initiative in its own hands. Concretely, the demand is that it assist the operations of friendly forces by harassing, suppressing, and attacking the flank of the enemy advancing westward along the Ping-Sui railroad and advancing southward along the Ping-Han railway line in the designated region bordering on the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan (a quadrangular area, not a triangular area). It is also appropriate to send some units to as far away as Rehe. This does not mean "being independently responsible for one front" but entails assisting in the operations of regular friendly forces which are at the front in a given locality. Such a formulation is freer, livelier, and more effective. In other words, it is appropriate for us to engage in combat only from the flanks and not from the front. Hence, it is inappropriate to use language implying that we are dealing independently with one front.

2. The question of the use of troops. We have put forth the principle of using troops in accordance with the circumstances. Under this principle, we agree that our main force will be dispatched (in terms of numbers, the main force may consist of half or two-thirds of the troops). We shall not tell Chiang Kaishek the precise fraction. In fact, we need to fully take into account the long-drawn-out and cruel nature of this war and Chiang's intention to set up a warlord stronghold (Chiang demands that the entire Red Army be dispatched). We should also take note of the fact that Shaanxi and Gansu constitute our most reliable rear (Chiang still has ten divisions here, and once all of us are gone, he will safely occupy this rear) and of other problems.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 25–27, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

3. The question of supplies and logistics from the rear. Apart from the fact that the issue of Shaanxi and Gansu should not be raised, we may demand Baotou and Ningxia, but we must put the emphasis on seeking western Shanxi, Ningxia, Suiyuan, and [the three *xian* of] Yulin, Shenmu, and Fugu. In reality we fear that it will be difficult to cooperate with Ma Hongkui,[1] and that this will be possible only after the establishment of the Sino-Soviet military alliance.

Luo [Fu] Mao [Zedong]

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[1] Regarding General Ma Hongkui, see the numerous references in Volume V, and in particular the biographical note on p. 62 of that volume.

Adopt a Modest Attitude While Consulting with People from All Sides

(August 10, 1937)

Comrade [Peng] Xuefeng:[1]

I have taken note of all your telegrams, and I am greatly reassured.

1. While consulting with people of all circles, under the overall orientation of actively promoting the War of Resistance, we must have a modest attitude. We must not boast of the merits of the Red Army ourselves or say that the Red Army is sure to win the War of Resistance against Japan; on the contrary, we must ask them for advice on all sorts of things, such as the fighting capacity of the Japanese army, campaigns in the mountains and on the plain, and other circumstances of which the Red Army generally has no experience, so that the Red Army will have some basis and will gradually overcome the difficulties. We must not conceal certain shortcomings of the Red Army that should not be concealed, such as that it can only wage guerrilla war and not positional war, mountain warfare and not warfare in the plains, or that it is suited only to fighting independently and self-reliantly under overall strategic command, and not to circumstances in which it is bound by a centralized command in campaigns and tactics, in which it will lose all its strengths. Because of [this suitability for] mountainous terrain and guerrilla warfare, the Red Army should be positioned in the four-cornered area bordering on the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan and should launch a flank attack against the enemy troops that are marching westward along the Ping-Sui railway line and those marching southward along the Ping-Han railway line in cooperation with the strategic operation of the friendly forces in the front. We must also let them know that the technology and equipment of the Red Army are rather primitive and ask them to supply us with the five categories and nineteen kinds of commodities listed in yesterday's telegram, for otherwise it will be very hard to be successful in fighting a strong enemy.

2. Since the current situation is very critical, the Red Army is planning to set out before reorganization, and the reorganization can be carried out after arriving at Datong. Zhu [De] and Zhou [Enlai] flew to Nanjing on the 9th.[2] The Red Army will set out as soon as we receive their telegram. If they ask why the Red Army is still not reorganized, you may say that it is because of the delay by Nanjing. (The declaration was not published, no decision was made regarding political principles, and there was no announcement regarding headquarters or designation; the designation [as the Eighth Route Army] was only issued a few days ago, but the headquarters has not yet been appointed.)

3. As regards the itinerary, because there is no grain along the distance of over a thousand *li* from Luochuan to Fugu, and no grain for sale in the area 800 *li* to the north and south of Yan'an (the grain the institutions consume was bought from western Shanxi and Xi'an), we must absolutely not take the way of northern Shaanxi. Instead, the only way is to cross the river at Hancheng, by way of Puxian, Xiaoyi, and Fenyang, and concentrate at Datong. This must be achieved while negotiating with Yan [Xishan].[3]

4. The office in Taiyuan should be set up immediately, and you are appointed its director.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 28–29, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] For a biography of Peng Xuefeng (1905–1944), alternate name Peng Yufeng, see Volume V, p. 559, note 1. In late 1936 Peng had been sent to Shanxi to engage in united front work, and in particular to persuade Yan Xishan cooperate with the Communist forces.

[2] As indicated in the telegram of August 4, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai had gone to Nanjing at the invitation of Chiang Kaishek to participate in the meeting of the National Military Council.

[3] Regarding Yan Xishan (1883–1960), the unchallenged ruler of his native province of Shanxi, see the brief note in Volume V, p. 61.

Interview with Nym Wales on Negotiations with the Guomindang and the War with Japan

(August 13, 1937)[1]

Wales: Is there any news about the conclusion of the United Front negotiations with the Guomindang?

Mao: Yes. The Red Army has just received an order from Nanjing to go to the front to fight the Japanese under the command of the Nanjing government. Commander Zhu De has gone to Nanjing to join the National Defense Conference now being held there. The political program of the unification of the two parties has not yet been permitted by Chiang Kaishek to be published. Now the Communist Party wants to publish a manifesto announcing the unification of the two parties in the Chinese press, but Nanjing will not permit this publication and the manifesto can only be published after actual fighting with Japan has begun.

Although the Communist Party now has a legal position and Zhu De can join the National Defense Conference, on the other hand, political prisoners have not yet been released by Nanjing. Moreover, up to the present the Communist Party still cannot work publicly in the White districts. Some things in China are very strange, you see. There is so far no order to release political prisoners, and only the seven National Salvation leaders in Suzhou have been released.

Wales: I understand the Red Army is now being reorganized for the anti-Japanese war in accordance with the terms of the negotiations with Nanjing. Is this true?

Our source for this document is the English text published by Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales) in *My Yenan Notebooks,* pp. 151–53. In a few instances, we have followed the wording in her contemporary typescript, conserved in the archives of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Variations between the two versions are of no substantive importance and have not been noted. Unlike the interview of July 4, 1937, which appears in Volume V, this interview is not included in *Mao Zedong zishu,* and no Chinese text appears to exist.

[1] At the beginning of her handwritten notes, which are also found in the Hoover Institution archives, Nym Wales wrote: "Mao Tse-tung—August 11th. My interview written 13th." In *My Yenan Notebooks,* p. 151, she states, "Originally, I talked with him August 11 for this interview, but the date was changed to the 13th." In *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 12, it is indicated, however, that the interview took place on August 13, and we follow that dating. As in the case of the July 4 interview, we have modified the spelling of Chinese names to conform to the style of this edition.

Mao: No. The Red Army has not yet been reorganized, because Chiang Kaishek has delayed [answering] this question and has not yet appointed a commander-in-chief. However, we have received our number as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army. Now we can only send the Red Army to the front and change the number there.

Wales: Has the name of the Red Army been changed, and the red star?

Mao: Not yet. We still use the old name of the Red Army. As to the red star, I don't know whether it has been changed at the front or not. Nanjing is now supplying the uniforms for the army and this question is decided by them.

Wales: Will the Red Army carry the Red Flag as well as the national flag in fighting the Japanese?

Mao: No. If we change the uniforms and the red star, of course, we must also change our flag.

Wales: What is the reason for the delay on the part of Chiang Kaishek?

Mao: I suppose it is because Nanjing is afraid that if the manifesto is published it will raise a strong reaction on the part of Japanese imperialism. Therefore, we want to publish the manifesto and many other things after the fighting breaks out. We have requested to publish the manifesto earlier than this, but Nanjing has refused.

Wales: Are there any problems which cannot be settled between the Guomindang and the Communist Party?

Mao: There are many questions not yet settled, such as the fact that Nanjing wants to appoint the commander-in-chief and the head of the political department in the army from Nanjing, and we refuse this. Other demands have been accepted by Nanjing but are not yet realized, such as freeing political prisoners, granting freedom of speech and press, permitting the Communist Party to work openly in the White districts, and the publication of the manifesto. Although Nanjing has accepted these demands, they are not yet realized.

Wales: Are there any Communist Party demands which Nanjing has not yet accepted?

Mao: Yes. (1) We have suggested a political program, which until now has not yet been decided upon. (2) We want to publish the cooperation manifesto but this has not been permitted. (3) Our request for the release of political prisoners has not been granted.

Wales: What are the main points of the political program advocated by the Communist Party?

Mao: We have made ten demands in connection with the Japanese problem:[2]

1. To fight against Japan thoroughly and decisively, and to drive Japanese imperialism out of China;
2. To stop all diplomatic negotiations with Japan and oppose the compromising and wavering attitude of the Nanjing government;
3. To mobilize the armies of the whole nation on the front to fight against the Japanese;
4. To mobilize the whole body of the masses to join the war front against the Japanese, to give the people the freedom of patriotism, and to give the people the freedom to arm themselves;
5. To organize a national defense government of all parties, clearing out the traitors and other forces of Japanese imperialism in China;
6. To establish an anti-Japanese diplomatic policy, enter into a military agreement with the USSR, and enter into a Pacific anti-Japanese agreement with England, America, and France;
7. To adopt an anti-Japanese financial policy, the principle of which financial policy to be that everybody who has money must support the nation and that all the property of Japanese imperialism must be confiscated. The principle of the economic policy should be to boycott the use of Japanese goods and to increase the use of national goods;
8. To improve and reconstruct the life of the people, including the removal of the many unjust surtaxes, decreasing the taxes, and decreasing rents;
9. To develop the anti-Japanese national defense education;
10. To organize a united front of the whole country with the unification of the two parties (Guomindang and Communist Party) as the basis for struggle against the Japanese.

This is our great program for resisting Japan. These ten were sent to Nanjing, asking the government to accept them. If we can realize these ten points, we can strike down Japanese imperialism; if not, China will perish.[3]

Wales: Does the Communist Party now demand immediate war with Japan?

Mao: Yes, the Communist Party demands immediate war with Japan.

Wales: Does Nanjing agree to this demand?

Mao: Yes, the Nanjing government agrees with this. However, although Nanjing has accepted this principle, only the future will prove the fact. Only to accept is no use.

Wales: What do you estimate to be the future development of the war with Japan?

Mao: The policy of Japanese imperialism will determine the time this war breaks out. The future of the war contains two possibilities: first, victory, and second, defeat. How shall we achieve victory? We must struggle with hope and courage, and continue this struggle, and we must realize the ten demands presented by the Communist Party. Then victory is sure. If we do not, we shall fail.

Wales: Where will the Red Army front be during this war?

Mao: This is not yet determined.

Wales: Where do you anticipate the immediate center of Japanese war operations to be in the near future?

Mao: Japan will perhaps attack Suiyuan and Chahar provinces, and we shall guard these two territories. Besides these two provinces, the Beiping-Hankou and Tianjin-Pukou railways will also be a main front, and also the Qingdao-Jinan railway in Shandong. These places will be the main front of the war.

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[2] The ten points listed here by Mao Zedong are essentially the same as those put forward formally in the propaganda outline of August 25, 1937, translated below. The only substantive difference consists in the elimination of the second point, which had been overtaken by events, and the addition of a new point, attacking the Chinese traitors, near the end of the list, to bring the number back up to ten.

[3] According to Nym Wales's handwritten notes, Mao placed particular emphasis on this last sentence.

Speech at the Evening Send-Off Party for the Northwest Battlefield Service Corps

(August 15, 1937)

An evening party was given in the Auditorium at 7:00 P.M. on the 15th, sponsored by all circles of Yan'an, to give a warm send-off to the Northwest Battlefield Service Corps before it leaves for service on the anti-Japanese battlefront. Present at the party, besides all the members of the service corps totaling several dozen, were representatives from various organs and from various circles. The event started at 7:10 with a speech by Chairman Mao. His remarks were roughly as follows:

The Battlefield Service Corps is an important undertaking because it serves the fight against Japan, and the fight against Japan is a grand affair, both at home and throughout the world. For many years, we have been voicing our demand that the whole nation unite and fight Japan together, and today we can say that this is already becoming reality. We can say of this war that it has the significance of finality. The Battlefield Service Corps is going to the front together with the Red Army to work there. You will fight Japan with your pens and with your tongues, while the army fights Japan with its guns. We shall attack Japanese imperialism from both the literary and the military fronts, making the Japanese bandits perish before our very eyes, and so on, and so on.

The speech was followed by talks by the representatives of various circles. [The texts are omitted here.]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 95, where it is reproduced from the mimeographed edition of *Xin Zhonghua bao* dated August 19, 1937.

The Main Force of the Red Army Will Follow Not the Beiping-Hankou Railroad, but the Datong-Pukou Railroad

(August 17, 1937)

To Mr. Zhang Huinan,[1] and to be transmitted to the three elder brothers, Zhu [De], Zhou [Enlai], and Ye [Jianying]:

We have taken note of Nan Mixi's telegram.[2]

1. We agree that the main force of our troops will be concentrated in the region of Yangyuan, Weixian, Laiyuan, Guanglin, and Linwu. But we will advance not along the Ping-Han railroad, but along the Tong-Pu railroad. We will get on the train at Houma, get off at Daixian, and move toward the destination to concentrate.

2. There is no money to buy rice. Quickly collect the 600,000 *yuan* for August and the funds for development.

3. Quickly order Taiyuan to prepare the supply of leather coats, weapons, and ammunition.

4. Be guided by Yan Baichuan[3] in accordance with the principles of independence and initiative in command, guerrilla warfare, and mountain warfare. Notify Yan quickly.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 30–31, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Zhang Chong (1904–1941), *zi* Huinan, was a native of Zhejiang. In November 1936 he was elected to the Guomindang's Fifth Central Executive Committee. At the time of the Xi'an Incident, he had been sent to hold discussions with Zhou Enlai. At this time, he was acting head of the Guomindang Organization Department and was again involved in talks with the Communists. In September 1937, he was appointed head of the Development Office of Gansu Province.

[2] It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M.

[3] Yan Baichuan is the *zi* of Yan Xishan.

The Luochuan Meeting Will Discuss Major Military Questions

(August 18, 1937)[1]

To Bo [Gu], Lin [Boqu], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for transmittal to Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:

1. The Guomindang's scheme has already been revealed very clearly. Its intention is to:
   a. Send all Red Army troops to the front lines.
   b. Advance along several routes so that we will not be concentrated and will be forced to obey their commands.
   c. After the Red Army has started to move in accordance with the order, it will be subordinated to Chiang, and he will achieve his purpose by issuing orders to it. At that time, the question of the Party and the question of the Border Region will be resolved by him, even to the point of not allowing the issuance of a declaration, or abolishing the soviet area.
2. As for our policy, refer to the instructions given to Zhou and Ye by the Central Committee.
3. This is a very important matter and should be discussed very carefully at the Luochuan meeting.
4. It is requested that eight comrades—Bo [Gu], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Liu [Bocheng], Zhang [Hao], He [Long], and Guan [Xiangying]—attend this meeting together, and they are requested to leave Yunyang on the 20th.

Luo [Fu]　　Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 32–33, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 1:00 and 3:00 P.M.

To Comrade Ren Bishi and Comrade Deng Xiaoping of the General Political Department

(August 19, 1937)

Comrade Bishi and Comrade Xiaoping:

Mrs. Snow is coming to the front and will stay with our army as a foreign correspondent. Please provide her with assistance on matters such as living expenses.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 5, p. 87, where it is reproduced from a photocopy of Mao's handwritten original, formerly held at the Hoover Library and Institution. Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales) never made use of it because Edgar Snow came to the Border Region, and she traveled with him, rather than going independently to the war zone as a reporter. She subsequently took back the original from Hoover and presented it to Deng Xiaoping when she met him during his visit to the United States in 1979.

Telegram to Xie Juezai

(August 21, 1937)

[Received a telegram from Chairman Mao:]

Zhu [De] and Zhou [Enlai] have already returned from their trip to Nanjing. The Red Army is to be reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, with Zhu as commander-in-chief and Peng [Dehuai] as deputy commander-in-chief. The War of Resistance has already started on a national scale. Our vanguard troops set off on the 19th; the rest of the army will leave after the publication of the proclamation regarding cooperation. Cadres should be selected locally. At present, we have no suitable people to send. The Muslims[1] may organize their own party of a national character, which they might call something like the Muslim Association for Fighting Japan and Saving the Country, etc., etc. [Advised me not to go back to Shaanxi.]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 99, where it is reproduced from Xie Juezai's diary.

[1] The term used is *Huizu,* now treated as the name of a national minority, but commonly employed in the 1930s to refer to Muslims in general.

Order Concerning the Reorganization of the Red Army into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army

(August 25, 1937)

Nanjing has already started the War of Resistance against Japan, and the Guomindang and the Communist Party have successfully carried out the first stage in their cooperation. In order to fulfill the promise of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the Third Plenary Session of the Guomindang to rename the Red Army,[1] to make the Red Army a model in the nation's war against Japan, and push the War of Resistance forward to make of it the anti-Japanese revolutionary war of the whole nation, so as to win final and complete victory, it is now announced that the Red Army has been renamed the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, in compliance with the results of our political discussions with the Guomindang in Nanjing. It is ordered that:

The Front General Headquarters is renamed as the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, with Zhu De as the commander-in-chief, Peng Dehuai as the deputy commander-in-chief, Ye Jianying as chief of the General Staff, and Zuo Quan as deputy chief of staff.

The General Political Department is renamed as the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army, with Ren Bishi as director and Deng Xiaoping as deputy director.

The First Army Group, the Fifteenth Army Group, and the Seventy-fourth Division are reorganized into the 115th Division of the ground forces, with Lin Biao as division commander, Nie Rongzhen as deputy division commander, Zhou Kun as chief of staff, Luo Ronghuan as director of the Political Training Department of the division, and Xiao Hua as its deputy director.

The Second Front Army, the Twenty-seventh Army, the Twenty-eighth Army, the First and Second Independent Divisions, as well as Chishui Battalion of Guards and part of the detachment directly under the Front General Headquarters are reorganized into the 120th Division of the ground forces, with He Long as division

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 34–36, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] This promise was made in a telegram of February 10, 1937, translated in Volume V, pp. 606–7.

commander, Xiao Ke as deputy division commander, Zhou Shidi as chief of staff, Guan Xiangying as director of the Political Training Department, and Gan Shiqi as deputy director.

The Fourth Front Army, the Twenty-ninth Army, the Thirtieth Army, and the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Independent Regiments of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia are reorganized into the 129th Division of the Ground Forces, with Liu Bocheng as division commander, Xu Xiangqian as deputy commander, Ni Zhiliang as chief of staff, Zhang Hao[2] as director of the Political Training Department, and Song Renqiong as deputy director.

When the above reorganization has been carried out in accordance with the foregoing orders, individual appointments will be made through orders by the Front General Headquarters. After each division is reorganized into the National Revolutionary Army, they must strengthen Party leadership, maintain and carry forward the glorious tradition that has been developed in the ten-year struggle, and resolutely comply with the orders issued by the Party Central Committee and its Military Commission, so as to guarantee that the Red Army will remain the armed force of the Communist Party after the reorganization, strive for the implementation of the Party line and Party policy, and accomplish the great mission of China's revolution.

Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee	Mao Zedong
Vice Chairmen	Zhu De Zhou Enlai

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[2] That is, Lin Yuying.

For the Mobilization of All Our Forces to Achieve Victory in the War of Resistance

Outline of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Present Situation and the Tasks of Propaganda and Agitation

(August 25, 1937)

1. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7 marked the beginning of Japanese imperialism's all-out invasion of China.[1] The fight put up by the Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge marked the beginning of China's nationwide War of Resistance. The ceaseless Japanese attacks, the people's resolute struggle, the national bourgeoisie's leftist tendency,[2] the Communist Party's vigorous advocacy and firm application of a national united front policy and the nationwide support this policy has won—all these have compelled the Chinese authorities to begin changing their policy of nonresistance, as pursued ever since the September Eighteenth Incident of 1931, to a policy of resistance since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and have caused the Chinese revolution to develop beyond the stage reached after the December Ninth Movement, that is, the stage of ending the civil war and preparing for resistance, into the stage of actual resistance. The initial changes in the Guomindang's policy with the Xi'an Incident and the Third Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee as their starting point, Mr. Chiang Kaishek's Lushan statement of July 17,[3] and many of his measures of national defense, all deserve commendation. The troops at the front of resistance,[4] whether the land and air forces or the local armed units, have all fought courageously and demonstrated the heroic spirit of the Chinese nation. In the name of the national revolution, the

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 249–256, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed version.

[1] The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, was a skirmish between Chinese and Japanese troops just southwest of Beiping that was used by the Japanese to justify a full-scale invasion of China. For the reaction of Mao and the Communist Party at the time, see Volume V, pp. 695 and 703–10.

[2] Leftist tendency → Tendency toward resistance

[3] Statement of July 17 → Statement of July 17 on the question of resistance to Japan

[4] At the front of resistance → At the front

Chinese Communist Party ardently salutes our patriotic troops and fellow countrymen throughout China.

2. The Japanese imperialists' massive military offensive against China proper since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7 is the result of the Chinese authorities' erroneous policies after the September Eighteenth Incident,[5] *and in particular, the lesson of the failure of the Hebei and Chahar authorities to adopt resolute policies of resistance and* the compromises and concessions made by them after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which suppressed the zeal of the patriotic troops and clamped down the movement of national salvation of the patriotic people, *thus enabling the enemy to grab Beiping, ancient capital with a history of several hundred years, and Tianjin, major port city of the north, within only twenty days. This is the most serious loss and the gravest lesson after the loss of the Four Northeastern Provinces.* There is no doubt that, having seized Beiping and Tianjin, Japanese imperialism will press ahead with its policy of large-scale offensives, take the second and third steps in its premeditated war plan, and launch fierce attacks on the whole of North China and other areas, relying on its own brute military strength, while at the same time drawing support from German and Italian imperialism, exploiting the vacillations of British imperialism, and waiting for[6] the estrangement of the Guomindang from the broad popular masses of the toilers. The flames of war are already raging in Chahar and in Shanghai. To save our motherland from peril, to resist the attacks of the powerful bandits, to defend North China and the seacoast, and recover Beiping, Tianjin, and the northeast, the people of the whole country and the Guomindang must thoroughly learn the lesson of the northeast, Beiping, and Tianjin, learn and take warning from the fall of Abyssinia, learn from the Soviet Union's past victories over its foreign enemies, learn from Spain's present experience in successfully defending Madrid, and firmly unite to fight to the end in defense of the motherland. Henceforth the task is: "Mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance," and the key to its accomplishment is a complete and thorough change in Guomindang policy. The step forward taken by the Guomindang on the question of resistance is to be commended; it is what the Chinese Communist Party and the people of the whole country have looked forward to for many years, and we *warmly* welcome it. But the Guomindang has not changed its policies on such matters as the mobilization of the masses and the introduction of political reforms. It is still basically unwilling to lift the ban on the people's anti-Japanese movement or make fundamental changes in the government apparatus; it still has no policy for improving the people's livelihood and is still not thoroughly sincere[7] in its cooperation with the Communist Party. If, at this critical juncture when we are threatened by the destruction of the country and the extinction of the race, the Guomindang continues to follow the policy outlined above and is unwilling to change it quickly, it will cause very great harm to the War of Resistance. Some Guomindang members say, "Wait to introduce political reforms until after victory." They think the Japanese bandits can be defeated by the government's efforts alone, but they are wrong. A few battles may be won in a War of Resistance fought by the government alone, *but such a course will almost inevitably cause the defeat of the war*, and it will be impossible to achieve complete victory over Japan.[8] Only a comprehensive national war of resistance can lead to the thorough defeat of the Japanese bandits. But in order to carry out such a war there must be a complete and drastic change in Guomindang policy, and joint efforts[9] to carry out a thoroughgoing program,[10] that is, a national salvation program formulated in the spirit of the revolutionary Three People's Principles and the Three Great Policies[11] drawn up personally by Mr. Sun Yatsen during the first period of Guomindang-Communist cooperation.

3. In all earnestness, the Chinese Communist Party proposes to the Guomindang, to the people of the whole country, to all political parties and groups, to people in all walks of life, and to all the armed forces a Ten-Point National Salvation Program for the purpose of thoroughly defeating Japan.[12] It firmly believes that only by carrying out this program fully, sincerely, and resolutely will it be possible to defend the motherland and defeat the Japanese aggressors. Otherwise, the responsibility will fall on those who procrastinate and allow the situation to deteriorate; once the country's fate is sealed, it will be too late for regrets and lamentations. The Ten Great Points for national salvation are as follows:

1. Overthrow Japanese imperialism.

Sever diplomatic relations with Japan, expel Japanese officials, arrest Japanese agents, confiscate Japanese *imperialists'* property in China, repudiate debts to Japan, abrogate treaties signed with Japan, and take back all Japanese concessions.

Fight to the finish in defense of North China and the seacoast.

Fight to the finish for the recovery of Beiping, Tianjin, and the northeast.

Drive the Japanese imperialists out of China.

Oppose all vacillation and compromise.

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[5] The Japanese imperialists' massive military offensive against China proper since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7 is the result of the Chinese authorities' erroneous policies after the September Eighteenth Incident → But on the other hand, even after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, the Guomindang authorities are continuing to pursue the wrong policy they have pursued ever since the September Eighteenth Incident

[6] Waiting for → Exploiting

[7] Thoroughly sincere → Sufficiently sincere

[8] Japan → The Japanese aggressors

[9] Joint efforts → Joint efforts of the whole nation from top to bottom

[10] A thoroughgoing program → A thoroughgoing program of resistance to Japan

[11] The "Three Great Policies" endorsed by Sun Yatsen toward the end of his life included alliance with those countries that treated China as an equal (in the first instance, the Soviet Union), cooperation with the Communist Party, and union with the peasants and workers.

[12] Japan → The Japanese aggressors

2. Mobilize the military strength of the whole country.

Mobilize all land, sea, and air forces throughout the country for a nationwide war of resistance.

Oppose a passive, purely defensive strategy and adopt an active, independent strategy.

Set up a permanent National Defense Council to deliberate and decide on national defense plans and strategy.

Arm the people and develop anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in coordination with the operations of the main forces.

Reform the political work in the armed forces to achieve unity between commanders and fighters.

Let the army unite as one with the people, and bring the army's militant spirit into play. Support the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army and the Northeast Volunteer Army,[13] and disrupt the enemy's rear.

Assure equal treatment of all troops fighting in the War of Resistance.

Establish military zones in all parts of the country, mobilize the whole nation to join in the war and thus effect a change[14] from the mercenary system to one of a volunteer army.

3. Mobilize the people of the whole country.

Let all the people of the country (with the exception of traitors) have freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and association in resisting Japan and saving the nation, and the right to take up arms against the enemy.

Annul all old laws and decrees which restrict the people's patriotic movements and promulgate new, revolutionary laws and decrees.

Release all patriotic and revolutionary political prisoners and lift the ban on political parties.

Let the people of the whole country mobilize, take up arms, and join the War of Resistance. Let those with strength contribute strength, those with money contribute money, those with guns contribute guns, and those with knowledge contribute knowledge.

Mobilize the Mongolians, the Hui, and all other minority nationalities, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination and autonomy, in the common fight against Japan.

4. Reform the government apparatus.

Call a national assembly which is genuinely representative of the people to adopt a genuinely democratic constitution, to decide on policies for resisting Japan and saving the nation, and to elect a government of national defense.

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[13] The Northeast People's Revolutionary Army and the Northeast Volunteer Army → The Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army

[14] A change → A gradual change

The government of national defense must draw in the revolutionaries of all parties and mass organizations, and expel the pro-Japanese elements.

The government of national defense shall practice democratic centralism and shall be at once democratic and centralized.

The government of national defense shall pursue revolutionary policies for resisting Japan and saving the nation.

Institute local self-government, throw out corrupt officials, and establish clean government.

5. Adopt an anti-Japanese foreign policy.

Conclude anti-aggression alliances and anti-Japanese pacts for mutual military aid with all countries that are opposed to Japanese aggression, provided that this entails no loss of our territory or of our sovereign rights.

Support the peace front[15] and oppose the front of aggression of Germany, Japan, and Italy.

Unite with the worker and peasant masses of Korea, *Taiwan*, and Japan against Japanese imperialism.

6. Adopt wartime financial and economic policies.

Financial policy should be based on the principle that those with money should contribute money and that the property of the Chinese traitors should be confiscated in order to meet war expenditures. Economic policy should consist in readjusting and expanding defense production, developing the rural economy, and assuring self-sufficiency in wartime agricultural produce.[16] Completely prohibit Japanese goods. Suppress profiteering merchants and ban speculation and manipulation of the market.

7. Improve the people's livelihood.

Improve the conditions of workers, *peasants*, office employees and teachers, and of soldiers fighting the Japanese.

Give preferential treatment to the families of the soldiers fighting the Japanese.

Abolish exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies.

Reduce rent and interest.

Give relief to the unemployed.

Regulate grain supplies.

Aid the victims of natural calamities.

8. Adopt an anti-Japanese educational policy.

Change the existing educational system and curriculum and put into effect a new system and curriculum aimed at resisting Japan and saving the nation.

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[15] The peace front → The international peace front

[16] Agricultural produce → Commodities

Adopt a program of generalized, compulsory, and free education, and raise the people's national consciousness.

Carry out military training of the students throughout the country.

9. Weed out traitors and pro-Japanese elements and consolidate the rear.

10. Achieve national unity against Japan.

Build up the Anti-Japanese National United Front of all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces on the basis of *complete* cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party in order to lead the War of Resistance, unite in good faith, and meet the national crisis.

4. Discard[17] the policy of resistance by the government alone and enforce the policy of total resistance by the whole nation. The government must unite with the people, fully restore the *entire* revolutionary spirit of Mr. Sun Yatsen, put the above Ten-Point Program into effect, and strive for complete victory. Together with the masses of the people and the armed forces under its leadership, the Chinese Communist Party will firmly adhere to this program and stand in the forefront of the War of Resistance, defending the motherland to the last drop of its blood. In keeping with its consistent policy, the Chinese Communist Party is ready to stand side by side with the Guomindang and the other political parties and groups and unite with them in building the solid Great Wall of the national united front to defeat the infamous Japanese aggressors and strive for a China[18] which is independent, happy, and free. To achieve this goal, we must firmly repudiate the Chinese traitors' theories of compromise and capitulation, and combat national defeatism, according to which it is impossible to defeat the Japanese aggressors. The Chinese Communist Party firmly believes that the Japanese aggressors can definitely be defeated provided the above Ten-Point Program is carried out. If our 450 million countrymen all exert themselves, the Chinese nation will certainly achieve final victory!

Down with Japanese imperialism!
Long live the national revolutionary war!
Long live New China, independent, happy, and free!

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[17] Discard → It is imperative to discard

[18] A China → A new China

Telegram Ordering the Reorganization of Various Independent Red Armies and Divisions in Northern Shaanxi

(August 25, 1937)

Various Independent Armies and Divisions, Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia, Shenfu, Guanzhong, North Shaanxi as well as Wang Hongkun, Chen [Jihan], Li [Zonggui], He [Jinnian], Yan [Hongyan], Du [Ping], Gan [Weihan], Wang [Weizhou], Ye [Daozhi], Chen Bojun, Ma [Mingfang], Huang [Luopin], Chen [Xianrui], and Wang [Zhaoxiang]:

It is proposed that the various independent armies and divisions shall be specifically reorganized as follows:

1. The organizational principle: It shall take as its basis the preservation of the original organizational systems, in a form suited to expansion and adapted to the geographical conditions for obtaining supplies in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region. Hence, it is decided that the size of the company is limited to ninety fighters. Regiments currently consisting of four companies will be reduced to three companies; those now consisting of three companies will not be changed. Only the names will be changed as follows: a company will become a platoon, and a regiment will become a company. Catering units will be set up at the platoon level.

2. The original Seventy-fourth Division will be changed into the two artillery battalions of the 115th Division of the National Revolutionary Army and be stationed to defend the area of Fuxian and Ganquan. The original Second Independent Division of Wang Zhaoxiang will be changed into the engineers' battalion of the 120th Division and be stationed in Shenfu. The original First Independent Division and the Independent Regiment of North Shaanxi will be changed into the special forces battalion of the 120th Division. It is proposed that it be stationed in the vicinity of Jingbian and Henshan. The Twenty-seventh Army will be changed into two artillery battalions of the 120th Division, and it is proposed that it be stationed in the area south of Anbian and Ningtiaoliang. The original Thirtieth Army will be reorganized into the artillery battalion of the 129th Division and be

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 37–39, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

stationed in the vicinity of Qingyang and Zhenyuan. Two to three companies of the Third Regiment of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia and the Guanzhong Guards Battalion will be turned into the baggage battalion of the 129th Division and be stationed in the area of Ning *xian.* The First, Second, and Fourth Regiments of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia will be changed into the engineers' battalion of the 129th Division and be stationed in the vicinity of Huai *xian* and Heshui. The Twenty-ninth Army will be changed into the 129th Engineers' Battalion and stationed at Dingyan. One regiment of the 129th Division that stays behind will be stationed either at Tongguan or at Luochuan; another will be stationed at the Chunhua-Xunyi-Zhengning line.

3. Shenfu, Jingbian, Anding, Zhidan, Fushi, Ganquan, Fuxian, Luochuan, and other *xian* will be designated as the eastern zone. Chen Bojun will be the director of the rear office, with Chen Xianrui as his deputy. They will be stationed in Luochuan. Dingyan, Huanxian, Qinghe, Zhenning, Xunchun, and other *xian* will be designated as the western zone. Wang Hongkun will be the director of the rear office, with Wang Weizhou as his deputy. They will be stationed in Zhenning. The rear department of the Eighth Route Army will be set up in Yan'an.

4. All of the above-mentioned units will be under the command of Xiao Jingguang.[1]

5. The above-mentioned units shall immediately undergo reorganization on receiving the telegraphic order and will make a detailed report concerning the work of reorganization.

6. All the other local forces will make separate arrangements in accordance with telegrams from Security Headquarters.

Mao Zedong

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[1] At this time, Xiao Jingguang was chief of staff of the Central Military Commission.

The Situation and Our Tasks After the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War

(September 1, 1937, noon)

1. The situation

a. The massive attack by Japan has begun

It is massive

It is continuous

A powerful imperialism, with foreign assistance

Yet at the same time it is a risky attack

b. China's nationwide War of Resistance has begun

It is nationwide, rather than regional

We have entered the stage of carrying out the War of Resistance

But it is still a War of Resistance by the government alone, in which the initiative of the people is suppressed, and this involves serious dangers

Changes are once again taking place in the class relationships among the leftists, centrists, and rightists within the anti-Japanese front, and we should be prepared for a new situation of class integration

The time of a War of Resistance by the whole people has not yet come, but without it, we will not be able to defeat Japan

The Anti-Japanese National United Front has already begun to be organized successfully in the whole country, but it is not yet substantial or strong

c. Conclusion

It is a protracted war

Struggle to mobilize all the forces for victory in the War of Resistance, and to establish a substantial and strong Anti-Japanese National United Front

2. Our tasks

a. Mobilize every possible force to strive for the victory of this War of Resistance, to carry out the Ten-Point Program, and to wage an all-out war of the whole nation

b. The unity of the Red Army is the central task

Independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountainous areas

From a "vigorous and vital army" to a position of leading from real strength

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 8–10, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

The problems of the anti-Japanese base areas and the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army

c. Our tasks in the territory of friendly parties and friendly armies

The position of the Party should be changed from the present status to that of leadership based on real strength

d. Our tasks in the Border Region

The source of politics and military affairs, as well as of cadres

e. In the course of the war, set up a democratic republic of the workers, peasants, and bourgeoisie, and prepare for the transition to socialism

Two characteristics

Two prospects

f. Should the bourgeoisie follow the proletariat, or should the proletariat follow the bourgeoisie (should the Guomindang attract the Communist Party, or should the Communist Party attract the Guomindang)?

Consciously or unconsciously

Oppose impetuosity

Oppose right opportunism, that is, capitulationism—which will become the major threat to the whole Party (getting mixed up with different classes, parties, and policies)

There are two kinds of national defeatism: one is "leftist"—Trotskyism; the other is rightist—national pessimism (it exists in the right wing of the anti-Japanese front)

g. Unite the cadres around the Party's line

Negotiate with Yan Xishan on the Zone of Red Army Activities

(September 3, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

1. The situation on the Beiping-Suiyuan line: The four divisions of Tang Enbo's[1] army have lost almost half of their strength and have been withdrawn and concentrated at Zhulu. The three divisions of Wei Lihuang's[2] army are located on the south bank of the Yongding River to the west of the Juyong Pass. Liu Ruming's division and the Seventy-second Division of the Shanxi army have withdrawn and concentrated on the south bank of the Yang River. Fu Zuoyi's[3] reinforcements of approximately six regiments are probably located within the Huilai area. Zhao Chenshou's cavalry army is probably in the Xinghe-Tianzhen area. The main force of the Shanxi army is located in the Datong-Guanglin-Daixian region.

2. The Red Army's First and Second Armies will probably be able to deploy their forces in the area between Beiping, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Datong, and Zhangjiakou around the 25th of this month.

3. After arriving at Taiyuan, Zhou and Peng should negotiate with Yan Xishan regarding the activity of the Red Army in the following areas: (1) all those areas of the three *xian* of Zhulu, Yangyuan, and Weixian at present not occupied by friendly troops; (2) all those areas of the four *xian* of Wanping, Fangshan, Laishui, and Yixian at present not occupied by friendly troops; (3) the areas to the west of the *xian* towns of the six *xian* of Wanxian, Tangxian, Quyang, Xintang, Lingshou, and Pingshan; (4) the whole of the three *xian* of Laiyuan, Fuping, and Lingqiu to serve as the central base area for our forces; and (5) the five *xian* of Guanglin, Hunyuan, Fanchi, Wutai, and Mengxian. The above total twenty-one *xian*, in some cases the whole *xian*, and in other cases some part of them. All these must be clearly and

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 40–41, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Tang Enbo (1899–1954) was commander of the Guomindang Twentieth Army Group and of the Thirteenth Army.

[2] Wei Lihuang was at this time the commander-in-chief of the Fourteenth Group Army of the Guomindang's Second War Zone.

[3] Fu Zuoyi was at this time front line commander of the Northern Route Army of the Guomindang Second War Zone.

positively designated, and Nanjing and Yan of Shanxi[4] must order and inform the provincial governments of the three provinces, which in turn will issue orders to the various *xian* governments, while at the same time issuing orders to the troops stationed near these *xian*, explaining the deployment of the Red Army and its task of creating guerrilla base areas. For if the zone of operations and the tasks of the Red Army are not clearly specified, and an order sent to friendly forces and localities concerning this, many disputes are bound to occur, resulting from the ambiguous delineation of zones and definition of tasks.

Mao Zedong

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[4] The reference is to Yan Xishan, who was at this time commander of the Guomindang Second War Zone.

Combat Liberalism

(September 7, 1937)

We stand for active ideological struggle because it is the weapon for ensuring unity within the Party and the revolutionary organizations in the interest of our fight. Every Communist and every revolutionary should take up this weapon.

But liberalism rejects ideological struggle and stands for unprincipled peace, thus giving rise to a decadent, philistine attitude and bringing about political degeneration in certain units and individuals in the Party and the revolutionary organizations.

Liberalism manifests itself in various ways.

To let things slide for the sake of peace and friendship when a person has clearly gone wrong, and refrain from principled argument because he is an old acquaintance, a fellow townsman, a schoolmate, a close friend, a loved one, an old colleague, or old subordinate. Or to touch on the matter lightly instead of going into it thoroughly, so as to keep on good terms. The result is that both the organization and the individual are harmed. This is one type of liberalism.

To indulge in irresponsible criticism in private instead of actively putting forward one's suggestions to the organization. To say nothing to people to their faces but to gossip behind their backs, or to say nothing at a meeting but to gossip afterward. To show no regard at all for the principles of collective life but to follow one's own inclination. This is a second type.

To let things drift if they do not affect one personally; to say as little as possible while knowing perfectly well what is wrong, to be worldly wise and play safe and seek only to avoid blame. This a third type.

Not to obey orders but to give pride of place to one's own opinions. To use cadre policies as an excuse, but to ignore organizational discipline.[1] This is a fourth type.

To indulge in personal attacks, pick quarrels, vent personal spite, or seek revenge, instead of entering into an argument and struggling against incorrect views for the sake of unity or progress or getting the work done properly. This is a fifth type.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 257–60, where it is reproduced from the 1944 Chinese edition of Mao's *Selected Works.*

[1] To use cadre policies as an excuse, but to ignore organizational discipline. → To demand special consideration from the organization but to reject its discipline.

To hear incorrect views without rebutting them and even to hear counterrevolutionary remarks without reporting them but, instead, to take them calmly as if nothing had happened. This is a sixth type.

To be among the masses and fail to conduct propaganda and agitation or speak at meetings or conduct investigations and inquiries among them, and instead to be indifferent to them and show no concern for their well-being, forgetting that one is a Communist and behaving as if one were an ordinary person. This is a seventh type.

To see someone harming the interests of the masses and yet not feel indignant, or dissuade or stop him or reason with him, but allow him to continue. This is an eighth type.

To work half-heartedly without a definite plan or direction; to work perfunctorily and muddle along—"So long as one remains a monk, one goes on tolling the bell." This is a ninth type.

To regard oneself as having rendered great service to the revolution, to pride oneself on being a veteran, to disdain minor assignments while being quite unequal to major tasks, to be slipshod in work and slack in study. This is a tenth type.

To be aware of one's own mistakes and yet make no attempt to correct them, taking a liberal attitude toward oneself. This is an eleventh type.

We could name more. But these eleven are the principal types.

They are all manifestations of liberalism.

Liberalism is extremely harmful in a collective.[2] It is a corrosive which eats away unity, undermines cohesion, causes apathy, and creates dissension. It robs the revolutionary ranks of compact organization and strict discipline, prevents policies from being carried through, and alienates the Party organizations from the masses which the Party leads. It is an extremely bad tendency.

Liberalism stems from petty-bourgeois selfishness. It places personal interests first and the interests of the revolution second, and this gives rise to ideological, political, and organizational liberalism.

Liberals look upon the principles of Marxism as abstract dogma. They approve of Marxism, but are not prepared to practice it or to practice it in full; they are not prepared to replace their liberalism with Marxism. These people have their Marxism, but they have their liberalism as well—they talk Marxism but practice liberalism; they apply Marxism to others but liberalism to themselves. They keep both kinds of goods in stock and find a use for each. This is the methodology of certain people.[3]

Liberalism is a manifestation of opportunism and conflicts fundamentally with Marxism. It is a negative thing and objectively has the effect of helping the enemy;

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[2] In a collective → In a revolutionary collective

[3] This is the methodology of certain people. → This is how the minds of certain people work.

that is why the enemy welcomes its preservation in our midst. Such being its nature, there should be no place for it in the ranks of the revolution.

We must use the positive spirit of Marxism to overcome the negative spirit of liberalism. A Communist should be openhearted and aboveboard, staunch and active, looking upon the interests of the revolution as his very life and sacrificing his personal interests;[4] always and everywhere he should adhere to correct principles, and wage a tireless struggle against all incorrect ideas and actions, so as to consolidate the collective life of the Party and strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses; he should be more concerned about the Party and the masses than about any private person, and more concerned about others than about himself. Only thus can he be considered a Communist.

All loyal, honest, active, and upright Communists must unite to oppose the liberal tendencies shown by certain people among us, and set them on the right path. This is one of the tasks on our ideological front.

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[4] Sacrificing his personal interests → Subordinating his personal interests to those of the revolution

Strive to Have Fuping and Other Xian *Designated as Zones of Eighth Route Army Activities*

(September 7, 1937)[1]

Zhou [Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], and Lin [Biao]:

1. The sixty thousand or so troops of the three units of Tang Enbo, Wei Lihuang, and Liu Ruming have already occupied the four *xian* of Weixian, Laiyuan, Guanglin, and Linqiu and areas to their northeast. There is no more room for maneuver for the Red Army in these areas, and it is extremely disadvantageous to be stationed between these troops.

2. Yan [Xishan] has the intention of dispatching the Red Army to Yangyuan and Datong, and Chiang may also attempt this.

3. The areas which are advantageous for the Red Army at present are Fuping, Tangxian, Quyang, Xintang, Linshou, Pingshan, Fanchi, Huiyuan, Wutai, and Mengxian, as well as areas in the southern part of the two *xian* of Laiyuan and Linqiu. It is hoped that you will make an effort to have Yan specify these areas.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 42–43, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 9:00 and 11:00 P.M.

Explanation of the Basic Principles for Waging Independent and Self-Reliant Guerrilla Warfare in the Hilly Areas of North China

(September 12, 1937)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

I have taken note of your telegram of the 11th.

1. I agree with your plan to go to Nanjing with [Zhou] Enlai.

2. In Shanxi, Hebei, and Nanjing, you should stress the explanation of our basic principle of "independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountainous regions," and obtain their complete understanding and approval.

3. This principle includes: (1) freedom to use our forces according to the specific situation. Now Jiang Jingwen[1] is still saying that the Liu division[2] should go to the front as soon as possible. As regards these people's intention, either they do not understand that it is inappropriate to use a large army group to fight a guerrilla warfare in a narrow region, in which case, it is obvious that we have not made any thorough and persistent explanation to them about this principle; or they harbor evil intentions and are trying to force the Red Army to fight difficult battles. (2) The Red Army should have the freedom to mobilize the masses, set up base areas, and organize volunteer armies, and local political authorities as well as the friendly armies should not interfere. If this is not made clear, it is certain that endless disputes will arise, and the great role of the Red Army will not be brought into full play. (3) Nanjing will only make strategic decisions, and the Red Army has complete freedom in carrying them out. (4) Stick to the principles of depending on the mountainous regions and not fighting difficult battles.

4. I shall command until you come back; please inform Zhu [De], Ren [Bishi], Lin [Biao], and He [Long].

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 44–45, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 11–12.

[1] Jiang Jingwen was at this time the head of the field headquarters of the Guomindang Military Affairs Committee in Xi'an.

[2] The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

The Orientation to Which We Should Adhere While Negotiating the Reorganization in the Guerrilla Regions in the South

(September 14, 1937)

To Bo [Gu], Ye [Jianying], and Zhou [Enlai], and for the information of Lin [Boqu], Dong [Biwu], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

Regarding the question of the united front in every border region:

1. It is completely wrong for the representatives sent to the negotiations in Wuhan by Fu Qiutao and others of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area[1] to accept many disadvantageous conditions, such as allowing the field headquarters in Wuhan to send directors of military supplies and directors of aides-de-camp to our troops. We have telegraphed Boqu and Biwu to tell the representatives to the negotiations to cease negotiating and come back immediately. Fu Qiutao should send other representatives, repudiate the conditions which have been agreed upon, make new rules, and firmly adhere to the following points:

   a. The Guomindang may not send a single person into our ranks;
   b. The amount of the soldiers' pay and provisions should be fixed;
   c. Set up camps in the mountainous regions where there are natural barriers that can be defended, be strictly on guard against secret attacks and sabotage, and do not ask to be stationed in big places.

2. Has Zheng Weisan met yet with Bo and Ye since he went to Nanjing? Please ask Bo to tell Zheng Weisan to stick strictly to the aforementioned three points in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui negotiations. In the future, Henan and the other regions should not repeat the mistakes of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi and Fujian-Guangdong border areas.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 13–14, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Fu Qiutao (1907–1981) was at this time secretary of the Special Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the border area in question.

3. Ask Nanjing to order Yu Hanmu[2] to return the personnel as well as the weapons of He Ming's troops;[3] not a single person or weapon should be missing. How are Bo and Ye's negotiations going?

4. In the united front, a local Party can easily fall into right opportunism. This has already become the principal danger for the Party; please pay close attention to it.

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian]　　[Mao] Zedong

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[2] Yu Hanmu (1897–1981), a native of Guangdong, was at this time deputy commander of the Guomindang's Fourth War Zone.

[3] He Ming (1910–1939), a native of Guangdong, was at this time the commander and political commissar of the South Fujian Third Independent Regiment. In July, the Guomindang had surrounded and disarmed approximately a thousand of his men.

On the Assessment of the Enemy's Situation, and Our Strategic Dispositions

(September 17, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]; Lin [Biao] and Nie [Rongzhen]; He [Long] and Xiao [Ke]; and Liu [Bocheng] and Xu [Xiangqian]:

Concerning the assessment of the situation and strategic dispositions:

1. We conclude that, broadly speaking, the enemy is attacking North China by four routes, with a force totaling between 150,000 and 200,000 men. One route is via Shandong, where there is no action for the moment. Another is along the Tianjin-Pukou line, with one and a half divisions, whose offensive edge has reached Machang. Still another is along the Beiping-Hankou line, with one division, which is now stationed north of Zhuozhou[1] without taking any action. The fourth route, operating along the Beiping-Suiyuan line and the Datong-Puzhou line, with about three divisions, is his main force. It is moving in an outflanking pattern with the intention of capturing Taiyuan, threatening the Central Army along the Beiping-Hankou line, and then defeating it so as to seize the area north of the Yellow River. This disposition, menacing the rear of Henan and Shandong, is advantageous for the final capture of Shandong, thus fulfilling the enemy's intention of seizing the five provinces of North China. His main strategic orientation is outflanking on the right. As for his advance toward Shanghai, apart from destroying the lifeline of China's economy, [the enemy] aims to pin down the main force of the Central Army and expedite his seizure of North China. The above is a general assessment of Japan's operational plan for the first phase.

2. The right wing of the Japanese bandits' main force is once again divided among three routes, all advancing in a posture of pursuit and attack. One route, estimated at approximately one division, is moving toward Yanmenguan[2] along the eastern portion of the Beiping-Suiyuan line and the northern portion of the Datong-Puzhou line; it has not been active since capturing Datong. Another, having started from Tianzhen and seized Guangling, is now moving up to attack Lingqiu and Pingxingguan, and to outflank the armies of Shanxi and Suiyuan on the right. The third, having started from Zhangjiakou and seized Wei *xian*, is likely to attack Laiyuan; it is outflanking Wei Lihuang's army and the troops at the Zijing Pass on the left. The last two are estimated to have formed a joint army corps, made up of at least two divisions, which intended a central breakthrough as the first step and then with that impetus to achieve its second-stage purpose, namely, a flanking movement on both sides.

3. Chiang [Kaishek], seeing Wei Lihuang's army surrounded by the enemy, has ordered its retreat. Yan [Xishan], regarding Lingqiu as the lifeline of Shanxi, plans to concentrate fourteen regiments for a decisive battle north of Pingxingguan. We estimate that if the decisive battle is victorious, the southward advance of the enemy will be somewhat delayed, but this will require sending in more troops and fighting fiercely. If the decisive battle is lost, the enemy will necessarily attack Pingxingguan and Yanmenguan without delay; when the reserve corps from the rear arrives, the enemy's main force will move and take Taiyuan directly. Consequently, the Shanxi and Suiyuan armies stationed to the west of Suiyuan, the armies in the south of the Heng mountain range, in places like Wutai, and along the northern portion of the Beiping-Hankou line, will have to retreat on their own initiative, so the enemy can take over these areas without firing a single shot, with Niangziguan unable to play its role as a natural barrier.

4. Laiyuan and Lingqiu are the two spots that the enemy will necessarily fight for. If there is no north-south highway, Fuping, Wutai, and Yuxian may not be occupied by the enemy for the time being; if there is such a highway, it is possible that the enemy will send troops southward to cut the Zhengding-Taiyuan line. No matter what, the Heng mountains remain the strategic center if the enemy is to seize the provinces of Hebei, Chahar, and Shanxi. That he will send his main force to this center has been borne out by the occupation of Hunyuan, Weixian, and Guangling.

5. The armies of Fu [Zuoyi], Yang [Aiyuan], Liu [Mao'en], and Tang [Enbo], all under Yan's command in Shanxi, have lost their morale, so we cannot conclude whether these armies are able to frustrate the enemy operation plan in their respective battlefronts.

6. The Red Army at present has the nature of a detachment, playing no decisive role in decisive battles. If deployed properly, however, it can play a decisive role in sustaining the guerrilla warfare in North China (mainly in Shanxi).

7. Our previous plan that all of the Red Army should stay in the Heng mountains to build base areas for guerrilla warfare is altogether outdated in the present situation as described above. Should we carry out our original plan, our entire army will be trapped in the enemy's outflanking strategy; even if we retreat to the Taihang mountains as our second step, we will still find ourselves within its outflanking (assuming that it has occupied Taiyuan) and completely fallen into a passive position.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 46–49, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 15–18.

[1] This city, located a short distance southwest of Beiping, was called Zhuo *xian* in 1937, but had been Zhuozhou until 1913 and has now taken that name again.

[2] Yanmenguan, located in the northern part of Dai *xian* in Shanxi, is one of the important strategic passes of the Great Wall.

8. Basing ourselves on the above-described situation and assessment, for the purpose of maneuvering in a strategically flexible position, that is, maneuvering on the enemy's flanks, so as to hold up the enemy from attacking Taiyuan and going farther south, and to assist the armies of Shanxi and Suiyuan and help them to avoid overly heavy losses; for the purpose of actually carrying on the independent guerrilla warfare in hilly areas; for the purpose of mobilizing the masses extensively, organizing the volunteers, and opening up guerrilla base areas in support of the guerrilla warfare in North China; and for the purpose of expanding the Red Army itself, it is proposed to alter our original plan and adopt the following strategic deployment: (1) Our Second Front Army is to assemble in Yi *xian*, north of Taiyuan, pending orders, and be ready to move, once Yan's approval has been obtained, to areas like the Guancen mountains in northwestern Shanxi and carry out operations there; (2) Our Fourth Front Army is to enter the Luliang mountain range at the appropriate time and start operations there; (3) Our First Front Army, deliberately assuming a passive manner, will now enter the southern part of the Heng mountain range and, if the enemy moves southward and our allied armies fail to defeat it, get ready to go gradually south and operate between the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges in southeastern Shanxi; (4) The headquarters will move to the neighborhood of Taiyuan and then choose the proper location in accordance with the actual circumstances.

9. What do you think? Please consider and reply by telegraph.

The Question of the Strategic Zones of the Eighth Route Army

(September 19, 1937, noon)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have taken note of your telegram dated the 18th. Have you received my long telegram on strategy dated the 17th?[1]

2. The enemy is resolved to take Taiyuan. At present we should look one step ahead when making deployments.

3. Wutai, Dinxiang, and Meng *xian* are rather narrow. After the enemy enters Taiyuan, he will be encircled. The present deployment of Lin Biao and Yang Aiyuan's units in these areas is temporary in nature. There is no possibility of their staying there for long. It is estimated that that area can only support a guerrilla war fought by a few thousand people.

4. He Long's unit should be stationed in northwestern Shanxi, located on the outer flank of Datong and Taiyuan, and engage in guerrilla warfare in the direction of Datong and Suiyuan. Only in this way will they be able to play quite an effective role in containing the enemy, which is advancing southward toward Taiyuan. There are the two units of Lin and Yang in the Wutai area. This is quite sufficient. If He's division goes there, too, it will lose its strategic significance.

5. Therefore, He's division should advance to the northwest of Shanxi and hasten to be the first to occupy that region.

6. In the future, Liu [Bocheng]'s division may move nearer to Lin [Biao]'s division and be stationed in the Taiyue mountain range and the Luliang mountain range (between Jixian and the Fenhe River) in the south of Shanxi. It is all right to transfer some units from northern Shaanxi to support them.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 50–51, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the preceding telegram.

The Main Force of Wang Zhaoxiang's Unit Should Prepare to Support the Operations of the 120th Division

(September 21, 1937)

To the Special Committee of Shenfu and Wang Zhaoxiang:

1. The Japanese bandits are attacking Yanmenguan. Our First and Second Front Armies have already moved to northern Shanxi to engage in the War of Resistance.
2. Zhaoxiang and other comrades should prepare to lead the main force to leave Wuzhai and Shenchi within five days, and support the Second Front Army in promoting the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. You should leave a third of your forces, plus local armed forces, to defend the soviet areas and the ferries.
3. Notify us quickly regarding your preparations.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, p. 52, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Resolutely Maintain the Principle of Independent and Self-Reliant Guerrilla Warfare in the Mountainous Regions

(September 21, 1937)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

Yan Xishan is now caught in an unresolvable contradiction: if he refuses to fight a battle, he will be unable to respond to the popular masses in Shanxi, while if he does fight, there is no guarantee whatsoever that he will be victorious. Your judgment that he will give up Pingxingguan, and that his determination to fight a decisive battle at Shahe is wavering, is absolutely correct. None of his subordinates has resolution, and his troops have lost their fighting capacity. It is possible that he will be forced to fight a decisive battle in the area of Yanmenguan, Pingxingguan, and Shahe, but the general trend will not remain favorable for long. Regardless of who wins this decisive battle, the situation in Taiyuan and all of North China is extremely precarious. It seems that a few comrades still do not have a clear understanding of this kind of objective and inevitable trend, and are led astray by the present temporary situation. If this kind of view remains unchanged, like Yan Xishan, the Red Army will fall into a passive position, in which it can only go through the motions of defending itself, and will take a beating and be crushed one by one. Today the Red Army plays no deciding role in any decisive battle. Nevertheless, there is one excellent kind of warfare at which the Red Army is particularly adept, and in which it can definitely play a deciding role, and this type of warfare it is good at is truly independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountainous regions (not mobile warfare). In order to carry out such an overall policy, strategically there must be powerful forces positioned on the enemy's flanks, primary importance should be given to creating base areas and mobilizing the masses, and we must disperse our forces, rather than laying emphasis on concentrating them for combat. We will not be able to conduct mass work if the stress is on concentrating our forces for combat, nor can we concentrate our forces for fighting if the emphasis is on conducting mass work; we cannot accomplish both

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 53–54, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 19–20.

simultaneously. But dividing up to conduct mass work is definitely the only way through which we can defeat the enemy and assist the friendly armies. At present, concentrating our forces for battle will have no result worth speaking of. The present situation is not at all the same as that during the civil war period. We should never think in terms of things as they were and continue to imitate now what we did in the past. I agree completely with the view you put forward in your telegram of the 18th, "See to it that, although the enemy has penetrated deeply into Shanxi, he is still surrounded on all sides by our guerrilla warfare." Hold resolutely to this view, think of everything in a broad future perspective, and as regards the incorrect ideas of a few comrades, explain to them in depth so that our strategic policy will be unified. Comrade Lin Biao has telegraphed saying that he is in complete agreement with my judgment and dispositions of the 17th.[1] He only wanted to concentrate Chen's brigade,[2] and strike a heavy blow at the enemy when the opportunity presented itself, and for the time being not disperse his forces. This kind of temporary concentration of one brigade is naturally acceptable. Nonetheless, if no opportunity arises after a fairly long time, it will be better to switch the emphasis to mass work at the appropriate time. It is also all right for Wang Zhen to lead one regiment temporarily to Wutai. Please pay attention, however, to the fact that it is still better for him to move to northwestern Shanxi at the appropriate time. Judging from the situation, we predict that even if the Chen brigade under Lin's command can win one or two battles, before long it must also move to Wutai. Please take all these points into consideration and deal with the matter appropriately.

Mao Zedong

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[1] See above the telegram of that date.

[2] The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

My Views About Developing Guerrilla Warfare in Shanxi

(September 23, 1937)

To Comrade [Peng] Xuefeng, and for the information of Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]:

I have taken note of your telegram of the 18th. As regards Mr. Yan [Xishan]'s suggestions, if under unfavorable conditions the two armies can unite as one, and follow the orientation of resolutely resisting the attack of the Japanese bandits by means of guerrilla warfare, I am in complete agreement. Nevertheless, I have the following suggestions:

1. The guerrilla warfare should take place mainly on the enemy's flanks and in his rear. In Shanxi it should be divided into the four districts of northwest Shanxi, northeast Shanxi, southeast Shanxi, and southwest Shanxi, adopting the posture of surrounding and attacking the enemy, who has already entered the central cities and intercepted important communication lines from four sides. It is inappropriate to concentrate all our forces in the single district of the Wutai mountain range. It will be very difficult to gain a foothold if we concentrate all our forces in one district.

2. We should make the Wutai mountain range one of the important guerrilla areas. We must intensify our preparations right away. Both sides may send some people to investigate and plan everything; there should be no delay in this.

3. At the same time, adequate attention should also be given to the Guanyin mountain range in northwestern Shanxi, and to deployment and preparation there, for the enemy is sure to take Shenchi and Ningwu in that region first, in coordination with its operation to capture the Heng mountain range in the east, so as to put itself into the advantageous position of occupying a commanding height, before attacking Taiyuan.

4. Although the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges in southeastern Shanxi, and the Luliang mountain range in southwestern Shanxi are relatively farther away from the enemy, proper deployment should be carried out without delay, such as

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 21–22, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

the preparation of certain materials for removal. It is inappropriate to concentrate all the materials in one place in Wutai.

5. Apart from the military arrangements, the most important thing in guerrilla warfare is to depend closely on the broad masses of the people in the countryside, for only in this way can we win final victory.

6. The aforementioned deployments and plans do not interfere at all with the present plan of trying to use the main forces to launch a decisive campaign in a sector of the Great Wall.

7. We admire and are grateful for Mr. Yan's sincere willingness to cooperate and to discuss the matter of command.

8. Please give Mr. Yan my aforementioned opinions on the guerrilla warfare for consideration as soon as possible. If they are adopted, it will really be most fortunate for the War of Resistance.

Mao Zedong

Deployment for Guerrilla War in the Wutai Mountain Range Assuming Japanese Occupation of Taiyuan

(September 24, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], Yang Shangkun, and Zhu Rui:

1. Zhu and Peng's telegram on deployment, and Zhou's telegram on the situation have been received and noted.

2. We have already ordered Liu's division[1] to get ready to set off. It is appropriate for the route of its advance still to be Houma-Shangche.

3. Now that both Lin's division[2] and Wang Zhen's unit[3] have been used for combat, the emphasis should be put on the making of deployments by the local Party as regards the guerrilla war in the Wutai mountain range. The Shanxi local Party organization at present should do its utmost to make arrangements for waging a guerrilla war in the three major mountain ranges of Heng, Wutai, and Guancen. The key is the Wutai mountain range, for there they can obtain more assistance from Yan [Xishan] and Yang [Aiyuan], and in the future they can expand to the north of the Heng mountain range. Therefore, a leading organ such as the Military-Political Committee should be established there. Cadres should be selected who are able to lead the various work of the Party, the government, and the military independently. It is imperative that work shall proceed immediately to organize local contingents and mass organizations everywhere. All these dispositions should be completed within half a month, and initial achievements be recorded. All work should take as its point of departure the assumption that the enemy has occupied Taiyuan.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 55–56.

[1] The reference is to the 128th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

[2] The 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

[3] The reference is to the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Wang Zhen.

Our Declaration and Chiang's Statement Have Proclaimed the Establishment of the United Front

(September 25, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai]:

1. Your speeches should please be based on the following points: Our declaration and Chiang's statement have announced the success of the united front and established the necessary foundation for unity between the two parties to save the country.

2. This declaration shall define not only the basis for the unity between the two parties but also the basic orientation of the grand national unity of the people of the whole country. The revival of the Chinese nation and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism shall be given a basis by the unity between the two parties and the unity of the whole country in the future.

3. Chiang's statement points out the profound significance of the unity for the salvation of the country, establishes the legitimate status of the Communist Party in the whole country, and makes the promise to "go all the way together with the people of the whole country." It is regrettable, however, that the statement still shows arrogance and lack of self-criticism. The problem for the future is the thorough application of the Three People's Principles and the Ten Major Points [i.e., the Ten-Point Program] of the Chinese Communist Party that correspond to these principles.

4. The declaration was drafted on March 4, handed in on May 15,[1] and published on September 22. Inform also Bo Gu [Qin Bangxian], [Ye] Jianying, [Pan] Hannian, Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], [Zhang] Yunyi, and [Xie] Juezai. It should also be relayed by Lin [Boju] to Comrades Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], Liu [Bocheng], and Zhang [Hao].

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Wenxian he yanjiu,* 1985, no. 4 (pp. 222–23 of the annual volume).

[1] According to a note to the Chinese text, March 4 and May 15 should read July 4 and July 15.

Guerrilla Warfare Should Be the Only Orientation of All the Work in North China

(September 25, 1937)

To Zhou Enlai; to be relayed to Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], [Yang] Shangkun, and Zhu Rui, and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi].

1. All our work in North China should be oriented solely toward guerrilla warfare. All work, such as the soldiers' movement, the united front, and so on, should center on guerrilla warfare. If the regular warfare in North China ends in defeat, we shall not be held responsible; but if guerrilla warfare fails, we must assume a heavy responsibility.

2. Apart from the dispositions in Shanxi, about which you have already been notified, the Party organizations in Hebei should be ordered to devote every effort to guerrilla warfare. Making use of the prestige of the Red Army in fighting Japan, the Party organizations in all of North China (including Shandong) should be encouraged to mobilize the masses, incorporate stragglers and their rifles into our forces, and organize guerrilla units in an extensive but planned way. Should Zhou have another talk with Feng Zhi'an and Huang Shaohong about this matter?

3. To achieve this purpose, special attention should be paid to the allocation of our high-ranking cadres, and to the establishment of Party, government, and army organs under their independent leadership. We must envisage how we can persist in extensive and forceful guerrilla warfare in the event of the occupation of the whole of North China by the enemy. We must make plain to the whole Party that, from now on, mobilizing the people both inside and outside the Party, we have no other task than guerrilla warfare. To this end, the Red Army should render all possible assistance.

4. Please let me know regarding the deployments in the whole of North China.[1]

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* pp. 57–58, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] A version of this document published in *Renmin ribao* for July 7, 1981, includes two more paragraphs, dealing with obtaining arms from Yan Xishan, running cadre schools at the front, and a possible coordinated attack by the 115th Division and two or three Guomindang divisions. (For a translation of this text, see Saich, *Rise to Power,* p. 794.) The more authoritative version of these military orders, which appears in *Junshi wenji,* reveals that these two paragraphs belong in fact to Mao's telegram to Zhou Enlai of September 29, 1937, translated below.

The Eighth Route Army Should Play a Strategic Role in the Decisive Battle at Baoding and in Northern Shanxi

(September 25, 1937)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

I have new views regarding strategy. A long telegram will be sent out immediately.[1] For the moment, I want to ask you to keep all Red Army units in northeastern Shanxi temporarily stationary, conceal the target, and do not alert the enemy. In this way, when the main forces of the enemy penetrate as far as the vicinity of Daizhou and Baoding, we will strike suddenly northward, to retake the Heng mountain range. The Red Army will play a strategic role in the decisive battle at Baoding and in northern Shanxi.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 59, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] See the text immediately following.

My Views Regarding Strategy in the Operations in North China

(September 25, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], and also to Zhou [Enlai], and to be communicated to Lin Biao:

My strategic views:

1. Based on the present situation, in which the enemy is attacking Baoding and Daizhou, and is advancing toward Shijiazhuang and Taiyuan, but does not appear to have many troops defending the four *xian* of Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei, and in the light of the talk between Chiang [Kaishek] and Yan [Xishan] in which they decided to adopt the policy of fighting a decisive campaign in Baoding, but resorting to a tenacious defense in northern Shanxi, in order to prevent the enemy from occupying Taiyuan and Shijiazhuang to the south, and to support the protracted war in North China, I propose to ask Chiang and Yan to send He Zhuguo's[1] entire cavalry army, as well 15,000 to 20,000 strong infantry troops from the Guangxi faction or the Central Army, to cooperate with the whole of Lin's division of our armies,[2] [the joint forces] to be commanded by Zhu and Peng. When the enemy from Wei and Lai is marching toward Baoding, and the enemy from Ling and Guang is marching toward Daizhou, and when they have indeed gone deeply into these regions, you should launch a sudden attack northward from between Ling and Lai (a counteroffensive breakthrough in the center), regain the four *xian* of Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei, and then launch a large-scale surprise attack from the rear flank along the Datong-Zhangjiakou-Beiping line, the Datong-Taiyuan line, and the Beiping-Shijiazhuang line, and set up fortified mass base areas in Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei. If this succeeds, we may use a fairly large unit to go in and out of Rehe, thus perhaps creating a new prospect in the war in North China, and sustaining this protracted war for quite a long period of time. Please think about this and then make suggestions to Chiang and Yan.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 60–62, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 25–27.

[1] He Zhuguo was at this time commander of the Second Cavalry Army of the Guomindang Army.

[2] I.e., the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

2. Whether or not Chiang and Yan help, at the moment it is not appropriate for the Red Army to be exposed too early, and it is particularly inappropriate to send out tactical detachments. You should wait until the enemy in Wei and Lai has left Wei and Lai and gone to the vicinity of Mancheng, wait until the enemy in Ling and Guang has left Ling and Guang and gone to the vicinity of Fanzhi, and the number of enemy troops in these four *xian* has become extremely small (at this moment the enemy in Zuozhou should be attacking in the vicinity of Xushui, and the enemy in Datong should be attacking in the vicinity of Yanmenguan). Then you can use our entire Lin division to launch an attack northward. On the basis of the specific situation, it may be subdivided into numerous small detachments or two to three corps, and carry out an extensive surprise attack on the enemy's empty rear flank in the extended region to the east, west, and north of the Heng mountains. If the main forces of the enemy have not been concentrated at its major point of attack, and the enemy's rear is not yet entirely empty, it will be disadvantageous to expose the target of the Red Army and attract the enemy's attention. It is no use at all if you send only tactical detachments.

3. If you agree with the above ideas, please conceal all our military forces for the time being, conserve strength and store up energy, and wait to carry out our plan until the necessary conditions are ready. At that time, Wang Zhen's forces[3] should be put in a place where they will be able to assist the front as well as to maintain the rear. The same principle applies to the use of He's division[4] in northwest Shanxi.

4. If you have reached the enemy's rear, you should adopt the policy of confiscating the property of the big landlords and mobilize the masses extensively. Thus, the Red Army will not be isolated.

5. Chiang and Yan's policy of fighting a decisive battle in Baoding and mounting a firm defense in northern Shanxi (see Chiang's telegram of the 19th regarding deployment) is absolutely a passive posture inviting defeat. Without the surprise attack in the enemy's rear by an army suddenly appearing from nowhere mentioned above, they will not be able to hold out for long. Only by carrying out the aforementioned plan can we turn a passive situation into an active one. Now that this is the only move left, you should try your best to persuade Chiang and Yan (for the moment, do not tell them that the Red Army is operating independently; only ask them to send some troops to assist you).

6. If the above plan can be carried out, even if Baoding and Daizhou fall, it will not be something to fear. Without paying the price of the fall of certain places, we will not be able to obtain the advantage of operating in the enemy's rear.

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[3] Wang Zhen was at this time deputy commander of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

[4] The reference is to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He Long.

7. The above plan should be carried out under the conditions that the enemy troops in Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei are extremely few, and that there is the kind of topography in which the enemy troops in the rear find it very difficult to operate while our infantry forces find it very easy to move around.

8. The above is a suggestion. Please think it over and reply by telegram.

Mao Zedong

Estimate of the Operational Plans of the Japanese Military in North China and Need for Urgent Mobilization by the Border Region in Preparation for War

(September 27, 1937)

Commanders of the various units of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia:

1. It is estimated that the operational plans of the Japanese bandits in North China consist of the occupation of the Beiping-Tianjin-Nankou-Zhangjiakou line as the first step, and the occupation of the Cangzhou-Baoding-Daixian-Laiyuan-Datong line as the second step. Now, except for Baoding and Daixian, they have completed the seizure of all the rest, and are advancing very rapidly toward Baoding and Daixian. There are approximately seven divisions of Japanese forces, totaling around 150,000 men, along the Shanxi-Suiyuan, Beiping-Suiyuan, Beiping-Hankou, and Tianjin-Pukou lines.

2. The enemy will have much more difficulty in accomplishing the third step in his plan. His lines of communication to the rear are longer, and his present forces are tired. Once he enters the mountainous areas, he will have difficulty with supplies, and his heavy artillery and tanks cannot display their might. Unless they send reinforcements, the present seven divisions cannot accomplish their mission. Such being the case, the situation is advantageous for the operations of our forces in the future.

3. Our forces are already beginning to enter Shanxi. The authorities are taking a relatively positive attitude, and the masses are more lively than before. The morale of the Shanxi forces has improved. Under the slogan of defending Shanxi and recovering Beiping and Tianjin, we should urgently mobilize the broad masses to strive for control of Shanxi, and engage in protracted war in the whole country.

4. With this intention, the Border Region should be urgently mobilized. We should oppose the former conception of peace and tranquillity, oppose corruption and waste, and oppose laxity in work-style. We must thoroughly eliminate bandits and traitors, assist the localities to organize and train new recruits, consolidate the armed forces, and expand air defense, safeguards against poison, night actions, and training in guerrilla tactics and political mobilization for guerrilla war. We need to advocate frugality and display our inherent spirit of hard work, so as to accomplish our present urgent mission.

Mao [Zedong] and Xiao [Jingguang]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 63–64, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

In the Dangerous Situation Prevailing in North China, We Must Firmly Uphold the Orientation of Waging Guerrilla War

(September 29, 1937, 10:00 A.M.)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

1. The overall situation in North China is extremely dangerous. The enemy has already broken through between the Beiping-Hankou line and the Tianjin-Pukou line. Baoding is lost. The enemy is just now carrying out a flanking operation on the side of Shijiazhuang. Hebei is finished. The three armies of Wei Lihuang, Zen Wanzhong, and Sun Lianzhong have retreated to the Fuping-Huolu line. They are digging in on the side taking advantage of the Taihang mountain range. After the loss of Hebei, the enemy will land at Haizhou and advance to take Xuzhou. Then Shandong will be lost without a battle. Very soon, the Chinese positions will be to defend the lines along the Yellow River and the Grand Canal. Such a situation will cause some changes at the Shanghai front. Nanjing will be subject to major bombardments. If the Guomindang does not compromise, it will have to change its capital. It is estimated that the political situation in China will undergo changes in the next few months. During this time, we should strive to achieve the goals of reforming the government, reforming the military, putting into practice the Three People's Principles and the Ten Major Points of the political program, and continuing to support the national war. And only at that time will it be possible to realize a true national people's war. It is estimated that at that time the Soviet Union will render China truly powerful assistance.

2. Shanxi will become a special case in North China. This is basically because of the existence of the Red Army, and secondarily because of the collaboration between Yan Xishan and us. The union of these two forces will result in a guerrilla war participated in by several millions of people. We should uphold this policy and make arrangements for waging guerrilla war in the whole province. We should uphold the fundamental orientation of abolishing the system of exorbitant taxes and levies, reducing rent and interest, letting people participate in government, and reforming the Shanxi forces.

3. At present, the situation of fighting the Resistance War along the Great Wall is only a temporary phenomenon, and a very temporary phenomenon at that. Yan [Xishan] will definitely request that our forces play a supportive role in fighting a battle or two in concert with his forces. In order to exert more effective influence on the Shanxi forces, if the conditions are truly advantageous, we may, of course, participate in such actions. We must, however, take into account the fact that this is only a temporary situation in the combat. The fundamental policy lies in winning over the masses, and organizing guerrilla contingents with participation by the masses. Guided by such a general policy, we shall concentrate and fight battles only when conditions are right. You should request that Yan provide ten thousand rifles to arm the people. You should set up a cadres' school at the front for from five hundred to one thousand people, to be run jointly by the Red Army and the local Party organization so as to supply cadres for the guerrilla war. In six months' time, a substantial part of the first class of Kangda[1] can be used in Shanxi.

4. As regards the plan to have the 115th Division collaborate with two or three Guomindang divisions to make a sudden thrust toward Linqiu, Laiyuan, Guangling, and Weixian and north of these *xian* to disrupt the empty rear of the enemy after he has penetrated very deeply, I ask you to make a serious study of this. If such a plan is carried out, we may be able to open up a new situation within a certain period. Although we will not be able to disrupt fundamentally the strategic plans of the enemy, it is possible to disrupt his plans temporarily and partially. This will be extremely helpful in creating our base areas in the whole of Shanxi Province.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 65–67, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 28–30.

[1] The Resist Japan University set up at about this time.

Urgent Tasks of the Chinese Revolution Following the Establishment of Guomindang-Communist Cooperation

(September 29, 1937)

The Establishment of the United Front Between the Two Parties

As far back as 1932,[1] the Chinese Communist Party issued its *well-known* declaration proposing to conclude an agreement for resisting Japan with all those in the Guomindang[2] *who are willing to stop the civil war with the Communist Party, the Soviet régime, and the Red Army and to resist Japan together,* under three conditions.[3] This declaration was made because after the September Eighteenth Incident,[4] resistance to the Japanese imperialist invasion became the primary task of the Chinese revolution.[5] But we did not achieve our objective.

In August 1935, the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Soviet Government[6] called upon all political parties and groups and the people throughout the country to organize an anti-Japanese united army and a government of national defense for a joint fight against Japanese imperialism. In December of that year, the Chinese Communist Party published a resolution regarding the formation of an anti-Japanese national united front.[7] In May 1936, *when the Red Army returned from Shanxi, the Central Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Council of* the Red Army once again published a declaration calling on the Nanjing government to stop the civil war and make common cause against Japan. In August of that year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a well-known petition[8] to the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang requesting[9] that the Guomindang stop the civil war and form a united front of the two parties to fight jointly against Japanese imperialism. In September of the same year, the Communist Party published a resolution on the establishment of a unified democratic republic in China. Besides these declarations, letters, and resolutions, we *actually* sent representatives to hold discussions with people from the Guomindang side on many occasions, and yet all in vain. It was only toward the end of 1936, after the Xi'an Incident, that the plenipotentiary of the Chinese Communist Party and the principal authorized representative of the Guomindang reached an agreement on an important political issue at that time, namely, *the achievement of* the cessation of the civil war between the two parties *and the two armies,* and brought about the peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident. This was a great event in Chinese history and provided the necessary precondition for a united front[10] between the two parties.

On February 10 of this year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a telegraphic notice to the Third Plenary Session of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee on the eve of its meeting, making comprehensive *and specific* proposals for the concrete establishment of a united front[11] between the two parties. In that telegram we demanded that the Guomindang give the Communist Party guarantees on the following five points: the ending of the civil war, the realization of democratic freedoms, the convening of a national assembly, speedy preparations for a war of resistance against Japan,[12] and improvement of the people's livelihood. At the same time the Communist Party offered guarantees to the Guomindang on the following four points: the elimination of the opposition[13] between the two régimes, the redesignation of the Red Army, the adoption of the democratic system,[14] and the discontinuance of the confiscation of the land.[15] This was likewise an important political step, for without it the establishment of the united front[16] between the two parties would have been postponed, and this would have been wholly detrimental to speedy preparations for the War of Resistance against Japan.[17]

Since then, the two parties have moved a step closer to each other in their negotiations. The Communist Party has made more specific proposals on the question

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 261–74, where it is reproduced from the 1944 Chinese edition of Mao's *Selected Works.*

[1] 1932 → 1933

[2] All those in the Guomindang → All those Guomindang army units

[3] Under three conditions → On three conditions, namely, that attacks on the Red Army be stopped, that democratic freedoms be granted to the popular masses, and that the popular masses be armed.

[4] The September Eighteenth Incident → The September Eighteenth Incident of 1931

[5] The Chinese revolution → The Chinese people

[6] The Central Soviet Government → The Chinese Red Army

[7] Here the revised text adds: "with the national bourgeoisie."

[8] A well-known petition → A letter

[9] Requesting → Demanding

[10] A united front → Renewed cooperation

[11] Establishment of a united front → Cooperation

[12] A war of resistance against Japan → Resisting Japan

[13] Opposition → Antagonism

[14] The adoption of the democratic system → The application of the new-democratic system in the revolutionary base areas

[15] The confiscation of the land → The confiscation of the land of the landlords

[16] The united front → The cooperation

[17] The War of Resistance against Japan → Resisting Japan

of a common political program for the two parties, on the question of lifting the ban on the mass movements and releasing political prisoners, and on the question of redesignating the Red Army *and the administration of the soviet areas.* Although thus far the Common Program has not yet been promulgated, nor has the ban on movements of the popular masses been lifted, nor has the new system in the soviet areas[18] been recognized. And yet, about a month after the fall of Beiping and Tianjin, an order was issued to the effect that the Red Army was to be redesignated as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army (also called the Eighteenth Group Army in the anti-Japanese battle order). The declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the establishment of cooperation between the two parties, which had been *drafted already on July 4* and conveyed to the Guomindang as early as July 15, and Chiang Kaishek's statement recognizing the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party, which should have been published as agreed simultaneously with the declaration, were finally released to the public (unfortunately after a long delay) by the Guomindang Central News Agency on September 22 and 23 respectively, when the situation at the front had become critical. The Communist Party's declaration and Chiang Kaishek's statement announced the establishment of the united front[19] between the two parties and laid the necessary foundation for the great cause of alliance between the two parties to save the nation. The declaration[20] embodies not only the principle of unity between the two parties but also the basic principle of the great unity of the people of the whole country. It is good that Chiang Kaishek, in his statement, recognized the legal status of the Communist Party throughout China and spoke of the necessity of unity to save the nation. He has not, however, abandoned his Guomindang arrogance or made any necessary self-criticism, and we can hardly be satisfied with that. Nevertheless, the establishment of the united front between the two parties has been proclaimed. This has ushered in a new era in the history of the Chinese revolution. *This great political significance should be recognized by the people of the whole country. From now on,* it will exert widespread and profound influence on the Chinese revolution, and defeat Japanese imperialism decisively.[21]

The Impact of the Establishment of the United Front Between the Two Parties

Ever since 1925,[22] the relationship between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party has played a decisive role in the Chinese revolution. The *successful great* revolution of 1925–1927[23] took place as a result of the cooperation *and leadership* of the two parties on the basis of a definite program. In a mere two or three years, successes unprecedented in history[24] were achieved in the national revolutionary cause of *nationalism, people's rights, and people's livelihood,* to which Mr. Sun Yatsen had devoted forty years and which he had been unable to carry to completion. These successes were the establishment of the revolutionary base in Guangdong and the victory of the Northern Expedition. They were the products of the formation of the united front of the two parties. But at the very moment when the revolution was nearing its goal, some people who failed to uphold the revolutionary cause disrupted the united front of the two parties, and so brought about the failure of the *Chinese* revolution. *Thereafter, political power belonged to one class and one party. This created a deep rift not only between the Communist Party and the Guomindang but also between the government and the people.* The door was left open for foreign aggression, and *a history of utmost misery and humiliation unfolded.* These were the consequences of the disruption of the united front of the two parties. Now the newly reestablished united front between the two parties has ushered in a new period in the Chinese revolution. There are still people who do not understand the historical role of the united front and its great future and regard it as a *very* temporary but unavoidable and perfunctory method devised under the pressure of circumstances. Nevertheless, through this united front, the wheel of history will propel the Chinese revolution forward to a completely new stage. This united front[25] will play a decisive role in whether China can extricate itself from the national and social crisis, which is now so grave. There is already fresh and concrete evidence.[26] First, as soon as the policy of the united front was put forward by the Chinese Communist Party, it won the approval of people throughout the country. This is a clear expression of the will of the people. Second, immediately after the Xi'an Incident was settled peacefully and the two parties *and two armies* ended the civil war, all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life, and all armed forces in the country achieved unprecedented unity. *The extent of* this unity, however, still falls far short of meeting the needs of the War of Resistance,[27] especially as the problem of unity between the government and the people remains basically unsolved. *Nevertheless, sharp conflicts between various provinces and the central government were alleviated greatly and immediately under the impact of the truce between the two parties.* Third, and most striking of all, is the fact that the nationwide War of Resistance has started. We are not satisfied with the War of Resistance in its present state because, though national in character, it is still confined to the government and the armed forces. As we pointed out long ago, Japanese imperialism cannot be defeated by a War of Resistance of this kind. Nevertheless, for the first time in a hundred years, China is definitely putting up nationwide resistance to a foreign invader, and this could never have come about without internal peace and without the united front[28] between the two parties. If the Japanese bandits were able to take the Four Eastern Provinces without firing a single shot *and with the greatest of ease* during the time when the two-party united front had broken down, then today, when the united front has been reestablished, they will not be able to occupy more Chinese territory without paying a price in bloody battles. *It is reported that the daily war expenditure of the Japanese bandits is 20 million to 25 million yen. If China can persist in the war for a year, the financial resources of the Japanese bandits will be exhausted, for they will have to lose 7.2 billion yen. In fact, their future expenses will greatly increase and will not be limited to this figure.* Fourth, there is the international effect. The anti-Japanese united front proposed by[29] the Chinese Communist Party has won the support of the workers, peasants, and popular masses, and of the communist parties all over the world. With the establishment of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, *its impact will be greater and* the people of various countries, and particularly *the popular masses* of the Soviet Union, will help China more actively. China and the Soviet Union have concluded a treaty of nonaggression, and relations between the two countries can be expected to improve still further, *moving to a stage when the two countries will oppose the Japanese bandits more concretely.* From all the above evidence, we can state with certainty that the development of the united front *of the two parties* will cause China to move toward a glorious and magnificent future. *To summarize in a single sentence, the historic task of national liberation will be accomplished in the future development of the united front between the two parties. And the result will be* the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the establishment of a unified democratic republic.

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[18] The soviet areas → The revolutionary base areas

[19] The united front → Cooperation

[20] The declaration → The declaration of the Communist Party

[21] Defeat Japanese imperialism decisively → Play a decisive role in defeating Japanese imperialism

[22] 1925 → 1924

[23] 1925–1927 → 1924–1927

[24] Successes unprecedented in history → Tremendous successes

[25] This united front → How this united front develops

[26] There is already fresh and concrete evidence. → There is already fresh evidence that the prospects are favorable.

[27] The War of Resistance → Resistance to Japan

But the united front cannot accomplish this great task if it remains in its present state. The united front of the two parties must be developed further, for the united front which has now been established is not yet substantial or consolidated.

What Is a Substantial and Consolidated United Front?

Should the Anti-Japanese National United Front be confined to the Guomindang and the Communist Party? No, it should be a united front of the whole nation, with the two parties forming only a *small* part of it. *Undoubtedly, the two parties are the leading component of this great united front, but from beginning to end they are only a part of it.* The Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front of all parties and groups, of people in all walks of life and all the armed forces, a united front of all patriotic fellow-countrymen—the workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals.[30] So far, the united front has in fact been confined to the two parties, while the masses of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and petty bourgeoisie[31] and a large number of other patriots have not yet been aroused, *their enthusiasm* has not been mobilized, and they have not been organized or armed. This is the most serious problem at present. It is serious because it makes victories at the front impossible. It is no longer possible to conceal the critical situation at the front both in North China and in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, nor is there any need to do so; the question is how to save the situation. And the only way to save it is to put Mr. Sun Yatsen's Testament into practice, to "arouse the popular masses." In his deathbed Testament, Mr. Sun declared he was deeply convinced, from the experience accumulated over forty years, that only thus could the goal of revolution be achieved. What reason is there for obstinately refusing to put this testament into practice? What reason is there for failing to do so at a moment when the fate of the nation is at stake? Everybody knows that autocracy and suppression run counter to the principle of "arousing the popular masses." *The essence of the contradiction is that those who have seized the latrine pit can't shit, while the people of the whole country, who suffer acutely from bloating, have no pit.* Resistance by the government and the army alone can never defeat Japanese imperialism. Early in April[32] this year we warned *our brother* ruling party[33] in all seriousness that unless the masses of the people were aroused to resist, China would follow the same path to disaster as Abyssinia. *(The Tasks of the Anti-Japanese National United Front at the Present Stage.)*[34] This point has been made not only by the Chinese Communists but by progressive compatriots throughout the country, and by many intelligent members of the Guomindang itself. Yet the policy of autocratic rule remains unchanged. As a result the government has estranged itself from the people, the army has estranged itself from the masses, and the military commanders are estranged from the fighters. Unless the united front is reinforced by the participation of the popular masses, the crisis on the war fronts cannot be avoided and will inevitably be aggravated, not mitigated.

Why has the policy of autocratic rule not changed up to now? Because the present united front[35] still lacks a political program to replace the policy[36] of autocratic rule, a program accepted by both parties and formally promulgated. In relation to the masses, the current practices[37] are still the same practices that have been followed for the last ten years; there has been no change and, on the whole, everything has remained the same for the last ten years, from the government apparatus, the army system, and the policy toward civilians to financial, economic, and educational policies. There have been some changes, and very important ones—cessation of civil war and unity against Japan. The civil war between the two parties has come to a stop, and the nationwide War of Resistance[38] has started; such are the very great changes in the Chinese political scene since the Xi'an Incident. But so far there has been no change in the practices enumerated above, and there is thus a disharmony between the things that have not changed and those that have. The old practices are suited only to compromise abroad and suppression of the revolution at home, and they prove ill-suited in every respect and reveal all their inadequacies when it comes to coping with the Japanese imperialist invasion. It would be another story if we did not want to resist Japan, but since we do, and resistance has actually begun, and since a serious crisis has already revealed itself, refusal to change over to new ways will lead to the gravest dangers imaginable. Resistance to Japan requires a broadly based united front, and hence all the people should be mobilized to join it. Resistance to Japan requires a consolidated united front, and this calls for a common program. The common program will be the united front's guide to action and will serve also as the tie which, like a cord, closely binds together all the organizations and people[39] in the united front, all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life, and all armed forces. Only in this way will we be able to speak of firm unity. We are opposed to the old binding rules because they are unsuited to the national revolutionary war. We look forward to the introduction of new binding rules to replace the old, that is, to the promulgation of a common program and the establishment of revolutionary order. Nothing else will suit the War of Resistance.

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[28] The united front → The cooperation

[29] The anti-Japanese united front proposed by → The proposal for the anti-Japanese united front put forward by

[30] Intellectuals → Intellectuals and merchants

[31] Petty bourgeoisie → Urban petty bourgeoisie

[32] April → May

[33] Our brother ruling party → The Guomindang

[34] See Mao's report of May 3, 1937, in Volume V, pp. 637–50, especially paragraph 7, p. 642.

[35] The present united front → The present anti-Japanese united front

[36] The policy → The Guomindang's policy

Struggle for the Realization of the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Program

What should the common program be? It should be the Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yat-sen and the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by the Communist Party on August 15[40] this year.

In its declaration announcing Guomindang-Communist cooperation, the Chinese Communist Party stated that "the Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yatsen being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization." Some people find it strange that the Communist Party should be ready to put the Three People's Principles of the Guomindang into practice; Zhu Jinglai of Shanghai, for instance, has expressed doubts in a local periodical. These people think that communism and the Three People's Principles are incompatible. This is a purely formalist perspective. Communism will be put into practice at a future stage in the development of the revolution. At the present stage the Communists harbor no illusions about being able to apply it now, but will carry out the national and democratic revolution as required by history. This is the basic reason why the Communist Party has put forward the slogans of an anti-Japanese national united front[41] and a unified democratic republic. As for *carrying out* the Three People's Principles, at the Guomindang's First National Congress the Communist Party and the Guomindang jointly decided to put them into practice during the first two-party united front over ten years ago, and they were put into practice from 1925[42] to 1927 in the whole country[43] through the efforts of all loyal Communists and all loyal members of the Guomindang. Unfortunately that united front broke up in 1927, and in the subsequent ten years there was a situation in which the application of the Three People's Principles was stopped.[44] But as far as the Communist Party is concerned, all its policies in these ten years have been fundamentally in line with the revolutionary spirit of Mr. Sun's Three People's Principles and Three Great Policies. Not a day has passed in which the Communist Party failed to struggle against imperialism, and this constituted a thoroughgoing application of Nationalism; the soviet system of the people's representative congresses[45] is nothing but the thoroughgoing application of Democracy; the agrarian revolution is *even more unquestionably* the thoroughgoing application of People's Livelihood. Why, then, has the Communist Party announced the abolition of the soviet régime and the discontinuance of land confiscation?[46] The reason, as we explained some time ago, is not that there is anything at all wrong with this system,[47] but that the Japanese imperialist armed aggression has led to a change in class relations within the country. It has become necessary to unite the nation[48] against Japanese imperialism, and possible to do so. At the same time, a democratic united front for the sake of the common struggle against the threat of fascism is in the process of being established throughout the world.[49] *This is what China really needs today.* It is on this basis that we have replaced the slogan of the soviets with the slogan of a democratic republic.[50] The agrarian revolution, which put into effect the principle of "land to the tiller," was precisely what Mr. Sun Yatsen proposed. We have now discontinued this policy *entirely* for the sake of uniting greater numbers of people against Japanese imperialism, but that does not mean that China does not need to solve the land problem. We have already explained without the slightest ambiguity our position regarding the objective reasons for these changes in policy and their temporary nature. It is precisely because the Chinese Communist Party, basing itself on Marxist principles, has consistently adhered to and developed the *spirit of the* common program of the first Guomindang-Communist united front, that is, the Three People's Principles,[51] *and has never been in the slightest degree disloyal to the revolution,* that in this hour of crisis,[52] when our country is invaded by a powerful aggressor, the Party has been able to put forward the timely proposal for a national-democratic united front, which is the only policy capable of saving our nation from destruction, and to apply this policy with unremitting effort. The question now is not whether the Communist Party believes in or carries out the Three People's Principles,[53] but whether the Guomindang does so. The present question[54] is to restore the spirit[55] of Mr. Sun's Three People's Principles throughout the country and, on this basis, to work out a definite political program and political policies, and put them into practice sincerely and not half-heartedly, conscientiously and not perfunctorily, promptly and not tardily. The Chinese Communist Party has been earnestly praying day and night for this to happen. For this very reason, it put forward the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident *on the very day of August 15.* The Ten-Point Program is in line both with Marxism and with the genuine revolutionary Three People's Principles. It is an initial program, the program for the Chinese revolution at the present stage, which is the stage of the anti-Japanese, national-revolutionary war; China can be saved only if this program is put into effect. History will punish those who persist in any course conflicting with this program. *The punishment will be the subjugation and enslavement of the Chinese nation.*

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[37] The current practices → The current practices of the Guomindang

[38] War of resistance → War of Resistance against Japan

[39] People → Individuals

[40] August 15 → August 25

[41] Has put forward the slogans of an anti-Japanese national united front → Has proposed an anti-Japanese national united front

[42] 1925 → 1924

[43] In the whole country → In large areas of the country

[44] There was a situation in which the application of the Three People's Principles was stopped → The Guomindang opposed the application of the Three People's Principles

[45] The soviet system of the people's representative congresses → The worker-peasant democratic dictatorship

[46] The abolition of the soviet régime and the discontinuance of land confiscation → The abolition of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship and the discontinuance of confiscating the land of the landlords

[47] This system → This system and these methods

[48] The nation → All classes of the nation

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[49] Throughout the world → Not only in China but also throughout the world

[50] We have replaced the slogan of the soviets with the slogan of a democratic republic → We have proposed a democratic republic based on the alliance of all classes in place of a worker-peasant democratic dictatorship

[51] The Three People's Principles → The revolutionary Three People's Principles

[52] Crisis → National crisis

[53] The Three People's Principles → The revolutionary Three People's Principles

[54] The present question → The present task

[55] The spirit → The revolutionary spirit

It is impossible to put this program into practice[56] without the consent of the Guomindang because the Guomindang today is still the biggest party in China and the ruling party. *Without its consent, it is impossible to put the program into practice throughout the country.* We are convinced that the day will come when intelligent members of the Guomindang *and their leaders* will agree to this program. If they do not, the Three People's Principles will forever remain an empty phrase, and it will be impossible to restore the revolutionary spirit of Mr. Sun Yatsen, impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism, and impossible for the Chinese people to escape the fate of becoming slaves without a country. No really intelligent member of the Guomindang *or their leaders* can possibly let this happen,[57] and our people will never allow themselves to be turned into slaves without a country with their eyes open. Moreover, in his statement of September 23, Mr. Chiang Kaishek declared:

> I hold that we who stand for the revolution should put aside personal grudges and prejudices and devote ourselves to the realization of the Three People's Principles. At this critical juncture of life and death, we should all the more let bygones be bygones and, together with the whole nation, make a completely fresh start and work strenuously for unity in order to preserve the very life and existence of our country.

This is most true. The urgent task at present is to strive for the realization of the Three People's Principles, to discard personal and factional *sentiments and* prejudices, to change the old set of practices, to carry out a revolutionary program in line with the Three People's Principles immediately, and to make a completely fresh start together with the whole nation. Today this is the only way out.[58] With further delay it will be too late to repent.

But if we want to carry out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Program, there must be instruments for doing so, and this raises the question of reforming the government and the army. The present government is still a one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang and not a government of the national-democratic united front. In the absence of a government of the national-democratic united front, it is impossible to carry out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Program. The present army system[59] is still the old one, and it is impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism *thoroughly* with troops organized *and controlled* according to this system. The troops are now engaged in *sacred* resistance *at the front*, and we have great admiration and respect for them all, and especially for those fighting at the front. But the army system must be changed, as it is unsuited to the task of completely defeating the Japanese aggressors and to the successful application of the Three People's Principles and the revolutionary program. There must be a reform *of the system, for only thus will it be up to the tasks*. The lessons of the War of Resistance during the last three months have already demonstrated this. The change should be based on the principles of unity between officers and men and unity between the army and the people. The present army system is fundamentally opposed to both these principles. It prevents the officers and men,[60] despite their loyalty and courage, from bringing their activism into play because they are ensnared in the old system, and therefore an immediate start must be made to reform it. This does not mean that the fighting has to stop until the system is reformed; it can be reformed while the fighting is going on. Here the central task is to bring about a change in the army's political spirit and political work. The [Guomindang] Party army[61] during the Great Revolution[62] provides an admirable precedent, for in general it did establish unity between officers and men and between the army and the people; a revival of that spirit[63] is absolutely necessary. China should study the lessons of the war in Spain, where the army of the Spanish government[64] has been created under extremely adverse circumstances. China is in a *much* better position than Spain, but it lacks a substantial and solid united front, it lacks a united front government capable of carrying out the whole revolutionary program, and large numbers of troops organized according to a new system. China *itself* must remedy these defects. The Red Army can at present play only a partial role in the anti-Japanese front[65] as a whole, it cannot yet play a decisive role.[66] Nevertheless, its political, military, and organizational strong points are well worth acquiring by friendly armies throughout the country. At its inception, this Red Army was not what it is today; it, too, has undergone many reforms, the main ones being the weeding out of feudal practices politically[67] and the application of the principles of unity between officers and men and unity between the army and the people. Friendly armies throughout the country can draw on this experience.

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[56] Practice → Practice throughout the country

[57] Let this happen → Want this to happen

[58] Only way out → Only course

[59] The present army system → The present army system of the Guomindang (The same variant occurs several more times in this paragraph, and will not be noted again.)

Comrades[68] of the ruling Guomindang! Today we share with you the *historic* responsibility for saving the nation from extinction and ensuring its survival. You have already established an anti-Japanese united front with us, and that is very good. You have carried out *the policies of* the War of Resistance,[69] and that is also very good. But we do not approve of your continuing your other policies in the old way. Our united front must continue to develop, and we must strengthen it and draw in the masses of the people. We must consolidate the united front and pursue a common program. We must resolutely reform the political system and the army system. It is absolutely necessary to have a new government, which alone can carry out the revolutionary program, and start to reform the armies on a national scale. This proposal of ours answers the needs of the times. Many people in your party have also reached this conclusion and feel that now is the time to put it into practice. Mr. Sun Yatsen, in his day, made up his mind and reformed the political and army systems, thereby laying the foundation for the previous Great Revolution.[70] This responsibility[71] now falls on your shoulders. We believe that no loyal and patriotic member of the Guomindang will consider that our proposal is ill suited to the needs of the situation. We are firmly convinced that it meets the objective needs. *We place special hope in Mr. Chiang Kaishek to take up responsibility for this reform.*

Our nation *and our country* are at a critical juncture where their very existence is at stake; let the Guomindang and the Communist Party unite closely! Let all our fellow countrymen who refuse to become slaves without a country unite closely on the basis of the unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Party! The urgent task of the Chinese revolution today is to carry out all necessary reforms in order to overcome all difficulties. When this task is accomplished, we can surely defeat Japanese imperialism. Provided only that we make the utmost efforts, our future will be bright.

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60. The officers and men → The masses of officers and men
61. Party army → National Revolutionary Army
62. The Great Revolution → The Northern Expedition
63. That spirit → The spirit of those days
64. The army of the Spanish government → The army of the Spanish Republic
65. The Red Army can at present play only a partial role in the anti-Japanese front → The Red Army led by the Communist Party can at present play only a vanguard role in the anti-Japanese War
66. A decisive role → A decisive role on a national scale
67. Feudal practices politically → Feudal practices within the army
68. Comrades → Anti-Japanese comrades
69. The War of Resistance → The War of Resistance against Japan
70. The previous Great Revolution → The revolution of 1924–1927
71. This responsibility → The responsibility for effecting the same kind of reform

The Results of the Pingxingguan Campaign

(October 1, 1937)

Bo and Ye, Xiaokai:[1]

In the Pingxingguan campaign on the 25th, apart from capturing eighty-two trucks, one cannon, more than two thousand shells, a few hundred rifles, and killing more than a thousand enemy troops, our forces also surrounded a high-level command post of the enemy, and captured numerous secret documents, among them the enemy's overall plan of campaign in North China, as well as a map which was marked with their objectives in Japanese. Taking advantage of the dark night, the remainder of the besieged enemy troops broke through the position of the Shanxi Army and escaped. Before the campaign, the Shanxi Army had promised to attack in two directions, but it did not set out until dusk, and as a result there was no way it could wipe out this enemy completely. Our forces suffered over four hundred casualties, including two to three deputy regimental commanders and battalion commanders. This campaign has already disrupted the enemy's plan to attack Pingxingguan, but the enemy is still attacking from the area around Yanmenguan. Our guerrilla detachment is operating in the area between Lingqiu, Laiyuan, and Weixian, and it has captured a considerable amount of booty. The enemy is using a big army corps in dealing with our guerrillas, yet he still does not know the tactics of the Red Army guerrillas. The news of our success spread all over the country, and in the last few days there have been a great many telegrams of congratulation. Among them are telegrams from Chiang Kaishek, Yang Hucheng, Ma Hongkui, Fan Changjiang, Long Yun, Sun Weiru, the Shanghai *Dagongbao,* the Shanghai Professional Society for National Salvation, the provincial party departments of Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Hubei, Guangdong, Shaanxi, and Kaifeng, the Wuhan field headquarters, the Kaifeng administrative office, the provincial governments of Zhejiang and Fujian, the Anti-Japanese Society for Assistance in the Rear in Zhejiang, and so on.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 68–69, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Bo and Ye are Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and Ye Jianying, who at this time were the representatives of the Chinese Communist Party engaged in negotiations with the Guomindang in Nanjing. Xiaokai refers to Pan Hannian, who was the head of the Eighth Route Army's office in Shanghai.

Treat the Friendly Armies Which Are Put Under the Command of the Eighth Route Army Correctly

(October 4, 1937)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], Luo [Ronghuan], He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]:

As regards the Nationalist troops which are put under our command, we should adopt a caring and supportive attitude. Do not assign to them the most dangerous tasks, do not let them feel the shortage of supplies and materials. In terms of the fighting, we should mainly let them win a few small victories. As for mobilizing the popular masses, we should inform them in detail regarding the policies and methods, and discuss it with them many times, display a solicitous and caring attitude, and strictly avoid erroneous attitudes such as looking down on them, neglecting them, ridiculing them, treating them with indifference, and putting them in a dangerous position. By following the orientation just described, we should try to win them over so that they will unite as one with the Red Army, and wholeheartedly attach themselves to the Red Army. In order to achieve the stated objective, except for the battlefield commands, which should be the responsibility of the superior officer, we should educate all our officers and soldiers regarding the proper attitude and methods we should adopt toward them, so that this policy will be carried out thoroughly by all.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 70–71, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

On the Operational Deployment of Every Division in Shanxi

(October 5, 1937, 3:00 P.M.)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai]:

1. I am in complete agreement with the plan of campaign discussed and decided on by Zhou, Cheng Qian,[1] and Yan Xishan.

2. All of our 115th Division, except for one unit, which is conducting local work, should quickly concentrate in the hilly area to the north of Taihuaizhen and south of Dayingzhen and Shahezhen. When the enemy has been attracted to the Yuanping and Yixian area and is fighting fiercely, we should take by surprise the Pingxingguan-Daying-Shahe-Fanzhi line. After succeeding in this, we should hand over the occupation of this line to the friendly army, while our forces make a sudden assault toward the north, take the Hunyuan and Yingxian area, and inaugurate a new phase.

3. Wang Zhen's forces should quickly rejoin the ranks of He [Long]'s division.[2] At this time, all the main forces of He's division, except for the guerrilla detachment, should conceal themselves in the Wuzai area. When the fighting on what was originally the main front of Ping[xingguan] is being waged fiercely, and, moreover, when our 115th Division is already carrying out the operation toward Daying and Hunyuan, He's division should use its main forces to march beyond the Great Wall to attack the Suxian and Zuoyun area and disrupt the entire rear of the enemy in response to the action of the 115th Division.

4. The 129th Division should place one regiment in Xiaoyi, and its main forces should be stationed on the rear wing of the Zheng-Tai railway line, which includes Niangziguan. Their main tasks are to mobilize the workers, and the peasants on both sides of the line, to assist the two divisions of Lin[3] and He, to provide strategic support to strengthen the rear.

5. In the regions which were originally assigned to Lin's and He's divisions, we should send local workers as necessary to disperse and carry out the work as planned and to fulfill certain tasks in certain districts. We should never neglect the local work in the areas originally decided on just because the main forces are fighting a campaign. Zhu and Peng should quickly think about and carry out the above-proposed deployment.

6. Yan Xishan can only be informed face to face of the deployment of our forces. He must not be informed by telegraph. In addition, you should tell Yan not to transmit this information to any of his subordinates, so as to avoid leaks.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 72–73, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Cheng Qian was at this time the chief of staff of the Military Commission of the Guomindang government and the acting commander of the First War Zone.

[2] Wang Zhen's unit was the 717th Regiment of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army; He Long was the commander of the 120th Division.

[3] The reference is to the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

To Zhou Suyuan[1]

(October 6, 1937)

Respected Elder Suyuan,

Your letter has been respectfully perused. We feel that you are a very dear and respected friend and revolutionary comrade, and we do not at all feel that you "sit back and enjoy preferential treatment." Your actions and work should be determined entirely by your health and interest, for you, sir, are advanced in age and should not be compared with young people. This point should be taken into consideration not only by us, but also by yourself. The work can be done better only when the conditions and environment are more appropriate, and your health is further assured.

Regarding the plan of returning to and working in Guizhou mentioned by you, if you have already made up your mind and believe that this is a better course of action, I agree completely. Three hundred *yuan* for travel expenses will be provided for you. I do not know whether this is enough; please calculate yourself and let me know the sum. In the future, when we have more financial resources, we can help you a little with your living expenses every month, more or less the same as for life in Yan'an. This is entirely because you, sir, are a fighter, and not for any other reason. Please leave your address before you depart and inform me as well. Whenever you leave, I will come to see you.

Respectful salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 108–9, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Zhou Suyuan (1879–1958) was born in Bijie, Guizhou. He participated in the Revolution of 1911 and served as premier of the military government of Guizhou. Zhou joined the Long March of the Second Field Army of the Red Army and reached northern Shaanxi in 1936. He served as a senior adviser to the Eighth Route Army after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. In 1938, he returned to his home province, as he had told Mao he intended to do.

Supplementary Opinions About Operations in North China

(October 6, 1937, 1:00 A.M.)

To Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], and Peng [Dehuai], and for the information of Lin [Biao] and Nie [Rongzhen]:

Here are some supplementary opinions about the operations:

1. Cheng Qian is correct in giving up Shijiazhuang and concentrating his forces to defend the mountainous regions in the Taihang mountains. But after taking Shijiazhuang, the enemy will attack toward the west. Therefore, we should concentrate heavy forces in Longquanguan and Niangziguan and resort to resolute defense so that the main forces will win victory north of Taiyuan. What other forces do we have on the right wing besides Zhu Huaibing,[1] and will they be able to fulfill the task of firm defense?

2. We judge that the total number of enemy forces that have entered Shanxi does not exceed two and a half divisions. In order to defend the several dozen *xian* already occupied in northern Shanxi, it has to disperse at least one division, so that the forces used to attack Taiyuan will not exceed one and a half divisions at most. More troops have to be spared for the defense along the way of the places to the south of Yanmenguan, so it seems that the forces which will actually reach the Xikou area for the combat will not be more than about one division, and they will be surrounded by us on three sides. If we can hold out for one month in Longquanguan and Niangziguan, and if, in addition, our dispositions are appropriate, in terms of the quantity and quality of our forces, it is possible that we will be able to shatter the enemy's offensive plans temporarily. Because our forces number more than 150,000, and in terms of quality, the Red Army troops and those of Wei Lihuang may be the best in the campaign in northern Shanxi, it is also the last critical moment for the Shanxi Army, and it has to fight.

3. The key to this campaign lies in the following three points:

a. Firm defense in Longquanguan and Niangziguan.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 76–79, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Zhu Huaibing was the commander of the Guomindang Ninety-fourth Division.

To Zhou Suyuan[1]

(October 6, 1937)

Respected Elder Suyuan,

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[1] Zhou Suyuan (1879–1958) was born in Bijie, Guizhou. He participated in the Revolution of 1911 and served as premier of the military government of Guizhou. Zhou joined the Long March of the Second Field Army of the Red Army and reached northern Shaanxi in 1936. He served as a senior adviser to the Eighth Route Army after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. In 1938, he returned to his home province, as he had told Mao he intended to do.

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2. We judge that the total number of enemy forces that have entered Shanxi does not exceed two and a half divisions. In order to defend the several dozen *xian* already occupied in northern Shanxi, it has to disperse at least one division, so that the forces used to attack Taiyuan will not exceed one and a half divisions at most. More troops have to be spared for the defense along the way of the places to the south of Yanmenguan, so it seems that the forces which will actually reach the Xikou area for the combat will not be more than about one division, and they will be surrounded by us on three sides. If we can hold out for one month in Longquanguan and Niangziguan, and if, in addition, our dispositions are appropriate, in terms of the quantity and quality of our forces, it is possible that we will be able to shatter the enemy's offensive plans temporarily. Because our forces number more than 150,000, and in terms of quality, the Red Army troops and those of Wei Lihuang may be the best in the campaign in northern Shanxi, it is also the last critical moment for the Shanxi Army, and it has to fight.

3. The key to this campaign lies in the following three points:

a. Firm defense in Longquanguan and Niangziguan.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 76–79, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Zhu Huaibing was the commander of the Guomindang Ninety-fourth Division.

b. The garrison and attacking forces in the Xikou area in the front (the offense being most important).
c. Sabotage in the enemy's rear.
4. In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives:
a. Ask Nanjing to send promptly three to four divisions of fresh troops to take up their stations in Niangziguan.
b. Ask that the four divisions of Wei's army be the main offensive forces of the army group in the front, and that two divisions of the Shanxi Army assist in the attack, while the rest assume garrison duties.
c. The main forces of Lin [Biao]'s and He [Long]'s divisions of the Red Army will be responsible for sabotaging the enemy's deep rear area in the wings from the east and the west. In addition, ask Nanjing to send out two divisions of fresh troops to operate from Laiyuan and Weixian.

5. For this purpose, not only should the main forces of our 115th Division not proceed to Hebei, but it is also not appropriate that it be stationed in Longquanguan. It seems that, as the first step, it should move to Doucun and Taihuai, so that it will be able to attack Daying, Shahe, and Fanzhi when the proper time comes. Furthermore, when it is possible and necessary, it is prepared to cross over the Great Wall and proceed to Hunyuan and Yingxian, use them as the center, divide up into several detachments, adopt the tactics of operating at night, attack the Yanmen-Datong and Datong-Zhangjiakou railway lines, and attack the Zhangjiakou-Guangling and Guangling-Daixian highways. This operation of the 115th Division (it will be even better if two divisions from Nanjing can be added), in cooperation with the operation of the main force of He's division in Zuoyun, Youyu, Pinglu, and Suxian, will lead to a pause in the offensive of the enemy in Shanxi at the front, or even temporary and partial retreat. Moreover, it will result in the stopping of the penetration to the south of Shijiazhuang by the enemy forces along the Ping-Han railway line. Instead, the enemy will use one unit to defend the Beiping-Shijiazhuang line and divert another unit to the localities of Lingshou, Laishui, Guangzong, and Weixian to deal with our forces. As far as the 115th Division itself is concerned, because of the frequent moving about and combats, it must be prepared to pay a considerable price, that is, it must be prepared to lose 2,000 to 2,500 men, and, moreover, because of this reduction in numbers, it will have to give a small number of weapons to the local popular masses so that they can arm themselves. Nonetheless, in terms of sustaining the campaign in Shanxi, that is, in terms of the strategic objective of sustaining the campaign in North China for a relatively long period, it is of great importance.

6. Therefore, after you have given the matter careful consideration, if you are basically in agreement with this orientation, please carry out the following measures:
a. Ask Cheng [Qian] and Yan [Xishan] to determine which units and which individuals will make up the newly added defensive forces in Longquanguan and Niangziguan, and when they will arrive, so as to guarantee the security of the east.

b. Ask Cheng and Yan to send two divisions, which will go to the north end of the Heng mountains.
c. Ask Cheng and Yan to supply our forces with 3,000 to 3,500 rifles, and 30 to 35 machine guns, and ask them to permit us to recruit 5,000 to 7,000 soldiers.
d. The training battalion of the 115th Division should go to the area of which Taiyuan is the center and carry out the policy of expanding the Red Army. Do not go to Hebei, for we cannot be sure of recruiting Red Army soldiers there. The cavalry battalion should operate together with the main forces. The General Headquarters and He's division should send some people to the Taiyuan region to recruit Red Army soldiers as well.
e. The main forces or the whole of Liu's division[2] should be used along the Zheng-Tai railway line, to mobilize the masses and to reinforce the rear in cooperation with the garrison troops in Niangziguan.

7. Please think carefully about the above suggestions and reply by telegram.

After composing this telegram, I received Zhu and Peng's telegram of six o'clock today. Our ideas are now basically the same, but I do not know whether Lin and Nie will have any different opinions? In addition, please suggest to Yan and Cheng that we request them to pay close attention to secrecy. It would be better if they do not deal with their deployments by radio; otherwise, it will be extremely dangerous.

Mao Zedong

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[2] The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

Establish Anti-Japanese Base Areas in Northwestern Shanxi

(October 6, 1937)[1]

He [Long], Xiao [Ke]:

Since Wang Zhaoxiang's troops are being used in northwestern Shanxi, we have the following suggestions regarding the arrangements for the work:

1. We estimate that, after the enemy has penetrated in depth, his forces in the rear can only defend major strongholds in order to maintain their communications lines.

2. Consequently, conditions will be advantageous for us to launch an extensive guerrilla movement in Pianguan, Suxian, Pinglu, Zuoyun, and Youyu, as well as the Qingshuihe area in Suiyuan. We can cooperate flexibly with our main forces in the south, and with Song [Shilun]'s[2] detachment to the east of Pinglu and, if necessary, cooperate with the operations of the friendly armies. Therefore, in accordance with the current tasks, as regards deployment, you should first launch a guerrilla movement in the Pinglu, Pianguan, Suxian, Zuoyun, Youyu, Qingshuihe, Hequ, Baode, and Kelan area and create anti-Japanese base areas. You should rely on Shenchi, Ningwu, Hequ, Baode, and Kelan as the mass basis and shield the work of those who are involved in this task. The remaining guerrilla forces should appear in the guise of the volunteer army. Second, in the Qingshuihe area in Suiyuan, the main task is to recruit the guerrilla and volunteer armies. Third, under the guerrilla units, a few small guerrilla groups can be organized.

3. In the same way, we and Song's detachment would recruit guerrillas in the area to the east of Pinglu and west of Daiyue, and connect these regions as one. First, use Pianguan as the rear for the time being, and the fixed leadership organ of the work team should be stationed there. You should select one platoon of soldiers from our forces as the backbone and organize a guerrilla detachment in the Pianguan region. Second, organize guerrilla detachments in Pinglu and Suxian, but every guerrilla unit must have at least one platoon of soldiers from our forces as the backbone. Only in this way can the guerrilla detachments be formed. Since the masses in Shanxi do not have the experience of armed struggle, it will be very difficult if we do not send armed forces as the backbone.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 74–75.

[1] It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 5:00 and 7:00 P.M.

[2] Song Shilun (1907–1991), a native of Hunan, was at this time the commander and political commissar of a detachment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

First Preface to Rural Surveys[1]

(October 6, 1937)

Beginning with the war of the Northern Expedition in 1927, until we left the Central Soviet Area in 1934, I personally gathered materials from the countryside. Now only those portions of the materials listed below remain: (1) the Xunwu investigation; (2) the Xingguo investigation; (3) investigation in Dongtang and other places; (4) the Mukou Village investigation; (5) circumstances regarding land distribution in southwestern Jiangxi; (6) clarifying the rent question; (7) mistakes in the land struggle in Jiangxi; (8) the rich peasant problem in Yongxin after land distribution; (9) two early land laws; (10) investigation in Changgang Township; (11) investigation in Caixi Township. The last two items were published in the newspaper *Douzheng* in the Central Soviet Area; all the rest remained in manuscript and have not yet been lost even after the Long March. Everything else was lost. Among these, the most regrettable is the loss of the investigations which I conducted in the spring of 1927 in Hunan in the five *xian* of Changsha, Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan, and Liling, which were lost as a result of Xu Kexiang's rebellion. The investigation in the spring of 1928 in the two *xian* of Ninggang and Yongxin on the Jinggangshan was lost when we were obliged to leave the Jinggangshan. The materials which remain here are all from investigations in the Central Soviet Area. The first nine are from the early period in the agrarian revolution; the last two deal with the agrarian revolution when it was well advanced. Although they are incomplete, they are worth a look. In order to prevent further loss, we are printing a few copies, and giving them to comrades for their study. These are historical materials, and some of the points of view expressed in them are those of the time and have subsequently been changed.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji,* pp. 14–15, where it is reproduced from the *neibu* edition of Mao's rural surveys published in Yan'an in 1941.

[1] This preface was written by Mao in 1937 for an edition of his *Rural Surveys,* which never appeared. When the volume was finally published in 1941, Mao added a second preface and a postface, which appear in Volume VII of our edition. The texts themselves were included in Volume III, under the dates of their composition (from 1928 to 1930).

To Lei Jingtian[1]

(October 10, 1937)

Comrade Lei Jingtian,

Both your letter and Huang Kegong's letter[2] have been received. Huang Kegong's past history of struggle was honorable. He receives capital punishment today and the comrades of the Party Central Committee and I feel sorry about it. But he committed an unpardonably serious crime. If a Communist Party member and Red Army cadre were pardoned for such a mean and brutal act, an act that deserted the stand of the Party, the revolution, and humanity, it would be impossible to educate the Party, the Red Army, and the revolutionaries, or to teach people how to be ordinary human beings. Therefore, the Party Central Committee and the Military Commission cannot do otherwise than to sentence him to death in view of his criminal act and in accordance with the discipline of the Party and the Red Army. It is precisely because Huang Kegong was not an ordinary person, because he was a Communist Party member for many years and a Red Army man for many years, that we cannot do otherwise. The Communist Party and the Red Army must impose stricter discipline on their members and soldiers than on ordinary civilians. At the time of a national crisis and a tense revolutionary situation, Huang Kegong could be malicious, contemptible, cruel, and selfish to such a degree; his execution was determined by his own acts. All Communist Party members, all Red Army commanders, and all revolutionaries must draw lessons from Huang Kegong's act. Apart from announcing the verdict of the court, you may read this letter from me before Huang Kegong and the masses present at the public trial. Comrade Liu Qian's family members should be comforted and compensated.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 110–11, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Lei Jingtian (1904–1959) was born in Nanning, Guangxi. He served as president of the Superior Court of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and was chief judge in the case of Huang Kegong at the time.

[2] Huang Kegong joined the Red Army in early youth and participated in the struggle on the Jinggangshan and the Long March. He served as leader of the Sixth Brigade of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College. In October 1937, he shot to death Liu Qian, a female student of the Shanbei Public School, after failing to force her to marry him. After a trial by the Superior Court of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, Huang Kegong was sentenced to death.

The Crucial Point in the Combat Situation in North China Is in the Taihang Mountains in the Area of Niangziguan and Longquanguan

(October 13, 1937)

To Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], and Peng [Dehuai], and for the information of Bo [Gu] and Ye [Jianying]:

1. The judgment in Zhou's telegram of the 10th is correct. There is inadequate assurance of a counteroffensive at Xikou in the north, nor can the defense at Niangziguan in the east be relied on.

2. Consequently, the deployment by Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi] on the 12th providing for the redivision of the region is correct, and we should be very cautious in using the 129th Division.

3. The weakness in North China lies in the fact that the troops are too miscellaneous, and there is not a single main force army.[1] Under the principle of trying our best to cooperate in the campaign, and to sustain North China as long as possible, the Red Army should at the same time consider our deployment in case the friendly armies prove unreliable.

4. I wonder if we could suggest to Chiang [Kaishek], Cheng [Qian], and Yan [Xishan] the appointment of Huang Shaoxiong as the commander-in-chief of all the troops in Niangziguan and Longquanguan, and those to the east of the Taihang mountains (not including the Red Army), in order to unify the command and make sure that Niangziguan does not fall. Because even if Taiyuan falls but Niangziguan does not, we will still be able to hold out, but if Niangziguan falls, the war situation in North China will immediately become a local war and will lose its overall importance. We must be aware that the focus of the war situation in North China is not in Taiyuan, but in the Taihang mountains in Niangziguan and Longquanguan area. If the Taihang mountains and the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line are in our hands, then if the enemy enters Taiyuan, he will be like a turtle in a jar, and our troops will be able to achieve something. Please think deeply about this point.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 80–81, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The adjective *za,* or *za pai* (miscellaneous), also has the meaning, when applied to armies, that they belong to the forces of various local warlords and are not of the same quality as Chiang Kaishek's own troops or those of other major Guomindang commanders, referred to here as "main force armies."

Opinions Regarding Strategic Deployment in North China After the Fall of Taiyuan

(October 13, 1937)

To the five comrades Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Bo [Gu], and Ye [Jianying]:

Please think about the following suggestions regarding strategic deployment, put them forward to the Guomindang, and be prepared to carry them out as soon as Taiyuan falls:

1. Even if Taiyuan falls, it will not greatly affect the overall situation, because on both sides of the Datong-Taiyuan railway line, our troops are attacking it, and the enemy is surrounded by us on four sides. The pivot of the overall situation in North China is now in the Heng mountains and the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line. If this region falls, the war situation in North China will at once become a partial war, the enemy will have achieved the goal of controlling the pivot in all of North China, the whole of our Red Army will be in a passive position, and Henan will be under immediate threat as well.

2. In order to guarantee that the Taihang mountains and the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line are in our hands, be prepared to launch a strategic counteroffensive on the Datong-Zhangjiakou-Beiping line, and sustain the protracted war in North China. For the purpose of exhausting the enemy and defending the various provinces in the Central Plains, we should carry out the following deployments:

   a. Take the various units stationed to the east of the Taihang mountains, plus five to ten fresh and combatworthy divisions, put them in Longquanguan and Niangziguan as well as in the area to the east, appoint Huang Shaoxiong as the commander-in-chief, build strong and fortified positions in the wings, launch a mobile war of annihilation against the advancing enemy, as well as the Beiping-Hankou railway line, so as to achieve our goal of defending these two passes and the whole of the Heng mountain range.
   b. Place the troops under Wei Lihuang, Hao Menglin, and Liu Mao'en, plus two divisions of the Sichuan Army, in the Shouyang, Yuxian, area east of Taimian, with Wei Lihuang as the commander-in-chief. Apart from building strong and fortified positions in the wings, deal with the enemy in Taiyuan by a mobile war of annihilation.
   c. Place the 115th Division of the Red Army, and Chen Changjie's troops from Shanxi, plus two divisions of the Guizhou Army, and one cavalry division in the Wutai area. Apart from using one unit to attack the line along Pingxingguan, Shahe, Daixian, Chunxian, and Yuanping, the main forces should be prepared, when it is possible and necessary, to move northward, take the northern section of the Heng mountains, and attack the Beiping-Suiyuan railway line.
   d. Put the 129th Division of the Red Army in the area from Pingding and Xiyang to the south of the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line to southern Yuzi, set up base areas, and get ready for a defensive campaign in the south, should the situation by any chance turn against us.
   e. Put the main forces of the 120th Division of the Red Army, in cooperation with about fifteen regiments of the main forces of the Shanxi Army, in the northwest of Shanxi, outside the Great Wall, make sure that this region is in our hands, and launch a surprise attack on the Taiyuan-Datong railway line.
   f. Put about twenty regiments of the Shanxi Army, in cooperation with Chen Bojun's troops of the 120th Division of the Red Army,[1] in the area from Fengyang and Xiaoyi to the west of Taiyuan to the Lishi and Zhongyang area, and resist the westward advance of the enemy.
   g. Put the remaining forces of the Shanxi Army in the Taigu, Pingyao, area to the south of Taiyuan, and complete the encirclement of Taiyuan from four sides.
   h. Move all the residents of Taiyuan, as well as those in the nearby area, to the Fengshui valley. Be prepared to burn the city of Taiyuan. (Zhu, Zhou, and Peng should consider to what extent this is possible; if you reckon that it is impossible, then do not propose it.)

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 82–84, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] At this time, Chen Bojun commanded the 359th Brigade of the 120th Army.

On the Problem of Confiscating the Property of Chinese Traitors

(October 15, 1937)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi]:

We have taken note of your telegram of the 11th. Confiscating the property of the big landlords constitutes the main class content of the policy of confiscating the property of Chinese traitors. Of course, those big landlords who have not turned Chinese traitors are not included among those whose property is to be confiscated. Of all Chinese traitors, we should, first, resolutely confiscate the property of the big landlords. In the case of middle-level elements who have become Chinese traitors, we should not be in a hurry to confiscate their property before we have obtained the approval of the popular masses. As for those among the workers and peasants who have been forced to become Chinese traitors, we should adopt a policy of leniency, placing the emphasis on persuasion and education. This is the class line in the united front, and it is necessary to explain it clearly to everyone.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 41, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Use Guerrilla Warfare to Cooperate in the Operations of Friendly Armies

(October 16, 1937)

To Comrade Lin Biao, and for the information of Zhu [De], Ren [Bishi], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen], and [Peng] Xuefeng:

1. According to Peng Xuefeng, a certain army of the Japanese bandits from Tianzhen and the Guandong Army[1] from Weixian are advancing rapidly toward Guanglin. Yan [Xishan] of Shanxi is planning to concentrate fourteen regiments to fight a decisive battle against the enemy, and he hopes that our 115th Division will also participate in the battle, and so on.
2. Our forces should adhere resolutely to the policy which has been decided on and use guerrilla warfare to cooperate with the campaigns of our friendly armies. This principle was agreed upon with Chiang [Kaishek] and He [Yingqin] in Nanjing. Moreover, Zhou [Enlai] and Peng [Dehuai] reaffirmed the same decision in face-to-face discussions with Yan in Shanxi and, generally speaking, this orientation should not be changed.
3. Please telegraph me at once about the current situation, as well as about your opinions as to how we can cooperate with the campaign of the friendly armies. Subsequently, you should inform me promptly about developments.
4. Where is the 115th Division now?

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 85–86, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] I.e., the Japanese army of occupation in the northeast.

On Lu Xun

Speech at the Memorial Meeting at the North Shaanxi Public School

(October 19, 1937)

Comrades,

Today, our main tasks at the North Shaanxi Public School are the ones of training anti-Japanese vanguards. At a time when this great war of national self-defense advances rapidly, we need large numbers of activists to lead and we need large numbers of capable vanguards to blaze trails. These vanguard elements are open and aboveboard, loyal, enthusiastic, and upright. They do not pursue their own self-interest and serve only the liberation of the nation and of society. They do not fear hardship, have steadfast resolve in front of difficulties, and advance courageously. They are not haughty and showy persons, but persons who are down-to-earth and full of the practical spirit. They play a guiding role on the road of revolution. The present war situation is one in which only the government and army are waging a war of resistance, without the participation of the broad masses of people; one in which there is absolutely no guarantee of final victory.[1] We now need to create large numbers of vanguards who will fight to the very end for national liberation and have them lead the masses and organize the masses so as to complete this historic task. First and foremost, the vast numbers of vanguards throughout the whole country should get organized immediately. Our Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat and is at the same time the vanguard working for the most thorough national liberation. We shall fight tenaciously to the end to fulfill this task.

In commemorating Mr. Lu Xun today, we must first of all understand Mr. Lu Xun and recognize the position he occupies in Chinese revolutionary history. We commemorate him not merely because he wrote good articles and was a great literary figure, but also because he was a vanguard of national liberation and provided great assistance to the revolution. He was not a member of the Communist Party organization, yet his thinking, actions, and writings were all Marxist. He was a non-Party Bolshevik.[2] Especially in his later years he demonstrated more youthful strength. He consistently waged relentless and resolute struggle against feudalist forces and imperialism. In the adverse environment of oppression and persecution by the enemy, he endured and resisted, just as the comrades of the North Shaanxi Public School are able to study revolutionary theory diligently under such poor material conditions, filled with the spirit of arduous struggle. All material facilities at the North Shaanxi Public School are poor, but here there is truth and freedom, and this is the place to foster revolutionary vanguard elements.

Lu Xun came out of a collapsing and failing feudal society, but he knew how to turn around and fight back, attacking the corrupt society that he had personally experienced and the vicious forces of imperialism. He used his sharp, humorous, and forceful brush to paint the evil faces of the dark forces and the ugly features of imperialism. He was simply a superb artist. In recent years he stood on the side of the proletariat and national liberation and fought for truth and freedom. Mr. Lu Xun's first characteristic is his political farsightedness. He observed society with both a telescope and a microscope, so he could see very far and with accuracy. As early as 1936 he boldly pointed out the dangerous tendencies of the Trotskyite bandits, and current reality fully proves how accurate and illuminating his views were.[3]

The value of Lu Xun in China, in my view, is as China's number one saint. Confucius was feudal society's saint, and Lu Xun is modern China's saint. To commemorate him eternally, we have established a Lu Xun Library in Yan'an and opened a Lu Xun Normal School in Yan'an, so that people in the future may be able to envisage his greatness.

Lu Xun's second characteristic is his fighting spirit. As mentioned just now, amid the onslaught of darkness and violence, he was a large, independent tree standing tall, not a small leaf of grass leaning to either side. Once he clearly discerned the political direction, he courageously struggled toward a goal, never to surrender or compromise midway. Some revolutionaries, who fail to be thoroughgoing, participate in the struggle at first and "drop out" later. Germany's Kautsky and Russia's Plekhanov, for instance, are obvious examples of this. There are quite

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This speech was first published in 1938, and that version has been reprinted in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 5, pp. 279–82. The author of this transcript (who signed himself Dahan) stated in an accompanying note that he had not shown the text to Mao and took responsibility for any errors it might contain. A carefully edited version differing only slightly from the earlier text was printed in *Renmin ribao* on September 22, 1981, and is reproduced in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 42–45. We have taken this as our source.

[1] This last sentence does not appear in the 1938 version.

[2] The preceding sentence does not appear in the 1938 version. The Chinese means literally "a Bolshevik outside the Party," but this is undoubtedly intended as a translation of the term "non-Party Bolshevik," commonly used in the Soviet Union to designate a person who follows the Party line without actually being a member.

[3] The 1938 version contains the following sentence, omitted here: "It has already become quite obvious that the Trotskyite faction has become an organization of Chinese traitors and receives subsidies directly from Japanese intelligence organs."

a few people of this sort in China as well. Just as Mr. Lu Xun said, at first everyone is Leftist and revolutionary, but as soon as oppression begins, there are some who recant and even offer up their comrades to the enemy as gifts. Lu Xun deeply hated such people and struggled against them, at all times educating and training the literary youth under his leadership, teaching them to struggle resolutely, serve as vanguards, and blaze their own paths.

Lu Xun's third characteristic is his spirit of sacrifice. He was not in the least bit cowed by the enemy's threats, enticements, and persecution. Not shrinking in the least from sharp attacks, he thrust his swordlike pen at everything he hated. He often stood amid the bloodstains of the fighters as he advanced, tenaciously resisting and crying out. Lu Xun was a thorough realist who would not compromise in the least and was full of resolve. In one of his articles he advocates beating the dog that has fallen into the water.[4] He says that if such a dog were not beaten, then as soon as he jumped out of the water he would bite you or, at the very least, splash you all over with muck. So he was in favor of fighting to the finish. He had in him not a trace of false mercy or fake gentlemanliness. At present we have not even beaten the mad dog of Japanese imperialism into the water, so we want to beat it all the way to the point that it can't get up and withdraws from within China's borders. We must emulate this spirit of Lu Xun's and apply it in all of China.

The sum total of the above characteristics forms a great "Lu Xun spirit." Lu Xun's entire life was permeated with this spirit. For this reason he became a writer of great artistic acclaim, and in the revolutionary ranks he was an outstanding and experienced vanguard element. In commemorating Lu Xun we must emulate the spirit of Lu Xun, bring it into the ranks of the anti-Japanese forces all over the country, and fight hard for the liberation of the Chinese nation!

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[4] This refers to an article Lu Xun wrote on December 29, 1925, entitled "On the Idea That 'Fair Play' Should Be Postponed," published in the first issue of the semimonthly *Mangyuan,* January 10, 1926.

The Operational Deployment of the Eighth Route Army After the Japanese Army Has Taken Taiyuan

(October 20, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi]:

1. After the enemy has taken Taiyuan, great and rapid changes will take place:

a. The enemy in Niangziguan is sure to take the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line quickly. Lin's division[1] of our forces and our General Headquarters will face the danger of being cut off from each other.

b. The enemy in Taiyuan will take one route to Fengyang and Lishicheng to cut off He's division[2] of our forces, and march to the south; they will also take another route to the Fenhe valley to cut off our General Headquarters from the divisions of Lin and Liu,[3] and march toward the west.

c. The forces to the north of Taiyuan engaged in the War of Resistance will be scattered in disorder, and the forces of resistance in Niangziguan may face the risk of being scattered in disorder as well.

2. Consequently, the main forces of Lin's division should not go too far to the north, and Liu's division should not go too far to the east. General Headquarters should move to the area near the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line, and Wang Zhaoxiang's troops should not cross the Great Wall to the north, so that in times of emergency it will be easier to move away.

3. Our planned arrangements are as follows:

a. Leave Yang Chengwu's regiment[4] in the mountainous area around Hengshan and Wutai, to sustain the guerrilla warfare.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 87–88, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

[2] The reference is to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He Long.

[3] The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

[4] The reference is to the independent regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yang Chengwu.

b. The main forces of Lin's division should be prepared to move to the Luliang mountains on the west bank of the Fenhe River.
c. Liu's division will carry on guerrilla warfare in the present location to the south of the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line.
d. General Headquarters should be prepared to move to Xiaoyi and Lingshiqu.
e. He's division should carry on the guerrilla warfare in the northwest of Shanxi, but Wang Zhaoxiang's forces should be prepared to come back to Shenfu when necessary, strengthen the defense along the river, and build more boats.
f. Chen Bojun's forces should stay where they are for the time being and prepare to go to the riverside to support by coordinated action when necessary.
g. The ammunition in Shangshe and Hongdong should be moved away immediately.

4. Please think about the above estimates and preparatory dispositions, and let us know your views as quickly as possible.

Mao Zedong

The Operational Deployment of Units Such as the 129th and 120th Divisions

(October 21, 1937)

To Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], and for the information of Zhou [Enlai]:

1. Please be prepared to send the whole of one regiment of the 129th Division, which is stationed to the north of Xikou, or the main forces of the General Headquarters Special Task Regiment, to the south of Jiexiu and north of Huoxian (mainly the Lingshi area) at the appropriate moment, choose sections of the railway in narrow defiles, destroy several of them, and stop the enemy's southward march. The sabotage should be carried out after Taiyuan has fallen, and the enemy is advancing toward Jiexiu, and the principle is not to miss the opportunity.

2. Please order He's division[1] to be prepared to send out one battalion, under the leadership of a capable commander, and equipped with a transmitter, to leave the Shijiaojie area, advance to the border region of Fenyang and Lishi, choose narrow sections, wait until the enemy has advanced to Fenyang and the area to its west, and then destroy the roads in this area without missing any opportunity and prevent the enemy from marching westward.

3. Yang Chengwu's regiment[2] should be prepared to maneuver independently and self-reliantly for a long period in the border region where the three provinces of Hebei, Chahar, and Shanxi meet. As soon as possible you should provide a few senior cadres who are both militarily and politically reliable to strengthen it. You should plan to use these methods of communication as well as the communications equipment for as long as two years. They should be provided with clear, precise political and military programs. In addition, a company of cavalry should be assigned to them.

4. As far as the Wutai mountains are concerned, Yang Chengwu's regiment will not be able to deal with this. Please consider choosing one of the best battal-

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 89–91, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He Long.

[2] The reference is to the Independent Sixth Regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yang Chengwu.

ions from the Special Tasks Regiment of General Headquarters and appointing a few military and political cadres who are capable of leading more than three thousand people. They will be acting independently and self-reliantly for a long period in the Wutai mountain area, in concert with Yang Chengwu's regiment.

5. The whole of Song Shilun's regiment (those units which were detached should rejoin their original organizational system) should be prepared to maneuver for a long period of time in the area to the north of the Great Wall and west of Datong and Yanmen, to work in concert with Yang Chengwu in the east and the main forces of the 120th Division in the south.

6. Of the two regiments of the 120th Division main forces as well as the unit directly attached to the division, apart from the one battalion which will be sent out to maneuver along the Fengyang-Wuchengzhen-Lishi line, the rest should be divided into two groups. The first group will be the main force and should prepare to operate in the three *xian* of Shenchi, Ningwu, and Jingle and in the area to the west of the Yanmenguan-Taiyuan railway line; the second group will be the secondary forces, which will operate in the Wuzai, Kelan, Pianguan, Hequ, and Xingxian area.

7. Wang Zhaoxiang's unit[3] should be prepared to come back to Shenfu in part or in whole when it is necessary. He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying] will be responsible for guiding the work in Shenfu.

8. Wen Niansheng's[4] regiment should set out from Luochuan and Fuxian today, and place themselves along the Wuchengbao, Zaolinping, Mahuiping, Xuejiamao, Chuankou, Hekou, Qingjiancheng line to consolidate the defense along the river, and support Shanxi by coordinated action. Chen Xianrui's troops of the 74th Division[5] will, however, be moved to Luochuan and Fuxian to relieve the garrison (they have now reached Yaoxian).

9. Please think about these various suggestions while making your decisions.

Mao Zedong

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[3] The reference is to the engineers' battalion of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Wang Zhaoxiang.

[4] Wen Niansheng was the commander of the Eighth Garrison Regiment of the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army.

[5] Chen Xianrui's forces originally constituted the 74th Division, of which he was commander. In August 1937 this division was reorganized as the artillery battalion and baggage battalion of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Chen Xianrui was at this time the deputy commander of the eastern sector of the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army.

Restore the System of Political Commissars and Political Organs in the Army

(October 22, 1937)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Deng [Xiaoping], and Zhou [Enlai]:

As regards restoring the original system of political commissars and political organs, we agree completely. Please issue an order immediately to carry this out. The only thing that is inappropriate is the name of the Party's representative; he should still be called the political commissar. Only when, in the future, the Guomindang adopts the system of party representatives, can our troops change this to Party representative.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 92–93, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

The Operational Deployment of General Headquarters and of the 115th Division

(October 22, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Zhou [Enlai]:

1. We have taken note of your telegram of the 21st. Your opinions are in complete agreement with ours. Instead of asking the General Headquarters and the main forces of the 115th Division to move immediately to the south of the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway line, what we want is that you should not be cut off by the enemy, and that you should definitely be assured of the possibility of moving southward at the proper time. You should pay attention to choosing such an opportunity. Moreover, you should immediately start arranging all the necessary work in the Heng and the Wutai mountains. In addition, you should also think about the problem of leaving the entire espionage regiment of General Headquarters in the Wutai mountains. In the future we can set up another espionage regiment.

2. In the future, when you are moving to the south, as the first step, the 115th Division can send out one brigade to the Luliang mountains on the west bank of the Fen River. The other brigade, as well as the directly affiliated unit of the division, can establish its position along the rivers in the Taiyue mountains. Furthermore, it can cooperate with the campaign of the 129th Division in the Taihang mountains. The first step of the General Headquarters may also be on the east bank of the Fen River. So long as you are not cut off from each other, you need have no fear.

3. It does not seem to be a good idea for the General Headquarters to move south by way of northwestern Shanxi, rather than moving westward by way of southeastern Shanxi. The main thing is the safety of the General Headquarters.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 94–95, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Inscription to Commemorate the Founding and Opening of the Northern Shaanxi Public School

(October 23, 1937)

It is imperative to train a large number of people who are vanguards of the revolution, who have political vision, and who are full of the spirit of struggle and sacrifice. These people are open and aboveboard, loyal, active, and upright. These people do not seek self-interest and only serve the cause of national and social liberation. These people fear no hardship, are always resolute in the face of difficulties, and advance courageously. These people are not mad, nor are they opportunists. On the contrary, they are very down-to-earth and practical. If China has a large group of such vanguard elements, the tasks of the Chinese revolution can be accomplished smoothly.

Our source for this text is *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 33. It can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, p. 283.

Our Duties

(October 23, 1937)

We must absolutely defeat Japanese imperialism. Such is the duty of the Communist Party, the Red Army, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Special Region. We must definitely arouse the people of the whole country and the parties and factions in the whole country to carry out the ten great guiding principles put forward by the Communist Party for resisting Japan and saving the country, so as to reverse the crisis situation and defeat the Japanese bandits. Every Communist Party member and every progressive element should unite, yield to no difficulties, make careful preparations for everything, and smash the Japanese imperialists in the end.

This text was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* November 4, 1937. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 127, which reproduces this version.

Guerrilla Warfare Should Be Carried Out Mainly on the Flanks and in the Rear of the Enemy

(October 23, 1937, noon)[1]

Comrades [Peng] Xuefeng, Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Li Yuying]:

We have taken note of your telegram of the 18th [of September]. As far as Mr. Yan [Xishan]'s suggestions are concerned, I totally agree with the orientation he proposes according to which, if circumstances are unfavorable, the two armies can unite as one and firmly resist the attack of the Japanese bandits by means of a guerrilla war. I have, however, the following suggestions:

1. A guerrilla war should be mainly in the enemy's flanks and rear. Shanxi should be divided into the four districts of northwestern Shanxi, northeastern Shanxi, southeastern Shanxi, and southwestern Shanxi. Toward the enemies that have entered central cities and major communication lines, we should adopt the posture of surrounding and attacking the enemy troops from four sides. It is unwise to concentrate in the single region of the Wutai mountains, and it is difficult to concentrate for long in one region.

2. We should make the Wutai mountain range one of the important guerrilla regions. In order to achieve that, the preparation should be speeded up. Both sides should send people there to investigate and plan everything without delay.

3. At the same time, we should pay full attention to the Guanyin mountain range in northeastern Shanxi, as well as to the arrangements and preparations there, since the enemy is sure to take first the Shenchi-Ningwu area in this region in order to coordinate this action with the action aimed at taking the Heng mountain range in the east, and to obtain the advantage of occupying a commanding position before attacking Taiyuan.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 96–97, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 11:00 A.M. and 1:00 P.M.

4. Although the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges in the southeast of Shanxi and the Luliang mountain range in southwestern Shanxi are still far away from the enemy now, it is still impossible to neglect proper preparations at this time, such as the preparation and moving of some supplies and materials. It is inappropriate to concentrate all the materials in Wutai alone.

5. Apart from the military deployment, the most important thing in guerrilla war is to rely closely on the broad masses of the people in the countryside. Only thus can final victory be obtained.

6. The aforementioned arrangements and plans will in no way obstruct the current plan of striving to use the main forces to launch an advantageous, decisive battle along the Great Wall.

7. We truly admire and appreciate Mr. Yan [Xishan]'s sincere cooperation and his discussing the command with us.

8. Please submit the above suggestions for guerrilla war to Mr. Yan for his consideration. If he can accept them and adopt them, it will be most advantageous for the War of Resistance.

Mao Zedong

The Border Region Should Immediately Carry Out Preparation and Mobilization for a Direct War of Resistance

(October 23, 1937)

To all leading political officers, including Zhong [Hanhua], Du [Ping], and Wang Hongkui of the 27th Army, Gan [Weihan], Liu [Suichun], and [Chen] Bojun of the 29th Army, and those in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, Shenfu, the Central Shaanxi Plain, northern Shaanxi, and Yunyang:

1. The Japanese bandits have entered and occupied Datong and are now attacking Taiyuan, Suiyuan, and Ningxia. They are trying to begin by taking all of our North China.

2. The Border Region is very close to the areas that the Japanese bandits are attacking. As a result of the circumstances already mentioned, it will soon become a region participating directly in the War of Resistance. Consequently, we must immediately carry out preparation and mobilization for such direct participation.

3. Preparation and mobilization for direct participation in the War of Resistance should involve the following:

a. Point out clearly the current situation as regards the Japanese offensive and its influence on the Border Region. Point out that peaceful circumstances have already come to an end in the Border Region and it will move into a situation of direct involvement in the War of Resistance. Carry out this mobilization in depth among the troops through the Party branches and clubs, and by giving lectures. Change the old peaceful ideas, strengthen the training, and eliminate the atmosphere of guerrillaism. Consolidate the forces politically and organizationally so that they will advance toward regular army status.

b. Speed up the wiping out of bandits and exterminate the Japanese invaders. Within the Border Region we should intensify the consolidation and training of our own local security troops and strictly carry out reconnaissance.

c. In the economic domain, carry out a savings movement, improve the provisions, oppose embezzlement and extravagance, and conduct strict economic

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 98–99, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

investigation. In order to push forward this work, a savings committee should be set up in every leadership organ down to the company.

4. Use all the aforementioned work to cooperate with the work of the local Party and government. Fight for the protection of the Border Region while at the same time cooperating with the work in the whole country. Fight for final victory over Japanese imperialism, for the defense of China, and for national liberation.

Mao [Zedong] Luo [Fu] Zhang [Guotao]

We Must Link the Spirit of Bravery with the Spirit of Prudence

(October 25, 1937)

To Comrades Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]; Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], and Luo [Rongqu]; He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], and Xiao [Ke]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]; and to be transmitted to responsible comrades at all levels:

After small[1] victories, arrogance is bound to appear, together with looking down upon the enemy and thinking oneself extraordinary. The surprise attack on the 771st Regiment at Qigen Village was a consequence of letting these victories go to our heads.[2] You should issue an order to the whole army, and relay it even to all the soldiers in the companies, explaining that the war against Japanese imperialism is a long process of arduous struggle. All those cadres who regard themselves as number one under heaven, swell with pride, and regard everyone as beneath them, should be sincerely admonished with words like these: the spirit of bravery must be linked to the spirit of prudence, and one-sided and mechanical opinions in the army must be opposed.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 102–3, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] According to a note to the Chinese edition, two of the three existing copies of this text have "small" here; the other one has "numerous." They have opted for "small," and we follow them in this. At the time, the Eighth Route Army had not recorded a large number of victories, and it seems more likely that Mao was warning the commanders not to take themselves too seriously because of the few successes they had enjoyed.

[2] On October 23, 1937, the 771st Regiment of the 386th Brigade of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army was attacked at Qigen Village (situated in Shanxi, 35 kilometers east of the Pingding *xian* seat) by a Japanese contingent, supported by cavalry numbering over two hundred, and suffered more than thirty casualties.

Interview with British Journalist James Bertram

(October 25, 1937)

The Communist Party[1] and the War of Resistance

James Bertram: What specific statements has the Chinese Communist Party made before and since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war?

Mao Zedong: Before the war broke out, the Chinese Communist Party warned the whole nation time and again that war with Japan was inevitable, and that all Japan's talk[2] of a "peaceful settlement" and all the fine phrases of the Japanese diplomats were a mere smoke screen covering up their preparations for war. We repeatedly stressed that we must strengthen the united front and carry out revolutionary policies; only then could a victorious war of national liberation be waged. What is exceptionally important among these thing[3] is that the Chinese government must institute democratic rights[4] in order to mobilize all the popular masses to join the anti-Japanese front. We repeatedly pointed out the error of those who believed Japan's "peace pledge" and thought that war might be avoided, and of those who believed in the possibility of resisting the Japanese bandits without mobilizing the popular masses. Both the outbreak of the war and its course have proved the correctness of our views. The day after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Communist Party issued a declaration to the whole country, calling upon all political parties, all groups, and all social strata to resist the invasion of the Japanese bandits unanimously and strengthen the national united front. Soon afterward we issued the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country, setting out the policies that the Chinese Government ought to adopt in the War of Resistance. At the time of the establishment of Guomindang-Communist cooperation, we issued another important declaration. All this testifies to our firm, unfailing adherence to the general policy of waging war[5] by strengthening the united front and putting revolutionary policies into effect. In the present period our slogans[6] are *focused on one point:* "All-out war[7] by the entire nation."

The Chinese version of this interview was first published in *Jiefang ribao,* no. 23, November 13, 1937. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 285–303, which reproduces the text as it appeared in the 1944 Chinese edition of Mao's *Selected Works.*

1. The Communist Party → The Communist Party of China
2. Japan's talk → The Japanese imperialists' talk
3. Among these things → Among the revolutionary policies
4. Democratic rights → Democratic reforms
5. War → War of Resistance against Japan

The Situation and Lessons of the War of Resistance Against Japan

Question: According to your observations, what effects has the war produced so far?

Answer: There are two main aspects. On the one hand, by attacking our cities, seizing our territory, raping, plundering, burning, and massacring, Japanese imperialism has finally brought the Chinese people face to face with the danger of national subjugation. On the other hand, the great majority of the Chinese people have consequently become very much aware that the crisis cannot be overcome without greater unity and without resistance by the whole nation. At the same time, the peaceable countries of the world have begun to be awakened to the necessity of resisting the Japanese menace. These are the effects that have already been produced.

Question: What do you think are Japan's objectives, and how many of them have been achieved?

Answer: Japan's plan is to occupy North China and Shanghai as the first step and then occupy other regions.[8] *This is its objective.* As to the extent to which the Japanese bandits have realized their plan, they seized the three provinces of Hebei, Chahar, and Suiyuan within a short period of time, and now Shanxi is in imminent danger; the reason is that China[9] has so far been confined to a War of Resistance by the government and the army alone. This crisis can be overcome only if the popular masses and the government wage the War of Resistance in unison.

Question: In your opinion, has China recorded any achievements in the War of Resistance? In terms of lessons, what lessons might be drawn?

Answer: I would like to discuss this question with you at some length. First of all, there have been achievements, and, moreover, they are great ones. They are to be seen in the following: (1) Never since imperialist aggression began against China has there been anything comparable to the present war.[10] This is truly a war involving the territory of the entire country. This war is revolutionary in character.

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6. Slogans → Basic slogans
7. War → War of Resistance
8. Other regions → Other regions of China
9. China → China's War of Resistance
10. Present war → Present War of Resistance against Japan

(2) The war has taken the country's disintegrated condition and made it relatively united. The basis of this unity is Guomindang-Communist cooperation. (3) The war has aroused the sympathy of international public opinion. Those in other countries who once disdained China for its nonresistance now have come to respect it for its resistance. (4) The war has been a great drain on the Japanese bandits. The daily depletion of their funds is said to be 20 million *yuan*[11] and the drain on manpower is also undoubtedly very heavy, though figures are not yet available. While the Japanese bandits took the Four Northeastern Provinces with little effort, now they cannot occupy Chinese territory without *paying the price of* going through bloody battles. The aggressors sought to satisfy their ravenous desires in China, but China's protracted resistance will *as its result* put Japanese imperialism itself on the road to collapse. Thus China's War of Resistance is not only to save itself but also to discharge its great duty in the whole world's antifascist front. This is another way in which the revolutionary character of the War of Resistance against Japan is manifest. (5) We have drawn some lessons from the war. They were paid for in territory as well as in flesh and blood.

As for the lessons, they are very great ones. In the several months of the War of Resistance, many of China's weaknesses have been exposed. They are primarily evident in the area of politics. Although the war involves the territory of the entire country, it is not being waged by the whole nation. As in the past, the broad masses are restrained by the government from taking part, and so the war is not yet of a mass character. Unless it has a mass character, a war against Japanese imperialist aggression cannot possibly succeed. Some people are saying, "The war is already an all-encompassing war." But this only expresses how much territory is involved in the war. In terms of the part of the population that is participating, it is still a partial war because it is being waged only by the government and the army, not by the people. This is precisely the chief reason for the great loss of territory and for the many military setbacks during the last few months. Therefore, although the present War of Resistance is a revolutionary one, its revolutionary character is incomplete because it is not yet a mass war. This, too, is a problem of unity. Although the various parties and factions in China are relatively united compared with the past, unity still falls far short of what is needed. Most of the political prisoners have not yet been released, and the ban on political parties has not been completely lifted. Relations between the government and the people, between the army and the people, and between officers and the rank and file are still extremely bad; what we have here is estrangement instead of unity. This is a most fundamental problem. Unless it is solved, victory is out of the question. In addition, military errors are another major reason for our losses. The bulk of the fighting has been in passive battles, or, to put it in military terms, it has been "pure defense." We can never win by fighting this way. To win victory, policies greatly different from the present ones must be adopted in both the political and the military fields. These are the lessons we have learned.

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[11] *Yuan* → Japanese *yen*

Question: What, then, are the political and military prerequisites?

Answer: On the political side, first, the present government must be transformed into a united front government in which representatives of the people participate. Such a government would be both democratic and centralized. It would carry out the necessary revolutionary policies. Second, grant the people the freedoms of speech, publication, assembly, association, and armed resistance against the enemy, thus giving a mass character to the war. Third, the people's livelihood must be improved through such measures as abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing rent and interest, improving conditions for workers, junior officers, and soldiers, giving preferential treatment to the families of soldiers fighting the War of Resistance against Japan, and relief for refugees and disaster victims. Government finance should be based on the principle of reasonable burden, meaning that those who have money should contribute money. Fourth, making foreign policy positive. Fifth, the reform of cultural and educational policy. Sixth, the stern suppression of Chinese traitors. This problem has reached a point of extreme seriousness. The Chinese traitors are running wild. At the front they are helping the enemy; in the rear they are recklessly causing trouble. Some of them even put on an anti-Japanese pose, denounce patriotic people as traitors, and have them arrested. But really suppressing the Chinese traitors will be possible only when the people rise up and cooperate with the government. As regards military matters, comprehensive reforms are also required, the most important of these being to change from an orientation of pure defense in strategy and tactics to one of actively attacking the enemy; to change the armies of the old system into armies of a new system; to change the method of forcible mobilization into one of arousing the people to go to the front lines; to change the divided command into a unified command; to change from a state of indiscipline and detachment from the people into *scrupulous* discipline built upon the principle of consciousness; to change the present situation in which warfare is conducted only by the regular army into one in which guerrilla warfare of the people is extensively developed in coordination with regular army operations; and so on. All these political and military prerequisites are mentioned in the Ten-Point Program that we have proclaimed. They all conform to the spirit of Mr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles, his Three Great Policies, and his Testament. The war can be won only when these things are carried out.

Question: How will the Communist Party see to it that this program is carried out?

Answer: Our task is to explain the current situation tirelessly, *intensely, but also patiently*, and to unite with the Guomindang and all other patriotic parties and groups in order to expand and consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United Front, mobilize all forces and struggle to achieve victory in the War of Resistance. *Because* the Anti-Japanese National United Front is still very narrow in scope and it is necessary to broaden it, that is, to carry out Mr. Sun Yatsen's Testament in "arousing the popular masses," by mobilizing the popular masses of the lower levels of society to join this united front. What the consolidation of the united front means is carrying out a common program and using this program to constrain the actions of all political parties and groups. We agree to accept Mr. Sun's revolutionary Three People's Principles, Three Great Policies, and Testament as the common program of the united front of all political parties and all social strata. But so far this program has not been accepted by all the parties, and above all the Guomindang has not agreed to the proclamation of such a program in its entirety. The Guomindang has now partially put into practice Mr. Sun Yatsen's principle of Nationalism; this is manifested in its carrying out resistance against Japan. But the principle of People's Rights has not been carried out, nor has the principle of People's Livelihood, and this has now caused a serious crisis in the current War of Resistance. With the war situation so critical, it is time that the Guomindang applied the Three People's Principles in full, or otherwise it will be too late for regrets. The duty of the Communist Party is to raise its voice loudly to the Guomindang and the whole nation, tirelessly explaining and persuading, to ensure that the genuinely revolutionary Three People's Principles, the Three Great Policies, and Mr. Sun Yatsen's Testament are fully and thoroughly applied throughout the country, in order to broaden and consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

The Eighth Route Army in the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance

Question: Please tell me about the Eighth Route Army—this is something many people are interested in—for instance, about its strategy and tactics, its political work, and so on.

Answer: Indeed a large number of people have become interested in its activities since the Red Army was redesignated as the Eighth Route Army and went to the front. I'll now give you a general overview.

First, the combat situation. In terms of strategy, the Eighth Route Army is making Shanxi the center from which it carries out warfare. As you know, the Eighth Route Army has had many victories. Examples are the battle of Pingxingguan; the recapture of Jingping, Pinglu, and Ningwu; the retaking of Laiyuan and Guangling; the capture of Zijingguan; the severing of three main transportation routes of the Japanese army (between Datong and Yanmenguan, between Wei *xian* and Pingxingguan, and between Shuo *xian* and Ningwu) and the assault on the rear of the Japanese forces south of Yanmenguan; two recapturings of Pingxingguan and Yanmenguan; and the recent recovery of Quyang and Tang *xian* in Hebei. The Japanese troops in Shanxi are being strategically encircled on all sides by the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese troops. We may say with certainty that the Japanese troops will in the future meet with the most stubborn resistance in North China. If the Japanese troops try to ride roughshod over Shanxi, they will certainly encounter greater difficulties than ever.

Next, on the question of strategy and tactics. We have taken measures that other Chinese forces have not done; *the Eighth Route Army* is fighting chiefly against the enemy's flanks and rear. This way of fighting differs greatly from purely frontal defense. We are not against employing part of our forces in frontal operations, for that is necessary. But the main forces must be used against the enemy's flanks. Only by adopting encircling and outflanking tactics, and attacking the enemy independently and with the initiative in our hands, can we preserve our own strength and destroy the enemy's strength. Furthermore, the use of a certain part of our forces against the enemy's rear has a particularly strong impact because this can disrupt the enemy's transport roads and base areas. Even the troops that are engaging in frontal operations cannot use purely defensive fighting tactics *(also called a position-holding defense)* and should instead mainly make use of the "counterassault." One of the important reasons for the military setbacks of the past few months has been the use of unsuitable methods of fighting. The methods of fighting now employed by the Eighth Route Army are what we call "mobile guerrilla warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands." The basic principles of these methods are the same as those we used in the past during the civil war, but there are certain differences. To take the situation right now at this stage for example, we rarely apply our troops in concentration and more often apply our troops in dispersed ways. This is necessary in order to make surprise attacks on the enemy's flanks and rear over an extensive area. In terms of the armed forces of the country as a whole, because they are large in number, apart from one portion that should be used for frontal defense and another portion that should be dispersed to carry on guerrilla warfare, the main forces should regularly be applied against the enemy's flanks. The first precept of military affairs is to preserve oneself and annihilate the enemy, and to achieve this goal it is necessary to use "mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands," and to avoid all passive, inflexible, *mechanical* tactics. If a large number of troops wage mobile warfare, with the Red Army[12] supplementing this using guerrilla warfare, then the wreaths of victory will lie in our hands for certain.

Next, the question of political work. The Eighth Route Army has something that is even more exceedingly important and exceedingly distinctive, which is its political work. The basic principles of the Eighth Route Army's political work are three, namely: First, the principle of unanimity between officers and soldiers, which means eradicating feudalism,[13] abolishing the system of beating and abuse, building up conscious discipline, and sharing weal and woe. As a result of this the entire army is closely united. Second, the principle of unity between the army and the people, which means maintaining a discipline that forbids the slightest transgression against the popular masses; conducting propaganda among the popular masses, organizing, and arming them; lightening their economic burdens; and striking out against the Chinese traitors and collaborators who do harm to the army and the people. As a result of this, the army is closely united with the people and is welcomed everywhere. Third, the principle of carrying out propaganda among the enemy troops[14] and giving special treatment to prisoners of war. *With regard to this work*, our victory depends not only upon the fighting of our troops but also upon the undermining of the enemy troops. Although these[15] have not yielded conspicuous results as yet, they will certainly do so in the future. Moreover, in line with the second of the three principles, the Eighth Route Army replenishes its forces not by the method of coercing the people, but by the method of arousing the people to go to the front lines. Compared to the method of coercion, this method is far more effective.

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[12] The Red Army → The Eighth Route Army

[13] Feudalism → Feudalism in the army

Even though Hebei, Chahar, Suiyuan, and part of Shanxi have now been lost, we will absolutely not become discouraged but are resolutely calling upon the entire army to coordinate its actions with all friendly forces and fight to the last drop of blood to defend Shanxi and recover the lost territory. The Eighth Route Army will coordinate its actions with those of other Chinese troops in order to maintain the War of Resistance in Shanxi; this will be of great significance for the war as a whole, and especially for the war in North China.

(At this point, Mao paused and pointed out on a map the areas of recent activities of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi. In these places, the Eighth Route Army had already won many military victories. He explained the general strategy and tactics that the Eighth Route Army was using in conducting operations against the enemy's flanks and rear.)

Question: In your view, can these strong points of the Eighth Route Army also apply to other Chinese armies?

Answer: They most certainly can. The spirit of the Guomindang army was once broadly similar to that of today's Eighth Route Army; that was back in the 1925–1927[16] period. At that time the Chinese Communist Party was supporting the Guomindang[17] in organizing armed forces on a new system. At first it was just two regiments, which united with many other troops around themselves and won their first victory against Chen Jiongming.[18] These forces later grew into an army and still more troops came under its influence; only then did the Northern Expedition take place. At that time there was a new atmosphere in this force: there was unity, more or less, between officers and men and between the army and the people, and the army was filled with the revolutionary spirit of forging ahead courageously. A system of Party representatives and of political departments was established within the armed forces, a type of system never before seen in Chinese history, and it was this system that entirely changed the complexion of the army. The post-1927 Red Army and the Eighth Route Army of today *simply* inherited this system and developed it, *nothing more.* In the period of the Great Revolution,[19] the armed forces imbued with this new spirit naturally employed methods of fighting consistent with their political spirit, fighting not in a passive, inflexible, *mechanical* way but, instead, fighting with initiative, enthusiasm, and with an eagerness to take the offensive, and consequently they were victorious in the Northern Expedition. It is troops of this kind that we need today on the battlefields of the War of Resistance. We do not necessarily need millions of them; with a nucleus of a few hundred thousand such men, we could defeat Japanese imperialism. We deeply esteem the armies throughout the country for their heroic sacrifices since the War of Resistance began, but there are certain lessons that need to be learned from the bloody battles. *We especially hope that the main forces that have made heroic achievements in fighting and that have had a glorious history will stand up and lead the transformation of the whole army. The transformation of the government armies of Spain can be a good example for us.*

Question: Your policy of giving special[20] treatment to prisoners of war won't necessarily be effective considering Japanese army discipline, wouldn't you say? For instance, if the Japanese kill them after you release them and they go back, the Japanese army as a whole will not understand the meaning of your policy.

Answer: That is impossible; the more they kill, the more sympathy will be aroused for the Chinese forces among the Japanese soldiers. Such facts cannot be concealed from the eyes of the masses of soldiers. We will persevere in this policy of ours. For instance, the Japanese army has publicly announced that it will use poison gas against the Eighth Route Army, but even if it does that, our policy of special[21] treatment will not change. We will go on looking upon Japanese soldiers

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[14] Carrying out propaganda among the enemy troops → Undermining the enemy troops

[15] These → These measures for undermining the enemy troops and for giving special treatment to prisoners of war

[16] 1925–1927 → 1924–1927

[17] The Chinese Communist Party was supporting the Guomindang → The Communist Party and the Guomindang were cooperating

[18] Regarding Chen Jiongming (1878–1933) and his defeat by Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang forces in 1925, see Volume II, *passim,* and especially p. 71, n. 12, and p. 228, n. 4.

[19] The Great Revolution → The revolution of 1924 to 1927

[20] Special → Lenient

[21] Special → Lenient

and all cadres who have been forced to fight just as if they were our own brothers,[22] *showing sincere sympathy to them, and giving them special treatment immediately after they are disarmed.* We will not humiliate or rebuke them, but will release them and allow them to go back after explaining to them the identity of interests of the two countries' people. Those who do not want to go back may serve in the Eighth Route Army. If an "international column" appears on the battlefields of the War of Resistance against Japan in the future, they can join this unit and oppose Japanese imperialism with weapons in their hands.

Question: Are you prepared against being attacked by poison gas in the future?

Answer: At present we still do not have any defensive weapons because of material difficulties, but right now we are asking for assistance from Chairman Chiang. Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] is preparing to issue a declaration in response to the Japanese North China Command, which points out that any such inhuman actions by the Japanese fascists would certainly hasten their own destruction.

Capitulationism in the War of Resistance

Question: As I understand it, Japan is carrying out war while, at the same time, making noises about peace in Shanghai. What are its real objectives?

Answer: After successfully taking certain steps, the Japanese imperialists will once again create a smoke screen about peace in order to attain three objectives. These three objectives are: (1) to consolidate the positions already captured for use as strategic launch points for a second stage of offensives; (2) to split China's anti-Japanese front; and (3) to break up the international front of various countries for assistance to China. The present noises[23] are simply the start of the creation of a smoke screen. The danger is that, incredibly, there are certain vacillating elements in China who are ready to succumb to the enemy's wiles and that the Chinese traitors and collaborators are maneuvering among them and spreading all kinds of rumors in their efforts to make China surrender to the Japanese bandits.

Question: As you see it, what are the prospects for these dangerous attempts?[24]

Answer: There are only two possibilities: one is that capitulationism will be overcome, the other is that capitulationism will prevail, with the result that China will descend into disorder and the anti-Japanese front will be split.

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[22] Looking upon Japanese soldiers and all cadres who have been forced to fight just as if they were our own brothers → Giving lenient treatment to Japanese soldiers and lower-level cadres who have been forced to fight

[23] Noises → Peace noises

[24] Dangerous attempts → Dangers

Question: Which of the two scenarios is the more likely?

Answer: All the people of China demand that the War of Resistance be fought to a finish. If a section within the contingent of society's upper-stratum elements[25] takes the road of capitulation in their actions, the rest who remain firm will certainly rise up and oppose it, and continue *to carry on* the War of Resistance together with the people. Of course this would be unfortunate for China's anti-Japanese front. But I am sure that the capitulationists cannot win over the masses, and in the end the power of the masses will overcome them, will continue to maintain the war, and will achieve victory in the war. *Mr. Chiang Kaishek seems to have recognized this point, since he mentioned the general policy of persevering to the end in the war in his statement published on October 9 and in his statement responding to the Roosevelt Declaration. He said that fighting will continue even if only one man and one gun are left. The Chinese Communist Party firmly supports this general policy of Mr. Chiang Kaishek and denounces the capitulationism of all vacillating elements. The slogan of the Communist Party is "Shed the last drop of blood to defend the motherland." The spirit of Chiang's statement is compatible with our slogan.*

Question: How can capitulationism be overcome, may I ask?

Answer: Using words, by exposing the danger of capitulationism, and using deeds, by organizing the masses to stop capitulationist activities. Capitulationism has its roots in national defeatism, that is, national pessimism. This kind of pessimism holds that, after having lost some battles, China has no strength left to resist Japan. It does not know that failure is the mother of success, that *profound* lessons learned from the experience of failure are the basis for future triumphs. Pessimism only sees the defeats in the War of Resistance but not the achievements in the War of Resistance. In particular it fails to see that our defeats already contain the elements of victory, while the enemy's victories contain the elements of defeat. [We must] point out to the masses of the people the prospects for victory in the war, make them understand the temporary nature of defeats and difficulties, and that, as long as we keep on fighting in spite of all setbacks, the final victory will certainly be ours. Deprived of a mass base, the capitulationists will have no chance to play their *capitulationist* tricks, and the anti-Japanese front can be consolidated.

A Democratic System and the War of Resistance

Question: What is the meaning of "democracy" as put forward by the Communist Party in its program? Does it not conflict with "wartime government"?

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[25] Within the contingent of society's upper-stratum elements → Within China's ruling clique

Answer: Not in the slightest. The Communist Party put forward the slogan of a "united democratic republic"[26] as early as September 1936.[27] The political and organizational implications of this slogan include the following three points: (1) It must not be a state and government of a single stratum[28] but must be a state and government of an alliance of all the strata[29] excluding Chinese traitors and collaborators, and must include the workers, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie.[30] (2) The organizational form of such a government will be democratic centralism. It will be both democratic and centralized, taking the two things democracy and centralization, which apparently conflict with each other, and bringing them together in a certain form. (3) This government will grant the people all necessary political freedoms, especially the freedom to organize, train, and arm themselves for self-defense. In these three respects, it can be seen that there is no conflict whatsoever with a "wartime government"; this is precisely the kind of state system and government system that would be advantageous in the War of Resistance against Japan.

Question: But isn't "democracy and centralism"[31] a contradiction in terms?

Answer: We must look not only at the term but at the reality. There is no impassable gulf between democracy and centralism, both of which are essential for China. On the one hand, the government we are asking for must be able truly to represent the popular will; it must be supported and embraced by the broad masses throughout the country, and the people certainly must be free to support it and have every opportunity to influence the government's policies. This is the meaning of democracy. On the other hand, the centralization of administrative power is also necessary, and once the policies demanded by the people are handed over to their own elected government through their representative body, the government will carry them out and will certainly be able to do so smoothly, so long as it does not go against the general policy line adopted in accordance with the people's will. This is the meaning of centralism. Only by adopting democratic centralism can a government be really strong, and this *beneficial* system must be adopted by China's government of national defense in the War of Resistance against Japan. *This beneficial form of organization is something that the political life of mankind has acquired from historical summation as it progressed into the present era. The system of democratic centralism is beneficial both in times of peace and in times of war. In wartime, it is particularly able to facilitate political and military effectiveness.*

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[26] United democratic republic → Democratic republic
[27] September 1936 → August 1936
[28] Stratum → Class
[29] All the strata → All the anti-Japanese classes
[30] The petty bourgeoisie → Other sections of the petty bourgeoisie
[31] Democracy and centralism → Democratic centralism

Question: This does not accord with a war-cabinet system, does it?

Answer: It does not accord with some of the war cabinets in history.

Question: Do you really mean that there have been some that were in accord with it?

Answer: Yes, there have been. Wartime systems of government can generally be divided into two kinds, one being democratic centralism, the other being absolute centralism, determined by the nature of the war. All wars in history may be divided into two kinds according to their nature, one being revolutionary[32] wars, the other being counterrevolutionary[33] wars. For instance, the Great War in Europe some twenty years ago was an *unjust* war of an imperialist nature. At that time the governments of the imperialist countries forced the people to fight for the interests of imperialism, going against the people's interests. Under these circumstances, a type of government such as the Lloyd George government in Britain was necessary. Lloyd George repressed the British people, not allowing them to say things against the imperialist war; no organizations or assemblies expressing this kind of popular opinion were allowed to exist. Even though Parliament remained, it was merely a Parliament that approved the war budgets whenever commanded to, and was just a pack of imperialists.[34] The lack of concurrence between the people and a government that is committed to war[35] produced a government of absolute centralism, one that wanted centralism but no democracy. But there have also been revolutionary wars in history—for example, France's revolutionary war, Russia's revolutionary war, and Spain's current revolutionary war. In such wars *the people are in concurrence with a government that is committed to war, and so* the government is not afraid that the people will disapprove of the war because the people are extremely willing to wage this kind of war. The government's foundation is built upon the people's willing support, so not only does the government not fear the people, but it must rouse them and encourage them to express their view so that they will actively participate in the war. China's war of national liberation has the overwhelming approval of the people, *there is no discord between the people and a government that is committed to war*, and furthermore the war cannot be won without the people's participation; therefore democratic centralism becomes necessary. *China's Northern Expedition of 1927[36] was also a revolutionary war.* Its victories *at the time* were achieved by relying on democratic centralism. Thus it can be seen that when the commitment to war directly reflects the interests of the people, the more democratic the government, the easier it is to prosecute the war. Such a government should not fear that the people will oppose the war; instead, what it should worry about is that the people will not rise up or will be indifferent toward the war. The nature of a war determines the relationship between the government and the people. This is a principle of history.

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[32] Revolutionary → Just
[33] Counterrevolutionary → Unjust
[34] A pack of imperialists → The organ of a pack of imperialists
[35] The lack of concurrence between the people and a government that is committed to war → The lack of unity between the government and the people during a war
[36] 1927 → 1926 to 1927

Question: So then what steps are you prepared to take toward instituting this new political system?

Answer: The key question is cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist Parties.

Question: Why?

Answer: For the last fifteen years, the relationship between the Nationalist and Communist Parties has been the decisive political factor in China. The cooperation of the two parties from 1925 to 1927[37] resulted in the victories of the first revolution. The split between the two parties in 1927 resulted in the unfortunate situation of the last decade. The responsibility for the split was not ours, however; we were forced to turn to a new direction of resisting the Guomindang's oppression, and we persisted in holding high the glorious banner of China's liberation. Now we have entered the third stage, and the two parties must cooperate fully on a definite program in order to resist Japan and save the nation. Through our ceaseless efforts, such cooperation can be considered to have been established, but the problem lies in both sides' accepting a common program and then acting upon this program. The setting up of a new political system is an important part of such a program.

Question: How would a new system constituted through the cooperation of the two parties be established?

Answer: We are proposing a transformation of the government apparatus and the military system. In order to respond to the present emergency, we propose that a provisional national assembly be convened. We should adopt Mr. Sun Yatsen's suggestion of 1924 that the delegates to this assembly be chosen in certain proportions from all the various anti-Japanese political parties, anti-Japanese armies, and anti-Japanese popular and business organizations. This assembly should be the supreme organ of state authority; it should decide on the general policies for saving the nation, adopt a constitutional program, and elect the government. We believe that the War of Resistance has reached a critical turning point and that only the immediate convening of such a national assembly that has power and also is representative of the people's will can turn around China's political situation and overcome the present crisis. We are exchanging views with the Guomindang about this proposal and hope to obtain its agreement.

Question: Doesn't the Communist Party advocate a system of universal suffrage?

Answer: We do advocate a system of universal suffrage because only a system of universal suffrage can fully represent the will of the people. The provisional national assembly is a transitional measure. Emergency conditions do not allow for unhurried elections, and right now there is no way to guarantee that the elections would reflect the will of the people. At present, in order to represent the will of the people in a relative way, what Mr. Sun Yatsen proposed when he was alive is still best: having the political parties, armies, and associations of the popular masses each choose their own representatives. Naturally there are differences between this and a system of universal suffrage. We will definitely get to a system of universal suffrage; this method is merely a bridge toward a system of universal suffrage, but it is comparatively the best method at present.

Question: In your judgment, will the Guomindang agree to this?

Answer: As the national disaster has unfolded, many sensible people in the Guomindang have issued this kind of appeal. Mr. Chiang Kaishek has also expressed the desire to institute the principle of People's Rights, and many people of all sectors of society and many generals and officers of the armies of the War of Resistance have also felt such a need. I would say that I think the Guomindang has no reason to turn down this proposal. If they accept, the Communist Party and the Guomindang will enter a new stage of close cooperation. This is a precondition for the well-being of the country and the prosperity of the people.

Question: Didn't the National Government announce that it was canceling the convening of the National Assembly?

Answer: That cancellation was correct. What was canceled was the kind of National Assembly that the Guomindang has prepared to convene in the past; under the Guomindang's guidelines, such a National Assembly would have had no power at all, and the procedures for its election were entirely at odds with the will of the people. Together with people of all sectors of society, we disapproved of that kind of National Assembly. The provisional National Assembly we are proposing is completely different *in spirit* from the one that has been canceled. After this provisional National Assembly has met, the situation[38] will certainly become an entirely new one, and a necessary condition for transforming the government apparatus, for transforming the army, and for mobilizing the people will have been met. A favorable turn in the War of Resistance is at stake here.

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[37] 1925 to 1927 → 1924 to 1927

[38] Situation → Situation throughout the country

The Decisive Battle at the Moment Is Along the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway Line

(October 25, 1937, 5:00 A.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of your telegram of the 24th.

1. Are you going to use Chen Guang's brigade[1] on the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line? I think this is necessary. Moreover, it also seems necessary for the main forces of Xu Haidong's brigade[2] to move southward to do battle. It is sufficient to leave one unit behind in the northwest to cooperate with the special task regiment of General Headquarters and Yang's detachment.[3] At the moment the decisive battle is along the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line.

2. For the purpose of really cutting off the major north-south communication line at Yanmen, it would seem advantageous for Wang Zhen's forces[4] to take part in the operation in Yanmenguan area,[5] and to cooperate in the campaign of Song's detachment.[6]

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 100–101, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

[2] The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

[3] The reference is to the independent regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yang Chengwu.

[4] At this time, Wang Zhen was leading the main force of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

[5] Yanmenguan, located in the northern part of Dai *xian* in Shanxi, was one of the major passages through the Great Wall.

[6] The reference is to the Yanbei Detachment, which had as its basis the Second Battalion of the 716th Regiment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and was commanded by Song Shilun.

The Deployment of the 120th Division in Northwestern Shanxi

(October 27, 1937)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. It seems that the Far Eastern Army of the Soviet Union has put on a show of force toward Manchuria and Japan. It is said that one unit of the Japanese forces in northern China has moved beyond the Shanhaiguan, and another unit has gone back to Japan, but this is not confirmed. Please do not pass it on to your subordinates, lest it encourage an attitude of underestimating the enemy.

2. As our main forces on the right have concentrated along the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway line, if we fight well, we should be able to halt the enemy's advance. In my last telegram I suggested that the main forces of the 120th Division should march northward, but I have as yet had no reply. I still hope that you will think about it. In my opinion, we should leave only one regiment to the west of Yuanping. Of the two regiments of main forces troops, put the whole of Song's regiment[1] in the area from Datong, Huairen, Daiyue, Zuoyun, and Youyu to Pinglu and divide it into several detachments. The main forces will attack the area along the railway. One unit will launch new work in the west; the other regiment will be in the Shanyin, Yanmenguan, Suxian area, and its main forces will carry out surprise attacks on the railway line. One unit will open up a new prospect in Su *xian,* and its purpose is to make sure, on the one hand, that the major transportation line is cut, while, on the other hand, developing the work in the north.

3. Wang Zhaoxiang's unit[2] should stay where it is for the moment and await further orders. If the negotiations to the effect that the Eighty-sixth Division[3] should not occupy the Shenfu soviet area are successful, then this division may not go back, and it will recruit and reconsolidate in Shanxi. If the negotiation is not successful, we can tell it in a telegraph to move back.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 109–10, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the 716th Regiment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Song Shilun.

[2] The reference is to the Engineer's Battalion of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Wang Zhaoxiang.

[3] The reference is to the Eighty-sixth Division of the Guomindang, commanded by Gao Shuangcheng.

Outline for a Report on the Current Situation in the War of Resistance and the Party's Tasks

(October 1937)

Part I. The Current Situation in the War of Resistance

A. The Sino-Japanese War: Current State and Assessments

1. The latest developments in the war in North China and the Yangzi River area following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

2. The Japanese bandits have achieved temporary, partial victory in this war of aggression. This is because: (a) Japan is an imperialist country with powerful armed forces; (b) it is a close neighbor of China; (c) it was a planned, prepared invasion.

3. But this time it is different from "September 18." Japan has paid an extremely high price for every inch of territory it has occupied and has met with forceful resistance.

4. China has carried out a resolute, brave war of national self-defense against Japan, and, though it has suffered temporary, partial defeats, this war of national self-defense: (a) brought out the great and resolute brave spirit of the Chinese nation in an unprecedented way, eliminated the "fear of Japan disease" of the past, and dealt a considerable blow to the Japanese invaders; (b) consolidated China's internal solidarity and unity in an unprecedented way, of China, signaling a new atmosphere in the Republic of China; (c) caused the Nationalist and Communist Parties, which had been opponents for the past ten years, to resume cooperation, and brought about a decisive transformation in the Guomindang.

5. These temporary and partial defeats are also due to the fact that China is a country of semicolonial and semifeudal relations, and so: (a) Its military technology is backward; (b) the government and the military are old and corrupt, with many morbid states and weaknesses; (c) the military command is thoroughly backward; (d) the government is afraid to allow an open people's movement.

6. Such defeats are usually difficult to avoid at the beginning of a war between a semicolonial country and an imperialist country.

B. The Crisis and the Difficulties of the Current Situation

1. It is precisely these temporary and partial defeats that have caused the many current military, political, fiscal, and economic difficulties.

2. These difficulties are being used by the national defeatists, Chinese traitors, and pro-Japanese factions to prove the inability of China to resist Japan and to support their own capitulation and compromise. We should never underestimate the overt emergence of their activities, their dangerous nature, or their strength. Their weakness is that they do not have the support of the military and the people.

3. These difficulties have caused wavering and disappointment among some people within the anti-Japanese faction. They feel that the War of Resistance is hopeless, and they are cowed by the yammering of the pro-Japanese elements that "if we are not subjugated by Japan, then we will be subjugated by the Communists." This is the biggest danger at the moment. Still, the "decisive force" within the resistance faction, Chiang Kaishek, has so far continued to advocate a resolute War of Resistance.

4. The current moment is crucial for turning the crisis around.

C. Our Standpoint

1. We firmly believe that the defeats at this point have been temporary and partial, and are not a final and complete defeat. The war that will determine victory or defeat is still ahead of us, and the ultimate victory or defeat will be decided in a protracted war.

2. We believe, nonetheless, that we are now at a critical moment in the crisis. Our urgent task at the moment is to unite those within the resist-Japan faction, which means first and foremost further cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, in order to use all of our force to shatter the conspiracy of the pro-Japanese faction, overcome all the current difficulties, and continue the War of Resistance.

3. We must use the most concrete facts to prove before the people of the whole country that China's War of Resistance can be won and propose specific methods to solve the current difficulties.

Part II. Can China's War of Resistance Be Victorious?

A. The Three Factors That Will Determine Victory or Defeat in the Sino-Japanese War

1. China's strength.
2. Japan's strength.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 48–61, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

3. The international strength.

But the decisive factor is China's own strength.

B. China's Strength Is Becoming Greater as the War of Resistance Proceeds

1. The War of Resistance has expanded and strengthened the Anti-Japanese National United Front and China's domestic unity and firmness (the cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, between the government and the people, between the localities and the center).

2. The War of Resistance made the government begin to become a government of national defense. It has laid down the beginnings of a foundation for a unified government of national defense: a national defense policy of resolute resistance war, the determination to convene a national defense conference—the release of political prisoners—eliminating the emergency criminal procedure law—legalizing, to a certain degree, the National Salvation movement—struggle against corruption—struggle against Chinese traitors.

3. The National Revolutionary Army has begun to become a unified army of national defense, and it has laid down the beginnings of a foundation on which to build a unified national defense army: the establishment of a unified supreme commanding headquarters—the differentiation of individual war zones—the moving to the front lines of each provincial army—the reorganization of the Red Army into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army—beginning to set up a new army—beginning to establish political work in the more progressive of the armies.

4. The broad masses have been mobilized to participate in the War of Resistance, creating a high tide in the national War of Resistance.

5. The longer the War of Resistance persists, the more internally united China will be, the more powerful it will become, the more it will be able to become a democratic republic and defeat the Japanese invaders.

C. The Weaknesses and Difficulties of the Japanese Invaders

1. Fiscal and economic difficulties, particularly the failure to develop military industry.

2. The intensification of domestic contradictions (between the government and the people, and within the military and the bourgeoisie themselves).

3. The large territory and rich resources of China mean that the Japanese troops are inadequately distributed and cannot consolidate the occupied regions.

4. Japan's rear area is not consolidated (Korea, Taiwan, the Four Eastern Provinces, and so on).

5. The longer the War of Resistance persists, the more Japan's weaknesses will increase, and the more advantages we will have for achieving victory in the War of Resistance.

D. The International Situation

1. China's War of Resistance has aroused the sympathy and assistance of the proletariat and the people of the entire world—the attitude of the social democratic parties—the attitude of England's Labor Party and labor unions—the sympathy of France's labor unions and Social Democratic Party—the most reactionary union federation in America advocates opposing Japan and a boycott of Japanese goods—the admission of the Soviet labor union into the International Federation of Labor Unions in Amsterdam. The Soviet Union.

2. The attitude of all the countries of the world—France—Great Britain—America—the inconsistencies in their internal attitudes. Germany, Italy.

3. Generally speaking, the international situation favors China, and Japan is relatively isolated.

E. Conclusion

1. China has the strength to defeat Japan. Both the domestic and the international situations are advantageous to China.

2. The central thing today is to persevere in the War of Resistance and to wage a protracted war.

Part III. How to Achieve Victory in the War of Resistance

A. Expand and Strengthen the Anti-Japanese National United Front, Which Is Founded on Cooperation Between the Nationalist and Communist Parties

1. First, it must be explained to people both within and outside the Party that the basic precondition for this united front is resistance to Japan. "Resisting Japan above all else." Democracy and People's Livelihood are both secondary to this.

2. The content of the united front is: (a) cooperation among all parties and factions resisting Japan; (b) a unified government of national defense; (c) a unified army of national defense; (d) unified associations of the popular masses. This does not mean a government, an army, or associations of the popular masses monopolized by one party or faction.

3. The objective of cooperation between all parties and factions within the united front is "mutual help, mutual development"; it is not a matter of who should lead whom. For instance, our attitude toward the Guomindang and all the Guomindang's different factions is to assist in their development, consolidation, and unification; it is not to weaken and splinter them (the question of dealing with the different

factions of the Guomindang such as the CC Clique,[1] the Huangpu Clique,[2] the Revival Society,[3] and the fascists).

4. Our methods in working with our allies: (a) practical, tangible assistance, often taking the form of suggestions; (b) making appropriate requests and slogans based on the degree of their consciousness and the urgency of their needs; these should not be too demanding or too leftist; (c) well-meaning criticism, and we should also praise their merits; (d) make use of the motive force of the masses, that is, motivate forces from the bottom up, but do not engage in confrontation.

5. Make clear to the Guomindang that the Communist Party will cooperate with the Guomindang not only in the War of Resistance against Japan but also in realizing the Three People's Principles and in founding a new China. Therefore, this is a long-term cooperation to last for several decades, not short-term cooperation or merely subterfuge. We must struggle to the end for the united front.

6. Contradictions and friction within the united front are inevitable; they cannot be eliminated and can only be diminished. We should resolve and alleviate internal contradiction and friction under the principles of developing the resist-Japan movement and putting resistance to Japan above all else.

7. The struggle between the two lines within the united front; oppose capitulationism and closed-doorism. What is "maintaining independence and keeping the initiative"?

8. How to expand the united front: (a) the united front of every party and faction; (b) all mass organizations joining the united front; (c) organizing the unorganized to join the united front; (d) splitting the pro-Japanese faction and striving to win over those elements who are under the influence of the pro-Japanese faction.

B. Establish a Unified Government of National Defense on the Basis of the National Government

1. Instead of establishing another government, we want to establish a unified government of national defense on the basis of this anti-Japanese National Government. Push the current government forward.

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[1] The conservative faction known as the CC Clique, or the Organization Clique, was led by the two brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu.

[2] The Huangpu Clique was made up of those who had studied or served as instructors at the Whampoa Military Academy when Chiang Kaishek was its commandant in the 1920s.

[3] The Revival Society (*Fuxingshe*), also known as the "Revive China Society," was the front organization for the shadowy body commonly referred to as the Blue Shirt Society, founded by Chiang Kaishek in 1932, of which the actual title was the *Lixingshe* (Society for the Forceful Application [of the Three People's Principles]). On this last point, see the article by Xu Youwei and Philip Billingsley, "Behind the Scenes of the Xi'an Incident: The Case of the *Lixingshe*," *China Quarterly*, no. 154 (June 1998), pp. 283–307. On the "Blue Shirts" and other related bodies in general, see Lloyd Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 31–79, and Hung-mao Tien, *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 54–65.

2. We call upon those members of all parties and factions, including the Communist Party, who have prestige to join this government, consolidate the center, and persist in the policy of the overall policy of the War of Resistance.

3. Gradually weed out the pro-Japanese elements and the corrupt and degenerate elements from the government.

4. Help the central government to improve the local governments, oppose the situation of feudal separatist rule, help the local governments make progress in becoming organic components of the central government. Eliminate the antithesis between the central government and the localities.

5. Solve the problem of special districts. The principles for solving the problem of special-district governments are: (a) maintain the leadership of the Party; (b) make the special districts into local governments that are part of the Republic of China; (c) maintain the special districts as progressive regions in the War of Resistance against Japan, as the locomotives of nationwide democratization, and as embryonic models for the new China.

6. We should strictly differentiate the special districts from the united front areas (for example, regions in which the Eighth Route Army is stationed).

7. Communist Party members in governments of all levels should become models of resolve and bravery, endurance and diligence, public-spiritedness, politeness, and honor, and should be subject to strict supervision by the Party at the central and local levels.

8. Our objective is to establish a democratic republic with a parliamentary structure; both the domestic and the international situations demand this. (The example of Spain)

C. Expand and Establish a Unified Army of National Defense on the Basis of the Current Military Forces

1. Expand and establish it on the basis of what exists, rather than discarding the existing military forces.

2. We cannot say that the existing forces fighting the War of Resistance are still warlord forces or that those who lead the troops are warlords. Warlords can become national heroes and good military men.

3. How should we assist in expanding and building a unified army of national defense? (a) set up a political work system: (i) to strengthen the fighting capacity of the military forces, (ii) to improve military-civilian relations, (iii) to improve officer-soldier relations; (b) unify command, discipline, armaments, supply, battle plans, and so on; (c) oppose the warlordist practice of commanding one's own army for self-defense only, but also oppose discrimination against the localities by the central government; (d) help the government carry out the military conscription system; (e) train talented military and political staff in large numbers, improve, and expand military and political schools; (f) improve our military skills and military command.

4. Expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, strengthen the Party's leadership, strengthen political work, and improve its technical equipment, to make it a part of the national army and act as a model within it.

5. The Communist Party members should go to the army, go to the schools for military officers, go to the guard teams, the recruit teams, the volunteer forces, and the guerrilla units, to become models of political consciousness, resolve and bravery, endurance and diligence, and disciplinary obedience. They should also use their position to influence other officers and soldiers, and improve the quality of the army.

6. Coordinate the guerrilla warfare with the regular warfare. Relying on guerrilla war alone, it will be impossible to defeat the Japanese bandits.

D. Mobilize and Arm the People to Help the Government and the Military to Fight the War of Resistance and to Organize a Consolidated Rear Area

1. The Guomindang's contradiction regarding the mass movement: on the one hand, it "wants" it, but, on the other hand, it "fears" it. Because it "wants" it, it cannot avoid giving it a certain legitimacy; because it "fears" it, it cannot refrain from dominating it.

2. Our contradiction: we want to mobilize the masses, but our allies are afraid of mobilizing the masses and want to dominate them. It is about the difference between a "one-sided War of Resistance" and a "Total War of Resistance."

3. The mass movement can, however, still be mobilized in such a situation. The problem is through what kind of methods, what kind of paths.

4. The fundamental principles for the mass movement should be "legality" and "unity." Use all kinds of legal forms, even old forms. Everything should be done for the purpose of unification and against splits. Even the movements started and organized by the Communist Party are also subject to these two general principles.

5. About launching the struggle between the two fronts within the Save-the-Nation-from-Extinction movement, go deep into the midst of the masses.

6. As regards the relationships between the government, the military, and the popular masses (for instance, concerning friction over the issues of democracy and People's Livelihood), the Party should play the role of bridge and mediator. The government and the army should make some concessions, but the people should also support the government in resisting Japan. It is a mistake to provoke sharp conflicts.

7. How to arm the popular masses? (a) Mainly by seizing the enemy's weapons; (b) asking the government to provide some; (c) coming up with ways to buy some; (d) gathering together miscellaneous guns and such to organize armed self-defense forces, picket teams, and traitor-elimination teams.

8. Struggle against Chinese traitors, enemy spies, and Trotskyite bandits, particularly the latter, to consolidate the rear area. (a) the role of the Trotskyite bandits; (b) the danger of the Trotskyite bandits; (c) resolutely wipe out the Trotskyite bandits.

E. Carry on the War of Resistance and Guerrilla Warfare in North China

1. Because of our Party's increasing strength in North China, we are shouldering important responsibilities in North China, particularly in developing guerrilla warfare. We must set a good example there to influence the whole country.

2. We should stick to the overall policy of the national united front. Rather than seeking to swallow them up, we should cooperate with all the anti-Japanese parties and factions, and help them organize in order to develop their strength.

3. In places where the old régimes still exist, we should use them and work through the old régimes to achieve our goal of carrying on the War of Resistance; in places where there are no old régimes, we should set up united front governments of all parties and factions, preserve the old forms, and ask the higher-level governments for direction, appointments, and assistance. When the old systems of command still exist, we should continue to use them and work through them to achieve our goal of carrying on the War of Resistance; when there are no such old systems of command, we should set up unified command headquarters and ask higher-level organs for direction, appointments, and assistance.

4. Help the Guomindang to set up party headquarters in the two provinces of Hebei and Chahar, and put them in touch with the Guomindang Central [Executive] Committee.

5. Regarding the organizations of Chinese traitors in the occupied regions, such as the Peace Preservation Society, we should splinter them and try to put them to our use.

6. We should arm the people on a large scale, expand the anti-Japanese army and the Eighth Route Army, and organize self-defense armies, volunteer armies, guerrilla forces, and such, of all kinds and under various names.

7. Use all the old and legal forms to organize the masses to cooperate and unite with one another; all struggles should have resistance against Japan as their primary purpose.

8. Set up Communist Party organizations everywhere, and pay attention to the connection between open work and secret work. There should be secret Party organizations everywhere.

F. Expand and Build Up the Defense Industry

1. The national government has thus far not paid attention to the importance of the defense industry in a protracted war.

2. The central government should set up a ministry of national defense industry to unify planning and direction.

3. Issue defense bonds to develop defense industries.
4. Defense industries should be built in safe areas.
5. It is also necessary for every province to set up small-scale defense industries.
6. The special zones should also apply themselves to this matter.

G. Seek International Assistance to Strengthen the Forces of Resistance

1. Strengthen international propaganda (films, picture books, newspapers, joint declarations, delegations, and so on) to win the sympathy and assistance of all countries and their boycott of Japanese goods, and to persuade them not to sell their munitions to Japan, but to sell them to us instead.
2. Go a step further in drawing closer to England, the United States, France, and all other countries in the peace front; make use of contradictions in the international domain.
3. On relations with the Soviet Union.
4. The connection between domestic policy and foreign policy.

H. Conclusion

[The completion of] these tasks is a necessary precondition for achieving victory in the War of Resistance. They are not the tasks of the Communist Party alone; they are the tasks of the whole nation. We are willing to struggle hard, together with the government authorities, every party, every faction, every sector of society, and every military force in order to bring about the accomplishment of these tasks.

Part IV. Set Up a Strong Communist Party Across All of China

A. What Has the Chinese Communist Party Done in the Resistance War?

1. Our achievements: (a) the cooperation between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party opened up prospects for a War of Resistance; (b) we laid out a specific program for achieving victory in the War of Resistance, carried out extensive propaganda, and have, moreover, carried out some parts of the program in some regions; (c) the participation of the Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance and its effectiveness; (d) the War of Resistance and guerrilla war in North China; (e) the mobilization of Party members nationwide to participate in the war; (f) the obtaining of semi-open and open status for organizations of the Communist Party—these achievements have greatly increased the Party's influence and prestige.
2. Our weak points: (a) the united front is inadequate, and Party members do not have a deep understanding of the united front policy; (b) our capacity to mobilize the masses is still weak, and Party members are unable to go deep among the masses; (c) our organizational strength is weak; it has fallen behind our political influence; (d) We are short on cadres with the ability to work independently. These weaknesses have made us unable to develop our work still further.

3. Relying on the position we have already achieved, we should correct our weaknesses and develop our work, so that our Party can play a decisive role in the War of Resistance.

B. Going from a Party of the Soviet Regions and the Red Army to Building a Party Across All of China

1. Strive to win open status for the Party on a nationwide basis, take advantage of every possible activity to "come down from the mountains."
2. Develop and strengthen the Party; set up leadership bodies in every locality.
3. Heighten alertness within the Party to prevent traitors, enemy agents, opportunists, and capitulationists from worming their way into the Party.
4. Set up an open, nationwide Party newspaper and circulation network.
5. Prepare to convene the Seventh Party Congress.

C. Cadre Policy

1. The present panic of the cadres. Reinforce the education, training, and promotion of the cadres. "Cadres decide everything."
2. Investigating the cadres, and testing the cadres' political aspect and work abilities.
3. Make our cadres capable not only of managing the Party but also of managing the country. They must understand how to speak to the people of all China and the people of the entire world and work on their behalf. They must have broad, far-reaching political vision and the demeanor of statesmen.

D. Struggle for Solidarity and Unanimity Within the Party

1. Solidarity and unanimity within the Party is a precondition for defeating the Japanese bandits.
2. The interests of the Party are above all else. Everything for the Party. Sabotage of the Party is the sabotage of the revolution.
3. Strengthen Marxist-Leninist education within the Party, and the unity of theory and practice.
4. Correctly develop ideological struggle and self-criticism.
5. Strictly enforce the Party's discipline; resolutely observe the organizational principle of democratic centralism.
6. Struggle on behalf of the Bolshevik line of the International and the Chinese Communist Party.

Instructions at the Inauguration Ceremony for the Buildings of the Anti-Japanese University

(October 1937)

I want to talk with the comrades about the reason for the success of this great cause. To sum it up, it is the ability to surmount difficulties and connect with the masses. The experience of struggle over the past decade, as well as the cave-digging by you this time, have demonstrated, and the future process of the War of Resistance will once again demonstrate, that if we can continue in this way, we can triumph over everything!

Although overcoming natural obstacles and conquering the soil has many similarities with overcoming living enemies and defeating the Japanese bandits, there are many respects in which they are not entirely the same. The latter will be somewhat harder and more difficult. Hence, in the War of Resistance, we must not simply have the mental attitude of surmounting difficulties and connecting with the masses. We can only succeed if we are also good at work such as applying strategy and tactics, organizing, mobilizing, and leading the masses, securing allies, and so on.

Now you already possess the spirit of overcoming difficulties and connecting with the masses. So long as you continue to mobilize and display your talents on this basis in defeating and expelling Japan, it is entirely possible to drive Japan out of China.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, p. 277, where it is reproduced from a Red Guard publication.

To Ai Siqi[1]

(1937)[2]

Comrade Siqi:

Your *Philosophy and Life*[3] is the profoundest of all your books. I have derived great benefit from reading it and have taken some notes. I am sending them to you with the request that you see whether what I have written is correct. In the notes, there is one question regarding which I take a somewhat different view (it is not a fundamental disagreement).[4] Please give further consideration to this point, and tell me frankly and in detail what you think. Today, whenever I have some free time, I will come to see you.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 112–13, where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript.

[1] Ai Siqi (1910–1966) had published in 1934 an extremely influential work of popularization of Marxism, entitled *Dazhong zhexue* (Philosophy for the Masses) and was admitted into the Chinese Communist Party a year later. In 1936 he had taken the side of "literature for national defense," rather than that of "people's literature," and in 1937 he had gone to Yan'an, where he rapidly became one of the Party's most influential propagandists.

[2] The letter is dated simply 1937 in the available sources, but it must have been written no earlier than October, since Ai Siqi arrived in Yan'an only at that time.

[3] This work had been published in Shanghai in April 1937.

[4] For details regarding the point on which Mao disagreed with him, see below, in the section of this volume devoted to his reading notes, his comments on *Philosophy and Life.*

The Current Situation and Orientation[1]

(November 1, 1937)

Comrades:

You have asked me to talk about problems of the current situation, and I shall take advantage of the opening of your school to address this question. You are intimately involved in this question because those who study and those who teach have a single goal, which is to resolve the national and social crises.

The situation now is extremely tense. The second line of defense in Shanghai has fallen. The enemies in eastern Shanxi have already broken through Niangziguan, and they are attempting to act in concert with the enemies in northern Shanxi and advance toward Taiyuan. At present, there are two issues facing us: 1. To continue to fight or to stop fighting? 2. How to fight?

The present war situation is obviously unfavorable to China. This is because in the past we only engaged in a one-sided War of Resistance, and not an all-out war. Now many people say that the present war is already an all-out war. This is incorrect because, although from a territorial standpoint, it is an all-out war, in terms of social composition it is still a one-sided war. The broad masses have still by no means been mobilized for the War of Resistance. Only armies and governments are involved, so we have suffered many defeats. Under such circumstances, a new kind of danger is growing: Traitors and pro-Japanese elements are taking the opportunity to raise their heads, and such arguments as "Fighting will inevitably lead to defeat" and "Weapons alone will determine the outcome" will certainly be encouraged as a result. Their conclusion is that China cannot win, so it must surrender. The theory of national surrender is the new danger now.

We must realize that the War of Resistance has registered indelible achievements in the past. What are these achievements? (1) China's War of Resistance is unprecedented in the past hundred years and is by nature a revolutionary war. (2) During the War of Resistance, China has become more united internally. (3) Although we have suffered many military setbacks, we have dealt rather heavy blows to the Japanese bandits. (4) We have gained international sympathy. (5) Most important, we have learned a profound lesson in the war, namely, that we cannot win by waging a one-sided War of Resistance.

We must never become disillusioned because of the current situation. We are in complete agreement with Mr. Chiang Kaishek's speech of October 9 and will fight to the end with determination, even to the last person and the last gun. This is the meaning of the Communist Party's statement about "shedding the last drop of blood for the defense of the motherland," and it constitutes our fundamental policy in the current situation.

We shall certainly continue to fight, but how should we fight? Militarily, we must emulate the methods of the Eighth Route Army, that is, we should fight flexibly and not rigidly. In the past, we were always attacked by the enemy, so our method of fighting must change, and we should attack the enemy. The most important thing is that we must carry out the Ten-Point Program for resisting Japan and saving the country put forward by the Communist Party, mobilize the 450 million Chinese to take part in the War of Resistance, organize them, and arm them. They constitute an extremely great force, and it is only with this force that China can be victorious. The whole country should definitely learn from the Eighth Route Army, truly bring about unity between soldiers and civilians, and between officers and soldiers, transform the spirit of the army, and strengthen political work in the army, in order to achieve our goals. Only thus can we turn around the current grave situation. This is the correct method for carrying out the policy of continued fighting.

If we have the two aspects represented by the above orientation and methods, we can definitely defeat Japanese imperialism.

We need to create for the national revolution large numbers of cadres who understand revolutionary theory, are infused with the spirit of sacrifice, and are the vanguards of the revolution. Only by relying on tens of thousands of good cadres, capable of applying revolutionary policies and methods, can an all-out nationwide revolutionary war emerge in China and the enemy be finally defeated.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 62–64, where it is reproduced from the text published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* November 4, 1937. The same version can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 131–32.

[1] This is Mao Zedong's speech at the opening ceremony of the Northern Shaanxi Public School.

After the Fall of Taiyuan, North China Will Carry on a Guerrilla War of Resistance Against Japan with the Eighth Route Army as the Main Force

(November 8, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Lin [Biao] and Nie [Rongzhen], He [Xiaoguang] [He Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying], and Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]:

1. After the fall of Taiyuan, the period of regular warfare in northern China will be basically over, and the period of guerrilla warfare will begin.[1] The Eighth Route Army will play the principal role in this phase of guerrilla warfare, and the others will rely on the Eighth Route Army. This is the overall situation in North China.

2. We judge that, in order to defend Henan, before the fall of Jincheng and Linfen, the remaining troops in Shanxi will not withdraw, and it is also possible that Liu Xiang's[2] forces may enter Shanxi. The remaining troops of Yan [Xishan], Wei [Lihuang], Sun [Lianzhong], Ceng [Wanzhong], Feng [Qinzai], Zhao [Shoushan], Deng [Xihou], Sun [Chu], and others will be scattered in large numbers. In that case it must be feared that even a guerrilla war will not be able to sustain them for long. Yan will not have the energy to interfere too much with the local work of the Eighth Route Army, and consequently the Eighth Route Army will become the backbone of the guerrilla war in the whole of Shanxi. In accordance with the principle of a united front, you should set out to mobilize the masses, expand your forces, gather supplies, and incorporate the scattered soldiers into your own forces. We should adopt the principle that each division should recruit three regiments. Do not rely on the Guomindang for salaries, but raise the money yourselves and pay them.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 111–13, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Taiyuan in fact fell to the Japanese on the next day, November 9.

[2] Liu Xiang (1888–1938) was at this time commander of the Guomindang Seventh War Zone.

3. The Luliang mountain range is a major base of the Eighth Route Army, but the work there has not yet begun. Consequently, not only should Xu's brigade[3] move away at once, but Chen's brigade,[4] under the command of Lin, should also not fight any longer in the east, and it will be better for it to start moving away immediately as well. We calculate that it will take at least twenty days from the time of moving away until beginning work, and it will take another ten days before the work can become effective (after the start). We are afraid that by that time the enemy will have gone deep into the Feng River drainage area and will have already taken Xiaoyi and other places. After the moving away, it is better if Xu's brigade can use Fengyang as its center, and Chen's brigade can use Puxian as its center. The General Headquarters should start moving to the west right away.

4. The forces under the command of Wen Niansheng, Yan Hongyan, and Bai Zhiwen[5] are responsible for the defense along the river from Jia *xian* to Yanchang. Chen Qihan[6] is the garrison commander for the five *xian* of Sui, Mi, Qing, Jia, and Wu; Guo Hongtao[7] is the political commissar, and together they command all the troops under Wen and Yan. Wen's troops have finished arranging the defense in Suide, Mizi, Jia *xian,* and Wubu. Yan's troops will set out from Yan'an tomorrow to relieve the garrison along Wayaobao, Qingjiancheng, Hekou, and Majiaping. He Changgong is the defensive commander of the two Yans.[8] He will command Bai's troops to build boats, and their additional task includes supervising and protecting transportation. Xiao Jingguang is the commander-in-chief of the river defense, holding to the west bank to resist the enemy on the east bank. Only in this way can the west bank of the river be forcefully defended, and can we assist in the most important task of He's entire division in the Luliang and Guanyin mountain ranges.

5. The entire 129th Division, in southeastern Shanxi, and the 120th Division in northwestern Shanxi should prepare to sustain a protracted guerrilla war. Their main forces should not withdraw from Shanxi unless they are facing the danger of having their retreat cut off. The concrete details of their deployment will be dealt with by Zhu and Peng. Zhou should please come back to Yan['an] by way of Suide.

Mao Zedong

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[3] The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

[4] The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

[5] Wen Niansheng was the commander of the Eighth Garrison Regiment, Yan Hongyan was the commander of the Third Garrison Regiment, and Bai Zhiwen was the commander of the Fifth Garrison Regiment.

[6] Chen Qihan was at this time commander of the garrison forces of the Eighth Route Army in Suide.

[7] Guo Hongtao was at this time secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee.

[8] The "two Yans" refers to Yanchuan and Yanchang *xian,* located on the banks of the Yellow River in northern Shanxi.

Opinions Regarding the Situation in North China and Readjustments in the Deployment of the Eighth Route Army

(November 9, 1937, 4:00 A.M.)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], for the information of Zhou [Enlai], and to be transmitted to Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi], Yang [Shangkun], and Peng [Xuefeng]:

In the situation in which regular war in northern China has already ended, and the guerrilla war has taken the leading position, the Japanese bandits will soon divert their main forces to attack key points in the *xian* in the interior. Shenchi, Ningwu, and Jingle in northwestern Shanxi; Wutai, Yu *xian*, Wei *xian*, Guangling, and Lingqiu in northeastern Shanxi; Xiyang, Heshun, Liao *xian,* and Jincheng in southeastern Shanxi; Lishi, Zhongyang, Xiaoyi, Lingshi, Pu *xian,* and other places in southwestern Shanxi, are all places the enemy will advance to next. Consequently, new dispositions should be adopted for the work of Nie [Rongzhen]'s forces, He [Long]'s division, Liu [Bocheng]'s division, and Lin [Biao]'s division (Lin's division should be moved to the Luliang mountain range) in these four major areas. The general guiding principle for these deployments is to dispose of one unit as the attack team, while the top priority for the majority is to disperse them as much as possible in important places to organize armed forces of the popular masses. Generally speaking, the troops should be deployed first in the areas near the railways and highways, where they should serve as advance detachments. They should work first in areas which the enemy will soon reach; work can be undertaken later in areas which the enemy will not reach soon. All the armies have been routed, and even Yan [Xishan] does not know what to do next. In accordance with the basic principles of the united front, the Red Army should take the initiative in mobilizing the people, abolishing the exorbitant taxes and levies, reducing rent and interest rates, incorporating the scattered troops into our own forces, buying guns, collecting money for soldiers' pay and provisions, carrying out a policy of self-sufficiency, expanding the army, cracking down on the Chinese traitors, incorporating the leftists into our ranks, and further bringing into play the spirit of

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 65–66. The same version appears in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 114–15, under a different title.

independence and self-reliance. If we continue like this, we will achieve striking successes in a month, thus helping to prepare us to resist with all our strength the enemy's forthcoming attack upon the *xian* in the interior.

Mao Zedong

The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan

(November 12, 1937)

I. The Present Situation Is One of Transition from a War of Partial Resistance to a War of Total Resistance

1. We support any kind of war of resistance, even though partial, against the invasion of Japanese imperialism. For partial resistance is a step forward from nonresistance, and to a certain extent it is revolutionary in character and is a war in defense of the motherland.

2. But a war of partial resistance by the government alone without the participation of the popular masses will certainly fail, as we have already pointed out (at the meeting of Party activists in Yan'an in April of this year, at the Party's national conference in May, and in the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee in August). For it is not a national revolutionary war in the full sense, not a war of the masses.

3. We stand for a national revolutionary war in the full sense, a war in which the people of the entire country are mobilized, in other words, all-out resistance. For only such a war of resistance constitutes a war of the masses and can achieve the goal of defending the motherland.

4. Although the partial war of resistance advocated by the Guomindang also constitutes a national war and is revolutionary in character, its revolutionary character is far from complete. Partial resistance is bound to lead to defeat in the war; it can never successfully defend the motherland.

5. Herein lies the difference in principle between the stand of the Communist Party and the present stand of the Guomindang with regard to resistance. If Communists forget this difference in principle, they will be unable to guide the War of Resistance correctly, they will be powerless to overcome the Guomindang's one-sidedness, and they will debase themselves to the point of abandoning their Communist principles and reducing their Party to the level of the Guomindang. That would be a crime against the sacred cause of the national revolutionary war and the defense of the motherland.

6. In a national revolutionary war in the full sense, in an all-out war of resistance, it is essential to put into effect the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by the Communist Party,[1] and it is essential to have a government and an army that will enforce this program in its entirety.

7. The situation after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan is as follows:

a. In North China, regular warfare in which the Guomindang played the chief role has ended, and guerrilla warfare in which the Communist Party is playing the chief role has become primary. In Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the Japanese aggressors have broken through the Guomindang's battle lines and are advancing on Nanjing and the Yangzi valley. It is already evident that the Guomindang's partial resistance cannot last long.
b. In their own imperialist interests, the governments of Britain, the United States, and France have indicated that they will help China, but so far there has been only verbal sympathy and no practical aid whatsoever.
c. The German and Italian fascists are doing everything to assist Japanese imperialism.
d. The Guomindang is still unwilling to make any fundamental change in its one-party dictatorship and autocratic rule over the popular masses, through which it is carrying on partial resistance.

This is one side of the picture.

The other side is seen in the following:

a. The political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army is spreading fast and far, and they are being acclaimed throughout the country as "the saviors of the nation." The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army are determined to persevere in the guerrilla warfare in North China, so as to defend the whole country, tie down the Japanese bandits, and hinder them from attacking the Central Plains and the Northwest.
b. The movement of the popular masses has developed a step further.
c. The national bourgeoisie is leaning toward the left.
d. Forces favoring reforms are growing within the Guomindang.
e. The movement to oppose Japan and aid China is spreading among the people of the world.
f. The Soviet Union is preparing to give forceful assistance to China.

This is the other side of the picture.

8. Therefore, the present situation is one of transition from a partial war of resistance to a full-scale war of resistance. While partial resistance cannot last

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Our source for this document is the 1991 revised edition of *Mao Zedong xuanji,* Vol. 2, pp. 387–96. No contemporary version is available.

[1] See above, the outline of the Propaganda Department dated August 25, 1937.

long, all-out resistance has not yet begun. The transition from one to the other, the gap in time, is fraught with danger.

9. In this period, China's partial War of Resistance may develop in one of three directions:

The first is the ending of the partial War of Resistance and its replacement by an all-out war of resistance. This is what the majority of the nation demands, but the Guomindang is still undecided.

The second is the ending of the War of Resistance and its replacement by capitulation. This is what the Japanese bandits, the Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements demand, but the majority of the Chinese people oppose it.

The third is the coexistence of armed resistance and capitulation in China. This could come about as a result of the intrigues of the Japanese bandits, the Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements to split China's anti-Japanese front when they find it impossible to attain the second direction. They are now engineering something of this kind. This is a very real and serious danger.

10. Judging from the present situation, the domestic and international factors which prevent capitulationism from winning out have the upper hand. These factors include Japan's resolute policy of destroying China, which leaves China no alternative but to fight; the existence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army; the demands of the Chinese people; the wishes of the majority of Guomindang members; the anxiety of Britain, the United States, and France lest capitulation by the Guomindang damage their interests; the existence of the Soviet Union and its policy of helping China; the high hopes which the Chinese people place (by no means in vain) in the Soviet Union. The proper and coordinated use of these factors would not only frustrate capitulationism and splitting but also overcome the obstructions to any advance beyond partial resistance.

11. Consequently, the prospect of going over from partial to total resistance does exist. To strive for this prospect is the urgent common task of all Chinese Communists, all progressive members of the Guomindang, and all the people of China.

12. China's anti-Japanese national revolutionary war is now confronting a grave crisis. This crisis may be prolonged, or it may be overcome fairly quickly. Internally, the decisive factors are Guomindang-Communist cooperation and a change in Guomindang policy on the basis of this cooperation and the strength of the worker and peasant masses. Externally, the decisive factor is assistance from the Soviet Union.

13. Political and organizational reform of the Guomindang is both necessary and possible. The main reasons are Japanese pressure, the Chinese Communist Party's united front policy, the demands of the Chinese people, and the growth of new forces inside the Guomindang. Our task is to strive for this reform of the Guomindang as a basis for reforming the government and the army. This reform undoubtedly requires the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, and we are only in a position to offer suggestions.

14. The government should be reformed. We have proposed the policy of convening a provisional national assembly, which is likewise both necessary and possible. Undoubtedly this reform also requires the consent of the Guomindang.

15. The task of reforming the army consists in building up new armies and reforming the old armies. If a new army of 250,000 to 300,000 men imbued with a new political spirit can be built up within six to twelve months, the situation on the anti-Japanese battlefield will begin to take a turn for the better. Such an army would influence all the old armies and rally them around itself. This would provide the military basis for the turn to the strategic counteroffensive in the War of Resistance. This reform likewise requires the Guomindang's consent. The Eighth Route Army ought to have an exemplary role to play in the course of this reform. And the Eighth Route Army itself should be expanded.

II. Capitulationism Must Be Combatted Both Inside the Party and Throughout the Country

Inside the Party, Oppose Class Capitulationism

16. In 1927 Chen Duxiu's capitulationism[2] led to the failure of the revolution. No member of our Party should ever forget this historical lesson written in blood.

17. With regard to the Party's line of an anti-Japanese national united front, the main danger inside the Party before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was "Left" opportunism, that is, closed-doorism. The primary reason for this was that the Guomindang had not yet begun to resist Japan.

18. Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident the main danger inside the Party has no longer been "Left" closed-doorism but has become, rather, Right opportunism, that is, capitulationism. The primary reason for this is that the Guomindang has already begun to resist Japan.

19. As early as the April meeting of Party activists in Yan'an, again in May at the national conference of the Party, and especially in August at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee (the Luochuan meeting), we posed the follow-

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[2] Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) was one of the leading figures in the May 4th Movement, and exercised great influence over Mao at that time. (See Volume I, especially the article in praise of Chen on pp. 325–330, and the accompanying note.) Chen was, with Li Dazhao, one of the two founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party, and its first leader. He and Mao worked together in 1923–1924, when Chen Duxiu was chairman and Mao secretary of the Central Committee. (See the two texts jointly signed by them in Volume II, pp. 218–221). At the time of the crucial confrontation with Chiang Kaishek in 1927, however, Chen had taken a much more conciliatory stand, and was removed from his leading position in the Party on orders from the International. By 1929, Mao had come to regard Chen's actions as "truly outrageous." (See Volume III, p. 193.) That being said, it was obviously not Chen Duxiu's lack of militancy, but the overwhelming military force commanded by Chiang Kaishek that had led to the defeat of 1927.

ing question: Within the united front, will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Will the Guomindang draw over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party the Guomindang? In relation to the current specific political task, this question means: Is the Guomindang to be raised to the level of the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and of an all-out War of Resistance advocated by the Communist Party? Or is the Communist Party to sink to the level of the Guomindang dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie, to the level of partial resistance?

20. Why must we pose the question so sharply? For the following reasons:

On the one hand, we have the Chinese bourgeoisie's tendency to compromise; the Guomindang's superiority in material strength; the declaration and the decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, which slander and insult the Communist Party and cry out for "an end to the class struggle"; the Guomindang's yearning for "the capitulation of the Communist Party" and its widespread propaganda to this end; Chiang Kaishek's attempts to place the Communist Party under his control; the Guomindang's policy of restricting and weakening the Red Army and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; the plan concocted during the Guomindang's Lushan Training Course in July "to reduce the Communist Party's strength by two-fifths in the course of the War of Resistance"; the attempts of the Guomindang to seduce Communist cadres with offers of fame and fortune and wine and women; the political capitulation of certain petty-bourgeois radicals (represented by Zhang Naiqi);[3] and other similar circumstances.

On the other hand, we have the uneven theoretical level within the Communist Party; the fact that many of our Party members lack the experience of cooperation between the two parties gained during the Northern Expedition; the fact that a large number of Party members are of petty-bourgeois origin; the reluctance of some Party members to continue a life of bitter struggle; the existence of a tendency toward unprincipled accommodation with the Guomindang in the united front; the emergence of a tendency toward a new type of warlordism in the Eighth Route Army; the emergence of the problem of Communist participation in the Guomindang government; the emergence of a tendency toward excessive accommodation in the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; and other similar circumstances.

In view of the grave situation described above, we must sharply pose the question of who is to lead and must resolutely combat capitulationism.

21. For several months now, and especially since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Party organizations at all levels have waged a clear-cut and firm struggle against capitulationist tendencies, actual or potential, have taken necessary precautions against them, and have achieved good results.

The Central Committee has issued a draft resolution on the problem of Communist participation in the government.

A struggle has been started against the tendency toward new warlordism in the Eighth Route Army. This tendency is manifest in certain individuals who, since the redesignation of the Red Army, have become unwilling to submit strictly to Communist Party leadership, have developed individualistic heroism, taken pride in being given appointments by the Guomindang (i.e., in becoming officials), and so forth. The tendency toward this new type of warlordism, which manifests itself in beating and abusing people, violating discipline, and so on, has the same root (the reduction of the Communist Party to the level of the Guomindang) and the same result (the alienation from the masses) as the tendency toward the old type of warlordism. It is particularly dangerous because it is occurring in the period of the Guomindang-Communist united front, and it therefore calls for special attention and determined opposition. Both the system of political commissars, which was abolished because of Guomindang intervention, and the system of political departments, which were renamed "political training offices" for the same reason, have now been restored. We have initiated and staunchly carried out the new strategic principle of "independent guerrilla warfare in the mountain regions with the initiative in our own hands," thus basically ensuring the Eighth Route Army's successes in fighting and in its other tasks. We have rejected the Guomindang's demand that its members should be sent to the Eighth Route Army units as cadres and have upheld the principle of absolute leadership of the Eighth Route Army by the Communist Party. Similarly, we have introduced the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front" in the revolutionary anti-Japanese base areas. We have corrected the tendency toward "parliamentarism" (of course, not the parliamentarism of the Second International, which is absent in the Chinese Party); we have also persisted in our struggle against bandits, enemy spies, and saboteurs.

In Xi'an we have corrected the tendency toward unprincipled accommodation in our relations with the Guomindang and have developed the mass struggle anew.

In eastern Gansu we have, on the whole, done the same as in Xi'an.

In Shanghai we have criticized Zhang Naiqi's line of "issuing fewer calls and offering more suggestions" and begun to correct the tendency toward excessive accommodation in the work of the national salvation movement.

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[3] Zhang Naiqi (1897–1977), a native of Zhejiang, was a banker and economist. In the early 1930s, he criticized the Guomindang because of its lack of resistance to Japan, and he was one of the founders of the National Salvation Association, established on May 30, 1936. Mao hailed this development with enthusiasm. (See, in Volume V, his letters of August 10 and September 18, 1936, to Zhang and three of his fellow organizers.) Because of their active opposition to Japan, the leaders of the National Salvation Association, who became known as the "Seven Gentlemen," were arrested and imprisoned by the Guomindang authorities, and released only after the Japanese attack of July 1937. After being freed from prison, Zhang adopted a less hostile attitude toward the National Government, hence, Mao's denunciation of his "political capitulation."

In the guerrilla zones in the south—which represent part of the gains of our decade of sanguinary warfare with the Guomindang, our strategic strongholds for the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the southern provinces, and our forces which the Guomindang tried to wipe out by "encirclement and suppression" even after the Xi'an Incident, and which it has tried to weaken by the newer method of "luring the tiger out of the mountains" even after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident—we have taken special care (1) to guard against concentrating our forces regardless of circumstances (which would suit the Guomindang's desire to destroy these strongholds), (2) to reject Guomintang appointees, and (3) to be on the alert against the danger of another He Ming Incident (i.e., the danger of being surrounded and disarmed by the Guomindang).[4]

Our attitude in *Jiefang* has continued to be one of serious and fair criticism.

22. In order to persevere in armed resistance and strive for final victory, as well as to turn partial resistance into total resistance, it is necessary to adhere to the Anti-Japanese National United Front and expand and strengthen it. No views disruptive of the Guomindang-Communist united front will be tolerated. We must still guard against "Left" closed-doorism. But at the same time we must closely adhere to the principle of independence and initiative in all our united front work. Our united front with the Guomindang and other parties is based on the execution of a definite program. Without this basis there can be no united front, and in that case cooperation would become unprincipled and a manifestation of capitulationism. Thus the key to leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war to victory is to explain, apply, and uphold the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front."

23. What is our purpose in all this? In one respect, it is to hold the ground we have already won, for this ground is our strategic point of departure, and its loss would mean the end of everything. But our chief purpose lies in another direction. It is to extend the ground already won and realize the positive aim of "winning the masses in their millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism." Holding our ground and extending it are inseparably connected. In the last few months, many more left-wing members of the petty bourgeoisie have become united under our influence, the new forces in the Guomindang camp have grown, the mass struggle in Shanxi has developed, and our Party organizations have expanded in many places.

24. But we must clearly understand that generally speaking the organizational capacity of our Party is still very weak in the country as a whole. The strength of the masses in the country as a whole is also very small, because the workers and peasants, the basic elements of the masses, are not yet organized. All this is due to the Guomindang's policy of control and repression, on the one hand, and the inadequacy of our own work or even its complete absence, on the other. This is the fundamental weakness of our Party in the present anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. Unless we overcome this weakness, Japanese imperialism cannot be defeated. To this end we must apply the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front" and overcome all tendencies toward capitulation or excessive accommodation.

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[4] See above, the text of September 14, 1937.

In the Country as a Whole, Oppose National Capitulationism

25. The above points deal with class capitulationism. This tendency would lead the proletariat to accommodate itself to bourgeois reformism and bourgeois lack of thoroughness. Unless it is overcome, we cannot succeed in carrying forward the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, in turning partial resistance into total resistance, and in defending the motherland.

But there is also another kind of capitulationism, national capitulationism, which would lead China to accommodate itself to the interests of Japanese imperialism, make China a Japanese colony, and turn the Chinese people into colonial slaves. This tendency has now appeared in the right wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

26. The left wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is composed of the Communist-led masses, which include the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Our task is to do our utmost to extend and consolidate this wing. The accomplishment of this task is the basic prerequisite for reforming the Guomindang, the government, and the army, for establishing a unified democratic republic, for turning partial resistance into total resistance, and for overthrowing Japanese imperialism.

27. The intermediate section of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is composed of the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. Those for whom the major Shanghai newspapers speak are now tending toward the Left, while some members of the Revival Society have begun to vacillate and some members of the CC Clique are also wavering.[5] The armies resisting Japan have learned severe lessons, and some components of it have begun to introduce or are preparing to introduce reforms. Our task is to win over the intermediate section to move forward and transform itself.

28. The right wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front consists of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. It is the supreme headquarters of national capitulationism. These people fear both the destruction of their property in the war and the rise of the masses, so it is inevitable that they should tend toward capitulationism. Many of them are already collaborators, many have become or

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[5] On the Revival Society (*Fuxingshe*) and its inner core, the *Lixingshe*, commonly known as the "Blue Shirts," and on the CC Clique, see above, the relevant notes to Mao's report of October 1937 on the current situation.

are ready to become pro-Japanese, many are vacillating, and only a very few, because of special circumstances, are resolutely [anti-Japanese]. Some among them have joined the national united front temporarily, under compulsion and with reluctance. Generally speaking, it will not be long before they split away. Many of the worst elements among the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are at this very moment engineering a split in the Anti-Japanese National United Front. They are manufacturing rumors, and allegations such as "The Communists are engaged in insurrection" and "The Eighth Route Army is in retreat" are sure to multiply daily. Our task is to combat national capitulationism resolutely and, in the course of this struggle, to expand and consolidate the left wing and help the intermediate section to move forward and transform itself.

The Relation Between Class Capitulationism and National Capitulationism

29. Class capitulationism is actually the reserve force of national capitulationism in the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war; it is a vile tendency that lends support to the camp of the right wing and leads to defeat in the war. In order to achieve the liberation of the Chinese nation and the emancipation of the toiling masses, and invigorate the struggle against national capitulationism, we must fight this tendency inside the Communist Party and the proletariat, and launch this struggle in all spheres of our work.

The Tasks of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi During the Transition to a Full-Scale War of Resistance

(November 13, 1937)

Comrades Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], as well as [Zhou] Enlai, Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], and [Yang] Shangkun, and for the information of Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]:

1. The partial resistance war in the whole nation is no longer sustainable, a full-scale War of Resistance has not yet come, and right now we are in a critical and serious moment of transition when the new crop is still in the blade and the old one is all consumed.

2. All the armies in Shanxi have suffered big defeats. Apart from Liu Xiang and Tang Enbo, the rest are simply unable to fight at present. With the regular war over, the only thing left is the guerrilla war, waged primarily by the Red Army. The ruling class of Shanxi, as well as the leaders of all the armies, are shaken and lost.

3. The task of the Red Army lies in further bringing into play the principle of independence and self-reliance and sustaining the guerrilla war in North China, while at the same time fighting fiercely with the Japanese bandits for the majority of the villages in the whole of Shanxi Province, in order to turn them into guerrilla base areas, mobilize the masses, incorporate the scattered troops into our own forces, expand our own strength, be self-sufficient, not relying on others, fight more victorious small-scale combats, raise morale, so as to influence the whole nation, facilitate the reform of the Guomindang, the government, and the military, overcome the crisis, and realize the new prospect of a full-scale War of Resistance.

4. Xu's brigade[1] of Lin [Biao]'s division should move as quickly as possible to the Wuchengzhen area and prepare to fight a few small victorious battles in coop-

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 67–69. The same version appears in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 116–18, with a slightly different title.

[1] The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

eration with He and Liao's detachment of He's division.[2] The General Headquarters, the division headquarters of Lin's division, and Chen Guang's brigade[3] should go quickly to the Fengxi and Xixian area, and be prepared to win a few small-scale battles. Liu's division should place the division headquarters and Chen Geng's brigade[4] in the Taihang mountains, and win as many small-scale battles as possible. Another regiment of Liu's division should be turned over to and commanded by either the General Headquarters or Lin's division. It should be stationed on the east bank of the Fen River to the east of Jiexiu and Lingshi. In cooperation with Chen's brigade on the west bank, they should launch a converging attack on the enemy troops that are moving southward along the Fen River, and win as many small-scale battles as possible. It is quite right for the Rongzhen Military District to organize the First Independent Division on the basis of Yang's regiment.[5] It should be prepared to organize the Second Independent Division on the basis of the General Headquarters' special task battalion. Zhu and Peng are requested to deal with this matter as soon as possible.

5. The plan to recruit in the south and in Sichuan is out of the question for the time being. The method for recruiting Red Army soldiers should focus mainly on expanding the guerrillas. Second, the recruiting should focus on big places. Although it is impossible in the places east of Fengyang and north of Jiexiu at the moment, it is still possible in places west and south of Fengyang and south of Jiexiu. General Headquarters, as well as Lin's division, should pay attention to this promptly. It will be impossible if further delayed. In the past all our plans were based on the assumption of the fall of Taiyuan and Niangziguan. In the future all our plans should be based on the fall of Jundu, Linfen, Puxian, and Jincheng. In northwestern Shanxi the plan should be based on the fall of Ningwu, Shenchi, and Wuzai; in the northeast the plan should be based on the fall of Wutai, Weixian, Guangling, Lingqiu, and Fuping. Please take all the above into consideration.

Mao Zedong

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[2] The reference is to the 716th Regiment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, of which He Bingyan was the commander and Liao Hansheng was the political commissar.

[3] The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

[4] The reference is to the 386th Brigade of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Geng.

[5] The reference is to the Independent Regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yang Chengwu.

Further Carry Out the Principle of Independence and Self-Reliance Within the United Front

(November 15, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

1. We have received Zhou's telegram sent on the 13th between 9:00 and 11:00 P.M.

2. The working principle in Shanxi at present is to "further carry out the principle of independence and self-reliance within the united front" because, in the face of the attacks by the Japanese bandits, the Guomindang as well as Yan [Xishan], Huang [Shaohong], and Wei [Lihuang] have basically lost the spirit as well as the capacity to hold out in Shanxi. It is essential that we "take a step forward" in assuming responsibility ourselves, reducing our expectations of and reliance on them, and acting with "independence and self-reliance." But at the same time, this is still independence and self-reliance within the united front, rather than absolute independence and self-reliance. As regards major matters, we should still discuss them with the Guomindang as well as with Yan, Huang, and Wei. For example, the various points listed in Zhou's telegram, and Zhu and Peng's request for reinforcements are entirely correct. The only thing is not to cherish too much hope or rely too much on them, for they are unable to keep many of their promises. Our plan should be based on the premise that even if they fail to reply or their promises are unreliable, we will still be able to continue.

3. We agree that when you return to Yan'an after the meeting of Zhu, Peng, and Ren with Yan, Huang, and Wei, it is better to take the road passing through Yanchang. Please ask Zhu, Peng, and Ren to cross the Fen River quickly for a discussion. The best place [to meet] would be at Xixian.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 70–71, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

The Cavalry Regiment of the Eighth Route Army Should Advance Toward the Mongolian Border

(November 16, 1937)

Comrade Gao Gang:[1]

1. Taiyuan has fallen, and the situation of Suiyuan has become more critical. Among the princes of the various allied banners in Inner Mongolia, some are already vacillating and leaning toward Japan, and others are hesitating and do not know what to do. The Japanese bandits are taking advantage of Prince De and Prince Sha[2] in an attempt to create a puppet government in Inner Mongolia. After the fall of Guisui[3] and Baotou, the forces of Ma Zhanshan[4] and others are concentrated near Xiwuyuan. If the Japanese troops and the puppet troops continue to advance westward, we are afraid that the current situation will be very difficult to sustain. It is highly necessary that we send some troops northward beyond the borders of Mongolia to reassure the people, make contact with every banner, launch a guerrilla war, and defend the three Bian.[5]

2. Consequently, we have decided to appoint you commander of the cavalry of the Eighth Route Army, to lead the cavalry regiment and the Mongolian and Han Detachment to the area of the East and West Wusheng banner and the Etuoke Banner in the north, operate in the area to the north of Sanbian and south of the desert. Your tasks are:

a. Use the slogans "Let the two nationalities, Mongolian and Han, unite as one to resist the Japanese" and "Defend Suiyuan" to promote and advocate a joint conference of all the princes of the banners, bring about an anti-Japanese united front among the upper levels of the various banners in the Ikezhao league, unite to resist Japan (adopt a critical attitude toward Prince De and Prince Sha). Meanwhile, carry out extensive work with the Mongolian and Han nationalities, organize and arm them, set up new anti-Japanese guerrilla units, and expand yourselves.

b. Get in touch with Ma Zhanshan, He Zhuguo,[6] and the local Guomindang people, inform them about our anti-Japanese views as well as about the situation of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi, urge them to improve their nationalities policy, so as to unite all the anti-Japanese organizations in the whole of Suiyuan, and arm the local people, struggle resolutely against the Chinese traitors, develop an independent and self-reliant guerrilla war of the masses, to strike a blow against the attack of the Japanese bandits.

3. The majority of the workers in the Mongolian Work Department of the provincial committee must go with you to work in Mongolia. Only one or two people should be left behind in Dingbian, to be responsible for reception and communications.

4. After a few days of reorganization, mobilization, and preparatory work, the cavalry regiment and detachment can set out. If you do not have leather uniforms, you may obtain two thousand *yuan* from the Bureau of Salt and Tax to buy leather uniforms.

Mao [Zedong], Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian], and
Xiao [Jingguang]

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 119–20, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Gao Gang was at this time commander at the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in Bao'an.

[2] Demchukdonggrub (1902–1966), commonly known in Chinese as De Wang or Prince De, was a Mongolian prince of the West Sunid Banner. In 1936 he had proclaimed the independence of Inner Mongolia, under the protection of the Japanese, and launched an attack on Suiyuan Province. For further details, see Volume V, pp. 126n.4, 307, 315n.3, and 317. At this time or shortly afterward, he became vice-chairman of the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government, which was supported by the Japanese. Prince Sha was the chairman of a governing council established by the Guomindang.

[3] Guisui was the name of the provincial capital of Suiyuan Province. It is now called Huhehot and has become the capital of Inner Mongolia.

[4] Ma Zhanshan (1885–1950) was appointed acting governor of Heilongjiang in 1931, and made a name for himself by his resistance to Japanese penetration. In early 1932 he was compelled by force of circumstances to collaborate with the Japanese in establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo, but in April of that year he escaped and fought the Japanese once again. When the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, he was given the mission of resisting the Japanese offensive in Inner Mongolia and succeeded in halting their drive.

[5] The reference is to Dingbian, Anbian, and Jingbian in northeastern Shaanxi.

[6] See note on page 59.

The Urgent Task at Present Is to Strengthen Security Along the River

(November 17, 1937, in the evening)

To He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying], and Gan [Siqi];[1] Wang [Zhaoxiang] and Sun [Chaoxun], and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Zhou [Enlai]:

1. In order to guarantee to our troops on the east bank of the [Yellow] river in Shanxi the possibility of sustaining an arduous and protracted guerrilla war in Shanxi, and also to assure them the possibility of crossing the river rapidly and safely to the west bank when this proves necessary, and to increase the obstacles to crossing by the enemy, the strengthening of security along the river has become an urgent task at the present.

2. We have divided the entire line of defense along the river, from Shenfu and Mazhen to Linzhen and Yichuan,[2] into three sections, and we have set up a river security headquarters in each section to exercise command.

a. The Two Yans[3] River Security Headquarters will be set up and is responsible for the section from the north of the Linzhen River to the mouth of the Qingjian River,[4] with He Changgong as commander and the Fifth Garrison Regiment as the river security troops.

b. The Five-*xian*[5] River Security Headquarters is responsible for the section from Hekou to Jiaxian, and the River Security troops are the 718th Regiment and the Third Garrison Regiment.

c. The Shenfu River Security District Headquarters will be set up and is responsible for the section from Jiaxian to Mazhen.[6] The Shenfu Security Forces are the river security forces.

3. In order to guarantee the crossing to the west of the troops on the east bank, we have selected the following places as the main crossing points:

a. All the ferries from Sanjiao to Sui and Mi.

b. The two ferries in Matou and Pingdu between the two Yans.

c. Choose two or three ferries in the Shenfu River Security District (in case the troops in northwestern Shanxi need to use them).

4. Each crossing area should prepare more than twenty boats, of which each big boat can carry a hundred people each time. Moreover, there must be enough sailors and steersmen. For the purpose of concealing our intentions, these boats should be hidden on the west bank of the river and be guarded by our troops so as to prevent them from being destroyed or discovered by the enemy. Of the boats at the other ferry points, apart from leaving one or two boats for crossing in case of necessity, all the rest should be either gathered in another place or anchored along the west bank. In addition, you should be prepared to destroy them when necessary.

5. All the ferries which our troops do not need should be completely destroyed step by step according to our plan. Moreover, in some of the major spots along the river, particularly in the crossing points, we should take advantage of the places which are strategically located and difficult of access, either to destroy them or to build up some kind of fortifications. Every River Security Command Headquarters will be responsible for the specific arrangements, surveillance and planning, and they should keep us informed.

6. The Two Yans and the Five-*xian* River Security Regions have already begun the arrangements. As regards the Shenfu District, He and Xiao should assign somebody directly, or they can ask Wang Zhaoxiang to appoint a capable cadre as the commander of this river security district to go there to investigate and arrange everything, as well as command the security forces that are responsible for the security of this section of the river. Please also inform the Shenfu Special Committee of this.

Mao [Zedong]   Xiao [Jingguang]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 121–23, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] He, Xiao, Guan, and Gan were respectively commander, deputy commander, political commissar, and head of the Political Department of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

[2] Shenfu and Mazhen are located near the northern end of the boundary between Shaanxi and Shanxi Provinces. Linzhen and Yichuan are some two hundred miles to the south.

[3] The two Yans refers to Yanchuan and Yanchang, located between Yan'an and the Yellow River.

[4] The Qingjian River flows into the Yellow River between Yanchuan and Yanchang.

[5] The five *xian* are Suide and four others in the middle of the portion of the Yellow River dealt with here.

[6] As already noted, Shenfu is located in the northern tip of Shaanxi.

To Wen Yunchang

(November 27, 1937)

Elder Brother Yunchang,[1]

Mo Liben[2] arrived and gave me your letter. Today I have also received your detailed letter of November 16, which has given me great pleasure and comfort. I am deeply saddened by the passing away of my eighth uncle and aunt, yet it is wonderful that you and your wife are alive and healthy. Hard and difficult living conditions are not confined to one family or one individual. The majority of the people of the whole country are in the same situation. Joining the masses in their struggle and driving out the Japanese imperialists are the only paths to survival. Your desire to come and work is good. The only thing is that we have only clothes to wear and food to eat here, and the treatment for a commander-in-chief at the top and a cook at the bottom are all the same. As our Party works only for the state, the nation, and the toiling popular masses, sacrificing individual self-interest, we are all equal and have no salaries. If you have heavy burdens at home and need to find a big or small job to earn some income to help make ends meet, then it is not a good idea to come here. It is a long way to travel, and I cannot send any money as travel expenses. The plan of running a military school in Hunan is very good, but it is also hard to carry out for the time being. Although in my heart I would like to assist you, it is difficult to do in reality. In the past, the state sent Zhou Runfang 20 *yuan* as travel expenses. Because she is the widow of Martyr Zetan, who died[3] (Zetan was killed in Jiangxi the year before last), the state gave the money, not because of me personally. I hope that you can understand it. I am making some efforts on behalf of society as a whole, including the members of my mother's family, for whom I have great respect, and all the poor people in my native place. I miss all the brothers and their children of my mother's family and all the poor people from my native place very much. But I can only help you all in this way, as you have probably understood already.

Even so, I want to exchange letters frequently with you and other cousins and their children, and I am glad even to get a few lines and words from you.

Are you informed about the situation in Shaoshan or not? If you are, please let my relatives and friends in the countryside know that if they want to write me I would like very much to hear from them. But please tell them that they should not come here for jobs because there are no salaries here.

Is Mr. Liu Linsheng[4] still alive and healthy? Please convey my regards to him in your letters.

Right now, Japanese imperialism is launching massive offensives, and we are very busy with our work, but we are all very happy and healthy. My health is somewhat better now than it was two years ago. Please send my greetings to the various brothers, sisters-in-law, and their children, and tell them that the victories of the Eighth Route Army are the victories of them all, so as to comfort them in the face of hardships and difficulties.

May my brother and sister-in-law enjoy good health!

Mao Zedong

This letter was first published in *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 114–16. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 72–73, and we have taken it from that source.

[1] Wen Yunchang (1884–1961), a native of Xiangxiang *xian* in Hunan, was Mao's first cousin.

[2] Mo Liben, also known as Fang Ke (b. 1918) was a young Hunanese who had left Changsha to come to Yan'an.

[3] Mao's younger brother, Mao Zetan, was left behind in Jiangxi at the time of the Long March and was killed there.

[4] Liu Linsheng (1865–1949) was a cousin of Mao and of Wen Yunchang.

To Surround and Attack the Bandits in the Sanbian Area, There Must Be a Comprehensive Plan

(November 28, 1937, 3:00 P.M.)

Comrade Gao Gang:[1]

1. Since the two bandits Zhang and Fan[2] are entrenched in fortified villages, there must be careful surveillance and a carefully thought-out and detailed plan in order to take the fortified villages by storm. In addition, there must also be a close watch over the enemy both in as well as outside of the fortified villages. You must not be careless.

2. Please find out immediately and inform us in detail regarding the following: how strong the fortified villages are, the number of troops and fortifications in the hands of the bandits, the supply of food, hay, fuel, and water of the bandits, the conditions of the masses, and the possible assistance of the bandits from the outside.

3. Does the 27th Army have mortars? How is your firepower if you are going to storm the fortifications? Do not act until you have a real guarantee of success.

Mao [Zedong] Xiao [Jingguang]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 124–25, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Regarding Gao Gang (1905–1954), a native of Shaanxi, see Volume V, p. 712, n. 4. He was at this time commander at the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in Bao'an.

[2] Zhang Tingfa and Fan Yushan were the leaders of a bandit gang established in northern Shaanxi.

Operational Methods for Dealing with the Enemy Troops That Are Attacking the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region

(December 5, 1937)

Zhu [De] and Ren [Bishi]:

As far as the enemy troops that are attacking the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region are concerned, apart from our telegram of the 29th of last month and your own telegram, you should also pay attention to the following;

1. Avoid frontal resistance; make a surprise attack on the troops in the enemy's rear.

2. Maneuver both in the enemy's distant and immediate rear, so that the enemy will still be encircled by us even if he advances.

3. You must also operate actively along the Tongpu and Zhengtai railway lines to cooperate strongly with your present operations.

4. Pay attention to sabotaging the puppet organizations and puppet troops in the enemy's rear.

5. Intensify the work of disintegrating the enemy troops.

6. Under the condition of assured victory, it is necessary to concentrate considerable strength to wipe out part of the enemy forces, impose a forceful blow upon the enemy, and increase the enemy's fear and their difficulty of attack. You should, however, be very careful and cautious.

Mao [Zedong] Peng [Dehuai]

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Mao [Zedong] Peng [Dehuai]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 126–27, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

To the Ninth Brigade of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(December 15, 1937)

Comrades of the Ninth Brigade:

Congratulations on your founding of the Office of National Salvation. The two words "national salvation" correspond exactly to the only general goal for you and for the people of the whole country at the present stage. The road to reach this goal is that of the anti-Japanese national united front. I hope that you will study the theory and methods of this united front. Only if there is a united front can we achieve the goal of national salvation.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* p. 117, where it is reproduced from a photocopy of Mao's handwritten manuscript.

Send Two Detachments to the East of the Beiping-Hankou Railway to Carry Out Guerrilla Missions

(December 16, 1937)

Zhu [De] and Ren [Bishi]:

1. According to Nie [Rongzhen]'s telegram, the area to the east of the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway line is very empty at present. We plan to send out two detachments to the east on guerrilla missions.

a. The 129th Division should send out one infantry battalion and one company of cavalry to go deep into the large area of Yongnian, Guangping, Quzhou, Guangzong, Qinghe, Pingxiang, Nangong, Xinhe, and Zaoqiang to the east of Cixian, Shahe, and Zhaoxian, and maneuver there.

b. Rongzhen should organize two infantry companies and one company of cavalry into one detachment, send it deep into the area east of Shijiazhuang, Baoding, Ding *xian*, north of the Cang-Shi Highway, and south of Tianjin, Baxian, and the Dingxing Highway. First, they should destroy the highway from Baoding, Gaoyang, and Renqiu to Dacheng before they can maintain an area for flexible maneuvers. After that, the destruction of the Cang-Shi Highway is also very important.

2. These two detachments should be assigned enough capable military and political cadres and a radio transmitter number, and they should have their own cipher codebook.

3. The tasks of these two detachments:

a. Reconnoiter the situation.

b. Expand the anti-Japanese united front, mobilize the popular masses, and organize guerrillas.

c. Sabotage the puppet organizations.

d. Collect the scattered weapons and expand themselves.

4. After setting out, these two detachments should be extremely cautious, careful, and flexible, and they should make their own decisions flexibly to decide what to do according to the circumstances.

Mao Zedong Peng Dehuai

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 128–29, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

We Should Resolutely Uphold the Principle of the United Front in the Territory of Friendly Armies

(December 24, 1937)

To leading military and political cadres of the five-*xian* garrison command, the headquarters of the two Yans,[1] the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh Garrison regiments, the Independent Battalion in the Central Shaanxi Plain, and all political organs:

1. To expand and consolidate the united front has been from beginning to end our central concern and general policy. Because of the enemy's instigation, and the sabotage of the Chinese traitors, some elements are afraid of the mass movement, as well as of the expansion and growth of the influence of our Party and of the Eighth Route Army. The weaknesses of the united front which exist in every region, and the narrow-minded views of some comrades, as well as the stiffness of their manner have created some kind of friction with the friendly party and the friendly army, and the local governments in the united front areas close to the Border Region. If we let this situation continue, it will affect the unity of the resistance to Japan.

2. In order to achieve our objective of expanding the united front, under the slogan of joint responsibility, joint leadership, mutual assistance, and mutual development, in our discussions with the local authorities of every united front region, and in the conduct of mass work, we must pay attention to trying our best to obtain their approval and cooperation, and persuade them to accept our ideas and suggestions on the basis of the interests of the War of Resistance. In case they do not agree, we should not force them, but should make temporary concessions.

3. In order to avoid unnecessary friction, and to reduce any friction which may arise, we have the following special instructions:

a. As far as some of the shortcomings of the friendly parties and armies are concerned, we should adopt an attitude of well-meaning criticism and suggestion instead of laughing at them or ridiculing them.
b. In addition to publicizing our Party's ideas and the victories of the Eighth Route Army, we should praise and encourage the determination of the government to carry on the War of Resistance, its other good measures and behavior, and the bravery and spirit of sacrifice of the friendly army in the War of Resistance.
c. We should act as the mediator in the friction between the masses and the government resulting from recruitment and tax collection, in order to avoid confrontations.
d. Help the government to conduct mobilization for recruiting, giving the necessary assurances, while at the same time asking the government to help us fulfill our plan of recruitment.
e. Stop at once the fundraising and grain-collecting campaign within the united front. We must return immediately the reserve grain we borrowed which is now in storage. Approval of the government must be obtained when confiscating the property of the Chinese traitors and disposing of it, as well as when arresting them. The best way is to hand them over to the government to be dealt with.

Mao Zedong Xiao Jingguang Tan Zheng

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 130–31, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army's river defenses in the two *xian* of Yanchuan and Yanchang in Shaanxi.

We Should Concentrate Our Forces to Fight Two or Three Victorious Campaigns While the Enemy Is Moving Southward

(December 29, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long] and Xiao [Ke], Liu [Bocheng] and Xu [Xiangqian], and Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] and Yang [Shangkun]:

1. The enemy troops in their southward offensive will be divided into three routes. The right route will take the Xiaoyi-Duijiu area and threaten Pucheng. The left route will attack Qin *xian*, and the central route will attack Linghuo. The right and central routes at least will advance simultaneously. They cannot let the central route go forward alone, or they will be exposed to our pincer attack.
2. We expect that you will arrange your deployment for the campaign on the basis of these judgments. In addition, you should also tell Yan [Xishan] and Wei [Lihuang] to prepare in good time. The local guerrillas should also base their deployment on this.
3. During the southward advance of the enemy troops on this occasion, our forces should concentrate the necessary forces under favorable conditions to fight two or three good victorious battles. Consequently, you should complete the necessary preparations for the campaign in good time, so as to avoid acting in haste when the time comes. We look forward to hearing from you.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 132–33, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Assessment Regarding the Offensive Situation of the Attacking Japanese Army, and Proposals Regarding the Deployment of Our Own Forces

(December 30, 1937)

Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Xiang [Ying], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian], and Ye [Jianying]:

1. We judge that after taking Ji'nan, Xuzhou, and Bangbu, and perhaps also Zhengzhou and Kaifeng, and fulfilling the operational tasks of the first period, the objectives of the enemy in the second period should be to take the three points of Lanzhou, Guangzhou, and Wuhan, and to connect them with one another. But for the purpose of cutting off China's communications with the outside world as soon as possible, and hemming China in, it seems that they will take Lanzhou and Guangzhou first, and leave the occupation of Wuhan until a bit later. It is very difficult for the enemy to take Lanzhou directly from Ningxia. It seems that they will first take Ningxia. According to reliable information, they have prepared thirty thousand troops for the offensive. Their second step will be divided into two routes: one group will attack Liangzhou[1] in the west, the other will attack Pingliang in the south, thus cutting the Xin-Lan and Xi-Lan Highways. Their third step will be to take Lanzhou. By that time they must have taken Zhengzhou in the front or even cut off Tongguan. This danger is almost at hand, and we and Chiang [Kaishek] must quickly take the necessary dispositions, or it will be too late.
2. Will you please suggest the following deployment to Chiang:
   a. Of the three main force divisions of the Eighth Route Army, one division should go to Ganzhou[2] and Liangzhou. This division should set out without delay. One division should go to the Guyuan area, and this division should also prepare to leave. One division should head for western Henan; this division should set out only when the enemy has begun to attack Zhengzhou and

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 134–35, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Liangzhou is the name of a former prefecture, corresponding to the Wuwei district in Gansu.

[2] Ganzhou is the name of a former prefecture, corresponding to the present Zhangye district in Gansu.

Tongguan. Each of these three divisions should leave one regiment of troops behind in Shandong and Shanxi to support the guerrilla war in North China in cooperation with the guerrilla forces.

b. The Central Army should send two additional divisions to reinforce the defense to the south of Ningxia.

c. Xinjiang should send one unit to reinforce the defense in Xi'an and Lanzhou. We look forward to hearing your reactions to these proposals.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian] Kang [Sheng]
Chen [Yun] Mao [Zedong]

Let the Enemy Attack Wuhan and Be Trapped in Our Strategic Encirclement

(December 30, 1937)

Comrades Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Xiang [Ying], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian] and Ye [Jianying]:[1]

Our views about the deployment for operations to the south and to the north of the Yangzi:

1. In order to induce the enemy to attack Wuhan and be trapped in our strategic encirclement, our forces must set up the following two major military districts and six supplementary military districts.

a. The Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui-Jiangxi Border Military District, with southern Anhui as its core, which should attack or prepare to attack the enemy forces in Nanjing, Wuhu, Hangzhou, the Zhe-Gan railway line,[2] and Hukou.

b. The Hubei-Henan-Anhui Military District, centered on Shu, Tong, Huang, Guang, Shang, and Gu,[3] which should attack or prepare to seize the three railway lines, and attack the enemy troops along the river. The aforementioned two districts are the major districts. The Guomindang should appoint high-ranking figures to exercise command there. Moreover, thirty to fifty thousand troops should be deployed in each district. We will put Chen Yi's detachment in southern Anhui, and Gao Jingting's detachment plus one more unit in northern Anhui.

c. The Southern Zhejiang Military District, which should attack and take the enemy troops along the Hang-Yong railway line[4] and Zhe-Gan railway line.

d. The Hubei-Jiangxi Military District, which should prepare to attack and take the enemy forces along the river and along the Nan-Xun railway line.[5]

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 136–37, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The recipients of this telegram were members of the Communist Party delegation which had been sent to negotiate with the Guomindang in Hankou.

[2] The Zhe-Gan railway line runs from Hankou in Zhejiang to Zhuzhou in Hunan.

[3] The reference is to Shucheng and Tongcheng in Anhui, Huangmei and Guangji in Hubei, and Shangcheng and Gushi in Henan.

[4] The Hang-Yong railway ran from Hangzhou to Ningbo.

[5] The Nan-Xun railway line ran from Nanchang to Jiujiang.

e. The Hanshui Military District, which should be prepared to attack and take the enemy troops along the southern end of the Ping-Han railway line.[6]

f. The Western Henan Military District, which should be prepared to attack the enemy troops along the central part of the Ping-Han railway line.

2. For the purpose of playing the role of strategic pin-down in the enemy's distant rear, we should set up the Jiangsu-Shandong Military District, the center of which should be in the border region of Jiangsu and Shandong. It should also command the guerrilla warfare in eastern Shandong. The Guomindang should appoint reliable high officials to this district, and we can send some people to assist them. The deployments in this district as well as in the southern and northern Anhui districts should begin right away. Please reflect on the aforementioned proposals, and then suggest them to Chiang.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian]   Kang [Sheng]
Chen [Yun]   Mao [Zedong]

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[6] The Ping-Han railway line ran from Beiping to Hankou.

1938

On the Basic Tactic of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare—The Surprise Attack[1]

(January 11, 1938)

1. Surprise Attacks Are the Basic Form of Fighting in Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare cannot be carried out for one minute away from the popular masses. This is the most fundamental principle. As for tactics, the basic form of fighting in guerrilla warfare is none other than the surprise attack. Surprise attacks are one form of offensive. Guerrilla warfare does not emphasize the form of regular positional offensives but, instead, stresses the form of sudden raids or the reputation for unexpected raids. This is because, at the level of strategy, guerrilla warfare defeats the many by the few and the strong by the weak. There is no other way to achieve the objective.

2. The Key Points of Surprise Attack Tactics

Generally speaking, there are twelve key points in the tactics of the surprise attack in guerrilla warfare:

First, the basic principle of the surprise attack is the need to have secret and meticulous planning and to take swift and sudden action.

This text was first published in *Jiefang*, no. 28, January 11, 1938. It is there attributed to Chen Bojun, who prepared this extract, but, as indicated in note 1 below, it was actually written and revised by Mao. Our source is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 138–52, where it is reproduced from the version in *Jiefang*.

[1] This article as published in *Jiefang* was introduced by the following paragraph:

> This essay is Comrade Chen Bojun's excerpt of the section on guerrilla tactics in Comrade Mao Zedong's 1934 pamphlet, *Guerrilla Warfare*. In order to adapt it to the conditions of the anti-Japanese war, Comrade Chen has made some additions and deletions in wording and paragraphing, and it has also been revised by Comrade Mao. It is now published in this periodical as reference material for leading cadres in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war around the country.

The editors of *Junshi wenji* (p. 152) confirm that this introduction was actually written by Mao. Mao's 1934 pamphlet is not available to us and could not be included in Volume IV of this edition.

Second, the overall objectives of the surprise attack in guerrilla warfare are to eliminate the small enemy, weaken the large enemy, harass enemy flanks and rear areas, coordinate with the political work of guerrilla troops, wreck enemy political power, arouse the popular masses to resist the enemy, and preserve or restore anti-Japanese political power, so as to create guerrilla bases for the Anti-Japanese War. This complements the fighting by regular armies because the capture of weapons gradually develops guerrilla units into regular anti-Japanese armies. As for the concrete objectives of the surprise attack, they are to eliminate small enemy units one by one, to harass large enemy units, to eliminate enemy militia, to wreck enemy institutions in the rear areas, to sabotage enemy communication routes, and so forth.

Third, surprise attacks should choose favorable conditions to strike. When such conditions are nonexistent or inadequate, attention should be paid to creating them. Quite often, this is possible and it is only necessary to adopt the following methods in view of the quality of the enemy units, the character of their commanders, and the tactics they use: (1) Make the enemy overconfident. For example, deliberately use guerrilla squads with weak fighting strength to engage the enemy, so as to make the enemy think that everything is fine. Then launch a sudden surprise attack against the enemy when he is unprepared. (2) Lull and confuse the enemy. For example, create an uproar in the east and strike in the west;[2] strike in the south one minute and in the north the next. Make the enemy uncertain. Then attack him by surprise at one point. For another example, dispatch guerrilla squads or small groups to operate in place A with handbills or notices under the name of larger guerrilla units, while a large guerrilla detachment makes a surprise attack in place B or C. (3) Exhaust and intimidate the enemy. For example, mobilize the popular masses to harvest crops and hide grain in order to cause the invading enemy unbearable hunger and fatigue. Again, divide a guerrilla detachment into several groups or send several small guerrilla units to raid and harass enemy garrisons incessantly. Startle and awaken them several times a night; leave them tired and depressed. Then select an opportune moment and attack them by surprise. If the enemy is strong in number but weak in quality and his commanders are timid, spread rumors and exaggerate one's own strength to increase his vacillation. Then launch a surprise attack. (4) Send spies to sneak into the areas where the invading enemy is garrisoned. Win over local people and soldiers who are sympathetic to us among the enemy to become our supporters from within, and to improve the success of surprise attacks. (5) Use small guerrilla units or the people's self-defense corps to maneuver in all four directions so that the enemy in that area has to be entrenched to defend himself. Pin down those enemy forces which could possibly counter our assault in order to assist the success of our surprise attack in another place. All the above are the various circumstances in which we change the enemy with our own actions to facilitate the success of guerrilla detachments. Although they may not always work, they are often effective.

Fourth, reconnaissance before an attack is of primary importance. The content of reconnaissance should include the following items: (1) The size of the enemy forces, the state of their fighting capacity and arms. If an attack is to be launched on an enemy garrison, it is essential to know the deployment of the enemy forces, the degree of their alertness and security, their schedule for the changing of the guard, and so forth. (2) Whether or not there are other enemy forces in the surrounding areas, their size and the possibility of reinforcement by them, transportation speed, the distances, the circumstances of their telephone or telegraph communications, the minimum time required for reinforcement, and the directions and road conditions of reinforcements are all items that should be checked carefully and taken into account individually. (3) The situation of the local residents. (4) The large and small roads that lead to the place where the surprise attack will be carried out and whether or not there are areas nearby in which the surprise attack troops can take cover. Secret and clever methods must be used in gathering intelligence on the above items. The more precise is the intelligence information, the more accurate will be the attack plan. Whenever possible, a simple map should be drawn beforehand with the deployment of enemy forces marked on it.

Fifth, the timing of a surprise attack involves no more than the following four situations: (1) At night: This timing is generally used to deal with enemy garrisons, and it is used because other times are not appropriate for such fighting. First, at night one can best camouflage oneself and approach the enemy. Second, charging in the darkness of night can reduce one's own casualties, inflate the impression of one's own strength, and increase panic among the enemy. Third, it is difficult for the enemy in the vicinity to bring in reinforcements at night. Therefore, guerrilla units should regularly give attention to practicing their operations at night. (2) Before dawn: This timing is also used to attack enemy garrisons. It takes advantage of the darkness of night to approach the enemy and launch the attack before daybreak. This is the most opportune time for attacks by guerrilla units that are quite far away from the enemy or are still unfamiliar with night operations. But it is better for the assault to start before the enemy gets up. (3) At dusk: This timing is also generally used against enemy garrisons for surprise attacks, particularly when the enemy is relatively alert at other times, the roads approaching the enemy are relatively under cover, and there are no problems in marching during daytime or it is possible to disguise oneself in crossing the area. At this time, if the attack should fail, it is still possible to withdraw safely under the cover of darkness. (4) During the day: The enemy often maneuvers during the day, so surprise attacks on the enemy on the move are always set during the day. If guerrilla troops want to make the most effective surprise attack on the enemy, they must not miss the opportunity to catch the enemy on the move. Such opportunities must be seized frequently.

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[2] The formula "Create an uproar in the east and strike in the west" occurs in the commentaries to Sunzi's *Art of War* and is frequently cited. For the source, see Samuel B. Griffith's translation of *Sunzi, The Art of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 79–80 (Commentary of Zhang Yu).

The most popular form of such surprise attacks is the ambush. If one desires to attack an enemy garrison in broad daylight, it should take place only under the following circumstances: (1) The quality of the enemy is very poor: not vigilant, lacking fortifications, and very careless. (2) The enemy knows nothing of the forthcoming surprise attack by the guerrilla unit. (3) The enemy is isolated and lacks reinforcements. (4) During heavy rains or fogs that can best cover the movements of the surprise attack. Under such conditions, it is possible to mount a successful surprise attack on enemy garrisons in daylight.

Sixth, the plans for the surprise attack must be kept secret. The plans of a surprise attack may be excellent, but if they are known to the enemy, they are not only worthless but run the risk of losses. So it is of cardinal importance to keep surprise attack plans strictly confidential. Apart from energetically using the anti-Japanese people and small guerrilla groups to operate in all four directions for the purpose of confusing the enemy, as mentioned in point 3 above, the following points also deserve attention: (1) Do not inform the lower ranks of the whole surprise attack plan. Tell them only what they need to know or tell them stage by stage (i.e., before setting off, during the march, and after arriving at the destination). (2) Neither the local people around the garrison nor the hired guides should be told of the planned surprise attack by guerrilla troops. (3) Whenever possible, start off in a false direction for a while and then turn toward the destination of the surprise attack in a roundabout way. This method can be employed in places where the enemy has many eyes and ears.

Seventh, the following points deserve emphasis for the advance of surprise attack forces: (1) If rivers and areas with obstacles must be crossed, methods of passages should be studied before departure and necessary tools should be brought along. (2) Bring handbills and notices and such. (3) Agree on various kinds of signals, such as the signal for the start of a charge and so forth and decide on a meeting place in case the assault fails or special difficulties arise. (4) When on the move, choose very hidden, small roads and even take routes that have no roads. (5) During the march, keep absolutely quiet; forbid talking and laughing. Apart from reconnaissance and security personnel, other group members should not carry red markings (but only secret markings).[3] (6) Ahead of the main column, assign a few armed scouts in plain clothes to carry out reconnaissance and security duties. (7) The marching should be as fast as possible. (8) During the march, preparations should be made to fight any of the enemy accidentally encountered on the way.

Eighth, preparations after arriving at the scene of the surprise attack. These are important links in the entire plan of the surprise attack, so the following points deserve attention: (1) Rapidly converge forces under cover outside the enemy cordance line. If the enemy is still unaware of the imminent attack, by no means alert him to it. At this time, the commander of the whole force should immediately call together the leaders of the various groups and give concrete instructions on the methods for this attack. In daylight, the leaders of various groups should be directed to observe under camouflage the arrangement and deployment of the enemy forces and be told in person the specific tasks of their respective groups. If it is possible, plainclothes scouts should quietly capture enemy sentries to further the reconnaissance. (2) A large force (larger than a battalion) should be divided into two routes (not separated too far from each other) to carry out the attack. A small force (smaller than a company) should make the assault together. (3) Send a few men and guns to feign an attack on the heavily defended area to tie down part of the enemy, while the main force should storm one or two enemy positions that are weak and relatively easy to break through. However, under no circumstances should one's forces be divided equally. (4) If there are additional troops, a small number of them may be dispatched to lay an ambush along the enemy's likely escape route to cut it off. (5) A few people must be dispatched to guard the routes by which reinforcements for the enemy could come and to sabotage their telephone and telegraph lines, bridges, and roads. (6) The position from where an attack is launched should be neither too far away nor too near. Preparation time for the attack should be as short as possible and preparations for the attack should be completed as quickly as possible. (7) Surprise attacks at night require very good identification signals to avoid confusion.

Ninth, the assault itself: (1) As soon as the assault starts, it should be carried out swiftly and suddenly according to the prearranged time, direction, and route. If the assault is carried out by several routes simultaneously, the time to start the whole assault should be decided by the time needed for the main force to reach the assault point. The other routes should coordinate their advance in parallel with the main route to avoid premature discovery by the enemy. (2) At the start of the assault, no noise should be made, no guns should be fired (even if the enemy fires first, it should be ignored), and no battle cries should be uttered. Instead, use bayonets, spears, and swords to storm enemy positions in one stroke, engage in face-to-face fighting, and so destroy the enemy quickly. If there are hand grenades, they should be thrown first. (Attention: Do not strike down our own people; prepare a few men at the front of the assault to throw them and do not give any to those behind.) Seize the disorientation of the hand grenade explosions to fall upon the enemy and kill him. (3) Only where one tries to pin down the enemy forces should one fire a few shots to attract their attention thereby assisting the rapid victory in the main direction of assault. (4) If the enemy forces obstinately defend a building and put up a stiff resistance, the building may be burned down to compel them to surrender (only buildings defended stubbornly by the enemy may be burned down;

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[3] It seems probable that the security people were to wear red markings because there were relatively few of them; it was essential that they be able to identify themselves to the Communist forces, and they were presumably skilled at concealment when necessary. Others were to wear markings described as *an* (literally "dark," but here perhaps meaning "secret"), i.e., markings which would not identify the other soldiers as "Reds" and therefore giving warning to the enemy.

no random burning is permitted), or advantage may be taken of the chaos among the enemy forces to assail them from another building. (5) If the surprise attack succeeds, and the enemy forces flee, the troops responsible for ambushing and intercepting them should first block their retreat. At the same time, the troops who have broken through should not concern themselves with capturing weapons and goods. And, apart from the necessary troops who must take care of the captives and guard the battlefield, the rest should all pursue and attack the enemy forces in order to decimate their strength and make it impossible for them to launch counterattacks. But if there is suspicion that the enemy forces have reinforcements, do not pursue them far.

Tenth, after the surprise attack: (1) After the success of the surprise attack, the troops should be gathered at once, and, together with the wounded and the captured goods, they should be directed to concentrate in a position near the road from which you have come. A portion of the troops should occupy the position to prevent counterattacks by the enemy. (2) If the remnants of the enemy forces have run far away, lacking any strength to counterattack, and there is no suspicion that they have reinforcements, then the surprise attack troops may remain in the local area for a while. During this time, some personnel may distribute captured enemy goods to the local poor and help the people deal with notorious Chinese traitors. The main force of the guerrilla unit should choose a position where there is room to fight, to gather together, and to rest. It is absolutely forbidden to act on one's own. Even so, the main force of the guerrilla unit should in general not take up quarters in the local area and should move and take up quarters in a good location a few *li* away. (3) If the situation is tense, then the time for handling matters after the battle should be reduced and the guerrilla troops should leave the place quickly and victoriously. (4) As for the prisoners, when you are close to our own base areas or regular anti-Japanese armies, escort all the prisoners to the rear areas or turn them over to the regular armies to handle. Otherwise, they should be released immediately after questioning and given suitable propaganda. It is strictly forbidden to kill prisoners. Only leading traitors who are deeply hated by the popular masses may be executed at the request of the popular masses. Even if captives sometimes do not want to go with the guerrilla troops, they may only be disarmed and let go. It must be clear that killing prisoners of war will only strengthen the enemy's fighting strength and provides no advantage with respect to the war against Japan. But one must take care to keep one's own actions secret while releasing prisoners. To achieve this objective, one must first release the prisoners who wish to go and lock in a room those who will not go, so that they will not see the direction in which the guerrilla unit withdraws. (5) If the surprise attack fails or enemy reinforcements come in the middle of the assault, our troops should quickly disperse without any hesitation. If the retreat from the battlefield must be carried out under pressure from the enemy, practice dispersed retreat under the cover provided by the most capable old guerrilla soldiers. Usually, the meetingplace after the retreat will be the previous day's camp site or other predesignated place.

(6) Guerrilla units should withdraw under disguise even if there is no great enemy pressure. For example, they should go some *li* in a false direction and then come back to the route really intended to be taken in order to confuse the enemy, and leave nothing to aid their pursuit.

Eleventh, surprise attacks on blockhouses, stockades, fortified villages, or walled towns.[4] Surprise attacks on blockhouses, stockades, fortified villages, or walled towns will not work if one relies only on the meager weapons of guerrilla units and ordinary fighting methods. Surprise attacks can work against these things, but the following conditions should be taken into consideration: (1) It is better to arrange spies or people and enemy soldiers who are sympathetic to the guerrilla unit to serve as supporters from within the city, village, or blockhouse before the surprise attack. Guerrilla units should regularly do such political work in a planned way. (2) Select the most neglected point of the enemy's security to sneak in quietly under the cover of the darkness of night and at a time when the enemy is unprepared. The most dangerous place is also the place to which the enemy pays the least attention and sometimes it is also the best place for us to steal in quietly. But this is certainly not usual. (3) If the surprise attack is discovered by the enemy, a small unit should also launch a false strike in another direction to lure the main force of the enemy, while the main force of the guerrilla unit strikes through the enemies' weak and neglected points. (4) When conducting surprise attacks in daylight over long distances, guerrilla units should disguise themselves as enemy troops whenever possible and seize opportunities to strike. (5) When the enemy forces are put to flight on a battlefield immediately outside such fortifications, engage them in a hot pursuit and take the opportunity to storm the city. Such opportunities should not be wasted. (6) The methods of siege and dynamiting walled town and blockhouse fortifications in the vicinity of our anti-Japanese base areas, and sometimes also in the distant or weak rear areas of the enemy, may be used, provided that the conditions of the popular masses are good and the guerrilla unit has ample forces. But this method can be used only when the enemy is isolated and without support.

Twelfth, harassing and pinning down the enemy. Harassment is a secondary but necessary part of the tactics of surprise attack in guerrilla warfare, and its purpose is to increase the anxiety of enemy and diminish their threatening posture. This creates the conditions for us to wipe them out or force them out. The methods are as follows: (1) When a nighttime surprise attack is unsuccessful, shift the goal to harassment. Shouting slogans, singing loudly, and shooting from all four directions are all ways of harassing. Before retreating, scatter slogan handbills on open ground. (2) In coordinating fighting with regular armies, harassment may be adopted to disperse enemy forces and to tie them down to one place, unable to offer support in other directions. At such times, the guerrilla units may be split into several groups, creep near the enemy garrisons, and shoot and shout suddenly in turns at dusk, midnight, and dawn. This will cause bewilderment and uncertainty among the enemy forces and make them unable or too slow to offer reinforcement. (3) Another method is to bluff and bluster. This method puts up more flags and bonfires in the vicinity of the enemy garrisons. The ancients called this the tactics of sowing doubt. The objective is to deceive the enemy and facilitate our own actions at other places or to intimidate the enemy and increase its sense of panic. At such times, our guerrilla units should only make mock engagements with the enemy and never engage in serious fighting, so as to avoid unnecessary losses.

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[4] Mao is referring to the most likely fortified spots guerrilla units might come up against. Blockhouses were used more in the Guomindang's encirclement campaigns against the Jiangxi soviet in the early and mid-1930s, when the original version of this text was produced, though the Japanese built some after 1938. Stockades would be fortified army encampments. Finally, since rural violence was not new to China, many villages had mud walls around them (especially in North China), and local administrative towns usually had high stone walls.

3. Surprise Attacks on the Enemy When He Is on the Move

Although the above twelve points address the general principles of the tactics of surprise attacks, they mainly deal with surprise attacks on enemy garrisons. Often, surprise attacks on the enemy when it is on the move offer the best chances for the greatest victories in guerrilla warfare. Therefore, guerrilla units should not waste any opportunity to strike the enemy when it is on the move and when the conditions are right. By nature, all these attacks are contact engagements, which may still be divided into two types of attacks: ambushes and sudden raids. An ambush is by nature a planned encounter, but it takes the form of entrapment. A sudden raid occurs in an unexpected encounter and takes the form of a rapid attack. The former is an important tactic of guerrilla units and therefore needs more detailed explanation. The latter refers to a fortuitous situation, so it shall be addressed only briefly.

First, an ambush is to lie in wait. It is the planned and camouflaged deployment of guerrilla troops along one side or both sides of the road that the enemy forces must take followed by a sudden attack when they pass. Such operations are called hidden attacks.[5] Based on different circumstances and deployment of troops, there are two types of ambushes: (1) To lie in wait. Forces are concealed beforehand along the road that the enemy must pass and make a sudden attack when they pass. (2) To lure the enemy into a trap. The main force should be deployed to lay the trap and small units may be used deliberately to display weaknesses and induce the enemy into the trap. Then the surprise attack is launched.

Second, according to the enemy's tactics and the quality of its troops, as well as the terrain and various other factors, several methods may be taken in laying an ambush: hiding on one side, on two sides, on several sides, or in multiple layers.

Third, the objectives of an ambush are as follows: (1) Destroy or weaken enemy infantry, artillery, cavalry, transportation units, requisition and dispatch units, automobiles, trains, ships, and so on. (2) Capture individual or several enemy messengers, scouts, telephone operators, and quartermasters in order to collect information about the enemy. (3) Use an ambush to intercept the enemy in retreat.

Fourth, an ambush requires, first and foremost, a clear understanding of the circumstances. If the circumstances are unclear, it is possible that the ambush may be futile, or may even cause us to suffer losses. Therefore, the scouting must be thorough and precise before making an ambush. In scouting, attention should be focused on the following points: (1) Methods of scouting. First, employ local residents sympathetic to the guerrilla units to approach the enemy by any means available to obtain the necessary information from the mouths of enemy soldiers and coolies. Second, use plainclothes scouts to approach the enemy to conduct intelligence work. Third, eavesdrop on enemy telephone calls. Fourth, seize enemy personnel to acquire information from their mouths or their documents. (2) The key facts to scout out are mainly the departure time of the enemy, the size of enemy troops, the route they will take, their destination, the presence of special weapons and equipment, whether or not they will have supply wagons, the state of communications and liaison during the movement of their troops, particular habits in marching, and so forth. (3) The techniques of reconnaissance follow the principle of concealing one's own intentions while obtaining information about the enemy. Except for those who need to know, the information acquired through reconnaissance should all be kept secret and leaks should be prevented. You must keep in mind that, no matter where, no matter when, enemy spies may be hidden both in the rear areas of the enemy and in the anti-Japanese areas.

Fifth, the choice of ambush sites. The choice of an ambush site should be based on the principle of maximizing the use of our greatest power and the minimizing the enemy's ability to use his greatest power. So, in choosing ambush sites, pay attention to the following points: (1) Good hiding spots make it easy for guerrilla units to see the enemy and difficult for the enemy to see the guerrillas. (2) Good terrain makes it easy for the guerrilla unit to attack the enemy and difficult for the enemy to strike at the guerrilla unit. (3) The roads near ambush sites must be convenient for the guerrilla units to retreat but not for the enemy. (4) The ambush site should be picked in areas other than directly in front of the enemy's march or patrols. There may be good spots by the side of a road, but if they are too close to the road that the enemy uses, such spots should not serve as secret gathering places in an ambush. Appropriate places should be selected in areas farther back. (5) There should be good observation positions. It is better for an ambush to have all these conditions, but it is not necessary to have everyone of these to lay a trap.

Sixth, deploying ambush troops: (1) An ambush should not be laid too early, in order to save the guerrilla units from a long ambush, which diminishes tension and caution, making the exposure of our intentions more likely, and increases the danger of detection by the enemy. But neither should it be laid too late, so that there is not enough time to arrange the trap. (2) The road for the deployment should be hidden. It is better to take small roads and even mountain and valley routes that have no roads. (3) During the march, plainclothes scouts posing as the enemy should be sent ahead of the troops to look out and provide security. If it is necessary to pass residential areas, it is best to disguise our troops as the enemy and keep operational secrecy. (4) After arriving at the ambush area, this news should be blocked.

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[5] In these two sentences Mao is distinguishing two related terms, *maifu* (to lie in ambush) and *fuji* (to attack from a hidden position).

Seventh, carrying out the ambush: (1) The deployment of troops should depend on the size of the guerrilla unit, the size of the enemy forces, and the terrain. Usually a small unit (below 30 percent of the total force) will seize positions that have strategic importance and are difficult to reach, and from them pin down the enemy with firepower and inflict casualties on him. The main force will lay the trap at the best place for the assault and carry out the attack. Sometimes, a few men with a few guns should be posted to watch out in the direction from which enemy reinforcements may come and to secure the protective positions for withdrawal. (2) When making a surprise attack on a large enemy force, let its advance and main troops pass, and launch a surprise attack on its tail. Meanwhile, if possible, a small guerrilla detachment can raid the forward troops of the enemies and draw their attention. This will help the surprise attack of the ambushing troops. It is also possible to destroy roads and bridges by any means available in advance (flooding, blocking, barricading with stones and turning ordinary bridges into unsafe ones, and so on) to extend the enemy's column, so that it is hard for the head and the tail to assist each other. (3) In a surprise attack on a small enemy force, it may be possible to block its escape, cut off its incoming route, and eliminate it completely. (4) Regarding the signals for the start of an attack, the specific tasks of the various subunits, the routes of the strike, which unit starts firing first, and so forth, all leaders of various subunits should be informed in detail in advance. (5) Before an attack, keep well hidden and keep utmost silence. No eating or smoking, no talking and laughing, no casual looking about and visiting. (6) Survey the battlefield. Establish two observation posts in advance. The first one may be set up some ten *li* up the route by which the enemy will come. Three or four communication personnel, all disguised in enemy uniform, carry out these observation duties. They provide constant reports to the commander of the guerrilla units on the length of the enemy ranks, the strength of the enemy troops, and their surveillance efforts, so that the commander may make timely decisions in light of these developments. After the complete passage of the enemy, this post should return to the main group. The second observation post should be set up close to the ambush area for the commander so that he can observe the scene personally and issue the signal for the start of an attack at the right time. (7) The timing to begin the attack should be selected for the moment most opportune for ourselves to attack the enemy on the march. At the same time, all the guerrilla troops must strictly obey orders. No free movement is permitted so as to avoid alerting the enemy in advance. (8) The actual attack should be swift and fierce and should catch the enemy "off guard." In short order all weapons should be fired together. The charge should start at once, and the battle should be finished quickly. Any doubt or hesitation will be harmful.

Eighth, as soon as the fighting has succeeded, immediately gather the troops together, deal with the prisoners of war, and collect the captured matériel and the wounded for a speedy withdrawal. If only a part of the enemy has been destroyed, a quicker withdrawal should begin to prevent a counterattack. All heavy equipment and goods that cannot be carried away should be destroyed.

Ninth, arrangements in case an ambush is impossible or unsuccessful: (1) If an attack has started but the battle between the two sides has not begun, and it is discovered suddenly that the enemy forces are too overwhelming or that they have found out in advance about our ambush and have already taken positions such that the attack is unlikely to be successful, stop the attack immediately and by all means quit the field. This is to preserve our own strength. Such times require the best judgment and inspiration from the commander. (2) If the fighting has already started and the enemy puts up stiff resistance and it is certain that the battle cannot be won, then stop fighting and retreat with determination.

Tenth, harassing the enemy. When the objective is not to destroy the enemy or the ambush cannot conclude the battle decisively, then take on the work of harassment. This method uses a small detachment to spread them over several points, to kill and wound the enemy with firepower for the purpose of harassing their columns on the march or to push huge rocks and old trees from high mountain cliffs to kill and wound their men and horses.

Eleventh, the tasks of the plainclothes scouts sent by small guerrilla groups [*xiaozu*] or guerrilla detachments are to ambush individual or groups of enemy dispatchers, purchasing agents, scouts, and so on. There are many such opportunities which should not be wasted.

Twelfth, ambushing cavalry. (1) The power of movement and attack of enemy cavalry is relatively strong, so choose forests or narrow roads (sometimes residential areas may also be appropriate), where the enemy cavalry will have difficulty maneuvering, to carry out the ambush. (2) Firepower should be concentrated on killing and wounding horses. After that, the people are easily captured. (3) When ambushing a few enemy cavalry offers the certainty of catching them, then a multilayered ambush from all directions may be laid. (4) Our troops may disguise themselves as civilian residents, hide in a village ahead of time, wait for the enemy cavalry to enter the village, and then launch a surprise attack against them when the enemy personnel and horses are scattered.

Thirteenth, ambushing trucks. The ambush site should be selected in a mountain valley, the bottom of a valley, the bottom of a gully, a corner, or on a rising or falling slope. Set up barricades and booby traps or lay mines (or bind together hand grenades and mortar shells) ahead of time, thus forcing the trucks that reach them to stop or to be blown up and turned over. Then the guerrilla units hidden nearby wait for the moment when the trucks stop or turn over to block their advance with one small force and cut off their retreat with another small force, while the main force launches a direct assault on the vehicles and captures people and goods. If there are guards, they should be disarmed first before burning the vehicles. Attention should, however, be placed on winning over the captured drivers and soldiers, who should not be killed or harmed.

Fourteenth, ambushing trains. (1) Turns, rising or falling slopes, high embankments, hollows, and entrances of tunnels are all good sites for laying an ambush. (2) Methods: First, loosen spikes on train rails or dismantle a section of the railroad to derail the train when it arrives. Or erect barricades by piling up big rocks and large logs on the rail lines or at the mouths of tunnels to halt the advance of the train. The guerrilla unit should divide into three parts: One part should take over the position and prevent the guards on the trains from resisting. Another part should fire at the train carriages. The last part should prepare to enter the carriages, seize weapons, and capture the personnel. Finally, the train should be set on fire and destroyed. (3) Special attention should be paid in particular to armored trains, for they are moving cannon platforms. Guerrilla units should not only loosen rail spikes in advance but also try to blow them up with mines. Attacks should be launched only after the rails collapse.

Fifteenth, ambushing ships and boats: (1) The ships and boats which guerrilla units may ambush are mainly commercial ships and smaller inland river gunboats used by the enemy for transportation. (2) Ambush sites should be in concealed places along riverbanks, at river bends, and near our location on the banks. (3) During an ambush, the main firepower and military force of the guerrilla unit should be ready to attack the head and a small force should be responsible for striking at the tail, ready to intercept it with firepower if the enemy turns around. As soon as the enemy ship arrives, start a fierce barrage of rifle and machine-gun fire. Cannon fire is especially good. (In case there are no foreign cannons, homemade cannons and pine tree cannons can also serve the purpose.) (4) Wooden ships should be ordered to stop and anchor near the banks. Search them for military equipment and goods. Private ships should be let go, and the crew should be given back their belongings. Official ships should be set on fire and burned.

Sixteenth, ambushing enemy requisition teams: (1) Ambush enemy requisition teams before they reach the villages. Guerrilla units must lay the ambush in advance along the sides of the road that the enemy forces must take, wait for them to arrive, and launch a surprise attack and wipe them out. (2) Or launch a surprise attack against the enemy requisition teams when they have entered a village and started to collect from house to house. At such times, the enemy is dispersed and cannot concentrate his forces, and so is easiest to eliminate. If a small detachment of guerrillas in disguise is planted in a village ahead of time, and the main force attack from outside the village, the outcome will be even better. But those concealed inside the village must wait for the major force outside the village to act first, so as not to alarm the enemy and allow him to flee. (3) If, because there is not enough time, the above two methods cannot be adopted, then you can wait for the enemy forces to finish their requisitioning and return with all the goods, and ambush them from the side of the road on their return. After the success of such an ambush, all captured money and goods should be returned to the popular masses from whom the goods were taken originally. Only when the popular masses want to express thanks to the guerrilla unit voluntarily can a portion of the money and goods be distributed to add to the supplies of the guerrilla unit. (4) However, the objective of ambushing enemy requisition teams, no matter when it takes place, can be achieved only by sudden action and the destruction of their covering troops first.

Seventeenth, ambushing enemy transportation units: (1) Narrow roads or bottlenecks of roads should be selected. (2) If the enemy guard troops are relatively powerful, then the guerrilla unit can be split into two. The main force should fight the enemy guard troops and draw them toward itself, while a small force should seize the goods being transported or burn them. (3) If the enemy guard troops are few, then these troops should be destroyed first, and then the transport goods should be captured. (4) The general principle in ambushing enemy transportation units is, first, to fire at the advance part of their ranks to cause disorder in the procession, as civilian porters try to escape and the road is blocked. Next, destroy or drive away the enemy guard troops with sudden force and then seize the supplies. (5) To prevent the transportation unit from turning back and running away, a small force should be deployed in advance to cut off their retreat.

Eighteenth, sudden raids: This is a method to handle unexpected encounters. (1) Guerrilla units on the move may encounter enemy suppression troops,[6] requisition teams, or transportation units on the move. So guerrilla units on the move should always be ready for such sudden attacks. (2) During their advance, guerrilla units should regularly dispatch plainclothes scouts to places three to five *li* in front of the advance part of the our troops, so that news of encountering the enemy may be obtained and ways of dealing with them may be decided quickly. (3) If a small enemy unit or an enemy unit with a force equivalent to our own is encountered, then the earliest opportunity should be seized and the guerrilla unit should turn rapidly toward the flanks of the enemy forces, open fire at them suddenly, charge toward them with full force, and destroy them in one stroke. Meanwhile, if the enemy forces retreat in defeat and there are no worries about support from other enemy forces, then they should be pursued and eliminated completely. But they should not be pursued too far. (4) If large numbers of enemy forces are encountered and the facts are unclear, a rapid withdrawal should be carried out without any hesitation, with the aim of getting away. If the enemy fires first, we should use a small force to occupy positions to resist and cover the main force as it with-

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6. Suppression troops (*taofa dui*) was the term used for the Guomindang troops carrying out the encirclement campaigns against the Jiangxi soviet in the early and mid-1930s. After 1938, Japanese occupation troops also organized to suppress Communist guerrilla units in areas of North China under Japanese military control.

draws first. Then the guerrilla covering forces should withdraw thereafter to avoid losses. (5) In sum, sudden encounters with the enemy require quick decisions first and foremost, whether to fight or to retreat. There should be no hesitation, for indecisiveness and hesitation are dangerous.

The above eighteen points are all methods for making surprise attacks on the enemy on the move, and the anti-Japanese guerrilla units should study them.

All tactics should, however, be based on the principle of adapting to objective conditions. Words and articles can only serve as references for the actual fighting, and they should not be applied rigidly. There will certainly be many new and valuable experiences in the anti-Japanese war that will surpass previous words and articles. We hope that all of you will encourage one another to defeat the Japanese imperialists.

To Ai Siqi

(January 12, 1938, at night)

Comrade Siqi:

I do not have the *Complete Works of Lu Xun*. I do have several individual works, including his *Dawn Blossoms Plucked at Dusk,*[1] but I can't find it anywhere.

I am just starting to study military questions, but for the time being I cannot write an article in this domain.

It would be somewhat better [for me] to study philosophical works a while longer before writing anything, and there would seem to be no immediate urgency.

Liang Shuming has come here. His *Theory of the Rural Movement*[2] contains a number of strange ideas. One could look him up and talk with him.

When you are free come over for a chat, but please come in the evening, any time except Monday or Friday.

Best wishes!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 118–19, where it is reproduced from the manuscript conserved in the archives.

[1] *Dawn Blossoms Plucked at Dusk* was a slim volume containing ten essays written by Lu Xun in 1926.

[2] The correct title of this work is *Theory of Rural Reconstruction.* Liang Huanting (1893–1988), commonly known by his *zi*, Shuming, was a native of Guangxi. In the early 1930s, he undertook to promote rural reform based on Confucian principles in Shandong.

Interview with a Correspondent of New China News *in Yan'an* (on One-Party Dictatorship)

(February 2, 1938)[1]

Question no. 1: Is the current political system in the Soviet Union a one-party dictatorship?

Answer: The Soviet Union is a state of the dictatorship of the working class, that is, a socialist state of the workers and peasants, but not a state of party dictatorship. From a Marxist-Leninist point of view, a class-based dictatorship and a party-based dictatorship are two distinct things. A party is composed only of the most conscious elements of a class. The Party must, and indeed can only, play the leading role in a state of the proletarian dictatorship. The Party must not, and indeed cannot, supplant the class in imposing the dictatorship. Consequently, the founders of the Soviet political system, Lenin and Stalin, have never confused a party-based dictatorship with a class-based dictatorship. If, on occasion, they have used the term of so-called Party dictatorship, they were merely referring to the leading role of the Party in the state structure, and that was all. In order to help you understand and accept this argument of mine, I'm happy to inform you regarding some of the things Lenin and Stalin have said about this issue. To help you remember and understand, I will, in particular, explain to you how Stalin, in his work *On Questions of Leninism,* presents Lenin's views on this problem, as well as his own. In the chapter in this book entitled "The Party and the Working Class in the System of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," Stalin gave a detailed and clear exposition of Lenin's views on this issue. He said, for example:

> The highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here, in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, is the fact that not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directives from the Party. In *this sense* it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, in essence, the "dictatorship" of its vanguard, the "dictatorship" of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Second Congress of the Comintern:
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> Tanner says that he stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the dictatorship of the proletariat is not conceived quite in the same way as we conceive it. He says that by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, in essence, the dictatorship of its organized and class-conscious minority.
>
> And, as a matter of fact, in the era of capitalism, when the masses of the workers are continuously subjected to exploitation and cannot develop their human potentialities, the most characteristic features of working-class political parties is that they can embrace only a minority of their class. A political party can comprise only a minority of the class, in the same way as the really class-conscious workers in any capitalist society constitute only a minority of all the workers. That is why we must admit that only this class-conscious minority can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them. And if Comrade Tanner says that he is opposed to parties, but at the same time is in favor of the minority consisting of the best organized and most revolutionary workers showing the way to the whole of the proletariat, then I say that there is really no difference between us.
>
> But this, however, must not be understood in the sense that a sign of equality can be put between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the Party (the "dictatorship" of the Party), that the former can be identified with the latter, that the latter can be substituted for the former. Comrade Sorin, for example, says that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party." This thesis, as you see, identifies the "dictatorship of the Party" with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Can we regard this identification as correct, and yet remain on the ground of Leninism? No, we cannot.[2]

This text was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 28, January 11, 1938, and that is our source. The interview also appears in *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 305–21, where it is reproduced from this and several other contemporary sources, but as noted below, a long passage is missing from that version. The text as published in *Jiefang* is preceded by the following note:

> The correspondent of *New China News* in Yan'an, Mr. Qiguang, has recently published some articles in newspapers and reviews putting forward the idea of a so-called one-party dictatorship, basing his arguments, first of all, on the example of the Soviet Union and, then, on that of Germany and Italy. On February 2, he paid a visit to Mr. Mao Zedong, to learn his views of this matter. We are publishing the complete record of their talk here, so that all our compatriots throughout the country can read it quickly.

[1] As stated in the source note, this interview appeared in the issue of *Jiefang* dated January 11, 1938, but in China at this time, the effective date of publication of a periodical often did not correspond exactly to the date on the cover. We therefore follow the indication in the introductory note to the *Jiefang* version to the effect that the interview took place on February 2.

[2] In the case of the foregoing long quotation from Stalin, and most of the other quotations in this passage, we have followed the English text in J.V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), rather than retranslating the Chinese rendering of the Russian text into English. (The above passage appears on p. 184.) There are no substantial differences between this text and the version Mao was following, except that Mao was using a translation from the second Russian edition of Lenin's writings, which had not yet been sanitized by the removal of all favorable references to Stalin's victims of the late 1930s. Thus, the version followed by Mao refers, in the last paragraph just quoted, to "Comrade Sorin," while in the edition reprinted in Beijing in 1976 he has become simply "Sorin." On such points, whenever they arise, we follow Mao and the second edition.

It can thus be seen that what the Soviet Union practices is the dictatorship of the working class, and not the dictatorship of the Communist Party. To confuse the dictatorship of a class with the dictatorship of a party conforms neither to Marxist-Leninist theories nor to the reality of the Soviet Union. I think that, in terms of understanding this problem in the Soviet Union, the views of the creators of the Soviet political system, Lenin and Stalin, are the most authoritative and trustworthy.

Question no. 2: Even though the Soviet Union is not a party dictatorship, why does the Communist Party alone exist there?

Answer: On the one hand, this is the result of the choice made by the will of the people during the past long struggle between the different parties and groups in Russia. In other words, it is the result of the Russian people's withdrawing their support for other parties and groups in the course of a long historical struggle and giving their support to the Communist Party. On the other hand, it is because there is already no social basis for the existence of other political parties in the socialist Soviet Union; consequently, there is neither the necessity nor the possibility for other political parties to exist. In order to help you understand and believe these statements of mine, it is best to refer you to Stalin's own words on this issue. The fact that the Communist Party alone exists in the Soviet Union is not fabricated, imagined, or created through administrative orders by the workers. It has taken shape as the result of historical life. On this point, Stalin put this very clearly in his talk with the First Delegation of American Workers on September 9, 1927. He said:

> Our Party's position as the only legal party in the country (the Communist Party's monopoly) is not something artificial and deliberately invented. Such a position cannot be created artificially by administrative machinations, and so forth. Our Party's monopoly grew out of life, it developed historically as a result of the utter bankruptcy of the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties.[3]

In the Soviet Union, there are no social bases for the existence of political parties other than the Communist Party; nor is there the necessity and possibility of the existence of other political parties.[4] On this point, Stalin gave a special explanation in his report on the new constitution of the Soviet Union on November 25, 1936. He said:

> Finally, there is yet another group of critics. While the last-mentioned group accuses the Draft Constitution of abandoning the dictatorship of the working class, this group, on the contrary, accuses it of not changing anything in the existing position in the USSR, of leaving the dictatorship of the working class intact, of not granting freedom to political parties, and of preserving the present leading position of the Communist Party in the USSR. And this group of critics maintains that the absence of freedom for parties in the USSR is a symptom of the violation of the principles of democratism.
>
> I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the USSR. If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution.
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> As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable—in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, rich peasants and poor peasants, etc. But in the USSR, there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the rich peasants, and so on. In the USSR there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests—far from being mutually hostile—are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence there is no ground in the USSR for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, for freedom for these parties. In the USSR there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the USSR, only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end. And that it defends the interests of these classes not at all badly, of that there can hardly be any doubt.
>
> They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the USSR, on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democratism are violated, not by the Draft of the new Constitution of the USSR, but by the bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the Constitution of the USSR is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world.[5]

We can, therefore, see that the fact of the existence of a single party can take shape and be realized only in countries, such as the socialist Soviet Union, in which parties and groups other than the single party in question have been completely abandoned or overthrown by the people in the course of the revolution, and in which there are no social bases for the existence of other parties and groups.

Question no. 3: Why can Germany and Italy both practice a one-party dictatorship?

Answer: Above all, we must clearly distinguish the question of the control of political power by one party within a country from the question of whether or not only one party really exists in a country. It is true that, both in Germany and in Italy, one party alone controls political power; but this does not mean that only the party in control of political power exists in these countries. In Germany today, though of course the only party in control of political power is the fascist National Socialist Party, other political parties that existed before the fascist party came to power—such as the Social Democratic Party, which had millions of votes in the last parliamentary election (1933), the Communist Party, which had 5 to 6 million votes, and various other pro-democratic bourgeois parties and groups that enjoyed the support of millions of voters and their own historical tradition—all continue to exist and operate, albeit in an underground and illegal manner. Anyone who goes to German cities and villages and observes carefully will immediately see that, although hundreds of thousands of antigovernment elements are incarcerated in concentration camps, the Social Democrats, the Communists, and all other parties and groups that support democracy and oppose the fascist dictatorship are all fighting heroically underground. They are secretly publishing their newspapers and journals. They are arduously carrying out the work of educating and organizing the popular masses. In countries such as France, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium, German political expatriates are forming ties with their own political parties and groups in these countries in order to establish a popular front to oppose fascism and support democratic politics. Representatives of the German Social Democratic Party and the German Communist Party all sit in the governing organs of the Social Democratic International (the Second International) and the Comintern. The situation in Italy is no different from that in Germany. The Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, and all democratic parties and groups are similarly carrying out heroic underground activities against the fascist party. The representatives of these parties and groups are also working both inside and outside Italy to establish an antifascist popular front. Representatives of the Italian Communist Party and the Italian Social Democratic Party also occupy important positions in the governing organs of the Third International and the Second International.

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[3] We have taken this passage from the English translation of Stalin's works (J.V. Stalin, *Works* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954], vol. 10, p. 120).

[4] This almost verbatim repetition of the third sentence in Mao's reply to the second question appears in the Chinese original.

[5] Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 818–20.

Thus it can be seen that, although only one party controls political power and enjoys a legal status in Germany and Italy, it is completely contrary to the facts to say that only fascist parties exist in these countries.

Question no. 4: Some say that the Guomindang should now impose a "one-party dictatorship." What are your views regarding this question?

Answer: I can respond to this question of yours from two perspectives.

First, if the "one-party dictatorship" you are talking about refers to the fact that the Guomindang alone controls the National Government, that is already an established fact today, for as everyone knows, only members of the Guomindang or those designated by the Guomindang are in charge in the National Government, and no other parties and groups in China today have representatives inside the government. Our Communist Party is the largest political party next to the Guomindang. At present, we definitely do not demand to join the government. Our Party's position on this issue has been sincerely explained on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party by one of the Party's leaders, Comrade Chen Shaoyu [Wang Ming], in his talk with the American reporter Mr. Biden [?], on December 25 of last year, and by another leader of our Party, Comrade Zhang Wentian (i.e., Luo Fu), in his article "Strengthen the Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communists to Seek Victory in the War of Resistance" (published in the current issue). On this point, I can solemnly state once again, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Our Chinese Communist Party is now assisting, in complete good faith, the Guomindang in its war of resistance to Japan, but at present we make no demand to join the National Government.

Second, so-called one-party government, which refers to the control of a country's political power by one party, need not necessarily employ the method of "dictatorship." If the methods of "one-party dictatorship" were, in fact, equivalent to the policies carried out by the Guomindang during the past decade, then I think it would be necessary to consider the matter. As I see it, although the Guomindang can maintain the situation of the control of political power by one party today, it should, it seems, adopt rather democratic methods in order to rally together those who want to fight Japan and save China and in order to demonstrate the popular resolve to fight Japan and save China. Of course, such democratic methods are those absolutely favorable to fighting the War of Resistance, strengthening the government, and increasing the people's support for and confidence in the government.

Question no. 5: Some people are now saying that the Guomindang should once again carry out the policy of "no party outside the party," in other words, the policy of not allowing any political parties other than the Guomindang to exist legally. What is your view, sir, on this issue?

Answer: Not only is the policy of permitting only the Guomindang to exist legally, and not only refusing to recognize the legal existence of the Communist Party and other political parties (such as the Nationalist Youth Party and the National Socialist Party) but of striving to destroy all parties except the Guomindang by military force by no means a new theory in China, but it is in fact an old policy that has already been carried out in China for a decade. But the tragic consequences of this are that we have not only suffered endless internecine strife but invited an unprecedented foreign disaster. The painful experience of actual political life in China during the past ten years tells us that the Guomindang's policy of attempting to use force to destroy other parties and groups has already ended in failure. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party's attempt to create a régime led by a single party under the conditions now existing in China has also failed to achieve the expected results. The lessons of the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, which led to the victory of the Northern Expedition, and the reality of the grave national crisis caused by the split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party in the last decade have taught the comrades of the two parties, the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as the Chinese people as a whole, a bitter truth, namely, that the truly effective means for creating a unified China is not to be found in an internal struggle by one party to oppose or attempt to destroy the other party but, rather, through forming a national united front of the forces of all the parties and groups on a common political basis and, above all, in the close cooperation between the two parties of the Guomindang and the Communist Party. The reason it has been possible in our country during the past six months to create the fundamental prerequisite for waging a war of resistance to Japan lies in the fact that the national forces in our country have been united and unified. Moreover, the specific form and content of the unity and unification of the nationalist forces in our country resides in the establishment of an anti-Japanese national united front formed on the basis of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Not only have the Guomindang and the Communist Party both abandoned their previous position of mutual nonrecognition and opposition, but they have begun to cooperate closely on the basis of fighting Japan to save China. This means that the Guomindang has given up its previous position of denying the existence of the Communist Party and other parties in favor of an orientation of uniting all anti-Japanese parties and groups to resist the foreign invader. The Communist Party and other parties have also abandoned their previous position of opposing the Guomindang and are cooperating with the Guomindang to pursue the common cause of fighting Japan and saving the country. It can thus be seen that the union of the forces of the various parties and groups to form an anti-Japanese national united front is a necessary precondition for China's war of resistance to Japan. If there is no such precondition, or if this precondition is destroyed, this will in fact cause China to continue to suffer from internal turmoil. A China torn by internal turmoil is incapable of continuing its war against Japan. This is a self-evident and commonly recognized truth. Moreover, precisely because of this, the Japanese fascist warlords, in addition to military aggression, also attempt, at all times, to employ the venomous scheme of "using Chinese to control Chinese," above all by trying to rekindle the internal strife between the various parties and groups in China, so that the Anti-Japanese National United Front may be split. It can thus be seen that the theory being touted by certain individuals today that does not allow the existence of any party except the Guomindang is, in fact, a theory which has already been negated by the facts of China's history. This represents an attempt to return China to the situation of internecine strife that existed before we united to fight the war. At the same time, this would make it impossible for the situation of unity created by the Anti-Japanese National United Front in China to continue. Consequently, it would create once again a situation in which China is powerless to fight a war of resistance to Japan. Thus, no matter how loudly the individuals espousing this theory shout "national unity," if their theory were unfortunately to be put into practice, the real effect would certainly be to destroy the existing unity in resisting Japan and make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance against Japan. Thus, no matter how loudly the individuals espousing this theory shout "resist Japan," if their theory were unfortunately to be applied, the actual result would certainly be to destroy our unity in waging the war against Japan and make it impossible for the War of Resistance to continue. Precisely because of this, I firmly believe that such theories, which damage our real unity in the name of unity, harm our war against Japan in the name of resisting Japan, and attempt, in essence, to force China to return to the tragic conditions prior to the emergence of national unity in the struggle against foreign aggression, will undoubtedly be opposed by the patriotic people of our country, negated by the country's soldiers who are fighting the war and, at the same time, denounced and rejected by the wise leaders of the Guomindang and all the comrades in the Guomindang who are willing to continue to fight the war for our country and our people. There is nothing surprising about this. First, this is because such theories are completely incompatible with reality and in fact contradict reality. These individuals are saying, "If other parties and groups apart from the Guomindang enjoy legal status, the war against Japan will be hampered because of interparty disputes." What the facts have proved is that when, previously, only the Guomindang was allowed to exist legally, while all other parties were denied legal status, there was, indeed, very serious interparty strife in China, which led to China's failure to wage a war of resistance to Japan—or, at most, China fought a localized war of resistance and was powerless to prosecute a full-scale war against Japan. On the contrary, when the Guomindang allowed other parties to exist legally, and cooperated with them, the civil war in China did stop, and interparty strife was resolved, creating an unprecedented situation of unity in the nation's government and armed forces. It was only because of this that we could wage an unprecedented holy war of national self-defense to ensure our national survival and seek our national liberation. These individuals are saying, "If, in addition to the Guomindang, other parties are given a legal right to exist, the fact of the legal existence of many parties will become a factor hampering and disrupting the unity of our country." The facts in China have proved that when only the Guomindang enjoyed a legal status, while denying it to other parties, our civil turmoil intensified to the point of unending civil war. On the contrary, when the Guomindang permitted other parties to have the legal right to exist, a situation of internal unity emerged, and different parties, despite their disagreement on certain issues, would never resort to arms as a means of criticism. At most, they would do no more than use friendly mutual criticism as weapons. The facts in England, the United States, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland also show: the fact of the legal existence of several parties has never hampered or hurt the unity of these countries. It can thus be seen that the theory that China can be unified and fight a war against Japan only by allowing the Guomindang alone to exist legally is a theory that is not compatible with China's real life; it is a theory that will make China neither truly unified nor truly capable of fighting a war against Japan. This theory will never be accepted by those Chinese armed forces and people who cherish unity and are resolved to fight Japan.

Question no. 6: Now some people are saying that since the Communist Party has declared that it believes in the Three People's Principles, it can no longer believe in communism. What is your view on this issue?

Answer: The first thing I want to declare is that some people are saying that when members of the Communist Party proclaim they will fight for the realization of the Three People's Principles, this is equivalent to abandoning their own faith in communism. I can, officially on behalf of our Party, declare once again that this is nothing but a rumor launched by troublemakers and absolutely does not correspond to the facts. We are members of the Communist Party. We declare our willingness to struggle, together with the comrades of the Guomindang, for the unfinished revolutionary cause of Mr. Sun Yatsen—that is to say, the cause of the Three People's Principles, which seek equal international status, equal political status, and equal economic status for China. At the same time, we can certainly never give up our communism, which we have faithfully believed in, and sacrificed and struggled for over so many years. Second, some are saying that if you declare that you are fighting for the realization of the Three People's Principles, but at the same time believe in communism, this position is not in accordance with the Three People's Principles, since the Three People's Principles and communism are fundamentally incompatible. On this point, I can once again solemnly point out that such statements are absolutely erroneous. Such statements neither are in agreement with the theory and practice of Mr. Sun,[6] the revolutionary teacher who formulated the Three People's Principles and founded the Guomindang, nor correspond to the reality of the Chinese revolution. From a theoretical point of view, the primary components of the Three People's Principles—nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood—are precisely compatible with the ideas which communism advocates: thoroughly overthrowing imperialist oppression, so that the Chinese people can enjoy national independence; thoroughly destroying feudal oppression, so that the Chinese people can enjoy democratic freedom; and thoroughly reforming China's economic system to help the Chinese people achieve higher standards of living. Therefore, communism and the Three People's Principles are by no means incompatible, and it is not impossible for our Party and the

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[6] Three versions of Sun's name have long been commonly used in China: Sun Wen, including his original given name, or *ming,* Wen; Sun Yatsen, Yatsen being the Cantonese pronunciation of one of his *hao,* Yixian; and Sun Zhongshan, using another *hao*. Throughout the discussion of Sun's Three People's Principles in this interview, Mao refers to him not as "Mr. Sun Zhongshan," but as "Mr. Zhongshan." This usage, in Chinese, has overtones both of familiarity and of respect, but might seem odd in English. We have therefore rendered the name throughout the balance of this text simply as "Mr. Sun."

Guomindang to coexist legally and cooperate closely. On this issue, Mr. Sun had given explicit instructions repeatedly in his lectures on the doctrine of People's Livelihood. For example, in the second lecture on People's Livelihood, Mr. Sun openly denounced such erroneous views of some members of the Guomindang. He said:

> So soon as social problems are mentioned, most young men rise to champion communism and want to apply Marx's theories in China. How much careful thinking have these youthful zealots done who are thus espousing Marxism? They are a very thoughtful group; they are proposing a radical solution; they feel that political and social problems must be righted at the foundation and cleared at the source, and so radical measures are necessary. Therefore, they are actively organizing a communist party and are beginning to agitate in China. This has given rise to many misgivings among the older comrades in the Guomindang, who feel that communism is incompatible with the Three People's Principles of our party.[7] (See *Zhongshan quanji,* vol. 1, Second lecture on People's Livelihood, p. 42)

From this we can see that Mr. Sun openly pointed out that if, among the members of the Guomindang, there were some comrades who regarded the Three People's Principles and Communism as incompatible, this was the result of a misunderstanding. Why did such a misunderstanding arise? Mr. Sun, in the lecture cited above (on pp. 44–45 of the lecture cited above), pointed out, in order to clarify this point, that in general the reason was that such people did not understand the interconnected character of the Three People's Principles. In particular, they did not understand the principle of People's Livelihood. Consequently, after explaining these reasons, Mr. Sun went on in his lecture to say:

> Why do I dare to say that our revolutionary comrades have no clear idea of the Principle of People's Livelihood? Because many of them, since our recent reorganization of the Guomindang, have in their opposition to the Communist Party, declared offhand that communism is different from the Three People's Principles; the Three People's Principles are all that is necessary in China, and communism should

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[7] As indicated above in the source note, a substantial passage of Mao's interview, as published in *Jiefang*, has by some accident been omitted from the text as reprinted in *Mao Zedong ji.* This gap begins after the words "who feel that communism is incompatible with the Three People's Principles of our party" and ends at the point indicated below by another note. For the quotations from Sun's lectures, we have used the translation of Frank W. Price, *SAN MIN CHU I: The Three Principles of the People* (Shanghai: China Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927), where the passage just quoted appears on pp. 423–24. This version is reasonably accurate and has the advantage of enabling users of this series who do not read Chinese to see the context of the passages cited by Mao. The Chinese text we have followed in checking the accuracy of the quotations from Sun is that in *Zhongshan congshu* (Collected Writings of Sun Yatsen) (Shanghai: Dayi tongyuan shuju, reprinted June 1927, i.e., before significant changes could have been made in the wake of the break between the Communists and the Guomindang).

> under no conditions be admitted. But what really is the Principle of People's Livelihood? In my last lecture I revealed a little of what it means; I said that *Minsheng*, or Livelihood, has been the central force in the cultural progress of society, in the improvement of economic organization, and in moral evolution. Livelihood is the driving power in all social movements; and if livelihood does not go right, social culture cannot advance, economic organization cannot improve, morals will decline, and many injustices such as class war, cruelty to workers, and other forms of oppression will spring up—all because of the failure to remedy the unfortunate conditions of livelihood. All social changes are effects; the search for livelihood is the cause.
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> In view of this conclusion, what is the Principle of Livelihood? It is communism and it is socialism. So not only should we not say that communism conflicts with the *Minsheng* principle, but we should even claim communism as a good friend. The supporters of the *Minsheng* principle should study communism thoughtfully.[8]

In his lecture, Mr. Sun continues by raising a question:

> If communism is a good ally of the *Minsheng* Principle, why do members of the Guomindang oppose the Communist Party? The reason may be that the members of the Communist Party themselves do not understand what communism is and have discoursed against the Three People's Principles, thus arousing a reaction within the Guomindang. But the blame for these ignorant and reckless communists should not be charged to the whole Communist Party or to the principles of the party. We can only say that they are acting as individuals; we cannot take the bad behavior of some individuals as representative and oppose the whole Communist Party. Since we cannot use the actions of a few persons as an excuse for opposing the principles of a whole group, why has the question arisen among our Guomindang comrades? Because they have not understood what the Principle of People's Livelihood really is. They do not realize that our principle of Livelihood is a form of communism.[9]

What conclusions should we draw from this lecture of Mr. Sun? The conclusions are, first, that the Three People's Principles and communism can coexist. The Three People's Principles and communism have a very good, friendly relationship. Second, those who consider that the Three People's Principles and communism are incompatible are, in reality, people who do not understand the Three People's Principles, and in particular those who do not know what the principle of People's Livelihood is all about. Such people should be a very small minority within the Guomindang. Similarly, those who consider that communism and the Three People's Principles are incompatible in reality do not understand communism, and in particular do not understand the reciprocal relations between communism and the Three People's Principles. These people should also constitute an extremely small number within the Communist Party. As regards the method for resolving this problem, Mr. Sun considers that this is a matter of individual behavior on one side or the other, and neither side can, in response to this, oppose the whole party or the entire ideology of the other side. Third, Mr. Sun considers that, not only should those who advocate communism understand the Three People's Principles; at the same time, he also points out that those who advocate People's Livelihood should also study communism in detail. This is an open, aboveboard, and unselfish attitude. We Communists greatly admire this attitude of Mr. Sun. In reality, any great thought or ideology in the world cannot be patented by a single party; it should and must welcome anyone else and any other party to come to study and apply it. Not only are we willing to fight for the application of the Three People's Principles; we also welcome anyone—especially our comrades from the Guomindang—to come, in accordance with Mr. Sun's directives, and study communism attentively. For we are profoundly convinced that all those who want to struggle for the cause of the liberation of humanity, and who also truly study and understand communism (or Marxism), will assuredly recognize that Marxism is the highest ideal for the resolution of social questions and that it is the great synthesis of several thousand years of human thought. Communist society is the most satisfactory, the most joyful, the happiest society; there is absolutely nothing frightening about it. Precisely for this reason, our country's greatest revolutionary of the modern era, Mr. Sun Yatsen, has said:

> Soon after man's conquest over nature and the wild beasts came the introduction of money.[10] Now in modern times has come the invention of machinery and the men with the keenest minds have taken the world's most valuable materials and have monopolized them for their own profit, making other classes of men their slaves. This has made our age one of fierce human struggle. When can this struggle be settled? Only when we initiate a new period of communism. What is man struggling for, anyway? He is struggling for bread, he is struggling for the rice bowl. In the communistic age, when all have bread and rice enough to eat, there will be no fighting between men and the human struggle will be eliminated. So communism is a very high ideal of social reconstruction. (See "The Second Lecture on People's Welfare," *Zhongshan quanji,* vol. 2, p. 38)[11]

Mr. Sun once said, about the value of Marxism:

> His books and theories may be said to have crystallized the best thinking of mankind for thousands of years upon social questions. Soon after Marx set forth his doctrines, the whole world began to follow him, while scholars of all lands declared their faith in him and became his disciples.[12]

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[8] See *SAN MIN CHU I,* pp. 427–28.

[9] *SAN MIN CHU I,* pp. 428–29.

[10] The text as reprinted in *Mao Zedong ji* resumes here.

[11] *SAN MIN CHU YI,* pp. 415–16.

[12] *SAN MIN CHU YI,* p. 377. (The quotation is from the first lecture on People's Livelihood.)

You may see, from every word said above, that we can find absolutely no reference in the theory of the Three People's Principles formulated by Mr. Sun to the incompatibility between the Three People's Principles and communism. As for how Mr. Sun dealt with this issue in his own actions, it is even more widely known. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921. From that time forward, Mr. Sun kept close ties with members of the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, when Mr. Sun decided to reorganize the Guomindang in 1924, he openly cooperated with the Communist Party. Moreover, the forms of cooperation were very close. Not only did he establish a national revolutionary alliance between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but he allowed members of the Communist Party in their capacity as individuals to become members of Guomindang organizations and share responsibility for revolutionary tasks. At that time, the Communist Party had no more than a few hundred members in the entire country and a history of only a few years since its establishment. Did Mr. Sun, even under those circumstances, demand of members of the Communist Party that, apart from the Three People's Principles, they were not allowed to believe in communism at the same time? No, he did not! Did Mr. Sun, even under those circumstances, advocate that only the Guomindang alone be allowed to exist and the Communist Party not be allowed to exist legally at the same time? No! Not only did he never do this, but Mr. Sun resolutely opposed the raising of such demands and the advocacy of such views by others. This represents precisely Mr. Sun's great farsightedness and clear understanding of the situation. Mr. Sun understood perfectly that the emergence of any ideology and political party is by no means an accident, but has its social basis and historical origins. No one's beliefs can be suppressed or abolished by force. Throughout history there have been countless people who have laid down their lives for their beliefs. No organization with its own social basis and mass support can possibly be disbanded or destroyed by force. In our history, countless revolutionary organizations have continued to exist and develop despite tyrannical oppression and extreme persecution. Furthermore, present circumstances differ markedly from those in the past. The Chinese Communist Party already has a seventeen-year history of revolutionary struggle, and hundreds of thousands of members. It has a strong organization long hardened in struggle, and leaders and cadres who have fought resolutely and heroically for the [communist] ideology, for the Party, for the revolution, for the liberation of the Chinese people, and for the liberation of all mankind. It has the faith and support of the masses in their tens of millions. How can one talk about abolishing Communist Party members' belief in communism and the Party organization? If one claims that we should abolish our belief in communism because we have declared our resolve to fight for the complete realization of the Three People's Principles, this would be a complete misunderstanding. Because we understand the relationship between the Three People's Principles and communism in exactly the same way Mr. Sun did—which is to say that we believe they are good friends and are compatible with each other—not only did we Communists, in our capacity as members of the Communist Party, fight together with the comrades of the Guomindang for the realization of the Three People's Principles during the first period of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists, but even after the split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and in our own difficult revolutionary struggles, we were fighting for the goal of national independence, democracy and freedom and People's Livelihood for China, that is, for a goal in keeping with the fundamental ideas of the Three People's Principles. The only difference between today and the previous period of a split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is that, after our previous cooperation with the Guomindang collapsed, we Communists single-handedly fought for the cause of our own Communist ideals and of the revolutionary Three People's Principles. Today, at a time of renewed cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, we Communists and the comrades of the Guomindang are again struggling together for the common revolutionary cause. Therefore, under these conditions, if someone insists that members of the Communist Party give up their Communist ideals and organization, this is not only unacceptable to the Communist Party, but directly contravenes Mr. Sun's theory and practice.

Judging from the actual circumstances in China, the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party was responsible for the rapid development of the revolution between 1925 and 1927, and the great victory of the armies of the Northern Expedition. The split in the relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party brought about the unprecedentedly grave situation of external aggression and internal turmoil during the past ten years. Now that the Guomindang and the Communist Party are once again cooperating, it is possible as regards foreign affairs to launch an unprecedentedly glorious War of Resistance for the defense of the nation. Within the country, it is possible to create political and military unity unprecedented during the past several decades, as well as unprecedented unity among the different parties, factions, strata, and social forces of the entire nation. Thus our compatriots in the entire country and the people of the whole world come to feel that this is the only opportunity and hope of survival for the Chinese nation at this critical juncture in its national existence. Whether the legal coexistence of two ideologies and parties is beneficial or harmful to the Chinese people and the Chinese nation should be judged according to living facts that everybody knows, and should not be based on the prejudices and subjective wishes of a few. The iron-clad facts of China's past and present have repeatedly demonstrated that when the Three People's Principles and communism cooperate, the country is united and the revolution advances; when the Three People's Principles and communism are opposed to and negate each other, the country is divided and the revolution encounters difficulties. Therefore, any view that violates these facts will certainly be impracticable. If, unfortunately, such views were put into practice, it would certainly lead to new calamities for our country and our people.

It can thus be seen that the view which holds that the Three People's Principles and communism are incompatible, and thus concludes that the Guomindang and the Communist Party cannot both be legal at the same time and coexist is totally baseless and harmful to the cause of the liberation of the state and the nation. Such views go against the legacy of the theory and practice of Mr. Sun and against the realities of China. The real danger of such views is to turn the present excellent political situation, in which our nation is united against external aggression, into a possible situation in which our attention is directed inward and our internal difficulties are multiplied.

At the conclusion of this conversation, let me therefore emphatically repeat a few sentences to you. If the substance of the so-called one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang means the control of the political power of the government by the Guomindang alone, this is an established fact about which there can be no doubt. Although we Communists do not join the government ourselves, we absolutely support the National Government, which is leading the War of Resistance. Today, only the Japanese fascist warlords repudiate and attempt to overthrow the National Government; today, only the Trotskyites and their disciples, who are acting in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese intelligence agencies, are capable of launching the rumor that the National Government is a Kerensky-type transitional government and consequently of adopting the Chinese traitors' policy of "outwardly submitting to the National Government," while "in reality preparing to overthrow it." The policy of supporting and assisting the National Government adopted by us Communists is absolutely sincere; its basic postulate is to support the fundamental interests of our state and nation. At the same time, if the substance of the one-party dictatorship by the Guomindang is to be expanded and distorted to mean that no Communist Party or parties other than the Guomindang are to enjoy a legal existence, and that, aside from the Three People's Principles, members of the Communist Party are not allowed to have their own Communist beliefs, this will be by no means a new theory, but an old practice. This is to return to the dead-end road and the impracticable methods of the last ten years. If this mentality were unfortunately put into practice, it would harm both unity and resistance to Japan. It would cause the established Anti-Japanese National United Front in China to disintegrate, thus endangering the cause of fighting the war and saving our country. Objectively speaking, therefore, this mentality will certainly be exploited by the Japanese fascist warlords and Chinese traitors. And precisely because of this, it is hard for me to believe that this mentality can gain the sympathy of the enlightened individuals in the Guomindang who value the fundamental interests of our nation and people. Such a mentality is, of course, even less likely to gain the sympathy of the majority of our soldiers and citizens, who, untainted by partisan prejudices, cherish unity and are willing to fight the war to the end. Nonetheless, since this issue was openly raised at the critical moment of our national crisis, this cannot but arouse the serious concern of the Communists and all other parties, groups, and Chinese compatriots who are engaged in resisting the Japanese to save China. Indeed, this concerns not only the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party but other parties and the survival of the entire Chinese nation. Therefore, I hope that people from all walks of life and the enlightened and farsighted members of other parties in our country will all pay serious attention to the development of this issue and make every effort to ensure that the Chinese Anti-Japanese National United Front based on cooperation between all parties not be threatened, and that the cause of national unity, resistance to Japan, and national salvation not be endangered, so that the War of Resistance may be fought to the end, and we can strive for the final victory of our state and nation.

The Region of Mount Wulong Offers Prospects for Development; Highly Skilled Cadres Should Be Sent There

(February 9, 1938)

To the Frontline General Headquarters, Hankou, Zhu [De], and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. The region of which Mount Wulong is the center offers prospects for expansion and development. But, as it is an independent battle zone, the forces to be dispatched there must be crack troops and should not be too few in number. The military, government, and Party leading personnel should have the capacity to cope independently with new situations. Full preparations must be made before setting off.

2. Except for the principal cadres, who have been assigned by Yunzhen[1] and the rest of you, cadres for the Northeast and the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar regions are being selected by the rear area as well. Meanwhile, the Northern Bureau is also requested to select and send cadres.

3. Yunzhen cannot leave the Hebei-Chahar area right now, but should be prepared to order senior leaders to Mount Wulong at an appropriate stage of development. This matter may be considered by the front line and the rear jointly.

4. Xu's brigade[2] is in the region at this time only for ordinary guerrilla warfare, and they come under your direct leadership. It seems that Comrade Lin Biao does not need to go.

5. Sending troops to Shandong must be given consideration only after the completion of the action at Mount Wulong. It is also inappropriate to mention it to the Guomindang just now.

Mao [Zedong]

Also inform Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi], Yang [Shangkun], Zhou [Enlai], and Ye [Jianying] at the same time.

This is the first in a series of telegrams sent by Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and others regarding the uprising in eastern Hebei between February and November 1938. Our source is *Wenxian he yanjiu*, no. 3, 1985, pp. 11 and 15.

[1] Yunzhen stands for Nie Rongzhen (1899–1992), a native of Sichuan. Nie had been a work-study student in France and Belgium and had also received military training in the Soviet Union. In November 1937 he had been appointed commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military District by the Communist government in Yan'an. At a conference held in January 1938, he had been chosen as one of the two Communist members of a regional government formed under joint Communist and Guomindang sponsorship.

[2] The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

Speech at the Yan'an Mass Rally Against Aggression

(Delivered at 7 P.M. on February 11, 1938)

Comrades:

Today's rally against aggression is not only for Yan'an but for the entire country. Similar rallies are being held across the country these days, all of them having one goal: opposing the war of aggression. Moreover, this rally is not only for China but for the world. Tomorrow, a world antiaggression rally will be held in London, with the participation of delegates from several dozen countries. This signals the beginning of an unprecedented, great, worldwide struggle. The aggressors of the world have now formed a front of the aggressors to destroy world peace; in consequence, those opposed to aggression have united the majority of the people of the world to defend world peace and oppose wars of aggression. These two opposing fronts are struggling against each other in the world. Never before in history has there been such a great international movement, nor has there been such a great movement similar to today's mobilization of all the regions of the world. Now is the moment for the overwhelming majority of good people in the world to settle accounts with the minority of bad people in the world.

Because China stands now at a critical moment for its national survival, the Chinese people have achieved unprecedented great unity, such as has never existed before in Chinese history. There is now already a basis for the great union of the whole country, and it is now in the process of expanding. Despite temporary defeats and the loss of some territory, such great unity has unparalleled power. With additional assistance from the world and the Japanese people, we will certainly triumph over the Japanese aggressors. At present, there are three antiaggression united fronts: the Chinese united front, the world united front, and, lastly, the Japanese united front. Today, the majority of the popular masses in Japan do not support their government's aggression against China and are forming a united front against aggression. The goal of these three united fronts is the same; it is to oppose unanimously the war of aggression waged by the Japanese imperialists. Some people say that China's antiaggression movements during the past several decades have all failed, and today's antiaggression movement will also fail. This is wrong. Today's situation is different from that in the past, principally because not only is there a national united front against aggression today, but this united front coincides with an unprecedented world united front against aggression. Moreover, it coincides not only with the world united front but also with unprecedented internal conflicts inside Japan—with the united front of the Japanese people. These historical characteristics used to be absent. Now they all happen to be present. Therefore, this is the basis for us to say that China's defeat is temporary, and China's War of Resistance will certainly win final victory. The three united fronts, like the rising sun, are advancing toward greater strength and expansion. The final victory certainly belongs to us. There is no ground for pessimism.

That is why today's rally in the city of Yan'an has its national and international significance. Those Chinese who are unwilling to be slaves, regardless of their party affiliations, beliefs, sex, and age, are all rallying around the same goal. All the people in the world who love peace and hate war are also rallying around the same goal. A great majority of the Japanese people are also rallying around the same goal. This goal is to oppose aggression. This is the overall direction of world politics today. Such a great unity among the Chinese people, the people of the world, and the people of Japan is so powerful that it will undoubtedly weaken the strength of the aggressors gradually and ultimately defeat them. Therefore, we resolutely declare: so long as we make an effort, China will certainly be able to defeat the aggressors, and a New China will certainly be established.

This speech was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* February 20, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 149–50, which reproduces that version.

To Fan Changjiang[1]

(February 15, 1938)

Mr. Changjiang:

Thanks to Mr. Ma's visit, I have received and read your letter. Comrade Zhang returned to Yan'an and passed on to me your esteemed letter of January 3. I beg your forgiveness for not responding for so long.

The issues you raised are all crucial issues for the country, and a short missive is not enough to explain them clearly. But the main point in solving the problems you have raised comes down, I believe, to truly recognizing and carrying out a common program. At present, quite a number of things are already being said and done jointly, from waging the War of Resistance to certain democratic freedoms, but not everything. There is not yet a complete thing extending from the War of Resistance to building the country, a thing which inspires the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as all social groups in the country, sincerely to recognize it and to strive for its realization. If this thing existed, and people sincerely recognized it and sought to put it into practice, then all the problems you, Sir, have raised would be solved.[2] As for using practical action to help the Guomindang perfect itself, we have already begun to do so and hope that the press and everybody else in the country will do the same. Precisely as you feel, this is an important issue. But, on the other hand, it is also necessary that the comrades of the Guomindang should welcome, or at least not reject, such assistance. We have already raised the slogan of mutual assistance. If there is a common program, things will be a lot easier. The problem of the military, which you regard as an obstacle to the mutual trust between the two parties, is really caused by the absence of a program covering the period from the War of Resistance to building the country. If there were one, neither party would have had such concerns. Because, in the light of the lessons from the past decade, any party which wanted to go against this program and launch a new civil war would certainly be opposed by the people of the whole country and would not be able to start a civil war even if it wanted to. Otherwise, there will be obstacles to the mutual trust not only between the two parties but within one party. Do not the innumerable wars fought during the past decade inside the Guomindang—under the same ideology and within the same political party—provide the clearest evidence of this? In the conclusion of my report delivered at a meeting in Yan'an in May of last year (I expect that you, Sir, must have read this text), I pointed out that the Communist Party should seek a peaceful transition and avoid bloodshed not only in the period during which we are defeating external enemies and building a democratic state but also in China's distant future—the transition from the democratic revolution to the social revolution.[3] Therefore, the essence of the question lies in the true political attitude, not of the Communist Party but of the Guomindang, that is, its attitude toward a comprehensive program governing the whole period from the War of Resistance to building the country. Historically speaking, it is clearly established by solid evidence known by everyone who initiated the split and who was on the receiving end ten years ago, and why this took place. You, Sir, can certainly tell us who broke with that common program (the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang) at that time and thus started the civil war. If we remain mindful of earlier lessons, this instructs us about the future. In the future, therefore, the key lies not only in the presence of a program but also in a guarantee that neither side will be allowed to tear it up. This is the most central issue. There was no Eighth Route Army ten years ago. It came into being because of the split between the two parties. Based on this logic, even if the Eighth Route Army, or even the Communist Party, were to be disbanded today, who could guarantee that another Eighth Route Army would not emerge, or another Communist Party would not be created, inside the borders of China? One must know that these things do not happen without a reason; they are not, as certain people see it, deliberately and willfully caused by the leaders of the Communist Party, nor are they, as is claimed, "unsuitable to the conditions of our country." Indeed, these are the consequences of our country's politics and economy. As for the second issue you raised—that, on the one hand, the authorities feel uneasy, and, on the other, the people demand reform—I believe that it is of the same nature as the above problem, and the crux lies in the Guomindang's acceptance and carrying out of a common program.

To reach this objective, efforts from all sides are undoubtedly required. Members of both parties and their leaders, as well as all those in our country concerned

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Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 120–22, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Fan Changjiang (1909–1970), a native of Sichuan, had been sent to Xi'an and Yan'an by the Tianjin *Dagongbao* to report on developments following the Xi'an Incident. See, in Volume V, p. 631, Mao's letter to him thanking him for his positive assessment. On his return from the Northwest in 1939, he joined the Chinese Communist Party.

[2] Presumably the "thing" referred to in this and the previous sentence is the "common program" mentioned above and referred to again below.

[3] The reference is to Mao's concluding remarks at the Party Congress of the Soviet Areas on May 7, 1937, which appear in Volume V, pp. 651–58. The statement about avoiding bloodshed is not quite so generous as Mao suggests here. The relevant sentence, which appears on p. 656, reads: "A sound transition (that is, bloodless) is what we would like and we should strive for it, but what will happen will depend on the strength of the masses."

with the future of the nation, must jointly promote and struggle for the realization of this program. The affairs between the two parties are not their private affairs—they are the joint affairs of our country's citizens. I have boundless admiration for your deep concern regarding this issue. Having received your queries from afar, I am now briefly offering my humble opinion and hope to benefit from your instructions. With this reply, I respectfully send you a national liberation salute!

Mao Zedong

The Mao Mountain Range Is Advantageous for the Expansion of the New Fourth Army

(February 15, 1938)

Xiang [Ying] and Chen [Yi]:

We have taken note of your various telegrams.

1. We are in agreement with the principles of action contained in the telegram of the 14th, to strive to concentrate on the borders of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui to develop guerrilla war. But the area that is the most advantageous for the expansion of our forces at present is still the Mao mountain range within the borders of Jiangsu. That is, if we take the area of Liyang and Lishui as the center and engage the enemy located along the Nanjing-Zhenjiang-Danyang-Jintan-Yixing-Changxing-Guangde line, we will definitely be able to establish base areas and expand the base of the Fourth Army. If there are two detachments, then at least one should be deployed in the Mao mountain range. The other one should be deployed to the west of the Wuxing-Guangde-Xuanchen line to support them by coordinated action.

2. When the third class of prospective cadres graduates from the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, a group of them should be sent to the Fourth Army, but if for the moment they cannot be transferred, we hope you will send a few men to study.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 155–56, where it is reproduced from a copy preserved in the Central Archives.

Opinion Concerning the 115th Division Advancing to Hebei, Shandong, and Other Places in Three Steps

(February 15, 1938)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Lin [Biao], and Zuo [Quan], and for the information of Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:

At a time when the enemy is concentrating his forces to attack the Longhai railway, he must suffer from a severe lack of forces in the whole of Hebei, Shandong, and northern Jiangsu. At the same time, the enemy in the three provinces of Shanxi, Chahar, and Suiyuan does not have enough forces to advance southward. Given this estimate, please consider the following questions and send your reply by telegram.

1. Use the whole of the 115th Division to advance eastward. Xu's brigade[1] will go to the area between Tianjin, Cangzhou, Beiping, and Shijiazhuang via Fuping. The division headquarters will command Chen's brigade[2] to go from its present location to the area of Cangzhou, Qihe (the north shores of Jinan), Shijiazhuang, and Zhangde via the area of Handan and Cixian *xian*. They will engage in actions there for a while as the first step. If it proves beneficial for a large army corps to engage in temporary actions on the plains, and there is no difficulty either in crossing the Yellow River southward or in crossing the Grand Canal westward, then, the second step, the third step, and so on can be taken. Otherwise, if and when they fail to obtain a foothold there or an urgent situation arises elsewhere, they may advance in the direction of Anhui and Henan or be withdrawn westward.

2. Assuming that the first step is beneficial, and they can cross the river, and also obtain the agreement of the Guomindang, the second step should be taken. The two brigades should stand side by side and suddenly cross the river in several columns to enter the borders of Shandong. They should engage in combat to the east of the Tianjing-Pudong railway line and throughout Shandong, take the mountainous area in southern Shandong as the base area for their command, and expand to the south and north of Xuzhou and Haizhou. Within this step, we shall persist in our efforts for as long as the situation permits. Then, we shall take the third step.

3. For the third step, we shall move instead to Anhui and take the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border area as the base area for our command, and engage in combat for the defense of Wuhan.

4. If, after taking the first step, Henan and Wuhan are in danger, then either we do not go to Shandong, turning the third step into the second step, or Xu's brigade will go to Shandong and Chen's brigade will go to Anhui. Under these circumstances, as a separate move, the main force of the 119th Division should go to western Henan to play a supportive combat role. Other decisions shall be made as the situation dictates.

5. The 115th Division shall, however, ultimately be prepared to move to western Henan and western Hubei.

6. Needless to say, this strategic move has a very clear function in domestic and international politics. It is also necessary and beneficial from the point of view of the military strategy of resistance to Japan. The problem is that it is rather risky. Just how risky will mainly be a function of our ability to solve the problem of crossing the various big and small rivers.

7. If, on reflection, you deem this strategy feasible, then you should request that Zhou and Ye get in touch with the Guomindang regarding the various necessary conditions for moving to Hebei. You should not, however, raise the question of moving to south of the Yellow River. None of the things after the second step should be raised.

Mao [Zedong] Teng [Daiyuan][3]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 157–59, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

[2] The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

[3] Teng Daiyuan (1904–1974), a native of Hunan, had served as political commissar in Peng Dehuai's Third Army Corps during the Jiangxi period. At this time, he was chief of staff of the Central Military Commission.

Strive to Establish a Key Strategic Fulcrum for Engaging in a Prolonged War of Resistance

(February 21, 1938)

1. Assuming that the Guomindang all by itself is ultimately able to defend Wuhan, Chiang will not let us get a foothold in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui. But if it is unable to do so, then there remains the possibility that Chiang may allow us to get a foothold.

2. The important strategic fulcrums for engaging in a prolonged War of Resistance are the following six: the Shanxi region; the Hubei-Henan-Anhui area; Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi border area; the Shaanxi-Gansu region; the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi border area; and the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area. This is assuming that the four points of Xi'an, Wuhan, Changsha, and Nanchang are under enemy attack and it proves impossible to defend them. In that case, we must strive to establish key strategic fulcrums for the War of Resistance. The Jiangsu-Shandong border area, the southern Hebei area, and the Daqing mountain range region will play a supportive role. If Wuhan should become indefensible, there is the possibility that we will be permitted to get a foothold in all these regions, including places near Wuhan itself.

3. Consequently, as regards the positions of the three main force divisions, generally speaking we should plan in advance that one shall be in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui region, one in the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi region, and the third in the Shaanxi-Gansu region, that is, two being on interior lines and one on exterior lines.

4. Although the region on the interior lines to the west of the Beiping-Hankou railway line is vast, only the regions through which the Fenshui, Weishui, and Hanshui Rivers pass are relatively rich. Moreover, the two regions through which the Fenshui River and Weishui River flow are two regions that the enemy is bound to fight to seize. If we want all three divisions to have future prospects for substantial expansion, to play a major role in checking the enemy, and to influence the situation in the whole country, then it is necessary to be prepared to deploy one division in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui region. Of course, we may continue to reflect on this point of view.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 160–61, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

We Must Deploy Sufficient Forces on Exterior Lines When the Japanese Army Is Launching a Deep Penetration Attack

(February 23, 1938)

To Comrades Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Lin [Biao]; Nie [Rongzhen]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]; Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] and Yang [Shangkun]; Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian], and Ye [Jianying]:

1. Evaluation of the enemy's intentions

a. In order to seize the two railways, the Longhai and the Pinghan,[1] the enemy will advance directly toward Xi'an and Wuhan; the key battlegrounds will certainly be at Tongguan and Wushengguan.[2]

b. If the enemy wants to take Tongguan, it would be relatively difficult to attack westward from Luoyang because of the terrain and easier to attack southward from Linfen. Therefore, enemy forces on the Pinghan and Tongpu[3] lines will probably split into several columns to advance from the north and the east toward southern Shanxi, with the overall objective of driving our forces out of Shanxi, occupying Linfen and Fenglingdu, and, finally, seizing Tongguan and providing protection for the right wing that will be attacking Wushengguan. The plan of the enemy force that is advancing along the Daoqing line[4] appears to be to begin by trying to cross the river at Mengjin and occupy Luoyang, thus forcing our army in Shanxi to retreat toward the south.

c. The forces the enemy will be employing to attack Wushengguan[5] will be transferred mainly via the Jinpu line.[6] The enemy units on the Pinghan and Tongpu lines will be used primarily to seize Tongguan.

2. The first phase of our strategic plan

a. The battle to defend Tongguan and Xi'an cannot be fought successfully by deploying all our forces on interior lines, west of the Pinghan line and south of the Yellow River. If we attempt to do so, we will certainly not be able to defend Tongguan and Xi'an, just as previously we were unable to defend Taiyuan by positioning all our forces inside Yanmenguan and Niangzhiguan.[7]

b. To defend Tongguan, we consider that our forces must be split into two groups. The first group consists of the units of Liu Shi, Song Zheyuan, Shang Zheng, Hu Zhongnan, and Fan Songpu; they are to defend the Zhengzhou-Luoyang-Tongguan line, devise tactics for the units fighting north of the line, and prevent the enemy from crossing the river. The second group consists of all the armies north of the Yellow River, including Yan [Xishan] and Wei [Lihuang], as well as the whole of the Eighth Route Army, who are to defend the combat positions in southern and western Shanxi. Under favorable circumstances, they should attempt to annihilate the enemy in the areas north and east of Linfen, check the enemy's offensive, and dispatch a strong force to the north of Daoqinglu to put pressure on the enemy units attempting to cross the river. Under unfavorable circumstances, supposing that, by some chance, Linfen cannot be defended, Luoyang is taken, and our units in Shanxi are unable to cross the river, and we have to transfer to exterior lines, then we should, on the contrary, attack the enemy's rear, cut the route by which the enemy came, and then seek to find a way to annihilate the enemy and completely foil his plan to attack Tongguan. When the enemy attacks and takes the three points at Jincheng, Huo *xian,* and Xi *xian,* our army should use no less than half its forces to move to areas outside these three points (move to the enemy's rear); only thus can we control the enemy.

c. We believe that every effort must be made to seek the approval of Chiang [Kaishek], Bai [Chongxi], Yan [Xishan], and Wei [Lihuang] for the above plan, and encourage all units to execute it. Only such efforts can defend

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 162–65, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1] The Longhai line ran from Baozhi near the Gansu-Shaanxi border to the sea in northern Jiangsu. The Pinghan line was the main north-south line from [Bei]ping to Han[kou].

[2] Tongguan was located in the northeastern part of Tongguan *xian* in Shaanxi Province, at the strategic point where Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Henan meet. Wushengguan was located in the southern part of Xinyang *xian* in Henan Province, at a strategic point on the boundary between Henan and Hubei, on the Pinghan line. It was one of the passes leading into the Dabie mountains.

[3] The Tongpu line was a narrow-gauge line running southward from Datong to Fenglingdu.

[4] The Daoqing line ran in Henan from Daokou city in Hua *xian* to Qinghua city in Bo'ai *xian.*

[5] The Chinese text reads "Wuhanguan" but the editors believe this is a typographical error for "Wushengguan."

[6] The Jinpu line, from Tianjin to Pukou, across the river from Nanjing, was a segment of today's main line from the north to Shanghai.

[7] Yanmenguan is situated in the northern part of Dai *xian,* Shanxi Province; it is one of the important strategic passes in the Great Wall. Niangziguan is located in the eastern part of Pingding *xian* in Shanxi and is an important thoroughfare between Shanxi and Hebei.

Tongguan; Wushengguan will also thus be made secure, and Wuhan will then be safe. Otherwise, once Tongguan is lost, Wushengguan will be in danger.

d. If Yan and Wei are unwilling or unable to execute the above plan and retreat across the river in defeat, these units will not only be unable to take part in the defense of Tongguan, but on the contrary will have a harmful influence on the units in Luo[yang] and Tong[guan].

3. The second phase of the strategic plan

a. In order to defend Wushengguan and Wuhan, we must first make sure that Tongguan remains in our hands. Second, we must fight a frontal, positional battle to provide support for the battles of movement on the flanks.

b. A force of at least 200,000 fighting men is required for the mobile warfare on the flanks. They should be kept to the east of the Pinghan railway for a long time. This force is as important as the massive forces deployed in Shanxi. It must not retreat to the west of Henan and Hubei unless there is no alternative. Only thus can this force act in coordination with the units in the front and on the western flank, and vigorously defend Wushengguan and Wuhan. Even if Wuhan cannot be defended, this will put the enemy inside our encirclement.

4. The future actions of the Eighth Route Army

a. Suppose we gain advantage in providing support for Yan and Wei in their battles in Shanxi, and achieve the objective of annihilating and checking the enemy and successfully defending Tongguan and Xi'an, while at the same time Wushengguan is not in danger. In this case, all the forces [of the Eighth Route Army] will remain in Shanxi and continue to fight, and they should prepare to send an additional unit to Hebei to establish a strong base for the War of Resistance in North China, to be used to defend the Central Plains, the Northwest, and Wuhan.

b. Assuming that Yan and Wei can execute the above plan, and secure Tongguan and Xi'an, but Wushengguan and Xi'an are in danger, we should take out a division and move it to the east of Wushengguan to provide support for the friendly forces.

c. Assuming that Yan and Wei are unable to execute the above plan, and Tongguan and Xi'an are in danger, but Wushengguan and Wuhan are not yet in danger, we should also take out one division and move it into the line west of Tongguan to provide support for the friendly forces.

d. Assuming that both Tongguan and Wushengguan are in danger, we should take out two divisions and move them southward, one of them to be deployed east of the Pinghan railway line, and the other west of the Pinghan railway line, to provide battle support for the friendly forces. There will remain one more division, to conduct operations in Shanxi and Hebei; it is not to be withdrawn unless some necessity arises.

e. The units left behind for garrison duty in the Border Region are to defend Shanxi and Gansu.

5. We believe that we must inform the Guomindang that, if nearly a million troops all withdraw to interior lines south of the Yellow River and west of the Pinghan railway line, while the Longhai and Pinghan railway lines are all occupied by the enemy, great difficulties will take shape. Therefore, the overall guideline must be that, when the enemy launches deep-penetration offensives, we must deploy sufficient forces on exterior lines, for only thus can we provide combat support for the main forces fighting on interior lines, increase difficulties for the enemy while reducing our own difficulties, and create favorable military and political conditions for a protracted war.

6. Our views are as stated above. What are your views? We hope you will inform us.

Mao Zedong Ren Bishi

To He Changgong[1]

(February 25, 1938)

Comrade Changgong:

In principle, I agree entirely with the methods you propose. Please meet with Comrade Wang Qun and deal with all these matters. You must definitely make every effort to correct the past wrong orientation, **actively carry out the training of cadres,** and do it well. The name should probably be changed to **training academy.** Stop calling it a home for the disabled. You are the director of the academy and concurrently head of its political department. Wang Qun is the political commissar and quartermaster. Find another specialized person to head the health department. You three will then be responsible for the overall administration of the academy. Find one or two houses near the office of the [Central] Military Commission and start to work. Call a good meeting on the work of the soon-to-be-opened training academy. You chair the meeting, with Wang Qun helping you. I can come and give a talk. Consult with Fuchun, Teng, Xiao, Tan, and Mo[2] about the key points of the meeting; that is, discuss the things you have drafted.

Mao Zedong

Take advantage of this meeting to conduct a thorough investigation of the conditions in all the academies.

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 123–24, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. The words set in bold are those which Mao underscored by placing dots underneath them.

[1] He Changgong (1900–1987), a native of Hunan, was deputy director of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy, but because the director, Lin Biao, was in very bad health, he was in fact in charge, as Mao indicates below.

[2] The reference is to Teng Daiyuan, at this time chief of staff of the Central Military Commission; Xiao Jingguang, head of the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army; Tan Zheng, deputy head of the Political Department of the Central Military Commission; and Mo Wenhua, head of the Political Department of the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army.

We Must Do Our Utmost to Wipe Out the Enemy Advancing Westward from Fucheng

(February 25, 1938, 3:00 P.M.)

Zhu [De], and inform Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of your telegram sent on the evening of the 24th.[1] Your judgment is correct. We must exert every effort to eliminate the enemy advancing westward from Fucheng. But please warn Yan [Xishan] and Wei [Lihuang] in advance that even if the said enemy makes a breakthrough to Linfen, he will absolutely not be able to change the entire war situation. The said enemy is few in number. We can surround him with a single unit. The rest of our forces should be determined to fight a mobile war in the rear of the enemy which allows him no way out for retreat. In this way, we will definitely be able to defeat the enemy in the end.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, p. 166, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Here Mao indicates the time using a Chinese character signifying the period from 5 to 7 P.M.

The 343rd Brigade Should Immediately Change Its Battle Plans

(February 28, 1938)

Comrade Lin Biao, and inform Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and He [Long]:

1. The enemy has already advanced to the lower reaches of the Fenhe River. The Fengling ferry and Tongguan are threatened. Yan [Xishan] and Wei [Lihuang] have reached the bank of the river and are preparing to cross it.

2. The enemy is attacking the west side of the river ferociously from the two points of Jundu and Jikou, and is preparing to cross the river. Suide is in imminent danger.

3. The whole of Chen's brigade,[1] under your command, should immediately change its battle plans.

   a. Quickly use one part of your forces to control the Damaijiao-Shuitou-Chuankou-Shikou region. Mobilize the masses to organize guerrilla units and consolidate the key strategic position.

   b. Dispatch enough [political] workers to mobilize the masses in the two *xian* of Shilou and Yonghe with all their might, organize guerrilla units, and consolidate the ferry point.

   c. Dispatch [political] workers to the two *xian* of Lingshi and Fenxi to mobilize the masses, organize guerrillas, and get prepared for the forces in eastern Shanxi to move westward when necessary.

   d. The main force should move to the Xianxian-Wucheng-Daning region to look for combat opportunities and eliminate the enemy when an opportunity arises.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 167–68, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, under the command of Chen Guang.

Interview with United Press Reporter Wang Gongda

(February 1938)

Wang Gongda: Many people are now pessimistic about the future of the War of Resistance in China. What is your view of this?

Mao Zedong: I am completely optimistic about it because the course of China's War of Resistance will necessarily be characterized by defeat first and then victory, and by a transition from weakness to strength. This has already become a well-defined direction. In the initial stage of the Sino-Japanese war, the overall situation was that Japan was strong and China was weak. But from now on, the situation is certainly going to be that Japan's weaknesses will be gradually exposed, while China's strength will gradually increase. Japan is now borrowing money to fight the war. Aside from the 2.2 billion *yuan* expended in the last six months, it is said that it will need 4 billion *yuan* this year, and this figure will surely be exceeded. This has already exhausted much of its national resources. Japan's international credit rating has been lowered, and the value of its bonds has fallen. Its "Blitzkrieg" strategy has failed. Let me ask where it can get so much money to fight an endless war. From a military standpoint, Japan's battlefronts in China have already been extended to the point where they stretch for thousands of kilometers, from Hangzhou to Baotou. Its forces are insufficient to defend all this. Consequently, its military strength has gradually been weakened as a result of this deep penetration and overextension. It has seized long-distance railways and, as a result, needs troops to guard every station. Japan has mobilized one-third of its armed forces to invade China. If it wants to occupy Hankou, Guangzhou, and other cities, it will have to mobilize at a minimum several hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers. By that time, its situation will become extremely difficult. Since China is not Japan's only enemy, and because of the other enormous international and domestic contradictions facing Japan, in the end it will ultimately take the road to total collapse.

Wang: Would you say that China's strength can gradually increase?

This interview was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 32, March 5, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 99–103, which reproduces this version.

Mao: On the basis of the experience of the last seven months of fighting, from a military point of view we can certainly force the enemy armies into a very difficult position if we can employ mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare to support each other. My view is that, at present, in addition to forming several powerful field armies with two to three hundred thousand crack troops to deliver annihilating blows against advancing enemy units in mobile warfare, we should take out eighty to ninety thousand troops to form twenty to thirty guerrilla units, each with three to four thousand soldiers. They should be led by firm but flexible officers, and their political work should also be strengthened. They should be deployed in front of the enemy lines from Hangzhou to Baotou to penetrate into the enemy's rear through the twenty to thirty gaps in this long front line. If they can be used effectively, work closely with the popular masses, and breed countless smaller guerrilla units, they will certainly be able to establish anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear, mobilize tens of millions of people, and provide effective support for the field armies in their mobile warfare, thus harassing the enemy and exhausting his resources. As for positional warfare, it should not be regarded as the primary form of combat now because of our technological weakness. But we must establish our national defense industries and produce our own heavy weapons and high-quality weapons, while at the same time trying to import these weapons, so that we can effectively wage defensive and offensive positional warfare. This is very necessary. Some say that we advocate only guerrilla warfare. This is nonsense. We have always advocated a combination of mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare. At present, mobile warfare should be the primary form of combat, with the other two playing a secondary role. In the future, positional warfare should be waged to provide effective support for mobile warfare. As for guerrilla warfare, it is always secondary to other forms of battle. Nevertheless, in the wars of national liberation in semicolonial countries and especially in countries with huge territories, guerrilla warfare undoubtedly plays a crucial strategic role. As regards politics, we already have internal unity and enjoy the sympathy and support of all the democratic countries in the world. But our achievements at present are insufficient and must be further strengthened. The military and political strengthening described above is necessary. As long as we continue to work hard, we can certainly gain strength. This is indicative of a bright future.

Wang: Does the Eighth Route Army, which is encircled by the Japanese armies on several sides, face the danger of being driven out or annihilated by the Japanese?

Mao: The Eighth Route Army is now conducting extensive guerrilla warfare in four zones. The first zone includes the areas between the four railway lines—Pinghan, Pingsui, Zhengtai, and Tongpu—as well as the areas north and east of them. This zone includes popular masses, numbering 12 million, who support resolute opposition to the Japanese, and all of whom are intimately linked to our forces. This is an immense fortress for the War of Resistance. The Eighth Route Army has established itself solidly in this zone. Although the enemy is intensifying his attacks against this zone, it is impossible for him to drive our army out, still less destroy it. Several large detachments of the Eighth Route Army, advancing toward the east, have already pressed forward to the vicinity of the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] line. The second zone includes the northwestern parts of Shanxi—the areas south of the Pingsui line, west of the northern segment of the Tongpu line, and east of the Yellow River. The third zone includes the southeastern parts of Shanxi and southwestern parts of Hebei—the areas along the middle stretch of the Pinghan, Zhengtai, and Tongpu lines. The fourth zone is the southwestern parts of Shanxi. All of them [i.e., of the units of the Eighth Route Army] there enjoy close relations with the local population. They are fiercely attacking the enemy's lines of communication in the rear at all times and have won many large and small victories, causing the enemy to reduce the strength of his advancing forces substantially. Looking at these areas, what China has lost is no more than a few railway lines and cities. It has not lost anything else. This concrete example provides the people of the whole country with concrete evidence: As long as this method is adopted everywhere, it will be impossible for the enemy to destroy China. This is one of the powerful bases from which counterattacks can be launched and lost land retaken in the future.

Wang: Do you feel that this time the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party will be of a lasting character?

Mao: I think so. When the Guomindang and the Communist Party split in 1927, this was originally against the wishes of the Communist Party. The Communist Party has consistently been unwilling to split with the Guomindang. In the last ten years, both the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as the people of the whole country, have gone through bitter experiences. Such experiences can strengthen unity in the future. The goal for the present and future cooperation is to fight Japan together and build the country together. Under this principle, provided only that our allied party has the same good faith as we do, and with the scrutiny of the people of the whole country, this cooperation will certainly last.

Wang: It is true that the Communist Party has declared in its statement on the current situation that the Guomindang and the Communist Party will not only resist Japan together, but will, after victory in the war, build the country together. Let me ask you, however, how these parties, which represent two different classes, can cooperate to build a new country in the future.

Answer: Because China is in the position of a semicolonial country and, moreover, because it is now facing a critical moment, which will decide whether or not it suffers the loss of the state and the extinction of the race, even its status as a semicolonial country is in danger. Although our parties and our classes are different, we are all in this same position. This determines that the two parties can cooperate not only to fight the war against Japan but to build the country. But cooperation means cooperation on the basis of certain principles. It is principled and genuine cooperation, not unprincipled and seeming cooperation. If we diverge from our programs and principles, then our cooperation will certainly become unprincipled and seeming cooperation, and this is something which cannot be tolerated by any party which has its own principles. Cooperation on the basis of a program and principles is similar to the ethical relationship between friends. Only when there are such ethical relationships can the relationship endure.

Wang: What is the "democratic republic" advocated by the Communist Party?

Mao: The democratic republic we are advocating refers to a country with a system under which all those people in the country who are unwilling to be slaves without a country make use of a system of unrestricted universal sufferage to elect representatives to form representative organs. Such a country is a country of People's Rights, which is basically like that advocated by Mr. Sun Yatsen a long time ago. The orientation for the establishment of the state in China should take this direction.

Wang: Is the Communist Party satisfied with the current central government? Is it still necessary to convene an extraordinary national congress?

Mao: We support the current central government because it persists in its policy of fighting the War of Resistance and is leading the war efforts. But we hope to strengthen and expand this government, as well as carry out the necessary reforms in its internal policies, in the interest of further strengthening the War of Resistance. We have once proposed convening an extraordinary national congress, as Mr. Sun Yatsen also proposed. We believed that this would be advantageous in uniting the whole country and strengthening the forces of the War of Resistance. But we have no fixed views as to the methods that will be most advantageous to the prosecution of the War of Resistance. As long as they genuinely contribute to the war, any methods can be adopted.

Wang: Did the Chinese Communist Party send people to lead the anti-Japanese activities of the Volunteer Army in the Three Eastern Provinces?

Mao: The Chinese Communist Party does have a very close relationship with the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army in the Three Eastern Provinces. For example, the celebrated generals of the Volunteer Army, such as Yang Jingyu, Zhao Shangzhi, and Li Hongguan, are all members of the Communist Party. Their achievements in resolutely fighting Japan and waging a difficult struggle are well known. There is also a national united front there. Aside from members of the Communist Party, there are other groups, as well as all kinds of different military units and organizations of the popular masses. They have also united under a common program.

Wang: What are your general views of the United States?

Mao: We welcome and appreciate the American Democratic Party's support for world peace, President Roosevelt's denunciation of fascism, the Scripps-Howard newspaper group's sympathy for China's War of Resistance against Japan, and especially the support of the broad masses of the American people for China's struggle against Japan. I hope, however, that the United States will go a step further, come out, and unite with other countries to impose real sanctions against a violent Japan. It is time for China, the United States, and all other countries opposed to aggression to unite further against the enemy.

An Account of the Founding of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts

(February 1938)

Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the people of China have risen as one to struggle for the survival and liberation of our nation, to resist the aggression of the Japanese imperialist bandits and drive them out of China, and for the consolidation of world peace. All parties and factions have rallied under the Anti-Japanese National United Front to wage the sacred national revolutionary anti-Japanese war until final victory is achieved.

During this period of the War of Resistance, we must not only mobilize and make use of all presently existing forces to resist Japan, but should seek out and prepare new forces, which is to say that we must pay attention to the problem of training the cadres urgently required for the war effort. "Cadres decide everything!"[1] This is a very urgent question, not only in times of peace but in times of war. In the bloody combat against the Japanese bandits at the front, as well as in the work of mobilization in the rear, we need tens of thousands of military, political, economic, and cultural cadres. There is no doubt at all about that.

The arts—drama, music, fine arts, and literature—are the most effective weapons in propagandizing, inspiring, and organizing the masses. Artistic workers are an indispensable force in the current War of Resistance. Therefore, the task of training cadres specialized in artistic work for the War of Resistance is one that at present can no longer be put off.

Our Border Region has actively carried out educational efforts regarding the War of Resistance and established many schools (such as the Chinese Anti-Japanese Military and Political University and the Northern Shaanxi Public School) that are suited for training generalist political and military cadres needed for the war. But there is a gap in establishing schools specialized in the arts. Therefore, we have decided to establish this academy of fine arts and, moreover, to name it after China's greatest writer, the late Lu Xun. This is not only to pay tribute to this great teacher but to demonstrate that we will march forward on the road he opened up.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 151–52, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979.

[1] This was one of the key slogans put forward by Stalin at this time regarding the requirements for developing socialism in the Soviet Union.

We are deeply aware that it is an arduous task to establish the Lu Xun Academy of Fine Arts; it is a task that the limited ability of a few of us can by no means accomplish. Therefore, we urgently hope the people from all walks of life in the country will offer us their sympathy and assistance, so that the academy may grow quickly. This will also help our country's heroic War of Resistance move forward victoriously and win final victory by driving the Japanese bandits out of China!

Concerning the Deployment for the Consolidation of the Defenses Along the River

(March 2, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Lin [Biao]; Nie [Rongzhen]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]:

1. The enemy's intention is to attack northern Shaanxi, on the one hand, and Tongguan, on the other. At present, the enemy is attacking fiercely in two columns at Jundu and Jikou, and there is the possibility that the river defenses will be broken through. Suide and Yan'an are in danger, and the route of retreat of all the forces on the east side of the river is being threatened.

2. It is imperative that at present our forces in northwestern Shanxi, in accordance with the previously formulated plans of He, Xiao, and Guan, should use the Sixth Guard Regiment to cope with the enemy that is attacking Hequ, use one brigade to attack the enemy that is attacking Linxian from Wuzhai, and send another brigade on a forced march night and day to the north of Lishi to attack from the enemy's rear at Jikou and Jundu to obstruct his efforts to cross the river. These three units also should make a major effort to mobilize the masses to consolidate all the ferry points that have not been lost in the northern sector of the defenses along the river and safeguard the route of retreat. If the enemy breaks through the river defenses and attacks Suide, it is necessary to have one brigade cross the river and eliminate the enemy in coordination with our forces on the west side of the river, thus defending Yan'an.

3. Xu's brigade[1] must move westward immediately and be reintegrated into the 115th Division. It should eliminate the enemy in that region in coordination with Chen's brigade,[2] energetically mobilize the popular masses at Lishi, Zhongyang, Shilou, Yonghe, Daning, Xianxian, Jixian, and the whole of the Luliang mountain range, support friendly forces, consolidate all the ferry points in the middle sector of the river defenses, and safeguard the route of retreat for the whole of the Guomindang forces in southeastern and southwestern Shanxi. If Tongguan and Xi'an are in danger, before the transfer of the main force of the Guomindang armies in Shanxi, we should be prepared to use one brigade of the 115th Division to cross the river to move southward and to fight in defense of Yan'an.

4. The 129th Division should be deployed to the east of Tongpu to establish positions on the flanks, destroy the railroad, obstruct and delay the enemy's attack on Tongguan, and support the combat operations of the two divisions of Lin and He. If Tongguan and Xi'an are in danger, and Chiang [Kaishek] intends to transfer the main forces of the Guomindang troops within the borders of Shanxi to the other side of the river to fulfill the mission of defending Xi'an, the main force of this division should also be ready to move westward. Some units should, however, be kept permanently in southeastern Shanxi to engage in guerrilla war. The Politburo meeting has completely endorsed the orientation outlined above. We trust that it will be resolutely carried out.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 175–76, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

[2] The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

Parting Words of Advice to the Graduates of the Northern Shaanxi Public School[1]

(March 3, 1938)

Students:

The Northern Shaanxi Public School is a miniature of all China. You come from different places, different professions, and different social strata, but you all have the same ambition, that is, the ambition to build a new China. You are progressive elements, the elements that are going to create a new China. Therefore, the Northern Shaanxi Public School represents the united front of all China, and it is the progress of China in miniature.

In the past, there was Huangpu,[2] and it displayed a kind of vitality, a vitality that represented an ambition. At both the Northern Shaanxi Public School and Huangpu students were drawn from different regions and then were sent out to different regions. At that time, Huangpu wanted to overthrow the warlords and imperialism. It was progressive China in miniature for that time. The goal of our Northern Shaanxi Public School is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and to build a new China. We should resolutely pursue this orientation. Those who violate this orientation also violate the aims of the Northern Shaanxi Public School. Our students should help one another and supervise one another.

Today, the enemy wants to attack Wuhan, Xi'an, Changsha, Nanchang, and other such places. China will suffer some unavoidable difficulties. In the face of

these difficulties, it is quite possible that some people will waver. For you students, graduating and going out into the world is like being scattered into the river. It is possible that some of you might be overwhelmed by the waves, but the great majority of you will struggle through the waves, maintain your direction, and reach your designated goal. In order to keep going in the right direction, you must have a steadfast will as well as a spirit unafraid of sacrificing everything through hardship and difficult struggle.

The present situation is different from that of the past. There are three united fronts in the world—the international united front, the Chinese united front, and the united front in Japan—which can defeat Japanese imperialism. If these three united fronts cooperate and pursue a common set of objectives, we are sure that we can change the situation. China is sure to march in this new direction.

A comrade who came from Wuhan said, "There is a formula now going around among the outsiders concerning our War of Resistance, namely, 'Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, it is certain that China will ultimately be victorious.'" This sentence is correct, but one passage is missing from it: the section on how we are going to win that victory. This question is absolutely critical. We must answer it. We must write that middle passage well.

Things are constantly changing, and it is impossible today to describe future events in detail. Such a desire is not much different from utopian socialism. We do not approve of a utopia that is based on fantasy. The scientific view of things is not like this at all. How can we get from the old China to the new China? Although it is impossible today to describe the specific contents completely, we can point out the general orientation. The protracted nature of the Chinese revolution is determined by the process of historical change. Based on our experience in the past six months, we can say the two following things: "Failure first, victory later. Transform weakness into strength." This is the future of our protracted War of Resistance. Our China has made many steps forward in the past six months: the War of Resistance, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, our alliance with the Soviet Union, the beginning of freedom of speech, the beginning of political work in the military. None of these things existed in the past. They are the contents of the march which was determined by the enemy's invasion. What is the path on which we make this journey? Our answer is: "A path of many difficulties and hardships." If places such as Wuhan and Xi'an fall, that means that large areas will be in the hands of the Japanese, while small areas will be in our hands. If such things happen, does it mean the end of us? No, there can assuredly never be such an end. China's geographic conditions are different from those of Spain. Spain's territory is small, and there is not much room to maneuver. After using the first thirty-five tricks, there is no room for the thirty-sixth.[3] Hence, they adopted

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 104–10, where it is reproduced from a record of the speech kept in the Central Archives.

[1] This is Mao Zedong's talk to the graduating students in the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth classes *(dui)* of the Northern Shaanxi Public School.

[2] The reference is to the Huangpu Military Academy (known in contemporary English-language sources as the Whampoa Military Academy), established in the Huangpu area of Canton (Guangzhou) by Sun Yatsen in 1924 with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Chiang Kaishek was the commandant, and Zhou Enlai was the head of the Political Department. Other prominent Communists also worked there, and among the students at the academy were many Party cadres and Communist Youth League members. At this time, Huangpu was a highly ambiguous symbol. On the one hand, it evoked a conservative or reactionary clique of Guomindang officers loyal to their former commandant, Chiang Kaishek; on the other, it could be used, as it is here, as a symbol of Guomindang-Communist cooperation in 1924–1927.

[3] I.e., running away. Mao is here referring to the classic text of military strategy, *The Thirty-Six Strategems.*

the strategy of resolutely defending Madrid. China is different. There is ample space to walk around. It is extremely difficult for Japanese imperialism to occupy the whole of China. China's territory is as large as seventeen to eighteen Frances put together. Its population is also several times that of France. Even if most of China's territory is occupied by Japan (and this is possible), we still have a way out, because we have two regions which will enable us to inflict fatal blows on the enemy—the interior front and the exterior front. These are two arenas of battle. The interior front includes Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Hunan, which are basically under the control of the central government. The exterior front is the large area of land that the Japanese occupy, the front lines. We absolutely must struggle to achieve a future with an anti-Japanese national united front based on cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, improve political as well as military conditions, create a new Chinese army that can employ airplanes and artillery, and fight both from within and from without. Only in this way can we drive the [Japanese] devils out of all of China. If we want to achieve this objective we may have to endure many difficulties. For instance, if Wuhan falls, the problem of wavering and compromise, as well as doubts about whether or not the War of Resistance should continue, will arise. Such problems may arise both at the front as well as in the rear areas. If that happens, there must be a political party with broad vision to judge the trends in the political situation.

Now let us review the history of the Guomindang. The Guomindang has suffered numerous defeats, but has also won many victories in its history; it has traveled a hard and tortuous road. It was only after the failure of the 1911 Revolution, and the subsequent reorganization of the Guomindang, that a new prospect for the Great Revolution appeared. The result of the Northern Expedition was the divorce between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, which benefited only the feudal forces and imperialism. We believe it is more likely that the Guomindang will continue to pursue the War of Resistance, for surrender is not a solution. No such question hangs over the Communist Party; it has always firmly insisted on the War of Resistance. The majority of the people are also against capitulation. Now many people recall the situation at the time of the Northern Expedition and hope that the three forces of the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people will all take a stand in favor of carrying on the War of Resistance to the very end.

If Wuhan falls—and such a possibility exists—you will all have to run down from the "mountain,"[4] and you may all encounter this phenomenon. Once Wuhan falls, the situation will assuredly become very bad, and those who want peace [at any price] will certainly emerge. We are very confident, however, that we will be able to overcome these difficulties. In addition to persisting in the War of Resistance domestically, we must also consider favorable international conditions. Although Germany is openly helping Japan, has recognized "Manchukuo,"[5] and refuses to sell arms to China, the attitude of the British cabinet has also changed.[6] But this is only one side of the situation. The peoples of the whole world, who represent the general direction of the world, and particularly those of the Soviet Union, will encourage and assist China. The Soviet Union will definitely help China. It is certain that one day the Soviet Union will become the direct opponent of Japan. So will the United States of America. All this convinces us that Japan will never be able to swallow China. When did the "heavenly dog" ever swallow the moon?[7] This is the first point. The second is that even if Japan does manage to swallow China, it will not be for long. This judgment is based on an analysis of Chinese and international conditions. Japan's military strength is insufficient, nor will it be able to sustain itself for long. From this we conclude that the overall orientation of China's anti-Japanese war will assuredly lead to victory.

Our guiding principle at the moment is: to defend Wuhan, defend Xi'an. Our method is to prepare for retreat but to exhaust the enemy and win time. To fight in the defense of Wuhan and Xi'an and to lose is no cause for anxiety. We have already made it clear that it is also possible to win by fighting outward from interior lines. This is one aspect. Another aspect is this. If the places occupied by the enemy are large areas, then we can write that "middle passage" in the small areas nearby. This is to write the missing section before making the final victorious conclusion. For example, if all of North China and parts of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui should fall, and we could not hold Wuhan, there are many places where we can write that "middle passage."[8]

A young man wrote me a letter from Changsha, saying: "China is sure to perish. If Wuhan falls, then most of our territory will be lost. Then what can we do?" I say that, when our students from the Northern Shaanxi Public School go out, they will certainly find a way. What they will do is draw "beancurd cubes" near the major highways.[9] For the moment we do not have solutions on the borders of the "beancurd cubes." That is because the major highways and big cities are occupied by Japanese troops armed with advanced weapons. That is, "China has not been lost, only the major highways have." The battles of quick decision that have brought Japan the big cities and major highways have also brought them the protracted warfare in the rural villages and small lanes. For instance, if Yan'an in northern Shaanxi is captured by the enemy, we will fight a protracted war in other small areas and in innumerable villages and small paths. Japan can win battles of quick decisions in the cities, while we can win the battles of protracted warfare in the countryside. This time after graduation you will be divided into two groups to work. One group will develop the mass movement in the rear areas. The other group will go into the "beancurd cubes." Now there may be some people who are afraid of drawing "beancurd cubes," so let me give you the example of Nie Rongzhen so you will not be afraid. Nie Rongzhen created a large army of 25,000 men in the Wutai mountain region (not including those still engaged in production). We should tell the people in the occupied territory as well as the people in the territory which will be occupied about this example, to let them see the method and the way out for the resistance to Japan. We are resolutely opposed to the argument that there is nothing to be done in the occupied territories. In that respect, we can also talk about our experiences during the ten-year civil war.

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[4] Mao appears to be suggesting that the students he is addressing will have to jump into the practical political and military struggle and leave their sheltered academic life.

[5] Manchukuo was the puppet state set up by the Japanese military in the northeastern provinces of China, still known informally as Manchuria, in 1931. The League of Nations, and most individual nations, never recognized the legitimacy of this regime. Until 1937, Mao and the Communists accused Chiang Kaishek of supinely accepting this development. (See Volume IV, *passim,* and especially pp. 445–47.)

[6] In early 1938, following the Brussels Conference of November 1937, which brought together the signatories of the Washington Conference, plus the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain were working together in Asian matters and showing support for China.

[7] According to Chinese mythology, eclipses occur when the "heavenly dog" swallows the sun or the moon. Here Mao expresses skepticism both about this legend and about its applicability to relations between Japan and China.

[8] Mao is using the metaphor of writing the middle section of the sentence, developed in his commentary on the saying by the comrade from Wuhan cited at the beginning of this talk, to refer to the Communist-controlled base areas in north and central China. These are the places Mao wants these graduates to work in.

There are many things in the Northern Shaanxi Public School that are not quite satisfactory. We do not care whether we have classes in which the students follow the textbook chapter by chapter as in other schools. Instead, we want students to learn a certain work-style, a certain orientation. The president and faculty of the Northern Shaanxi Public School have all come through hard and difficult struggles. Therefore, you can learn an orientation in the Northern Shaanxi Public School—a political orientation. At the same time, you can learn a certain style—a work-style. You must go to work in all the places occupied by the enemy. In the checkerboard pattern of Shanxi, from the perspective of a few major highways, we are surrounded by the enemy. But, on the other hand, we occupy the many "beancurd cubes" near these major highways and thereby also surround the enemy. From the international perspective, although Japan surrounds China, the antifascist countries in the world also surround Japan. The Sino-Japanese war will not end in a few days. The strength of the Guomindang and the Communist Party is still not very great, and Japan is stronger than we are. Had the united front not been broken up a decade ago, the situation today would certainly not be like this. This point also determines the long-term and protracted nature of the Sino-Japanese war. International conditions are also such that the time is drawing near for the people all over the world to launch a movement against invasion and for liberation. China is not alone. It is connected with the struggle for liberation by people all over the world. The world cannot be divided, the revolution cannot be divided, nor can victory be divided. If things continue to develop in this way, there can be no doubt at all that China will be victorious. Comrade Stalin has said: The establishment of socialism can be carried out in one country, but capitalism still exists in this world, it still surrounds the Soviet Union. Consequently, only if the struggle of the world's proletariat and of the colonial peoples is successful can socialism win final victory.

Chinese unity + the world's assistance + Japan's domestic difficulties = China's victory. This formula makes sense. Of course, the slogan of self-reliance is correct, but, at the same time, we should also pay attention to the fact that China must not be isolated.

After graduation, you should work even harder. On the one hand, you should not be lazy. This opportunistic tendency should absolutely be discarded. We should work actively and struggle hard. On the other hand, we must also oppose impetuosity. We must also eliminate the idea that victory can be won in a single day.

Today's difficulties we should solve on the basis of a combination of basic principles and specific conditions. Take the Xi'an Incident, for example. Had it not been solved peacefully but, instead, led to civil war, we would have provided the reactionaries with an opportunity. When you go to work, you should set out to solve problems according to this principle. Take the organization of a guerrilla unit, for example. If the provincial government wants to confiscate the weapons of the guerrilla unit, then our principle is to avoid open conflict, in order not to give the Japanese an opportunity of which they can take advantage. The best example in solving this kind of problem is the Eighth Route Army. Some people want the Communist Party to withdraw from the Eighth Route Army. This is absolutism and will not do. The United Front is relative, and the Communist Party must maintain its relative independence within the United Front.

In sum, our principle is revolutionary, but it is concrete rather than abstract. It must be combined with the specific conditions in order to solve a problem.

So these are my parting words of advice today. You have learned here mainly about orientation, principles, and work-style. When you go out after graduation, no matter whether you are at the front or in the rear areas, on interior or exterior lines, you should all work hard to create countless large and small anti-Japanese base areas. Move from building a Wutai mountain region in Shanxi to building a Wutai mountain region in the entire country, and strive for final victory.

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9. Mao is using the image of beancurd cubes to suggest the shape and size of anti-Japanese base areas behind the Japanese lines. His major example, given below, is that of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Base Area under Nie Rongzhen. While Mao mentions it in terms of the Wutai mountain region in Shanxi, the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area was founded over the border in Fuping, Hebei, in January 1938.

On Condition That Our Route of Retreat Not Be Cut, Our Main Force May Stay Behind in Shanxi to Attack the Enemy

(March 3, 1938, 5:00 A.M.)

Comrades Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of Peng's telegram.[1] The precondition for the main force of the Eighth Route Army to remain in Shanxi to attack the enemy is that the route of retreat via the Yellow River and the Fen River not be cut. Otherwise, it would be very harmful to the whole of the resistance effort and to Guomindang-Communist relations. In particular, the two of you must come back. Even if one of you should remain to command the forces, you should only remain at a place which is not liable to be isolated (such as the Luliang mountain range). You absolutely should not remain to the east of the Fen River. Therefore, it is hoped that the transfer of the Headquarters [of the Eighth Route Army] and the deployment of Xu's brigade[2] and Liu's division[3] will be guided by this orientation, that practical and appropriate ways will be considered, and that you will notify us quickly of your plans.

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian]　　[Mao] Zedong
[Ren] Bishi

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 177–78, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to Peng Dehuai's telegram of March 1, 1938, on strategic issues to Mao, Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian], and others.

[2] The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

[3] The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

The Enemy's Situation and the Deployment of the 115th Division

(March 3, 1938, midnight)

Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. The enemy at Xiaoyi reached and occupied Shilou directly, without encountering resistance, and then advanced to the town of Yidie. There is the possibility that he will launch a sudden attack on Jundu. Wang Jingguo's forces[1] are retreating in the direction of Zhongyang. The enemy at Jixian is pressing near Ganzhentan and may possibly make a sudden attack on the ferry at Yanchang. We judge that the enemy's intention is to drive out the Shanxi troops, seize the ferry crossings, blockade the Yellow River, sever the routes of supplies and communications of the Chinese armies, and threaten Yan'an.

2. Under such circumstances, it seems that the 115th Division should deploy those units directly under it in the area of Yonghe, Daning, and Xian *xian* to mobilize the popular masses and work in concert with all the various forces. It should use one regiment to make sudden attacks on the enemy in that region left and right, taking Jixian as the center. It should use the other regiment to advance to the region of Shilou and make a surprise attack on the enemy in the region of Shilou and Yidie. Xiao's detachment[2] shall remain in the region of Damaijiao.[3] In this way, they will be able to support the forces on the west side of the river in consolidating river defenses. If we act appropriately, the enemy will be put in a difficult situation in the towns of Shilou, Yidie, Jixian, and Xiangning, without food supplies or any other support, and will be forced to withdraw. We can then take advantage of their withdrawal to wipe them out. We look forward to hearing your opinion.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 179-80, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Wang Jingguo was at this time commander of the Guomindang's Thirteenth Group Army in the Second War Zone.

[2] The reference is to the anti-Japanese forward column of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xiao Hua.

[3] Damaijiao is located in Shanxi Province approximately 25 kilometers to the west of the Fen River and approximately on the 37th parallel.

Instructions to the Unit of Chen Guang and Luo Ronghuan Regarding the Question of the Actions They Should Take

(March 5, 1938, midnight)

Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi], Yang [Shangkun], and Cheng Zihua:

1. Concerning your actions, you should still regularly seek instructions from Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]. The Military Affairs Commission will only issue instructions on certain special issues of a temporary nature. You should send telegrams to Zhu and Peng and at the same time notify the Military Affairs Commission.
2. You may rest for a few days near Daning and decide on your actions only after ascertaining the situation of the enemy. In order to make sure of arriving at a correct assessment of the enemy's situation, you should send a lightly armed reconnaissance unit to follow closely the footsteps of the enemy, equipped with radio transmitters so as to report on the enemy without interruption.
3. Besides entrusting to you the local work in the territory west of Damaijiao in Xishuitou, Shikou, and Chuankou, south of there in Xian *xian,* and north of there in Guanshang and Zhongyangchen, as well as in the two whole *xian* of Shilou and Yonghe, the missions of organizing guerrillas, and mobilizing the masses for supporting our forces to the west of the river in their effort to consolidate the route of retreat of our main force are also yours. In a few days we will send to Yonghe fifty Kangda students to be handed over to you for use. It is important, however, that you avoid conflict with friendly forces.
4. Cheng Zihua is commanding several hundred local troops who are just now moving southward from Lan *xian* in the direction of the region of Wuchengzhen. Hu [Fu] and Yang [Shangkun], as well as the second echelon troops under the Headquarters, are moving toward the region of Yonghe and Shilou. Yan Hongyan's Third Guard Regiment is located along the Jieshou-Xinguan-Hekou line. Bai Zhiwen's Fifth Guard Regiment is located along the Qingshuiguan-Yanshuiguan-Madouguan-Pingduguan line. It is hoped that you will keep in close touch with all of them.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 181–82, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Make a Planned Deployment for Guerrilla Warfare in the Shanxi-Henan Border Region

(March 6, 1938)

Comrade Zhu Rui, and inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] and Yang [Shangkun]:

1. We have taken note of the telegram dated the 3rd.[1] The deployments are very appropriate. The Shanxi-Henan Border Region is very important. It is hoped that you will make systematic plans for engaging in guerrilla war in the regions of Xinshui, Yichen, Qu'ao, Huanqu, Jiyuan, Bo'ai, and Jinchen, and support the actions of the main force from the west and from the north.

2. You should order Magistrate Li of Yangcheng *xian* to send someone to make a detour to Ji *xian* to report to Director Yan[2] on his arrangements for guerrilla war in seven *xian* and his plan to assume the leadership of guerrilla war in the Shanxi-Henan Border Region, requesting him to appoint him to this position and support him with guns, ammunition, and funds.

3. Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai] are commanding the Eastern Route Army in the area of Yushe and Liao *xian.* Wei[3] is commanding the Southern Route Army in the Luliang mountain range with Wei himself at Hejing. Fu Zuoyi is commanding the Northern Route Army to the north of Fenyang and Lishi. Yan is at Ji *xian.* Hu [Fu] and Yang [Shangkun] are making a detour and moving in the direction of Daning and Xian *xian.*

4. One route of the enemy has reached Yangcheng from Bo'ai. One route has reached Linfen from Changzhi and Fucheng. One route is on the way to Linfen from Linshi and Zhaocheng. One route is moving in the direction of Linfen from Xian *xian* and Bocheng. One route has reached Jundu from Fenyang. One route is moving in the direction of Loufanzhen from Wenshui and Jiaocheng. One route is moving in the direction of Wuzhai from Ningwu and Shenchi. One route has reached Baode from Pinglu and the Qingshui River. The total strength of the enemy is no more than fifty thousand. The various units of our Eighth Route Army are now attacking the enemy from the flanks and from the rear in support of friendly forces, with the determination to persist in guerrilla war.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 183–84, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to Zhu Rui's telegram of March 3 to Liu Shaoqi and Yang Shangkun proposing a plan for guerrilla warfare in the border region between Shanxi and Henan, with Yangcheng as its center.

[2] The reference is to Yan Xishan, Guomindang commander of the Second War Zone, designated here by his former title of Director of the Taiyuan Government Pacification Office.

[3] The reference is to Wei Lihuang, at this time deputy commander of the Guomindang Armies of the Second War Zone and frontline commander of the Southern Route Army.

The 120th Division Should Join Forces with Fu Zuoyi to Destroy the Enemy Who Is Advancing Westward

(March 6, 1938, midnight)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]:

1. According to the telegram of the 5th from Gao Shuangcheng,[1] the enemy at Fugu had already been defeated by the Zhang regiment of the Zuo brigade of his forces[2] on the 3rd and withdrawn back to Baode, and there were no longer any enemy forces at Fugu, and so on. According to Chen Qihan, the enemy at Lishi, Jundu, and Jikou, as a result of the failure of his attack and attempt to cross the river, has temporarily halted his advance. The enemy at Jikou is moving in the direction of Lin *xian.* In addition, according to He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying], some of Fu Zuoyi's forces[3] are engaged at present in combat against the enemy at Dawuzhen. It is estimated that this enemy will divide his main force into two routes to move toward Fangshan and Lin *xian* in an attempt, first, to defeat Fu Zuoyi's units so as to guarantee the safety of his flanks and, second, to support the combat operations of the three routes of the enemy from the two directions of the east and the north. According to Chen Guang, Luo Ronghuan, and Bai Zhiwen,[4] the enemies at Xian *xian*, Daning, and Wuchenzhen are all moving toward Pu *xian.* There is no enemy at these three places or at Fenxi. According to He, Xiao, and Guan, the enemy at Kefeng number no more than eight hundred. But the enemy at Wenshui and Jiaochen has already advanced to the south of Loufanzhen. We estimate that this enemy has the intention of occupying Jingle *xian*, so as to coordinate his actions with the enemy at Kelan and Dawuzhen.

2. In view of the above circumstances, it is already clear that the enemy is surrounding the 120th Division and Fu Zuoyi's army in five routes in an attempt to compel our forces to cross the river. But the enemy strength of each route is generally not great. Our He division[5] should defeat the enemy one after another in coordination with the forces of Fu Zuoyi.

3. If Wang's brigade[6] is able to defeat the enemy moving from Kelan to Wuzhai in cooperation with Fu Zuoyi's forces, then it will be advantageous that Zhang's brigade,[7] which is now at Dongcunzhen in Feng *xian,* move to Loufanzhen and seize appropriate opportunities to defeat the enemy moving from Loufan to Jingle. After succeeding there, then if the enemy at Dawuzhen continues to advance toward Fangshan, Zhang's brigade may, as the second step, cooperate with Fu Zuoyi's forces to attack the enemy at Fangshan. In such a way we can be sure of controlling the three *xian* of Jingle, Kefeng, and Fangshan. This may prevent Fu's forces from feeling surrounded on several sides and enable them to persist in combat in northwestern Shanxi. If it is felt that Wang's brigade and Zhang's brigade fighting separately cannot smash a single column of the enemy, but by concentrating our forces we may indeed defeat a single column of the enemy, then it is appropriate to concentrate our effort to attack one single column of the enemy. But whether it is appropriate to attack a single column in Kelan or the one in Loufan must be decided on the basis of the circumstances.

4. Now that there are the eight regiments of Fu's forces to the south of Lin *xian*, which are sufficient to constitute a threat to the enemy at Jikou and Jundu, it is no longer necessary for Zhang's brigade to move in the direction of Jikou and Jundu. The priority for now is to attack resolutely and defeat the enemy who is advancing toward the three points of Jingle, Fangshan, and Wuzhai. Only by successfully attacking one or two of these three routes will it be possible to frustrate the enemy's plan of encirclement, consolidate the base area in northwestern Shanxi, and support the combat operations in other regions.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 185–87, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] At this time, Gao Shuangcheng was the commander of the Guomindang Eighty-sixth Division.

[2] The reference is to the 512th Regiment of the 256th Brigade of Gao's Eighty-sixth Division, commanded respectively by Zhang Jie and Zuo Shiyun.

[3] Fu Zuoyi was at this time frontline commander-in-chief of the Northern Route of the Guomindang Second War Zone, and commander-in-chief of the Seventh Group Army.

[4] Chen Guang and Luo Ronghuan were, respectively, acting commander and head of the Political Department of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Bai Zhiwen was the commander of the Fifth Regiment of the Eighth Route Army garrison forces.

[5] I.e., the 120th Division, commanded by He Long.

[6] I.e., the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, with Wang Zhen as its political commissar.

[7] The reference is to the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Zhang Zongsun.

The 358th Brigade Ought to Begin Fighting from the Direction of Loufan

(March 7, 1938, 2:00 P.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], and for the information of He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]:

1. The main force of the enemy at Liuling and Jundu is intruding into Lin *xian*; the few remaining enemies took to their heels to Lishi on the 3rd, frightened by the reconnaissance platoon of Yan's regiment.[1] This reconnaissance platoon retook Liuling. When this platoon was making a sudden attack on the enemy, the popular masses reported to the enemy that there were three to four thousand Eighth Route Army soldiers on the attack. The enemy then fled in haste, leaving much rice and many cans of food and other things behind. Now, we have one company stationed in Liulin.

2. The main force of the enemy at both Lishi and Qikou is advancing toward Lin *xian* and Fangshan. Their route of retreat is largely empty. If this point is confirmed, then it seems inappropriate that our brigade of Zhang and Li[2] should move in the direction of Xing *xian*. Instead, it should begin fighting from the direction of Loufan. After winning there, they should cut to the route of retreat of the enemy to the south of Fangshan and Ling *xian*. This move will be conducive to victory and relieve the encirclement of Fu Zuoyi,[3] saving Ling *xian* and Fangshan from falling into enemy hands. After that, this brigade should be used in the region north of the Taiyuan-Fenyang-Lishi-Jundu line (at present, this line is the main artery of the enemy). At the same time, you should send a small contingent to support the surprise attack by Cheng Zihua[4] on the road between Fenyang and Lishi. This is bound to have a major impact, and I hope you will consider it. If the enemy at Loufan does not make a rash advance, or immediately take a shortcut to Fangshan, it is perhaps appropriate to consider directly cutting to the route of retreat of the enemy in Ling *xian*.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 188–89, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the Third Regiment of the garrison unit of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yan Hongyan.

[2] The reference is to the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Zhang Zongsun, with Li Jingquan as political commissar.

[3] Regarding Fu Zuoyi, see the note to the previous text.

[4] Cheng Zihua was at this time commander of the People's Armed Unit of the General Mobilization Committee of the National Revolutionary War in the Second War Zone.

Guidance by the Military Affairs Commission Shall Be Limited to Putting Forward the Overall Orientation

(March 8, 1938, 4:00 P.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]; and Nie [Rongzhen]:

1. Guidance by the Military Affairs Commission shall consist only in putting forward the overall strategic orientation. It is up to Zhu and Peng to carry out the concrete deployments in the light of this orientation and the present circumstances. Sometimes, the Military Affairs Commission advances opinions regarding specific combat operations, but these are merely suggestions. It is up to Zhu and Peng to take the decisions on the basis of the situation and the enemy's dispositions, without interference from the Military Affairs Commission.

2. Concerning the positions of the enemy and ourselves and the circumstances of the combat, besides the reports sent by Headquarters[1] to the Military Affairs Commission as the occasion demands, each division should also send a copy of its telegraphic combat report to the Headquarters to the Military Affairs Commission, so that the Military Affairs Commission will be fully informed regarding the situation.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 190–91, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] I.e., by the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army.

The Eighth Route Army Should Prepare to Fight Successive Battles in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Henan Region

(March 9, 1938, 10:00 A.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of your telegram sent between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M. on the 7th.

1. The strategic orientation decided on by the Politburo covers two stages: the present stage, during which we operate in North China, and the second stage, when we will have moved to Shaanxi and Henan. It does not refer solely to the present.

2. During the present stage, it is not just because of the orders of Chiang [Kaishek], but mainly because of strategic requirements (as discussed in the telegram of February 23),[1] that under the circumstances in which we are not fundamentally isolated by the enemy, our troops must resolutely engage in combat in the rear of the enemy in support of friendly forces, with a view to the effective elimination and weakening of the enemy. We shall launch an extensive movement to resist Japan. Only in this way will we be able to check and obstruct the advance of the enemy's offensive in the direction of Tongguan,[2] Xi'an, and northern Shaanxi. We must, however, avoid the risk of being cut off and must absolutely not cross the river too early, still less cross the river disregarding Chiang's orders and the timing of the river crossing by the friendly forces. In order to assure that it will be easy to redeploy in the future, it is imperative to consolidate the Luliang mountain range, the axis for redeployment, and to make arrangements for work in the Taiyu and Wangwu mountains (Zhu Rui's department).[3] Deployment for the first stage must take into consideration dispositions for the second stage, when the situation changes.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 192–94, where it is reproduced from a handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1] Translated above.

[2] Tongguan is located in the northern part of Tongguan *xian* in Shaanxi and is an important pass between Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Henan.

[3] At this time, Zhu Rui was secretary of the Military Committee of the Northern Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, involved in united front work in the mountainous areas on the border between Shanxi and Henan.

3. In the future stage, that is, during the stage in which the enemy massively invades Tongguan, Xi'an, Wushengguan,[4] Wuhan, and northern Shaanxi, after obtaining the agreement of Chiang [Kaishek], Yan [Xishan], and Wei [Lihuang], the main forces of the Eighth Route Army and of other Guomindang armies should cross to the west and south side of the river to fight in defense of the northwest and of Wuhan. At the same time, an appropriate level of forces should be maintained in the various regions of Shanxi to continue to fight a robust guerrilla war. If the enemy breaks through the Wubao line, attacks Suide, and threatens Yan'an, then we should be prepared to get one brigade from the 120th Division to cross the river first to fight the enemy. If the enemy attacks Tongguan, and Xi'an is in danger, whereas Wushengguan and Wuhan are not yet in danger, then we should withdraw the 115th Division, or at least one of its brigades, as well as some units from the forces of Yan and Wei, to cross the river first to attack the enemy. The specific deployments will be made in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. But no matter how many troops cross the river, it will be imperative then to strive very hard to obtain the prior consent of Chiang and to cooperate with friendly forces.

4. In general, during the present stage, all forces within the borders of Shanxi should carry out the task of eliminating the enemy and mobilizing the popular masses. But at the same time, they should be prepared for redeployment during the next stage when the situation is changing rapidly. If the whole of the Eighth Route Army is confined in an encirclement by the enemy in North China and is completely unable to be redeployed to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Henan region, this will be detrimental to the whole of the resistance effort and to political relations in the whole country. This is the basic spirit of the strategic decision by the Politburo. Proceeding from the prolonged character of the war, it must be so; this is the only advantageous approach.

5. Therefore, when you report to Yan and Wei and convene officers' meetings, you should point out the strategic significance of combat in the enemy's rear and the great number of ways to rely on the popular masses. But at the same time, you should not under any circumstances say anything about all the forces being permanently deployed in North China. In reality, even though Chiang has issued harsh orders, Wei's 54th and 83rd Divisions have already passed Yichuan via Ji *xian* (Wu Ting saw this himself),[5] and one unit of He Zhuguo's forces has already passed Fugu via Baode. (See the telegram of He, Xiao, and Guan.)[6] It is totally incorrect for them to cross the river at this time. But we may also see from this that Wei Lihuang and others are wavering in carrying out orders. Also, please pay attention to the double meaning of Chiang's orders. On the one hand, they contain the positive significance of strategic requirements; on the other, it is difficult for them not to harbor any malice.

6. We will notify you separately regarding the rest.

Mao Zedong

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[4] Wushengguan is located in the southern part of Xinyang *xian* in Henan and is one of the passes into the Dabie mountains.

[5] At this time Wu Ting was commander of the artillery regiment of the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army.

[6] The reference is to He Long, Xiao Ke, and Guan Xiangying, respectively commander, deputy commander, and political commissar of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

Speech at the Rally in Memory of the Thirteenth Anniversary of Sun Yatsen's Death, and in Honor of the Officers and Men Who Have Died in the War of Resistance

(March 12, 1938)

Today is the thirteenth anniversary of Mr. Sun Yatsen's death, and we are holding this solemn rally in his memory. At the same time, the War of Resistance against Japan has been fought for eight months, and many heroic commanders and soldiers have laid down their lives, so we are holding this memorial meeting to mourn for them. All this is by no means casual or accidental; there are inevitable causes in the historical development of our nation.

Where does Mr. Sun's greatness lie? It lies in his program of the Three People's Principles, in his policy of a united front, and in his spirit of hard struggle. When I met Mr. Sun in Guangdong, the First National Congress of the Guomindang was in session, and the new program of the Three People's Principles, authored by Mr. Sun, had already been passed by the congress. That was the famous "Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Chinese Guomindang." At that time, moreover, the policy of a united front based on the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party was beginning to be carried out. This united front included an internal alliance with the Communist Party, and with the workers and peasants, and an external alliance with those nations that treated us as equals to wage a common struggle. Thus the famed "Three Cardinal Policies" were established at this time. Mr. Sun's program of the Three People's Principles and his policy of a united front constituted, indeed, the greatest contribution to the Chinese nation by this great revolutionary in a semicolonial country. Apart from this, the greatness of Mr. Sun also lies in his revolutionary resolve and spirit of hard struggle and uncompromising determination. Without this resolve or spirit, his doctrine and policy could not have been put into effect. As stated in the first sentence of the late Director General's political testament, which we have just read, "I have devoted myself to the national revolution for forty years." He experienced countless difficulties and setbacks during those four decades, but Mr. Sun struggled even harder after each setback and never gave up. When many of his followers became discouraged, lost their resolve, or even surrendered and became traitors in the face of difficulties and temptations, Mr. Sun always held firm. He remained true to his ideas. Throughout his lifetime, Mr. Sun upheld his Three People's Principles, developed them, and never abandoned them. Mr. Sun never gave up his ideas in times of difficulties. From beginning to end, he consistently upheld and developed the Three People's Principles. The manifesto of the First National Congress demonstrated the development of the Three People's Principles. As for the united front, it was the same. Mr. Sun not only upheld the united front, but developed it from an alliance of various revolutionary groups and secret societies with the goal of overthrowing the Qing dynasty to the adoption of the policy of uniting with Soviet Russia, with the Communist Party, and with the workers and peasants in order to overthrow imperialism and feudalism. These accomplishments, together with his fearless, uncompromising, and persistent revolutionary resolve or practical revolutionary spirit, reveal Mr. Sun as a great revolutionary model. Today, we have another united front. Compared with the previous one, this united front is even broader. The enemy this united front must deal with is also more serious than the last one. The program that this united front should carry out remains, at the moment, the same as that declared by the manifesto of the First National Congress. But its form and content have developed in some respects and will certainly develop further in the future. The goal of realizing the Three People's Principles, expanding the united front, and defeating our enemy, Japanese imperialism, will be reached only by upholding the uncompromising revolutionary spirit of hard struggle, determination, and no wavering or compromise in our revolutionary practice. Therefore, in paying our tribute to Mr. Sun, we must, if we are not to follow the old customs, pay attention to the following three points. First, struggle for the thoroughgoing realization of the Three People's Principles; second, struggle for the consolidation and expansion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; and third, uphold the revolutionary spirit of hard struggle, determination, and persistence. I think that the above three points are the most central, most essential, and greatest legacy Mr. Sun has left us. Every member of the Guomindang, every member of the Communist Party, and all patriotic fellow countrymen should accept this legacy and develop it. The judgment as to whether, in the final analysis, a person is a loyal follower of Mr. Sun depends on his attitude toward these three precious legacies.

Now let us speak about the significance of the commanders and soldiers who have died resisting the enemy. Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the unprecedented great war in the East has been going on for eight months. The enemy has exhausted all his national resources to wage the war; his goal is the destruction of China, and his strategy is fighting a quick battle to force a quick decision. What about us? We have also mobilized all our resources to resist; our goal is to defend our motherland, and our strategy is to wage a protracted struggle. In the past eight

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This text was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* March 15, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 111–15.

months, our army and air force have fought heroically. Great unity has been achieved in our whole country, and several million troops and countless people have joined in the fighting. Hundreds of thousands of them have gloriously and heroically laid down their lives in executing their sacred tasks. Among these, many were members of the Guomindang, many were Communists, and many were members of other parties or belonged to no party. We pay our heartfelt tribute to the dead and will keep them forever in our memory. All of them without exception—from generals like Hao Menglin, Dong Lingge, Zhao Dengyu, Rao Guohua, Liu Jiaqi, Jiang Yuzhen, Chen Jingxiu, Li Guidan, Huang Meixing, Yao Zixiang, and Pan Zhankui to every soldier—have set a great and noble example for the people of the whole country. The Chinese nation is assuredly not a flock of sheep. It is a great nation rich in national dignity and sense of human justice. For the sake of national dignity and human justice, and for the Chinese people to continue to live in their own land, it will never allow Japanese fascists to reach their criminal and outrageous goal without paying a heavy price. Our methods are war and sacrifice. We will resist war with war; we will pit revolutionary justice against barbarous wars of aggression. This spirit has already been manifested in our nation's history of several thousand years; now it is being magnificently demonstrated once again. General Hao Menglin and hundreds of thousands of soldiers have died for this spirit. We assume that the Japanese fascists will continue to advance; they still want to attack our Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Nanchang, Fuzhou, Changsha, and Guangzhou. They want to swallow up and destroy China. But I want to tell these mad enemies, "You will never reach your goal. Do not think that you have reached your goal once you occupy our land. You have not reached your goal and never will. History will judge that the victory of you Japanese fascists is only temporary and will never be permanent. There are sufficient causes to prove that the final victory belongs only to us. Moreover, when the war is concluded, you will occupy only part of our land. It is impossible for you to occupy the entire country. Even when you win a quick victory in a city, you will also get a prolonged war in a village. For example, you have already taken several major roads and several cities in Shanxi, but the countryside several times the size of the land you have occupied will always belong to the Republic of China. We will tell this truth to the people of the whole country: Japan can impose only partial occupation in practically every province. The Japanese armed forces are not sufficient to be spread everywhere; their barbarous policy has also aroused the wrath of every Chinese. China has a huge army and many people. China also carries out a good united front policy. This determines the prolonged nature of the war and to whom the final victory belongs. In terms of the situation in the future, even if, as a result of bloody fighting, Japan occupies most of China's territory and there is only a small part of China that is intact and remains as the central base for continuing the war and struggling for the final victory, Japan will really occupy only the large cities, the major roads, and some flat areas in most of China. Provided only that we can organize the people in most of the countryside in every province to rise up in arms together with us to fight the Japanese and establish many anti-Japanese base areas, such as the Wutai mountains base area, which has already been established, we will surround the Japanese Army. This war of ours on exterior lines supports the war on interior lines. Let us, moreover, strive in every way to make great progress in various critical tasks in our Party, government, military, and civil affairs throughout the country. The day will come when we can support each other, attack both from without and within, and launch a great counteroffensive. At that time, we will assuredly be aided by support from the world revolution and the people's revolution inside Japan. Who can say that the final victory will not belong to China? Who can say that the warm blood of General Hao Menglin and others was shed in vain? Who can say that it is not a certainty that the Japanese bandits will be driven out of China? Who can say that the three great ideals of Mr. Sun Yatsen—national liberation, democratic freedom, and people's livelihood and happiness—will not be realized in China? We want the people of all China to have this clear understanding and firm belief, and understand the best overall strategy for protracted warfare. Under the leadership of the central government and of Chairman Chiang [Kaishek], let us unite as one during this campaign, and we will certainly be able to get rid of the shackles of being, or the threat of becoming, slaves without a country.

At this rally, we want to salute every officer and soldier fighting at the front because they are all waging a heroic struggle to win final victory. We want to salute all the families of the soldiers who are fighting the Japanese, especially the families of the martyrs, because their families have produced such soldiers who have fought for their country without fear of laying down their lives. We also want to salute every worker, and the leaders at every level, who are toiling selflessly in the rear for the war effort, because their work directly or indirectly guides or contributes to the War of Resistance.[1] At this rally, let us also offer a special salute to our national leader, and the commander-in-chief of the War of Liberation, Chairman Chiang, because he is leading the country with determination and perseverance, and because he has initiated and commanded the great War of Resistance against Japan.

Compatriots at the rally, and of the whole country, let us unite forever! Down with Japanese imperialism! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

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[1] The text as reproduced in *Mao Zedong wenji* ends here. The remaining sentences are taken from the version in *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 329–33.

It Is Appropriate That the Main Force of Liu Bocheng's Division and Xu Haidong's Brigade Carry Out the Task of Combat at Zhengtai

(March 14, 1938, midnight)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

In accordance with Chiang [Kaishek]'s opinion as relayed by Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying], and the judgment that changes will soon take place in Henan and on the Longhai railway, it is more appropriate that the main force of Xu Haidong's brigade and Liu Bocheng's division be deployed south of the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line to carry out the Zhengtai mission. This will also facilitate their northward and westward redeployment in the future. If they penetrate deeply into the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Border Region, it may be an exercise in futility marching back and forth, not at all favorable to the overall situation. According to Chiang's intention, Wei Lihuang should go to the east of the Datong-Tongguan railway line to command combat along the Datong-Tongguan and Beiping-Hankou railway lines, as well as to the south. It seems that it is not yet decided that Zhu and Peng shall shoulder the responsibility of commanding combat to the north. Under these uncertain circumstances, it is appropriate to be cautious about the deployment of Liu's division and Xu's brigade. In particular, Xu's brigade must be located at an appropriate place which enables it to carry out the present tasks and to redeploy when opportunities arise.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 195–96, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Pay Attention to Distinguishing Between the Two Stages When Holding Discussions with the Guomindang on Military Affairs in North China

(March 17, 1938, 2:00 P.M.)

Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying], Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. When talking with Chiang [Kaishek], Bai [Chongxi], He [Yingqin], and Chen [Cheng] about military issues of North China, please pay attention to dividing things into two stages, the present and the future. Explain to them that it is now necessary and possible to keep large armies in North China. In the future, however, the situation will undergo the following changes:

a. The enemy will adopt the policy of destroying our economic base in a big way. For example, much damage has been caused by large-scale burning in the area around Fuping.

b. He will build and repair roads, attack by several routes, and construct fortifications so as to reduce gradually the zone of our activities.

c. He will occupy all the major ferry points on both shores of the Yellow River so as to create difficulties for our supplies and make it hard to maneuver.

The above-mentioned three circumstances are bound to occur. Some are already being put into effect.

2. Therefore, it is now possible and necessary to keep large military units in North China. In the future, we may only be able to keep a few smaller units, that is, a few guerrilla units, in North China. The main force of various armies must cross the river before the enemy manages to blockade the different ferry points on the Yellow River. Otherwise, we would fall into great difficulties.

3. It is entirely possible and very necessary to establish many anti-Japanese base areas in the rear of the enemy. Both the Guomindang and the Communist Party should do their utmost to do so, and no suspicions should be entertained about this. We should not, however, regard it as easy, nor should we imagine that several hundred thousand regular troops can engage in prolonged combat in North China.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 197–98, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

4. A regiment of Gao Shuangcheng's forces[1] is under siege in Dongshen. The enemy in Pianguan has already crossed the river and is staging an offensive to the north of Shenmu. The enemy at Linfen has sent reinforcements to Pu *xian.* The enemy in Pu *xian* is attacking Daning again, and Madouguan is in danger.

5. Gao Gang[2] is building boats at the mouth of the river. On the basis of the assumption that it will cost 25,000 *yuan* to build one hundred big boats (each costing 250 yuan), please get the money from the Military Affairs Department.

Mao Zedong

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[1] Gao Shuangcheng was at this time the commander of the Guomindang Eighty-sixth Division.

[2] Gao Gang was at this time the public security commander of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia garrison force of the Eighth Route Army.

It Is Advantageous for Liu Bocheng's Division to Stay on the East Side at Present to Conduct Operations

(March 18, 1938, midnight)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have taken note of your telegram of the 18th at 7 A.M. Several words were not decoded clearly. Were you saying that it is better for [Peng] Dehuai to stay on the east side and Zhu [De] to go to the west side?

2. Liu [Bocheng]'s division has determined that at the present stage it is advantageous to remain on the east side, but during the stage when the enemy is attacking Wuhan, we think there will definitely be a power vacuum in the eastern sector of the Longhai railway[1] and the middle sector of the Grand Canal along the lower reaches of the Yellow River. There will still be the need and the possibility to go to Hebei, pass through Shandong, and enter Anhui. If there is a way out, then, even if we are isolated we will not be afraid of them.

3. With the boats we had at Laoyaguan, Xinguan, Hekou, and Yongheguan, we were able to take ten thousand men across every night. Now that we have built twenty more big boats, in addition to the boats we had before, we will be able to take at least twenty thousand men across every night. All the boats have been put in the Wuding River under camouflage ready for use.

Pingduguan has been lost. The boats were sunk so as to prevent the enemy from using them.

Mao [Zedong] Teng [Daiyuan][2]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 199–200, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The Longhai railway runs westward from the sea to Xi'an.

[2] Teng was at this time chief of staff of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Main Force of He Long's Division Should Gradually Move Southward to Replace Chen Guang's Brigade of Lin Biao's Division

(March 21, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. The main force of He [Long]'s division should get prepared to move gradually southward to replace Chen [Guang]'s brigade of Lin [Biao]'s division so that Chen's brigade may be deployed in a new direction in the future. At present, it is appropriate to order He's division to send one regiment to the region west of Fenyang and Xiaoyi immediately to support Chen's brigade in the battle.
2. After the enemy's occupation of Zhenzhou, the situation in Henan and Wuhan will definitely undergo rapid changes. Chiang [Kaishek] will certainly agree that Liu [Bocheng]'s division should move to the east of Xingyang, and that Lin [Biao]'s division should go to western Henan and participate in combat operations to defend Wuhan. Therefore, it is appropriate for Xu [Haidong]'s brigade and the main force of Liu's division to concentrate in the region of Jinchen and Changzhi to engage in combat. The plan to get Xu's brigade to move to Hebei should be given up.
3. It seems that it is impossible for Chen's brigade to move eastward at present. It is appropriate to decide that it should stay where it is now to engage in combat. I request you all to consider this.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 201–2, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Establish Solid Bases in the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan Area with the Greatest Possible Speed

(March 24, 1938)

Comrade Zhu Rui, and convey to Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], Deng [Xiaoping], and Tang Tianji:[1]

The central task confronting the whole of the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan region is to establish as quickly as possible the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan Border Region as a consolidated base area which persists in the War of Resistance. Consequently, the tasks of the Party organization and the Eighth Route Army where you are located are:

1. Establish several combat-ready guerrilla units (like the guerrilla detachment under Comrade [Nie] Rongzhen) and local guerrilla contingents which are completely under the leadership of the Party.
2. Organize widely self-defense corps which do not quit production and get them to shoulder the responsibilities of reconnaissance, security, sentry duty, and hiding provisions and clearing the fields.
3. Strive to reform the friendly forces, especially those which are prepared to remain permanently in North China to engage in guerrilla war, turning them into strong, progressive forces resisting Japan.
4. Gradually reform the political organs and turn them into democratic régimes resisting Japan with the participation of diverse strata of the people, while remaining Guomindang régimes. Let the mobilization committees at different levels recruit the real representatives of people's organizations and armed forces, and turn them into actual government committees at various levels. Gradually purge the corrupt elements within the political organs, especially the Chinese traitors and wavering elements.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 203–4, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Tang Tianji (1904–1989) was at this time the commander of the Shanxi-Henan Border Detachment of the Eighth Route Army.

5. Strive to build gradually unity in command and leadership in the military and political domains. Adopt some necessary transitional methods, so as to prepare for the convening of a representative conference of the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan Border Region government in the future to establish a provisional border region government.

6. Under the overall policy of the united front, resolutely carry out the policy of mobilizing and arming the masses and eliminating Chinese traitors.

7. Find a way to convene a representative conference of mass organizations of the whole border region, or one organized jointly by several *xian,* so as to mobilize the masses for participation in the war, and set up organizations which truly include the broad masses. Under the major premise of resistance to Japan, alleviate some of the hardships of the people and satisfy some of their urgent demands in accordance with Yan [Xishan]'s decrees.

8. Greatly expand the Party, and establish and perfect the leadership organs at all levels; set up one or two relatively large schools to train cadres for political, military, and mass organizations and government work, and let the Party run training courses.

9. You should prepare to remain in the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan Border Region to take overall charge, just as Comrade Nie Rongzhen is doing in the Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi Border Region.

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] Mao Zedong
Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

The Principal Operational Tasks in Southeastern Shanxi

(March 24, 1938, 2:00 P.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. At present, the main combat mission in southeastern Shanxi appears to be to check the enemy who has advanced to Xiuwu and Bo'ai, and is attempting to invade Luoyang to the south by various methods, such as attacking him, weakening him, and cutting off his line of retreat. Second, it is to attack the enemy, who has advanced to Changzhi.

2. Consequently, it seems that Liu [Bocheng]'s division and Xu [Haidong]'s brigade should engage in combat separately. Xu's brigade (or Liu's division) should move southward via Dongyangguan to reach directly the side of the Dao[kou]-Qing[hua] railway line, sabotaging this railroad and attacking the enemy along this railroad. Liu's division (or Xu's brigade) should be deployed near Changzhi to attack the enemy there.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 205–6, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Immediately Organize Guerrilla Detachments Which Operate Using the Name of the Eighth Route Army

(March 24, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Zhu Rui; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]; Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]; as well as the various Party provincial committees; [Cheng] Zihua and [Yang] Shangkun:

Because of the developments in the war situation, perhaps in the not-too-distant future, it will be necessary for the main force of the Eighth Route Army to be redeployed elsewhere for combat. In order that our Party may continue to be able to persist energetically in and lead the War of Resistance in North China within the united front after the main force of the Eighth Route Army is redeployed to a different region, it is imperative to organize immediately in the name of the Eighth Route Army the following guerrilla corps:

1. Besides the Song Shilun contingent in northwestern Shanxi, organize a contingent in Pianguan, Hequ, Baode, Wuzhai, and the region to their north; a contingent in the region of Chunxian, Xinxian, and Ningwu to the south of Yanmenguan; a contingent in the region of Yangqu, Jiaochen, and Wenshui; and a contingent in the region of Fangshan, Linxian, and Lishi. All of them shall be entrusted to the responsibility of He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying], together with the Provincial Committee in northwestern Shanxi and [Cheng] Zihua.

2. Organize a contingent in the region of Zhongyang, Shilou, and Yonghe in southwestern Shanxi; a contingent in the region of Linfen, Xiaoyi, Fenxi, Linshi, Zhaochen, Xianxian, and Hongdong; and a contingent in the region of Xiangning, Jixian, and Daning. All of them shall be entrusted to the responsibility of Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], and [Yang] Shangkun, and the Provincial Committee.

3. Organize a contingent in the region of Taigu, Yuci, and Pingding of southeastern Shanxi; a contingent in the region west of Yuanshi, Jingchen, and Neiqiu; a contingent in the region of Cixian, Wu'an, and Shexian; a contingent in the region of Jinchen, Linchuan, and Xiuwu; a contingent in the region of Yangchen, Jiyuan, and Huanqu; a contingent in the region of Xinyuan and Anze; and a contingent in the region of Yichen, Xinshui, and Jiangxian. All of them shall be entrusted to the responsibility of Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], Deng [Xiaoping], Zhu Rui, and the Provincial Party Committee.

4. Organize several contingents to the east of the Beiping-Hankou railway line and have Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping] inform Chen [Zaidao] and Song [Renqiong] and the local Party organization that will be responsible for them.

5. All divisions should speedily set up training courses for guerrilla cadres. There should be at least a hundred trainees who will be transferred from the various units and guerrilla contingents.

6. The various contingents mentioned above shall each have at least a thousand men, and each of them shall have one or two companies of the Eighth Route Army with combat experience as the core, the balance being made up of local guerrillas and new recruits.

7. If the aforementioned areas are the sectors in which friendly forces station their troops, and it is temporarily not convenient for the Eighth Route Army to send forces there, then these contingents should be organized in other areas for the moment. In the future, when the situation permits and requires it, they shall then move to the designated areas to engage in activities.

8. Military and political cadres should be allocated appropriately to the various contingents, and once they have been set up, they should operate under the name of the Guerrilla Contingent of the Eighth Route Army, and establish their prestige.

Mao Zedong Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 207–9, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

It Is Urgent to Establish a Unified Military and Political Leadership in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Region

(March 25, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Zhu Rui; and Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]:

1. The work in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan area east of the [Beiping-Hankou] railway line is very important. We have very little information on this locality. We hope you will telegraph us regularly to inform us in detail regarding the activities of Chen [Zaidao] and Song [Renqiong].

2. Comrade Zhu Rui shall be responsible for organizing the Party Committee of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region and for administering the work in the areas east of the Beiping-Hankou railway, south of the Cangxian-Shijiazhuang railway, north of the Yellow River, and in western and northern Shandong.

3. The North Shandong Special Committee has a few guerrilla units. The responsible person of the West Shandong Special Committee, Xing Jinsheng,[1] and Commissioner Fan Zhuxian,[2] who is collaborating with him, have armed forces of several thousands. The Zhinan commissioner, Ding Shuben,[3] is resolutely resisting Japan and has over three thousand armed men. He is also very anxious to collaborate with us, and requests that we send cadres over. Commissioners Ding and Fan have both sent representatives to Hankou and have received awards from the central government. As for our armed forces, besides the Fourth Detachment,[4] we have also expanded the Eighth Brigade at Puyang,[5] which has four hundred men and rifles. Please tell Chen and Song to find a way to get in touch with these forces.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 210–11, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Xing Jinsheng was the pseudonym of Zhang Lin.

[2] Fan Zhuxian was the commissioner of the Sixth Administrative Area in Shandong.

[3] Ding Shuben was the commissioner of the Puyang Administrative Area in Hebei.

[4] The reference is to the Fourth Detachment of the Hebei People's Army, an anti-Japanese force set up at the beginning of the anti-Japanese war by the Communists.

[5] This unit had also been set up by the Chinese Communist Party to fight the Japanese.

4. At present, there is an urgent need to establish unified military and political leadership in this region. Besides establishing armed forces, an attempt should be made to establish and reform local governments, and organize the popular masses. The principle for the organization of armed forces should, however, be few but highly trained.

Mao Zedong Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

It Is Appropriate That Liu Bocheng's Division and Xu Haidong's Brigade Should Be Located to the East of the Tongpu Railway Line[1]

(March 29, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

In view of the situation of the enemy and of ourselves at present, it is possible that the situation in Henan, Anhui, Tongguan, Xi'an, and even Wuhan will very rapidly undergo serious changes. At the same time, the enemy certainly has a plan for attacking the Communist Party politically by invading northern Shaanxi. Therefore, it is appropriate that Liu's division and Xu's brigade should be located to the east of the Tongpu railway line. Using the Taiyu mountain range as the base area, they should mobilize the popular masses, attack the Tongpu railway, and support the divisions of Lin and He[2] in attacking the enemy in western Shanxi. This will also facilitate redeployment westward.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 212–13, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Regarding the Tongpu railway line, see above, the note to the text of February 23, 1938.

[2] The reference is to the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao, and the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He Long.

Speech at the Opening Ceremony for the Second Session of the Northern Shaanxi Public School

(April 1, 1938)

Comrades!

School starts today. You have had several school openings before, and many people have graduated. You come from all over the entire country, from the fighting zones, from the rear areas, from the South Sea archipelago, and from places thousands or tens of thousands of *li* away. Today the school opening ceremony of the second session is being held. I think that the Chinese Communist Party is very happy about the starting of school today, so I am very honored to represent the Chinese Communist Party in welcoming all comrades. [Applause]

As I said the other day, you are not out to get promoted to high office or to get rich, but instead are prepared or are getting prepared to sacrifice your lives in order to participate in the War of Resistance. Why have fifteen or sixteen hundred people like you not gone to some other places, but come here instead? I think that it is because of your faith in the Communist Party. If it weren't for the fact that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is here, you would not have come. For example, after you arrived in Yan'an, why didn't you go out the north gate and keep on going north? There are many places you could have gone to out there! You did not go to those places, but stayed here. Or, you all know Xi'an; transportation is convenient there, and you would not be living in caves and eating millet, but you did not remain there. Without fear of hardship, you walked a distance of eight or nine hundred *li* to come over here. There is only one reason for this, and that is that the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party are here.

So what is good about the Communist Party, then? Why do you like the Communist Party? The Japanese imperialists do not like the Communist Party, and there are many other people who dislike it as well. In the past, there were many pictures around where Communist Party members were drawn with hair growing upward [loud laughter from the whole audience] and with long, pointed teeth; they were drawn to look like demons. Others showed Communist Party members

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 153–58.

killing and burning, having not just communal property but also communal wives [loud laughter]. But that is not the way you see the Communist Party. One comrade told me that when he was outside, he thought that Communist Party members must be very ugly. But when he arrived here and had a look, they weren't ugly after all and in fact were fairly good looking [loud laughter from the whole audience]. I also think that [the Communist Party] is fairly good looking, although it also has some flaws, so it can only be called fairly good looking. It is precisely because it is this way that people believe in the Communist Party and come running over here.

Why is the Communist Party trusted by you while it is detested by the Japanese imperialists and certain other people? I think that is because it has its own special characteristics that cannot be matched by others. These characteristics are:

First, it has an orientation, a political orientation. The people of the entire country think that this is a good orientation, and it is: overthrow imperialism and complete the establishment of democratic politics. This political orientation represents the view of the overwhelming majority of the people of the entire country. The Communist Party decided on this orientation the day it was born. Externally, because the imperialists are oppressing us, we raise the slogan of overthrowing imperialism. Domestically, there are certain things that are old and rotten; they must be overthrown and democratic politics established. This has been the general orientation put forward by the Chinese Communist Party for the past seventeen years and is also the overall orientation approved of by the people of the whole country. There is another direction, which is the ideal of socialism. Everyone think for moment: let us say democratic politics has been established and we have graduated. Should we go on to further schooling? Yes, we should. Is there another school that we can go on to? Yes, there is: the college of socialism. It can give the people the greatest happiness. You cannot get to the end of the road to democracy and then stop moving forward; you have to keep going, and that means taking the road to socialism. But if you want to get to socialism, you must first take the present road and follow the present orientation.

Why do the people of the whole country like the Communist Party in particular? Because it not only has a political orientation but has persisted in this orientation.

Some people say that the Communist Party changes very often. For example, the Northern Shaanxi Public School has changed many times within a few months. They say: I do not know how many schools it has run, but in fact there has never been any change, it is all the same, even the teaching materials date back to the founding year of the Republic. We say: we do change: The Chinese Communist Party has changed three times over the past seventeen years. The first time was the revolutionary civil war from 1924 to 1927; the second time was the soviet movement; and the third time was from the September Eighteenth Incident to the Xi'an Incident to the present Second United Front. Indeed it has changed. But is there anything that has not changed? Yes, the general political orientation has not changed. What was the First Great Revolution for? It was to overthrow imperialism and complete the establishment of democratic politics. What was the soviet movement for? It was to overthrow imperialism and complete the establishment of democratic politics. The current War of Resistance is still in keeping with this overall orientation. In your school song, there is a line that says: "We are loyal to the cause of national liberation." This is good. The Chinese Communist Party has been loyal to the cause of national liberation for the past seventeen years. Not only does it have a political orientation that is welcomed by the people of the whole country, but it has also persisted in this political orientation. But there are some people who cannot do this and even ask us not to. We have climbed the most difficult mountains, crossed rivers, and crossed grasslands, and we have not been afraid of having our heads chopped off. Even after the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Party members, we have nonetheless continued to move forward. The dead are dead and the living step over their bloody traces to advance with bright-colored banners raised high! [Applause]

This is the first thing that has made the people of the whole country like [the Party].

There is another point, and that is that it has a certain work-style, a certain habit of hard struggle. Lu Xun had Lu Xun's style of work; the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University has its style of work, and your Northern Shaanxi Public School also has the Northern Shaanxi Public School's style of work. The Communist Party has its style of work: arduous struggle! This is the work-style of every Communist Party member and every revolutionary.

There is a comrade who received a letter that was probably written by a graduate of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University or the Northern Shaanxi Public School. The letter stated that nothing was gained after living in Yan'an for a long time, that every day, there was only mountain climbing. Every place has mountains, so why should you rush here to where your Communist Party is to climb mountains? [Loud laughter from the whole audience.] He is an anti–mountain-climbist. [Loud laughter from the whole audience.] I am a mountain-climbist. I do not know whether the Northern Shaanxi Public School has mountain climbing every day. The Anti-Japanese Military and Political University has climbing every day. [Someone replies that the Northern Shaanxi Public School also climbs every day.] In my view, it is necessary to climb mountains.

Marxism is the head. People have heads and they must also have feet. Mountain-climbism is about feet. To overthrow Japanese imperialism, you need feet. Mountain climbing has become a general way of approaching things. No matter what work you are doing, it will always have a general way of approaching things just as mountain climbing does. This general way of approaching things is, in fact, a work-style. Other nations have their work-styles, and our nation's work-style is one of frugality and hard struggle. You see the peasants in the fields: they are always working, sweating and enduring hardship, regardless of what the weather is like. Isn't this the work-style of hard struggle? The workers and soldiers have this work-style as well; the absolute majority of them have this work-style. Other strata also have it. For example, Mr. Sun Yatsen had this style of work; in times of defeat he would still advance with banners raised high. The Communist Party also has this style of work.

Nevertheless, everyone always feels that the Communist Party has done somewhat better in this regard than others. Why is this so? This is because the Communist Party has persisted in its political orientation. In times when it has run into extraordinary difficulties during the last seventeen years, it still persisted in its political orientation. This kind of arduous struggle has become a kind of traditional style of work for the whole Party; Cheng Fangwu is like this.[1] Apart from educating them to be persistent in political orientation, our Party should require that every Party member have another kind of work-style: being frank, telling the truth, fearing no difficulty, and struggling against all bad tendencies and the enemies of the nation. No matter where they are, if Communist Party members talk about fighting Japan, they should really fight Japan; if they talk about democracy, they should truly carry out democracy; if they talk about opposing corruption, they should really struggle against those unhealthy elements. The majority of Party members have this style of work. But there are also bad elements. We know that the Communist Party does not have an elder Party member living on a mountain, training disciples to master the use of magic weapons and then sending them down the mountain in batches. [Loud laughter] So there are bad elements. The facts of these seventeen years testify that the majority of Party members are persevering and unyielding. They are working arduously. Having such a flock of excellent Party members is an honor to the nation. Your flock of excellent boys and girls uniting around the Party is also an honor to the nation. But our nation also has bad elements; what they study is the art of getting promoted to high office and the art of getting rich; they study these disciplines in colleges and graduate schools. But it is very obvious that there is a majority of good elements, on the one side, and a minority of bad elements, on the other. Many good elements have joined the Communist Party. There are also some bad elements who say that, one, they themselves do not want promotion to high office; two, they do not want to get rich; and, three, they are willing to sacrifice everything, and they join the Party. But they are the absolute minority. Because of this, and guaranteed by the excellent Party members, the Communist Party has persisted in its own political direction, maintained a work-style of arduous struggle, and is traveling down the road toward national liberation. [Applause]

With these two good points, the Communist Party is regarded as excellent by everyone. It looks as though the Communist Party has now become good looking. In fact, it has been this good looking all along, it's just that the painters were bad; they painted the Communist Party as ugly. Of course, we have also painted them before [loud laughter], but we never did as harsh a paint job. [Loud laughter] Now things are better and we're not painting each other. That's because we are all fighting on the same front, being very civilized, with no more painting.

School starts today at the Northern Shaanxi Public School. And I should give some gifts. But I do not own all that many things and can only give you two gifts.

The first is a firm and unswerving political direction.

The second is a work-style of arduous struggle.

In the process of your future work, you will certainly encounter big problems, many of them. The road will be hard to travel and so there will be two kinds of attitude. One attitude is when someone frowns if his skin gets grazed or pricked and he sheds a few drops of blood. And then if he goes on and bumps into a nail—how terrible—it's as if the water of the Yellow River is coming down from the sky, and tears flow [loud laughter], and then he turns around and walks away. [Loud laughter] The other attitude is not like this. If he falls down, he climbs up and keeps walking, never losing his own banner. Furthermore, he is able to think up a way out. For example, if you try to get over this mountain opposite us, and you start from the entrance of Cheng Fangwu's cave here, you won't be able to keep climbing, so you take a detour and start to the south where there is a road, or in a place that is not so steep, and then you can climb it.

This War of Resistance demonstrates that our nation has such a work-style; that is, not fearing difficult hardships, fearing no sacrifice, and persevering. This ensures our victory.

The road you have taken is very much the correct one, and you have great enthusiasm for studying. I completely approve of what Principal Cheng Fangwu said to you just now. We must militarize, get close to the masses, and overcome arrogance and self-importance. These are very good suggestions.

My gifts are just these two things. Think again about whether they are good or not. I think they are useful. So long as we have a unanimous political direction and the work-style of hard struggle, and, moreover, persist in this direction and work-style, it will be possible to unite the people of the whole country and defeat Japanese imperialism.

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[1] Cheng Fangwu (1897–1984), a native of Hunan, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1928 while studying in France. At this time, he was principal of the Northern Shaanxi Public School.

On the Problem of Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party

(April 5, 1938)

Comrades! Today I am going to talk about the problem of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. This is a central problem in the situation at present, and it is likely that it will also be a central problem in the situation in the future. This is a problem that the people of the whole country care about very much, and I am sure that the comrades who have come here to study must be concerned about it as well. Many different opinions have manifested themselves regarding this problem. Some have a well-intentioned attitude, but entertain worries or doubts about this problem. Others have adopted a bad, malicious attitude and are using methods like willful slander to foment discord. Therefore this problem needs to be explained.

1. Why Are the Guomindang and the Communist Party Able to Cooperate?

This is one of the problems within the broad topic of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Although this problem has already become common knowledge and ought not to require much elaboration because it is a foundation and is a basic question, it should be discussed once again.

This problem can be clearly explained with a few brief but comprehensive sentences: The return to cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party resulted from the fact that they have common interests. The national crisis has reached its highest level. Japanese imperialism wants to destroy us, and the national contradiction between Japan and China has become the principal contradiction; this contradiction has become the foundation of all other problems. You have walked several thousand *li* to come here to the Northern Shaanxi Public School in order to put into practice cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and so forth. All these things have been produced on the basis of this principal contradiction. China is a semicolony, and the national contradiction is one of [its] basic contradictions. This contradiction determines the character and tasks of the revolution, and so the very first slogan we put forward was "overthrow imperialism." A student at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University wrote a letter saying that he had heard a lot of different views and opinions elsewhere, but could not figure out which was correct. Only after living for a month at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University did he learn that China is a semicolonial and semifeudal society and thus come to understand the nature of Chinese society. Now if he were to go out and see again those things of all different sorts, he would know which was correct and which was unreliable. Understanding these things allows us to put forward a correct slogan: "Oppose national oppression; down with imperialism!" The nationalism put forward by Mr. Sun Yatsen sought to make our nation independent. Given the semifeudal nature of Chinese society, there must be a revolution of People's Rights, or a democratic revolution. For Mr. Sun Yatsen saw that China was infected with two diseases—national oppression and feudal oppression—and to cure these two diseases, it was necessary to apply a remedy appropriate to the illness. Hence he proposed the principle of nationalism and the principle of People's Rights.

Now let us return to the problem itself: how is it that the Guomindang and the Communist Party are able to cooperate once again? It is because, at present, the national contradiction ranks higher than the class contradiction. The China-Japan contradiction surpasses the Guomindang–Communist Party contradiction; it surpasses the contradiction between capitalists and workers, and between landlords and peasants. Because of this, the Guomindang and the Communist Party are cooperating again. All right, they are cooperating now; but some people will ask: why did the Guomindang and the Communist Party fight in the past? Had we just gone crazy? Generally speaking, it is natural for the national contradiction to rank higher than the class contradiction. During the ten-year civil war it seemed on the surface that the class contradiction exceeded the national contradiction, but in reality, the national contradiction in fact exceeded the class contradiction. The fighting between the Guomindang and the Communist Party was one form of anti-imperialism, that is to say, the fighting between the Guomindang and the Communist Party contained within it the national contradiction.

Comrades! We all know that the domestic battlefield in semicolonial China is a microcosm of the world. Among the guns, cannons, and bullets on the front lines are some provided by foreign countries; if China were independent and its own master, the domestic war would not have this kind of situation! The first slogan of the Communist Party has always been overthrow imperialism; it was this way ten years ago, it has been this way for the past ten years, and it will still be this way in the future. China is divided into two kinds of places: in one part there are imperialist powers that forcibly open factories in China; in the other, doing this is not allowed. In one part the customs duties are forcibly reduced; in the other part the customs duties are kept in our own hands. Take Jiangxi in the past, for example. If they had demanded that we reduce customs duties, we would not have been afraid

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This is the text of a talk by Mao at the Northern Shaanxi Public School. Our source is *Dang de wenxian,* 1995, no. 4, pp. 8–11.

of fighting; we would have been ready to fight them to the end. Therefore, the first of our slogans is "overthrow imperialism," and we overthrow imperialism in our actions as well. Once, in Hunan, Comrade Peng Dehuai put Mr. He Jian[1] to flight. The imperialist warships then opened fire with their cannons, so we fought them. We also fought them a few times in Hubei. But does that mean that we are against anyone coming to the soviet region to engage in industry and commerce? No, this is not the case. We welcome those who conduct business if they are well intentioned and peaceful, and as long as they do not destroy our sovereignty; if they are vicious and bad, then, of course, we will not be polite to them either.

The second of our slogans is to put into practice democracy, that is, the principle of People's Rights. The soviet movement in the past was actually a People's Rights movement; there was no feudal exploitation in the soviet regions, and the people were also free to speak. There is also the principle of People's Livelihood; we have, in the past, put that into practice too. Mr. Sun Yatsen said, "Land to the tiller." We distributed land to the peasants; isn't that the principle of People's Livelihood? All of this demonstrates that the Communist Party is a loyal follower of Mr. Sun Yatsen. Then you may ask: since the Communist Party is a loyal follower of Mr. Sun Yatsen, why did it want to fight against the Guomindang? These are two different aspects of things. At that time, the two sides had a common program—the Three People's Principles. Then this was destroyed by the other side, but we persisted in carrying out the Three People's Principles, and in this way we fought for ten years. The reason why we are now able to cooperate once again is that a thing called Japanese imperialism showed up from outside. After the "September Eighteenth [Incident]," after the "January Twenty-eighth [Incident],"[2] we asked our friends to go and take a look at these circumstances in the Japanese invasion of China. Some of our friends knew then that if things continued in this way China would perish. Nevertheless, there were other friends who were still unwilling to go and take a look. By now, the majority of our friends and the majority of the people all believe that Japanese imperialism is China's number one enemy.

This contradiction between China and Japan affects the domestic class contradictions as well as international contradictions. As a result of the Xi'an Incident, the British and American newspapers are sympathetic and approving toward our advocacy of bringing about domestic peace. They too have changed their posture; this is evidence.

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[1] He Jian (1887–1956), a native of Hunan, was governor of that province from 1929 until November 1937. At this time he was minister of the interior in the National Government.

[2] September 18, 1931, marked the beginning of Japan's invasion of Manchuria; January 28, 1932, was the date of the Japanese attack on Shanghai.

2. Should We, and Are We Able to, Consolidate and Expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front?

The united front must be consolidated and must be expanded. But how to consolidate it and how to expand it remain a question.

In terms of the question of whether we should consolidate and expand, we can deal with this in a few sentences. Without the united front, we will be unable to resist Japan. Previously, the Red Army was unable to walk freely everywhere in China, and the Guomindang and the Communist Party were fighting each other every day, so how could we resist Japan? We had the help of the Soviet Union, and the sympathy and assistance of the people of the whole world, particularly the proletariat, but still it was impossible to fight Japan without cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Right now every aspect of our strength is inadequate—every aspect of the Party, the government, and the military as well as the people needs strengthening—so we should consolidate and expand the united front. The cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is like this: as political parties, you could say they are two thumbs, but in terms of the 450 million people of the entire country, they are two small fingers. Japan cannot be overthrown simply by relying on two small fingers; we must use two fists in order to overthrow Japan.

Now we all acknowledge the "should," but will we be "able to"? Our answer is "Yes, we can." It will work as long as we get a few types of things right. First, there must be a political program that everyone abides by; second, there must be mutual respect; and, third, there must be mutual assistance and mutual development.

3. What Is the Common Program?

I said just now that we must have a common program. Why must we have such a common program? We say that this is the weapon for overthrowing Japanese imperialism and building a new China that is independent, free, and happy. To fight Japan, we need to have this weapon in addition to airplanes, cannons, and machine guns. Moreover, this weapon is in charge of the other weapons; it is an important weapon for our national liberation.

On the day school opened I talked about the problem of political orientation. What this political orientation does is point toward the road down which the people of the entire country should walk. A political orientation is like a person's head; only with a head can the other parts move. What should be written in this political program? If we wrote it in simple form, there would be just two or three items such as overthrowing Japanese imperialism, realizing the Three People's Principles, and so forth; but if we put it more elaborately, we would write as many as a dozen or several dozen items, like the Ten-Point Program. Only having a correct road will prevent those who walk down it from losing their direction. The Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country have to work out such a political program together. Right now one part of this program has been worked out. The first item, resistance to Japan, is there. The second item, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, is there. The third item, cooperation with the Soviet Union, has also been put into practice. The fourth item, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, is there to some extent, but not completely. This common program is meant to consolidate the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and both parties must respect it. If the stipulations of the common program are inadequately carried out, that would not do and should be criticized. But if it is overdone, and the stipulations of the common program are exceeded, this would also be a violation of the common program. For instance, it would be wrong if we were now to confiscate the land of the landlords and distribute it. In carrying it out, we should do neither too little nor too much; it should be precisely in accordance with the common program. We are very welcoming to friendly parties and hope that everyone will consolidate the united front.

4. Mutual Respect

As I said just now, once there is a common political program there must also be mutual respect. What is mutual respect? There must be mutual respect between people, otherwise the other person will not be happy. People are not like objects. For example, if you put your bundle on the ground and sit on it with your backside, it will not object; it will not make a peep. When I came here today, I am very sorry to say that I rode on that horse for a while, but it did not raise any protest at all. But if you sit on a person's body or ride on a child's body, he will raise a protest and oppose you. So people need respect. In school, instructors and students should respect each other. In the army, officers and soldiers should also respect each other, and if they do not respect each other and the officers begin to beat the soldiers, there will be estrangement between top and bottom. The army should treat the people the same way: they should be fierce toward the enemy but polite toward the people. The Eighth Route Army has the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, two of which are "be polite in speaking" and "be fair in buying and selling," which has exactly this meaning. I hope that you comrades will have two faces when you go to the front lines, one face for the enemy, and another face for friendly armies, for the soldiers, and for the people. There is no need for two faces between friends; friends will be close and united only when there is politeness, and only then will they have the strength to overthrow Japanese imperialism.

Now, to discuss the problem itself, this means that the Guomindang and the Communist Party should respect each other. I read in the newspaper that someone wants the Guomindang and the Communist Party to merge into one party; he wants to eliminate the Communist Party. But the existence of the Communist Party has its class basis. China has landlords, capitalists, workers, and peasants, and as a result the Guomindang and the Communist Party exist. This is beyond doubt and

is inevitable. At the moment neither can swallow up the other. Moreover, things would be difficult to manage if there were no Communist Party. It would have been very difficult to clean up the Xi'an Incident if there had been no Communist Party. Nor is it possible to eliminate the Communist Party; it is in the midst of struggle that we expand. The problem is not that if you feel like eliminating it you can eliminate it. Rather, as long as imperialism has not been overthrown and the feudal forces are still in existence, it is impossible for the Communist Party not to come into being and to exist. For that reason, though the Guomindang wanted to eliminate us in the past, and fought us, the more it fought us the more numerous we became. When we say that we should respect each other, does that mean that we should just have a little politeness and that's all? No; above all, we should have a spirit of self-criticism. Whether it is the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, or the Guomindang, all should criticize themselves. At the same time, because we have mutual respect, there should be well-intentioned, mutual criticism. If the Guomindang can point out the shortcomings of the Communist Party, so long as the criticism is well intentioned and correct, we will, of course, be glad to accept it, and if there are inaccuracies in the criticism we will explain this. The Communist Party should also criticize the Guomindang, and this can be published in *Jiefang,* but it should be appropriate, not overdone. Self-criticism and mutual criticism should be carried out under the condition of mutual respect.

Some people say, "You want unity in the united front, but as long as the two party organizations have an independent existence, there will be no unity." We are greatly in favor of unity, but each of the two parties has its own characteristics; it would be unimaginable for communism to receive approval within the Guomindang, and it would be unimaginable for the Communist Party to abandon the ideals of socialism and communism. A socialist society cannot be realized immediately simply by saying, "I want it." The democratic republic of the future will not be enough; we must continue marching forward to socialism. Only when many people support it can socialism be realized. The Guomindang government magistrate in Yanchang *xian* said to me: "When a socialist society is reached, I will have nothing to do; what will I do when my monthly 200 *yuan* of salary is gone?" I told him that the salary will be much bigger in the future. A socialist society is a good thing, and, moreover, China will, in the future, be able to make the transition without going through war. Last May in the concluding remarks I made at the meeting of soviet-area Party representatives, I said that there may be two roads to transformation from a democratic revolution to a socialist revolution: one is to pass through bloody struggle as in the October Revolution; the other is a transformation without bloodshed, which is what we hope for. Right now it is impracticable to carry out a socialist revolution, as conditions are not ready. China is a semicolonial and semifeudal society, and a small-scale peasant economy prevails, so a socialist revolution still cannot be carried out at the moment.

For the Guomindang to want to abolish the Communist Party will not do. For the two different political parties to unite, there must be a bridge, a committee must be organized—any name for it will be fine—with both the Guomindang and the Communist Party participating in it. Or a separate party could be organized, with the Communist Party joining it, and the Guomindang also joining it. Both solutions would be fine; this would be the high-level organization of the united front.

5. The Guomindang and the Communist Party Should Develop Greatly

As far as our hopes are concerned, the larger the Guomindang is, the better; it should expand to at least ten million party members. The Communist Party should have at least one million members; of course, to have somewhat fewer would also be all right. If both parties increase in numbers, our power will be great and will be able to overthrow Japanese imperialism. I approve of young people joining the Guomindang, and I also welcome those comrades who join the Communist Party. So long as we are able to withstand hardship and work hard, have a spirit of sacrifice, and work hard for the interests of the great toiling masses, need we fear that socialism cannot be realized in the future? Overthrowing Japanese imperialism and building a new China that is independent, free, and happy—these are not the private affairs of the Guomindang and the Communist Party but, rather, the business of the people of all China. Whether the strength of the Communist Party is great or small, whether its political program is correct or not, matters a great deal to the whole country. Comrades of the Northern Shaanxi Public School! You should love and protect this Party, and you can criticize it in a well-intentioned way, but do not let others slander it, do not let others hurt it. It is natural that there be the occasional corrupt element in our Party, who is Marxist on the surface, but in fact is a follower only of the doctrine of getting promoted to high office and getting rich. We should oppose these corrupt elements, liquidate these corrupt elements.

I hope that you comrades will put forward your opinions more often and help the Communist Party. Meanwhile, I hope that you comrades will defend the Communist Party whenever you hear any vicious slander. Love and protect the Communist Party; make it develop and expand. Do the same for the Guomindang.

What Should You Learn at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University?

(April 9, 1938)

Undeterred by hardship, you students have come here from faraway places to study, trekking through wind and dust—this kind of spirit, this kind of determination, is very good. We do not know one another, yet you could say that we do know one another already because we stand on the same battle line politically. In terms of politics, in terms of spirit, we have thorough knowledge of each other; we are mutually acquainted. The time you will spend studying here is very short, only a few months; you will not be able to learn many things, unlike at other universities where you can study for a few years or more. Nonetheless, you will learn one thing, one very important thing, that is, you will learn a purpose, and this purpose is the purpose of the whole country and the entire Chinese nation: resist Japan and save the country. This is the overall orientation of our school, and it is also the demand of the people of the whole country. Specifically, you should learn the following few things here:

First, to begin with, you must learn a political orientation. There may be many different political orientations; you must learn a correct political orientation, that is, a correct political orientation which includes wanting to fight Japan, how to fight Japan, and why Japanese imperialism can certainly be defeated. Second, you must learn a work-style by which this political orientation can be reached and accomplished—the work-style of arduous hard struggle. You must possess this style in order to reach and accomplish the political orientation just mentioned. Moreover, you must learn a bit of strategy and tactics. The Anti-Japanese Military and Political University is a military school; you must learn to be a military man and learn some military skills. Military men are made from common people. If nobody was willing to be a military man, we would not be able to defeat Japanese imperialism; we want all the broad common people to be willing to become military men, for only then will we be able to defeat Japanese imperialism. Therefore,

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This is the text of Mao's talk at the opening day ceremony for the Third Contingent of the Fourth Session of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 116–20, which reproduces the draft record of Mao's talk preserved in the Central Archives.

you must learn to be a military man, study military affairs, study strategy and tactics—flexible strategy and tactics. Our strategy and tactics here are not rigid; instead they are flexible, that is, no matter what kind of method the enemy uses for attack, we will always have a way to deal with it. If the enemy attacks us using one method, we will fight back with another method. If we bring to bear flexible strategy and tactics, and wait until the enemy has exhausted his tricks, then we will be able to defeat him. In sum, you must learn here a firm and correct political orientation, the work-style of arduous struggle, plus flexible strategy and tactics. With these three things, we will be able to defeat the enemy in the end. This is the first point.

Second, you must learn to be cadres here. Cadres alone cannot defeat the enemy, but without cadres we cannot defeat the enemy either. We need cadres to arouse and organize the broad masses, to turn the thousands and tens of thousands of people into organized contingents. Without organization there is no power; it is impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism without such widespread, organized contingents. No matter whether you are at the front or in the rear, you must all arouse the popular masses, organize the popular masses, organize them politically and militarily. Japan's population is small and China's population is large, but the reason Japan is able to bully us is that the broad masses of our people do not have very good organization; to this day we are still very inadequately organized. You must keep a tight grip on this correct political orientation; it is through you that this political orientation will be transmitted to the broad masses, through you that they will be educated and organized. This is because in reality it is not possible for the people of the whole country to come here to study, but we can rely on you to inform the people of the entire country regarding this political orientation in the course of your work, so that they will all understand how China is to (and surely will be able to) defeat the enemy, so that this political orientation will become the political orientation of the people of the whole country. At the same time, you should also spread the work-style of arduous struggle, so that the broad popular masses will be able to struggle hard against all difficulties, firmly and unshakably. It is just like the way you eat millet here and climb Qingliang mountain. This can also be called a kind of hard struggle, this is to make you change the soft and weak style of being incapable of arduous struggle, to make you a little bit tough. For instance, if you fall while out running and break a tooth, you still come to your feet and march forward. It is not sufficient for you alone to have this work-style; you must make the people of the whole country all have this work-style. One thing lies in our path, and it goes by the name of "hardship." We tell it: we have been steeled at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University; we are not afraid of you! It says that it has great capacities. It can deny us clothes to wear, but we are not afraid; it can deny us food to eat, but we are not afraid. It says that it also has planes, cannons, and tanks, but we are not afraid of any of them. When we have overcome all the hardships, we ask it again whether it has any left. It says that it does not, and finally it has no alternative but to lay down its arms. This is the way we can definitely defeat Japanese imperialism! You must, moreover, educate the broad popular masses of the whole country so that none of them fears hardship, and, moreover, so they will be able to overcome hardship; in this way, we will certainly be able to defeat Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, you should use flexible strategy and tactics to teach the broad popular masses, so that they all know they must fight Japan, and they all know how to do it. We depend on you cadres to organize the people of the whole country, to train the people of the whole country. Therefore, the second point is that you must learn to be cadres.

Third, you must also be resolute. Since you came to Yan'an from faraway places to study, going through trials and tribulations, I believe that you already are resolute. What kind of resolution, then? There are no opportunities for promotion to high office and getting rich in Yan'an. You came here, number one, not for promotion to high office, and, number two, not to get rich. So why in the end did you come such a long way to be here? Undoubtedly, you came here for the purpose of resisting Japan and saving the country, and so you are resolved to resist Japan and save the country. You want to learn how to resist Japan and save the country, and we want to help you to accomplish this. But some people only have a "general" resolution. By "general," I mean that it might be a bit vague, not completely firm and thorough. Among them there are inevitably some people who came here simply because they saw others going and went along with them, and do not have thorough understanding and resolve. What I mean is that their resolution does not derive from a firm political direction; they did not come here after careful consideration. Today we climb mountains and eat millet here. These are not terrible hardships; there are much greater hardships at the front. You must know that airplanes and cannons do not have eyes. Now, though the Japanese army of invasion suffered a defeat in southern Shandong, it will probably come back again. They seized our Shanghai and Nanjing, and are attempting to capture our Tongguan and even Wuhan; now the enemy army in Shanxi has taken Linfen and arrived at Fenglingdu. If we say that Japanese imperialism is a wild bull, then our big army of several tens of thousands of Chinese troops in Shanxi is pulling the bull's tail from behind its back, trying to stop it from moving south. Or if our Eighth Route Army is in the enemy's rear area, having difficulties in getting supplies, with airplanes in the sky and artillery on the ground, but even in this kind of environment of hardship, it still has to pull the wild bull's tail, continually striking at the enemy. When you set out from those many places, some of you imagined the difficulties in Yan'an, but I am afraid that some other people did not imagine the hardships in Yan'an at all. In other places there are fish, there is meat, and there is rice, but here there is only millet, and you have to climb Qingliang mountain, too. Now you have the resolve to eat millet and climb Qingliang mountain, but in the future you will also have to "pull the wild bull's tail." There are still many hardships along the way of the War of Resistance against Japan, and you must make an even greater resolution—the resolution to march forward without fear of any adversity! The War of Resistance against Japan is a protracted war, it is not something that can be resolved in six months or a year, and besides, in the future we will have to build a new China. I can see that none of you has a beard or mustache. Those without beards are what are called youth, and young people have courage, but you must remain unwavering and not back off until you have grown beards (female comrades won't be growing beards, naturally), until you grow old and die. The process of the revolution is like traveling in a boat on a river with waves surging all around. Cowards will often start to waver and not know what to do. Historically, within the tide of revolution there have been people who have wavered and backed off upon running into hardship. I hope that there are no such people among you. You should never back off but bravely march straight forward for the liberation of the Chinese nation, and for the building of a new China. You must struggle hard to the very end for your 450 million compatriots in the entire country! You sacrifice everything, not for yourself, but for the 450 million compatriots in the whole country; not for your own family, but for the families of the 450 million compatriots. Therefore, the first resolution is to sacrifice promotion to high office. The second resolution is to sacrifice getting rich. The third is that you must make a final resolution to sacrifice your own lives! Now you have the preliminary resolutions to sacrifice promotion to high office and getting rich, as well as to eat millet and climb Qingliang mountain. But this is not enough without the final resolution. You must also resolve to sacrifice yourselves, to contribute your lives for your 450 million compatriots!

Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the First Representative Assembly of the Border Region National Defense Education Commission

(April 11, 1938)

Comrade Mao Zedong said:

Our nation is a nation that lacks education. But the War of Resistance has greatly changed the Chinese people; this is something that even decades of education could not have achieved. If we are able to continue to persist in the War of Resistance, it will create more new people by the millions or tens of millions. I think that all you gentlemen present today will live to see the realization of a new China, independent, free, and happy, organized by these new people. Since the War of Resistance is such a big help to us, we should use all our strength to deal with the War of Resistance, and use education to support the War of Resistance. At the moment, the War of Resistance is the thing that determines everything. Our education must also take orders from the War of Resistance; that is what's called War of Resistance education. War of Resistance education is not compulsory, but spontaneous; it depends on enthusiasm to learn on the part of the masses or the students, and on the activism of the education cadres. It is also necessary to join the educator and the educated closely together.

This record of Mao's remarks was published in *Xin Zhonghua bao* on April 15, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 9, p. 369, which reproduces that text.

Consolidate and Expand the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Base Area

(April 20, 1938)

To Comrades [Nie] Rongzhen and Peng Zhen,[1] and to be passed on to Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

Your telegram of the 10th has arrived only today.

1. As a result of various favorable conditions, plus your leadership and the efforts made by our comrades, there has been great development in all aspects of the anti-Japanese movement in the broad area of Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei. On the whole, the establishment of the base area has already been successfully completed, but it is still not consolidated in all respects. Your central task at present is to consolidate the victories that have already been won in all areas and to pursue further development on the basis of consolidating the existing foundation.

2. Your victory and development pose an enormous threat to the base area of the Japanese bandits—Beiping and Tianjin—and the Japanese bandits are bound to exhaust every possible means to attack and destroy you. Besides engaging in brutal armed attacks, they are even more certain to send out and buy off large numbers of Chinese traitors, vagabonds, and local bandits to sneak into various Party, government, military, and mass organizations, and particularly into military organizations, to engage in conspiracy and sabotage. It would be hard to rule out the role of enemy conspiracies in the assassination of the person in charge of the Party Committee for the area east of the railroad and in the various unprincipled disputes within the Party and the army. You should pay serious attention to this.

3. In order to consolidate your forces rapidly, so as to continue to bring about even greater development, we make the following proposals:

a. Step up reorganization and training, and Party work within the armed forces. Purge undesirable elements such as vagabonds, local bandits, and others who have wormed their way into our forces. Investigate and unite cadres at all levels. Carefully and effectively set up security work within the military.

b. Rid the base area of local bandits, and use prudent and effective methods to reform those banditlike anti-Japanese troops. Strengthen the work of eliminating traitors at the local level. Restore and establish an anti-Japanese order.

c. Apart from sending Huang Jing[2] to the east of the railway to rectify the work of the Party there, one person should immediately be chosen from among comrades Wang Ping, Liu Daosheng, and Zhao Erlu,[3] and sent east of the railway to serve as political commissar for Lü's troops[4] and, concurrently, head of the Provincial Military Affairs Department. Or else a command headquarters should be established for the army subdistrict to the east of the railroad, so as to rectify effectively the troops under Lü and Meng.[5] Once Lü's forces have been reorganized and are in order, a portion of his troops may be assigned to follow Deng Hua's forces in expanding toward eastern Hebei and the Rehe border area.

d. Consolidate the Party organization and its internal unity and cohesion, and improve its iron discipline. Any act at present that undermines the internal unity and cohesion of the Party is of the greatest assistance to the enemy. Severely criticize and correct all factional activities, strengthen education with regard to principles within the Party, and raise the prestige of the Party and its leading cadres among the masses.

e. Correct certain ultra-Left actions and guild tendencies in the mass movement, and ameliorate the landlords' and rich peasants' fear of and opposition to us. But the central task must remain the mobilization of the enthusiasm of the masses for the War of Resistance, to establish genuine mass organizations which are truly powerful, and to carry out effective organizational work.

f. There should be no further changes in the way the government is organized. In addition to broadly organizing and training the Self-Defense Army, the main work is to raise funds and procure food so as to solve the problem of supplying the troops. As for the way to raise funds, in addition to regular

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 214–16, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Peng Zhen (1902–1997), a native of Shanxi, was released by the Guomindang in 1935 after six years in prison. When the Sino-Japanese war began, he moved to Yan'an and was assigned to work with the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi, under the command of Nie Rongzhen.

[2] At this time, Huang Jing was secretary of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei District Party Committee. On the following day, April 21, he became secretary of the Central Hebei District Party Committee.

[3] Wang, Liu, and Zhao were the political commissars for, respectively, the third army subdistrict, the fourth army subdistrict, and the second army subdistrict under the Eighth Route Army's Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Zhao served concurrently as his army subdistrict's commander.

[4] The reference is to the unit under the command of Lü Zhengcao, a Communist Party member, which had originally been the Sixty-ninth Regiment of the 388th Column of the Fifty-third Army of the Guomindang Northeastern Army, but which Lü had led in October 1937 to abandon the Guomindang and become part of the People's Self-Defense Army.

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taxation and donations, a special point should be made of getting funds from the Chinese traitors. Special task forces may be formed to go to railway stations and places near cities to confiscate from and arrest Chinese traitors. We are unable to help you in a major way with funds.

4. Large numbers of cadres have already been sent out from Yan'an. As for the high-ranking cadres you want, once all the [security] checks have been made we shall see if we can send you one or two. More low-ranking cadres can be sent to you. We will find a way to send you the documents and radio transmitters via northwestern Shanxi.

5. You should find a way to establish communications with Tianjin, and have a group of cadres from the Beiping-Tianjin [area] transferred to work where you are.

Mao Zedong
Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian]
Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

Develop Guerrilla Warfare in a Big Way on the Plains of Hebei and Shandong

(April 21, 1938)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping], and for transmittal to comrades Chen [Geng], Chen [Zaidao], Zhu Rui, Song [Renqiong], Nie Rongzhen, Peng Zhen, and [Yang] Shangkun:

1. On the basis of our experience since the beginning of the War of Resistance, and under the two present conditions of a resolute War of Resistance in the whole country, and the deepening of mass work, it is possible to expand the anti-Japanese guerrilla war on a large scale on the plains of Hebei and Shandong, and also to persist in guerrilla warfare in the plains.

2. The Party and the Eighth Route Army forces should resolutely adopt the orientation of expanding and developing the guerrilla war to the greatest possible extent, and do their utmost to mobilize vigorously the broad popular masses to take the course of engaging in open, armed struggle against Japan. The secret struggle against Japan should be the main form of struggle only in the cities occupied by the enemy and in areas near the railroads.

3. In the light of the orientation defined above, the Hebei and Shandong plains should immediately be divided into several military districts for guerrilla warfare, and a guerrilla headquarters should be set up in each of these military districts to expand the guerrilla war everywhere in a planned and systematic way, and to organize extensively self-defense forces which are not detached from production.

4. In the areas that have been recovered, governments should be set up immediately and should try to find a way to restore order to some degree to the anti-Japanese resistance in those localities. Such governments should either be appointed by institutions or headquarters at a higher level or be recommended and elected by the organizations of the popular masses. They should all move with a guerrilla contingent, issue simple announcements and decrees, organize the mass struggle to resist Japan, suppress the Chinese traitors, protect the interests of the popular masses, assist the troops to obtain supplies, and so on.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 217–19, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

5. In the areas of Commissioners Fan and Ding, where the original governments still exist, by promoting a united front, these governments must be immediately reformed and strengthened so as to turn them into anti-Japanese people's governments. Those who are resolute and capable must be drawn into these governments, while corrupt and incompetent elements are eliminated, so that the governments, the troops, and the people can be intimately linked together.

6. As for drawing in the guns among the ranks of the masses for the use of the guerrillas and the army, we should make use of propaganda and persuasion, as well as the method of borrowing guns (certificates of gun borrowing may be issued). Or we may incite the popular masses to come with their guns to join the guerrilla units. As for grain procurement and fund raising, the principles must be those of voluntarism, and equitable assessment must be applied while at the same time paying attention to arresting big Chinese traitors in cities and railway stations in order to raise money from them.

7. The People's Self-Defense Army shall be the main form of mass organization. When possible, peasant associations and youth leagues can also be established.

8. A cautious approach should be adopted in dealing with secret societies and bandits. An effort should made to reform them when the concrete circumstances permit.

9. Recruit new Party members, and establish Party organizations at various levels. Most Party members should appear as activists in the anti-Japanese struggle, and engage in various kinds of open work.

10. Generally speaking, the expansion of the Party organization should be kept secret.

Mao [Zedong] Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Speech at the Lu Xun Academy of Arts

(April 28, 1938)

You have asked me to make a few remarks. But since I do not know much about art, I can only give you a few rough and superficial ideas to consider.

1. What should our views be about the arts? This issue was once hotly debated in China. You may all know that Mr. Xu Zhimo[1] once said: "A poem must sound like a silver needle in a quiet valley." I do not know what a silver needle in a quiet valley sounds like. But I do know that Mr. Xu believed in putting art above everything else. At that time, many people held the same views that he did; he is a representative of this school of thought. Another school of thought, represented by Mr. Lu Xun, is that of the believers in the Marxist theory of art. The theoretical controversies between these two schools regarding art have a long history which I cannot talk about now in detail. The view that we should put art above everything else is an idealistic theory, and it is not correct. Now, however, we need a united front in artistic circles too, in order to resist the Japanese. Just as Mr. Lu Xun said, whether one is a realist, a romanticist, a Communist, or something else, we must all unite to resist the Japanese. Of course, as far as we are concerned, it is necessary to maintain political independence in art. We can never give up our political position in the realm of art, and so this art academy of ours must have its own political standpoint. In matters of artistic theory we are Marxists, not partisans of putting art above everything else. We believe in realism in art, but this does not mean that we advocate that kind of "realism" which is simply an imitation of nature, like bookkeeping, for art cannot simply replicate nature. Romanticism in art is by no means entirely wrong. There are many different sorts of it: there is active and revolutionary romanticism, and passive and reactionary romanticism. Some people explain things through reading each line, and they look down upon romanticism, believing it to be nothing but wind, flowers, snow, the moon, brothers, and sisters. They do not have the slightest idea that the primary spirit of active romanticism is dissatisfaction with the status quo; it is to imagine the future with revolutionary enthusiasm. This school of thought was once a progressive force in

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 121–26, where it is reproduced from the draft record of Mao's talk preserved in the Central Archives.

[1] Xu Zhimo (1896–1931), who had studied at Columbia University and Cambridge University, launched the so-called modern poetry movement, whose members sought to write according to the literary standards of the West rather than those of traditional China.

history. If a work of art only records the status quo and does not contain a desire to search for an ideal in the future, it cannot impel people forward. Simultaneously to discover defects in the present and the hope and glory of the future—this is the revolutionary spirit, and it is this spirit that Marxists need.

There used to be a so-called third category of people in art circles in China, but we will not exclude even them now. The first priority today is the National Anti-Japanese United Front of all patriots, and our own political position in the realm of art can only come second. Every artistic school has its own class position. We stand on the side of the proletariat and the toiling masses, but under the guiding principle of the united front, we will not use Marxism to exclude others. Exclusion is closed-doorism, not a united front. Nonetheless, within this united front, we must not give up our position; this was the orientation of Mr. Lu Xun. Your Lu Xun Academy of Art must follow his orientation.

2. A work of art must have content, and must meet the demands of the time, and of the broad masses. Like a good meal, a work of art must be both nutritious and flavorful. The Chinese are the best people at cooking and eating. When we cook, we use just the right amounts of ingredients, then add oil, salt, sauces, vinegar, and every kind of spice. After skillful cooking, a wonderful flavor emerges, and the nutritional value has been preserved. Great chefs learn how to cook well through a long period of practical experience, not simply after studying for one day. When they cook, they use the same ingredients as other people, yet are able to create marvelous flavors. To achieve this, one must master blending spices, cooking time, and cooking temperature. Believers in putting art above everything else pay attention only to whether something tastes good; they do not care if it is nutritious or not. Consequently, the content of their work is often hollow or harmful. Art must stress nutritional value; that is, it must have good content and meet the demands of the time and of the masses. Take Beijing opera, for example. Today, one cannot find advertisements for operas like *A Pleasant Dream in the Garden,* because tickets for that sort of opera do not sell. When performing old operas today, we must increase the performance of those that portray national heroes or resisting an enemy. These are the demands of the time. Works of art must also have moving images and plots, and must be close to real life; otherwise, nobody will want to see them. Stuffing abstract concepts awkwardly into a work of art will never be popular.

3. The Lu Xun Academy of Arts must train a group of artistic workers with grand ideals, rich life experiences, and excellent artistic skills. You should not become artistic workers who are only able to record social life; rather, you should have the grand ideal of struggling hard for a new China. That is to say, you should not only resist Japan, but also strive to construct a new democratic republic during the process of the War of Resistance. You should work not only for the democratic republic but also for the realization of socialist and then communist ideals. Without such great ideals, it is impossible to become great artists. But ideals alone are not enough; you must also have rich life experience and excellent artistic skills. The fact that there has been no great work of art in China for the past few years is

certainly due to objective social causes, but as far as the artists themselves are concerned, it is also because there are too few who fulfill these three criteria. Many of our writers have grand ideals, but they do not have rich life experience, and not a few of them lack strong artistic skills as well. If you lack any one of these three criteria, you will not become a great artist.

As Mr. Lu Xun wrote in his afterword to *Destroy,* its author [Aleksandr Aleksandrovich] Fadeev personally experienced guerrilla warfare, and so his description of the training of horses was that of an expert. Fadeev even noticed such details as how to climb into a saddle, as did Mr. Lu Xun. This story tells us that great writers do not sit at home, basing their writing on what they imagine. Stuff written in that manner is no good. Many people now look down on the novel *The Dream of the Red Chamber* and are in fact reluctant to mention it. *The Dream of the Red Chamber* is actually a very good novel. In particular, it contains abundant social and historical materials. For instance, it describes how Liu Xianglian, after beating Xue Pan severely, "unfastened his horse, and vaulted into the saddle."[2] Without real experience, nobody could come up with the phrase "vaulted into the saddle." Without personally experiencing something, one cannot know it well. Everything, no matter how trivial, has rich content that can only be learned through real-life experience. You are young artistic workers, and the whole world belongs to you. It is your field of activity. If you want your art to have rich content, you will have to get nutrients from real life. You cannot stay here and study for the rest of your lives. Before long you will scatter to different places and be in the midst of real struggles. Like the words in "The Song of the Guerrillas" which you sing: "We are all flying soldiers, how can we fear high mountains or deep water?" You should not merely mouth these words, but act this way as well. Without abundant real-life experience, there is no real content in art. In order to create a masterpiece, you must first go and enrich your experiences through real struggle. Although it is true that artists must have ideals, they also must study details like how to climb into a saddle. In the past a man who studied *The Dream of the Red Chamber* said that he did indeed tour and survey Prospect Garden. Now your "Prospect Garden" is all China. Every one of you young artistic workers here is a Jia Baoyu or Lin Daiyu;[3] you need really to live in and study your Prospect Garden. In your work, the "big outline" is all China, and the "small outline" is the Wutaishan district. When surveying China, it is not enough simply to use the style of a reporter, for a reporter's work has the quality of one who just passes by. An old expression says: "Looking at flowers while riding on horseback cannot be compared to stopping the horse to look at flowers; stopping the horse to look at flowers cannot be compared to dismounting from the horse to enjoy the flowers." I hope that you will all dismount from your horses to enjoy the flowers.

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[2] Cao Xueqin, *The Story of the Stone*, trans. and ed. David Hawkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), vol. 2, p. 444. (Professor Hawkes adopted for his translation this alternative, and arguably more correct, title for the novel.)

[3] These are the two central characters in *The Dream of the Red Chamber.*

Going among the masses will not only enrich your own life experience but also improve your artistic skills. On summer evenings, farmers find a cool place to relax. They sit on benches with big palm-leaf fans in their hands, telling stories. They know the "eight nots" of Mr. Hu Shizhi.[4] They do not allude to the classics, but the content of their stories is rich, and their language beautiful. These farmers are not only good prose writers, they are poets as well. There are good poems to be found in folksongs. Once when we were working in a school, we asked the students to collect folk ballads from different places and found many good things in them. There is something very wrong here: those with rich life experience and beautiful words are unable to write; on the other hand, many people who can write just sit in pavilions in big cities. They lack rich life experience and are not familiar with the vivid language of the people. We all know that Gorky's life experience was extremely rich; he knew intimately the lives and language of the lower classes in Russia, as well as the reality of the other classes. That is why he was able to produce so many masterpieces.

Every artistic worker must learn artistic skills. Without strong skills, you will not be able to express rich content. Such skill has many aspects and is not restricted to language, although the ability to master language is indeed very important. I think that Mr. Lu Xun must have studied the language of the masses. You must spend much time and effort to master artistic skills.

To be a great artist, you must fulfill the aforementioned three conditions. You cannot lack even one. At present, the writings of some people on our war front lack rich, real content; they do not fit objective reality; and their artistic skills are somewhat crude. We must definitely make an effort to overcome this shortcoming.

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[4] The reference is to Hu Shi (1891–1962), *zi* Hu Shizhi, one of the earliest and most influential of the participants in the movement to replace the old literary language with the vernacular. Regarding Mao's relations with him in the early years, see Volumes I and II, *passim,* especially Volume I, p. 412, n. 6. Although politically they were at this time on opposite sides, Mao's reference here makes plain that he still recognized the positive role Hu played in China's literary revolution.

Form Organizations and Fight Japan

(April 30, 1938)

The Workers' Representative Assembly of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been in session for several days, but I have not had time to attend. Today they have asked me to give a talk, so I will discuss one problem, that of "forming organizations and fighting Japan."

The united front, for which another name is "form organizations," is engaged precisely in forming organizations to fight Japan. These organizations are different now from what they were in the past. The united front is a big organization, put together from many small organizations. The workers' union is one of these many small organizations. There are tens of millions of workers in China, and this proletariat of tens of millions of people should unite to form an organization. Among these tens of millions of workers, there are also seventy-two trades, and the workers of every trade and industry should organize a workers' union for each trade and industry. At the same time, within each trade and industry, each locality is different. For instance, Yanchang has the coal miners of Yanchang, the central Shaanxi plain has the coal miners of the central Shaanxi plain, and every place has its own workers' union for coal miners; Shaanxi Province has organized a general union for all the coal miners in Shaanxi. Tai'erzhuang, where China recently won a great victory, produces very good coal, and there are many coal miners there. They too want to organize a workers' union for the coal industry. Once every province has its own workers' union for the coal industry, then a general union for coal-industry workers of the entire country can be organized. In addition, the unions of every industry in every locality in every province can join together to organize a national general workers' union. This is the way we must organize the country's proletariat of tens of millions of people. I am told that you are discussing the issue of unifying and spreading the union organizations. This is excellent; we must organize the proletariat of tens of millions of people in every province and every industry in the entire country to form a workers' organization. This is the way to "form organizations and fight Japan," and its strength will be very great.

Should it be only the workers who form organizations and fight Japan? Are there other organizations? There is another organization that is formed by the farmers

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Our source for this text is *Dangde wenxian,* 1995, no. 4, pp. 12–13.

who till the land. There is a saying in China: "If the peasants don't exert themselves, the emperor will starve." But I think that if the peasants do not exert themselves, it is not just the emperor who will starve; there will certainly be a lot of people who starve. Our China has several hundred million peasants, and they should also be formed into an organization. Everywhere, in every province, every *xian*, and every township, a peasants' association, a peasants' society for resisting Japan and saving the country, should be established. If we organize in such a way, and use these kinds of organizations to go fight Japan, need we fear that Japanese imperialism cannot be overthrown?

There are also the businessmen; those who do business should also be organized. Are there others? Cultural workers, those who wield the pen, these people who write articles, should also be organized. The Northern Shaanxi Public School has now been set up, and in cultural circles the National Salvation Society has been established as well. Some people ask what is the use of a pen; can you use a pen to fight the Japanese? Yes, you can fight the Japanese with a pen; axes, hoes, and pens should all be organized, and united in organizations to fight the Japanese. Napoleon said: one pen is stronger than three thousand Mausers.[1] Now we say that if one pen is equal to even one gun, the whole country will have many tens of thousands of guns.

For the people of every profession in the whole country all to be organized in this way is what is called the National Anti-Japanese United Front; this is a big organization of the whole country.

Are there any other organizations or not? Yes, there are big organizations of a global nature; this means forming organizations with other countries. For this, one must understand a bit about the world situation. Back when I was a child I heard people say, "Without stepping outside his gate, the scholar knows all the wide world's affairs"; now I think that this sentence is completely wrong. There are still some old scholars[2] who are still alive today, and they only know about the affairs of a few dozen *li* around them. If you go and ask one about Japanese affairs, about why Japan is fighting China, he would say he does not know. If you go on and ask about the affairs of Italy, Germany, and Spain, again he would not know. What do these scholars know about the wide world's affairs? I say they do not know a thing. There is now another kind of scholar,[3] like the students at the Northern Shaanxi Public School and the people of the National Salvation Association in cultural circles. They have a kind of skill that enables them to keep in touch with the news sent by radio; they truly know about the affairs of the world. Now when the Spanish government wins a victory, I know that this is because their workers are very well united. The Chinese army won a victory at Tai'erzhuang, and I also know this. Yesterday our Commander in Chief Zhu [De] won a victory, and I knew about it today! What is the reason for this? It is because now there is a kind of thing, made by the workers, which can fly through the sky, and it is called radio.

In the past some people said that foreigners are all straight-legged; their legs are straight, and they cannot walk, if they fall down they cannot get up, and so forth. All this talk was wrong. Among the foreigners there are good foreigners, and there are bad foreigners. You could say that among the foreigners about eight or nine out of ten have sympathy for China or may be willing to help China. I think some of you must have seen that a few days ago the *Xinhua ribao* of Hankou published two articles by Japanese; those are two good Japanese.

In every country of the world now those good foreigners have organizations. The proletarian Soviet Union is the largest organization. In Japan, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the good people in these countries all have formed organizations, antifascist organizations. The workers of foreign countries want to oppose fascism, and we, the Chinese people, also want to oppose fascism; the goal is the same. This is a big organization of world antifascists. In this way, the workers in every country want to overthrow Japanese imperialism. The workers within Japan want to overthrow Japanese imperialism as well; they also want to organize a united front. The three united fronts, one in China, one of the antifascists of the whole world, plus the one of the Japanese proletariat, all want to rise up and overthrow Japanese imperialism, and this will result in a united front of the whole world. This united front must still be organized well, and expanded well, in order to attack Japanese imperialism in unison. Do you think that Japanese imperialism can be overthrown? It certainly can. Whoever says that China cannot defeat Japan is wrong.

If China is to defeat Japanese imperialism, the working class will have a very important role to play in the War of Resistance. Hence, the proletariat must unite together well. We must overthrow Japanese imperialism, for only then can we be sure that we will not become slaves without a country. We will never agree to serve as slaves without a country. We must raise up our heads, we must stand up.[4] Only through unity can we overthrow Japanese imperialism!

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[1] Since Paul von Mauser, the inventor of this weapon, was not born until 1838, after Napoleon's death, Mao's citation cannot be strictly accurate. Perhaps he understood Mauser, in its Chinese transcription, to refer to any nineteenth-century gun.

[2] The term *xiucai,* here translated "scholars," refers to the graduates at the lowest level of the imperial bureaucracy. Since the examinations for this rank had been abolished thirty years earlier, any *xiucai* still alive would necessarily have been relatively old.

[3] Once again, the term here translated "scholar" is *xiucai*; both before and after 1949, Mao used it deliberately in referring to his contemporaries to underscore that they were fulfilling the role which the graduates of the imperial examinations were supposed to play, but could not.

[4] The term here translated "stand up" is *fanshen,* used by Mao in the late 1930s to symbolize the liberation of the Chinese people, and especially of the peasantry.

Expand the Guerrilla War in the Rear of the Enemy in Central China

(May 4, 1938)

Comrade Xiang Ying:

Although there are difficulties in engaging in guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy, it is better, easier, and less constrained than fighting at the front together with friendly forces and under their command. The enemy situation is more serious there, yet as long as we have the broad popular masses behind us and sufficient areas in which to maneuver, and provided we pay attention to mobility and flexibility in command, such difficulties can be overcome. This has already been proven by the guerrilla war in Hebei and Shandong. A few days after the reconnaissance forces have been sent out, the main force may get ready to follow along. There is every reason to hope that we will be able to create base areas in the extensive areas among the five regions of Guangde, Suzhou, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhu, to mobilize the popular masses to wage an anti-Japanese struggle, to organize armed forces of the popular masses, and to develop new guerrilla contingents. After the Mao mountain base area has been in large measure established, you should also prepare some forces to enter the triangular area of Suzhou, Zhenjiang, and Wusong, as well as a contingent for crossing the river to enter the area north of it. Under certain circumstances, it is possible to wage guerrilla warfare on the plains too. The conditions are very different from those during the civil war. Of course, a cautious attitude should be adopted at all times. One cannot ignore the point that specific combat actions should be taken when the specific circumstances permit. You need to pay serious attention to Xue Yue[1] and others who harbor malicious intent. The present orientation does not, however, consist in competing with him for some time or some more miles of defense sectors, but in obeying his orders to go to the areas designated by him. You will have your own freedom after getting there. In the future, you need not ask for instructions from him or report to him on all matters. You only need to report to him your general course of action and battle victories. In addition, please always keep the good relations with Comrade Ye [Ting].[2] Please give consideration to the above points.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 220–21, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Xue Yue was at this time the commander of the First Army Group of the Guomindang First War Zone.

[2] Ye Ting (1897–1946) had joined the Communist Party while studying in the Soviet Union in 1925. In August 1927, he participated in the Nanchang Uprising. Subsequently, he severed connections with the Chinese Communist Party, but in September 1937 he persuaded Chiang Kaishek to appoint him commander of the New Fourth Army, which was formally created in January 1938.

Both Sides Will Benefit If We Cooperate, Both Sides Will Suffer If We Split

(May 4, 1938)

Our comrades are very concerned about the problem of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. This is a problem for the future, not the present. The present situation with regard to cooperation is relatively stable and may become more stable. The question is: After the overthrow of Japanese imperialism, will the Guomindang and the Communist Party continue to cooperate? Or will the two parties begin to fight each other? Many people have raised this question; you are not the only ones. Members of both the Guomindang and the Communist Party have also brought it up, and the common people in the whole country have shown concern about it as well. I have given other people an answer to this question. We have several reasons for believing that the Guomindang and the Communist Party will not fight each other, and also that they should not do so.

The two major reasons are: first, the international reason; and second, the domestic reason. These two reasons make it possible for the Guomindang and the Communist Party to continue to cooperate and show that they should continue to do so.

The domestic reason can be further divided into three aspects: first, the Guomindang; second, the Communist Party; and third, the people.

I will begin with the first aspect.

From the point of view of the Guomindang, what are the reasons for which the two parties should continue to cooperate? I am not the Guomindang chief of staff, so how can I speak for them with assurance? Generally speaking, however, that is, looking at the broad trend of things, one can still say a few words about whether or not cooperation is desirable and possible. First, I will now discuss the significance of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party.

Relations between the two parties can be divided into three stages: first, cooperation between the two parties; second, a split between them; and third, cooperation once more. In accordance with the opening words of the classic Chinese novel *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, "It is said that historical trends were ever thus: when the empire has long been divided, it must unite; and when it has long been united, it must divide."[1] The Guomindang and the Communist Party were split for ten years, and now they have once more united. It is, however, incorrect to apply these words to the present situation, for the two parties will not necessarily split again after their present unity. We can change these words into the following: "The Guomindang and the Communist Party will both benefit if we unite, and both suffer if we split." The past has already demonstrated the truth of this. If you look at the historical experience of unity and splits between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, you will understand this. The fundamental reason for the success of the Northern Expedition was that, at that time, the united front of the two parties carried out the correct guiding principle. In January 1924 the Guomindang held its first national congress in Guangzhou. At this meeting it published a declaration asserting its agreement with the guiding principles of the First United Front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. I personally attended this meeting; Mr. Sun Yatsen presided. The congress was held in 1924, and in the same year the Huangpu Military Academy was founded. In 1925 Guangdong was unified, and the Chen Jiongming faction wiped out. Chen Jiongming had been in Guangdong for many years. Nobody had been able to defeat him, but then two eastern punitive expeditions entirely destroyed his forces. This, too, was entirely due to the combined strength of the Guomindang and the Communist Party. At that time, Mr. Chiang Kaishek was commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy, and Comrade Zhou Enlai was the head of its political department. Another example of beneficial cooperation is that Mr. Chiang Kaishek was the commander of the First Army, and Comrade Zhou Enlai was the deputy party representative. In 1926, the Northern Expedition began. Its strength was irresistible, and it took Wuhan, Nanchang, Shanghai, and Nanjing, utterly routing Wu Peifu[2] and Sun Chuanfang.[3] All these victories depended upon the strength of the united front. Without such strength, these results would not have been achieved. Therefore, I say that the victories of the great revolution from 1925 to 1927 are historically unprecedented, and the deep influence that this revolution had among the masses had also never occurred before. This is proof that "both sides will benefit if we cooperate."

Where is the evidence that both sides will suffer if we split? It may be found in the separation between the two parties which lasted from 1927 until the Xi'an Incident. During this period, not two but three sides were hurt, because the ordinary people also suffered terribly. What good did all this do the Guomindang?

This text is an extract from Mao's talk on the occasion of the establishment of the first contingent at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. Our source is *Dangde wenxian,* 1995, no. 4, pp. 13–15.

[1] The *Romance of the Three Kingdoms,* a fictional account of the brief period in the third century when China was divided into three rival domains, dates from the fourteenth century and had been one of Mao's favorite novels since his youth.

[2] Wu Peifu (1874–1939) was the leader of the Zhili faction, which dominated North China from 1922 to 1924.

[3] Sun Chuanfang (1884–1935) was the warlord who controlled Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Fujian in the mid-1920s.

They fought for ten years intending to wipe out the Communist Party, but ended up empty-handed, achieving nothing. Previously, Communists had joined the Guomindang, but at that time the Guomindang did not approve of cooperation, and drove the Communists out during a so-called purge. They would not allow us to organize workers', peasants', and students' unions in different areas, and would not allow us to develop the workers' and peasants' movements, claiming that we were too extreme in our opposition to feudalism and also went too far in resisting imperialism. But this is not what the people in the whole country thought, because not only did our actions at that time not go beyond the Guomindang's declaration at its First National Congress, but in fact we were still not doing enough in support of the declaration. Who, then, in the final analysis, loyally carried out the demands of the declaration? Even Guomindang comrades could not help giving the credit to the Communist Party. The Communist Party honestly and thoroughly carried out the principles of Nationalism, People's Rights, and People's Livelihood. After the failure of the great revolution, hundreds of thousands of Communist Party members, workers, and peasants were executed. What was their crime? Their "crime" was nothing more than that they carried out the Three People's Principles. Back then we had not begun the agrarian revolution. Actually, the agrarian revolution is simply the principle of People's Livelihood as well as the equal right to land. Is it communism or bourgeois democracy to carry out Mr. Sun Yatsen's slogan of "land to the tiller"? In my opinion, it is bourgeois democracy, for when a peasant gets land he then owns property. This remains within the sphere of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, because the system of private ownership is not abolished. You may perhaps ask, why does the Communist Party not carry out communism? We do want to carry out communism, but that is a matter for the future. Adoption of bourgeois democracy at present is a stage along the road to eventual communism. Then some people may say: you did another wrong thing; you set up soviets. As a matter of fact, the soviets are an example of the principle of People's Rights: ordinary people had freedom of speech, travel, and assembly. These rights were all included in the rules of the soviet governments in the past. Now, the Border Region governments have such rules as well, with the sole exception of the Chinese traitors. In the past you would be arrested if you took a walk in Hankou, and your brain would have to find itself a new house. You all know that they are keeping under observation the Seven Gentlemen formerly imprisoned in Suzhou.[4] Why were they imprisoned? Because they advocated resisting Japan, and there in Suzhou the people have no rights and are not allowed to advocate resisting Japan. Here we carry out the principle of People's Rights. "Soviet" is a word of foreign origin, which actually refers to representative meetings. All those opposed to imperialism and feudalism can send representatives to such a meeting and can discuss and make decisions about the issues. This is People's Rights! Do we have the principle of Nationalism here? Imperialists do not like what we have done over the past ten years, because wherever we go, they quake in their boots. Examples of this are Changsha, Huangshi Harbor, and Tianjia Township. When we attacked Zhangzhou in 1932 the imperialists used twenty-three warships to blockade us and aimed their cannons at us. When we assign customs duties for imports from any country, we might choose not to tax those goods we need, to impose heavy duties on those goods we do not really need, and to forbid the importation of products which we do not need at all. It is we who decide everything; what imperialist country dares to interfere with us? If someone wants to do missionary work here, he cannot do so without our permission. In other areas of China, have people dared to treat foreigners, "foreign bigshots," in this way? In those places, the rule has become that the rank and file fear officials, who in turn fear the "foreign bigshots." The Communist Party is not afraid of "foreign bigshots." If they want to do business with us on a basis of equality, then of course we welcome them. This is the principle of Nationalism, which we put into practice.

For the past ten years, we have been carrying out the Three People's Principles. We have done nothing at all except to carry out the important tasks of achieving Nationalism, People's Rights, and People's Livelihood. Why would you want to fight us? I really cannot understand it. Let us no longer settle old scores. In a word, what we have been doing has been to carry out the declaration of the First National Congress of the Guomindang and to carry out the guiding principle of a united front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. The idea of a "purge" was all theirs; we were forced to go up Liangshan.[5] Why did we flee to the Jinggangshan? Because we could not live on the plains below. We had no option but to go up into the mountains and fight a guerrilla war. We want to fulfill the task of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semicolonial and semifeudal country, and so we have raised the banner of anti-imperialism and antifeudalism. But we are not allowed to raise this banner in the cities. So we have had no alternative but to go and fly it on the mountain tops, never letting it fall. In the past, we raised it on the Jianggangshan, on the Snowy Mountains, and on Mount Kunlun. Now we have raised it on Qingliang mountain. The reason you have come here is that this great banner flies on Qingliang mountain. Ever since its birth seventeen years ago, the Communist Party has been raising high this great banner. You have come all the way from Southeast Asia, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou to climb a mountain in Yan'an, not because there are no mountains in these places, but because there is

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[4] The "Seven Gentlemen" were the leading figures in establishing the National Salvation Association in 1936, to advocate resistance to Japan. The principal organizers were Zhang Naiqi and Shen Junru; one of the seven was a woman lawyer, Shi Liang. (The term *junzi,* commonly translated "gentlemen" in referring to this group, can be used of either sex.) For Mao's letter to this group in August 1936, see Volume V, pp. 295–302. As explained in note 6 on p. 652 of the same volume, the Seven Gentlemen were arrested in April 1937 and sentenced to prison. They were released on bail after the beginning of the war against Japan in July 1937, but as Mao indicates here they were still regarded with suspicion by Chiang Kaishek.

[5] I.e., to take to the wilderness, like the heroes of Liangshanpo, in the popular novel known in English as *Water Margin* or *All Men Are Brothers.*

this banner on this mountain. We warmly welcome you comrades. You and we stand on the same side politically. We share a common goal, which is to transform the old China into the new.

Previously, we cooperated with the Guomindang. After the failure of the great revolution we did not cooperate until the Xi'an Incident. Now the cooperation has begun again.

Cooperation must take place under certain conditions. What are these conditions? They are simply anti-imperialism and antifeudalism. We will cooperate to the end with anyone who is willing to abide by these conditions. At the time of the Xi'an Incident, many people said that we did the wrong thing in releasing our enemies. Now, however, the peaceful resolution of the Xi'an Incident has been proved correct. Some people think that the Guomindang cannot make any progress. They cite as examples the fact that after the peaceful resolution of the Xi'an Incident, the trial of the Seven Gentlemen was carried out in Suzhou,[6] and Yang Hucheng was forced to go abroad. Even some Guomindang members are worried. But consider the fact that since the fighting really began at the time of the July 7 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Guomindang has recently summoned a provisional national assembly.[7] In addition, it published a declaration and the "Guiding Principles for the War of Resistance and Building the Country." These principles are essentially good ones and constitute the manifestation of the Guomindang's progress over the last ten years. Looking back at its own history, the Guomindang cannot possibly want to fight a civil war. What good has come from the past ten years? Even the leaders of the Guomindang admit that there has been none. If they do carry out these principles, if they continue to make progress, the Communist Party will certainly continue to cooperate with them, for both sides will benefit if we cooperate, and both sides will suffer if we split. We will all benefit greatly from the present cooperation in resisting Japan. During the ten-year civil war, although the Guomindang wanted to wipe out the Communist Party, it was unable to do so. Whenever hundreds of thousands of Guomindang troops came to "suppress" us, we would have a big harvest of weapons. Our military equipment factories are to be found in Hankou, Berlin, London, Tokyo, and so on. Whenever the Guomindang troops launch an attack, the Red Army and the Communist Party just grow larger. I believe it is still better not to fight. To put it in dialectic terms: the means and the end are opposed to one another.

This is [looking at things from] the perspective of the Guomindang.

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[6] According to Mao's statement of December 28, 1936, the terms accepted by Chiang Kaishek for his liberation at the time of the Xi'an Incident included the release of the Seven Gentlemen (see Volume V, p. 570), but instead, as noted above, they were formally condemned.

[7] Mao is apparently referring here to the People's Political Council, an appointed but widely representative body, including a number of Communists, set up at this time on the basis of a decision by an Extraordinary Congress of the Guomindang. Elections to the National Assembly called for by the Fifth Congress of the Guomindang were under way at the time of the Japanese attack in 1937, but were never completed, and this body never met.

The Argument Put Forward by the Dagongbao *Regarding a Quasi-Decisive Battle Is Incorrect*

(May 13, 1938)

Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian], and Kai [Feng][1] [He Kequan]:

We hold that the argument of the *Dagongbao* negating protracted war and advocating quasi-decisive battles is incorrect. The decisive battle at Xuzhou was a decisive battle only to a certain degree in a campaign. It absolutely should not be regarded as a strategically decisive battle. It is imperative that preparations be made so that there will be sufficient troops to fight in defense of Wuhan after defeat in the decisive battle at Xuzhou.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 222–23, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Kai Feng (1907–1955), a native of Hunan, was at this time a member of the Politburo, and probably also the head of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

Offensives Are Primary, But They Are Also Subject to Conditions

(May 14, 1938, at night)

Comrade Lin Biao:

I have already read it, and it is excellent.[1] But there are some inappropriate places, which I have already corrected, and you may want have another look. The phrase "attack unconditionally" is incorrect. Offensives are also conditional, but they are primary, basic, and central.[2]

Publication may be delayed temporarily until the time is fixed for setting out.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, p. 224, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to a speech of May 2, 1938, by Lin Biao, who was then the president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, to faculty, staff, and students, under the title "The Overall Orientation of Teaching at the Anti-Japanese University."

[2] According to a note to *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 70, Mao had replaced the sentence "We should attack unconditionally, and defend conditionally" with the words "In our operations, we should take attack as primary, and defense as complementary."

Proclamation of the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army

(May 15, 1938)

It is proclaimed: ever since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the forces of the whole country and the whole nation,[1] *under the leadership of the central government and Chairman Chiang,* have waged a resolute War of Resistance. The generals and soldiers at the front have been sacrificing their lives and shedding their blood; all parties and groups have been uniting in good faith, and the people of all circles have been joining their efforts to save the country from destruction. This is the bright and broad road for the Chinese nation and a strong guarantee of victory in the resistance to Japan; all of our fellow-countrymen must proceed forward upon it. *As a component part of the Republic of China,* our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region submits[2] to the leadership of the center[3] and works hard for the cause of saving the country. All the measures we have taken are open and aboveboard, and we have engaged in arduous, hard struggle, without daring to boast, thus winning uniform praise from the people of the whole country. This government and this office shall strive only to impel the popular masses of the whole region to continue their efforts, and shall not allow anyone to be lax in his duties, or permit any deed harmful to the cause of saving the country. According to recent investigations, there are within our region persons heedless of the overall situation, who use every means to force the peasants to return the land and houses that have been redistributed to them, or to force debtor families to pay back debts that have been abolished, or to force the people to change the democratic systems that have been established, or to destroy the organizations of military, economic, cultural, and mass associations that have been set up. They even serve as secret agents, establishing relations

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 335–37, which reproduces it from a documentary collection published in 1942. According to *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 70, Mao drafted this document.

[1] The forces of the whole country and the whole nation → The patriotic compatriots of the whole country

[2] Our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region submits → The people of our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region submit

[3] Center → Government

with local bandits, inciting mutiny among the troops, carrying out surveying for making maps, secretly investigating the situation, openly carrying out propaganda against the government of the Border Region, *and so on and so forth. In light of the investigations,* these various acts mentioned above are obvious violations of the basic principle of unity in resistance to Japan and are contrary to the public will of the people of the Border Region. They are also attempts to create internal disputes *and to stir up class struggle* in order to sabotage the united front, harm the interests of the people, undermine the reputation of the government of the border region, increase the difficulties of mobilization for resistance to Japan, *and foster among the people suspicion of the supreme commander and the central government.* Investigations show that the cause is none other than a few obstinate elements acting wantonly in defiance of the interests of the nation and the country. Some of them are even used by the Japanese bandits and serve as their tools to cover up conspiratorial activities under false pretenses. Over the past several months, people of every *xian* have constantly reported them and asked that they be stopped. Such occurrences happen several times a day and have become too many to handle. In order to strengthen the forces of resistance to Japan, consolidate the rear area of resistance to Japan, and protect the interests of the people, this government and this office have no choice but to put into effect a ban on the activities stated above. We hereby urgently announce the following clear guidelines:

1. Regarding all land and buildings that had been redistributed and debts that had been abolished as of the beginning of the domestic peace in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Border Region, this government and this office shall protect the vested interests of the people and shall not permit any unauthorized changes.

2. Regarding all military, political, economic, and cultural organizations, organizations of the popular masses, and other such associations that had been set up as of the beginning of the domestic peace or were reformed or developed after that time in line with the principles of the national united front of resistance to Japan, this government and this office shall protect their activities, promote their development, and stop all acts of conspiracy and sabotage against them.

3. Regarding all endeavors beneficial to resistance against Japan and the salvation of the country, this government and this office would be pleased to promote all of them under the principles of resolutely carrying out the *center's* program of resisting Japan and building the country. We express welcome to well-intentioned people from all circles who offer their assistance. All persons are, however, forbidden to enter the Border Region from outside, stay, and carry out activities here without permission of this government or this office and without receiving documents of certification from this government and this office, regardless of the nature of the business to which their activities pertain, so as to prevent deceptions and stop malefactors.

4. During the present tense period of the War of Resistance, all elements who engage in conspiracy and sabotage, or wantonly stir up trouble, or engage in enticement or agitation, or pry into the military situation within the region's borders may be reported and exposed by the people. Those on whom there is reliable evidence may be arrested on the spot. Once this is confirmed through interrogation, they shall be punished without leniency in all cases.

The above four points must be complied with by all the military and civilian population of the entire Border Region and may not be violated. If there are any lawless elements who dare to plot and make trouble, this government and this office shall enforce the laws as they have been promulgated, and shall not be accused of giving no advance warning. This is hereby proclaimed.

Chairman: Lin Boqu
Director: Xiao Jingguang

Prepare to Expand to the Rear of the Enemy in Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shandong

(May 20, 1938)[1]

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], and Ye [Jianying]:

After the loss of Xuzhou, Henan will soon be in enemy hands. Wuhan is in imminent danger. By that time Chiang [Kaishek] will agree to our troops moving southward to engage in actions in the deep rear of the enemy in the four provinces of Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shandong. Before the opportune moment arrives, we should not put forth this point to Chiang or to Li [Zongren], Bai [Chongxi], Cheng [Qian], and others. We should keep it as our own advance preparation. At that time, the two divisions of Liu [Bocheng] and Lin [Biao][2] will engage in entirely new deployments. On the Shandong front, they have already engaged in extensive guerrilla warfare. We have already sent Zhang Jingwu and Guo Hongtao[3] there, leading fifty to sixty military, political, and Party cadres, and taking two radios. Today, after crossing the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railroad, they will reach Tai'an. There are many guns scattered among the people over there. The main thing is to send cadres. It is all the better if we can send one or two battalions over to work as core cadres. But they need to prepare to stay there for a long time without coming back to their original units. There is no problem about crossing the Yellow River southward.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 225–26, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M.

[2] Liu and Lin commanded the 129th and 115th Divisions of the Eighth Route Army, respectively.

[3] Guo Hongtao was at this time secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee.

Telegram of Congratulations to the "May Thirtieth" Rallies on the Movement of Mobilization for the Resistance War Held by All Garrisons and Military Formations

(May 22, 1938)

To the senior officers of all units, and for transmittal to all officers and men:

We are extremely moved and gratified by the spirit of resolute struggle with which all the armies in our rear areas have carried out the present fighting and educational tasks, at a time when the Japanese bandits are constantly making ever more ferocious attacks against us, thus bringing about another step forward in the consolidation and enhancement of the foundation of our army units.

The mass meetings to mobilize people for the War of Resistance which will be held by all military units on May 30[1] are a day for reviewing and strengthening our fighting forces. It is hoped that at these rallies, both the strong and weak points of our work will be examined, thus providing an orientation to guide our future work, so that it may make further strides forward toward regularization on the basis of current progress.

At present, the Japanese bandits are madly attacking Longhai and Xuzhou and are once again planning to attack Wuhan and Xi'an. Only if the War of Resistance throughout the whole country is infused with the spirit of a protracted and arduous struggle can it attain final victory. Every commander and fighter of ours should, during and after this mass meeting to mobilize people for the War of Resistance now and in the future, further display a high degree of fighting spirit, heighten political vigilance, eliminate all bad tendencies in the armed forces, and consolidate and put in order our own forces, thereby preparing ourselves to meet and beat

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This text was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* May 25, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 175–76, which reproduces that version.

[1] May 30, 1925, was the date on which police in Shanghai, under British command, had shot down workers in Shanghai protesting against low wages and poor working conditions. The initial clash leading to these events had taken place on May 15 at a Japanese-owned cotton mill, and the anniversary of the May 30 killings continued to be the occasion for anti-Japanese demonstrations. For ironic comments by Mao half a year afterward, see his article of December 13, 1925, in Volume II, pp. 290–92.

back the enemy's new offensive, and fight the War of Resistance to the end and to final victory, in order to defend the rivers and the borders, the Northwest, and the whole of China. We are sending this telegram to congratulate you, to wish you a triumphant mass meeting, and to wish all comrades good health!

On Protracted War

A Speech at the Yan'an Symposium on the War of Resistance Against Japan from May 26 to June 3, 1938

Statement of the Problem

1. It will soon be July 7, the first anniversary of the great War of Resistance against Japan. Rallying in unity, persevering in the War of Resistance, and persevering in the united front, the forces of the whole nation have been valiantly fighting the enemy for almost a year. The people of the whole world are attentively following this war, which has no precedent in the history of the East, and which will go down as a great war in world history, too. Every Chinese suffering from the disasters of the war and struggling for the life or death[1] of his nation daily yearns for victory. But what actually will be the course of the war? Can we attain victory or not? Can we win quickly or not? Many people are talking about protracted war, but why is it a protracted war? How should a protracted war be waged? Many people are talking about final victory, but why will final victory be ours? How shall we strive for final victory?

Not everyone has found answers to these questions; in fact, to this day most people have not done so. And so the defeatists who hold to the theory of national subjugation have come running out to tell people that China will be subjugated, that final victory will not be China's. At the same time, some impetuous friends have come running out to tell people that China will win very quickly without having to exert any great effort. In the final analysis, are these views correct? We *Communists* have said all along that they are not. But what we have been saying has not yet been *completely* understood by the majority of people *throughout the country.* This is partly because propaganda and explanation were not extensive

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This work was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 43/44, July 1, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 6, pp. 49–145, where the text is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao's *Selected Works,* and the variants as compared to the official edition of the *Selected Works* are shown. We have also checked with the original version in *Jiefang* to elucidate some slight discrepancies between that text and the 1944 edition.

[1] Life or death → Survival

enough.[2] It is also partly because the development of objective events had not yet fully revealed their inherent nature, had not yet clearly placed their features before *the masses of* the people, who were thus not able to see the overall trends and prospects, and unable to decide on a complete set of measures and efforts.[3] Now things are better; the experience of ten months of the War of Resistance has been sufficient to explode the utterly baseless theory of national subjugation and to dissuade our impetuous friends from their theory of quick victory. In these circumstances many people are asking for a comprehensive explanation. This is especially so with regard to protracted war, not only because there exist dissenting viewpoints in the theories of national subjugation and quick victory, but also because there are those who understand it only in a shallow, insubstantial way.

"Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident our four hundred million people have been making a concerted effort, and final victory will be China's." This kind of formula is widely prevalent among the people. It is a correct formula, but needs to be given more content. Our perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the united front has been possible because of many factors. These comprise all the country's political parties from the Guomindang to the Communist Party,[4] all the country's people from the capitalists to the workers,[5] and all the country's armed forces from the regular forces to the guerrillas. Internationally, they range from all the democratic countries to the socialist countries.[6] In enemy countries, they range from people within those countries who are against the war to soldiers at the front who are against the war. All of these have contributed their efforts in varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Every person with a conscience should salute them. We Communists, together with all the other parties and groups of the War of Resistance and the people of the whole country, have no other course than to strive to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese bandits. *This has been our consistent endeavor in the past and at present.* July 1[7] will be the seventeenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. *This is also the date of the first anniversary of the War of Resistance against Japan.* A serious study of protracted war is necessary in order to enable every Communist Party member to exert better and greater efforts in the *future* War of Resistance. Therefore my lecture will represent an inquiry into protracted war, *as a contribution to these two great anniversaries.* I will speak on *many* problems relevant to protracted war, but I will not go into everything because it is not possible to talk about everything in a single lecture.

2. All the experience of the ten months of the War of Resistance proves the incorrectness of the following two views: the theory of China's inevitable subjugation and the theory of China's quick victory. The former gives rise to the tendency to compromise and the latter to the tendency to underestimate the enemy. Both approaches to the problem are subjective and one-sided or, in a word, unscientific.

3. Before the War of Resistance, there was a great deal of talk about national subjugation. Some said, "China's weapons are inferior, and it is bound to lose in a war." Others said, "If China fights a War of Resistance, it is sure to become another Abyssinia." Since the beginning of the war, open talk of national subjugation has disappeared, but secret talk, and quite a lot of it too, still continues. For instance, from time to time an atmosphere of compromise arises, and the advocates of compromise base their arguments on the idea that "to continue the war would bring certain subjugation." In a letter from Hunan a student has written:

> In the countryside everything seems difficult. As a lone person doing propaganda work on my own, all I can do is talk to people whenever and wherever I find them. The people I have talked to are by no means ignoramuses; they all have some understanding of what is going on and are very interested in what I have to say. But when I run into one of those relatives of mine, they always say: "China cannot win; it is doomed." It's extremely annoying! Fortunately, they do not go around spreading their views, otherwise things would really be bad. The peasants would naturally put more stock in what they say.

Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation form the social basis of the tendency to compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China, and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to crop up within the anti-Japanese front at any time and will probably remain with us right until the end of the war. Now that Xuzhou has fallen and Wuhan is in danger, it will be of some benefit, I think, to give the theory of national subjugation a good, sharp rebuttal.

4. During the ten months of the War of Resistance, all kinds of views that show signs of the disease of impetuosity have also appeared. For instance, at the outset of the War of Resistance many people were groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and even believing that the Japanese could not get as far as Shanxi. Some belittled the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and expressed doubts about the proposition, "With regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfare is primary and mobile warfare supplementary." They disagreed with the Eighth Route Army's strategic orientation—"Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favorable conditions"—which they regarded as a

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[2] Propaganda and explanation were not extensive enough → Our propaganda and explanation work was not yet adequate

[3] Decide on a complete set of measures and efforts → Decide on their own complete set of overall policies and measures

[4] From the Guomindang to the Communist Party → From the Communist Party to the Guomindang

[5] From the capitalists to the workers → From the workers and peasants to the bourgeoisie

[6] From all the democratic countries to the socialist countries → From the socialist countries to justice-loving people in all countries

[7] July 1 → July 1 of this year

"mechanical" approach. During the battle of Shanghai many people[8] said: "If we can fight for just three months, the international situation is bound to change; the Soviet Union is certain to send troops, and the war will be over." They pinned their hopes for the future of the War of Resistance chiefly on foreign aid. After the Tai'erzhuang victory, some people maintained that the Xuzhou campaign should be fought as a "quasi-decisive campaign" and that the previous policy of protracted war should be changed. They said things like, "This battle is the enemy's last desperate struggle," or, "If we win, the Japanese warlords will be demoralized and able only to sit quietly and await their Day of Judgment." The victory at Pingxingguan knocked some people's heads giddy with success; the further victory at Tai'erzhuang made even more people giddy. Doubts arose as to whether the enemy would even attack Wuhan; many people thought, "not necessarily," and many others, "definitely not." Such doubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is our strength for resistance to Japan already sufficient? Some people may answer affirmatively, for our present strength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance, so why increase it? Or, for instance, is the slogan "Consolidate and expand the National United Front of Resistance against Japan" still correct? Some people may answer negatively, for the united front in its present state is already strong enough to repel the enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should our efforts in diplomacy and international propaganda be intensified? Here again the answer may be in the negative. Or, for instance, should we proceed in earnest to reform the army system and the political system, develop the mass movement, rigorously implement education for national defense, suppress traitors and Trotskyites, develop war industries, and improve the people's livelihood? Or, for instance, are the slogans calling for the defense of Wuhan, the defense of Guangzhou, and the defense of the Northwest, and for the vigorous development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear still correct? The answers might all be negative. There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favorable turn occurs in the war situation, prepare to intensify the friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, diverting attention from external to internal matters. This kind of situation almost invariably occurs whenever a comparatively big battle is won or the enemy's advance comes to a temporary halt. All the above can be termed "political and military shortsightedness." Such people's talk, however plausible it may seem, is actually quite groundless. To sweep away such empty talk should help the victorious prosecution of the War of Resistance.

5. So the question is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is: No, it will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is: No, it cannot win quickly, and the War of Resistance will be a protracted war.

6. As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated our main arguments on these questions. Back on July 16, 1936, five months before the Xi'an Incident and twelve months before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in a conversation with the American correspondent Mr. [Edgar] Snow, I made a general estimate of the situation with regard to war between China and Japan and advanced various overall principles for winning victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder:[9]

Question: Under what conditions can China defeat and destroy the strength of Japanese imperialism?

Answer: Three conditions are required: first, the completion of a united front of resistance against Japan in China; second, the completion of an international united front of resistance against Japan; third, the rise of a revolutionary movement of the Japanese people within Japan as well as of the oppressed nationalities.[10] Of these three conditions, the grand alliance of the Chinese people is the most important.[11]

Question: How long do you think such a war would last?

Answer: That depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and many other determining factors involving China and Japan. That is to say, apart from the main thing, China's own strength, international help to China and help from the revolution in Japan also matter a great deal. If China's anti-Japanese united front is forcefully developed and effectively organized both horizontally and vertically, if all those governments and peoples that recognize the threat posed by Japanese imperialism to their own interests can give China the necessary aid, and if the Japanese revolution rises up quickly, the war will swiftly be brought to an end and China will swiftly win victory. If this condition is not realized for the time being,[12] the war will be prolonged. But the result will be the same; Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. It is just that the sacrifices will be great and it will be necessary to go through a very painful period.

Question: How do you believe the prospects of such a war would develop, politically and militarily?

Answer: Japan's continental policy is already fixed, and as for those people who think they can halt the Japanese advance by making compromises with Japan at the expense of more Chinese territory and sovereign rights, their thinking is merely a kind of *utopian* fantasy. We definitely know that even the lower Yangzi River valley and all the southern seaports are already included in the continental program of Japanese imperialism. Moreover, the Japanese navy[13] wants to occupy the Philippines, Siam, Annam,[14] the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies in order to cut off other countries from China and monopolize the southwestern Pacific. This is Japan's maritime policy. In such a period, China will undoubtedly be in an extremely difficult position. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that such difficulties can be overcome; only the rich people in the big port cities are defeatists because they are afraid of losing their property. Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue to fight once its coastline is blockaded by Japan. This is nonsense. To refute them we need only make mention of the war history of the Red Army.

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[8] Many people → Some people

[9] The full text of Snow's five interviews with Mao in the summer and autumn of 1936, as recorded by Snow himself, has been published in Volume V of this edition. The passages quoted here by Mao appear on pp. 259–66. In substance, they are very close to Snow's English version, but there are some differences of detail. Although no independent Chinese-language text of the interviews exists (see, in Volume V, p. 249, the source note to the first interview), a Chinese version of these interviews was soon published in China under the title *Zhongguo de xin xibei* (China's New Northwest) (Shanghai: Pingfan shudian, 1937). Since it is this text on which Mao based himself in 1938 in preparing the present lecture, we have drawn here on the *Selected Works* retranslation into English, with modifications as appropriate. Those interested in the nuances between the two versions can consult Snow's text in our Volume V.

[10] The oppressed nationalities → The people of the Japanese colonies

[11] The most important → The most important from the standpoint of the Chinese people

[12] If this condition is not realized for the time being → If these conditions are not realized quickly

In the War of Resistance against Japan, China's position is much superior to that of the Red Army in the civil war. China is a vast country, and even if Japan is able to occupy *a substantial part of* China with as many as 100 to 200 million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have ample strength to fight against Japan, while the Japanese would continually have to fight defensive battles in their rear throughout the war.

The heterogeneity and uneven development of China's economy turn out to be rather advantageous in the War of Resistance against Japan. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China would definitely not be as damaging to China as would be the severance of New York from the rest of the United States. Even if Japan blockades the Chinese coastline, it would have no way to blockade China's Northwest, Southwest, and West.

Thus, once more the central point of the problem is the unity *and mobilization* of the entire Chinese people and the establishment of a countrywide united front of resistance against Japan. This is what we have long been advocating.

Question: If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated, could the Communist Party agree to peace talks and recognize Japan's rule in Northeastern China?

Answer: No. Like the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communist Party will not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese territory.

Question: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategic orientation for this war of liberation?

Answer: Our strategic orientation should be to employ our main forces to operate over a highly extended and fluid front. To achieve victory, the Chinese troops must carry out a high degree of mobile warfare on extensive battlefields, making swift advances and swift withdrawals, swift concentrations and swift dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare *(rendered as "guerrilla warfare" in several translated versions; this is wrong),* and not positional warfare depending exclusively on defensive fortifications with deep trenches, high ramparts, and row after row of defensive positions.

This definitely does not mean the abandonment of all the important military points; positional warfare should be arranged for these points as long as it is beneficial. But the strategic orientation for transforming the overall situation must be mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but it is a secondary orientation, auxiliary in nature.

Geographically the field of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to conduct the most effective mobile warfare. After coming up against the vigorous actions of our forces, the Japanese army will have to be cautious. Its war machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited efficiency. If we concentrate our forces within small, cramped positions for resistance through a war of attrition, our army would lose the advantageous conditions of our geography and economic organization, and would be making the mistake of Abyssinia. In the early period of the war, we must avoid any major decisive battles and must first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the spirit and fighting strength of the enemy troops.

Besides deploying trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize large numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants *politically and militarily*. One should know that the Volunteer Units for Resistance against Japan in the Three Eastern Provinces are only a minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasants of the whole country. The Chinese peasants have very great latent power; properly organized and directed, they can keep the Japanese[15] busy twenty-four hours a day and wear them out. It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China, that is to say, the Japanese army will be entirely surrounded by the hostile Chinese people, it will be forced to ship in all the military supplies it needs and will have to guard them itself, it will have to use large numbers of troops to protect *all* its lines of transport and constantly be on guard against attacks *by guerrilla troops*, and it will need large forces to garrison Manchuria and Japan as well.

In the course of the war, China will be able to capture many Japanese soldiers and seize many weapons and munitions with which to arm itself; at the same time China will win foreign aid to improve the *mechanization* and equipment of her troops gradually. Because of this, China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the later period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will collapse after being drained by China's long War of Resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will flag after being sapped by innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the latent power of the War of Resistance will rise and surge forward day by day and large numbers of the revolutionary popular masses will be pouring into the front lines to fight for freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the final and fatal assault on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China.

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[13] The Japanese navy → Japan

[14] Annam → Vietnam

[15] The Japanese → The Japanese army

The Japanese soldiers and officers that we capture should be welcomed and given very good treatment. Not only should they not be killed or harmed, they should be taken good care of just like brothers. All kinds of methods must be used to make the Japanese soldiers rise up and oppose their fascist officers. Our slogan is: "Unite up and oppose our common oppressors." (A Record of Impressions of the Northwest,[16] pp. 10–24.)

The above views have been proved correct in light of the experience of ten months of the War of Resistance and will also be borne out in the future.

7. As far back as August 15,[17] 1937, less than two months after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed out in its "Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party":

The military provocation by the Japanese bandits at the Marco Polo Bridge and their occupation of Beiping and Tianjin are merely the beginning of their *entire* large-scale invasion of the main part of China. The Japanese bandits have already begun their nationwide military mobilization.[18] Their propaganda that they supposedly "do not seek to expand" is only a smokescreen covering their assault.

The battle of resistance at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7 has become the starting point of China's nationwide War of Resistance.

Thus a new stage has henceforth begun in China's political situation; this is the stage of carrying out the War of Resistance. The stage of preparation for the War of Resistance is over. In this stage the central task is to mobilize all forces to win victory in the War of Resistance.

The key to winning victory in the war now lies in developing the War of Resistance that has already been launched into a total War of Resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a total War of Resistance by the whole nation can final victory be achieved.

Because serious weaknesses still exist in the War of Resistance, many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and other such unfavorable situations may occur in the future course of the War of Resistance. *The loss of Beiping and Tianjin is the gravest lesson since the loss of the Four Northeastern Provinces.* Therefore it should be realized that the war will be an arduous, protracted war. But we believe that, through the efforts of the people of the whole country,[19] the War of Resistance that has already been aroused will

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[16] *A Record of Impressions of the Northwest* → Snow, *A Record of Impressions of the Northwest.* (See above, note 9.)

[17] August 15 → August 25

[18] Nationwide military mobilization → Nationwide wartime mobilization

[19] Through the efforts of the people of the whole country → Through the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country

break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop (*Liberation,* no. 15, p. 6).

The above thesis, too, has been proved correct by the experience of ten months of the War of Resistance and will also be borne out in the future.

8. Methodologically[20] speaking, the source of all erroneous views on war lies in idealist and mechanistic tendencies on the question. People with such tendencies are subjective and one-sided in their method of looking at problems. They either indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk, or, basing themselves upon one phenomenon[21] or a temporary manifestation, magnify it with similar subjectivity into the whole of the problem, *and talk about it with a show of earnestness. This is the theoretical source of erroneous viewpoints.* But there are two categories of people with erroneous views.[22] One type are fundamental errors, which are consistently committed; these are hard to correct. The other type are accidental errors, which are temporary ones; these are easy to correct. But because both are wrong, both need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing idealist and mechanistic tendencies and taking an objective and all-sided view in making a study of war can we draw correct conclusions on the question of war.

The Basis of the Problem

9. Why is the War of Resistance against Japan a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?

The war between China and Japan is not just any war; it is specifically a war of life and death between semicolonial and semifeudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the 1940s.[23] Herein lies the basis of the whole problem. To put it differently, the two sides in the war have many mutually opposing features, which will be considered in turn below.

10. Concerning the Japanese side. First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country, which lies in the top category in the East in military, economic, and political-organizational power, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of the world. These are the basic factors in Japan's war of aggression. The inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China result from Japan's imperialist system and its great military, economic, and political-organizational power. Second, however, the imperialist character of Japan's society and economy produces the imperialist character of its war, a war that is retrogressive and barbarous.

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[20] Methodologically → Epistemologically

[21] Upon one phenomenon → Upon one single aspect

[22] Two categories of people with erroneous views → Two categories of erroneous views that people have (Unlike most of the changes in the revised version of the 1950s, which modify the substance of Mao's writings, this correction serves to eliminate a carelessness of expression in the 1938 text, in which "people" are the subject in this sentence, and "errors" are the subject in the following sentence.)

[23] 1940s → 1930s

In the 1940s,[24] the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven Japan not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale but also to approach its final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by its ruling classes but to the very reverse, the death of Japanese imperialism. This is what is meant by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this retrogressive quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, that gives rise to the special barbarity of Japan's war. All of which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, *China's national antagonism* (the antagonism between the entire Chinese nation and the Japanese rulers),[25] and the antagonism between Japan and most other countries *and peoples* of the world. The retrogressive and barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for its inevitable defeat. And that is not all. Third, although Japan's war is conducted on the basis of its great military, economic, and political-organizational power, at the same time it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic, and political-organizational power is great but quantitatively inadequate. Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military, financial, and material resources, and it cannot endure a long war. Japan's rulers are endeavoring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is, the war they have launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually aggravate it and even exhaust Japan's original resources. Fourth and last, while Japan can get international support from the fascist countries, the international opposition it is bound to encounter will be greater than its international support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancel out the support but even bring its pressure to bear upon Japan herself. Such is the law that an unjust cause finds meager support, and such is the consequence of the very nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in its great capacity to wage war, and its disadvantage lies in the retrogressive and barbarous nature of its war, in the inadequacy of its manpower and material resources, and in its meager international support. These are the characteristics of the Japanese side.

11. As regards the Chinese side, we are first of all a semicolonial and semifeudal country. From the Opium War, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Reform Movement of 1898, and the Revolution of 1911, to *the great revolution of* the Northern Expedition, without exception the revolutionary movements[26] that sought to extricate China from its semicolonial and semifeudal state all met with serious setbacks, and consequently China remains a semicolonial and semifeudal country. We are still a weak country, manifestly inferior to the enemy in military, economic, and political-organizational power. Here again one finds the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China. Second, however, China's liberation movement, with its cumulative development over the past hundred years up until the present day, is now different from that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forces opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, they have tempered the Chinese.[27] Although China[28] is not as strong as Japan militarily, economically, politically, and culturally, yet comparing China with itself, one finds factors today that are more progressive than in any other period of its history.[29] It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberation can be protracted and can achieve final victory. China is a country rising like the morning sun; this contrasts starkly with the declining state of Japanese imperialism. China's war is progressive, and the progressiveness of China's war produces its just character. Because it is a just war, it is capable of arousing the nation to unity, of evoking the sympathy of the enemy country's people, and of winning the support of most countries in the world. Third, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a very big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population, and many soldiers; it is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourth and last, *the retrogressive and barbarous nature of Japan's war, and* the progressive and just character of China's war have produced broad international support for China, which is again exactly the reverse of the meager support for Japan's unjust cause. To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in the weakness of its capacity to wage war; its advantage lies in the progressive and just character of its war, its great size, and its abundant international support. These are China's characteristics.

12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic, and political-organizational power, but that its war is reactionary and barbarous, its manpower and material resources are inadequate, and it is in an unfavorable position internationally. China, on the contrary, has relatively less military, economic, and political-organizational power, but it is in its era of progress; its war is progressive and just; it is, moreover, a big country, a factor that enables it to sustain a protracted war; and it is supported[30] by most countries *and peoples* of the world. The above are the basic, mutually contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese war. They have determined and are determining all the political policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides; they have determined and are determining the protracted character of the war and the fact that final victory will go to China and not to Japan. The war is a contest between these characteristics. They will change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature, and from this everything else will follow. These characteristics exist in reality and are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the basic elements of the war, and are not incomplete fragments;

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[24] 1940s → 1930s

[25] The antagonism between the entire Chinese nation and the Japanese rulers → The antagonism between the Japanese nation and the Chinese nation

[26] Revolutionary movements → Revolutionary or reformist movements

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[27] The Chinese → The people of China

[28] China → China today

[29] Its history. → Its history. The Chinese Communist Party and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors.

[30] It is supported → It will be supported

they permeate all major and minor problems on both sides and all stages of the war; and they are indispensable. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studying the Sino-Japanese war, he will surely go wrong; and even if some of his ideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably be proved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristics, we shall now proceed to explain all the problems about which we wish to speak.

Refutation of the Theory of National Subjugation

13. Theorists of national subjugation, who see nothing but the contrast between the enemy's strength and our weakness, used to say, "A War of Resistance will mean certain subjugation," and now they are saying, "Continuing the war will mean certain subjugation." We shall not be able to convince them merely by stating that the enemy, though strong, is small, while China, though weak, is large. They can adduce historical instances, such as the destruction of the Song dynasty by the Yuan and the destruction of the Ming dynasty by the Qing, to prove that a small but strong country can vanquish a large but weak one and, moreover, that a backward country can vanquish an advanced one. If we say these events occurred long ago and do not prove the point, they can cite the British subjugation of India to prove that a small but strong capitalist country can vanquish a large but weak and backward country. Therefore, *to answer this question,* we have to produce other grounds in order to seal the mouths of all the subjugationists, to convince them, and to supply everyone engaged in propaganda work with adequate arguments for persuading those who do not understand or lack resolve and thus consolidate their faith in the War of Resistance.

14. What then are these grounds we should adduce? The characteristics of the times. These characteristics are concretely reflected in Japan's retrogression and paucity of support and in China's progress and abundance of support.

15. Our war is not just any old war; it is specifically a war between China and Japan fought in the 1940s.[31] Our enemy, Japan, is first of all an imperialism that will soon perish; it is already in its era of decline. It is not only different from Britain, which was still in its progressive, capitalist era when Britain subjugated India; Japan is also different from what it was itself at the time of the European War[32] twenty years ago. The present war was launched on the eve of the general collapse of world imperialism and, above all, of the fascist countries; that is the very reason the enemy has launched this adventurist war, which has the character of a last desperate struggle. Therefore, it is an inescapable certainty that it will not be China but the ruling clique of Japanese imperialism that will be destroyed as a result of the war. Moreover, Japan has undertaken this war at a time when many countries have been or are about to be embroiled in war, when we are all fighting or preparing to fight against barbarous aggression, and China's fortunes are linked with those of most of the countries and peoples of the world. This is the root cause of the opposition Japan has aroused and will increasingly arouse among those countries and peoples.

16. What about China? The China of today cannot be compared with the China of any other historical period. It has the special characteristics of a semicolonial and semifeudal society, and so it is called a weak country. But, at the same time, China is historically in its era of progress; this is the primary reason for its ability to defeat Japan. When we say that the War of Resistance against Japan is progressive, we do not mean progressive in the ordinary or general sense, nor do we mean progressive in the sense that the Abyssinian war of resistance against Italy, or the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, or the Revolution of 1911 were progressive. We mean progressive in the sense that China is progressive today. In what way is the China of today progressive? It is progressive in that it is no longer a completely feudal country; it already has capitalism; it has a bourgeoisie and a proletariat; it has vast numbers of people who have awakened to political consciousness or are awakening; it has *a Guomindang and* a Communist Party; it has a politically progressive army;[33] and it has the tradition and the experience of many decades of revolution, especially the experience of the past fifteen years.[34] This experience has schooled the people and the political parties of China and forms the very basis for the present unity against the enemy.[35] If it is said that, without the experience of 1905, the victory of 1917 would have been impossible in Russia, then we can also say that, without the experience of the past fifteen years,[36] our future victory in the anti-Japanese Resistance War would be impossible. These are the internal conditions.

The international conditions ensure that China is not isolated in the war, and this fact too is without precedent in history. In the past, China's wars, and India's too, were wars fought in isolation. It is only today that we meet with worldwide people's movements, unprecedented in breadth and depth, which have arisen or are arising and which are supporting China. The Russia of 1917[37] also received world support, and because of this it won,[38] but that support was not so broad in scale and deep in nature as ours today. The people's movements in the world today are developing on a scale and with a depth that are unprecedented. *At the same time,* the existence of the Soviet Union is a particularly vital factor in present-day international politics, and the Soviet Union will certainly support China with the greatest enthusiasm; there was nothing like this phenomenon twenty years ago. All these factors have created and are creating important conditions indispensable to China's final victory. Large-scale direct assistance is as yet lacking and will come only in the future, but China is progressive and is a big country, and these are factors enabling it to prolong the duration of the war and to encourage international help while awaiting its arrival.

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[31] 1940s → 1930s

[32] The European War → World War I

[33] It has a politically progressive army → It has a politically progressive army, namely, the Chinese Red Army led by the Communist Party

[34] Especially the experience of the past fifteen years → Especially the experience of the seventeen years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party

[35] Against the enemy → Against Japan

[36] Fifteen years → Seventeen years

[37] The Russia of 1917 → The Russian Revolution of 1917

[38] It won → The Russian workers and peasants won

17. To these should be added the additional *contrasting* conditions that Japan is a *relatively* small country with a small territory, few resources, a small population, and a limited number of soldiers, while China is a big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population, and plenty of soldiers. Thus, apart from the contrast between strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a small country, retrogression, and meager support and a big country, progress, and abundant support. This is the reason why China will never be subjugated. The contrast between strength and weakness determines that Japan can ride roughshod over China for a certain time and to a certain extent; that China must unavoidably travel a hard stretch of road; and that the War of Resistance against Japan will be a protracted war and not a war of quick decision. Nevertheless, the other contrast—*the three opposites of* a small country, retrogression, and meager support versus a big country, progress, and abundant support—determines that Japan cannot ride roughshod over China indefinitely but is sure to meet final defeat, while China can never be subjugated but is sure to win final victory.

18. Why was Abyssinia vanquished? First, it was not only a weak country but also a small one. Second, it was not as progressive as China; it was an ancient country passing from the slave to the serf system, a country without capitalism or bourgeois political parties, let alone a Communist Party; it had no *progressive* army such as China's, *no army like the [Guomindang] Central Army,* let alone one like the Eighth Route Army. Third, it was unable to hold out and wait for international assistance; its war was an isolated one. Fourth, and most important of all, there were leadership mistakes in its war of resistance against Italy. Therefore Abyssinia was subjugated. But there is still quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia, which, if persisted in, will enable the Abyssinians to recover their fatherland during future changes of the world situation.

19. If the subjugationists apply indiscriminately the history of the failure of liberation movements in modern China to prove their assertions that "A War of Resistance will mean certain subjugation" and "Continuing the war will mean certain subjugation," here again our answer is a single sentence: The times have changed. China itself, the internal situation in Japan, and the international environment are all different now. It is a serious matter that Japan is stronger than before, while China, in its unchanged semicolonial and semifeudal position, is still fairly weak. It is also a fact that, for the time being, Japan can still control its people at home and exploit international contradictions as tools to use in invading China. But, during the process of a long war, these things are bound to change in the opposite direction. Such changes are not yet accomplished facts, but they will become so in the future. The subjugationists dismiss this point and pay no attention to it. As for China, not only do we already have new people, a new political party, a new army, and a new policy of resistance to Japan, a situation very different from that of over a decade ago, but what is more, all these will inevitably make further progress. It is true that historically the liberation movements met with repeated setbacks, with the result that China could not accumulate greater strength for the present War of Resistance against Japan—this is a very painful historical lesson, and in the future never again should we destroy any of our own revolutionary forces. Yet even, on the present basis, by exerting great efforts we can certainly forge ahead gradually and increase the strength of our resistance. All such efforts should go toward the general policy of the great Anti-Japanese National United Front. As for the aspect of international support, though direct and large-scale assistance is not yet in sight, it is in the making, the international situation being fundamentally different from before. The countless failures in the liberation movements of the modern era[39] all had their subjective and objective causes, but the situation today is entirely beyond compare. Today, although there are many difficulties which determine that the War of Resistance will be an arduous war—such as the enemy's strength and our weakness, and the fact that the enemy's difficulties are just starting, while our progress is far from sufficient, and so forth—nevertheless many favorable conditions exist for defeating the enemy; we need only add our subjective efforts, and we shall be able to overcome the difficulties and successfully strive for victory. These are favorable conditions which have no parallel before in any period of history, and that is why the War of Resistance against Japan, unlike the liberation movements of the past, will not end in failure.

Compromise or War of Resistance? Corruption or Progress?

20. It has been fully explained above that the theory of national subjugation is groundless. But there are many other people who do not subscribe to this theory; they are sincere patriots, who are nevertheless deeply worried about the present situation. Two things are worrying them: fear of a compromise with Japan and doubts about the possibility of political progress. These two vexing questions are being widely discussed, and no key has been found to their solution. Let us now examine these two questions.

21. As previously explained, the question of compromise has its social roots, and as long as these roots exist, the question is bound to arise. But compromise will not avail. To find evidence to prove the point, again we need only look at Japan, China, and the international situation. First, consider Japan. At the very beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated that the time would come when an atmosphere conducive to compromise would arise, in other words, that after occupying North China, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, Japan might devise schemes for inducing China to capitulate. True enough, it did so, but the crisis soon passed, one

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[39] The modern era → China's modern era

reason being that the enemy everywhere pursued a policy of barbarity and practiced naked plunder. Had China capitulated, everyone would have become a slave without a country. The enemy's policy for plundering and subjugating China has two aspects, the material and the spiritual. Both of these are being applied universally to all Chinese, not only to the popular masses of the lower strata but also to members of the upper strata; of course, the latter are treated a little more politely, but the difference is only one of degree, and definitely not of principle. In the main, it[40] is transplanting into the interior of China the same old measures it adopted in the Three Eastern Provinces. Materially, it is robbing the common people of their food and clothing, making them cry out in hunger and cold; it is plundering the instruments of production, thus ruining and enslaving China's national capital.[41] Spiritually, it is working to seize[42] the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under the flag of the Rising Sun, all Chinese are forced to be docile subjects, beasts of burden forbidden to show the slightest trace of Chinese national spirit. This barbarous enemy policy will be carried deep into the interior of China. Japan with its voracious appetite is unwilling to stop the war. As was inevitable, the policy set forth in the enemy[43] cabinet's statement of January 16, 1938, is still being obstinately carried out. This has enraged all strata of the Chinese people. Their rage is engendered by the retrogressive and barbarous character of Japan's war, [under which] "there is no escape from the calamity," and hence an absolute confrontation[44] has taken shape. It is to be expected that, on some future occasion, the enemy's schemes for inducing China to capitulate will once again appear and that certain subjugationists will again crawl out and most probably collude with certain foreign elements (who are found in Britain, the United States, and France, and especially among the upper strata in Britain) as partners in crime. But the general trend of events will not permit capitulation; the obstinate and particularly barbarous character of Japan's war has determined this aspect of the question.

22. Second, consider China. There are three factors contributing to China's perseverance in the War of Resistance. In the first place,[45] *judging from the history of the Guomindang, its leaders and the majority of its members are all capable of persevering. Next, even the enemies of the Communist Party do not doubt its determination to carry out the War of Resistance.* Finally, the *overwhelming* majority of other political parties and groups *and the people of the whole country* will oppose compromise and support the War of Resistance, *because to compromise is to become slaves without a country.* With unity among these three, *along with mutual oversight,* whoever wants to compromise will be standing with the Chinese traitors, and anybody will have the right to punish him. All those unwilling to be Chinese traitors have no choice but to unite and carry on the War of Resistance to the end; therefore compromise can hardly succeed.

23. Third, consider the international situation. Except for Japan's allies and certain elements in the upper strata within each other country,[46] every other aspect is favorable toward the War of Resistance, and not toward compromise by China. This factor has an impact on China's hopes. Today everyone in the country has[47] a certain hope, believing that international forces will gradually give China increasing help. It is not a vain hope; in particular, the existence of the Soviet Union encourages China in its War of Resistance. The socialist Soviet Union, now strong as never before, has always shared China's joys and sorrows. *Moreover, in accordance with Leninism* and in direct contrast to *some* members of the upper strata in all capitalist countries who seek nothing but profits, the Soviet Union considers it its duty to aid all weak nations and all revolutionary wars. The nonisolation of China in the war has its basis not only in international support in general but in Soviet support in particular. China and the Soviet Union are in close geographic proximity, which aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China's War of Resistance. China's geographic proximity to Japan increases the difficulties of China's resistance. *On this point, it is different from the American war of independence against Britain.* China's proximity to the Soviet Union, on the other hand,[48] *provides it a great advantage compared to America in its war of independence. We should not neglect this point.*

24. Hence we may conclude that the danger of compromise exists but can be overcome. Even if the enemy can modify its policy to some extent, it cannot alter this policy fundamentally. In China the social roots of compromise are present, but the opponents of compromise are in the majority. Internationally, there are also some forces favoring compromise but the main forces favor the War of Resistance. The combination of these three factors makes it possible to overcome the danger of compromise and persist to the end in the War of Resistance.

25. Let us now answer the second question. Political progress at home and perseverance in the War of Resistance are inseparable. The greater the political progress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the more we persevere in the war, the greater the political progress. But, fundamentally, everything depends on our perseverance in the War of Resistance. The unhealthy phenomena in various fields of the Party, the government, the army, and civil affairs[49] are very serious, and the historical accumulation of these undesirable factors has caused great anxiety and

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[40] It → The enemy

[41] National capital → National industries

[42] Seize → Destroy

[43] The enemy → The Japanese

[44] Confrontation → Hostility

[45] In the first place → In the first place, the Communist Party; this is the reliable force leading the people in resistance to Japan. Next, the Guomindang; because it depends on Britain and the United States, it will not capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to.

[46] Within each other country → Of each other capitalist country

[47] Everyone in the country has → The people of the whole country have

[48] On the other hand, → On the other hand, is a favorable condition for the Chinese War of Resistance.

[49] Of the Party, the government, the army, and civil affairs → Under the Guomindang

vexation among the broad ranks of our patriots. But there are no grounds for pessimism, since experience in the War of Resistance has already proved that the progress made[50] in the past ten months is equal to that made over the course of many years in the past. Although the historically accumulated phenomenon of corruption is seriously retarding the growth of our strength for the War of Resistance,[51] thus diminishing our victories and causing us losses in the war, the overall situation in China, in Japan, and in the world is such that we[52] cannot but make progress. This progress will be slow because of the existence of the factor that impedes progress, that is, corruption. Progress and the slow pace of progress are two characteristics of the present situation. This accords poorly with the urgent needs of the war and is a source of great worry to patriots. But we are in the middle of a war,[53] *and war will certainly be able to overcome the phenomenon of corruption.* Revolutionary war is an antitoxin that not only eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our own filth. A war[54] has tremendous power, which can transform everything.[55] The Sino-Japanese war will transform both China and Japan; provided China perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front, it will surely be able to transform the old Japan into a new Japan and the old China into a new China. The people and everything else in both China and Japan will achieve transformation during and after the war. It is proper for us to regard the War of Resistance and our national reconstruction as interconnected. To say that Japan can also achieve transformation is to say that the war of aggression by Japan's rulers will end in failure and may lead to a revolution by the Japanese people. The day of triumph of the Japanese people's revolution will be the day Japan is transformed. All this is closely linked to China's War of Resistance and is a prospect we should take into account. *To repeat: wars change everything; everyone should have resolute faith in this and make resolute efforts inspired by this faith.*

The Theory of National Subjugation Is Wrong and the Theory of Quick Victory Is Also Wrong

26. In our comparative study of the enemy and ourselves with respect to the basic contradictory characteristics, such as strong and weak, big and small, progressive and retrogressive, much support and little support, we have already refuted the theory of national subjugation, and we have explained why compromise is unlikely and why political progress is possible. The subjugationists stress the contradiction between strength and weakness and exaggerate it until it becomes

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[50] The progress made → The progress made by the Chinese people

[51] Our strength for the War of Resistance → The people's strength for the War of Resistance

[52] We → The Chinese people

[53] A war → A revolutionary war

[54] A war → Every just, revolutionary war

[55] Everything → Many things or clear the way for their transformation

the basis of their whole argument on the question, neglecting the other contradictions. The fact that they only bring up the single point of the contrast in strength is their one-sidedness, and their exaggeration of this one side of the matter into the whole is their subjectivism. Thus, if one looks at the matter as a whole, it will be seen that they have no ground to stand on; they are wrong. As for those who are neither subjugationists nor confirmed pessimists, but who are in a pessimistic frame of mind for the moment simply because they are confused by the disparity between our strength and that of the enemy at a given time and in certain respects or by the corruption in the country, we should point out to them that their views stem from a tendency toward one-sidedness and subjectivism. But in their case correction is relatively easy; once they are alerted, they will understand, for they are patriots and their error is only momentary.

27. The exponents of quick victory are likewise wrong. Sometimes they completely forget the contradiction between strength and weakness, and only bear in mind other contradictions. They depart from the true situation and often exaggerate China's advantages, changing them into something beyond recognition.[56] Or they presumptuously take the balance of strength and weakness at one time and place for the whole situation, as in the saying, "A leaf before the eye blocks out Mount Tai." In a word, they lack the courage to admit the truth that the enemy is strong while we are weak. They often deny this point and consequently deny one aspect of the truth. Moreover they do not have the courage to admit the limitations of our advantages, *but confuse boastfulness and politeness,* and thus they deny another aspect of the truth. The result is that they make mistakes, big and small, and there again it is subjectivism and one-sidedness that are doing the mischief. These friends have their hearts in the right place, and they, too, are patriots. But while "the gentlemen's aspirations are indeed lofty," their evaluations[57] are wrong, and to act according to them would certainly be to run into a brick wall. For if appraisal does not conform to reality, action cannot attain its objective; and to act in spite of this would mean the army's defeat and the nation's subjugation, so that the result would be the same as with the defeatists. Hence this theory will not do either.

28. Do we deny the danger of national subjugation? No, we do not. We recognize that China faces two possible prospects, liberation or subjugation, and that the two are in fierce conflict. Our task is to achieve liberation and to avert subjugation. The preconditions for liberation are China's progress, which is basic, the enemy's difficulties, and international support. We differ from the subjugationists. Taking an objective and comprehensive view, we recognize that the two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation both exist at the same time, stress that liberation is the dominant possibility, point out the conditions for its achievement,

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[56] They depart from the true situation and often exaggerate China's advantages, changing them into something beyond recognition → They depart from the true situation in an exaggerated way and change China's advantages into something beyond recognition

[57] Evaluations → Views

and strive to secure them. The subjugationists, on the other hand, taking a subjective and one-sided view, recognize only one possibility, that of subjugation; they do not admit the possibility of liberation and still less point out the conditions necessary for liberation or strive to secure them. Moreover, while acknowledging the tendency toward compromise and the phenomenon of corruption, we see other tendencies and phenomena which, we indicate, will prevail[58] and are already in fierce conflict with the former; in addition, we point out the conditions necessary for these other tendencies and phenomena to be realized, and we strive to overcome the tendency to compromise and to transform the state of corruption. Therefore, we are in no sense pessimistic; this is directly opposite to the pessimists.

29. It is not that we would not like a quick victory; everybody would be in favor of driving the "devils" out tomorrow in a single morning. But we point out that, in the absence of certain definite conditions, quick victory is something that exists only in our subjectivity[59] and not in objective *reality;* it is a mere illusion, a false truth. Accordingly, having made an objective and comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point out that a strategic, protracted war is the only way to achieve final victory, and we reject the groundless theory of quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to final victory, and the more fully and the sooner these conditions are secured, the surer we shall be of victory and the sooner we shall win it. We believe that only in this way can the course of the war be shortened, and we reject the theory of quick victory, which is just empty talk and an effort to get things on the cheap.

Why a Protracted War?

30. Let us now examine the problem of protracted war. A correct answer to the question "Why a protracted war?" can be arrived at only on the basis of all the fundamental factors making up the contrast between ourselves and the enemy. For instance, if we say merely that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are a weak semicolonial and semifeudal country, we are in danger of falling into the theory of national subjugation. Because neither in theory nor in practice can a protracted outcome be produced simply by pitting the strong against the weak.[60] The same is true if one simply sets the big against the small, the progressive against the reactionary, or abundant support against meager support. The annexation of the small by the big or of the big by the small is a common occurrence. It often happens that a progressive country or thing is destroyed by a big, retrogressive country or thing if its power is not great. Abundant or meager support is an important but subsidiary factor, and the degree of its effect depends upon the fundamental factors on both sides. *The saying "Heaven helps those who help themselves" is a scientific truth.* Therefore when we say that the War of Resistance against Japan is a protracted war, our conclusion is derived from the interrelations of all the factors at work on both sides. The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the road of subjugation[61] is there for us. Yet the enemy has other shortcomings, and we have other advantages. The enemy's advantages can be reduced by our efforts and his shortcomings can be aggravated by our efforts. On our own side, our advantages can be enhanced by our efforts and our shortcomings can be overcome by our efforts. Hence, we can win final victory and avert destruction, while the enemy will ultimately fail and will be unable to avert the collapse of the entire imperialist system.

31. Since the enemy has advantages only in one respect but shortcomings in all others and we have shortcomings only in one respect but advantages in all others, why has this produced not a balanced result, but, on the contrary, a superior position for the enemy and an inferior position for us?[62] Quite clearly, we cannot consider the question in such a formal way. The fact is that the disparity between the enemy's strength and our own is now so great that the enemy's shortcomings have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to offset the factors underlying its strength, while our advantages have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to compensate for the factors underlying our weakness. Therefore a balance cannot emerge, and what has emerged is an imbalance.

32. Although our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and the united front have somewhat changed the enemy's strength and superiority as against our weakness and inferiority, there has as yet been no basic change. Hence during a certain stage of the war, to a certain degree the enemy will be victorious and we will suffer defeats. But what is the reason that the enemy's victories and our defeats have been limited to a certain stage and a certain degree, and have not gone further and progressed to total victory for the enemy and total defeat for us? First, this is because the original situation of the enemy's strength and our weakness was relative, not absolute. Second, our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front have further accentuated this relativeness. In comparison with the original situation, the enemy is still strong, but unfavorable factors have reduced this strength, although not yet to a degree sufficient to destroy its superiority. Similarly, we are still weak, but favorable factors have compensated for our weakness, although not yet to a degree sufficient to transform our inferiority. Thus what has taken shape is that the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak, that the enemy is in a relatively superior and we are in a relatively inferior position. On both sides, strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority, have never been absolute. *Therefore, the victories and defeats of both sides have been limited to a*

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[58] Will prevail → Will gradually prevail

[59] In our subjectivity → In our brains

[60] The strong against the weak → The weak against the strong

[61] The road of subjugation → The danger of subjugation

[62] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "at present."

certain stage and a certain degree, giving rise to a situation of protracted war. Besides, our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front during the course of the war have brought about further changes in the original balance of strength and weakness between us and the enemy, *which have created or are creating relative strength and weakness and relative superiority and inferiority.* Therefore, the enemy's victories and our defeats have been limited to a certain stage and a certain degree, and this has created a situation of protracted war.

33. But circumstances will continue to change. In the course of the war, provided we employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakes of principle, and exert our best efforts, the factors working to the enemy's disadvantage and the factors working to China's advantage will both develop as the war is drawn out. This will inevitably continue to influence[63] our original degree of strength and that of the enemy, and continue to change the comparative superiority and inferiority of the two sides. When a certain new stage is reached, a great change will take place in the comparative degree of strength and superiority, leading to the enemy's defeat and our victory.

34. At present the enemy can still manage to exploit the factors of its strength, and our War of Resistance has not yet fundamentally weakened it. The factors of the insufficiency in its manpower, *troops, and financial* and material resources are not yet such as to check its offensive; on the contrary, they can still sustain its offensive to a certain extent. The retrogressive and barbarous nature of its war, a factor which arouses[64] both class antagonisms within Japan and the antagonism[65] of the Chinese nation, has not yet brought about a situation that fundamentally impedes its advance. The enemy's international isolation is likewise still in the midst of changes and development and is not yet complete. In many countries that assist us,[66] the capitalists dealing in munitions and raw materials for munitions are still bent solely on profit and are supplying Japan with large quantities of war supplies, and their governments are still unwilling to join the Soviet Union in using practical methods to sanction Japan. All this determines that our War of Resistance cannot be won quickly and can only be a protracted war. As for China, the factors of its weakness are found in the military, economic, political, and cultural areas, and although there has been a certain degree of improvement in the ten months of the War of Resistance, it is still a long way from what is required to check the enemy's offensive and prepare our counteroffensive. Moreover, quantitatively speaking, we have had to sustain certain losses. Although all the factors favorable to us are having a positive effect, it will not be sufficient to halt the enemy's offensive and to prepare for our counteroffensive until we make a sweeping effort.[67] Neither the abolition of corruption and the acceleration of progress at home, nor the curbing of the pro-Japanese forces and the expansion of the anti-Japanese forces abroad, are yet accomplished facts. This means that[68] the war cannot be won quickly; it determines that it will be a protracted war.[69]

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[63] Influence → Change

[64] Arouses → Intensifies

[65] Antagonism → Resistance

[66] In many countries that assist us → In many countries that have indicated that they will assist us

The Three Stages of the Protracted War

35. The protracted war between China and Japan will be played out concretely in three stages.[70] The first stage is the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defense. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counteroffensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counteroffensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to predict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in the war may be pointed out on the basis of present conditions. The objective course of events will be exceptionally rich and varied, with many twists and turns, and nobody can cast a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese war; nevertheless, in order to have strategic direction in the war it is necessary to make a rough sketch of its trends. Although the things we sketch out may not be in full accord with the subsequent facts and will be amended by them, it is still necessary to make such a sketch in order to give firm and purposeful strategic direction to the protracted war.

36. The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's design is to occupy the three points of Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Lanzhou, and to link these three points together. To accomplish this aim, the enemy will have to use at least fifty divisions, or about one and a half million soldiers, spend from one and a half to two years, and expend more than ten billion *yen*. In penetrating so deeply, the enemy will encounter immense difficulties, with consequences too awful to imagine. If it attempts to occupy the entire length of the Guangzhou-Hankou railway line and the Xi'an-Lanzhou Highway, it will have to fight perilous battles and even so may not fully accomplish its design. But in drawing up our operational plans we should take as a basis the assumption that the enemy may occupy the three points and even certain additional areas, and link them up as well, and we should deploy for a protracted war, so that even if the enemy does so, we will have ways to respond. In this stage the form of fighting[71] is primarily mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare. Because of subjective errors,[72] positional warfare

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[67] A sweeping effort → An immense effort

[68] This means that → All this determines that

[69] It determines that it will be a protracted war → It can only be a protracted war

[70] The protracted war between China and Japan will be played out concretely in three stages. → As the Sino-Japanese war is a protracted one, and final victory will belong to China, it can reasonably be assumed that this protracted war will be played out concretely in three stages.

[71] The form of fighting → The form of fighting we should adopt

[72] Because of subjective errors → Because of the subjective errors of the Guomindang military authorities

was assigned the primary role in the first period of this stage, but it is nevertheless supplementary from the point of view of the stage as a whole. In this stage, China has already built up a broad united front and achieved unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has used and will continue to use base and shameless means to induce China to capitulate in attempting to realize its plan for a quick decision, and to conquer the whole country without expending great effort, it has failed hitherto, and it is unlikely to succeed in the future either. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China will make considerable progress, which will become the main basis for continuing the War of Resistance in the second stage. In the present stage, *although international assistance may still not be large in quantity or direct, such assistance has already started,* particularly from the Soviet Union.[73] On the enemy side, there are already signs of flagging morale, and the spirit of the enemy army's attack is weaker in the middle period of this stage than it was in the initial phase; it will diminish still further in the concluding period. Signs of exhaustion are beginning to appear in the enemy's finances and economy; war weariness is beginning to set in among its people and troops; "war frustrations" are beginning to manifest themselves within the clique at the helm of the war; and pessimism about the prospects of the war is growing.

37. The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tail end of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to its strategic offensive, because of its shortage of troops and our firm resistance, and upon reaching them it will stop its strategic offensive and enter the stage of safeguarding its occupied areas. In the second stage, the enemy's concern will be to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them its own by the superficial procedure[74] of setting up puppet governments, while plundering the Chinese people to the limit; but again it will be confronted with stubborn guerrilla warfare. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear is unguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop extensively in the first stage, and many base areas will be established, seriously threatening the enemy's consolidation of the occupied areas, and so in the second stage there will still be widespread fighting. In this stage, the form of fighting for both sides[75] will be primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still be able to retain a large regular army, but it will find it difficult to launch the strategic counteroffensive quickly[76] because, on the one hand, the enemy will adopt a position of strategic defense in the big cities and along the main routes under its occupation and, on the other hand, China will not yet be adequately equipped technologically. Except for the troops engaged in frontal defense against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed deployments, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and acting in coordination with the local armed forces of the popular masses, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas. They will also keep the enemy on the move as much as possible in order to destroy it in mobile warfare, just as is now being done in the case of Shanxi Province. The fighting in the second stage will be ruthless, and localities will suffer serious devastation. But the guerrilla warfare will be able to succeed, and if it is conducted well the enemy may be able to retain only about one-third of its occupied territory, with the remaining two-thirds in our hands, and this will constitute a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then the enemy-occupied territory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on the degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy and on the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we should be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to endure this arduous stretch of road. It will be a very painful period for China; economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of the Chinese traitors will be two very serious problems. The enemy will go all out to wreck China's united front, and the organizations of Chinese traitors in all the occupied areas will merge into a so-called unified government. Because of the loss of big cities and the hardships of war, vacillating elements within our ranks will clamor for compromise, and pessimistic sentiments will grow to a serious extent. Our tasks will then be to mobilize the popular masses of the whole country to make concerted efforts in carrying on the war with unflinching perseverance, to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism and ideas of compromise, promote the will to struggle hard, and apply new wartime policies, and so to endure this arduous stretch of road. In the second stage, we will have to call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government, we will have to oppose *dissensions and* splits and improve techniques[77] in a planned fashion, transform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people, and prepare for the counteroffensive. The international situation will become still more unfavorable to Japan in this stage, and the main international forces will change toward giving more help to China, even though there may be talk of Chamberlain-type "realism" which accommodates itself to so-called *"faits accomplis."* Japan's threat to Southeast Asia and Siberia will become more serious than before, and a new war may even break out. As regards the enemy, dozens of its divisions will be inextricably bogged down in the quagmire of China. Widespread guerrilla warfare and the people's movement of resistance to Japan will wear down this big Japanese force, greatly depleting it and also undermining its morale by stimulating the further growth of homesickness, war weariness, and even antiwar sentiment. Although it would be wrong to say

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[73] Particularly from the Soviet Union → The Soviet Union has already given our country large amounts of aid

[74] The superficial procedure → The fraudulent method

[75] The form of fighting for both sides → Our form of fighting

[76] Quickly → Immediately

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[77] Techniques → Fighting techniques

that Japan will achieve no results at all in its plunder of China, yet, being short of capital and harassed by guerrilla warfare, it cannot possibly achieve rapid or substantial results. *Its operations in the Three Northeastern Provinces are evidence of this.* This second stage will be the transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the most difficult period but also the pivotal one. Whether China becomes an independent country or is reduced to a colony will be determined not by the retention or loss of the big cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front, and in the protracted war, China will in this stage gain the power to change from weakness to strength. It will be the second act in the three-act play of China's War of Resistance. And through the efforts of the entire cast it will become possible to perform a most brilliant last act.

38. The third stage will be the stage of the counteroffensive to recover our lost territories. Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strength which China has built up in the preceding stage and which will continue to grow in the third stage. But China's strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces and on the changes that will take place inside the country of the enemy, or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China's tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy. *These tasks will not be fully accomplished within a short time, for the vast occupied areas can only be recovered through bloody fighting.* In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategic defense, but will turn into a strategic counteroffensive overtly manifesting itself in strategic offensives, and it will no longer be fought on strategically interior lines, but will gradually shift to strategically exterior lines. Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can the entire war[78] be considered over. *If a revolutionary war breaks out in Korea or other places and requires China's assistance, that will belong to a separate war.* The third stage will be the last stage in the protracted war, and when we talk of persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all the way through to the end of this stage. The primary form of fighting[79] will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to importance. While positional defense cannot be regarded as important in the first stage because of the prevailing circumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the third stage because of the changed conditions and the requirements of the task. In the third stage, guerrilla warfare will again provide strategic support by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not become the primary form as in the second stage.

39. Seen this way, it is obvious that the war will be of long duration and consequently ruthless in nature. The enemy will not be able to gobble up the whole of China, but will be able to occupy many places for a fairly long period of time. China will not be able to oust the Japanese quickly, but the greater part of its territory will remain in China's hands. Ultimately the enemy will lose and we will win, but we shall have a hard stretch of road to travel.

40. The Chinese people will become tempered in the course of this long and ruthless war. All the political parties taking part in the war have also been tempered and tested.[80] *There should be only cooperation and no confrontation among them, for confrontation is the road to destruction.* The united front must be persevered in; only by persevering in the united front can we persevere in the war; and only by persevering in the united front and persevering in the war can we win final victory. If indeed we do so, all difficulties can be overcome. After traveling the arduous stretch of road we shall reach the highway to victory. This is the natural logic of the war.

41. In the three stages the changes in our strength and the enemy's strength will proceed along the following lines. In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we are inferior in strength. With regard to our inferiority, we must reckon on changes of two different kinds from before the War of Resistance to the end of this stage. The first kind is a change for the worse. China's original inferiority will be aggravated by war losses, namely, decreases in territory, population, economic strength, military strength, and cultural institutions. Toward the end of the first stage, the decrease will probably be considerable, especially on the economic side. This point will be exploited by some people as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise. But the second kind of change, the change for the better, must also be noted. It includes the experience gained in the war, the progress of the armed forces, the political progress, the mobilization of the people, the development of culture in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the increase in international support, and so forth. What is changing for the worse in the first stage is the quantity and the quality of the old, the manifestations being mainly quantitative. What is changing for the better is the quantity and quality of the new, the manifestations being mainly qualitative. It is the second kind of change that gives us a basis for our protracted war[81] and final victory.

42. In the first stage, changes of two kinds are also occurring on the enemy's side. The first kind is a change for the worse. It manifests itself in hundreds of thousands of casualties, the depletion of arms and ammunition, deterioration of morale, popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade, the expenditure of over ten billion *yen,* condemnation by world opinion, and so forth. This trend also gives us a basis for our protracted war[82] and final victory. But we must likewise reckon on the second kind of change on the enemy's side, a change for the better, that is, its expansion in territory, population, and resources. This too is a basis for the protracted nature of our War of Resistance and the impossibility of quick victory, but at the same time certain people will use it as a basis for their theories of national

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[78] The entire war → This war

[79] The primary form of fighting → Our primary form of fighting

[80] Have also been tempered and tested → Will also be tempered and tested

[81] Our protracted war → Our ability to endure

[82] Our protracted war → Our ability to endure

subjugation and of compromise. But we must take into account the temporary and partial character of this change for the better on the enemy's side. Japan is an imperialist power heading for collapse, and its occupation of China's territory is temporary. *The stubborn resistance by China's main forces and* the vigorous growth of guerrilla warfare in China will restrict its actual occupation to small and narrow zones. Moreover, its occupation of Chinese territory has created and intensified the opposition[83] between Japan and other foreign countries. Besides, generally speaking, such occupation involves a fairly long period in which Japan will make capital outlays without drawing any profits, as is shown by the experience of the Three Northeastern Provinces. All of these points again give us a basis for demolishing the theories of national subjugation and of compromise, and for establishing the theories of protracted war and of final victory.

43. In the second stage, the above changes on both sides will continue to develop. While the concrete circumstances cannot be predicted, on the whole Japan will continue to change for the worse and China to change for the better. For example, Japan's military and financial resources will be seriously depleted by China's guerrilla warfare, popular discontent will grow in Japan, morale will deteriorate further, and it will become more isolated internationally. As for China, it will make further progress in the political, military, and cultural spheres and in the mobilization of the people; guerrilla warfare will develop further; there will be a certain degree of new economic growth on the basis of the small industries and widespread agriculture of the interior; international support will gradually increase; and the whole picture will be quite different from what it is now. This second stage may last quite a long time, during which there will be a great reversal in the balance of forces, with China gradually rising and Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from its inferior position, and Japan will lose its superior position; first the two countries will become balanced, and then their relative positions will be reversed. Thereupon, China will in general have completed its preparations for the strategic counteroffensive and will enter the stage of carrying out the counteroffensive and expelling the enemy from the country. It should be reiterated that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counteroffensive will include an increase in China's own strength, an increase in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in international support; it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China's superiority and the completion of its preparations for the counteroffensive.

44. Because of China's unbalanced political and economic situation, the strategic counteroffensive of the third stage will not present a uniform and even picture throughout the country in its initial period, but will be regional in character, rising here and subsiding there. During this stage, the enemy will assuredly not desist from employing divisive ploys in attempts to rupture China's united front; consequently, the task of maintaining internal unity in China will become still more important, and we shall have to ensure that the strategic counteroffensive does not collapse halfway through internal dissension. In this period the international situation will become very favorable to China. China's task will be to take advantage of this international situation in order to attain complete liberation and establish an independent democratic state; at the same time this will help the world antifascist movement.

45. China moving from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, Japan moving from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China moving from the defensive to stalemate and then to the counteroffensive, Japan moving from the offensive to consolidation and then to retreat—such will be the course of the Sino-Japanese war and its inevitable trend.

46. Hence the questions and the conclusions are as follows: Will China be subjugated? Answer: No, it will not be subjugated; final victory will be China's. Can China win quickly? Answer: No, it cannot win quickly, there must be a protracted war. Is this conclusion correct? I believe it is.

47. At this point, the exponents of national subjugation and of compromise will again rush in and say, "To move from inferiority to parity China would need military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to move from parity to superiority it would need military and economic power greater than Japan's. But this is impossible; therefore the above conclusions are incorrect."

48. This is the so-called theory that "weapons decide everything," which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war, a subjective and one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also human power. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The balance of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power but also a contest of human power and human hearts. Military and economic power requires people to wield it. If the great majority of the Chinese people, the great majority of the Japanese people, and the great majority of the people of other countries are standing with our War of Resistance against Japan, how can Japan's military and economic power, wielded as it is by a small minority through coercion, count as superiority? And if not, then does not China, though wielding relatively inferior military and economic power, become the superior? There is no doubt that China will gradually grow in military and economic power, provided it perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front. As for our enemy, weakened as it will be by the long war and by internal and external contradictions, *the present situation of* its military and economic power is bound to change in the reverse direction. In these circumstances, is there any reason why China cannot become the superior? And that is not all. Although we cannot as yet count the military and economic power of other countries as being openly and to any great extent on our side, is there any reason why we will not be able to do so in the future? If Japan has more than just China alone as its enemy, if in the future any one country[84] makes open use of its considerable military and economic power

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[83] Opposition → Contradiction

[84] Any one country → One country or several countries

defensively or offensively against Japan and openly helps us, then will not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small country, its war is retrogressive and barbarous, and its international position will tend more and more toward isolation; China is a large country, its war is progressive and just, and its international position will tend more and more toward abundant support. Is there any reason why the long-term development of these factors should not definitely change the situation of relative superiority between the enemy and ourselves?

49. The exponents of quick victory, however, do not realize that war is a contest of strength, and that before a certain change has taken place in the relative strength of the belligerents, there is no basis for trying to fight strategically decisive battles and shorten the road to liberation. Were their ideas to be put into practice, we would inevitably run into a brick wall. Or perhaps they are just talking empty talk for their own pleasure without really intending to put their ideas into practice. In the end Mr. Reality will come and pour a bucket of cold water on these purveyors of empty talk, proving them in fact to be mere empty-talkists who want to get things on the cheap, to have gains without pains. We have had this kind of empty-talkism before and we have it now, though not very much so far, but there will be more[85] as the war develops into the stage of stalemate and then the stage of counteroffensive. But in the meantime, if China's losses in the first stage are fairly heavy and the second stage drags on very long, it is the theories of national subjugation and of compromise that will gain great currency. Therefore, our fire should be directed mainly against the theories of national subjugation and of compromise, and only secondarily against the empty-talkist theory of quick victory.

50. That the war will be of long duration is certain, but nobody can predict exactly how many months or years it will last, as this will depend entirely upon the degree of the change in the balance of forces. All those who wish to shorten the war have no alternative but to work hard to increase our own strength and reduce that of the enemy. Specifically, the only way is to work hard to fight more victorious engagements and wear down the enemy's forces; work hard to develop guerrilla warfare to reduce enemy-occupied territory to a minimum; work hard to consolidate and expand the united front and unite the forces of the whole country; work hard to build up new armies and develop new war industries; work hard to promote political, economic, and cultural progress; work hard to mobilize the people of the industrial, agricultural, commercial, and educational sectors; work hard to undermine the enemy forces and win over their soldiers; work hard to carry on international propaganda to strive to achieve foreign support; and work hard to win the support of the Japanese people and other oppressed peoples. Only by doing all this can we reduce the duration of the war. There is no magic shortcut.

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[85] There will be more → There may be more

A War of a Jigsaw Pattern

51. We can say with certainty that the protracted War of Resistance against Japan will represent a glorious, special page in the history of human wars. A jigsaw pattern of war is one of its rather special features. This pattern arises from such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan and its shortage of troops, on the one hand, and the progressiveness of China and the extensiveness of its territory, on the other. There have been other wars of a jigsaw pattern in history; the three years' civil war in Russia after the October Revolution was this kind of situation. But what distinguishes this war in China is its especially protracted and widespread character, which will break historical records. The jigsaw patterns manifest themselves in the following several ways.

52. Interior and exterior lines. The anti-Japanese war as a whole is being fought on interior lines; but as far as the relationship between the main forces and the guerrilla units is concerned, the former are on the interior lines while the latter are on the exterior lines, taking the remarkable form of a pincer attack around the enemy. The same can be said of the relationship between the various guerrilla areas. From its own viewpoint, each guerrilla area is on interior lines and the other areas are on exterior lines; together they form many battlefronts, which attack the enemy in pincers. In the first stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on interior lines is withdrawing, but the guerrilla units operating strategically on exterior lines will advance with great strides over wide areas toward the rear of the enemy—they will advance even more fiercely in the second stage—thereby forming an unusual pattern of both withdrawal and advance.

53. Possession and nonpossession of a rear area. The main forces, which extend the front lines to the outer limits of the enemy's occupied areas, are operating from the rear area of the country as a whole. The guerrilla units, which extend the battle lines into the enemy rear, are separated from the rear area of the country as a whole. But each guerrilla area has a small rear of its own, which it relies upon to establish its fluid battle lines. The case is different with the guerrilla detachments that are dispatched by a guerrilla area to operate temporarily behind the enemy; such detachments have no rear, nor do they have a battle line. "Operating without a rear area" is a special feature of revolutionary war in the new era, when circumstances include a vast territory, a progressive people, and an advanced political party and army. There is nothing to fear but much to gain from it, and far from having doubts about it we should promote it.

54. Encirclement and counterencirclement. Taking the war as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because the enemy is on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We for our part can encircle one or more of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes because we apply the policy of fighting campaigns and battles from exterior lines by using numerically preponderant forces against these

defensively or offensively against Japan and openly helps us, then will not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small country, its war is retrogressive and barbarous, and its international position will tend more and more toward isolation; China is a large country, its war is progressive and just, and its international position will tend more and more toward abundant support. Is there any reason why the long-term development of these factors should not definitely change the situation of relative superiority between the enemy and ourselves?

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enemy columns advancing on us from strategically exterior lines. This is the first form of our counterencirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountains, or on three sides, like the northwestern Shanxi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. If, however, one looks upon all the guerrilla base areas as linked up together and also considers the guerrilla base areas as linked up with the positions of the regular forces, one can see that we again surround a great many enemy forces. In Shanxi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Datong-Puzhou railway line on three sides (the east and west flanks of the railway and its southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all four sides; there are also many similar encirclements in Hebei, Shandong, and other provinces. This is the second form of our counterencirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement of the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own—rather like playing *weiqi.*[86] Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of enemy strongholds (such as Taiyuan) and our guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai mountains) resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. Weiqi *is, however, mechanistic in that the "spaces" in* weiqi *cannot be destroyed, whereas war is dialectic in that the "spaces" in war can be destroyed.* If one includes also the global game of *weiqi*, there is yet a third form of encirclement between us and the enemy: the interrelation between the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France, and Czechoslovakia with its front of aggression, while we counterencircle Germany, Japan, and Italy with our front of peace. But our encirclement, like the hand of Buddha, will turn into the Xumi Mountain[87] lying athwart the universe, and these new-style Sun Wukongs[88]—the fascist aggressors—will finally be buried underneath it, never to rise again. Therefore, if on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, with the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as another strategic unit, and with the Japanese people's movement as still another strategic unit, and thus form a gigantic net from which the fascist Sun Wukongs can find no escape, then that will be our enemy's day of doom. Indeed, the day when this gigantic net is formed will undoubtedly be the day of the complete overthrow of Japanese imperialism. This is not at all a joke; this is the inevitable trend of the war.

55. Big pieces and little pieces. There is a possibility that the enemy will occupy more than half of China proper, and only less than half will be kept intact. That is one aspect of the situation. But within this greater part, which does not include the Three Eastern Provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of transportation, and some of the plains—which may rank first in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in area,[89] while the greater part will be taken up by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere. That is another aspect of the situation. If we go beyond China proper, and include Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet, then the unoccupied area will constitute the greater part of China's territory, and the enemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even with the Three Eastern Provinces. That is yet another aspect of the situation. The area kept intact, *which constitutes the main rear area of the whole country and the location of the center of direction,* is of course important, and we should devote great efforts to developing it, not only politically, militarily, and economically but, what is also important, culturally. The enemy has transformed our former cultural centers into culturally backward areas, and we for our part must transform what have in the past been culturally backward areas into cultural centers. At the same time, the work of running extensive guerrilla areas behind the enemy lines is also extremely important; we should develop these areas in every respect, and we should develop cultural work as well. All in all, the big pieces of China's territory—the rural areas—will be transformed into regions of progress and light, while the small pieces—the enemy-occupied areas and especially the big cities—will temporarily become regions of backwardness and darkness.

56. Thus it can be seen that the protracted and far-flung War of Resistance against Japan is a war of a jigsaw pattern militarily, politically, economically, and culturally. It is an unusual spectacle in the annals of war, a magnificent feat by the Chinese nation, an astoundingly grand undertaking. This war not only will affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both to advance, but will also affect the whole world, impelling all nations, especially the oppressed nations such as India, to march forward. The people of all China should consciously throw themselves into this war of a jigsaw pattern, for this is the form of war by which the Chinese nation is seeking liberation for itself, the special form of war of liberation waged by a big semicolonial country in the 1940s.[90]

Fighting for Perpetual Peace

57. The protracted nature of China's anti-Japanese war cannot be separated from the fight for perpetual peace in China and the world. In no historical epoch was war ever so near to perpetual peace as it is today. *The life of humanity over several hundreds of thousands of years has already passed through two eras—the*

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[86] *Weiqi,* literally "encircling chess," is better known in the West under its Japanese name of *go,* though it took its present form in China as early as the Tang dynasty. It is played on a board containing 361 points of intersection. The object, as the name suggests, is to encircle the adversary's pieces, remove them from the board, and thereby take control of the greater part of the area of the board.

[87] Xumi Mountain → Mountain of Five Elements

[88] Sun Wukong is the name of the character also known as Monkey, the hero of the traditional Chinese novel *Journey to the West.* Many references to him are scattered through Mao's writings, and, although he is here assimilated to the fascist aggressors, Mao often took a more positive view of him.

[89] In area → In area and population

[90] In the 1940s → In the 1930s and the 1940s

era of the peaceful life of humanity and the era of the warlike life of humanity. The first of these eras occupied the longest historical period. In this era, humanity's production was extremely poor, and the only thing was to wage war against nature; wars between groups of human beings were unnecessary and impossible. The second era extends roughly from the last period of clan society to the present day. Because of the development of production and the appearance of social divisions, the era of the warlike life of humanity arrived.[91] Although this era has existed for no more than a few thousand years in all, each nation has fought countless wars, either within its own national group or with other national groups. When this fighting has continued into the imperialist epoch of capitalist society, wars are waged on a particularly extensive scale and with a peculiar ruthlessness. The first great imperialist war of twenty years ago was unprecedented in all previous history, but it was not yet *a war such as will not be known in all of history, still less was it* the last of all wars. Only the war that has now begun *has the character of being historically unprecedented and, moreover,* comes close to being the final war, that is, comes close to perpetual peace for humanity. At present one-third of the world's population has entered the war. Just look. Italy, then Japan; Abyssinia, then Spain, then China. The population of these countries participating in the war now amounts to about 600 million, or fully[92] a third of the total population of the world. The characteristics of the present war are its uninterruptedness and its nearness to perpetual peace. Why is it uninterrupted? After attacking Abyssinia, Italy attacked Spain, and Germany joined in; then Japan also attacked China. Who will come next? Undoubtedly Hitler will fight the great powers next. "Fascism is war"—this is perfectly correct. *Although one cannot say that once victory has been decided in the war between antifascism and fascism, there will be no more wars, and wars will certainly continue to be fought afterward,* there will be no interruption between the present war and a second world war.[93] Humanity will not be able to avoid the calamity of war. Why, then, do we say the present war is close to perpetual peace? The present war has developed on the basis of the general crisis of world capitalism.[94] This general crisis is compelling all the capitalist countries to enter into a war[95] and is driving all the fascist countries into war adventures[96] first. *In view of this kind of general crisis* we can foresee that this war will result, not in the salvation of capitalism, but in its collapse. This war will be bigger and more cruel than the war of twenty years ago; all nations will inevitably be drawn in, and it will drag on for a very long time; *it will settle all old accounts;* and humanity will suffer greatly. But because of the existence of the Soviet Union and the heightened political consciousness of the people of the world, great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly emerge from this war, and will intervene in[97] all counterrevolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a struggle for perpetual peace. Even if later there should be another period of war, perpetual world peace will not be far off. Once mankind has reached perpetual peace,[98] there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter, *the third era in the life of humanity will emerge, an era of peaceful life that will be forever without wars,* and our children and grandchildren[99] will never again see war for all eternity. The revolutionary wars that have already begun are part of the war for perpetual peace. The war between China and Japan, two countries which have a combined population of over 500 million, will occupy an important place in this war for perpetual peace, and out of it will come the liberation of the Chinese nation. The liberated new China of the future will be inseparable from the liberated new world of the future. Hence our War of Resistance against Japan takes on the character of a struggle for perpetual peace.

58. The wars that have taken place in history are divided into two kinds, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary.[100] All progressive wars are revolutionary,[101] and all wars that impede progress are counterrevolutionary.[102] We Communists oppose all counterrevolutionary[103] wars that impede progress, but we do not oppose progressive, revolutionary[104] wars. Not only do we Communists not oppose wars of the latter type, but we actively participate in them. As for counterrevolutionary wars, World War I is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; therefore the Communist Party[105] firmly opposed that war. The way to oppose a war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it breaks out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose counterrevolutionary[106] war with revolutionary[107] war whenever possible. Japan's war is a counterrevolutionary[108] war that impedes progress, and the peoples of the world, including

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[91] In the *Selected Works* version, this entire paragraph has been replaced by the following sentence: "Because of the emergence of classes, for the past several thousand years the life of humanity has been full of wars."

[92] Fully → Nearly

[93] And a second world war → And the development of a world war

[94] The present war has developed on the basis of the general crisis of world capitalism → The present war has developed on the basis of the general crisis of world capitalism, which was the reason for the start of World War I

[95] A war → A new war

[96] War adventures → New war adventures

[97] Intervene in → Oppose

[98] Once mankind has reached perpetual peace → Once mankind has eliminated capitalism, it will reach perpetual peace, and at that time

[99] Our children and grandchildren → Humanity

[100] Revolutionary and counterrevolutionary → Just and unjust

[101] Revolutionary → Just

[102] Counterrevolutionary → Unjust

[103] Counterrevolutionary → Unjust

[104] Revolutionary → Just

[105] The Communist Party → The Communists of the whole world

[106] Counterrevolutionary → Unjust

[107] Revolutionary → Just

[108] Counterrevolutionary → Unjust

the Japanese people, should oppose it and *are beginning to* oppose it. In our China, from the government to the people, from the Guomindang to the Communist Party,[109] *from the main forces to the guerrilla detachments*—all have raised the banner of righteousness and carried out the national-revolutionary war against aggression. Our war is sacred and just; it is progressive, and its aim is peace. The aim is peace not just in one country but throughout the world, not just temporary but perpetual peace. To achieve this aim, we must wage a life-and-death struggle, be prepared for any sacrifice, persevere to the end, and never stop short of the goal. However great the sacrifice and however long the time needed to attain it, a new world of perpetual peace and brightness already lies clearly before us. Our faith in waging this war is based upon the new China and the new world of perpetual peace and brightness for which we are striving. Fascism and imperialism wish to extend war endlessly, but we wish to put an end to it in the not-too-distant future. The great majority of mankind should exert its utmost efforts for this purpose. The 450 million people of China constitute one-quarter of the world's population, and if by their concerted efforts *and perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the united front* they overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China of freedom and equality, they will most certainly be making a tremendous contribution to the struggle for perpetual world peace. This is no empty hope, for the whole world is approaching this point in its social and economic path, and, provided that the majority of mankind works together, our goal will surely be attained with a few decades of effort.

Man's Conscious Activity in War

59. We have so far explained why the war is a protracted war and why the final victory will be China's, mainly dealing with "what it is" and "what it is not." Now we shall turn to the question of "how to do it" and "how not to do it." How to conduct protracted war and how to win final victory? These are the questions answered below. We shall therefore discuss successively the following problems: man's conscious activity in war, war and politics, political mobilization for the War of Resistance, the object of war, offense within defense, quick decisions within a protracted war, exterior lines within interior lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, the possibilities of exploiting the enemy's mistakes, the question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war, the army and the people as the foundation of victory, *and finally the conclusion.* Let us start with the problem of man's conscious activity.

60. When we say we are opposed to looking at problems subjectively, we mean that if an individual's ideas are not based upon or do not correspond to objective facts, such ideas are fanciful and fallacious and will lead to failure if acted on, so we must oppose them. But whatever is done has to be done by human beings; protracted war and final victory will not come about without human action. *To take such action and* for it to be effective there must first be ideas, principles, opinions, plans,[110] orientations, policies, strategies, and tactics. Ideas and so forth are subjective things, while deeds or actions are the objective manifestations of the subjective, but both represent the capacity for action peculiar to human beings. We term this "conscious activity," and it is a characteristic that distinguishes human beings from things. All ideas based upon and corresponding to objective facts are correct ideas, and all deeds or actions based upon correct ideas are correct actions. We must develop such ideas and actions; we must develop this conscious activity. The anti-Japanese war is being waged to drive out an imperialist[111] and transform the old China into a new China; these goals can be achieved only when we mobilize the whole Chinese people and cultivate their conscious activity in resisting Japan. If we just sit and take no action, only subjugation awaits us and there will be neither protracted war nor final victory.

61. Conscious activity is a characteristic of human beings, and especially of human beings at war.[112] *Conscious activity is displayed by human beings in all of their actions, but nowhere so strongly as in war.* Victory or defeat in war is decided, on the one hand,[113] by the military, political, economic, and geographical conditions on both sides, the nature of the war, and international assistance, but not by these alone; in themselves, these factors provide only the possibility of victory or defeat, but do not decide the issue. To decide the issue, subjective efforts must be added, that is, efforts in directing and waging the war, that is, conscious activity in war.

62. In seeking victory, those who direct a war cannot overstep the limitations imposed by objective conditions; within these limitations, however, they can and must strive actively for victory. The stage of action for commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but on that stage they can direct the performance of many *living* dramas, full of sound and color, power and grandeur. Given the objective material foundations, the commanders in the War of Resistance against Japan should display their prowess and marshall all their forces to overthrow those enemies of the nation, transform the present situation in which our country and society are suffering from aggression and oppression, and create a new China of freedom and equality. Here is where our subjective ability to direct can and must be exercised. We do not want any of our commanders in the war to detach himself from the objective conditions and become a blundering hothead, but we must urge every anti-Japanese commander to become a general who is both courageous and

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[109] From the government to the people, from the Guomindang to the Communist Party → From the people to the government, from the Communist Party to the Guomindang

[110] There must first be ideas, principles, opinions, plans → There must first be people who derive ideas, principles, and opinions from objective facts, then put forward plans

[111] An imperialist → Imperialism

[112] And especially of human beings at war → Human beings strongly display this characteristic in war

[113] On the one hand → To be sure

wise. Our commanders should have not only the boldness to overwhelm the enemy, but also the ability to remain masters of the situation throughout the changes and developments of the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, they must not founder, but must reach the opposite shore resolutely with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics, which constitute the laws for directing war, define the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

War and Politics

63. "War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character. The anti-Japanese war is a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and victory is inseparable from the political aims of the war—to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality. It is inseparable from the general orientation of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front, from the mobilization of the people of the whole country, and from political principles such as the unity between officers and men, the unity between the army and the people, and disintegrating the enemy forces. It is inseparable from the effective application of united front policy, from mobilization on the cultural front, and from the efforts to win international support and the support of the people of the enemy country. In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. Any tendency among the anti-Japanese soldiers to belittle politics, to regard war in isolation, and to treat war as an absolute, is wrong and should be corrected.

64. But war has its own particular characteristics and in this respect it cannot be equated with politics.[114] War is politics by other means.[115] *It is something that is used to achieve political ends.* When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed in the old way, war breaks out and is used to sweep the obstacles in the way of politics. For instance, the semi-independent status of China is an obstacle to the political development of Japanese imperialism, and so Japan has unleashed a war of aggression to sweep away that obstacle. What about China? Imperialist oppression has long been an obstacle to China's bourgeois-democratic revolution; hence many wars of liberation have been waged in the effort to sweep this obstacle away. Japan is now using war for the purpose of oppressing China and completely blocking the advance of the Chinese revolution, and therefore China is compelled to wage the War of Resistance against Japan in its determination to sweep away this obstacle. When the obstacle is removed, politics will appear again,[116] and the war will be concluded. But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue until the aims are fully accomplished. Thus anyone who seeks a compromise before the task of the anti-Japanese war is fulfilled is bound to fail because even if a compromise were to occur for one reason or another, the war would break out again, since the broad masses of the people would certainly not submit, but would continue the war until its political objectives were achieved. It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.

65. From the particular characteristics of war there arise a particular set of organizations, a particular set of methods, and a particular kind of process. The organizations are the armed forces and everything that goes with them. The methods are the strategy and tactics for directing war. The process is the particular form of social activity in which the opposing armed forces engage in attacking each other or defending themselves against one another, employing strategy and tactics favorable to themselves and unfavorable to the enemy. Hence war experience is a particular kind of experience. All those who take part in war must rid themselves of their customary ways and accustom themselves to war before they can win victory.

Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance[117]

66. Such a gigantic national revolutionary war as ours cannot be victorious without universal and thoroughgoing political mobilization. Failure to undertake political mobilization for the War of Resistance before it began was a great deficiency on China's part, which resulted in the loss of a move to the enemy. Even after the War of Resistance[118] began, political mobilization was very far from universal, let alone penetrating. News of the war reached the great majority of the people through the enemy's shelling and aerial bombardment. That was also a kind of mobilization, but it was done for us by the enemy; we did not do it ourselves. Even now the people in the remote regions beyond the noise of the guns are still very quiet.[119] This situation must be changed; otherwise we cannot win victory in our life-and-death struggle. We must never lose another move to the enemy; on the contrary, we must fully exploit this move to vanquish him. This move is crucial; it is truly of paramount importance, while our inferiority in weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, persevere in the united front, and persevere in the protracted war. But all these things are inseparable from the mo-

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[114] Politics → Politics in general

[115] War is politics by other means. → "War is the continuation of politics by particular means." (This latter formulation, inserted by Mao in the *Selected Works,* is a direct quotation from Lenin.)

[116] Politics will appear again → Our political aims will be attained

[117] For the War of Resistance → for Resistance Against Japan

[118] War of Resistance → Resistance to Japan

[119] Still very quiet → Still living quietly there

bilization of the common people. To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like "trying to go south by driving the chariot north," and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.

67. What does political mobilization mean? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political aims of the war. It is necessary for every soldier and civilian to see why the war must be fought and how it concerns him. The political aims of the war are "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality." We must tell everyone, soldiers and civilians, about these aims, before we can create an upsurge in the War of Resistance[120] and unite hundreds of millions in a concerted effort to contribute their all to the war. Second, it is not enough merely to explain the aims to them; the steps and policies for their attainment must also be given, that is, there must be a political program. We already have the Program for the War of Resistance and the Building of the Nation;[121] we should popularize both of them in the army and among the people and mobilize everyone to carry them out. Without a clear-cut, concrete political program, it is impossible to mobilize all the armed forces and the whole people to carry the War of Resistance through to the end. Third, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth; by leaflets and bulletins; by newspapers, books, and pamphlets; through plays and films; through schools; through the mass organizations; and through our cadres. What has been done so far[122] is only a drop in the ocean, and, moreover, it has been done in a manner ill suited to the people's tastes and in a spirit uncongenial to them; this must be earnestly changed. Fourth, to mobilize once is not enough; political mobilization for the War of Resistance must be continuous. Our job is not to recite our political program to the people, for nobody will listen to such recitations; we must link the political mobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement. This is a matter of immense importance on which our victory in the war primarily depends.

The Object of War

68. Here we are not dealing with the political aims of war; the political aims of the War of Resistance against Japan have been defined above as "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality." Here we are dealing with the elementary object of war, war as "politics with bloodshed," as mutual slaughter by opposing armies. The object of war is specifically "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or "deprive him of the power to resist," and does not mean his physical destruction).[123] In ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present day, all weapons are still an extension of the spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine gun, the long-range gun, and poison gas are developments of the spear, while the air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification, and the gas mask are developments of the shield. The tank is a powerful weapon[124] combining the functions of both spear and shield. Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy, but defense cannot be dispensed with. In attack the immediate object is to destroy the enemy, but, at the same time, it is self-preservation, because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defense the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but, at the same time, defense is a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack. Retreat is in the category of defense and is a continuation of defense, while pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that destruction of the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary, because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively preserve oneself. Therefore attack, the chief means of destroying the enemy, is primary, while defense, a supplementary means of destroying the enemy and a means of self-preservation, is secondary. In actual warfare the chief role is played by defense much of the time and by attack the rest of the time, but if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.

69. How do we explain the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Does it not contradict "self-preservation"? No, it does not; *to put it more correctly*, sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. War is politics with bloodshed and exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (nonpreservation) is incurred for the sake of general and permanent preservation. This is precisely why we say that attack, which is basically a means of destroying the enemy, also has the function of self-preservation. It is also the reason why defense must be accompanied by attack and should not be defense pure and simple.

70. The object of war—namely, the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy—is the essence of war and the basis of all war activities, an essence which pervades all warlike actions, from the technical to the strategic. The object of war is the underlying principle of war, and no tenets or principles of techniques, tactics, campaigns, or strategy can in any way depart from it. What for instance is meant by the principle of "concealing the body and making full use of fire-power" in shooting? The purpose of the former is self-preservation, of the latter the destruction of the enemy. The former gives rise to such techniques as making use of the terrain and its features, advancing in spurts, and spreading out in dispersed formation. The latter gives rise to other techniques, such as clearing the field of

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[120] In the War of Resistance → In resistance to Japan

[121] We already have the Program for the War of Resistance and the Building of the Nation → We already have the Ten-Point Program of Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and also the Program of the War of Resistance and the Building of the Nation

[122] What has been done so far → What has been done so far in the Guomindang-ruled areas

[123] Physical destruction → Complete physical destruction

[124] A powerful weapon → A new weapon

fire and organizing a network of fire. As for the assault force, the containing force, and the reserve force in a tactical operation, the first is for annihilating the enemy, the second for preserving oneself, and the third for either purpose according to circumstances—either for annihilating the enemy (in which case it reinforces the assault force or serves as a pursuit force) or for self-preservation (in which case it reinforces the containing force or serves as a covering force). Thus, no principles or operations can in any way depart from the object of war in terms of techniques, tactics, campaigns, or strategy, and this object pervades the whole of a war and runs through it from beginning to end.

71. In directing the War of Resistance against Japan, leaders at every level must lose sight neither of the contrast between the fundamental factors on each side nor of the object of this war. In the course of military operations, these contrasting fundamental factors play themselves out, becoming the struggle by each side to preserve itself and destroy the other. In our war we strive in every engagement to win a victory, big or small, and to disarm a part of the enemy and destroy a part of his men and materials. We must accumulate the results of these partial destructions of the enemy into major strategic victories and so achieve the final political aim of expelling the enemy, protecting the motherland, and building a new China.

Offense Within Defense, Quick Decisions Within a Protracted War, Exterior Lines Within Interior Lines

72. Now let us examine the concrete strategic orientation of the War of Resistance against Japan. We have already said that our strategic orientation for resisting Japan is that of protracted war. That is true, and it is perfectly correct. But this is a general orientation, not a concrete orientation. Concretely, how should the protracted war be conducted? That is the question we shall now discuss. Our answer is as follows. In the first and second stages of the war, that is, in the stages of the enemy's offensive and the preservation of his gains, we should conduct campaigns and battles of attack within the strategic defensive, campaigns and battles of quick decision within the strategically protracted war, and campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. In the third stage, we should launch the strategic counteroffensive.

73. Since Japan is a strong imperialist power and we are a weak semicolonial and semifeudal country, it has adopted the overall policy of strategic offensive, while we are in a position of strategic defense. Japan is trying to execute the strategy of a war of quick decision; we should consciously execute the strategy of protracted war. Japan is using dozens of army divisions of fairly high combat effectiveness (now numbering thirty) and part of its navy to encircle and blockade China from both land and sea, and is using its air force to bomb China. Its army has already occupied a long front stretching from Baotou to Hangzhou and its navy has reached Fujian and Guangdong; thus exterior-line operations have taken shape on a vast scale. On the other hand, we are in the position of operating on interior lines. All of this results from the fact that the enemy is strong while we are weak. This is one aspect of the situation.

74. But there is another and exactly opposite aspect. Japan, though strong, does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory, a large population, and many soldiers. This raises two big issues.[125] First, the enemy, employing its small forces against a vast country, can only occupy some big cities, main lines of transportation, and part of the plains. Thus there are extensive areas in territory under its occupation which it has had to leave ungarrisoned, and which provide a vast arena for China's guerrilla warfare activities. Taking the country as a whole, even if the enemy manages to occupy the line connecting Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Lanzhou and its adjacent areas, it can hardly occupy the regions beyond, and this gives China a general rear and central bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory. Second, in pitting its small forces against large forces, the enemy is encircled by our large forces. The enemy is attacking us along several routes. Strategically the enemy is on exterior lines while we are on interior lines; strategically the enemy is on the offensive while we are on the defensive. All this appears very much to our disadvantage. But we can make use of our two advantages—our vast territory and large forces—and, instead of stubborn positional warfare, carry on flexible mobile warfare, employing several divisions against one enemy division, several tens of thousands of our men against ten thousand of his, several columns against one of his columns, and suddenly encircling a single column from the exterior lines of the battlefield and attacking it. In this way, while the enemy is on exterior lines and on the offensive in strategic operations, he will be forced to fight on interior lines and on the defensive in campaigns and battles. And for us, interior lines and the defensive in strategic operations will be transformed into exterior lines and the offensive in campaigns and battles. This is the way to deal with one or indeed with any enemy column. Both of the points discussed above follow from the fact that the enemy is small while we are big. Moreover, *there is also a third point;* the enemy forces, though small, are strong (in arms and training) while our forces, though large, are weak (only in arms and training, not in morale). Consequently, in campaigns and battles we should not only employ large forces against small and operate from exterior against interior lines, but also follow the general policy of seeking quick decisions. In general, to achieve quick decision, we should attack the enemy when he is moving, not when he is at rest. We should concentrate a big force under cover beforehand, alongside the route that the enemy must take, and seize the opportunity, while he is on the move, to advance suddenly to encircle and attack by surprise, *before he has a chance to deploy his troops, use his heavy weapons, and bring his advanced weapons into play. In general, within half a day, one day, or a day and an evening,* the fighting should be concluded.[126] If we fight well, we may destroy the entire enemy

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[125] This raises two big issues → This produces two important consequences

[126] The fighting should be concluded → Concluding the fighting rapidly

force or the greater part or some part of it, and even if we do not fight well, we may still inflict heavy casualties. This applies to any and every one of our battles. If each month we win one fairly large victory like those at Pingxingguan or Tai'erzhuang, not to speak of more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of our own forces, and call forth international support. Thus our strategically protracted war is translated in the field into battles of quick decision. The enemy's war of strategic quick decision can only change into protracted war after the enemy is defeated in many campaigns and battles.

75. To sum up the above general operational orientation for fighting campaigns and battles in a single sentence, it is one of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines." It is the opposite of our overall strategic policy of "protracted defensive warfare on interior lines," and yet it is an indispensable orientation for carrying out this overall strategic policy. If we should use "protracted defensive warfare on interior lines" as the principle for campaigns and battles too, as we did at the beginning of the War of Resistance, it would be totally unsuited to the *contrasting* circumstance in which the enemy is big while we are small[127] and the enemy is strong while we are weak. In that case we could never achieve our strategic objective, we could never achieve an overall protracted war, and we would be defeated by the enemy. That is why we have always advocated the organization of the forces of the entire country into a number of large field armies, each counterposed to one of the enemy's field armies but having two, three, or four times its strength, and so contending with the enemy in extensive theaters of war in accordance with the general orientation outlined above. *After the loss of Nanjing, we learned the lessons of the first period of fighting and have started to adopt the general orientation for fighting and the method for organizing field armies described above. It is just that they have not yet been used skillfully. But the campaigns of southern Shandong and southern Shanxi achieved notable results and demonstrate that this orientation is the only correct orientation.* This general orientation can be used not only in regular warfare; in guerrilla warfare too it *is usually suitable and* can be used, indeed must be used. It is applicable not only to any one stage of the war but to its entire course. In the stage of strategic counteroffensive, when we are better equipped technically and are no longer in the position of the weak fighting the strong, we shall be all the more able to capture prisoners and matériel on a large scale if we continue to employ superior numbers in quick-decision offensive battles from exterior lines. For instance, if we employ two mechanized divisions[128] against one mechanized enemy division, we can be all the more certain of destroying it. It is a commonsensical truth that several big fellows can easily beat up one.

76. If we resolutely apply "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines" in battlefield operations, we shall not only change the balance of forces on the battlefield but also gradually change the general situation. On the battlefield we shall be on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive; we shall be employing superior numbers on exterior lines and the enemy inferior numbers on interior lines; and we shall seek quick decisions, while the enemy, though he will seek to protract the fighting in the expectation of reinforcements, will not be in a position to have his way in this respect. For all these reasons, the enemy's position will change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forces, in contrast, will change from weak to strong, from inferior to superior. After the fighting of many such victorious battles, the general situation between us and the enemy will change. That is, through the accumulation of victories on many battlefields by quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, we shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy, and this will necessarily affect the general balance of forces and bring about changes in it. When that happens, these changes, together with other factors on our side and together with the changes within the enemy and a favorable international situation, will turn the overall situation between us and the enemy first into one of parity and then from parity into one in which we are superior and the enemy inferior. That will be the time for us to launch the counteroffensive and drive the enemy out of the country.

77. War is a contest of strength, but the original pattern of strength changes in the course of war. Here the decisive factor is subjective effort—winning more victories and committing fewer errors. The objective factors provide the possibility for such change, but turning this possibility into actuality requires both correct policy and subjective effort. It is then that the subjective plays the decisive role.

Initiative, Flexibility, and Planning

78. In quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines, as discussed above, the crucial point is the offensive; exterior lines refers to the scope of the offensive and quick-decision to the duration of the offensive. Hence the name "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines." This is the best overall orientation for waging a protracted war, and it is also the orientation for what is known as mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect without initiative, flexibility, and planning. Let us now study these three questions.

79. We have already discussed conscious activity, so why do we also talk about initiative? Conscious activity refers to conscious actions and efforts, a characteristic distinguishing human beings from animals, and this human characteristic manifests itself most strongly in war; these points have already been discussed. The initiative referred to here means an army's freedom of action, as distinguished from an enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of action is the very life of an army, and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeat or destruction. The disarming of a soldier is the result of his losing freedom of action through being forced into a passive position. The same is true of the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in war do all they can to gain the initiative and avoid passivity. It may be said

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[127] The enemy is big while we are small → The enemy is small while we are big

[128] Two mechanized divisions → Two, three, or four mechanized divisions

that the quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines that we advocate, as well as the flexibility and planning necessary for its execution, are designed to gain the initiative and thus force the enemy into a passive position and achieve the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. But initiative or passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority in capacity to wage war. Consequently it is also inseparable from the correctness or incorrectness of the subjective direction of war. In addition, there is the question of exploiting the enemy's misconceptions and unpreparedness in order to gain the initiative and force the enemy into passivity. These points are analyzed below.

80. Initiative is inseparable from superiority in capacity to wage war, while passivity is inseparable from inferiority in capacity to wage war. Such superiority or inferiority is the objective basis of initiative or passivity. It is natural that the strategic initiative can be better maintained and exercised through a strategic offensive, but to maintain the initiative always and everywhere, that is, to have the absolute initiative, is possible only when there is absolute superiority matched against absolute inferiority. When a strong, healthy man wrestles with an invalid, he has the absolute initiative. If Japan were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if, for instance, it could throw in a huge force of several million or ten million men all at once, if its financial resources were several times what they are, if it had no opposition from its own people or from other countries, and if it did not pursue the barbarous policies which arouse the opposition[129] of the Chinese people, then it would be able to maintain absolute superiority and have the absolute initiative always and everywhere. In history, such absolute superiority rarely appears in the early stages of a war or a campaign but is to be found toward its end. For instance, on the eve of Germany's capitulation in the European War,[130] the Entente countries became absolutely superior, Germany became absolutely inferior, and thus Germany was defeated and the Entente countries were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority toward the end of a war. As another example, on the eve of the Chinese victory at Tai'erzhuang, the isolated Japanese forces there were reduced after bitter fighting to absolute inferiority while our forces achieved absolute superiority, so that the enemy was defeated and we were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority toward the end of a campaign. A war or campaign may also end in a situation of relative superiority or of parity, in which case there is compromise in the war or confrontation in the campaign. But in most cases it is absolute superiority and inferiority that decide victory and defeat. All this holds for the end of a war or a campaign, and not for the beginning. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war, it can be predicted, will be that Japan will become absolutely inferior and be defeated, and that China will become absolutely superior and gain victory. But at present superiority or inferiority is not absolute on either side, but is relative. With the advantages of its military, economic, and political-organizational power, Japan enjoys superiority over us with our military, economic, and political-organizational weakness, which creates the basis for its initiative. But because quantitatively its military and other power is not great and it has many other disadvantageous factors, its superiority is reduced by its own contradictions. Since arriving in China, Japan's superiority has been reduced still further because it has come up against our vast territory, large population, great numbers of troops, and resolute national resistance. Hence, Japan's general position has become one of only relative superiority, and its ability to exercise and maintain the initiative, which has thereby been restricted, has likewise become a relative thing. As for China, though placed in a somewhat passive position strategically because of its inferior strength, it is nevertheless quantitatively superior in territory, population, and troops, and also superior in the morale of its people and army and their hatred of the enemy; this superiority, together with other advantageous factors, reduces the extent of its inferiority in military, economic, and other power, and changes it into a relative strategic inferiority. This also reduces the degree of China's passivity so that its strategic position is one of only relative passivity. Any passivity, however, is a disadvantage, and one must strive hard to shake it off. Militarily, the way to do so is resolutely to wage quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, to launch guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy and so secure overwhelming local superiority and initiative in many campaigns of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Through such local superiority and local initiative in many campaigns, we can gradually create strategic superiority and strategic initiative and extricate ourselves from strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the relationship between initiative and passivity, or between superiority and inferiority.

81. From this we can also understand the relationship between initiative or passivity and the subjective direction of war. As already explained, it is possible to escape from our position of relative strategic inferiority and passivity, and the method is artificially to create local superiority and initiative in many campaigns, so depriving the enemy of local superiority and initiative and plunging him into inferiority and passivity. Combined, these local things will add up to strategic superiority and initiative for us and strategic inferiority and passivity for the enemy. *But* such a change depends upon correct subjective direction. Why? Because while we seek superiority and the initiative, so does the enemy; viewed from this angle, war is a contest in subjective ability between the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for superiority and for the initiative within the arena of the material basis.[131] Out of the contest there emerge a victor and a vanquished; apart from the contrast in objective material conditions, the victor will necessarily owe his success to correct subjective direction and the vanquished his defeat to erroneous subjective direction. We recognize that the phenomenon of war is more

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[129] The opposition → The all-out resistance

[130] The European War → World War I

[131] Within the arena of the material basis → Within the arena of the material basis of military strength, financial strength, and such

elusive and is characterized by greater uncertainty than any other social phenomenon, in other words, that it is more a matter of "probability." Yet war is not supernatural, but a mundane process governed by necessity. That is why Sunzi's axiom "He who knows himself and knows the enemy will win a hundred times in a hundred battles"[132] remains a scientific truth. Mistakes arise from ignorance about the enemy and about ourselves, and, moreover, the peculiar nature of war makes it impossible in most settings[133] to have full knowledge both of the enemy and of oneself; this gives rise to the uncertainty about military conditions and operations, and hence to mistakes and defeats. But whatever the situation and the actions in a war, one can know their general aspects and essential points. It is possible for a commander to reduce errors and give generally correct direction, first through all kinds of reconnaissance and then through intelligent inference and judgment. Armed with the weapon of "generally correct direction," we can fight more victorious battles and transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into initiative. This is how initiative or passivity is related to the correct or incorrect subjective direction of a war.

82. The idea that correct or incorrect subjective direction can effect changes between superiority and inferiority and between initiative and passivity becomes all the more convincing when we look at the record of defeats suffered by big and powerful armies and of victories won by small and weak armies. There are many such instances in Chinese and foreign history. Examples in China are the Battle of Chengpu between the states of Jin and Chu,[134] the Battle of Chenggao between the states of Chu and Han,[135] the battle in which Han Xin defeated Zhao's armies,[136] the Battle of Kunyang between the states of Xin and Han,[137] the Battle of Guandu between Yuan and Cao,[138] the Battle of the Red Cliff between the states of Wu and Wei,[139] the Battle of Yiling between the states of Wu and Shu,[140] the Battle of Feishui between the states of Qin and Jin,[141] and so forth. Among examples to be found abroad are most of Napoleon's wars,[142] *Hindenburg's East Prussian Campaign,* and the civil war in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution. In all these instances, victory was won by the few fighting the many, by the inferior fighting the superior. In every case, the weaker force, pitting local superiority and initiative against the enemy's local inferiority and passivity, first inflicted one sharp defeat on the enemy and then turned on the rest of its forces and smashed them one by one, thus transforming the overall situation into one of superiority and initiative. The reverse was the case with the enemy, which originally had superiority and held the initiative. Owing to subjective errors and internal contradictions, the enemy [commander] managed to forfeit completely an excellent or fairly good position in which he enjoyed superiority and initiative, and became a general without an army or a king without a kingdom. Thus it can be seen that although superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war is the objective basis determining initiative or passivity, it is not in itself actual initiative or passivity; it is only through a struggle, a contest of subjective ability, that actual initiative or passivity can emerge. In the struggle, correct or incorrect subjective direction can transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into initiative, or transform superiority into inferiority and initiative into passivity. The fact *that the Ox-Devil King could not defeat the Monkey King*[143] *and* that every ruling dynasty could not defeat revolutionary armies shows that merely having superiority[144] does not mean definitely having a position of initiative, much less does it definitely mean final victory. Through a

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[132] "He who knows himself and knows the enemy will win a hundred times in a hundred battles" → "He who knows the enemy and knows himself will never in a hundred battles be in peril" (Here the *Selected Works* version replaces Sunzi's maxim as commonly quoted by Mao and others at the time with the formulation which appears in the text of *The Art of War,* chapter 3.)

[133] In most settings → In many settings

[134] In this battle, which took place in 632 B.C.E., the Chu armies initially had the advantage, but the Jin forces, after retreating, attacked the enemy's weak spots, the right and left flanks, and inflicted heavy defeats.

[135] In 203 B.C.E., battles took place in Chenggao between Liu Bang of Han and Xiang Yu of Chu. Initially Xiang Yu had the advantage, but Liu Bang, the future founder of the Han dynasty, attacked his adversary's forces while they were crossing a river and crushed them.

[136] In 204 B.C.E. Han Xin, a general of Han, defeated the army of Zhao Xie, which was several times the size of his own, by attacking the enemy's rear.

[137] In 23 C.E. a battle took place in Kunyang between Liu Xiu, the founder of the Eastern Han dynasty, and Wang Mang, who had usurped the throne in 9 C.E. Although Liu Xiu had only 8,000 or 9,000 men, as compared with some 400,000 for Wang Mang, he won a crushing victory by exploiting the failings of Wang Mang's generals, who underestimated their enemy.

[138] Guandu was the scene of a battle between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao in 200 C.E. Cao Cao launched a surprise attack on his careless enemies, set their supplies on fire, and wiped out Yuan Shao's main force.

[139] The battle of the Red Cliff (Chibi) took place in 208 C.E. between Cao Cao, the ruler of Wei, and Sun Quan, the ruler of Wu, allied with Liu Bei of Shu. Although greatly outnumbered, the allied forces succeeded in setting fire to Cao Cao's fleet and won a decisive victory.

[140] In the battle of Yiling, in 222 C.E., Lu Sun, a general of Wu, defeated Liu Bei, the ruler of Shu, by avoiding combat for seven months and fighting only when Liu's forces were exhausted and demoralized.

[141] In 383 C.E. Xie Xuan, a general of the Eastern Qin dynasty, defeated Fu Jian, the ruler of Jin, even though his forces were outnumbered ten to one, by asking the overconfident enemy to move his troops back from the river between them so Xie's forces could come and fight them, thus provoking panic and confusion in the ranks of the Jin army.

[142] Wars → Campaigns

[143] The reference is to an episode in *Journey to the West,* recounting the clash between the Monkey King (Sun Wukong) and the Ox-Devil King.

[144] Merely having superiority → Merely having a certain kind of superiority

leap of subjective ability,[145] initiative and victory can[146] be wrested from the hands of the side with superiority and initiative by the side of inferiority and passivity.

83. To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares may mean to lose superiority and initiative. Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy and then springing surprise attacks upon it are two ways—indeed two important ways—of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are misconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount Bagong as an enemy soldier" is an example of misconception. And "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west" is a way of creating misconceptions among the enemy. When the mass support is sufficiently good to block the leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses to succeed in leading the enemy into a morass of wrong judgments and actions so that it loses its superiority and the initiative. The saying "There can never be too much deception in war" means precisely this. What does "being caught unawares" mean? It means being unprepared. Without preparedness, superiority is not real superiority and nor can there be any initiative. Having grasped this point, a force that is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to attack precisely because it is then off guard, that is, unprepared. These two points—creating misconceptions among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on it—mean transferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy while securing the greatest possible certainty for ourselves and thereby striving for superiority and the initiative, and striving for our victory. Excellent organizations of the popular masses are the prerequisite for attaining all this. Therefore it is extremely important to arouse all the people who are opposed to the enemy to arm themselves to the last man, make widespread raids on the enemy, and at the same time prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; in this way the enemy will have no way to know where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis will be created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on its part. It was largely owing to the organized, armed popular masses that the weak and small force of the Red Army[147] was able frequently to win battles in the period of the civil war.[148] Logically, a national war should win broader mass support than a civil war;[149] however, as a result of historical mistakes the people are in an unorganized state; not only is it difficult to put their storehouses and manpower to our use, but these are sometimes even made use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of the whole of the popular masses on a broad scale *under the general orientation of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front* is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all the requirements of the war. It will definitely play a big part in carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading it and catching it unawares. We are not Duke Xiang of Song and have no use for his idiotic virtue and morality.[150] In order to achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing its eyes and ears, and create as much confusion as possible in the minds of its commanders, making them into madmen. All of this concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity is related to[151] the subjective direction of the war. This[152] is indispensable for defeating Japan.

84. By and large, Japan has held the initiative in the stage of its offensive by reason of its military power and its exploitation of our subjective errors, past and present. But its initiative is beginning to wane to some extent because of its many inherent disadvantages and of the subjective errors it, too, has committed in the course of the war (of which more later) and also because of our many advantages *and of the fact that some (only some) of our subjective errors have begun to be corrected.* The enemy's defeat at Tai'erzhuang and its predicament in Shanxi prove this clearly. The widespread development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear has placed its garrisons in the occupied areas in a completely passive position. Although it is still on the offensive strategically and still holds the initiative, its initiative will end when its strategic offensive ends. The enemy's troops are insufficient, and it cannot continue the offensive indefinitely; that is the first reason why the enemy will not be able to maintain the initiative. Our offensive warfare in campaigns and our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, together with other factors, constitute the second reason why it will have to cease the offensive at a certain limit and will not be able to retain the initiative. The existence of the Soviet Union and other changes in the international situation constitute the third reason. Thus it can be seen that the enemy's position holding the initiative is limited and can be broken. *In the first period of the war, we were in a passive position; inappropriate positional warfare and the fact that the popular masses were not aroused were important subjective reasons for this. But since beginning to adopt the general orientation toward mobile warfare in the second period, we have made some progress. Unfortunately, however, it is still only an extremely small portion of the popular masses that has been aroused.* If, in *future* military operations, China can keep up offensive warfare by its main forces in campaigns and battles, vigorously

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[145] Through a leap of subjective ability → Through a leap of subjective ability and having obtained certain conditions

[146] Can → Can, in accordance with actual circumstances,

[147] The Red Army → The Chinese Red Army

[148] The civil war → The Agrarian Revolutionary War

[149] A civil war → An agrarian revolutionary war

[150] In 638 B.C.E. Duke Xiang of Song faced the army of Chu at the River Hong. When the Chu forces were halfway across, Duke Xiang's minister urged him to attack, but he refused this opportunity to take advantage of his adversary. When the enemy had finished crossing but was not yet arrayed for battle, Duke Xiang once again refused to attack him, declaring: "The sage does not crush the feeble nor give the order for attack until the enemy have formed their ranks." As a result, the duke was wounded and his forces scattered. In this context, Mao's refusal to emulate him is, as General Griffith has written, "interesting." See Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 30, note.

[151] Is related to → Is interrelated with

[152] This → Such subjective direction

develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, and arouse the popular masses on a broad scale politically, we can gradually build up a position of strategic initiative.

85. Let us now discuss flexibility. What is flexibility? It is something that means the concrete realization of the initiative in combat operations; it is the flexible employment of troops. The flexible employment of troops is the central task in directing a war; it is the task most difficult to perform well. In addition to organizing and educating the army, organizing and educating the people, and so forth, the business of war consists in employing the army in combat, and all these things are done to win victory in combat. Of course it is difficult to organize an army and so forth, but it is even more difficult to employ the army, particularly in circumstances when the weak are fighting the strong. To do so requires subjective ability of a very high order, and requires the overcoming of the confusion, obscurity, and uncertainty that are characteristic of war and the discovery of order, clarity, and certainty in it; only thus can flexibility in command be realized.

86. The basic orientation of field operations for the War of Resistance against Japan is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. There are various tactics or methods for putting this orientation into effect, such as dispersion and concentration of forces, diverging advance and converging attack, the offensive and the defensive, assault and containment, encirclement and outflanking, advance and retreat. It is easy to understand these tactics, but not at all easy to employ and vary them flexibly. Here the three crucial links are the time, the place, and the troops. No victory can be won unless the time, the place, and the troops are well chosen. For example, in attacking an enemy force on the move, if we strike too early, we expose ourselves and give the enemy a chance to prepare; if we strike too late, the enemy may have encamped and concentrated its forces, presenting us with a hard nut to crack. This is the question of the time. If we select a point of assault on the left flank which turns out to be the enemy's weak point, victory will be easy; but if we select the right flank and hit a snag, nothing will be achieved. This is the question of the place. If a particular unit of our forces is employed for a particular task, victory may be easy; but if another unit is employed for the same task, it may be hard to achieve results. This is the question of the troops. We should know not only how to employ tactics but how to vary them. For flexibility of command the important task is to make changes back and forth such as from the offensive to the defensive or from the defensive to the offensive, from advance to retreat or from retreat to advance, from containment to assault or from assault to containment, and the same with encirclement and outflanking and so forth, and to make such changes promptly and properly according to the circumstances of the troops and terrain on both sides. This is true of command in campaigns and strategic command as well as of command in battles.

87. The ancients said, "Ingenuity in application is contained in a single mind." This "ingenuity," which is what we mean by flexibility, is the contribution of the intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean recklessness; recklessness must be rejected. Flexibility consists in the intelligent commander's characteristic of taking[153] timely and appropriate measures on the basis of objective conditions after "judging the hour and sizing up the situation" (the "situation" includes the enemy's situation, our situation, and the terrain), and this flexibility is what is called "ingenuity in application." On the basis of this ingenuity, we can win more victories in quick-decision offensive warfare on interior lines,[154] change the balance of superiority and inferiority in our favor, gain the initiative over the enemy, and overwhelm and crush the enemy so that the final victory will be ours.

88. Let us now discuss the nature of planning. Because of the uncertainty peculiar to war, it is much more difficult to prosecute war according to plan than is the case with other activities. Yet "in every endeavor, preparedness means success and unpreparedness means failure"; there can be no victory in war without advance planning and preparation. There is no absolute certainty in war, and yet it is not without some degree of relative certainty. We are comparatively certain about our own situation. The enemy's situation is the most uncertain,[155] but here too there are signs for us to read, clues to follow, and sequences of phenomena to ponder. These form what we call a degree of relative certainty, which provides an objective basis for planning in war. Modern technological developments (telegraphy, radios, airplanes, motor vehicles, railways, steamships, and so forth) have added to the possibilities of planning in war. But complete or stable planning in war is limited[156] because there is only very limited and transient certainty in war; such planning must change with the movement (or flow, or evolution) of the war and vary in degree according to the scale of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans for attack or defense by small formations or units, often have to be changed several times a day. A plan of campaign, that is, of action by large formations, can generally stand until the conclusion of the campaign, in the course of which, however, it is common to have partial changes, and occasionally there are even total changes. A strategic plan is based on the overall situation of both belligerents and it has even more stability, but it too is applicable only in a given strategic stage and has to be changed when the war evolves toward a new stage. The making and changing of tactical, campaign, and strategic plans in accordance with their scope and circumstances is a key link in directing a war; it is the concrete application of flexibility in war, in other words, it is ingenuity in varying one's tactics, *and victory in war cannot depart from this.* Commanders at all levels in the War of Resistance against Japan should take note of this.

89. Because of the fluidity of war, some people categorically deny that war plans or general orientations can be relatively stable, describing such plans or orientations as "mechanical" things. Such views are wrong. In the preceding section we fully recognized that, because the circumstances of war are only relatively certain and the forward flow (or movement, or evolution) of war is rapid, war

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[153] 153. Characteristic of taking → Ability to take

[154] 154. Interior lines → Exterior lines

[155] 155. The most uncertain → Very uncertain

[156] 156. Limited → Difficult

plans or general orientations should be given only relative stability and have to be changed or revised in a timely way in accordance with changing circumstances and the flow of the war; otherwise we would become mechanists. But one must absolutely not deny the need for war plans or general orientations that are relatively stable over given periods; to negate this is to negate everything, including the war itself as well as the person himself who says so. As both military conditions and operations have relative stability, we must grant the relative stability of the war plans and policies resulting from them. For example, as both the circumstances of the war in North China and the dispersed nature of the Eighth Route Army's operations have relative stability for a particular stage, it is completely necessary during this stage to acknowledge the relative stability of the Eighth Route Army's strategic orientation for operations, namely, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favorable conditions." The period of validity of an orientation for a campaign is shorter than that of a strategic orientation, and for a tactical orientation it is shorter still, but each is stable over a given period. To deny this would mean having no way of handling warfare; it would mean becoming relativists in war with no settled views whatsoever—this is wrong and that is wrong too, or this is right and that is right too. No one denies that even an orientation valid for a given period is fluid; otherwise, one orientation would never be abandoned in favor of another. But it is fluid within limits, fluid within the scope of the various war operations undertaken for carrying it out, but not fluid as to its essence.[157] Within such a given period of time, this essence is definitely not fluid, which is what we mean by relative stability within a given period. In the great river of absolute fluidity throughout the war, there is relative stability for each particular stretch—this is our view regarding the fundamental nature of war plans or orientations.

90. Having dealt with protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy and with quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and also with initiative, flexibility, and planning, we can now say a few words by way of summing up. The War of Resistance against Japan must have a plan. War plans, which are the concrete application of strategy and tactics, must be flexible so that they can be adapted to the circumstances of the war. We should always seek to transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into the initiative so as to change the situation between the enemy and ourselves. All these find expression in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles and protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy.

Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare, and Positional Warfare

91. A war will take the form of mobile warfare when its content is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the strategy of interior lines, protracted war, and defense. Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation. At the same time, it includes "mobile defense," which is conducted when necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positional attack and positional defense in a supplementary role. Its characteristics are regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive, and fluidity.

92. China has a vast territory and a large number[158] of soldiers, but its troops have inadequate technology and training, while the enemy's forces, on the other hand, are inadequate in number, but have relatively superior technology and training. In this situation, there is no doubt that we must adopt offensive mobile warfare as our primary form of warfare, supplementing it by others and integrating them all into mobile warfare. We must oppose "only retreat, never advance," which is flightism, and at the same time oppose "only advance, never retreat," which is desperate recklessness.

93. One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides. This has, however, nothing in common with flightism of the Han Fuqu brand.[159] The primary requirement of war is to destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. The object of self-preservation is to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy is in turn the most effective means of self-preservation. Hence mobile warfare is in no way an excuse for people like Han Fuqu, and can never mean moving only backward and never forward. That kind of "moving," which negates the basic offensive character of mobile warfare would, if practiced, "move" China out of existence, *even if it had "Kamchatka," which would be of no use.*[160]

94. There is, however, another kind of thing[161] that is also wrong, and that is the desperate recklessness of what is called "only advance, never retreat." The mobile warfare we advocate, the content of which is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, includes positional warfare in a supplementary role, "mobile defense," and retreat, without all of which mobile warfare cannot be adequately carried out. Desperate recklessness is military shortsightedness, originating often from fear of losing territory. The advocates of desperate recklessness do not know that one characteristic of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great

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[157] As to its essence → As to its essence; in other words, it is quantitatively but not qualitatively fluid

[158] Large number → Multitude

[159] Han Fuqu (1890–1938), a native of Hebei, had been in 1936 pacification commander for Shandong Province. At that time, Mao had expressed a desire to "establish a relationship" with him. See Volume V, p. 316, n. 4.

[160] Even if it had "Kamchatka," which would be of no use. → Despite its large size. (This passage is not altogether clear, but presumably the meaning of the original text is: Even if China's territory extended northward as far as the Kamchatka Peninsula, to include the extreme northeast corner of the Soviet Union, a "flightist" strategy of withdrawing there could only lead to defeat.)

[161] Another kind of thing → Another kind of thinking

strides. On the positive side, in order to draw the enemy into a fight unfavorable to it but favorable to us, it is usually necessary that the enemy should be on the move and that we should have a number of advantages, such as favorable terrain, a vulnerable enemy, a local population that can prevent the leakage of information, and the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness. This requires that the enemy should advance, and we should not begrudge a temporary loss of part of our territory. For the temporary loss of part of our territory is the price we pay for the permanent preservation and recovery of all our territory. On the negative side, whenever we are forced into a disadvantageous position which fundamentally endangers the preservation of our forces, we should courageously retreat, so as to preserve our forces and strike the enemy again when new opportunities arise. In their ignorance of this principle, the advocates of desperate recklessness will contest a city or a piece of ground even when it is obvious that they are in a decisively unfavorable position; as a result, they not only lose the city or ground but fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of "luring the enemy in deep," precisely because it is the most effective military policy for a weak army strategically on the defensive to employ against a strong army.

95. Among the forms of warfare in the War of Resistance against Japan, mobile warfare comes first and guerrilla warfare second. When we say that in the entire war mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility for deciding the outcome. It does not follow, however, that guerrilla warfare does not have an important strategic status in the War of Resistance against Japan. Its role in the strategy of the war as a whole is second only to that of mobile warfare, for without the support of guerrilla warfare we cannot defeat the enemy. In saying this we also have in mind the strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare will not stay at the same status throughout this long and cruel war, but will elevate itself into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold: on the one hand, to support regular warfare and, on the other hand, to transform itself into regular warfare. Considering the significance of the unprecedented extent and unprecedented duration of guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance, it is all the more important not to underestimate its strategic role. Consequently, guerrilla warfare in China has not only its tactical problems but also its special strategic problems. I have already discussed this in "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War."[162] As indicated above, the forms of warfare in the three strategic stages of the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first stage, mobile warfare is primary, while guerrilla and positional warfare are supplementary. In the second stage, guerrilla warfare will advance to the first place and be supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage, mobile warfare will again advance to become the primary form and will be supplemented by positional and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will no longer be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally guerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare. From the viewpoint of all three stages in China's War of Resistance against Japan, guerrilla warfare is absolutely not something we can either have or do without. It will perform a great drama unparalleled in the history of human combat. For this reason, out of the several millions of regular troops around the country, it is absolutely essential to assign at least several hundred thousand to disperse through all enemy-occupied areas, arouse and support the popular masses in arming themselves, and wage guerrilla warfare in coordination with the masses. The regular forces so assigned should shoulder this sacred task conscientiously, and they should not think their status lowered because they fight fewer big battles and for the time being do not appear as national heroes; this kind of thinking is wrong. Guerrilla warfare does not bring the same kind of quick results and illustrious renown as does regular warfare, but "a long road tests a horse's strength and a prolonged task proves a man's heart," and in the course of this long and cruel war guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its immense power; it is indeed no trivial undertaking. Moreover, such regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when dispersed and mobile warfare when concentrated, as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The orientation of the Eighth Route Army is: "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favorable conditions." This principle is perfectly correct; the views of its opponents are wrong. *After the enemy's occupation of Linfen, the military authorities ordered that the entire army in Shanxi should "engage in guerrilla warfare in units of brigades." This is an arrangement with strategic vision.*

96. At China's present technological level, positional warfare, defensive or offensive, is generally impracticable, and this is where our weakness manifests itself. Moreover, the enemy is also exploiting the vastness of our territory to bypass our fortified positions. Hence positional warfare cannot be adopted as an important method, still less can it be used as the principal method. But in the first and second stages of the war, it is possible and essential, within the scope of mobile warfare, to employ localized positional warfare in a supplementary role in campaigns. Semipositional "mobile defense" is a still more essential part of positional warfare[163] undertaken for the purpose of resisting the enemy at every step, thereby depleting its forces and gaining extra time. China must strive to increase its supplies of modern weapons so that it can fully carry out the tasks of positional attack in the stage of the strategic counteroffensive. In the strategic counteroffensive stage, positional warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role, for then the enemy will be

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[162] This work, which Mao says he has "already" produced, appears below, because it was published in the middle of the ten-day period during which Mao delivered the present speech.

[163] Positional warfare → Mobile warfare

holding fast to its positions, and we shall not be able to achieve our goal of recovering lost territory unless we launch powerful positional attacks in support of mobile warfare. Nevertheless, in the third stage too, we must exert our every effort to make mobile warfare the primary form of warfare. For the art of leadership in war and the active role of man are largely nullified in positional warfare such as that fought in Western Europe in the middle and later periods of the European War.[164] *This is an adverse consequence of modern technology.* It is only natural that we should "liberate the war by taking it out of the trenches," as the war is being fought in the vast expanse within China's borders, and as our side will remain poorly equipped technologically for quite a long time. Even during the third stage, when China's technological position will be better, it is unlikely to surpass the enemy in that respect and so will be forced to concentrate on highly mobile warfare, without which it cannot achieve final victory. Hence, throughout the War of Resistance against Japan China will not adopt positional warfare as primary; the primary and important forms are mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. These two forms of warfare will afford opportunities to exercise fully the art of leadership in war and man's active role. What a piece of good fortune out of our misfortune!

Wars of Attrition and Wars of Annihilation

97. *This is a question concerning the essence of the war.* As we have said before, the essence, or the object, of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. As there are three forms of warfare—mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare—for achieving this object, and as they differ in degree of effectiveness when employed, there arises the general distinction between what are called wars of attrition and wars of annihilation.

98. To begin with, we may say that the War of Resistance against Japan is a war of attrition, and at the same time it is also a war of annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is still making good use of its factors of strength, and it retains strategic superiority and initiative, and therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot effectively and speedily reduce its factors of strength and break its superiority and initiative. We still have our factors of weakness and have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity; therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal and international situation and alter our unfavorable position. Hence campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition. In this sense war of annihilation is war of attrition. It is chiefly by using the method of attrition through annihilation that China can wage protracted war.

99. But the objective of strategic attrition may also be achieved by campaigns of attrition. Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of annihilation, positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and guerrilla warfare performs the task of attrition and at the same time also performs the task of annihilation; the three forms of warfare are thus distinguished from one another. In this sense war of annihilation is different from war of attrition. Campaigns of attrition are supplementary but necessary in protracted war.

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[164] The European War → World War I

100. Speaking theoretically and in terms of needs, in order to achieve the strategic objective of greatly depleting the enemy's forces, China in its defensive stage should use mobile warfare's primary function of annihilation and guerrilla warfare's partial function of annihilation, and supplement these with positional warfare's primary function of attrition and guerrilla warfare's partial function of attrition. In the stage of stalemate we should continue to exploit the functions of annihilation and attrition fulfilled by guerrilla and mobile warfare for further large-scale depletion of the enemy's forces. All this is aimed at making the war situation more protracted, gradually changing the general situation between ourselves and the enemy, and preparing the conditions for our counteroffensive. During the strategic counteroffensive, we should continue to employ the method of attrition through annihilation so as finally to expel the enemy.

101. But as a matter of fact, it was our experience in the last ten months that many or even most of the mobile warfare campaigns became campaigns of attrition, and guerrilla warfare did not adequately fulfill its proper function of annihilation in certain areas. The positive aspect of this situation is that at least we depleted the enemy's forces, which is important both for the protracted war and for our final victory, and did not shed our blood in vain. But the drawbacks are first, that we did not sufficiently deplete the enemy, and second, that we were unable to avoid rather heavy losses and captured little matériel. We should recognize the objective cause of this situation: the disparity between us and the enemy in technical equipment and in the training of troops. But in any case it is necessary, both theoretically and practically, to urge that our main forces strive hard to fight battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favorable. And although our guerrilla units have to wage battles of pure attrition in performing specific tasks such as sabotage and harassment, it is necessary to urge and vigorously carry out campaigns and battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favorable, so as to achieve our goal of greatly depleting the enemy's forces while at the same time greatly replenishing our own.

102. The "exterior lines," the "quick-decision" and the "offensive" in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, and the "mobility" in mobile warfare find their main operational expression in the use of encircling and outflanking tactics; hence the necessity for concentrating superior forces. Therefore concentration of forces and the use of encircling and outflanking tactics are the prerequisites for mobile warfare, that is, for quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. All this is aimed at annihilating the enemy forces.

103. The strength of the Japanese army lies not only in its weapons but also in the training of its officers and men—its degree of organization, its self-confidence

arising from never having been defeated, its superstitious belief in the Mikado and in ghosts and spirits, its arrogant self-esteem, its contempt for the Chinese people, and other such characteristics, all of which stem from long years of indoctrination by the Japanese warlords and from Japanese national customs. This is the chief reason we have taken very few prisoners despite killing and wounding a great many enemy troops. It is a point that has been underestimated by many people in the past. To destroy these things will require a long process. The first thing to do is to give the matter serious attention and then patiently and in a planned way to work at it in the political field and in the fields of international propaganda and the Japanese people's movement; in the military sphere war of annihilation is one of the means. In these enemy characteristics, pessimists may find a basis for the theory of national subjugation and passively minded military men a basis for opposition to war of annihilation. We, on the contrary, maintain that these strong points of the Japanese army can be destroyed and that their destruction has already begun. The chief method of destroying them is winning them over politically. We should not insult the *arrogant* self-esteem of the Japanese soldiers but, rather, should understand this self-esteem of theirs and channel it in the proper direction. By using such methods as treating prisoners of war leniently *and people's diplomacy,* we should lead them to see the antipopular character of the Japanese rulers' expansionism. On the other hand, we should demonstrate in front of the Japanese soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic, stubborn fighting capacity of the Chinese army and the Chinese people; this in itself will be waging a war of annihilation against them. In terms of military operations, our experience in the last ten months shows that annihilation is possible—the Pingxingguan and Tai'erzhuang campaigns, and so forth, are proof. The Japanese army's morale is beginning to waver, its soldiers do not understand the aim of the war, they are trapped in encirclement by Chinese armies and by the Chinese people, in assault they show far less courage than the Chinese soldiers, and so on; all these are objective conditions,[165] and these objective conditions will, moreover, steadily develop as the war becomes protracted. From this standpoint,[166] annihilation is one of the prerequisites for shortening the war and accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese people. Cats only make friends with cats, and nowhere in the world do cats make friends with mice.

104. On the other hand, it must be admitted that, for the present, we are inferior to the enemy in technical equipment and in the extent of troop training. Therefore, in many settings it is difficult to achieve the maximum in annihilation, such as capturing the whole or the greater part of an enemy force, especially when fighting on the plains. In this connection the excessive demands of the theorists of quick victory are wrong. What should be correctly demanded in the War of Resistance against Japan is "war of annihilation as far as possible." In all favorable circumstances, we should concentrate superior forces in every battle and employ encircling and outflanking tactics—encircle part if not all of the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the encircled forces, and inflict heavy casualties on part of the encircled forces if we cannot capture them. On the other hand, in circumstances that are unfavorable for the carrying out of war of annihilation, we should carry out a war of attrition. In the former, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces and, in the latter, employ the principle of dispersion of forces. As for the relationship of command in campaigns, we should apply the principle of centralized command in the former and the principle of decentralized command in the latter. This is the basic orientation for field operations in the War of Resistance against Japan.

The Possibilities of Exploiting the Enemy's Mistakes

105. As for dealing with the enemy, the enemy command itself provides a basis for this. From ancient times, there has never been an infallible general, and the enemy makes mistakes just as we ourselves can hardly avoid making them; hence, the possibility exists of exploiting the enemy's errors. In the ten months of the war of aggression, the enemy has already made many mistakes in strategy and tactics. There are five major ones.

First, gradual reinforcement. This results from the enemy's underestimation of China and also to its shortage of troops. The enemy has always looked down on us. After grabbing the Four Eastern Provinces at small cost, it occupied eastern Hebei and northern Chahar, all by way of strategic reconnaissance. The conclusion the enemy came to was: [China is] a plate of loose sand. Thus, thinking that China could not stand a single blow, it mapped out a plan of so-called quick decision, attempting with very small forces to set us collapsing in panic. It did not expect to find such great unity and such immense powers of resistance as China has shown during the past ten months, forgetting as it did that China is already in an era of progress and already has advanced political parties and groups, an advanced army, and an advanced people. Meeting with setbacks, the enemy then gradually increased its forces bit by bit from about a dozen to thirty divisions. If it wants to advance further, it will have to make further increases. But because of Japan's antagonism toward the Soviet Union and its inherent shortage of manpower and finances, *we say that* there are inevitable limits to the maximum number of men it can field and to the furthest extent of its advance.

Second, absence of a main direction of attack. Before the Tai'erzhuang campaign, the enemy had divided its forces more or less equally between North China and Central China and had again divided them equally inside each of these areas. In North China, for example, it divided its forces among the Tianjin-Pukou, the Beiping-Hankou, and the Datong-Puzhou railway lines, and along each of these lines it suffered some casualties and left some garrisons in the places occupied, after which it lacked the forces for further advances. After the Tai'erzhuang defeat, it summed up the lessons and concentrated its main forces in the direction of Xuzhou, and so this mistake can be considered temporarily corrected.

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[165] All these are objective conditions → All these are objective conditions favorable to our pursuit of a war of annihilation

[166] From this standpoint → From the standpoint of destroying the enemy's arrogance through a war of annihilation

Third, lack of strategic coordination. On the whole, coordination exists within the groups of enemy forces in North China and in Central China, but there is a serious lack of coordination between the two. When the forces on the southern section of the Tianjin-Pukou railway attacked Xiaobengbu, those on the northern section made no move, and when the forces on the northern section attacked Tai'erzhuang, those on the southern section made no move. After the enemy came to grief at both places, the Japanese minister of war arrived on an inspection tour and the chief of the General Staff turned up to take command, and for the moment one could say there was coordination. There exist very serious internal contradictions among the landlord class, the bourgeoisie, and the warlords of Japan, and these contradictions are developing; the lack of military coordination is one of the concrete manifestations of this fact.

Fourth, failure to grasp strategic opportunities. This failure was conspicuously shown in the enemy's halt after occupying Nanjing and Taiyuan, chiefly because of its shortage of troops and its lack of a strategic pursuit force.

Fifth, it encircles many, but annihilates few. Before the Tai'erzhuang campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanjing, Cangzhou, Baoding, Nankou, Xinkou, and Linfen, many Chinese troops were routed but few were taken prisoner, which shows the stupidity of the enemy command.

These five errors—gradual reinforcement, absence of a main direction of attack, lack of strategic coordination, failure to grasp opportunities, and encirclement of many, but annihilation of few—were all points of incompetence in the Japanese command prior to the Tai'erzhuang campaign. Although the enemy has made some improvements since the Tai'erzhuang campaign, it cannot possibly avoid repeating its errors because of its shortage of troops, its internal contradictions, and other factors. In addition, what it gains at one point it loses at another. For instance, by concentrating its forces in northern China on Xuzhou, it left a great gap in the occupied areas in northern China, which gave us free rein to develop guerrilla warfare. These mistakes were of the enemy's own making and not induced by us. On our part, we can deliberately make the enemy commit errors, that is, we can mislead it and maneuver it into the desired position by ingenious and effective moves under the cover of organized popular masses, for example, by "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west." This possibility *also exists, and* has already been discussed. All the above shows that in the enemy's command, too, we can find some resources for victory. We should not take this as an important basis for our strategic planning; on the contrary, the only reliable course is to base our planning on the assumption that the enemy will make few mistakes. Besides, the enemy can exploit our mistakes just as we can exploit the enemy's. It is the duty of our command to allow the enemy few opportunities for doing so. In any event, mistakes of the enemy command have in fact taken place, will again occur in the future, and can be manufactured through our endeavors. All these errors we can exploit, and our generals in the resistance to Japan should do their utmost to seize upon them. Although much of the enemy's strategic and campaign command is incompetent *(not all of it is incompetent),* there are quite a few intelligent points in its battle command, that is, in its unit and small formation tactics, and here we should learn from them.

The Question of Decisive Engagements in the War of Resistance Against Japan

106. The question of decisive engagements in the War of Resistance against Japan should be divided into three types: we should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive engagement in which the fate of the whole nation is at stake. The characteristics differentiating our War of Resistance against Japan from many other wars are also revealed in this question of decisive engagements. In the first and second stages of the war, when the enemy is strong and we are weak, the enemy's objective is to have us concentrate our main forces for a decisive engagement. Our objective is exactly the opposite. We want to choose conditions favorable to us, concentrate superior forces, and fight decisive campaigns or battles only when we are sure of victory, as in the battles at Pingxingguan, Tai'erzhuang, and many other places; we want to avoid decisive engagements under unfavorable conditions when we are not sure of victory, this being the orientation we adopted in the Zhangde and other campaigns. As for fighting a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked, for instance as in the recent withdrawal from Xuzhou, we simply must not do so. In this way the enemy's plan for a "quick decision" will be foiled, and it will not be able to avoid going through a protracted war with us. This orientation cannot be carried out in a country with a small territory and would be difficult to carry out in a country that is too backward politically. But we can carry it out because ours is a big country, and it is in an era of progress. *Our worry is that our country's main forces may be tricked by the enemy into a decisive engagement and thus sacrificed.* If strategically decisive engagements are avoided, then "as long as the green mountains are there, one need not worry about firewood," for even though some of our territory may be lost, we will still have plenty of room for maneuver and will thus be able to promote and await domestic progress, an increase in international support, and the internal disintegration of the enemy; that is the best policy for us in the War of Resistance against Japan. Unable to endure the arduous trials of a protracted war and eager for an early triumph, the impetuous theorists of quick victory clamor for a strategically decisive engagement the moment the situation takes a slightly favorable turn. To do what they want would be

to inflict great damage on the entire War of Resistance, spell an end to the protracted war, and land us in the enemy's deadly trap; it would truly be the worst policy. Undoubtedly, if we are to avoid decisive engagements, we shall have to abandon territory, and we must have the courage to do so when (and only when) it becomes completely unavoidable. At such times we should not feel the slightest regret, for this policy of "trading territory for time" is correct. History tells us how Russia made a courageous retreat to avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon, the terror of his age. *In late August 1914, France avoided a decisive engagement on the Franco-Belgian border, made a courageous retreat, and defeated the German army, which menaced Europe.* China should now do likewise. *The loss of some territory is the precondition for the liberation of the whole country, and temporary suffering is the precondition to eternal happiness. All true patriots should know this truth.*

107. Are we not afraid of being denounced as "nonresisters"? No, we are not. Not to fight at all but to compromise with enemy—that is nonresistance, which not only should be denounced but is utterly impermissible. We must resolutely fight the War of Resistance, but, in order to avoid the enemy's deadly trap, it is absolutely necessary that we not allow the country's main forces[167] to be finished off at one blow, thereby adversely affecting *national survival and* the continuation of the War of Resistance. To put it in a single sentence, it is absolutely necessary to avoid national subjugation. To have doubts on this point is to be short-sighted on the question of the war and is sure to lead one into the ranks of the subjugationists. We have criticized the desperate recklessness of "only advance, never retreat" precisely because, if it became generally prevalent, this doctrine would make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance and would lead to the danger of ultimate national subjugation.

108. We are for decisive engagements whenever circumstances are favorable, whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and in this respect we do not tolerate any passivity whatsoever. Only through such decisive engagements can we achieve the objective of annihilating or depleting the enemy forces, and every soldier in the resistance to Japan should go and do so resolutely. For this purpose, considerable partial sacrifices are necessary; the avoidance of any sacrifice whatsoever is the attitude of cowards and of those afflicted by the fear of Japan, and must be firmly opposed. The killing of Li Fuying, Han Fuqu, and other flightists was correct. Within the scope of correct combat planning, encouraging the spirit and practice of brave self-sacrifice and dauntless advance is something that is absolutely necessary and inseparable from protracted war and final victory. We have strongly condemned the flightism of "only retreat, never advance" and have supported the strict enforcement of discipline, because it is only through heroic decisive engagements, fought under a correct plan, that we can vanquish the powerful enemy; flightism, on the contrary, is a direct supporter of the theory of national subjugation.

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[167] The country's main forces → Our army's main forces

109. Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and then abandon territory later? Will not these heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? This is a highly inappropriate line of questioning. To eat first and then to shit later—is this not to eat in vain? To sleep first and then to get up later—is this not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I think not. When eating, to keep on eating without a stop; when sleeping, to keep on sleeping without a stop, when fighting heroically, to keep on fighting all the way to the Yalu River without a stop—this is mechanism and formalist logic applied to the question of war; they do not exist in the world of men and things.[168] As everyone knows, although in fighting and shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare the counteroffensive we have had to abandon some territory, we have indeed gained time; we have indeed achieved the objective of annihilating and depleting enemy forces; we have indeed acquired experience in fighting; we have indeed aroused hitherto inactive people; and we have indeed improved our international standing. Has our blood been shed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in order to preserve our military forces and in fact precisely to preserve territory, because if we do not abandon part of our territory when conditions are unfavorable but blindly fight decisive engagements without the least assurance of winning, we shall lose our military forces and then be unable to avoid the loss of all our territory, to say nothing of recovering territory already lost. A capitalist must have capital to run his business, and if he loses it all he is not much of a capitalist. Even a gambler must have money to stake, and if he risks it all on a single throw and his luck fails, he cannot gamble any more. Events have their twists and turns and do not follow a straight line, and war is the same; only formalists are unable to comprehend this truth.

110. I think the same will also hold true for the decisive engagements in the stage of strategic counteroffensive. Although by then the enemy will be in the inferior and we in the superior position, the principle of "fighting advantageous decisive engagements and avoiding detrimental ones" will still apply and will continue to apply until we have fought our way to the Yalu River. This is how we will be able to maintain the initiative from beginning to end, and as for all the enemy's "letters of challenge" and other people's "goading us with taunts," we should brush them aside and ignore them without being perturbed by them in the slightest. In the resistance to Japan, only those generals who show this kind of firmness can be deemed courageous and wise. This is beyond the ken of those people who "jump at a single touch." Even though we are in a more or less passive position strategically

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[168] This is mechanism and formalist logic applied to the question of war; they do not exist in the world of men and things. → These are subjectivist and formalist illusions, not realities of life.

in this first stage of the war, we should have the initiative in every campaign; and we should have the initiative throughout the later stages. We are believers in the theory of protracted war and final victory;[169] we are not believers in the gambler's theory of risking everything on a single throw.

The Soldiers and the People are the Foundation of Victory

111. Standing before revolutionary China, Japan[170] will never relent in its attacks and repression; this is determined by its imperialist nature. If China did not resist, Japan would easily occupy China without firing a single shot; the loss of the Four Eastern Provinces is a precedent. If China resists, it is an inexorable law that Japan will try to repress this resistance and will only stop when the force of its repression is unable to exceed the force of China's resistance. The Japanese landlord class and bourgeoisie are very ambitious, and in order to drive south to Southeast Asia and its islands, and north to Siberia, they have employed a breakthrough in the center[171] by first attacking China. Those who think that Japan will be content with the occupation of North China and the area of Jiangsu and Zhejiang completely fail to perceive that imperialist Japan, which has developed to a new stage and has been pushed to the brink of extinction, differs from the Japan of the past. When we say that there is a definite limit both to the number of men Japan can field and to the extent of its advance, we mean that, on the basis of its strength, Japan can commit only a certain part of its forces and can only fight[172] up to the limit of its strength, in order to attack further[173] and to defend itself against other enemies. Meanwhile, for its part, China has demonstrated its own progress and capacity for stubborn resistance, and it is inconceivable that there should be fierce attacks by Japan without the necessary capacity for resistance by China. Japan cannot occupy the whole of China, but it will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance in all the areas it can reach and will not stop this kind of suppression until internal and external conditions bring about a crisis in Japanese imperialism that pushes it to the brink of the grave. The domestic political situation in Japan faces two different paths to a yawning chasm.[174] Either the entire class that is in power collapses rapidly, political power is handed to the people, and the war thus comes to an end—but for the time being this possibility does not exist—or its landlord class and bourgeoisie become more fascist day by day and sustain the war until the day of their collapse, which is the very road Japan is now traveling. There can be no third outcome other than these. As to those who hope that the moderates among the Japanese bourgeoisie will come forward and stop the war—this is merely a kind of illusion. The reality of Japanese politics over the past year[175] has been that the bourgeois moderates of Japan have fallen captive to the landlords and the financial oligarchs. Now that Japan has started to fight China, so long as it does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese resistance and still retains sufficient strength, it is bound to attack Southeast Asia or Siberia, or even both. It will pull that trick as soon as war breaks out in Europe. The rulers of Japan have mapped out their maximum ambitions on an extremely large scale. Of course, the following kind of possibility does exist: Japan may have to drop its original plan of invading Siberia and adopt a fundamentally defensive posture toward the Soviet Union on account of the Soviets' *greater* strength and the fact that Japan has been greatly weakened by its war in China. But if that situation appears, it will not mean Japan's relaxing its offensive against China, but will mean its intensification of this offensive, because then the only path left to it will be that of gobbling up the weak. China's task of persevering in the War of Resistance, persevering in the united front, and persevering in the protracted war will then become all the more serious, and it will be all the more necessary not to slacken our efforts in the slightest. *"When Lord Lei beat the bean curd, he chose a weak object to bully." This is a law of the natural world and of class society.*[176]

112. Under these kinds of circumstances, the main prerequisites for China's victory over Japan are unity and all-around progress throughout the country on a scale ten or even a hundred times greater than in the past. China is already in an era of progress and has achieved very great unity, but at present the degree [of progress and unity] is still far from adequate. That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due in part to Japan's strength, but also in part to China's weakness; this kind of weakness is entirely the cumulative result of the various historical errors of the last hundred years, and especially of recent years,[177] which have confined the factors of China's progress to their present state. It is impossible to vanquish so strong an enemy without making an extensive and long-term effort. There are many things we have to exert ourselves to do. Here I will discuss only two fundamental aspects: the progress of the army and of the people.

113. The improvement of our military system cannot be separated from modernization and the strengthening of technological conditions, without which we will be unable to drive the enemy back across the Yalu River. In our use of troops, we need strategy and tactics that are progressive and flexible, without which we likewise cannot win victory. Nevertheless, soldiers are the foundation of an army; unless there is concentration on a progressive political spirit within the army, and

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[169] We are believers in the theory of protracted war and final victory → We are believers in the theory of protractedness and the theory of final victory

[170] Japan → Japanese imperialism

[171] They have employed a breakthrough in the center → they have adopted the overall policy of breaking through in the center

[172] And can only fight → And can only fight China

[173] In order to attack further → In order to launch further attacks in other places

[174] The domestic political situation in Japan faces two different paths to a yawning chasm → There are only two possible outcomes to the domestic political situation in Japan

[175] Over the past year → For many years

[176] Lord Lei was the god of lightning in Chinese mythology.

[177] Recent years → The past ten years

unless there is progressive political work to promote such concentration, it will be impossible to achieve genuine unity between officers and men, it will be impossible to arouse to the utmost limit the enthusiasm of officers and men for the War of Resistance and impossible to provide the best basis for all our technology and tactics to display the effectiveness they should. When we say that Japan will finally be defeated despite the superiority of its technological conditions, we mean that apart from the blows of annihilation and attrition that we deliver, we will eventually through our blows shake its military morale; its weapons and soldiers are not stably integrated. With us, on the contrary, officers and men are at one on the political aims of the War of Resistance. *This is fundamentally different from the civil war period.* This gives us a foundation upon which to build political work among all forces.[178] The forces should, within certain limits, put into effect democratization, chiefly by abolishing the feudal system of bullying and beating and by having officers and men share weal and woe in their lives. After this is done, the goal of unity between officers and men will be achieved, the combat effectiveness of the army will be increased to an extremely great degree, and there will be no doubt of our ability to sustain the long, cruel war.

114. In war, the profoundest source of mighty power lies within the popular masses. It is mainly because of the unorganized state of China's popular masses that Japan dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japanese aggressor will be placed before our hundreds of millions of people who have stood up. It will be like a wild bull crashing into a bed of fire—a single shout[179] would be enough to give it a big scare, and this wild bull cannot fail to be burned to death. On our side, the armies must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, and the brazen "press-ganging" and "buying of substitutes" that are now being recklessly practiced at the lower levels must be speedily banned and replaced by widespread and enthusiastic political mobilization; in this way, enlisting even millions *or tens of millions* of men will be easy. Financial resources for the War of Resistance[180] present great difficulties, but once the popular masses are mobilized, several billion or tens of billions[181] will not be a problem. How can a country as large and populous as China suffer from lack of funds? The army must merge with the people, to make it so that, in the eyes of the popular masses, the army is seen as their own army. Such an army will have no match throughout the world, and merely fighting Japanese imperialism will hardly be a sufficient challenge for it.

115. As regards the unsatisfactory relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, many people think it is the methods that are wrong. I always tell them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic purpose), and this attitude should be respect for the soldiers and respect for the people. Start from this attitude, and then have the various policies, methods, and forms. Depart from this attitude, and the policies, methods, and forms will certainly also be wrong, and you will never be able to get the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people right. The three major principles for the army's political work are, first, unity between officers and men; second, unity between the army and the people; and third, winning over[182] the enemy forces. To apply these principles effectively, we must start with this basic attitude of respecting the soldiers, respecting the people, and respecting enemy prisoners of war.[183] Those who take all this as a technical matter and not one of basic attitude have truly got their thinking wrong, and this should be corrected.

116. At this moment, when the defense of Wuhan and such places has become an urgent task, it is a task of the utmost importance to arouse to the full the activism of the whole army and the whole people in support of the war. Beyond a doubt, the task of defending Wuhan and such places must be conscientiously raised and carried out. But in the end, whether we can be certain of holding them will depend not on our subjective desires but on concrete conditions. One of the most important of these concrete conditions is the political mobilization of the whole army and the whole people to rise up and struggle hard. If a strenuous effort is not made to secure all the necessary conditions—indeed, if even one of these conditions is missing—disasters like Nanjing and such places[184] are bound to be repeated. Where China's Madrid will be located will depend on which places possess the conditions for a Madrid. So far China has not had a Madrid, and from now on we should work hard to have several, but it all depends on the conditions. The most fundamental of these conditions is extensive political mobilization of the whole army and the whole people.

117. In all our work we must persevere in the overall orientation of the National United Front of Resistance against Japan. For only when we have this kind of orientation can we persevere in the War of Resistance and persevere in protracted war; only then can we bring about a widespread and profound improvement in relations between officers and men and between the army and the people; only then can we arouse to the full the activism of the entire army and the entire people to fight for the defense of all the territory still in our hands and for the recovery of all the territory we have lost; and only then can we strive to win final victory.

118. This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people is truly of the greatest importance. The reason we have not hesitated to repeat ourselves over and over in discussing it is that without it there will simply be no victory. There are, of course, many other necessary things without which there

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[178] All forces → All forces in the resistance to Japan

[179] A single shout → A single shout from us

[180] War of Resistance → Resistance to Japan

[181] Several billion or tens of billions → Finances

[182] Winning over → Undermining

[183] Respecting enemy prisoners of war → Respecting the human dignity of enemy prisoners of war once they have put down their arms

[184] Disasters like Nanjing and such places → Disasters like the loss of Nanjing and such places

will be no victory, but this is the most fundamental precondition for victory. The National United Front of Resistance against Japan is a united front of the whole army and the whole people; it is certainly not a united front merely of the headquarters and members of a few parties and groups. Mobilizing the whole army and the whole people to participate in the united front is the fundamental objective of this united front.

Conclusions

119. What are our conclusions? They are:[185]

"Under what conditions can China defeat and destroy the strength of Japanese imperialism? Three conditions are required: first, the completion of a united front of resistance against Japan in China; second, the completion of an international united front of resistance against Japan; third, the rise of a revolutionary movement of the Japanese people.[186] Of these three conditions, the grand alliance of the Chinese people is the most important."[187]

"How long would such a war last? That depends on[188] China's united front of resistance against Japan and many other determining factors involving China and Japan."

"If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged. But the result will be the same; Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. It is just that the sacrifices will be great and it will be necessary to go through a very painful period." "Our strategic orientation should be to employ our main forces to operate over a highly extended and fluid front. To achieve victory, the Chinese troops must carry out a high degree of mobile warfare on extensive battlefields."

"Besides deploying trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize large numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants *politically and militarily*."

"In the course of the war, China will be able . . . to improve the *mechanization* and equipment of its troops gradually. Because of this, China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the later period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will collapse after being drained by China's long War of Resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will flag after being sapped by innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the latent power of the War of Resistance will rise and surge forward day by day and large numbers of revolutionary popular masses will be pouring into the front lines to fight for freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the final and fatal assault on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China." (From a conversation with Snow in June[189] 1936.)

"Thus a new stage has henceforth begun in China's political situation. . . . In this stage the central task is to mobilize all forces to win victory in the War of Resistance."

"The key to winning victory in the war now lies in developing the War of Resistance that has already been aroused into a total War of Resistance by the whole nation; only then[190] can final victory be achieved in the War of Resistance."

"Because serious weaknesses still exist in the War of Resistance, many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and other such situations may occur in the future course of the War of Resistance. . . . Therefore it should be realized that the war will be an arduous, protracted war. But we believe that, through the efforts of the people of the whole country,[191] the War of Resistance that has already been aroused will break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop." (The August Decision of the Chinese Communist Party.)[192] These are our conclusions. The subjugationists see the enemy as supernatural beings and see ourselves as worthless. The theorists of quick victory see the enemy as worthless and see ourselves as supernatural beings. These are both wrong. Our view is the opposite: the War of Resistance against Japan will be a protracted war, and final victory will be China's—these are our conclusions.

120. Here my lectures come to a close. The great War of Resistance[193] is now unfolding, and many people have been hoping for a summary of experience to facilitate the winning of complete victory. What I have discussed are simply general things from the experience of the past ten months; perhaps it may serve as a kind of summary. This question ought to stimulate wide attention and discussion. What I have given is only an outline; I hope all of you will study and discuss it, and provide corrections and additions.

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[185] As will be seen, this passage consists of portions of the extracts from Snow's July 16 interview quoted above in section 6 of this lecture.

[186] A revolutionary movement of the Japanese people → A revolutionary movement of the Japanese people within Japan and the people of the Japanese colonies

[187] Of these three conditions, the grand alliance of the Chinese people is the most important → Of these three conditions, the most important from the standpoint of the Chinese people is the grand alliance of the Chinese people

[188] That depends on → That depends on the strength of

[189] June → July

[190] Only then → Only through such a total War of Resistance by the whole nation

[191] Through the efforts of the people of the whole country → Through the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country

[192] The August Decision of the Chinese Communist Party → The "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party" of August 1937

[193] War of Resistance → War of Resistance against Japan

To Mao Yuju[1]

(May 26, 1938)

To Elder Brother Yuju and the others:

I have received and read your letter of May 10. It is better for Tan Jiyu not to come.[2] I have mailed a little money to Chuxiong[3] and others, and I may also provide some small assistance to him in the future. Please urge him to be hard-working and frugal. It is a very good thing that Mr. Zhou[4] stays and lives in Shaoshan, and he should be regarded as a member of the family, without any distinction from the other members. This is my reply. With all best wishes!

May you enjoy peace!

Your younger brother Mao Zedong

Yuanrao[5] and the others are all very well here.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 127–28, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Mao Yuju was Mao Zedong's first cousin, who had served as his tutor during Mao's youth.

[2] Tan Jiyu, a relative of Mao Zedong, had written to Mao early in 1938 proposing to go to Yan'an.

[3] Mao Chuxiong was the son of Mao's brother Mao Zetan. At this time he was living in Shaoshan.

[4] The reference is to Mao Chuxiong's maternal uncle Zhou Zuyu, who was at that time living in Mao Zedong's old residence.

[5] Mao Yuanrao was Mao Yuju's nephew. He was working in the Secretariat of the Central Military Commission in Yan'an.

We Should Develop Guerrilla Warfare Extensively in North China

(May 26, 1938)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Fu [Zhong]; Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying], and Gan [Siqi]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]; Nie [Rongzhen], Peng [Zhen], Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying]; Guo [Hongxiu] and Li [Yu]:

1. After the loss of Xuzhou, we judge that the enemy will take the attack on Wuhan as the heart of his war plans.
2. The estimate that the enemy will immediately move his main force to North China and to the Northwest to attack the guerrillas and to sever the route of communications between China and the Soviet Union, disregarding the fact that Wuhan is the center of gravity of the resistance struggle, is incorrect. This move will take place, but at a slightly later date.
3. If war breaks out or a major crisis unfolds in Europe, the enemy will rapidly invade Guangdong.
4. Our slogan is: Defend Wuhan, defend Guangzhou, defend the Northwest, and resolutely carry out the guerrilla war in North China.
5. Given the above-mentioned circumstances, it remains an opportune time to engage in extensive guerrilla warfare in North China. At present, more attention should be paid to Shandong, Rehe, and the Daqing mountain range.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 227–28, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

There Are No Strategic Offensives in the Anti-Japanese War, but Only Battlefield Counteroffensives and Strategic Counteroffensives[1]

(May 28, 1938)

Of course, the anti-Japanese war does not have so-called strategic offensives, but only battlefield counteroffensives and strategic counteroffensives, which are positive components of the entire strategic defense and are relied upon in part for the defeat of Japan. When speaking in popular terms it is, of course, also permissible to call them offensives.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, p. 229, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1] Mao wrote this letter in his capacity as chief editor of the series *Kang-Ri zhanzheng congshu* (Collected Writings on the Anti-Japanese War), in reply to Guo Huaruo, one of the authors of *Kangri youji zhanzheng de yiban wenti* (All the Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War). Regarding this latter work, see below, Mao's "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War."

Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War

(May 30, 1938)[1]

I.[2] Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War?

In the War of Resistance against Japan, regular warfare is primary, and guerrilla warfare supplementary. This point we have already correctly settled. Thus it seems there are only tactical problems in guerrilla warfare. Why, then, raise the question of strategy?

If we were a small country in which the role of guerrilla warfare was only to render direct support over short distances to the campaigns of the regular army, there would, of course, be only tactical problems and no strategic ones. If, on the other hand, China were a country as strong as the Soviet Union, and the invading

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This work was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 40, May 30, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 6, pp. 7–47, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao's *Selected Works.* It was also included in a slim volume entitled *Kang-Ri youji zhanzheng de yiban wenti* (All the Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War), dated July 7, 1938, on the title page, but published, according to *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 74, only in 1939. Although the title of this latter volume appears on the first page in Mao's calligraphy, there is no evidence that he played a major role in editing it, so the other six chapters are not translated in this volume.[3]

> Editor's Foreword
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> This book summarizes not only the lessons of the guerrilla warfare in the civil war but also the lessons of the guerrilla warfare in the first ten months of the Resistance War and solves many basic problems in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. This book was written collectively; Mao Zedong, Chen Changhao, Liu Yalu, Xiao Jingguang, and Guo Huaruo were the authors. None of it has ever been published before, except the chapter entitled "Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" by Mr. Mao, which has been published in *Jiefang.* Sections on the tactics and political work of the guerrilla war have already been put together and will be printed soon.
>
> The Editor

[1] May 30 is the date of publication in *Jiefang*; in the various Chinese editions of this work it is dated simply May 1938.

[2] I → Chapter I

[3] Because Mao was involved to some degree in putting together this volume, we reproduce here the editor's foreword to the collection as subsequently published.

enemy could either be quickly expelled or, even though the expulsion were to take some time, the enemy did not occupy extensive areas, then again guerrilla warfare would simply play a supporting role in campaigns and would naturally involve only tactical and not strategic problems.

The question of strategy in guerrilla war does arise, however, in the case of China, which is neither small nor like the Soviet Union, but which is both a large and a weak country. This large and weak country is being attacked by a small and strong country, but the large and weak country is in an era of progress; this is the source of the whole problem. It is in these circumstances that vast areas have come under enemy occupation and the war has become a protracted one. The enemy is occupying vast areas of this large country of ours, but theirs is a small country without sufficient soldiers, so many places remain unoccupied, and consequently the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consists primarily not in interior-line operations in support of the campaigns of the regular troops, but in independent operations on exterior lines. Furthermore, because China is progressing, the warfare is not small scale, but large scale.[4] Hence the emergence of a whole lot of things, such as the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, and so on. The protracted nature of the war (together with its attendant ruthlessness) have made it necessary for guerrilla warfare to undertake many unusual tasks; hence such problems as those of the base areas, the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, and so on. For all these reasons, China's anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy, and it demands examination from the viewpoint of strategy. The point that merits particular attention is that such extensive as well as protracted guerrilla warfare is quite new in the entire history of wars among the human race. This point is inseparable from the fact that we have now progressed to the 1930s and 1940s.[5] Herein lies the crux of the matter. Our enemy is probably still cherishing fond dreams of emulating the Mongol conquest of the Song dynasty, the Manchu conquest of the Ming dynasty, the British occupation of North America and *East* India, the occupation of Central and South America by the Latin countries, and so on. But such dreams have no practical value in present-day China because there are certain factors present in today's China that were absent in those historical instances, and one of them is guerrilla warfare, which is quite a new phenomenon. If our enemy overlooks this fact, he will certainly come to grief.

These are the reasons why the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, though occupying only a supplementary place in the War of Resistance as a whole, must nevertheless be examined from the viewpoint of strategy.

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[4] The warfare is not small scale, but large scale → Which is to say that it has a staunch army and broad popular masses, both led by the Communist Party, so that, far from being small scale, the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is in fact large scale

[5] To the 1930s and 1940s → To the 1930s and 1940s and that we now have the Communist Party and Red Army

II. Why Not, Then, Apply to Guerrilla Warfare Elements of the General Strategic Principles of the War of Resistance Against Japan?

The question of strategy in the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is, of course, closely linked to the question of strategy in the War of Resistance as a whole; the two have much in common. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare is different from regular warfare and has its own peculiarities, and consequently many peculiar elements are involved in the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare. Without modification it is impossible to apply the strategic principles of the War of Resistance in general to guerrilla warfare with its own peculiarities.

III.[6] The Basic Principle of War Is to Preserve Oneself and Destroy the Enemy

Before discussing the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare in concrete terms, a few words are needed on the fundamental problem of war.

All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of one basic principle: to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy. In a revolutionary war, this principle is directly linked to basic political principles. For instance, the basic political principle of China's War of Resistance against Japan (that is, its political goal), is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build an independent, free, and happy new China. In terms of military action this principle means the use of armed force to defend our motherland and to drive out the Japanese bandits. To attain this end, the operations of the armed units take the form of doing their utmost to preserve their own strength, on the one hand, and destroy the enemy's, on the other. How then do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? In reality, there is no contradiction at all, or, to put it more exactly, it is an instance of things which oppose one another and yet also complement one another, because such sacrifice is essential not only for destroying the enemy but also for preserving oneself. Partial and temporary "nonpreservation" (sacrifice, or paying the price) is necessary for the sake of general and permanent preservation. From this basic principle stems the series of principles guiding military operations, all of which—from the principles of shooting (taking cover to preserve oneself and making full use of firepower to destroy the enemy) to the principles of strategy—are permeated with the spirit of this basic principle. All technical, tactical, and strategic principles represent applications of this basic principle. *Only* the principle of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy is the basis of all military principles.

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[6] III → Chapter II

IV.[7] There Are Altogether Six Specific Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan

Now let us see what overall policies or principles have to be adopted in the military operations of the guerrilla war against Japan before we can attain the objective of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. Since the guerrilla units in the War of Resistance (and in all revolutionary wars) generally grow out of nothing and expand from a small to a large force, they must preserve themselves, and in addition they must expand. Hence the question is, what policies or principles have to be adopted to attain the object of preserving and expanding ourselves and destroying the enemy?

Generally speaking, the main principles are as follows: (1) the use of initiative, flexibility, and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations; (2) coordination with regular warfare; (3) establishment of base areas; (4) the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive; (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare; and (6) correct command relationships. These six items constitute the whole of the strategic program for guerrilla war against Japan and are the means necessary for the preservation and expansion of our own forces, for the destruction and expulsion of the enemy, for coordination with regular warfare, and for the winning of final victory.

V. *The First Problem:* Initiative, Flexibility, and Planning in Conducting Offensives Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations

Here the subject may be dealt with under four headings: (1) the relationship between the defensive and the offensive, between protractedness and quick decision, and between the interior and exterior lines; (2) the initiative in all operations; (3) flexible employment of forces; and (4) planning in all operations. I will begin by speaking of the first of these.

With regard to the War of Resistance as a whole, the fact that the Japanese bandits are a strong country and are attacking, while we are a weak country defending itself, makes our war strategically a defensive and protracted war. As far as the operational lines are concerned, the enemy is fighting on exterior and we on interior lines. This is one aspect of the situation. But there is another aspect which is just the reverse. The enemy forces, though strong (in arms, in certain qualities of their men, and certain other conditions) are numerically small, whereas our forces, though weak (likewise, only with regard to arms, certain qualities of our men, and certain other factors), are numerically very large. If you add the fact that the enemy is an alien nation invading our country while we are one nation resisting an alien nation,[8] this determines the following strategic orientation: It is possible and indeed necessary to use tactical offensives within the strategic defensive, to fight campaigns and battles of quick decision within a strategically protracted war, and to fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. Such is the strategy to be adopted in the War of Resistance as a whole. It holds true both for regular and for guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is different only in degree and form. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks. Although surprise attacks can and should be employed in regular warfare too, the degree of surprise is somewhat smaller. In guerrilla warfare, the need to bring operations to a quick decision is very great, and our exterior-line ring of encirclement of the enemy in campaigns and battles is very small. All these distinguish it from regular warfare.

Thus it can be seen that in their operations guerrilla forces have to concentrate the maximum possible forces, act secretly and swiftly, attack the enemy by surprise, and bring battles to a quick decision, and that they must strictly avoid passive defense, procrastination, and the dispersal of forces before engagements. Of course, guerrilla warfare includes not only the strategic but also the tactical defensive. The latter embraces, among other things, containing outpost actions during battles; the disposition of forces for resistance at narrow passes, strategic points, rivers, or villages in order to deplete and exhaust the enemy; and action to cover withdrawal. But the basic orientation of guerrilla warfare must be the offensive, and guerrilla warfare is more offensive in character than is regular warfare. The offensive, moreover, must take the form of surprise attacks, and to expose ourselves by ostentatiously parading our forces is even less permissible in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare. From the fact that the enemy is strong and we are weak it necessarily follows that, in guerrilla operations in general even more than in regular warfare, battles must be decided quickly, although on some occasions guerrilla fighting may be kept up for several days, as in an assault on a small and isolated enemy force cut off from help. Because of its dispersed character, guerrilla warfare can spread everywhere, and in many of its tasks, as in harassing, containing, and disrupting the enemy and in mass work, its principle is dispersal of forces. But a guerrilla unit, or a guerrilla formation, must concentrate its main forces when it is engaged in destroying the enemy, and especially when it is striving to smash an enemy attack. "Concentrate a big force to strike at a small section of the enemy force" remains a principle of field operations in guerrilla warfare.

Thus it can also be seen that, with regard to the War of Resistance as a whole, we can attain the aim of our strategic defensive and finally drive out[9] Japanese imperialism only through the cumulative effect of many offensive campaigns and battles in both regular and guerrilla warfare, namely, through the cumulative effect of many victories in offensive actions. Only through the cumulative effect of many campaigns and battles of quick decision, namely, the cumulative effect of many victories achieved through quick decision in offensive campaigns and battles, can we attain our goal of strategic protractedness, which means gaining time to increase our capacity to resist while hastening or awaiting changes in the international situation and the internal collapse of the enemy, in order to be able to launch a strategic counteroffensive and drive the Japanese bandits out of China. We must also concentrate superior forces and fight exterior-line operations in every campaign or battle, whether in the stage of strategic defensive or in that of strategic counteroffensive, in order to encircle and destroy the enemy forces, encircling part if not all of them, destroying part if not all of the forces we have encircled, and inflicting heavy casualties on the encircled forces if we cannot capture them in large numbers. Only through the cumulative effect of many such battles of annihilation can we change the relative position as between the enemy and ourselves, thoroughly smash his strategic encirclement—that is, his scheme of exterior-line operations—and finally, in coordination with international forces and the revolutionary warfare[10] of the Japanese people, surround Japanese imperialism and overthrow[11] it with one blow. These results are to be achieved mainly through regular warfare, with guerrilla warfare making only a secondary contribution. What is common to both types of warfare, however, is the accumulation of many minor victories to make a major victory. Herein lies the great strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the process of resistance to Japan.

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[7] IV → Chapter III

[8] One nation resisting an alien nation → Resisting an alien nation's invasion on our own soil

[9] Drive out → Defeat

Now let us discuss the question of initiative, flexibility, and planning in guerrilla warfare. What is initiative in guerrilla warfare?

In any war, the opponents contend for the initiative, whether on a battlefield, in a battle area, in a war zone, or in the whole war, for the initiative means freedom of action for an army. Any army which, losing the initiative, is forced into a passive position and ceases to have freedom of action, faces the danger of defeat or extermination. Naturally, gaining the initiative is harder in strategic defensive and interior-line operations and easier in offensive exterior-line operations. Japanese imperialism, however, has two basic weaknesses, namely, its shortage of troops and the fact that it is fighting a foreign nation.[12] Moreover, its underestimation of China's strength and the internal contradictions among the Japanese militarists have given rise to many mistakes in command, such as piecemeal reinforcement, lack of strategic coordination, occasional absence of a main direction for attack, failure to grasp opportunities in some operations, and failure to wipe out encircled forces, and so on—all of which may be considered its third weakness. Thus, because of their shortage of troops (including their small territory, limited population, inadequate resources, the fact that they are feudal imperialists, and so on), because they are at war with a foreign nation[13] (including the imperialist nature of the war and its barbarous policies, etc.), and because of their stupidities in command, the Japanese militarists are steadily losing the initiative, despite the advantage of being on the offensive and operating on exterior lines. Japan is neither willing nor able to conclude the war at present, nor has its strategic offensive yet come to an end, but, as the general trend shows, its offensive is confined within certain limits. This is the inevitable consequence of its three weaknesses; it cannot go on indefinitely until it swallows the whole of China. Already there are signs that Japan will one day find itself in an utterly passive position. China, on the other hand, was in a rather passive position during the first period of the war, but in the second period,[14] having gained experience, it has turned to the new policy of mobile warfare, which is that of taking the offensive, seeking quick decisions, and operating on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and which, together with the policy of developing widespread guerrilla warfare, is helping China to build up a position of initiative day by day.

The question of the initiative is even more vital in guerrilla warfare, because most guerrilla units operate in very difficult circumstances, fighting without a rear, with their own weak forces facing the enemy's strong forces, lacking experience (when the units are newly organized), being separated, and so on. Nevertheless, it is possible to build up the initiative in guerrilla warfare, the essential condition being to seize on the enemy's three weaknesses as described above. Taking advantage of the enemy's shortage of troops (from the viewpoint of the war as a whole) allows the guerrilla units to use vast areas as their fields of operation; taking advantage of the fact that the enemy is an alien invader and is pursuing a most barbarous policy provides the guerrilla units with the support of millions upon millions of people; and taking advantage of the stupidities in the enemy's command makes the command of the guerrilla units seem objectively that much more brilliant.[15] While the regular army must seize on all these weaknesses of the enemy and turn them to good account in order to defeat him, it is even more important for the guerrilla units to do so. As for the guerrilla units' own weaknesses, they can be gradually reduced in the course of the struggle. Moreover, these weaknesses sometimes constitute the very condition for gaining the initiative. For example, it is precisely because the guerrilla units are small that they can mysteriously appear and disappear in their operations behind enemy lines, without the enemy's being able to do anything about them, and thus enjoy a freedom of action such as massive regular armies never can.

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10. Warfare → Struggles
11. Overthrow → Destroy
12. A foreign nation → On foreign soil
13. At war with a foreign nation → Fighting on foreign soil
14. In the second period → Now
15. Makes the command of the guerrilla units seem objectively that much more brilliant → The guerrilla units can give full scope to their brilliance

When the enemy is making a converging attack from several directions, a guerrilla unit can exercise initiative only with difficulty and can lose it all too easily. In such a case, if its appraisals and dispositions are wrong, it is liable to get into a passive position and consequently fail to smash the converging enemy attack. This may occur even when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive. Thus, the initiative results from making a correct appraisal of the situation (both our own and that of the enemy) and from making the correct military and political dispositions. A pessimistic appraisal not in accordance with the objective conditions, and the passive dispositions ensuing from it, will undoubtedly result in the loss of the initiative and throw one into a passive position. But an overoptimistic appraisal out of accordance with the objective conditions and the risky (unjustifiably risky) dispositions ensuing from it will likewise result in the loss of the initiative and eventually land one in a position similar to that of the pessimists. The initiative is not an innate attribute of genius, but is something an intelligent leader attains through open-minded study and correct appraisal of the objective conditions and through correct military and political dispositions. It follows that the initiative is not ready-made but is something that requires conscious effort.

When forced into a passive position through some incorrect appraisal and disposition or through overwhelming pressure, [a guerrilla unit] must strive to extricate itself. How this can be done depends on the circumstances. In many cases it is necessary to "move away." The ability to move is the distinctive feature of a guerrilla unit. To move away is the principal method for getting out of a passive position and regaining the initiative. But it is not the sole method. Just at the moment when the enemy is most energetic and we are in the greatest difficulties is often the very moment when things begin to turn against him and in our favor. Frequently a favorable situation recurs and the initiative is regained as a result of efforts to "hold out a little longer."

Next, let us deal with flexibility.

Flexibility is a concrete expression of the initiative. The flexible employment of forces is more essential in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

A guerrilla commander must be made to understand that the flexible employment of his forces is the most important means of changing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves and of gaining the initiative. The character of guerrilla warfare is such that guerrilla forces must be employed flexibly in accordance with the tasks in hand and with such circumstances as the state of the enemy, the terrain, and the local population. The chief ways of employing the forces are dispersal, concentration, and shifting of position. In employing his forces, a guerrilla commander is like a fisherman casting his net, which he should be able to spread wide as well as draw in tight. When casting his net, he has to ascertain the depth of the water, the speed of the current, and the presence or absence of obstructions; *similarly,* when dispersing his units, a guerrilla commander must take care not to incur losses through ignorance of the situation or through miscalculated action. Just as the fisherman must keep a grip on the cord in order to draw his net in tight, so the guerrilla commander must maintain liaison and communication with all his forces and keep enough of his main forces at hand. Just as a frequent change of position is necessary in fishing, so a frequent shift of position is necessary for a guerrilla unit. Dispersal, concentration, and shifting of position are the three ways of flexibly employing forces in guerrilla warfare.

Generally speaking, the dispersal of guerrilla units, or "breaking up the whole into parts," is employed chiefly under the following circumstances: (1) when we want to threaten the enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive, and there is temporarily no chance to mass our forces for action; (2) when we want to harass and disrupt the enemy throughout an area where his forces are weak; (3) when we are unable to break through the enemy's encirclement and try to slip away by making ourselves less conspicuous; (4) when we are restricted by terrain or supplies; or (5) when we are carrying on mass work over a wide area. But whatever the circumstances, when dispersing for action we must pay attention to the following: (1) we should never make an absolutely even dispersal of forces, but should keep a fairly large part in an area convenient for maneuver, so that any possible exigency can be met and there is a center of gravity for the task being carried out in dispersion; and (2) we should assign to the dispersed units clearly defined tasks, fields of operation, time limits for actions, places for reassembly, and ways and means of liaison.

Concentration of forces, or "assembling the parts into a whole," is the method usually applied to destroy an enemy when he is on the offensive and sometimes to destroy some of his stationary forces when he is on the defensive. Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces for use in one important direction while retaining or dispatching part of the forces for use in other directions to contain, harass, or disrupt the enemy, or to carry on mass work.

Although the flexible dispersal or concentration of forces according to circumstances is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexibly. When the enemy feels seriously threatened by guerrillas, he will send troops to attack or suppress them. Hence the guerrilla units will have to take stock of the situation. If advisable, they should fight where they are; if not, they should lose no time in shifting elsewhere. Sometimes, in order to crush the enemy units one by one, guerrilla units which have destroyed an enemy force in one place may immediately shift to another so as to wipe out a second enemy force; sometimes, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, they may have to disengage quickly and fight the enemy elsewhere. If the enemy's forces in a certain place present a particularly serious threat, the guerrilla units should not linger, but should move off with lightning speed. In general, shifts of position should be made with secrecy and speed. In order to mislead and confuse[16] the enemy, they should constantly use stratagems, such as making a feint to the east but attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit-and-run attacks, and night actions.

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[16] Mislead and confuse → Mislead, decoy, and confuse

Flexibility in dispersal, concentration, and shifts of position is a concrete expression of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas rigidness and inertia inevitably lead to passivity and cause unnecessary losses. But a commander proves himself wise not just by recognition of the importance of employing his forces flexibly but by skill in dispersing, concentrating, or shifting them in good time according to the specific circumstances. This wisdom in sensing changes and choosing the right moment to act is not easily acquired; it can be gained only by those who study with a receptive mind and investigate and ponder diligently. Prudent consideration of the circumstances is essential to prevent flexibility from turning into impulsive action.

Lastly, we come to planning.

Without planning, victories in guerrilla warfare are impossible. Any idea that guerrilla warfare can be conducted in haphazard fashion indicates either a flippant attitude or ignorance of guerrilla warfare. The operations in a guerrilla zone as a whole, or those of a guerrilla unit or formation, must be preceded by as thorough planning as possible, by preparation in advance for every action. Grasping the situation, setting the tasks, disposing the forces, giving military and political training, securing supplies, putting the equipment in good order, making proper use of the people's help, and so on—all these are part of the work of the guerrilla commanders, which they must carefully consider and conscientiously perform and check up on. There can be no initiative, no flexibility, and no offensive unless they do so. True, guerrilla conditions do not allow as high a degree of planning as do those of regular warfare, and it would be a mistake to attempt very thorough planning in guerrilla warfare. But it is necessary to plan as thoroughly as the objective conditions permit, for it should be understood that fighting the enemy is no joke.

In sum, the above points serve to explain the first of the strategic principles of guerrilla warfare, the principle of using initiative, flexibility, and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations. It is the key problem in the strategy of guerrilla warfare. The solution of this problem provides the major guarantee of victory in guerrilla warfare so far as military command is concerned.

Although a variety of matters have been dealt with here, they all revolve around the offensive in campaigns and battles. The initiative can be decisively grasped only after victory in an offensive. Every offensive operation must be organized on our initiative and not launched under compulsion. Flexibility in the employment of forces revolves around the effort to take the offensive, and planning likewise is necessary chiefly in order to ensure success in offensive operations. Measures of tactical defense are meaningless if they are divorced from their role of giving either direct or indirect support to an offensive. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, and exterior lines refer to its scope. The offensive is the only means of destroying the enemy and is also the principal means of self-preservation, while pure defense and retreat can play only a temporary and partial role in self-preservation and are quite useless for destroying the enemy.

This principle is basically the same for both regular and guerrilla war; it differs to some degree only in its form of expression. But in guerrilla war it is both important and necessary to note this point of difference. It is precisely this difference in form which distinguishes the operational methods of guerrilla war from those of regular war. If we confuse the two different forms in which the principle is expressed, victory in guerrilla war will be impossible.

VI.[17] *The Second Problem:* Coordination with Regular Warfare

The second problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare is its coordination with regular warfare. It is a matter of clarifying the relation between guerrilla and regular warfare on the operational level, in light of the nature of actual guerrilla operations. An understanding of this relationship is very important for effectiveness in defeating the enemy.

There are three kinds of coordination between guerrilla and regular warfare: in strategy, in campaigns, and in battles.

Taken as a whole, guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, which cripples the enemy, pins him down, disrupts his supply lines, and inspires the regular forces and the people throughout the country, is coordinated with regular warfare in strategy. Take the case of the guerrilla warfare in the Three Eastern Provinces. Of course, the question of coordination did not arise before the War of Resistance[18] began, but since the war began the significance of such coordination has become obvious. Every enemy soldier the guerrillas kill there, every bullet they make the enemy expend, every enemy soldier they stop from advancing south of the Great Wall can be reckoned a contribution to the total strength of the resistance. It is, moreover, clear that they are having a demoralizing effect on the whole enemy army and country, and a heartening effect on our whole army and people. Still clearer is the role in strategic coordination played by the guerrilla warfare along the Beiping-Suiyuan, Beiping-Hankou, Tianjin-Pukou, Datong-Puzhou, Zhengding-Taiyuan, and Shanghai-Hangzhou railway lines. Not only are [the guerrilla units] performing the function of coordination with the regular forces in our present strategic defensive, when the enemy is on the strategic offensive; not only will they coordinate with the regular forces in disrupting the enemy's hold on the occupied territory, after he concludes his strategic offensive and switches to the safeguarding of his gains; they will also coordinate with the regular forces in driving out the enemy forces and recovering all the lost territories, when the regular forces launch the strategic counteroffensive. The great role of guerrilla warfare in strategic coordination must not be overlooked. The commanders both of the guerrilla units and of the regular forces must clearly understand this role.

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[17] VI → Chapter V

[18] War of Resistance → Nationwide War of Resistance

In addition, guerrilla warfare also performs a coordinating function in campaigns. For instance, in the campaign at Xinkou, north of Taiyuan, the guerrillas played a remarkable role in coordination both north and south of Yanmenguan by wrecking the Datong-Puzhou railway line and the motor roads running through Pingxingguan and Yangfangkou. Or take another example. After the enemy occupied Fenglingdu, guerrilla warfare, which was already widespread throughout Shanxi (and was conducted mainly by the regular forces), played an even greater role through coordination with the defensive campaigns west of the Yellow River in Shaanxi and south of the Yellow River in Henan. Again, when the enemy attacked southern Shandong, the guerrilla warfare throughout the five provinces of North China contributed a great deal through coordination with the campaigns of our army. In performing a task of this sort, the leaders of each guerrilla base behind the enemy lines, or the commanders of guerrilla formations temporarily dispatched there, must dispose their forces well *under the unified command of each war zone's commanding officer* and, by adopting different tactics suited to the time and place, move energetically against the enemy's most vital and vulnerable spots in order to cripple him, pin him down, disrupt his supply lines, inspire our armies campaigning on the interior lines, and so fulfill their duty of coordinating with the campaign. If each guerrilla zone or unit goes it alone without giving any attention to coordinating with the campaigns of the regular forces, its role in strategic coordination will lose a great deal of its significance, although it will still play some such role in the general strategy. All guerrilla commanders should give this point serious attention. To achieve this goal, it is absolutely necessary for all larger guerrilla units and guerrilla formations to have radio equipment.

Finally, coordination with the regular forces in battles, in actual fighting on the battlefield, is the task of all guerrilla units in the vicinity of an interior-line battlefield. Of course, this applies only to guerrilla units operating close to the regular forces or to units of regulars dispatched on temporary guerrilla missions. In such cases, a guerrilla unit has to perform whatever task it is assigned by the commander of the regular forces, which is usually to pin down some of the enemy's forces, disrupt his supply lines, conduct reconnaissance, act as guides, and so on. Even without such an assignment from the commander of the regular forces, the guerrilla unit should carry out these tasks on its own initiative. To sit by idly, neither moving nor launching attacks, or to move about without making *surprise* attacks, would be an intolerable attitude *whatever the circumstances.*

VII.[19] *The Third Problem:* The Establishment of Base Areas

The third problem of strategy in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is the establishment of base areas. This problem is important and essential because of the protracted nature and ruthlessness of the war. The recovery of lost territories will have to await the nationwide strategic counteroffensive. By then the enemy's front will have extended deep into Central China and cut it in two from north to south, and a part or even a greater part of our territory will have fallen into the hands of the enemy and become his rear. Extending guerrilla warfare all over this vast enemy-occupied area will turn the enemy's rear into his front and force him to fight ceaselessly throughout the territory he occupies. Until such time as our strategic counteroffensive is launched, and so long as our lost territories are not recovered, it will be necessary to persist in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, certainly for a fairly long time, though one cannot say definitely for how long. This is precisely what is meant by the protracted nature of the war. And in order to safeguard his gains in the occupied areas, the enemy is bound to step up his antiguerrilla measures and, especially after the halting of his strategic offensive, to embark on relentless suppression of the guerrillas. With ruthlessness thus added to protractedness, it will be impossible to sustain guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines without base areas.

What, then, are these base areas of guerrilla warfare? They are the strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the objective of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the war. It is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines that it is fought without a rear, for the guerrilla forces are severed from the country's general rear. But guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear.

History knows many peasant wars of the "roving rebel" type, but none of them were able to succeed. In the present age of advanced communications and technology, it would be an even more groundless illusion to imagine that one can win victory by fighting in the manner of roving rebels. This roving rebel idea, however, exists among the impoverished peasants, and in the minds of guerrilla commanders it becomes the view that base areas are neither necessary nor important. Therefore, ridding the minds of guerrilla commanders of this idea is a prerequisite for deciding on a policy of establishing base areas. The question of whether or not to have base areas and of whether or not to regard them as important—in other words, the conflict between the idea of establishing base areas and that of fighting like roving rebels—arises in all guerrilla warfare, and, to a certain extent, the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare can be no exception. Therefore the struggle against the roving rebel ideology will be an inevitable process. Only when this ideology is thoroughly overcome and the policy of establishing base areas is initiated and applied will there be conditions favorable for the maintenance of guerrilla warfare over a long period.

Now that the "necessity and importance of base areas" have been made clear, let us move on to the following problems which must be understood and solved when it comes to establishing the base areas. These problems are: the types of base areas, guerrilla zones and base areas, the conditions for establishing base areas, their consolidation and expansion, and the forms in which we and the enemy encircle each other.

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[19] VII → Chapter VI

1.[20] *Types of Base Areas*

Base areas in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare are mainly of three types: those in the mountains, those on the plains, and those in the river-lake-estuary regions.

The advantage of setting up base areas in mountainous regions is obvious to everyone, and those that have been, are being, or will be established in the Changbai, Wutai, Taihang, Taishan, Yanshan, and Maoshan mountains[21] all belong to this type. These base areas will all be places where anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare can be maintained for the longest time and are important strongholds for the War of Resistance. We must *thoroughly* develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all the mountainous regions behind the enemy lines.

Of course, the plains are somewhat less suitable than the mountains, but it is by no means impossible to develop guerrilla warfare or establish any base areas there. Indeed, the widespread guerrilla warfare in the plains of Hebei and of northern and northwestern Shandong proves that it is possible to develop guerrilla warfare in the plains. While there is as yet no evidence on the possibility of setting up base areas there and maintaining them for long, it has been proved that the setting up of temporary base areas is possible, and it should be possible to set up base areas for small units or for seasonal use. On the one hand, the enemy does not have enough troops at his disposal and is pursuing a policy of unparalleled brutality, and, on the other hand, China has a vast territory and vast numbers of people who are resisting Japan; the objective conditions for spreading guerrilla warfare and setting up temporary base areas in the plains are therefore fulfilled. Given competent military command, it should, of course, be possible to establish bases for small guerrilla units there, bases which are long term but not fixed. Broadly speaking, when the strategic offensive of the enemy is brought to a halt and he enters the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas, he will undoubtedly launch savage attacks on all the guerrilla base areas, and those in the plains will naturally be the first to bear the brunt. The large guerrilla formations operating on the plains will be unable to keep on fighting there for long and will gradually have to move up into the mountains as the circumstances require, as for instance, from the Hebei plain to the Wutai and Taihang mountains, or from the Shandong plain to Mount Taishan and the Shandong peninsula in the east. But in the circumstances of our national war it is not impossible for numerous small guerrilla units to keep moving from one *xian* to another over the vast plains and adopt a fluid way of fighting, which means shifting their bases from place to place. It is definitely possible to conduct seasonal guerrilla warfare by taking advantage of the "green curtain" of tall crops in summer and of the frozen rivers in winter. As the enemy has no strength to spare now and will never be able to attend to everything even when he has the strength to spare, it is absolutely necessary for us to decide on the policy, for the present, of spreading guerrilla warfare far and wide and setting up temporary base areas in the plains and, for the future, of preparing to keep up guerrilla warfare by small units, if only seasonally, and of creating base areas which are not fixed.

Objectively speaking, the possibilities of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas are greater in the river-lake-estuary regions than in the plains, though less than in the mountains. The dramatic battles fought by "pirates" and "water-bandits," of which our history is full, and the guerrilla warfare around Honghu Lake kept up for several years in the Red Army period, both testify to the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and of establishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions. So far, however, the political parties and the masses who are resisting Japan have given this possibility little attention. Although the subjective conditions are as yet lacking, we should undoubtedly turn our attention to this possibility and start working on it. As one aspect in the development of our nationwide guerrilla warfare, we should effectively organize guerrilla warfare in the Hongze Lake region north of the Yangzi River, in the Taihu Lake region south of the Yangzi, and in all river-lake-estuary regions in the enemy-occupied areas along the rivers and on the seacoast, and we should create permanent base areas in and near such places. By overlooking this aspect we are virtually providing the enemy with water transport facilities; this is a gap in our strategic plan for the War of Resistance which must be filled in good time.

2.[22] *Guerrilla Zones and Base Areas*

In guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, there is a distinction between guerrilla zones and base areas. Areas that are surrounded by the enemy but whose central parts are not occupied or have been recovered, like some *xian* in the Wutai mountain region, and also some places in the Taihang and Taishan mountain regions, are ready-made bases for the convenient use of guerrilla units in developing guerrilla

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20. 1 → Paragraph 1

21. Changhai mountain range, on China's northeastern border, became a base area for anti-Japanese guerrillas led by the Communist Party after the Japanese invasion in 1931. Bases in all the other areas mentioned here were set up in 1937 and 1938. The Wutai mountain range is situated on the borders between Shanxi, Hebei, and what was then the province of Chahar; the Taihang mountain range is situated on the borders between Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan; Mount Taishan is one of the chief peaks of the Tai-Yi mountain range in central Shandong; the Yanshan mountain range is situated on the border of Hebei and the then-province of Rehe; the Maoshan mountains are in southern Jiangsu.

22. 2 → Paragraph 2

warfare. But elsewhere in these areas the situation is different, as for instance in the eastern and northern sections of the Wutai mountain region *(i.e., the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region),* which include parts of western Hebei and southern Chahar, and in many places east of Baoding and west of Cangzhou. When guerrilla warfare began, the guerrillas could not completely occupy these places but could only make frequent raids; they are areas held by the guerrillas when they are there and by the puppet régime when they are gone, and are therefore not yet guerrilla bases but only what may be called guerrilla zones. Such guerrilla zones will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the necessary processes of guerrilla warfare, that is, when large numbers of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated there, the puppet régime has been destroyed, the popular masses have been roused to activity, anti-Japanese mass organizations have been formed, people's local armed forces have been developed, and anti-Japanese political power has been established. By expansion of the base areas we mean the addition of areas such as these to the bases already established.

In some places, such as eastern Hebei, for example, the whole area of guerrilla operations has been a guerrilla zone from the very beginning. The puppet régime is of long standing there, and from the beginning the whole area of operations has been a guerrilla zone both for the people's armed forces that have grown out of local uprisings and for the guerrilla detachments dispatched from the Wutai mountains. At the outset all they could do was to choose some fairly good spots in the region as temporary rear areas or temporary base areas. Not until the enemy forces are destroyed and the work of rousing the popular masses has progressed[23] will such places be transformed from guerrilla zones into relatively stable base areas.

Thus the transformation of guerrilla zone into base area is an arduous creative process, and its accomplishment depends upon the extent to which the enemy is destroyed and the popular masses are roused.

Many regions will remain guerrilla zones for a long time. In these regions the enemy will not be able to set up stable puppet régimes, however much he tries to maintain control, while for our part, however vigorously guerrilla warfare is developed, we will not be able to achieve the aim of establishing anti-Japanese political power. Examples of this kind are to be found in the enemy-occupied regions along the railway lines, in the areas near big cities, and in certain areas in the plains.

As for the big cities, the railway stations, and certain areas in the plains, which are controlled by strong enemy forces, guerrilla warfare can only extend to the fringes and not right into these places, which have relatively stable puppet régimes. This is another kind of situation.

Mistakes in our leadership or strong enemy pressure may cause a reversal of the state of affairs described above, which is to say that a base area may turn into a guerrilla zone, and a guerrilla zone may turn into an area under relatively stable

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[23] Has progressed → Has developed

enemy occupation. Such changes are possible, and they deserve special vigilance on the part of guerrilla leaders.

Therefore, as a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between us and the enemy, the entire enemy-occupied territory will fall into the following three categories: first, anti-Japanese bases held by guerrilla units and organs of Chinese political power;[24] second, areas held by Japanese imperialism and its puppet régimes; and, third, intermediate zones contested by both sides, namely, guerrilla zones. Guerrilla commanders have the duty to expand the first and third categories to the maximum and to reduce the second category to the minimum. This is the strategic task of guerrilla warfare.

3.[25] Conditions for Establishing Base Areas

The fundamental conditions for establishing a base area are that there should be anti-Japanese armed forces, that these armed forces should be employed to inflict defeats on the enemy, and that they should rouse the popular masses to action. Thus the establishment of a base area is first and foremost a matter of building an armed force. Leaders in guerrilla war must devote their energy to building one or more guerrilla units and must gradually develop them in the course of struggle into guerrilla formations or even into units and formations of regular troops. The building up of an armed force is the key to establishing a base area; if there is no such thing or if there is but it is weak, we will be in no position to deal with any of the problems. This constitutes the first condition.

The second indispensable condition for establishing a base area is that the armed forces should be used in coordination with the popular masses to defeat the enemy. All places under enemy control are enemy base areas, not guerrilla base areas. It is patently obvious that enemy base areas cannot be transformed into guerrilla base areas unless the enemy is defeated. Even in places controlled by the guerrillas, if there are enemy attacks *(and it is safe to say that the enemy will attack no matter what),* unless we defeat the enemy, the places under our control will come under enemy control, and it will be impossible to establish base areas.

Likewise, the third indispensable condition for establishing a base area is the use of all our strength, including the strength of our armed forces, to rouse the popular masses for struggle against Japan. It is in the course of this struggle that we shall arm the people and organize self-defense corps and guerrilla units. It is in the course of this struggle that we shall form mass organizations of workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants, and professionals. According to the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm, we must organize these popular masses into the various organizations necessary for resistance to

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[24] Guerrilla units and organs of Chinese political power → Our guerrilla units and our organs of political power

[25] 3 → Paragraph 3

Japan, and gradually expand them. Without organization, the popular masses cannot give effect to their anti-Japanese strength. It is in the course of this sort of struggle that open and hidden forces of Chinese traitors can be eliminated, a step which can be accomplished only by relying on the strength of the popular masses. What is particularly important in the course of this sort of struggle is to rouse the popular masses to consolidate, or to establish, local organs of anti-Japanese political power. Where the original Chinese organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy, we should consolidate them[26] on the basis of the support of the broad popular masses. Where the original Chinese organs of political power have been destroyed by the enemy, we should rebuild them on the basis of the efforts of the broad popular masses. They are organs of political power for carrying out the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and should unite all forces[27] to fight against our sole enemy, Japanese imperialism.[28]

Every base area for guerrilla war can be truly established only after three basic conditions are gradually fulfilled, namely, only after the anti-Japanese armed forces are built up, the enemy has suffered defeat, and the popular masses are roused to action.

In addition, mention must also be made of geographic and economic conditions. As for the former, we have already discussed three different categories earlier in dealing with "types of base areas," and here we need only mention one major requirement, which is that the area be extensive. In places surrounded[29] on all sides, or on three sides, mountainous regions naturally offer the best conditions for setting up base areas that can hold out for a long time, but the main thing is that there be enough room for the guerrillas to maneuver, that is, an extensive area. Given an extensive area, guerrilla warfare can be developed and sustained even in the plains, to say nothing of the river-lake-estuary regions. Generally speaking, *the mutually contradictory phenomena of* the vastness of China's territory and the enemy's shortage of troops provide guerrilla warfare in China with this condition. This is an important, even a primary condition, as far as the possibility of waging guerrilla warfare is concerned. For this reason, in small countries such as Belgium, because they lack this condition, the possibility of guerrilla warfare is small or nonexistent. But in China this condition is *naturally present,* not something that has to be striven for, nor is it a problem that awaits a solution; it is something provided by nature, waiting only to be exploited by man.

So far as their natural setting is concerned, the economic conditions resemble the geographic conditions. Because we are now discussing the establishment of base areas not in a desert, where no enemy is to be found, but behind the enemy lines. Every place the enemy can penetrate already has its Chinese inhabitants, of course, and has long had an economic basis for subsistence, so that the question of choice of economic conditions in establishing base areas simply does not arise. Irrespective of the economic conditions, we should do our utmost to develop guerrilla warfare and set up permanent or temporary base areas in all places where Chinese inhabitants and enemy forces are to be found. In a political perspective, however, this is not the case. Here there is a problem, a problem of economic policy which is of immense importance to the establishment of base areas. The economic policy of the guerrilla base areas must follow the principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front by equitably distributing the financial burden and protecting commerce. Neither the local organs of political power nor the guerrilla units must violate these principles, or the establishment of base areas and the maintenance of guerrilla warfare would be adversely affected. The equitable distribution of the financial burden means that "those with money should contribute money," while the peasants should supply the guerrilla units with grain within certain limits. The protection of commerce means that the guerrilla units should be highly disciplined and that the confiscation of shops, except those owned by proven Chinese traitors, should be strictly prohibited. This is no easy matter, but the policy is set and must be put into effect.

4.[30] The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas

In order to confine the enemy invading China to a few strongholds, that is, to the big cities and along the main communication lines, the guerrillas must do all they can to extend guerrilla warfare from their base areas as widely as possible and hem in all the enemy's strongholds, thus threatening his existence and shaking his morale while expanding the base areas. This is essential. In this context, we must oppose conservatism in guerrilla warfare. Whether originating in the desire for an easy existence or in overestimation of the enemy's strength, conservatism can only bring losses in the War of Resistance and is harmful to guerrilla warfare and to the base areas themselves. At the same time, we must not forget the consolidation of the base areas, the chief task being to arouse and organize the popular masses, *also including* the training of guerrilla units and local armed forces. Such consolidation is needed for maintaining protracted warfare and also for expansion, and in its absence forceful expansion is impossible. If we attend only to expansion and forget about consolidation in guerrilla warfare, we shall be unable to withstand the enemy's attacks, and consequently not only forfeit the possibility of expansion but also endanger the very existence of the base areas. The correct principle is "expansion with consolidation," which is a good method that "allows us to take the offensive or the defensive as we choose." Given a protracted war, the problem of consolidating and expanding base areas constantly arises for every guerrilla unit. The concrete solution depends on the circumstances. At one time, the emphasis may be on expansion, which means to expand the guerrilla zones and increase the number of guerrillas. At another, the emphasis may be on consolidation, which means on organizing the popular masses and training the troops. Because the two differ in nature, and as military dispositions and other tasks will differ accordingly, an effective solution of the problem is possible only if we alternate the emphasis according to time and circumstances.

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[26] Consolidate them → Reorganize and consolidate them

[27] Forces → Forces of the people

[28] Japanese imperialism → Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, the Chinese traitors and reactionaries

[29] Surrounded → Surrounded by the enemy

[30] 4 → Paragraph 4

5.[31] *Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle Each Other*

Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensive and is operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and are operating on interior lines. This is the first form of the enemy's encirclement. We for our part encircle each of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes because we apply the policy of the offensive and of exterior-line operations in campaigns and battles by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from exterior lines. This is the first form of our encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountain region, or on three sides, like the northwestern Shanxi area. This is the second form of the enemy's encirclement. But if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together, and in their relation to the battlefronts of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In Shanxi, for example, we have surrounded the Datong-Puzhou railway line on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hebei and Shandong. This is the second form of our encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own—rather like playing a game of *weiqi.*[32] Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matter of "dominating the spaces" that the great strategic role of guerrilla base areas in the rear of the enemy is revealed. We are raising this question in the War of Resistance in order that the nation's military authorities and the guerrilla commanders in all areas should place on the agenda the development of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and the establishment of base areas wherever possible and carry this out as a strategic task. If, on the international plane, we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, and the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as other strategic units, we shall then have one more form of encirclement against the enemy than he has against us and bring about exterior-line operations in the Pacific region by which to *carry out the* encirclement and suppression of fascist Japan. To be sure, this is of little practical significance at present, but such a prospect is not impossible. *The world is in the midst of change, and the Japanese people are preparing for a great struggle!*

VIII.[33] *The Fourth Problem:* The Strategic Defensive and the Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War

The fourth problem of strategy in guerrilla war concerns the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive. This is the problem of how the overall policy of offensive warfare, which was mentioned in the discussion of the first problem, is to be carried out in practice, when we are on the defensive and when we are on the offensive in guerrilla warfare against Japan.

Within the nationwide strategic defensive or strategic offensive (to be more exact, the strategic counteroffensive), small-scale strategic defensives and offensives take place in and around each guerrilla base area. By strategic defensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive; by strategic offensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive.

1.[34] *Strategy and Defense in Guerrilla War*[35]

After guerrilla warfare has broken out and grown to a considerable extent, the enemy will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas, especially in the period when his strategic offensive against the country as a whole is brought to an end and he adopts the policy of safeguarding his occupied areas. It is essential to recognize the inevitability of such attacks, for otherwise the guerrilla leaders will be caught wholly unprepared, and in the face of heavy enemy attacks they will undoubtedly become alarmed and confused and their forces will be routed.

To wipe out the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy frequently resorts to converging attacks. For instance, in each of the four or five "punitive expeditions" directed against the Wutai mountain region, the enemy made a planned advance in three, four, or even six or seven columns simultaneously. The larger the scale of the guerrilla fighting, the more important the position of the base areas, and the greater the threat to the enemy's strategic centers and vital communication lines, the fiercer will be the enemy's attacks. Therefore, the fiercer the enemy's attacks on a guerrilla area, the greater the indication that the guerrilla warfare there is successful and is being effectively coordinated with the regular fighting.

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[31] 5 → Paragraph 5

[32] On Mao's use of *weiqi,* better known in the West under its Japanese name *go,* as a metaphor in discussing military tactics, see page 352 above, paragraph 54 of "On Protracted War."

[33] VIII → Chapter VII

[34] 1 → Paragraph 1

[35] Strategy and defense in guerrilla war → The Strategic Defensive in Guerrilla War

When the enemy launches a converging attack in several columns, the overall guerrilla policy for smashing it takes the form of counterattack. This sort of attack can be easily smashed if each advancing enemy column consists of only one unit, whether big or small, has no follow-up units, and is unable to station troops along the route of advance, construct blockhouses, or build motor roads. In such instances the enemy is on the offensive and operating on exterior lines, while we are on the defensive and operating on interior lines. As for our dispositions, we should use our secondary forces to pin down several enemy columns, while our main force should launch surprise attacks (chiefly in the form of ambushes) in a campaign or battle against a single enemy column, striking it when it is on the move. The enemy, though strong, will be weakened by repeated surprise attacks and will often withdraw when he has gone halfway; the guerrilla units can then make more surprise attacks during the pursuit and weaken him still further. The enemy generally occupies the *xian* towns or other towns in our base areas before he stops his offensive or begins to withdraw, and we should encircle these towns, cutting off his grain supply and severing his communications, so that when he cannot hold out and begins to retreat, we can seize the opportunity to pursue and attack him. After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, and, by smashing them one by one, shatter the converging attack.

A big base area such as the Wutai mountain region forms a "military area," which is divided into four or five[36] "military subareas," each with its own armed forces operating independently. By employing the tactics described above, these forces have often smashed the enemy's attacks simultaneously or successively.

In our plan of operations against a converging attack by the enemy, we generally place our main force on interior lines. But when we have the strength to spare, we use our secondary forces (such as the *xian* or district guerrilla units, or even detachments of the main force) on exterior lines to disrupt the enemy's communications, and it is necessary to pin down the enemy's reinforcements. Should the enemy stay put in our base area, we may reverse the above-mentioned tactics, namely, leave some forces in the base area to invest the enemy while employing the main force to attack the region whence he has come and to step up our activities there, in order to induce him to withdraw and attack our main force; this is the tactic of "relieving the state of Zhao by besieging the state of Wei."[37]

In the course of operations against a converging attack, the local anti-Japanese self-defense corps and the mass organizations should all mobilize for action and in every way help our troops to fight the enemy. In the work of fighting the enemy, it

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[36] Four or five → Four or five, or even more

[37] Refers to tactics similar to those used in a famous battle during the Warring States period. The state of Wei had invaded the state of Zhao, and Zhao's ally the state of Qi attacked Wei, whose troops withdrew from Zhao to defend their own state.

is important both to enforce local martial law and to "strengthen the walls and clear the fields."[38] The purpose of the former is to suppress Chinese traitors and prevent the enemy from getting information and of the latter to assist our own operations (by strengthening the walls) and prevent the enemy from getting food (by clearing the fields).[39]

When the enemy retreats, he often burns down the houses in the cities and towns he has occupied and razes the villages along his route, with the purpose of destroying the guerrilla base areas; but in so doing he deprives himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and thereby harms himself. This is a concrete illustration of what we mean by one and the same thing having two contradictory aspects.

A guerrilla leader should not think of abandoning his base area and shifting to another, unless it proves impossible, after repeated operations, to smash the enemy's heavy converging attacks. In these circumstances he must guard against the emergence of pessimism. So long as the leaders do not blunder in matters of principle, it is generally possible to smash the converging attacks and hold onto the base areas in mountainous regions. It is only in the plains that, when confronted by a heavy converging attack, the following problem should be considered in light of the specific circumstances: leaving many small guerrilla units for scattered operations in the local area, while temporarily shifting large guerrilla formations to some mountainous region, so that they can return and resume their activities in the plains once the main forces of the enemy move away.

Generally speaking, the enemy cannot adopt the principle of blockhouse warfare employed in the days of the civil war,[40] because their forces are inadequate in relation to China's vast territory. But we should reckon with the possibility that the enemy may use it to some extent against those guerrilla base areas which pose a particular threat to their vital positions, and precisely in such circumstances we should be prepared to keep up guerrilla warfare in those areas. Since we have had the experience of being able to maintain guerrilla warfare during the civil war, there is not the slightest doubt of our greater capacity to do so in a national war. Although in point of relative military strength, the enemy can throw forces that are vastly superior in quantity as well as in quality against some of our base areas, there remain the insoluble national contradiction between us and the enemy and the unavoidable weaknesses of his command. Our victories are based on thorough work among the masses and flexible tactics in our operations.

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[38] To enforce local martial law and to "strengthen the walls and clear the fields" → To enforce martial law and, to the extent possible, to "strengthen the walls and clear the fields"

[39] The *Selected Works* version adds here: "Clearing the fields" means harvesting the crops as soon as they are ripe.

[40] Employed in the days of the civil war → Which the Guomindang employed in the days of the civil war

2.[41] *The Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War*

After we have smashed an enemy offensive and before the enemy starts a new offensive, he is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic offensive.

At such times our operational policy is not to attack enemy forces that are entrenched in defensive positions and that we are not sure of defeating, but systematically to destroy or drive out the small enemy units and Chinese traitor forces in certain areas, which our guerrilla units are strong enough to deal with, and to expand our occupied areas, arouse the masses for struggle against Japan, replenish and train our troops, and organize new guerrilla units. If the enemy still remains on the defensive when these tasks are under way, we can expand our new areas still further and attack weakly garrisoned cities and communication lines and hold them for as long as circumstances permit. These are all tasks of the strategic offensive, and the purpose is to take advantage of the fact that the enemy is on the defensive so that we may effectively build up our own military and mass strength, effectively reduce the enemy's strength, and prepare to smash the enemy methodically and vigorously when he mounts an offensive again.

It is essential to rest and train our troops, and the best time for doing so is when the enemy is on the defensive. It is not a question of shutting ourselves off from everything else for rest and training, but of finding time for rest and training while expanding our areas of occupation, mopping up small enemy units, and mobilizing the popular masses. This is usually also the time for tackling the difficult problem of obtaining food supplies, bedding, clothing, and so on.

It is also the time for destroying the enemy's communication lines on a large scale, hampering his transport, and giving direct support to the regular forces in the campaigns.

At such times the guerrilla base areas, guerrilla zones, and guerrilla units are in high spirits, and the areas devastated by the enemy are gradually rehabilitated and revived. The people in the enemy-occupied territories are also delighted, and the fame of the guerrillas resounds everywhere. On the other hand, in the camp of the enemy and his running dogs, the Chinese traitors, panic and disintegration are mounting, while there is growing hatred of the guerrillas and their base areas, and preparations to deal with them are intensified. During the strategic offensive, therefore, it is impermissible for the guerrilla commanders to become so elated as to underrate the enemy and forget to strengthen unity in their own ranks and to consolidate their base areas and their forces. At such times, they must skillfully watch the enemy's every move for signs of any new offensive against us, so that the moment it comes they can wind up their strategic offensive in good order, turn to the strategic defensive, and thereby smash the enemy's offensive.

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[41] 2 → Paragraph 2

IX.[42] *The Fifth Problem:* **Development into Mobile War**

The fifth problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan is its development into mobile war, a development which is necessary and possible because the war is protracted and ruthless. If China could speedily defeat the Japanese bandits and recover its lost territories, and if the war were neither protracted nor ruthless, then it would not be necessary for guerrilla warfare to develop into mobile warfare. But as, on the contrary, the war is protracted and ruthless, guerrilla warfare cannot adapt itself to such a war except by developing into mobile warfare. Since the war is protracted and ruthless, it is possible for the guerrilla units to undergo the necessary steeling and gradually to transform themselves into regular *army* forces, so that their mode of operations is gradually regularized and guerrilla warfare develops into mobile warfare. The necessity and possibility of this development must be clearly recognized by the guerrilla commanders if they are to persist in, and systematically carry out, the policy of turning guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare.

In many places, such as the Wutai mountain region, the present guerrilla warfare owes its growth to the strong detachments sent there by the regular forces. The operations there, though generally of a guerrilla character, have contained an element of mobile warfare from the very beginning. This element will gradually increase as the war goes on. Herein lies the advantage that makes possible the swift expansion of the present anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and its rapid development to a higher level; thus the conditions for guerrilla warfare are far superior to what they were in the Three Eastern Provinces.

To transform guerrilla units waging guerrilla warfare into regular forces waging mobile warfare, two conditions are necessary: an increase in numbers and an improvement in quality. Apart from directly mobilizing the people to join the forces, increased numbers can be attained by amalgamating small units, while better quality depends on steeling the fighters and improving their weapons in the course of the war.

In amalgamating small units, we must, on the one hand, guard against localism, whereby centralization is impeded,[43] and, on the other, guard against the purely military approach, whereby local interests are brushed aside.

Localism exists among the local guerrilla units and local governments, which are frequently preoccupied with local considerations to the neglect of the general interest, or which prefer to act each on its own because they are unaccustomed to acting in larger groups. Leaders of the main guerrilla units or of the guerrilla formations must take this into account and adopt the method of gradual amalgamation of part of the local units, allowing the localities to expand their guerrilla warfare;[44] they should draw these units into joint operations and then bring about their amalgamation without breaking up their original organization or reshuffling their cadres, so that the small groups may integrate smoothly into the larger group.

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[42] IX → Chapter VIII

[43] Centralization is impeded → Attention is concentrated exclusively on local interests and centralization is impeded

As against localism, the purely military approach represents the wrong viewpoint held in the main forces by those who are bent on expanding their own strength and who neglect to assist the people.[45] They do not realize that the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare means not the abandonment of guerrilla warfare, but the gradual formation, in the midst of widespread guerrilla warfare, of a main force capable of conducting mobile warfare. Around this force there must still be numerous guerrilla units and extensive guerrilla operations. Such extensive guerrilla units *and guerrilla operations* are powerful auxiliaries to the main force and serve as inexhaustible reserves for its continuous growth. Therefore, if, *among the* leaders of a main force, the mistake is made of neglecting the interests of the local popular masses and the local government as a result of a purely military approach, it must be corrected in order that the expansion of the main force and the multiplication of the local armed units may both receive due attention.

To raise the quality [of the guerrilla units] it is imperative to raise their political and organizational level and improve their equipment, military technique, tactics, and discipline, so that they gradually pattern themselves on the regular forces and shed their guerrilla ways. Politically, it is imperative to get both the commanders and the fighters to realize the necessity of raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular forces, to encourage them to strive toward this end, and to guarantee its attainment by means of political work. Organizationally, it is imperative gradually to fulfill all the requirements of a regular formation in the following respects: military and political organs, staff, and working methods, a regular supply system, a medical service, and so on. In the matter of equipment, it is imperative to acquire better and more varied weapons and increase the supply of the necessary communications equipment. In the matter of military technique and tactics, it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to the level required of a regular formation. In the matter of discipline, it is imperative to raise the level so that uniform standards are observed, every order is executed without fail, and all slackness is eliminated. To accomplish all these tasks requires a prolonged effort, and it cannot be done overnight; but that is the direction in which we must go. Only thus can a main force be built up in each guerrilla base area, and mobile warfare emerge for more effective attacks on the enemy. Where detachments or cadres have been sent in by the regular forces, the goal can be achieved more easily. Hence all the regular forces have the responsibility of helping the guerrilla units to make progress.[46]

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[44] To expand their guerrilla warfare → To keep some of their forces and expand their guerrilla warfare

[45] The people → The local armed units

[46] Make progress → Develop into regular units

X.[47] *The Sixth Problem:* Command Relationships

The last problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan concerns command relationships. A correct solution of this problem is one of the prerequisites for the unhampered development of guerrilla warfare.

Since guerrilla units are a lower level of armed organization characterized by dispersed operations, the methods of command in guerrilla warfare do not allow as high a degree of centralization as in regular warfare. If any attempt is made to apply the methods of command in regular warfare to guerrilla warfare, its great flexibility will inevitably be restricted and its vitality sapped. *Therefore,* a highly centralized command is in direct contradiction to the great flexibility of guerrilla warfare and must not and cannot be applied to it.

Guerrilla warfare cannot, however, be successfully developed without some centralized command. In circumstances where extensive regular warfare and extensive guerrilla warfare are going on at the same time, their operations must be properly coordinated; hence the need for a command coordinating the two kinds of warfare, which is to say a unified strategic command by the national general staff and the war-zone commanders. In a guerrilla zone or guerrilla base area, where there are many guerrilla units, there are usually one or more guerrilla formations (sometimes together with regular formations) that constitute the main force, a number of other guerrilla units, big and small, which represent the supplementary force, and many armed units composed of people not withdrawn from production; the enemy forces there usually form a unified complex to concert their operations against the guerrillas. Consequently, the problem arises of setting up a unified or centralized command in such guerrilla zones or base areas.

Hence, as opposed both to absolute centralization and to absolute decentralization, the principle of command in guerrilla warfare should be centralized strategic command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles.

Centralized strategic command includes the planning and direction of guerrilla warfare as a whole by the state, the coordination of guerrilla warfare with regular warfare in each war zone, and the unified direction of all the anti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla zone or base area. Here lack of harmony, lack of unity, and lack of centralization is harmful, and every effort must be made to ensure all three. In general matters, that is, matters of strategy, the lower levels must report to the higher and follow their instructions so as to ensure concerted action. Centralization, however, stops at this point, and it would likewise be harmful to go beyond it and interfere with the lower levels in matters of detail such as the specific dispositions for a campaign or battle, and so on. For such details must be settled in the light of specific conditions, which change from time to time and from place to place and are quite beyond the knowledge of the distant higher levels of command.

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[47] X → Chapter IX

This is what is meant by the principle of decentralized command in campaigns and battles. The same principle generally applies in regular operations, especially when communications are inadequate. In a word, it means "guerrilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative in our hands within the framework of a unified strategy."

Where a guerrilla base area constitutes a military area divided into subareas, each comprising several *xian,* each of which is again divided into districts, the relationship between the various levels, from the headquarters of the military area and subareas down to the *xian* and district governments, is one of consecutive subordination, and every armed force must, according to its nature, be under the direct command of one of these. On the principle that has been enunciated, in the relationship of command at these levels matters of general policy should be centralized in the higher levels, while actual operations should be carried out in the light of the specific circumstances by the lower levels, which should have the right of independent action *(sometimes called making arbitrary decisions and taking peremptory action).* If a higher level has something to say about the actual operations undertaken at a lower level, it can and should advance its views as "instructions," but absolutely must not issue hard and fast "commands." The more extensive the area, the more complex the situation, and the greater the distance between the higher and the lower levels, the more advisable it becomes to allow greater independence to the lower levels in their actual operations and thus give those operations a character conforming more closely to the local requirements, so that the lower levels and the local personnel may develop the ability to work independently, cope with complicated situations, and successfully expand guerrilla warfare. For an armed unit or bigger formation which is engaged in a concentrated operation, the principle to be applied is one of centralization and its internal relationship of command, since the situation is clear [to the higher command]; but the moment this unit or formation breaks up for dispersed action, the principle of centralization in general matters and of decentralization in details should be applied, for then the specific situation cannot be clear [to the higher command].

Absence of centralization where it is needed means negligence by the higher levels or usurpation of authority by the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the military sphere. If decentralization is not effected where it should be, that means monopolization of power by the higher levels and lack of initiative by the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the relations of command in guerrilla warfare.[48] The above principles constitute the only correct orientation for solving the problem.

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[48] In guerrilla warfare → In the command of guerrilla warfare

The New Fourth Army Can Maneuver Freely in the Enemy's Rear

(June 2, 1938)

Comrade Xiang Ying:

We have taken note of your telegram of May 4.

1. Gu Zhutong[1] is relatively enlightened, and I hope that you will try to establish good contacts with him.

2. Since your territory has expanded, you are no longer worried about the lack of room for maneuver. I hope that, on the basis of concrete experience of war, you can send our troops to maneuver in all the regions in the enemy's rear where there are none of our friendly armies. In the future, when we have the time and the strength, we should be prepared to send small detachments not only to the large area to the north of Lake Tai and west of the Wusong River, but also to the area north of the Yangzi.

3. The overall goal of the enemy is to attack Wuhan. You can go all out in your actions in the enemy's rear.

4. As far as the weapons are concerned, instead of spending a huge amount of money to buy them from distant places, you can obtain large numbers of them from the localities as well as from the enemy.

5. Strengthen the instruction of the training battalion, and recruit more soldiers, so as to be prepared for the future expansion of our forces.

6. Lai Chuanzhu[2] can be appointed either as deputy brigade commander or brigade political commissar, or you can ask him to take charge of instruction for the training battalion for the time being. Please give some thought to this.

7. We have asked the Third Bureau to try to find a transmitter operator for you.

8. The document from Hankou has arrived.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 351–52, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Gu Zhutong was at this time the commanding officer of the Guomindang army's Third Battle Area.

[2] At this time Lai was chief of staff of the New Fourth Army.

Urgent Statement by Seven Persons, Including Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai

(June 3, 1938)

We have just heard the report of the Central Agency from Chongqing to the effect that the Control Commission of the Chinese Guomindang held the fourteenth meeting of its Standing Committee and adopted a resolution at 8:00 A.M. on the third, restoring party memberships to Chen Qi'ai[2] and twenty-six other persons, including the seven persons Zhou Enlai, Lin Zuhan,[3] Wu Yuzhang, Mao Zedong, Dong Biwu, Deng Yingchao,[4] and Ye Jianying. We are all members of the Chinese Communist Party. Although the two parties of the Guomindang and the Communist Party have announced their political cooperation, it still remains to be decided through negotiation as to whether the cooperative relations between the two parties are to be restored in line with the methods of 1924. Furthermore, regarding the restoration to us of the Guomindang party memberships, neither the Central Committee of our Party nor we ourselves were notified or given an opportunity to express our views in advance. We hereby solemnly declare that we really cannot accept the portion of this resolution of the Control Commission of the Central Committee of the Guomindang concerning us seven persons. This statement is issued jointly by the seven persons Zhou Enlai, Lin Zuhan, Wu Yuzhang, Mao Zedong, Dong Biwu, Deng Yingchao, and Ye Jianying.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 177, which reproduces the text from Wu Yuzhang's[1] autobiography, as published in China in 1981.

[1] Wu Yuzhang (1878–1966), a native of Sichuan, was an active member both of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Guomindang.

[2] Chen Qi'ai (1888–1968), a native of Guangzhou, was at this time in San Francisco, after an active career in the Guomindang in the 1920s.

[3] Lin Boqu (1886–1960), also known as Lin Zuhan, was a native of Hunan, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, and also took part in the reorganization of the Guomindang in 1923–1924. At this time, he was chairman of the Border Region government.

[4] Deng Yingchao (1903–1992), the wife of Zhou Enlai, was one of the few women to survive the Long March.

A Telegraphic Reply Thanking the Congress of the Communist Party of the United States

(June 8, 1938)

The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of the United States, Chairman [William Z.] Foster of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States, and Secretary-General [Earl] Browder earlier sent a telegram of congratulations to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. After receiving this telegram, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party immediately dispatched a telegram of reply. The original text of the telegram is given below:

Transmitted through the *Daily Worker* of New York.

Chairman Foster of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States, Secretary-General Browder, and the representatives of the Tenth National Congress:

On behalf of the Central Committee and all members of the Chinese Communist Party, we would like to express our respect to the vanguard of the American working class, the vanguard which works hard to defend the peace, progress, and democracy of the United States, and our appreciation to your Party and the American people for the assistance and sympathy you have given to the Chinese war of national liberation.

Support the close solidarity between the fraternal Chinese and American Parties, and between the peoples of the two countries! Down with the Japanese invaders! Long live the Communist Party of the United States! Long live an independent, free, and happy new China!

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian], Bo Gu [Qin Bangxian], Xiang Ying, Chen Yun

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This telegram was first published in *Xinhua ribao,* June 8, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 6, p. 147, which reproduces this text.

We Are Planning to Create a Base in the Daqing Mountains

(June 11, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke] and Guan [Xiangying]:

The importance of the Daqing mountain range is just as you said in your telegram. What kind of troop units should be sent there, who should be the commander, and how they should operate are for you to decide on the basis of the situation. The only thing is that when you have just begun to set up a base there, the enemy, being fully aware of its importance, will certainly try to sabotage your effort in every possible way. Therefore, you should choose the best troops for this mission. The leaders should be both politically and militarily up to the task, and, in addition, they should be intelligent, alert, and able to endure hardships, as well as determined to set up a base area in this area. The Northern Shaanxi Cavalry Regiment now controls the large territory of a river valley in Mongolia. It is resisting the enemy's movement to the south in cooperation with the Mongolians in the Hangjinqi area about five hundred *li* north of Dingyan; hence it cannot be moved.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 353–54, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

To Wu Liangping[1]

(June 15, 1938)

Comrade Liangping,

I have received a letter from an American sympathizer and I want to ask you to draft a letter of reply. Apart from expressing thanks to her, the letter may describe the circumstances of the Eighth Route Army's participation in the anti-Japanese war, ask her to tell our American brothers and sisters to provide more assistance to us, and state that we and they stand by each other. How are you? Please let me know.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* p. 129, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Wu Liangping was at this time editor of the Party's weekly organ *Jiefang* in Yan'an.

Freely Develop Guerrilla Warfare in North and Northwest China

(June 15, 1938)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Zhou [Enlai]:

I have taken note of Zhou's telegram.[1] The main direction of the enemy's attack is toward Wuhan. Consequently, for the time being it is unable to pay too much attention to North China and the Northwest, and this gives us the opportunity to develop guerrilla warfare freely and to seize some chances for mobile warfare. I have already proposed this in broad outline in my telegram of the 26th of last month.[2] At the moment, in order to cooperate with the campaign in Central China, to reduce the territory occupied by the enemy in North China, and to develop and strengthen the base area in North China, it is very necessary to attack the enemy on a large scale. The suggestion in Zhou's telegram is correct. My only concern is that the actual campaign should be based totally on the current actual conditions of the enemy and of ourselves. We should not become confused ourselves because of what the others say. We must also pay attention to this.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 355–56, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to a telegram sent by Zhou Enlai to Mao, Zhu, and Peng earlier on the same day.

[2] Mao's telegram of May 26 is translated above.

Conversation with the Delegates of the World Students' Federation, Messrs. Coleman, Garden, Ford, and Redmond

(July 2, 1938, in Yan'an)

First question: What are the significance and role of the border regions in China now? Please explain this to us, for we need very much to be clear about it.

Answer: A clear understanding of the nature of the border regions is essential in order to understand their significance and role in China. What kind of a place is a border region? One sentence is sufficient to describe it; it is a democratic anti-Japanese base.

First, as regards the popular masses, they all have their own organizations. So long as they are guided by the principle of resistance to Japan, they all enjoy freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association. All organizations of the people, no matter whether they are workers', peasants', merchants', students', intellectuals', women's, or children's organizations, or even religious or professional organizations, have such freedoms. Moreover, the Communist Party and the border region governments actively support them and help them, so as to enable them to develop more widely. Here, only the activities of the Chinese traitors are restricted; no freedoms whatsoever are granted to them.

Next, the border regions have already become areas for participating directly in the War of Resistance. Part of the Eighth Route Army still remains here, and there are also some local armed forces. As regards these armed forces, the internal relationship between officers and soldiers and the external relationship between them and the people are imbued with a kind of democratic spirit which makes the officers and soldiers and the soldiers and civilians unite as one so as to become an invincible force in the anti-Japanese war.

Next, education in the border regions is equally anti-Japanese and democratic. You may see this spirit from the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University and the Northern Shaanxi Public School.

This interview was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 45, July 23, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 129–36, which reproduces this text. The same version can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 6, pp. 149–56. We have been unable to verify the names of the delegates.

Next, the economic field is likewise guided by the key principle of supporting the War of Resistance and is run in a democratic spirit. Examples are the relatively advanced cooperatives here. The peasants who have obtained land engage in agricultural production in the same spirit as well. It improves the livelihood of the people and serves the anti-Japanese cause at the same time. There are rents and taxes here, too, but there are no exorbitant levies or miscellaneous taxes. A unified progressive taxation system is in force, in conformity with the above key principle.

The next point, which is also the most important point, is that all levels of the government in the border regions are elected by popular vote. This shows that those people who say "The educationally backward workers and peasants cannot carry out a system of elections" are out of touch with reality. The results of the practice of popular elections here are not bad, as anyone with eyes to see can observe. When the people elect those they like to run government affairs, the government is run rather well. This system is much better than the system of appointing officials to manage affairs and is especially forceful and effective in mobilizing the strength of the people to participate in the anti-Japanese war. The only difference between it and the former soviets lies in the widening of the range of people who may vote and be elected. All workers, peasants, women, intellectuals, students, merchants, and property owners enjoy the right to vote or to be elected, so long as they are not against resistance to Japan, and have reached the age of eighteen.

Combining the anti-Japanese war and the democratic system in the various respects indicated above can yield remarkable results. Under this system, people of all walks of life, regardless of which professions they follow and which activities they engage in, can exercise their talents and display whatever gifts they have.

Such are the nature and characteristics of the border regions. Once these are understood, it is possible to comprehend their significance and role in the whole country. This system should likewise be adopted throughout the country, to combine the anti-Japanese war with the democratic system and to win victory in the anti-Japanese war through the wide application of the democratic system. If the people of the whole country have full freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association; if officers and soldiers in the armies throughout the country unite as one, and if the civilians and soldiers also unite as one; if education throughout the country is carried out in a democratic spirit; if economic construction throughout the country mobilizes the power of the people and improves the livelihood of the people at same time; if an election system is instituted at all levels of the government throughout the whole country; if the people have representative organs at all levels of the government; and if, moreover, all these things serve the purpose of winning victory in the War of Resistance, then the day for defeating Japan is not faraway. The democratic system in other countries is a thing which has already taken shape in the course of history, but as yet it has not been carried out in China. The role of the border regions is to set an example for the people of the whole country to see and to make them understand that this system is the most conducive to resisting Japan and saving the country, and is the only correct road for resisting Japan and saving the country. Such is the significance and role of the border regions in the whole country. The adoption of this system by the whole country requires that the people of the whole country genuinely understand it and believe in its feasibility; only then can it be instituted. Therefore, we welcome the people of all parties, groups, and those outside parties and groups to come and have a look. There are quite a few people who have come, and the number of youth and students is especially large. The fact that, with few exceptions, the majority of the people describe the system as good is heartening. The border regions are parts of China and are under the leadership of the central government. They are similar to other parts of China in this regard. But there is one difference, which is the fact that these regions have instituted a democratic system. This is the characteristic of the border regions, and we hope that this characteristic may spread all over China.

Now, there are some people who hold [one of] two incorrect viewpoints toward the border regions. One viewpoint states that nothing about the border regions is good. There are a few diehard elements who say this, and such statements obviously run counter to the facts. Another viewpoint claims that they are like a sacred paradise with no shortcomings at all. This way of putting it is also exaggerated. The correct formulation must be as follows. The democratic system and the anti-Japanese spirit here are excellent and worthy of emulation and consideration by the people of the whole country. But the work here is still limited by certain conditions. Material difficulties are one example. Much work still requires further efforts before it can improve. The situation is not that everything here is so wonderful that no further improvement is necessary. So we welcome criticisms from outside, which increase the efforts of those working here. This point should be made clear as well. Since you have come to visit Yan'an with good will, I welcome criticisms from all of you to point out shortcomings here, so that these shortcomings may be corrected for the benefit of the great cause of resisting Japan and saving the country.

Second question: What is the role of the Chinese Communist Party at present in the whole of China?

Answer: This question is very simple. Persevering in the War of Resistance, in the united front, and in the protracted war is the basic stand of the Chinese Communist Party at present. Its work and role in the whole country lie precisely here.

What does perseverance in the War of Resistance mean? There is such a question as whether to compromise or to persevere in the War of Resistance. We advocate resisting to the end and opposing any compromises. We are willing to continue the War of Resistance together with the Guomindang, other parties and factions, and the people of the whole country, with absolutely no wavering, and fight to the Yalu River until all the lost territory is recovered.

What does perseverance in the united front mean? It means that the whole country should unite to the end. Only firm adherence to the unity of the whole country can ensure perseverance in the War of Resistance. Although there is already unity of the whole country, the unity should be strengthened further. It is insufficient merely to unite a few parties and factions. It is essential to unite the people of the whole country. Only when the people from all walks of life in the whole country are united in certain organizations, and their enthusiasm for the War of Resistance is mobilized, can the united front be regarded as consolidated and expanded.

What does perseverance in a protracted war mean? There are two types of person in China at present. One type of person says, "China will be destroyed, and we cannot wage a protracted war." Another type of person says, "China can drive out the Japanese imperialists quickly, so there is no need for a protracted war." In our opinion, both of these views are wrong. First, China will never be destroyed. The reason is that, though Japan is strong, it has congenital deficiencies and suffers from multifarious internal and external contradictions, and, though China is weak, it is a big country and also enjoys many excellent internal and external conditions. Therefore, although China may have lost many localities during a certain period of the war, it can still carry out the war resolutely and attain final victory. But it will also be difficult to defeat the Japanese very quickly, because even though there are possible conditions for winning victory, they cannot all manifest themselves within a very short time. Thus, whether it is a question of China's progress, the internal collapse of Japan, or international assistance, none of these factors can enable us to reach the goal before a relatively long time has elapsed. Hence, we should be prepared for a protracted war and should not hope for immediate victory.

So the present orientation should be as follows: persevering in the War of Resistance first; persevering in the united front second; and persevering in a protracted war third.

What is the Chinese Communist Party doing in the whole country? It is doing precisely these things. The Chinese Communist Party is ready to unite closely with every party and faction, and with the people of the whole country, and is determined to pursue this orientation. This is the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the whole country.

Third question: Does China have any factors that can reduce the duration of this protracted war?

Answer: To lessen the duration of the war, three factors must be strengthened. The first factor is the further consolidation and expansion of China's united front. This is fundamental. In the context of the orientation of the united front, all items of work must show considerable development and progress. The greater the improvement and progress the work makes, the more the length of the war can be reduced. The second condition is assistance from the people inside Japan. Now such assistance has already started. For example, their soldiers are unwilling to fight; some of them have committed suicide, some have surrendered, and some have distributed antiwar handbills. The antiwar thinking of the Japanese people is also on the rise. If the consciousness of the Japanese soldiers and people increases by one degree, the length of the war may be shortened by one degree. There is still another condition, which is the assistance from various countries of the world. We need the help of the world's students, the world's peoples, and the governments of various countries. If these forms of assistance are more numerous and become available more quickly, then our war may be shortened. These three conditions are related to one another. If China speeds up progress and unity, this may cause the Japanese domestic forces supporting us and the forces in various countries of the world supporting us to grow faster. And if the forces in Japan and the countries of the world supporting us develop faster, this may also cause our internal anti-Japanese forces to expand and progress more rapidly. By dealing greater blows to the Japanese imperialists, China will also help the Japanese people and cause the liberation struggle of the Japanese people to develop more rapidly. The same applies to the world as well. The Chinese War of Resistance is also helping the people of the world in their opposition to the common enemies. Therefore, China, Japan, and the various antifascist forces of the world influence and help one another. World peace is indivisible, and the world is an integral whole. This is a characteristic of world politics at present. The extent to which the duration of the war is shortened depends on the extent of the existence and adequacy of these three conditions. This is also the task of the Chinese Communist Party, the task of various anti-Japanese parties and factions, and the task of the people of the whole country. At the same time, it is the task of the progressive political parties of Japan and of all the countries of the world, and of all the people. Our war is a protracted war, but we should do our utmost to secure the conditions for shortening the war as much as possible. Without these conditions, cutting down on the length of the war is a mere illusion.

Fourth question: After the final victory of the War of Resistance, what will be the main task of the Chinese Communist Party?

Answer: In short, the main task of the Chinese Communist Party after the victory of the War of Resistance is to establish a democratic state of freedom and equality. In this state, there will be an independent and democratic government, a national assembly representing the people, and a constitution in conformity with the demands of the people. All the nationalities in this state will be equal and form a federal relationship on a basis of equality. Within this state, the economy will make upward progress; agriculture, industry, and commerce will develop greatly and will be run jointly by the state and the people. An eight-hour workday will be established; the peasants should be given land; a unified progressive taxation system will be adopted; peaceful trade with foreign countries will be carried out; and mutually beneficial agreements will be concluded. Within the country, the people will have complete freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, and belief. The talents of all outstanding persons can be developed. Science and culture in general can be enhanced, and illiteracy can be eradicated in the whole country. Within this country, the army will not be in opposition to the people, but will be at one with them. Such a state is not yet a socialist state, and such a government is not a soviet government. They are a state and a government that carry out the democratic system completely and are guided by the principle of nondestruction of private property. This is a modern state for China, and China urgently needs such a state. Once it has such a state, China will be free from its semicolonial and semifeudal status and will turn into a state of freedom and equality; it will leave behind the old China and become a new China. The Communist Party is willing to ally with all parties, groups, and people of the whole country in a common effort to set up such a state. Such a state is the object of desire of the people of the whole country over the past several decades, and it is also what Mr. Sun Yatsen hoped for and strove for. The establishment of such a state cannot start only on the day after the Japanese are driven to the Yalu River. All types of work in the course of the War of Resistance are connected with the establishment of such a country. Nevertheless, much important work, such as basic economic construction and so forth, can be completed only after victory in the War of Resistance. During the War of Resistance, a primary condition for the establishment of such a state is to drive out the Japanese imperialists. Such a task belongs not only to the Communist Party, but also to the Guomindang and other revolutionary parties and factions, and to the people of the whole country. This is China's historical task.

Fifth question: What do you think are the main tasks of the Chinese students and youth in the War of Resistance? What are the main tasks of the movement for assisting China by the students and youth of the world?

Answer: The tasks of Chinese youth may be divided into general ones and particular ones. The general tasks are similar to those that have been mentioned above, namely, persevering in the War of Resistance, in the united front, and in the protracted war so as to expel Japanese imperialism and to set up a democratic republic of freedom and equality. This is the common task of all Chinese whatever their age or profession. It is only in the particular tasks that there are differences. What is the particular task of Chinese youth? It is to strive for special advantages for themselves, such as reforms in education and learning, the right to participate in the movement of saving the country while receiving an education, the right to organize student and youth groups and organizations for saving the nation from extinction, the right of young people over the age of eighteen to vote and to be elected, the right of poor students to attend schools free of charge, the possibility for large numbers of young people to go to the front, and so on.

As regards the main tasks of young people throughout the world to assist the Chinese War of Resistance, I think that, first and foremost, the World Students' Federation should help the majority of the youth and students of the world understand the necessity of jointly opposing Japan and assisting China, and also understand the link of such work with their own interests, for peace is indivisible and worldwide fascist aggression is the enemy of world peace. Next, students are the bridge that connects the various peoples. Through students, the people of all nations should be made to realize the necessity of opposing Japan and helping China, and the relationship between this work and their own interests. The specific methods of assistance may include oral and written propaganda to persuade their peoples and governments to provide material assistance to us and to refuse to buy Japanese goods or to sell goods to Japan, and even organizing international anti-Japanese volunteer armies in order to get ready to come to China and join the war at an appropriate time, and so on and so forth.

The people of all China are grateful to you for coming and surveying the situation in China on behalf of the broad international student organizations and for offering us wide sympathy. On behalf of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, I salute you and hope that you will bring back the truth of the great Chinese anti-Japanese war to the students and people of the world when you return. We shall always unite with you in fighting for the freedom and equality of China, and for lasting peace and lasting happiness in the world.

Launch Guerrilla Warfare in the Relatively Weakly Defended Regions in the Enemy's Rear

(July 3, 1938)

Comrades [Peng] Xuefeng and [Zhu] Lizhi:[1]

We have received your telegram. On the whole, we are in agreement with your arrangements for guerrilla war. Generally speaking, however, guerrilla war should not be launched too early, and it should be launched in the relatively weakly defended areas in the enemy's rear. As far as the Funiu mountain range is concerned, we should go there right away to establish a basis for Party and mass work. In terms of cadres, we plan to send four hundred members of this graduating class of the Anti-Japanese University to Henan and northern Anhui. The only problem is that we have very few cadres with guerrilla experience. Right now we are still searching, and we may be able to send a few. Guo Zihua[2] of the Jiangsu-Shandong Border Region has already been in touch with Guo Hongtao[3] of the Shandong Provincial Committee.

Hongtao is now setting up a base area in Mengshan. In the future please inform him by telegraph of the development of guerrilla warfare in Henan at all times.

Mao [Zedong]   Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 357–58, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Regarding Peng Xuefeng, see above, the note to the text of August 19, 1937. At this time, he was the head of the Military Department of the Henan Provincial Committee; Zhu Lizhi was the secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee.

[2] Guo Zihua was the secretary of the Jiangsu-Shandong Special Committee.

[3] Guo Hongtao was the secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee.

Congratulatory Telegram from Comrade Mao Zedong to the People's Political Council

(July 5, 1938)

For the perusal of Mr. Wang Jingwei, speaker of the Wuhan People's Political Council, Mr. Zhang Boling, deputy speaker, and all the councilors:

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the anti-Japanese war, at a time when the whole country from top to bottom is united in absolute sincerity, fighting ceaselessly and unremittingly, and swearing to expel the ferocious enemy, but the enemy is still stepping up its attack endlessly, the fact that the People's Political Council is holding its meeting in Wuhan at this time will create a precedent for a constitutional government and set up an example of soliciting the will of the people at the very initial stage. This causes all our compatriots profound satisfaction. Although he has been chosen as a member of the council, Zedong is not able to come and personally listen to everyone's eloquent speeches and profound comments, because he has been caught up with so many trivial tasks. But I have already asked the other comrades to express fully my humble ideas that might be helpful regarding big issues such as the anti-Japanese war and building the country in their proposals, thus taking such an opportunity to make my small contribution. The [Japanese] bandits are so aggressive, and have brought such a tremendous calamity to us, that the Divine Land[1] seems to be falling apart like a sinking continent, but so long as the will of the people can be manifested, there is still a hope to reverse the great disaster. There are many ways to reverse it, but, according to my opinion, the following three ways are the most fundamental ones: first, persist in the anti-Japanese war; second, persist in the united front; and third, persist in a protracted war. If we make the right move and march forward forcefully, if we do not lose our courage or relax our will, there is absolutely no doubt that victory will belong to us. At the time of the opening day of your meeting, I would like to

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This telegram was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 46, July 23, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 6, p. 161, which reproduces that version. In *Mao Zedong ji,* the document is dated July 6, but according to *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 80, the telegram was sent on July 5, to arrive on the 6th.

[1] Here the Chinese is *Shenzhou,* a poetic name for China.

express my sincere congratulations to you and extend national-revolutionary greetings to all of you in this telegram.

Mao Zedong

Our Views on the People's Political Council

(July 5, 1938)

The meeting of the People's Political Council is going to be held in a few days. We, seven members of the Chinese Communist Party, have been selected as councilors. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has already officially decided that the seven of us would accept the government's invitation to join the People's Political Council. As a result, a lot of news reporters, our colleagues on the council, our comrades in the Communist Party, and our friends in various places have kindly asked us about our views on the People's Political Council. In response, we would like to issue the following joint statement.

The fact that the meeting of the People's Political Council takes place in the current acute situation of the anti-Japanese war clearly indicates a further step in the political life of our country toward a democratic system, as well as progress in the unity and integration of all the parties, nationalities, social strata, and regions. Even though the People's Political Council is by no means a perfect plenipotentiary representative organ of the people in terms of the way it has been established or in terms of its functions and powers, these two defects will not deprive it of its utility and significance at present—its role in further uniting all kinds of forces in the country for the struggle to resist the Japanese and save the country, and its impact on our attempt to push the political life in our country toward the preliminary stage of an authentic democratization. For this reason, despite our continuous efforts to promote the establishment of a representative organ of the people elected by universal suffrage and endowed with full powers in the future, we Communists will participate in the People's Political Council with the most active, most enthusiastic, and most sincere attitude. At the same time, we also consider that to work actively for the People's Political Council is an important part of our job to reinforce the defense of Wuhan and consolidate our forces for the third stage of the anti-Japanese war and also contributes to laying down part of the foundations for the establishment of a representative organ of the people in the future. As representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, we join the People's Political Council with a sincere desire to stand side by side and strive together with the councilors and comrades who join the council as representatives of the Guomindang and all the other parties, or as independents, in the hope that we may discuss and work

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This document was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 47, August 1, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 6, pp. 157–60, which reproduces this text.

out, in a friendly and harmonious way, all the concrete methods and measures that will help to guarantee the final victory of our anti-Japanese war and the successful construction of our country, and we may more effectively strike at and defeat the Japanese bandits and lay down a basis for transforming the Republic of China into a new country, advancing toward independence, liberty, and happiness.

In order to defeat the Japanese bandits and establish a new country that is independent, free, and happy, we must start our work on the military side, striving to strengthen the fighting capacity of the units on the front line, wage a large-scale guerrilla war of the people in the territory occupied by the enemy, and create a strong army equipped with modern weaponry. On the political side, we must improve our political organs, promote the establishment of popular organizations in districts, *xian*, and provinces, and widely mobilize and organize the broad popular masses to take an active part in the battle. On the economic side, we must create a national defense industry as quickly as possible, regulate the financial and banking management during wartime, increase industrial and agricultural production, and, at the same time, adopt various kinds of effective measures to guarantee and improve the people's livelihood. Moreover, all these military, political, and economic improvements depend on the continuous consolidation and expansion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. All the above-mentioned ideas must be well known to the people of our country, since they have been repeatedly expounded in the documents and manifestos issued by the Chinese Communist Party in the past few years (such as the August 1 Statement in 1935, the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country issued last September, the statement on current affairs issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party last December as well as the speeches and comments made by the leaders and members of our Party). While taking an active part in the work of the People's Political Council, we will faithfully carry out all the instructions from the Central Committee of our Party, and continually strive for the realization of all our Party's proposals during the period of the anti-Japanese war.

At the time when the first meeting of the People's Political Council is taking place, the iron heels of the enemy have already entered the Central Plains, and the enemy's gunfire is heard all over the region from the Yangzi to the Huai and from the Yellow River to the Han; Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei are under the threat of the enemy's cavalry; and Wuhan has become a target on which the enemy is casting his anxious and greedy eyes. Under such circumstances, we believe that no issue is more urgent than how to defend Wuhan and win victory in the third stage of the anti-Japanese war.

At present, it is our belief that the most critical issues, for whose solution we must put forward a plan rapidly, are basically as follows: how to muster our military, human, financial, and material resources to defend our military, political, economic, and transportation center, Greater Wuhan, and effectively conduct the third stage of the anti-Japanese war; how to reform the current conscription system, which has been plagued with all sorts of abuses, and replace it with a method of enlistment based on widescale political mobilization, so that our country's army can be replenished continuously by an adequate source of soldiers who have a strong national consciousness, and meanwhile the cause of creating a new army can be carried out quickly and effectively; how to find a concrete method for really achieving the goal of "whoever has money gives money"; how to guarantee a minimum level of improvement in the life of the people, so that those who have strength can help with their strength; how to mobilize and organize the popular masses on a large scale and, at the same time, unify the mass movements and mass organizations under the general principles of the anti-Japanese war and democracy; how to guarantee the people's freedom of speech, assembly, press, and association, and the legal rights of all the anti-Japanese parties as well; how to train the young people in a really effective way and enable them to take over the responsibilities as cadres in the anti-Japanese war and in the construction of our country so that the current situation in many youth training classes, with which the young people are disappointed, can be rectified; how to improve the political institutions at all levels, first of all, the institutions at the *xian* level and below; how to push forward local autonomy seriously, and so on. All these things are the pressing demands of the people all over the country and also the necessary measures to win the anti-Japanese war. We will express our ideas and present our proposals in the Consultative Council along with the people from all sides who share our viewpoints.

Today, when the enemy bandits are running rampant, our officers and soldiers at the front are fighting a bloody battle to defend the survival and independence of the Chinese nation. On this great and heroic national battlefield, thousands upon thousands of our officers and soldiers are helping one another, pointing their guns at the enemy with one heart and one mind, and gloriously shedding their warm blood together, regardless of which party they belong to or where they come from. We are persuaded that in this meetingplace of the People's Political Council, just as on the battlefields of our war for national liberation, all the members of the council will absolutely not be divided into "the ruling party" and "the opposition party," nor will there be partisan struggles between different parties and factions. On the contrary, all of us, without distinctions of party or region, will eliminate all misunderstandings and will together devote our efforts to helping win final victory in the anti-Japanese war. The reason is that, since the Provisional Congress of the Guomindang proclaimed the program for the anti-Japanese war and building the country, not only does our Party believe that the overall policy of the Guomindang during the war is basically similar to our Party's program during the anti-Japanese war, but other parties have also expressed agreement with it. The National Government and its policy of fighting a long-term anti-Japanese war in order to achieve the final victory of our nation and our country have won unanimous support from people all over the country. On such a foundation, we believe that the People's Political Council will be able to carry out its work successfully in a harmonious and friendly atmosphere.

Finally, we, the Communist councilors, will not dodge any of the responsibilities we have assumed before the people of the country simply because the People's Political Council has not been established on the basis of a general election by all the people. We are profoundly aware that the members of the People's Political Council are public servants, messengers, and representatives of the people. We will work hard in faithful accordance with the people's instructions and the people's will. We are resolved to strive for the realization of the wishes, desires, and demands of the Chinese people. It is our firm belief that to consolidate national unity and drive the Japanese bandits out of our country is the most pressing demand of the Chinese people today. We will not shy away from our duties, nor retreat before any difficulties, but will firmly and loyally strive, both in and outside the People's Political Council, to satisfy completely these most imperative demands. We hope that the people all over the country, individuals and organizations alike, will give us instructions and assistance, and if we commit errors, we also hope that they will criticize and blame us. We hope that, with the support, supervision, encouragement, and criticism of the people throughout the country, we and all the councilors will be able to fulfill the sacred responsibilities placed upon the People's Political Council and on every councilor as an organ of popular will and as representatives of the people.

Mao Zedong
Chen Shaoyu [Wang Ming]
Qin Bangxian [Bo Gu]
Lin Zuhan
Wu Yuzhang
Dong Biwu
Deng Yingchao

The Situation of the Enemy in Eastern Hebei, and the Requirements for Work in This Area

(July 8, 1938)

Nie [Rongzhen][1] and Peng [Zhen][2]:

According to a telegram from Tianjin, the enemy's attack on the guerrilla forces in Eastern Hebei, and the demands thus placed on the work in Eastern Hebei, are as follows. Please take note of this:

1. The enemy's plan of attack:

a. Set up defenses along the Great Wall, from Louyingguan to Malanyu and back to Ji *xian,* adopting the form of a big encirclement.

b. Deploy massive forces in Miyun, Changping, Shunyi, Tong *xian,* and Sanhe to complete the plan of encirclement, taking sure and steady steps in the hope of gradually tightening the encirclement, pushing our forces into the northern part of Ji *xian,* and annihilating them in large numbers.

c. At present there are four hundred of Okamura's troops stationed in Malanyu. Part of Miyazaki's column has arrived at Ji *xian* and Tong *xian.* About a company of Hitotsubashi's column, along with a cavalry regiment and over a hundred infantrymen of the puppet Manchurian troops under the command of Zhang Sicang, have arrived at Miyun from beyond the Pass. About one company of Miyazaki's column is stationed in Shunyi. A unit of Yamashita's army, about four hundred soldiers, is stationed in Changping, and a hundred soldiers are stationed in Ninghe.

d. Out of concern that the Japanese bandit forces are too weak to accomplish their task of encirclement, they are still considering more thorough methods.

e. Apart from one squadron, which has been dispatched to guard Ninghe, the rest of the Eastern Hebei garrison troops have not been moved for some reason. The defense corps do not fight outside the boundaries of their *xian,* and the actual strength of the garrison troops is insubstantial.

Our source for this text is *Wenxian he yanjiu,* no. 3, 1985, pp. 11–12.

[1] See above, the note to the text of February 9, 1938.

[2] See above, the note to the text of April 20, 1938.

2. The requirements for the work in the border area of Hebei and Rehe:

a. Our troops in Eastern Hebei must move more quickly toward the areas of Qian'an, Zunhua, and Lulong to expand their operations, because the enemy forces in these areas are relatively weak, our Party's strength is relatively great, and we can work in concert with uprisings in the south to break through the enemy's line of encirclement.

b. The destruction of the enemy's communications and transportation has been insufficient. More small units must be dispatched to sabotage transportation as well as telephonic and cable communications in Beining, Pingyu, and other places. They are making arrangements for this right now and request you to undertake it at the same time.

c. The Sixth Detachment must set up a base area outside the Great Wall gate. Only if we place every gateway to the Great Wall entirely under our control from the inside and the outside, and if at the same time we are able to begin establishing the Eastern Hebei base area, can we make it impossible for the enemy to fulfill his plan for mass annihilation.

d. Zhao Tong's unit must coordinate its actions with Wanping, pinning down the Japanese troops in Beiping so that they cannot move toward Eastern Hebei, and launching an attack on Beiping as the opportunity arises. At present, Beiping and Tianjin are weakly defended by the enemy forces, and there will yet be opportunities of which we can take advantage. Please consider this and act accordingly.

Inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai] as well.

Mao [Zedong] Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Our Overall Orientation in the Course of the War of Resistance

(August 6, 1938)

Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian], Kai [Feng] [He Kequan], and Ye [Jianying]:

The key to the defense of Wuhan is to mobilize the popular masses. In military operations the emphasis must be placed on attacking the enemy's flanks and rear, so as to stop the enemy from moving forward and gain time. We must be sure to avoid any disadvantageous decisive battle with the enemy. Once it becomes in fact impossible to defend Wuhan, we should not hesitate to give it up. As most of the troops are currently much weaker in their fighting capacity than before, any further excessive losses in these troops will naturally provoke more and more discontent with Chiang [Kaishek] among all the commanders. The capitulationists and separatists will take advantage of this, and it will affect Chiang's position and cause anxiety about the ongoing War of Resistance as well. In the course of the War of Resistance, our overall orientation should be to consolidate Chiang's position, to support the War of Resistance, and to strike resolutely at the capitulationist faction. But the preservation of military strength is the foundation for carrying out this orientation. We hope you will pay more attention to this.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian] Chen [Yun]
Kang [Sheng] Wang [Jiaxiang]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 359–60, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

The Overall Orientation of the Work of the Fourth Column of the Eighth Route Army

(August 13, 1938)

Nie [Rongzhen] and Peng [Zhen]:

We received your telegram sent at 7:00 P.M. on the 8th.

The orientation according to which the main forces of the Song-Deng Column[1] step up their work and settle down in the present area of Pinggu, Zhao *xian,* and Miyun before gradually developing toward the southeast is correct. But Song and Deng must immediately send out about one battalion of forces, together with some cadres, to Yutian, Fengrun, and Luan *xian* in the east to cooperate with the operations of the guerrillas that have risen up there, and to assist those guerrillas in every possible way. For without the cooperation of a backbone detachment, those guerrillas will face the danger of being weakened or even wiped out by the enemy. We also want to inform you that as regards the Zhanggaofeng Incident,[2] it seems that it will most likely be solved peacefully.

Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 361–62, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the Fourth Column of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Song Shilun, with Deng Hua as political commissar.

[2] In late July and early August 1938, the Japanese Army engaged in provocations against the Soviet Army at Zhanggaofeng, where the Chinese, Soviet, and Korean boundaries converged. After a forceful response from the Soviet Army, the Japanese were defeated and sought peace. On August 10, an agreement was concluded in Moscow, and the two sides immediately ceased fighting.

The Monetary Policy of the Border Region

(August 17, 1938)

Nie [Rongzhen] and Peng [Zhen], and for the information of Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

The monetary policy of the Border Region should be based on the following principles:

1. The Border Region should have a relatively stable currency so as to be prepared to carry on a protracted struggle against the Japanese invaders.
2. The number of notes in the Border Region should not exceed the demand of the market in the Border Region. Here we have to take into consideration the possible expansion or contraction of the Border Region.
3. The notes in the Border Region must have a reserve fund: first, goods, particularly industrial products; second, the currency of the puppet government; third, the currency of the National Government.
4. The Japanese bandits occupy the cities as well as the railway lines; we occupy the countryside. The source of industrial products for the Border Region is the territory occupied by the Japanese bandits; the market for the agricultural products of the Border Region is also the territory occupied by the Japanese bandits. Therefore, the Border Region should have proper policies for dealing with the trade with the outside, so as to support the monetary policy.
5. The military expenditure of the border region is very great, and the financial and monetary policy should have in mind the source of military expenditure in the future.
6. Before the final victory of the War of Resistance, the currency of the National Government is sure to continue to depreciate, and it may gradually disappear in North China. Miscellaneous currencies may depreciate even more, and the currency of the puppet government will also depreciate to a certain extent. If the number of Border Region notes is too big, it may also depreciate. The crucial point is that the exchange value of the Border Region currency should not fall below that of the currency of the puppet government.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 137–38, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

We suggest the following concrete measures:

1. Issue a certain number of Border Region notes (you should think about and decide on this number and inform us by telegram), buy the national currency, keep some of it, use most of it to buy industrial products, and use part of it to exchange for the currency of the puppet government.
2. As regards the miscellaneous currencies, we should try by all possible means to cause them to circulate to places outside the Border Region.
3. Is it possible to send part of the miscellaneous currencies to the General Headquarters and the 120th Division, and to bring some national currency to Yan'an? Please think about this and reply by telegram.
4. Increase the printing of Border Region notes, since printing them in the future will undoubtedly be more difficult than it is now.

Please think about and consider the above suggestions. We will wait until Peng Zhen's arrival in Yan'an before holding further detailed discussions and coming to a decision.

Mao Zedong	Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian]
Wang [Jiaxiang]	Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

The Situation in Eastern Hebei and the Rapid Regularization of the Guerrilla Forces in Eastern Hebei

(September 10, 1938)

Nie [Rongzhen] and Song [Shilun], and to Deng [Hua] for transmittal to [Ma] Mingzhi:[1]

1. After a military meeting was held in Eastern Hebei,[2] a military area and five military subareas were established, and the persons responsible for each area were appointed. The commander and deputy commander of the Fourth Military Subarea are Central Committee members. In order to regularize the guerrilla forces in Eastern Hebei rapidly and get them to adopt the work-style of the Eighth Route Army, it seems necessary for the troops led by Song and Deng to scatter throughout all the military subareas, in units of regiments or battalions, and merge themselves with the guerrilla forces there to serve as the backbone. It will be better if the posts of commander and deputy commander of each military subarea are held both by officers of the Eighth Route Army and by cadres from the local areas. It would not seem appropriate to have no backbone forces or responsible cadres at all from the Eighth Route Army in each military subarea. Please consider this and decide.
2. As soon as each *xian* is recaptured in Eastern Hebei, interim *xian* magistrates must be appointed by the headquarters or chosen by the local people. Each military subarea should immediately appoint special staff to set up a government. This should not wait. As to the government of the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Border Region, it would be best for us to wait one or two more months, and then officially establish it.

Our source for this text is *Wenxian he yanjiu,* no. 3, 1985, p. 12.

[1] Ma Mingzhi was at this time the secretary of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee.

[2] The reference is to a meeting in mid-August 1938 between the Eighth Route Army columns of Song and Deng, and the Eastern Hebei United Anti-Japanese Army. On this occasion it was decided to establish a coordination committee for the military districts in Hebei, Chahar, Rehe, and Ningdu, in order to unify the command of the armies and the political work.

3. So far as the Central Committee members are concerned, if they are unable to cooperate with us sincerely, we must not promote them to positions which are too high nor casually allow them to occupy any important posts.

Zhu [De]　　Mao [Zedong]
Wang [Jiaxiang]　　Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Cheng Zihua Should Lead Our Troops to Attack the Area Northwest of Liulin

(September 11, 1938, midnight)

Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], Cheng [Zihua], Zhou [Shidi] and Gan [Siqi], as well as [Chen] Qihan:

1. Enemy troops from Lishi, numbering about four thousand (the accuracy of this has yet to be verified), comprising a mixture of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, attacked and took Liulin and Jundu at seven o'clock this afternoon (the 11th), and also fired shots at our flood prevention units.[1] The Nineteenth Army, which was originally stationed in Liulin, retreated to the south of Liulin. We think it possible that this enemy force will attack and harass Suide and threaten Yan'an.

2. Our 718th Regiment has already taken Songjiachuan,[2] as well as the ferry crossings near it, and is confronting the enemy. The opposite bank at Jikou, as well as the area north of it, is guarded by our First Garrison Regiment. Zaolinping[3] and the area south of it is guarded by the Third Garrison Regiment.

3. We expect Comrade [Cheng] Zihua to lead a strong detachment to attack the area northwest of Liulin, harass and attack the enemy's flanks and rear, and destroy his communications with the rear. Meanwhile, Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], Zhou [Shidi], and Gan [Siqi] should also dispatch nearby troops on a forced march to seek the opportunity to attack the flanks and rear of this enemy. They should also actively destroy and cut off the enemy's communication lines to the rear, in order to cooperate with our garrison force on the west bank of the river to stop the enemy from crossing to the west. We await a telegraphic report regarding your deployments.

Mao [Zedong]　　Zhu [De]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 363–64, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] These places are located in west central Shanxi, near the Yellow River, which runs north and south here and marks the border with Shaanxi.

[2] A township located on the other side of the Yellow River in Shaanxi, immediately opposite Jundu.

[3] Zaolinping is a village in Shaanxi located southwest of Songjiachuan.

Overcome Difficulties, and Create the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Base Area

(September 26, 1938, noon)

To Nie [Rongzhen], and for transmittal to Song [Shilun], Deng [Hua], and all the comrades of the Eastern Hebei Special Committee:

1. Given the favorable situation marked by a nationwide, resolute commitment to the War of Resistance, and by the widespread guerrilla warfare in North China, as well as by other factors such as the cooperation of the Eighth Route Army both near and far, the support of the broad masses, the convenience of maneuvering in the great mountain range including Mount Wuling, Mount Yan, and Mount Wulong which extends for more than a thousand *li* from east to west, and the fact that the local Party organizations in Eastern Hebei have a rather solid basis, it should be possible, on the basis of all these conditions, to create a base area in the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Border Region, and organize a rather large army. But the environment is a severe one, and the job is difficult. It is necessary to maintain a high-level Bolshevik spirit, overcome all the difficulties in the struggle, hold firmly to the principle of the united front, build up a firm belief in victory in the protracted War of Resistance, and overcome the inevitable, complicated, and serious phenomena that will appear in the new armies that have risen in insurrection.

2. Take advantage of the opportune moment when the main force of the enemy is attacking Wuhan and the area along the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] and Tongpu[1] railway lines so that you can gain time and devote all your efforts to reorganizing your forces. First of all, you should establish the political system and the Party organization, strictly enforce discipline, and build a close relationship between the army and the people. But you should not abandon the necessary education in military affairs and in guerrilla operations.

3. Launch a struggle against the Chinese traitors in the military units and among the local residents, expose all the plots to sow dissension and sabotage unity, prevent spies from penetrating our forces for destructive purposes, and clean out the extremely bad elements from our troops in a patient and planned way.

4. There must be a plan and a focus for the work of reorganizing the troops and creating base areas. At present, in our view, the main force should remain east of the White River in Miyun, Pinggu, Jixian, Xinglong, and Zhunhua,[2] while a small part of your force should go to the west of the White River to create a base area. With regard to the reorganization of the troops, particular attention should be paid at present to training the backbone army units and guerrilla detachments, and turning them into models of struggle and discipline, so that they become the core of the leadership in the struggle.

5. Maintain a close relationship between the army and the local Party organizations, strengthen solidarity within the Party, and place all the armies in Eastern Hebei under the unified command of Song and Deng. Run short-term military and political training classes at all levels, and train the cadres in rotation.

Mao Zedong Zhu De
Peng Dehuai Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 365–66, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The Tongpu line ran from Datong to the vicinity of Baotou in what is now Inner Mongolia.

[2] There are several "White Rivers" in China. The one referred to here rises in the north of Hebei, flows south and then east, and ends its course in the reservoir near Miyun, northeast of Beijing, which became celebrated in the course of the Great Leap Forward.

A Letter to Chiang Kaishek

(September 29, 1938)

To Mr. Kaishek[1] for his gracious perusal:

Enlai and all the comrades, on returning to Yan'an, spoke of your great kindness and expressed deep admiration for you.

You, sir, have been leading the whole nation in fighting an unprecedently great revolutionary war, and there is no one among our countrymen who fails to look up to you. In the War of Resistance, which has been going on for fifteen months, each setback has made us all the more fierce, and we have continued to exert ourselves. Although the ferocious thrust of the stubborn bandits has not yet been halted, the foundation for our triumph has already been laid. Future prospects are bright, and our hopes are boundless. As regards the situation in the War of Resistance, there is a trend toward gradually entering a new stage. On the one hand, this will be more difficult, but, on the other hand, it will certainly see more progress. We must unify the entire people, consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese front, persist in the protracted war, mobilize fresh forces, overcome our difficulties, and prepare for a counterattack. During this process, the enemy will surely take advantage of the events in Europe and the weaknesses of our country to carry out all sorts of plots to sabotage the unification and solidarity of our country. For this reason, my colleagues and I believe that our unification and solidarity are more important at this stage than at any other time. Only when all the parties and factions as well as the people of the whole country exert their very best efforts under your unified leadership to prevent and smash the enemy's plots of sabotage, clear away the pessimistic feelings among our countrymen, raise national consciousness and confidence in victory, and carry out the wartime policies that are necessary for this new stage can we achieve our purpose of stopping the enemy's attack and preparing for a counterattack. Since the situation in Wuhan is so tense, we desire that Comrade [Zhou] Enlai not wait until the meeting is over,[2] but return to Wuhan immediately so that he can meet with you, sir, and discuss all these issues. Whatever is not fully stated here, Enlai will be entrusted to convey in person. It is Zedong's firm belief that long-term unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Party will certainly be capable of supporting the protracted war, and that even though the enemy is ferocious and stubborn, he will be defeated in the end. China, a nation with a population of 450 million, will surely be able, in the course of a long-term, bitter struggle, to overcome all difficulties, gather its strength, launch its counterattack, expel the obstinate bandits, and stand as a hero in East Asia. I am quite sure that you must have the same feelings and ambitions. I have here expressed my views. I respectfully wish you good health and extend to you national revolutionary greetings.

Respectfully yours,

Mao Zedong

September 29, the 27th Year of the Republic

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 185–86, where it is reproduced from a volume entitled *Jiang zongtong milu* (Secret Records of President Chiang), published in Taibei in 1974.

[1] This usage, in which the given name of the recipient is preceded by *xiansheng,* "sir" or "Mr.," is frequently followed in semiformal writing of this kind. It implies a mixture of deference and familiarity. In the balance of the letter, Mao consistently addresses Chiang simply as *xiansheng.* This could most accurately be translated as "you, sir." The use of that expression half a dozen times in a short letter would be rather ponderous in English, so for the most part we have rendered it simply as "you," even though in three places Mao further underscores his respect by elevating the reference to Chiang to begin a new line of text.

[2] The reference is to the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, which had just begun.

The Creation of a Base in the Hebei-Rehe Border Region Is of Strategic Significance

(October 2, 1938)

Nie [Rongzhen], Song [Shilun], and Deng [Hua], and the Committee of the Hebei and Rehe Border Region:

1. Building a base for the resistance to Japan in the Hebei-Rehe Border Region is of very great strategic significance. The column led by Song and Deng, and all the comrades in the Hebei-Rehe Border Region, must struggle resolutely for the accomplishment of this task. At present, when the enemy's main force is still attacking central and southern China, and the Eighth Route Army in Eastern Hebei is uniting with the whole Party and carrying out the correct policies and the correct strategy and tactics, it is entirely possible to create a base in the Hebei-Rehe Border Region. The present difficulties, as well as bad phenomena, such as the laxity in discipline among the guerrilla forces, can be overcome.

2. Nevertheless, the development of guerrilla warfare in Hebei and Rehe constitutes the greatest threat to the enemy. The enemy has controlled Hebei and Rehe for a relatively long time, and a relatively large number of Chinese traitors have been trained and organized. Apart from waging fierce attacks on the guerrilla detachments with armed forces, the enemy will necessarily order the traitors and spies to sneak into the guerrilla detachments, the Eighth Route Army, and even our Party for the purpose of instigating all kinds of plots and sabotage. It is particularly important, therefore, to maintain unity and consensus in the whole Party and the Eighth Route Army. Any potential clashes or incidents that manifest a lack of unity within the Party and the Eighth Route Army will naturally be utilized by the Japanese bandits, the Chinese traitors, and enemy spies, and will cause the most serious damage to us. For this reason, we issue the following calls:

a. Comrades Song and Deng must cooperate closely with each other.
b. The cadres of the Eighth Route Army must maintain close unity with the comrades in the local Party organizations and the guerrilla forces.
c. All military operations must be subject to the unified command of Song and Deng.
d. The guerrilla forces led by the local Party organizations must be enlisted into the Eighth Route Army as soon as possible.
e. Establish an atmosphere of unity and harmony among our comrades. Any criticism of the leading comrades in the Eighth Route Army and the local Party organizations must be extremely cautious. Any disagreement can only be discussed within the leading organs or be reported to a higher level for a solution. It cannot be discussed or struggled over outside the leading organs. In particular, the members of the Communist Party must not criticize the Eighth Route Army and the Party organs among the masses.
f. Strengthen discipline in Party organizations in the army and in the localities, call on the entire Party to unite together, and carry on an arduous struggle.

3. As regards our work, we must immediately expand the Eighth Route Army, draw local guerrilla forces into it, run short-term training courses, reform the guerrilla units, and heighten discipline in the units. Organize and develop the Party in the units, establish the government, and reestablish order. Launch a large-scale mobilization within the Party and the army.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De]
Peng [Dehuai] Wang [Jiaxiang]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] Yang [Shangkun]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 367–68, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Mobilize Our Forces on Every Hand to Defeat the Enemy's Encirclement of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region

(October 2, 1938)

Nie [Rongzhen] and for transmittal to the Provincial Committee; Zuo [Quan], [Liu] Bocheng, Zhou [Shidi], and Gan [Siqi]:

1. The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region has already become one of the bases in North China and is, for the masses in territory occupied by the enemy, a guiding light for the struggle of resistance to Japan. It has also made it difficult for puppet régimes to establish their authority in an extensive or stable way. Militarily, it not only threatens important cities such as Beiping, Tianjin, and Zhangyuan[1] but also jeopardizes rail lines such as the [Bei]ping-Han[kou], Zheng-Tai [Shijiazhang-Taiyuan], and [Bei]ping-Sui[yuan] lines, and also the major transportation routes of Tongpu.[2] Consequently, it has drawn the enemy's serious attention and unceasing attacks, but this campaign of encirclement and attack is better planned and more sustained than any previous one.

2. We estimate that, because of the widespread development of guerrilla warfare in North China, assisted by the War of Resistance throughout the country, the enemy will not at the moment be able to gather a force of absolute superiority or to carry out a well-planned attack. Therefore, we should mobilize our forces on every hand to strive to overcome the enemy's encirclement and attack. There is, however, the possibility that Wutai, Fuping, Lingqiu, and Laiyuan, as well as some large towns, might be occupied by the enemy for a period of time. Consequently:

a. The core of all our work is to carry out a thorough campaign of political mobilization in our Party, government, and military, as well as among the people, in order to build up confidence in a victory through a protracted War of Resistance; to strive to endure; and to be prepared for an arduous struggle.

b. Mobilize the masses to take part in the war; oppose the possible occurrence of phenomena such as wavering, compromise, and surrender; eliminate traitors and enemy agents; carry out the clearing of fields and emptying of houses; and bury grain and tools.

c. The army should attend to providing cover for the autumn harvest.

3. Based on the enemy's points of strength and weakness such as its building up of strongholds, its pushing forward step by step, its squeezing of the border region, its tenacity, and its lack of adequate force strength, we make the following suggestions on fighting tactics; please apply them flexibly as opportunities permit:

a. Concentrate our main force to a large extent in places where all conditions favor us (the enemy is weak, the topography favors us), and wait for the right opportunity.

b. Use small units to fight extremely irregular skirmishes against the enemy in order to delay, obstruct, and exhaust the enemy. Move relatively strong forces to the communication lines at the enemy's rear, and attack the enemy's transportation.

c. If the enemy has no weaknesses that we can take advantage of, and at times when it is not suitable for our main forces to concentrate together and strike or wipe out the enemy, wait until the enemy is enmeshed in a devastating cycle, and then move the main force behind the enemy. Gradually and on different routes use small units to lure the enemy in deep, thus rendering the enemy exhausted, careless, and frustrated. When the enemy changes direction or retreats, suddenly attack or pursue him.

4. [Liu] Bocheng should order the Zheng-Tai Railway Line Corps, as well as other corps nearby, to carry out the destruction of this railway line in a planned manner and then, when the opportunity arises, to send an appropriate number of troops across the railway line to proceed north along different routes and attack the enemy from behind. Zhou Shidi should immediately order all the corps along the Yanmenguan-Taiyuan line vigorously to attract the enemy troops in Yuanping, Xinkou, and Guancheng, and when the opportunity arises to cross the railway line and proceed east in order to attack from behind the enemy force that is advancing eastward.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De]
Peng [Dehuai] Wang [Jiaxiang]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] Peng [Zhen]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 369–71, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Now Zhangjiakou.

[2] The reference is to the area served by the Tongpu railway line, on which see, above, the note to the text of September 26, 1938.

On the New Stage

The New Stage in the Development of the National War of Resistance Against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front

(Report to the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,
from October 12 to October 14, 1938)

Comrades, I am giving a report to the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. What do I intend to say? What I am going to say will be divided into the following parts: (1) from the Fifth Plenum to the Sixth Plenum; (2) a summary of the fifteen-month War of Resistance; (3) the new stage in the development of the National War of Resistance against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front; (4) the urgent tasks of our whole nation at present; (5) long-term war and long-term cooperation; (6) China's war against aggression and the world antifascist movement; (7) the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war; and (8) the Seventh National Congress of the Party. These are the problems I want to address.

Comrades, at our Enlarged Sixth Plenum, which is being held in critical circumstances of constant artillery fire throughout the country, and a threatening war in the whole world, what work do we want to accomplish? What is our purpose? We must definitely unite forever with all patriotic parties and all patriotic countrymen of all China, overcome new difficulties, and mobilize new forces. At present, we must stop the enemy's attacks. In the future, we must carry out our counterattacks, in order to reach the goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a republic of the Three People's Principles. We must absolutely be free; we must absolutely be victorious—such is our aim, and such is also the overall orientation of my report.

This document was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 57, November 25, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 6, pp. 163–263, which reproduces this version. The same text also appears in *Central Committee Documents,* Vol. 11, pp. 557–662.

I. From the Fifth Plenum to the Sixth Plenum

1. The Convening of the Enlarged Sixth Plenum

It has been almost five years since the last plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, the Fifth Plenum convened in January 1934 in Jiangxi. Because the various members of the Central Committee were working in all sorts of different environments, inside China and abroad, we could not get together in one place. This time, except for a few comrades, the great majority of the members of the Central Committee are present; moreover, many comrades who play leading roles in various places throughout the country are also present, so that this plenum of ours has the largest number of participants of any meeting since the Sixth National Congress. Originally, we were preparing to hold the Seventh National Congress this year, but because of war and the resulting tension it has had to be postponed until next year. The current situation has, however, raised a lot of problems, for which we must find clear solutions, in order to strive for victory in the War of Resistance. Consequently, we have called this Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Committee.

2. From the Fifth Plenum to the Sixth Plenum

During the past five years, our Party has experienced many significant events. The biggest and most important are the transition from a situation of opposition between the various parties, factions, and classes inside the country to an Anti-Japanese National United Front, and the transition from civil war to the War of Resistance against Japan.

The reason civil war took shape in the past lies in the unfortunate split in the united front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party that took place in 1927, which was caused by the historical circumstances at that time.

How did the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front come about? It resulted from new historical circumstances. All of us have already clearly understood that, since the September Eighteenth Incident, the enemy of the Chinese nation, Japanese imperialism, has completed the first step of invading the Four Eastern Provinces and has proceeded to prepare and carry out the second step of invading all of China. This unprecedented historical incident has brought about a change both in the internal and in the international situation. First, it has changed and is still changing the domestic relationships among all the strata, all the parties, and all the groups; at the same time, it has changed and is still changing international relationships. As a result, our Party, on the basis of these unprecedented historical developments and of the changed domestic and international relationships, and following the path first adopted long ago in 1933 (on three conditions, to conclude agreements on waging a war of resistance against Japan with any elements of the Guomindang prepared to cooperate with us), raised this path to the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Hence we have published our declaration of August 1935, the December Resolution, the letter of August 1936 to the Guomindang, and the Resolution of September on a Democratic Republic. Moreover, on this basis, we were further able to insist on the principle of a peaceful solution to the Xi'an Incident, which took place in December of the same year, and to deliver in February 1937 a concrete proposal for united resistance to the Third Plenum of the Guomindang. Last May, a provisional congress was convened (entitled Congress of Delegates from the Soviet Areas, participants were representatives of the soviet and non-soviet areas and representatives of the Red Army), which passed the "Tasks of the Anti-Japanese National United Front During the Current Stage" and approved the redesignation of the Red Army as the National Revolutionary Army, and the transformation of the soviets into a democratic system. In this way, a change was effectively made from the state of civil war to a new period of beginning to establish the Anti-Japanese National United Front. At that time, the Chinese Guomindang also gradually altered its policy, moving gradually to a position of united resistance to Japan. If there had been no change in the Guomindang's policy, it would have been impossible to establish the Anti-Japanese National United Front. At that time, national salvation groups had been organized in many places, and other parties and factions had also put forward demands to resist Japan. Because of the change in the policies of both the Guomindang and the Communist Party, because of the leadership of Mr. Chiang Kaishek, because of the support of the military and the people of the whole country, and because of the coordination of other groups and parties, the steps of Japanese imperialism to invade and destroy China encountered unprecedented resistance from the entire nation. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7 of last year, the whole of China, under the united leadership of the national leader and supreme commander, Chairman Chiang Kaishek, launched the sacred and righteous sound of cannons. All of China formed an unprecedented great anti-Japanese union, and an Anti-Japanese National United Front. In the second month after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, that is, in August of last year, our Party issued a Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation. In the meantime, the Eighth Route Army had completed its redesignation and had marched to North China to fight. On September 22, our Party published an open proclamation about going to save our country from national calamity on the basis of the Three People's Principles and the Guomindang's "being united in good faith." On the next day, the supreme leader of the Guomindang, the national government, and the National Revolutionary Army, Mr. Chiang Kaishek, gave a talk in which he recognized the legal existence of the Communist Party, and expressed his willingness to unite with it to save the country. Thereafter, the Anti-Japanese National United Front was fully established, with the Guomindang and the Communist Party as its foundation. In December, in order to consolidate and develop the Anti-Japanese National United Front, our Party further published a manifesto stating that we were willing not only to cooperate with the Guomingtang to resist Japan but also to cooperate in

building the state. Soon after that, the Red Army guerrilla forces in the south were redesignated as the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, and marched to the south of the lower reaches of the Yangzi to fight. From this time forward, unity in resisting Japan has been progressing daily.

Comrades, this kind of change from the ten-year war between the two parties to the renewed cooperation of the two parties, and, moreover, a change that was executed under extremely difficult conditions, thereby laying the ground for the long-term cooperation between the two parties, has been completed only after passing through many difficulties and setbacks. But thanks to the efforts of the Central Committee and of the whole Party, they have been completed at last. The Communist International completely approves of this new political line of our Party (the resolution of the Communist International, *Xinhua ribao,* September 8). Moreover, for the sake of the victory of the Chinese nation, it has called on the Communist Parties and on the proletariat of all the countries in the world to support China's War of Resistance.

Comrades, if there had been no launching, establishment, and consolidation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front on the foundation of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, it would be impossible to launch such a great revolutionary War of Resistance against Japan, to sustain it, and to strive for victory. Now the people of all China and of the whole world have all understood that the Chinese nation has stood up! After being trodden upon, humiliated, invaded, and oppressed for the past hundred years, and especially after being in such an intolerable position of slavery since the September Eighteenth Incident, things have indeed changed. The people of all China, holding weapons in their hands, have marched to the battleground of the war of self-defense. The final victory of all China, namely, the dawn of freedom and emancipation for the Chinese nation, is already in sight.

We know that this current great national war of ours differs from all wars in the past history of China, because this war is a war that frees the Chinese nation from the status of semicolony and from the destruction of the state and the extinction of the race. Moreover, this war is taking place during the most progressive period in the history of the Chinese nation; at the same time, it is taking place in a period when Japanese imperialism is seeking a deadly road and heading for collapse, and also when progressive humanity throughout the world is preparing unprecedentedly broad and deep fighting forces to resist and defeat the despots, the German, Japanese, and Italian fascists, and to strive for a bright future of the world. The combination of these three factors—the combination of the three factors that have China's progress and continued progress as a basis—will guarantee that our War of Resistance will, without a doubt, ultimately be victorious, and that a free and liberated New China will definitely appear in East Asia and become an extremely important component part of the future bright world. Such a China will not only bring happiness to the 450 million Chinese but will also bring happiness to all humanity.

3. The Tasks of the Sixth Plenum

This Enlarged Sixth Plenum is meeting at a important juncture of the War of Resistance, which is entering a new phase in its development; the Enlarged Sixth Plenum has assumed a significant historical task.

It is entirely correct that, after more than a year of courageous fighting in the anti-Japanese war, the entire country has achieved great unity and great progress, and has struck heavy blows at Japanese imperialism. Even though much territory was lost, at the same time there were also many victories. This is an undeniable fact. As the war develops, primarily due to China's continuous progress, at the same time coupled with Japan's increased difficulties, and international support for us, the final victory will definitely belong to us, not to the enemy. This, too, can be predicted. Whoever fails to see the great achievements in the past and the victorious future will fall into the pit of pessimism and will be unable to extricate himself. But it is not enough to see only this side; the War of Resistance has another side, its negative side, which is the source of many of the difficulties before us. The conditions at present tell us that all of China's struggles, unity, progress, and victories for the past year have not been able to check the enemy's advance and do not have the force to counterattack the enemy. Wuhan is at present under threat from the enemy; the enemy will also attack Guangzhou, Changsha, the Northeast, and so on. Therefore, the people of our entire country are expecting the Communist Party to express its opinions. The new environment has posed a great many problems. Comrades, we must express our opinions and must solve the problems. Yes, our Party long ago expressed its opinions; and many fundamental problems have already been solved. But the new environment requires that we express new opinions and solve new problems.

What are the new problems?

How to add new forces on the present basis, to tide over the difficulties, to stop the enemy's attacks, and to prepare our counterattacks to reach the goal of driving the enemy out are the keys to current problems. These problems are being discussed and worried about by countless people in the whole country. Should we answer these questions? Beyond a doubt, we must.

These questions have arisen with reference to various aspects and generated many questions.

For example, what exactly has the fifteen months' experience of the War of Resistance proved? Has this experience of fifteen months proved that the War of Resistance is long-term or short-term? Is the strategic orientation to defeat the enemy in a protracted war or to defeat him quickly? Will the final victory be China's or the enemy's? Does the War of Resistance offer a way out, or is compromise the way out? If the war is protracted, then what method should be used to sustain the protracted war and achieve final victory? Does the experience of the last fifteen months provide a basis for clear answers to all these questions? Furthermore, can the basis of this past experience play a positive role in the new stage of the War of Resistance, allowing us to overcome new difficulties and achieve new victories? These are all important questions and belong to the same set of questions.

To take another example, how will the whole War of Resistance develop and change? What is actually the nature of the so-called New Stage? If we assume that Wuhan cannot be held, just what will the trend of the war be? What should be the direction of the future effort of the whole country, that is, the urgent task of the Chinese nation at the present time? What are the good methods that will enable us to tide over the difficult moments in the war? These are even more important problems, and they are problems of another kind.

To take another example, what will the future and the long-term prospects of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party be like? What basis does the Communist Party have for talking about long-term cooperation? What is the method of the Communist Party for ameliorating the relationship between the two Parties? As for what is called cooperation not only in the War of Resistance but also in building up the country, what kind of state will actually be founded? What is the relationship between the Three People's Principles and communism? These are very important questions, too, and they comprise another set of questions.

To take yet another example, the world situation is so critical; what will its future trend be? What will be the positive and negative relationships between China's War of Resistance against Japan and the world movement against fascism? These are also important questions, and they are yet another kind of questions.

Furthermore, what is the place of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war? What should the attitude of members of the Communist Party be when they are struggling to apply the political orientation of their Party? What better methods does the Communist Party have for cooperating with other parties, and for maintaining links to the people, in order to make the difficult situation evolve into a favorable situation? What are the internal relations within the Communist Party like? What are the good methods for uniting the whole Party, in order for it to play its great role during the War of Resistance, and in particular during the present difficult situation? What will the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party actually be like? These are also important questions, and they are yet another set of questions.

Both within and without the Party, all these problems urgently demand a solution. For the last few months, we have been constantly encountering people who demanded answers to these questions.

Comrades, our country is a vast and complex country, and right now this country finds itself in a life-and-death struggle against a powerful imperialism. This struggle is now approaching a new stage in its development; it is in the period of transition to a new stage. Our Enlarged Sixth Plenum is being held during this time. The responsibility of the Enlarged Sixth Plenum is extremely heavy; we have to solve many problems.

II. Summary of the Fifteen Months of the War of Resistance

1. What Has the Experience of the Fifteen Months Proved?

Let us start from the experience of the fifteen months.

What has the experience of fifteen months of the War of Resistance given us? In my view, there are three main aspects. First, it has proved that the War of Resistance against Japan is long-term and not short-term; consequently, the strategic orientation of the War of Resistance is protracted war and not a war of quick decision. Second, it has proved that China's War of Resistance can achieve final victory, and that the view of the pessimists is unfounded. Third, it has proved that the single correct road for sustaining a long-term war and obtaining final victory, to which there is no alternative, lies in uniting the whole nation, striving to make progress, and relying on the popular masses to overcome difficulties and achieve victory.

2. The War of Resistance Against Japan Is Long-Term and Not Short-Term; the Strategic Orientation Is Protracted War and Not Quick Victory

When the War of Resistance began, many people, judging not from the basic comparison between the forces of the enemy and our own forces, but from certain one-time and superficial phenomena, imagined that the war would soon be resolved. For a time, the idea of a quick victory hovered around. Last year, however, on the October 10 holiday, Chairman Chiang clearly pointed out: "This War of Resistance cannot be resolved in a year or so, but must go through extreme bitterness and hardship before we can achieve the final victory." We also pointed out at a very early stage the long-term nature of the War of Resistance against Japan, and that it absolutely could not be resolved in a short time. "The result of the war will be that Japan will definitely be defeated, and China will definitely be victorious. The sacrifices will, however, be severe, and we will go through a very painful period." (Mao Zedong's Talk with Snow, July 16, 1936).[1] "It should be seen that this War of Resistance is an arduous and protracted war." (Decision on the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, August 15, 1937).[2] All these statements point out: the War of Resistance against Japan is a long-term and not a short-term war; the strategic orientation is protracted war and not a war of quick decision. The fifteen-month experience of the War of Resistance has completely proved their correctness.

Where is the reason for this to be found? It is to be found in the fact that the enemy is strong, and we are weak; the enemy is in a dominant position, and we are in an inferior position; the enemy is an imperialist country, and we are a semicolonial country.

We pointed out long ago that defeating imperialist Japan requires three conditions. The first is progress by China, which is the basic and primary thing. The second is difficulties for Japan. The third is international support. Let us take a look at what these conditions have already been like during the fifteen months of the War of Resistance. In a word, there is already a basis, but it is still very far from reaching the necessary level.

Take the first condition (the basic and primary condition for defeating the enemy). As regards progress by China, after fifteen months there is indeed a basis, but only if there is continuous progress can the enemy finally be defeated. What we call progress by China includes every aspect—domestic politics, military affairs, Party affairs, mass movements, culture, education, and so on. The progress of these aspects has been very notable during the last fifteen months. Nevertheless, we still cannot stop the enemy's attacks and execute our counterattacks simply by using these already existing things. A counterattack requires a period of preparation, as well as an effort by the whole nation, in which all the vital forces in our nation are mobilized broadly and profoundly. Only thus will a counterattack and victory over the enemy become possible. Therefore, the doctrine of quick victory has no foundation. It leaves out of account the peculiarity that the enemy is strong and we are weak; it ignores the fact that the enemy is in a dominant position, while we are in an inferior position, and that the enemy is an imperialist country, while we are a semicolonial country. China possesses great hidden potential. If it is mobilized, it is sufficient to turn our defeat into victory, to turn weakness into strength, and to change fundamentally relations between the enemy and ourselves. But this depends upon our future efforts; it is not yet an established fact.

The same is true of the second condition, Japan's difficulties. During these fifteen months, the enemy dispatched a million troops; their casualties amounted to several hundred thousand, and their expenditures reached several hundred million;[3] day by day the edge was taken off their troops' spirit, and their finances and economy became impoverished. Various currents of world opinion have condemned them one after the other, and all of this is the result of Japan's brutal aggression and China's brave resistance. All these existing difficulties for the enemy are, however, still insufficient to stop his attacks and to benefit our counterattack. We must wait until the enemy has greater difficulties and we have made greater progress; it is only then that the opportunity will come to counterattack and defeat the enemy.

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[1] For Snow's version of the passage referred to here, see Volume V, p. 259. The substance of the two sentences Mao cites is basically the same, but they are preceded by the statement that, if the Chinese People's Front is homogeneous, if international aid to China is considerable, and if revolution comes quickly in Japan, "the war will be short and victory speedily won." Two years later, he was less optimistic.

[2] The reference is to paragraph 7 of a document drafted on August 15, 1937, and formally adopted at the Luochuan Conference on August 25. The Chinese text can be found in *Central Committee Documents,* Vol. 11, pp. 324–26. For a translation, see Saich, *Rise to Power,* p. 791.

[3] Most likely several hundred million yen, but not specifically stated.

Consequently, the theory of rapid victory has no basis either in the enemy's situation. The experience of these fifteen months has already proved this.

As regards the third condition, international support for us, we have not yet reached the most beneficial time. During the past fifteen months, we have gained widespread support from world opinion. The Soviet Union and other democratic countries, on the basis of resolutions by the League of Nations, have already provided us with a lot of help, proving that we are not isolated. Nevertheless, we must see that the various countries in the international peace front find themselves in differing circumstances. In capitalist countries, the people support us, but their governments adopt a neutral attitude to some degree. Their bourgeoisie takes advantage of war to do business; moreover, they are sending large quantities of munitions, and of raw materials for munitions, to Japan. The socialist countries differ fundamentally from the capitalist countries, as has already been shown concretely with regard to support for China. But the international situation does not yet allow them to provide support beyond the present level. Therefore, we must definitely not expect too much from international support for the time being. It is undoubtedly quite wrong to abandon the orientation of self-reliance and place our hopes principally in external support. The experience of these fifteen months has proved that the only correct way is to rely primarily on ourselves, but at the same time not to relax our striving to obtain external support. On this point, our past experience has also negated the theory of rapid victory.

In general, whether we look at the matter from the Chinese side, the enemy side, or the international side, our experience of the past fifteen months has proved that the views predicting rapid victory have absolutely no foundation. On the contrary, this experience has revealed the protracted and bitter nature of the war. Therefore, our strategic orientation absolutely cannot be toward a war of quick conclusion, but toward protracted war. To defeat the enemy in a protracted war—this is the only correct orientation for the War of Resistance against Japan. Those who did not believe in this orientation in the past have now received a clear lesson from experience, and they should not have any further doubts!

3. Final Victory Belongs to China; Pessimism Is Entirely Unfounded

Prior to the War of Resistance, the theory that weapons alone decide the outcome of war was very popular. It was believed that China was inferior in weapons to others and would surely lose the war if it were to fight, and China would surely become another Abyssinia. Although outwardly talk along these lines disappeared after the beginning of the war, secretly it continued to be prevalent. Whenever there is a critical moment in the war, such a view will manifest itself once again. It holds that China must stop fighting and carry on peace negotiations: China can fight no more, and if it continues the war it will surely perish. We, however, take the opposite view. We consider that, although China is indeed inferior to others in weapons, weapons can be strengthened by human efforts, and ultimately victory or defeat in a war is determined mainly by people, rather than by things. The conclusion of a protracted war depends on the efforts of the whole nation. Assuredly China can gradually overcome its own defects, enhance its own strength, turn the passive into the active, turn the inferior situation into the superior. Meanwhile, the difficulties of the enemy must gradually increase, and in the international context aid to us must also gradually increase. Summing up all these factors, we will definitely be able to defeat Japanese imperialism in the end. Chairman Chiang long ago clearly declared, "Since the war has begun, the only way we have is to risk the life of the entire nation and sacrifice ourselves to the end; there is no reason to stop and compromise halfway through" (speech at Lushan in July of last year). "This War of Resistance is unavoidable in the course of the national revolution. The war of the invaded nation against the invaders for independence and survival is very different from the usual war among participants of equal strength. Therefore it does not depend upon weapons and military preparation, but relies instead on a strong and unyielding revolutionary spirit, and a strong and unshakable national consciousness" (open letter to the nation in December last year). The Chinese Communist Party also long since pointed out, "Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long expensive occupation of China, and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the Chinese people will still be pouring men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines long after the tidal flood of Japanese imperialism has wrecked itself on the hidden reefs of Chinese resistance. All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China" (Mao Zedong's talk with Edgar Snow).[4] "We are confident that the War of Resistance which has already been launched will break through all the obstacles and continue to move forward, thanks to the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country. . . . Provided only that we can truly organize the masses in their millions into the Anti-Japanese National Front, there will be no doubt regarding the victory of the War of Resistance" (Decision of the Chinese Communist Party in August of last year).[5] All these [statements] have been borne out by the experience of the past fifteen months. The absurd theories of people who are pessimistic or defeatist, and believe that China will be conquered because the enemy is too strong to be resisted, and that China cannot afford such a war, and compromise is the only way out, and so on, have already been proved completely wrong.

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[4] This quotation is from Mao's interview with Snow on Japanese imperialism, July 16, 1936, already cited above. The version of this passage in the Chinese text of "On the New Stage" does not correspond precisely to Snow's English text as reproduced in Volume V, p. 266, but since the substance is essentially the same, and no independent record of these interviews in Chinese exists, we have inserted Snow's version here.

[5] The reference is once again to the "Decision of the Central Committee on Present Conditions and the Party's Task," adopted on August 25, 1937. The quotations are taken from points 7 and 8 of this document. See *Central Committee Documents*, Vol. 11, pp. 324–26, and the translation in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 791–92.

What are the reasons? Because it is only one aspect of the reality that the enemy is strong and we are weak; the enemy still has weak points, and China still has strong points.

What, then, are the weak points of our enemy? First, it is a relatively small country, it does not have enough troops or financial capability, and cannot afford a protracted drain [on these resources]. Because of its lack of military forces, and also because in the face of China's resolute resistance it must disperse and expend them, it will be impossible for Japan to occupy the whole of China. Moreover, even in the areas it does occupy, it can in reality hold only the big cities and the major roads, and some flat regions. The rest will still be under Chinese control. Second, the enemy's war is imperialist in character and is retrogressive. Its internal contradictions force it to carry out wars of aggression and, moreover, forced it to adopt an extremely barbaric policy of pillage. As a result, Japan's war has, on the one hand, become a war of absolute confrontation against the Chinese people as a whole, forcing all Chinese, no matter of which class, party, or faction, to unite together and fight this resistance war resolutely. On the other hand, it has also become a war of absolute confrontation against the broad popular masses in its own country. The eventual consequence of the Japanese imperialists' putting all their manpower and financial capacity into the war has been the gradual brewing of discontent among the people within the country and among the soldiers at the front. If the war continues to develop, there is no doubt that there will be a trend forcing the broad masses of its own people and of the ordinary soldiers to fight against the war itself in a resolute way. These have begun to be proved in the past fifteen months. This point, which exists on the side of the enemy itself, is the most important factor which will necessarily lead to its defeat. Third, it is precisely because the enemy's war is imperialist in character, or, to put it differently, because it aims to benefit itself at the expense of others, that it cannot fail to put it in a position of confrontation vis-à-vis those countries which have opposite interests. Apart from one or two fascist countries, all countries, and especially their broad popular masses, all disapprove of Japan's war of aggression. Thus, Japan is obliged to reduce its sphere of international activities and is becoming more isolated day by day. This has also begun to be proved in the past fifteen months.

Thus the small size of Japan as a country, which causes its deficiency in military force and financial capability; the retrogressive character of Japan's war; and Japan's isolated international status—these three combined at the same time represent the innate weaknesses and difficulties of the Japanese war. Moreover, these weaknesses and difficulties are still developing every day. The capitulationists and pessimists are blind to all this; they do not see these at all but, instead, see only one thing: the enemy is strong, and we are weak. So capitulationism and pessimism have no basis in the enemy's situation, and their policy of compromise can only be a policy of the destruction of the state. We believe in the theory of ultimate victory. Our views are based on abundant evidence in terms of the enemy's situation, and the experience of the past fifteen months has begun to verify them.

What are our advantages? In the first place, we are a big country with a vast territory and abundant resources, a large population, and large military forces. Although the enemy has occupied our major big cities and lines of communication, we still have large areas of land to serve as our base areas in sustaining a protracted war of resistance and striving for final victory. Even in the enemy-occupied regions, we still have many base areas for guerrilla warfare. This characteristic is utterly different from those that obtain in small countries such as Czechoslovakia and Belgium. This is our first advantage. In the second place, our Resistance War against Japan today is unlike the wars in all the periods of Chinese history. Our war is a national revolutionary war and a progressive war. Not only is the character of the war itself progressive, but this war is being waged on a progressive foundation without parallel in China's past. China in the fourth decade of the twentieth century is different from China in any other historical period. We have progressive people, progressive political parties, and a progressive army unlike those in any other historic periods. The national revolutionary War of Resistance against Japan that is being waged on this basis contains within itself great forces that can continue to develop and progress. This is the foundation that we have on our side and which will enable us to sustain a protracted war and win final victory. The experience of fifteen months has proved that the great, sacred national revolutionary war that is being waged on the original progressive basis has already pushed forward progress in the whole of China. The old, corrupt national tradition is being destroyed, new national progressive forces are growing, and a great process of unity, unification, progress, and development of the entire nation is moving forward to completion. China before the War of Resistance was different from China after the War of Resistance, and everyone with eyes can see this. Furthermore, it can already be predicted that China in the first period of the War of Resistance (at present, this period is still not over) will be different from China in the period after the War of Resistance. In the third place, moreover, our War of Resistance against the Japanese is not isolated. Even though the capitalist countries are still maintaining many of their contradictory policies, and even though the international situation may temporarily affect the degree of assistance from other countries, China's War of Resistance against the Japanese and the worldwide struggle against aggression and fascism are inseparably linked. It is not only the Chinese who are waging war against Japanese aggression; Europeans, Americans, Africans, Australians, and other Asians are also doing so. The sympathy and assistance from various nations all over the world in the past fifteen months have given us this conviction. China, which depends mainly on self-reliance, can at the same time cooperate with the assistance from the world, because the world today is no longer the world of the past. Progressive humanity throughout the world has become one entity bound together by a common cause, and the enemy's attempt to isolate us can only be in vain.

Thus, we are a very big country, our war is a progressive war, and, in addition, we have international assistance, and these three things are all combined at the same time. These are all favorable conditions for us, and they not only exist, but are developing day by day. Here again, the capitulationists and pessimists are also blind. They see nothing of this and see only that we are a weak country, in an unfavorable situation, and that we are a semicolony. They murmur their nonsense of "The War of Resistance will lead to the destruction of the country," and "If we continue to fight the country will be destroyed." Among them, many bad elements, on the basis of such nonsense, are secretly carrying out their conspiracies of surrender and compromise. We are quite different. On the basis of those things that have been proved correct during the experience of the past fifteen months, we want to point out explicitly to the entire Party and the entire nation the strengths and weaknesses of our nation and of our war, the favorable and unfavorable conditions. Moreover, we must point out that the advantages and favorable conditions are predominant in the war as a whole, call on the whole nation to struggle hard, develop our strong points, strengthen our advantages, overcome our shortcomings and unfavorable conditions, and struggle for final victory. To whom will victory ultimately belong? We now give a definite answer: to China. On this basis we determine our policies: are we going to fight a resolute war of resistance, or are we going to waver and compromise? We give a definite reply: there must never be wavering and compromise, the only way out is a resolute war of resistance. It is obvious that neither the loss of the Four Northeastern Provinces, nor the subjugation of Austria, nor the partition of Czechoslovakia came about because of a war of resistance. It is the same now. Under the many favorable conditions for China, the War of Resistance is sure to prevail, but if we choose the path of compromise, the destruction of the state and the extinction of the race are unavoidable. For this reason, to oppose firmly the theory of compromise and pessimism, and call on all the people to fight to the very end is our one and only orientation.

In sum, the contradiction between the facts that the enemy is strong and we are weak has determined the long-term character of the war, and the strategic orientation of a protracted war. We are partisans of the theory of defeating the enemy in a protracted war, not of the theory of a quick victory. The enemy is small, and we are big; the enemy's war is retrogressive, while our war is progressive; the enemy's international position is relatively isolated, while we are relatively capable of obtaining foreign support. These pairs of contradictory contrasts also determine the fact that final victory in the war will belong to us, and not to the enemy. This is the second summary of the experience of the War of Resistance during the past fifteen months.

4. The Only Way to Sustain a Long-Term War and Strive for Final Victory Lies in Uniting and Gathering Together the Entire Nation, Striving to Advance, and Relying on the Popular Masses

The two basic points that the War of Resistance against Japan will be protracted, and that final victory belongs to China, have already been demonstrated by the experience in the past fifteen months of the War of Resistance. But what are the concrete plans for sustaining a long-term war and gaining final victory? Regarding this, there have been disagreements among our compatriots in the past. Many think that it will be all right to go on in the old way. They do not pay attention to uniting the whole country and do not pay attention to improvements in various matters such as military affairs, politics, culture, Party affairs, and popular movements. They even go so far as to increase friction and obstruct progress. In the past we have never approved of such ideas but, instead, have considered that only the unity and progress of the whole nation and reliance on the popular masses can sustain a long-term war and secure final victory. Otherwise, it will be impossible. In its "Program for the War of Resistance and Building the Country," the Guomindang explicitly points out: "If we want to ensure victory in the War of Resistance and success in building the country, though this depends on the efforts of the comrades in our party, it requires above all hard work, the union of hearts, and sharing of the burden by the people of the whole country." The Chinese Communist Party also pointed out a long time ago: "The most central task during the War of Resistance is to mobilize all the forces to win victory in the War of Resistance. Moreover, the central key to winning victory in the War of Resistance lies in developing the already mobilized War of Resistance into an all-out War of Resistance of the entire nation. Only such an all-out War of Resistance of the entire nation can lead to final victory" (Decision by the Chinese Communist Party in August of last year).[6] These [views] are absolutely correct; the experience of the past fifteen months has proved it.

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, all the mutually opposing classes, parties, factions, and cliques have been united; all the different regions and armies have been unified under the command of the National Government and the Military Affairs Commission. Without this unity and solidarity, it would have been impossible to sustain the War of Resistance during the past fifteen months. And only because of the War of Resistance has it been possible to unite and rally around all sides. Such uniting as one constitutes the anti-Japanese national front. But the experience of the past fifteen months has also demonstrated to us the seriousness of the enemy's conspiracy to sabotage and the inadequacy of our internal unity. Why has the War of Resistance suffered so many setbacks? Why have we hitherto been unable to stop the offensives of the enemy and carry out our counteroffensive? Apart from the objective reasons, the inadequate strength of the united front and the fact that it has still not attained the necessary scope and solidity are the most important reasons. From this we learn that only by further uniting and consolidating the whole nation, and strengthening and consolidating the Anti-Japanese National United Front, can we sustain a protracted war and win final victory. This is the first point. Second, the resistance in the past fifteen months not only has pushed forward the unity of the whole nation, but has also exposed the various respects in which this unity is inadequate. Moreover, while pushing forward progress in the various aspects such as military, political, cultural, Party affairs, and the people's movement, it also revealed the shortcomings in these respects. To sustain the protracted war and win final victory, we must mobilize all the vital forces in all social categories in the whole nation, and if we want to achieve this goal, it will be impossible to do so without striving to make progress in the domains of military affairs, politics, culture, party affairs, and people's movements. Without greater progress in these various aspects we will not be able to mobilize all the vital forces in the whole nation, nor will we be able to make further progress in uniting the whole nation as one. Third, the War of Resistance during the past fifteen months has also proved the greatness of the assistance from the popular masses to the forces of the War of Resistance; at the same time, it has also demonstrated that the mobilization of the strength of the popular masses has just begun, and as a result of the failure to obtain extensive assistance from the popular masses for the War of Resistance, it has suffered many setbacks. From this we must draw the lesson that our compatriots must better understand the basic point that the War of Resistance depends on the popular masses. By relying on the popular masses, we will be able to overcome all difficulties, and defeat all enemies, however powerful; if we are detached from the popular masses, we will not be able to succeed in anything. China's progress in the future must be fully expressed in mobilizing the forces of the popular masses.

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[6] This passage, like those cited above in sections I.2 and I.3, is taken from the August 25, 1937, "Decision of the Central Committee on Present Conditions and the Party's Task." See paragraphs 3 and 5 in *Central Committee Documents,* Vol. 11, pp. 324–25; translated in Saich, *Rise to Power,* p. 791.

In short, the only correct way to sustain a protracted war and win final victory lies in the firm and broad solidarity of the entire nation, in striving to advance by mobilizing the vital forces of the entire nation, and by relying on the popular masses to overcome difficulties. This is our third conclusion.

Comrades, persist in the War of Resistance, persist in the protracted war, and strive to unite and to make progress—this is the basic lesson of the past fifteen months of the War of Resistance, and it is also the overall orientation for the War of Resistance from this time forward. We can defeat the enemy, provided only that we and the entire nation adhere to this orientation and make extensive efforts over the long term. The War of Resistance against Japan is developing toward a new stage, during which there are many new tasks, but this overall orientation will not change. The experience of the past fifteen months constitutes the foundation on which we will observe the new situation and put forward new tasks.

III. The New Stage in the Development of the National Resistance War Against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front

1. The Study of the Laws of the War and of the United Front Is the Foundation for Policy Decisions

Comrades, after summarizing past experience, the important question is to look at the tendency of the development of the present situation. How will the War of Resistance against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front evolve from the past basis? This is a question we must answer now; this is very important in solving our present problems. Because if we do not have a general estimate about the process of change and development of the War of Resistance against Japan, we can only be entangled by the war and let the war tie us hand and foot, instead of putting the war under our control, making adjustments and arrangements, creating the necessary conditions for the war, leading the war in the direction we desire, and achieving victory in the war. Therefore we must understand the laws of the War of Resistance against Japan, for only then can we exercise strategic guidance over it, and decide on all the strategies, tactics, policies, plans, and schemes which serve the war. The same is true of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; only when we have studied and understood its laws can we effectively push the united front onto the track of solid development and let it play its role as a pillar of victory in the war.

Let us first talk about the problem of war.

2. Specific Historic Conditions, and the Superiority or Inferiority of the Subjective Capacity, Determine the Process of Development of the War

Some wars in history have ended after a single stage. For example, the war between Japan and Russia in 1905 was over after the attack of the Japanese armies and the defeat and retreat of the Russian armies. Another example was the war between Italy and Abyssinia, which came to an end after the attack by Italy and the defeat of Abyssinia. The same was true of the Chinese war against the northern warlords, which began in 1926. This is one type. It is because, on the one hand, the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides and, on the other hand, the superiority and inferiority of their leadership capacity make them no match for each other. This is the first category of war. Wars of the second category end after two stages. Take the war between France and Russia, for instance. Napoleon went from attack to retreat; Russia went from retreat to attack. There were two stages for both sides. In ancient China, the famous battle of the Red Cliff between [the states of] Wu and Wei, and the battle at Feishui between [the states of] Qin and Jin were like this. Although the two sides were different in strength and weakness, the weak side was good at using other good and favorable conditions and provided correct leadership. Thus they followed the retreat with counteroffensives and defeated the enemy. But there is still the third category of war, for instance, the Seven Years' War, the Eight Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, and the Hundred Years' War in foreign countries or even the great European war of twenty years ago, lasting four years (especially as manifested on the Western front). All of these had three stages. Side A attacks, and side B retreats; this is the first period. Both sides are locked in stalemate, which lasts for quite a long time; this is the second period. Side B launches a counteroffensive, and side A retreats; this is the third period. There have been many such wars in Chinese history, too. The characteristic of this kind of war is that there is a relatively long or very long period of stalemate; this is also the consequence of the specific historical conditions and of the characteristics of the cliques leading the war.

Which category does the Sino-Japanese war fall into? In my opinion, it falls into the third category. This is a result of the different historical conditions of the two sides and of the particular circumstances of the different leading cliques of the war on the two sides.

3. The Long-Term Character of the Sino-Japanese War Is Shown in the Three Stages of the War

The long-term character of the Sino-Japanese war will be manifested in the three stages of the enemy's offensive, stalemate, and retreat, on the one hand, and our defensive, stalemate, and counteroffensive, on the other. Because the enemy is strong and we are weak (the enemy is in a superior position, we are in an inferior position; the enemy is an imperialist country, we are a semicolonial country), the result is a first stage during which the enemy attacks and we are on the defensive. If we do not speak of retreat, but rather of defense, this is to express the idea of retreat through a strategic mobile defense, an attitude of step-by-step resistance, instead of a sudden and clear-cut retreat. Nonetheless, under the specific conditions that the enemy is a small, backward country which enjoys little assistance, while we are a big, progressive country, which receives much assistance, our heroic War of Resistance has also caused the enemy to suffer scattered difficulties and debilitating losses in the course of his offensive, so that he had to end his strategic offensive at a certain time and move to a stage of protecting and preserving his occupied territory militarily and attacking us politically and through economic blockade. During this period, though the enemy has been worn down, for the time being he has not yet been worn down sufficiently to lead to his defeat. Although we are resolutely waging the War of Resistance, and making progress in every respect, we are unable to change all at once to such an extent that we can launch a counteroffensive and drive the enemy out of our country. For all the above reasons, a second stage of stalemate between the two sides, or an intermediate stage, takes shape. Because during the second stage the enemy's difficulties and our progress are increasing daily, and also taking into account the fact that the international situation is favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy, these factors will eventually change the original situation in which the enemy is strong but we are weak, and the enemy is in a superior position but we are in an inferior position. Eventually, it will develop into a situation which will become more and more disadvantageous to the enemy and favorable to us. First will come a period of equilibrium between us and the enemy, and then a period when we are superior. Then we can move on to the third stage of our counteroffensive and the enemy's retreat.

The above views about the three stages constitute a prediction about the entire process of the war based on the contrast between the existing and possible future specific conditions on both sides. It is not yet a fact, but only a possible tendency. On the basis of our subjective efforts, we must create the necessary conditions for such a possible tendency, and then we can change the possible tendency into reality. Nevertheless, relying on the existing conditions, plus correct guidance and the great strenuous efforts of the entire nation, we will be able to turn this possible tendency into reality.

4. People Who Believe in a Quick Victory and Those Who Believe in National Subjugation Are All Opposed to This Estimate

People who believe in a quick victory oppose the theory of three stages, and think that we can quickly start a counteroffensive, and no intervening period is necessary. This is wrong. There are many difficulties in the War of Resistance against Japan, we need a certain period of time in order to overcome these difficulties, and it is impossible to launch a counteroffensive quickly. The reason they believe in a quick victory is that they underestimate the strength of the enemy, on the one hand, and overestimate our own forces, on the other hand. Those who believe the nation will be subjugated are also against the theory of three periods. They think that stalemate as well as a counteroffensive are impossible and that China is only another Abyssinia. This is wrong. Unlike those who believe in a quick victory, they overestimate the strength of the enemy but underestimate our own strength. They see only darkness before them. They acknowledge that China will be subjugated and that our resistance and efforts are useless. In their view, it is impossible to reach a stalemate between the enemy and ourselves, let alone a counteroffensive and the defeat of the enemy. Thus, only if we oppose the theory of a quick victory, on the one hand, and the theory of national subjugation, on the other, can we persist in our theory of three stages. At present it is more important to oppose the theory of national subjugation than to oppose the theory of a quick victory. There are still some people who support a protracted war with their words, but are against the theory of three stages. This is not right either. Where are the so-called protracted war and the so-called long-term war reflected? They are manifested in the three stages of the war. If they support protracted or long-term war, but disapprove of the three stages, then the so-called protracted and long term are abstract things without any content or reality. Hence they cannot provide any real strategic guidance or any real policy in the War of Resistance. Actually, this idea also belongs to the theory of a quick victory, and is simply disguised as a version of "protracted war."

5. The Relationship Between the Theory of the Three Stages and the International Situation

When the Zhanggaofeng Incident[7] took place, a portion of public opinion was overjoyed. They thought that if war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union,

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[7] See above, the relevant note to the text of August 13, 1938.

China could move to the counteroffensive without fighting a protracted war. According to this point of view, the theory of the three stages naturally could not hold water, and our predictions would be wrong. This is a kind of thinking that depends mainly on foreign assistance and is one variety of the theory of a quick victory. Nonetheless, the international situation does not develop according to the subjective wishes of these friends but, rather, according to its own laws. The major center of the world is in Europe, and the East is an important part of the area surrounding it. The major countries in the peace front and the major fascist countries in the world are just now quarreling endlessly about the crisis of war in Europe, and the problems in Europe are all tangled up. No matter whether it is the eve of war between the big powers in Europe or war breaks out, the big and small countries of Europe will all put the resolution of the problems in Europe at the top of their agenda, so for the time being the problems in the East must come second. Looking at the Sino-Japanese war from this perspective as well, the theory of a quick counteroffensive is not reasonable either. We must rely principally on ourselves. Not only are we not afraid of the three periods, but we are about to create three periods. The three stages represent the pattern of the Sino-Japanese war. This is based not only on the balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves but also on the international situation.

6. The Stage of Stalemate Is the Pivot of the War

The major characteristic of the three stages lies in the inclusion of a transitional middle stage. That is, first our resistance must try by every possible means to stop the offensive of the enemy. If the enemy's offensive cannot be stopped in a certain period of time and in a certain region, there will not be the so-called three stages that are different in character. Second, when the stage of the stalemate comes, we must try our best to prepare all the necessary conditions for our counteroffensive. If we cannot do this, we will not be able to proceed to the stage of the counteroffensive, it can only be a continuous stalemate, and there will be no so-called three stages. Here, to those who believe in a quick victory, we definitely say that only if there is such a transitional period can we unite the entire nation, overcome the difficulties, foster new forces, and, in conjunction with the difficulties of the enemy and international aid, carry out a counteroffensive and drive the enemy out of our country. Otherwise it is impossible. Looking at the problem from the point of view of self-reliance, we will unavoidably come to this conclusion. To those who talk about national subjugation and who are pessimistic, we confidently say that only this transitional stage is the pivot of the entire war. Whether China becomes a colony or is going to be liberated depends not on the loss of the big cities and important lines of communication in the first stage but, rather, on the level of effort of the whole nation. The loss of big cities and important communication lines is regrettable; it increases the strength of the enemy and reduces our strength. But many of the things that have not been lost can still serve as our resources in defeating the enemy. It does no good to mourn the loss of treasures. The territory and the various active forces we preserved during the first period, especially the progress in fields such as military affairs, politics, culture, Party affairs, and people's movements, are the most valuable things, and they are the foundation for continued progress and preparation for a counteroffensive in the second stage. In spite of that, they are merely the foundations for continued progress and preparation for a counteroffensive; they cannot determine the counteroffensive. What will determine the counteroffensive are the forces which are added in the second stage. The counteroffensive will be empty talk without the addition of great newly emerging forces.

7. The Characteristics of the Three Stages: The First Stage

The characteristics of the three stages of the War of Resistance against Japan have already appeared. It is necessary to point out in a general way those that have not appeared but can be predicted, for they have an important influence on the guidance of the war and the making of policy.

What are the characteristics and important symbols of the first stage?

First, on the Chinese side: the formation of a national united front, the participation in the war by all the armies in the country, the resolute character of the War of Resistance, the publication by the Guomindang of the Guiding Principles for the War of Resistance and Building the Country, the meeting of the People's Political Council, the acquisition of legitimate status by the Chinese Communist Party and other parties, the creation of guerrilla warfare, the progress of all the country's armies, the development of the movements of the popular masses, and so on. These are all major events which denote progress on the Chinese side. Meanwhile, however, there are many disadvantageous events and bad phenomena, such as, for instance, the loss of major cities, important communication lines and major industries and businesses, the loss of territory and population, the imbalance of progress in the country (the progress in some regions is very slow), and the fact that generally speaking the political system has just begun to move toward democratization, the existence of diehard elements and of corruption, the brewing of the compromising tendency, and so on.

Second, on the enemy's side: the drain of military strength and financial capability, the condemnation by international opinion, the worsening of military discipline, the relative decline of the fighting capacity of the armies, the development of dissatisfaction among the people in the country and among the soldiers at the front, the defeat in the battle of Zhanggaofeng, the difficulty in organizing an army of Chinese traitors, and the incapacity of those that have been organized, and so on. These are all big events showing his difficulties. At the same time, however, there are things which show his capacity, namely, the firmness of his offense, the persistence of his military forces, the enlargement of his occupied territory, the persistence of his capacity for political organization, the strength of his conspiratorial agencies, and so on.

Third, on the international side: the growth of the movement to assist China, the increasing strength of the forces of the Soviet Union and its assistance to China, these are all things that favor China. Yet there are other also things: the development of the war in Europe, a certain tendency toward compromise between Britain and Japan, the assistance in military raw materials to our enemy by other countries. These are all disadvantageous to China.

Many of the above things concerning China, Japan, and the international situation are characteristics that have emerged in the past fifteen months during the first stage of the War of Resistance.

8. The Second Stage

Supposing that Wuhan cannot be defended, many new things will emerge in the situation of the war. Although the capture of Wuhan by the enemy in no sense represents the end of the old stage and the beginning of a new stage, from now on, when the enemy can still continue his offensive until he is forced to stop it, this period is still a transitional stage from the old stage to the new. In spite of that, after the loss of Wuhan becomes a fact, many new circumstances will manifest themselves.

After the loss of Wuhan, as well as during most of the time in the new stage, the basic situation that can be predicted will be, on the one hand, more difficulties, but, on the other hand, more progress. This is the primary characteristic of the new stage.

The increased difficulties will manifest themselves in the following respects: (1) Because of the loss of the principal large cities and important communication lines, the political power of the state and the battlefields will be separated geographically by the action of the enemy, and as a consequence many problems will arise; (2) extreme difficulties in finances and in the economy; (3) a certain degree of compromise between Britain and Japan (or, on the contrary, there may be further conflict between Britain and Japan if Japan insists on occupying alone and threatening Southeast Asia); (4) if the enemy attacks Guangzhou, China's most important communication line by sea may be cut off, and as a result international assistance may decrease temporarily and partially; (5) there is the possibility of the formation of a national puppet political régime and its possible influence on the anti-Japanese front; (6) the possibility that some faction in the anti-Japanese front may betray us, and an increase in the atmosphere of compromise; (7) an increase in pessimistic sentiments, and in phenomena of disagreement, and so on. These are all possible new events that may add new difficulties to the War of Resistance against Japan. To predict these difficulties will help us to overcome them by preparation and planning.

Progress will be expressed in the following respects: (1) The orientation of resolutely persisting in the War of Resistance put forward by Chairman Chiang and the Guomindang and their further political progress; (2) improvement of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, the consolidation and enlargement of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; (3) progress in the work of reforming the army; (4) the expansion and development of guerrilla warfare; (5) progress in the democratization of the state; (6) greater development of the movements of the popular masses; (7) the carrying out of the new wartime financial and economic policies; (8) raising the level of culture and education in the anti-Japanese war; (9) the continuation of assistance from the Soviet Union and its possible increase, and a more friendly and intimate relationship between China and the Soviet Union, and so on.

The entire second stage is the stage of stalemate; it is the preparatory stage for a Chinese counteroffensive. The length of this period depends on the degree of change in the enemy's strength as well as our own and the evolution of the international environment. Nevertheless, we should prepare for a long war. If we can survive this hard and difficult journey, the smooth road to victory will come.

During the second stage, although the enemy and we are strategically in a stalemate, there will still be extensive warfare. This will manifest itself chiefly in defense at the front by the main forces, but extensive guerrilla warfare will develop in the enemy's rear. By then, the guerrilla warfare in many strategically important regions will become very bitter, and we must start to prepare for such difficulties now.

9. The Third Stage

The concrete situation cannot be predicted. But by then the preparations for our counteroffensive must have been completed; at the same time, the level of difficulties for the enemy will have greatly increased, and the international situation will greatly favor us. By then the situation of the war will not be one of strategic defensive or strategic stalemate, but one of strategic counteroffensive; it will not be a strategic internal front but a strategic external front. At that time there must be great progress in our domestic politics and new military technology. Otherwise, a counteroffensive will be impossible.

10. Defending Wuhan Is a Question of Gaining Time, Not One of Defending the City to the Death

The purpose of the struggle to defend Wuhan is to drain the enemy, on the one hand, and win time, on the other, so that the work in the whole country will make progress, and not a last-ditch defense of a strong point. When the time comes that the war situation has proved that giving it up will be more favorable to us, we should adopt the principle of giving up territory to preserve our military strength. Therefore we must avoid big and unprofitable decisive battles. Strategically decisive battles should not take place in the first and second stages. They will obstruct both persistence in the war of resistance and the preparation for a counteroffensive. Hence they must be avoided. It should be one of our orientations in a protracted war to avoid strategically decisive battles and to try our best to fight decisive campaigns and battles under favorable conditions. To give up some of the cities which we cannot defend at certain times and under certain conditions is not only unavoidable, but it is an active policy to lure the enemy deep, disperse him, drain him, and wear him out. Under the general premise of persisting in the War of Resistance, without compromise or surrender, it is perfectly permissible, in accordance with the policy of a protracted war, to give up some strongholds at proper times, and we should not be surprised at this.

11. To Proceed from the Present to the Stage of Stalemate

This will benefit our preparation for a counteroffensive only when the enemy's offensive is stopped. But in order to achieve this objective, we must make a greater effort. Hence it is still a process of struggle to proceed from the present to the time when the enemy has to stop his strategic offensive and change into defending his occupied territory, and the period of stalemate will emerge, and there are many difficulties to be overcome before we can achieve this. Because after the capture of Wuhan the enemy will not stop his offensive. It is certain that he still wants to attack Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Hengzhou, Wuzhou, Beihai, Nanchang, Shantou, Fuzhou, and the nearby regions. If we want to stop the offensive of the enemy, we must continue to carry out strategic mobile defense warfare to confront this attempt of the enemy, and make the greatest efforts to fight persistent wars to drain the enemy as much as we can without suffering any losses to the enemy, so that the enemy will be forced to stop his offensive and shift the war situation into the phase of a stalemate, which is beneficial to us.

12. But the Situation of a Stalemate Will Come Soon

After the enemy has captured Wuhan, his weakness, resulting from an insufficient number of troops and the dispersal of his forces, will become even more apparent. If he still wants to attack Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Hengzhou, Wuzhou, Beihai, Nanchang, Shantou, Fuzhou, and other places, and occupy them by force, the extreme difficulties caused by the insufficiency and dispersal of his troops will surely reach their highest point during the period of this offensive. At this point, the phenomena of the stubborn resistance of our main forces at the front, and the threat of our guerrillas in the broad rear areas, when added to the insufficiency of the enemy's troops (they cannot be sufficient) and the dispersal of his troops (they cannot but be dispersed) will create great difficulties. This situation—on the enemy's side, insufficient forces and their dispersal, on our side, defense at the front, and threat to the enemy's rear—is to our great advantage and the enemy's great disadvantage. Of course, as far as the overall comparison between the strength of the enemy and our own is concerned, the fundamental situation that the enemy is strong and in a superior position and we are weak and in an inferior position has not changed; this can be changed only through the extremely hard efforts of our entire nation in combination with the conditions abroad during a long stage of stalemate. But in his attack upon Wuhan, the enemy's strong forces have been deployed even more extensively. On the one hand, this further deployment of his strong forces has caused us losses, but, meanwhile, it has brought difficulties to the enemy himself. Since the morale of the strong forces of the enemy (which are at the same time his insufficient and dispersed forces) will decline after further extensive deployment, this will inevitably cause his general strategic offensive to reach a peak. We recognize that there will be some remaining strength in the enemy's attack, and, according to our best and most appropriate estimates, this remaining strength is still rather great. Hence, it is highly probable that he will attack places such as Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Nanchang, Wuzhou, and Fuzhou and their surrounding areas, and we must also be prepared for a possible attack on the whole of the railway between Guangdong and Wuhan and the highway between Xi'an and Lanzhou. In spite of that, this will only be a residual threat, compared to the overall strength of the enemy. In terms of its total national strength, Japan has to be on guard against the Soviet Union to the north, the United States to the east, Britain and France to the south, and the people within the country. It has only so much strength; here may be barely enough to be used in China. What is more, extensive wars that must be dealt with at the front and within its occupied territory still exist; the contradictions between Japan and the Soviet Union, between Japan and the United States, between Japan and Britain, and between Japan and France are increasing; the contradictions between the government and the people in the home country, between the officers and the soldiers at the front, and between the vast expenditures and the financial impoverishment are deepening. These are all things that will cause great concern for the enemy. We and the people of the whole country must see these things, not be shocked by the loss of major big cities and important communication lines, assist the government in adjusting the war in the whole country, make dispositions for the battles along the railway between Guangdong and Wuhan and the Longhai line, along the highway between Xi'an and Lanzhou, and in other strategic regions, make dispositions for guerrilla warfare in the enemy's great rear area, seize the weak points where the enemy's forces are insufficient and dispersed, imposing greater losses on him, and causing him to disperse his troops even more, and making the war turn victoriously and definitely into a new state of stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. This is the urgent task facing the whole nation at the moment.

13. The Strength of the Enemy Is Gradually Decreasing, but Our Strength Is Gradually Increasing

Has the enemy's strength increased or not? Compared to his original strength, there is no increase; on the contrary, his strength has decreased very greatly. The enemy's original military and economic strength has been greatly drained. During the past fifteen months of war, his military forces suffered casualties of several hundred thousand, used up large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and matériel, suffered the destruction of several hundred airplanes and more than a hundred warships, and spent several billion yuan on military expenses. This drain is unprecedented in Japanese history. The enemy will have to use up a great deal more strength before he is forced to stop the strategic offensive. As far as this is concerned, his ally Hitler has been greatly worried for some time. And yet, is there no increase in the enemy's strength at all? Yes, there is. It consists in the occupation of the major big Chinese cities, important communication lines, and some parts of the countryside. The enemy has taken over the markets from the other countries and from the Chinese national capitalists, seized natural resources, instruments of production, and considerable manpower from China. This is the only purpose of the Japanese war. Temporarily it has added these things to itself. But the question is: can these things compensate for the losses already suffered in the war? No, they cannot; all the "investment" used up in the war is already gone, and the enemy will have to pay for new productive investment if he wants to get a return on it. Again the question is: leaving aside the inability of Japan to make a productive investment, if it could, could it really recover its losses in the war? Once again, no. Because the large-scale war will still be there in the future, Japan will still suffer losses every day. So long as widespread guerrilla warfare exists in the enemy's rear, such as the current guerrilla warfare in North China, it will be very difficult for Japan to recoup its losses. Because of the constant war, not only will it be unable to get any compensation for its previous losses, but in addition it will have to continue to pay for new losses. So long as we continue to pursue resolutely our War of Resistance, Japan's pitiful fate is largely assured. We say that, during the second strategic stage, that is, the stage of stalemate, Japan will gradually change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior. This continuous drain is one aspect of the situation which is already decided. Let us now talk about the Chinese side. In the final analysis, has China's strength increased or decreased? Our answer is that it has both decreased and increased. The reduction is in the quality and quantity of the original forces; it is shown in the drain of personnel and weapons in the military, the loss of population, industry, land, and natural resources. This is one important aspect that makes us feel difficulties. Nevertheless, it does not mean that there is no increase. The increase is in new quality and quantity and is manifested in the unity of the whole country, the progress of the military, the progress of politics, the progress of culture, and the increase in the degree of consciousness and organization of the people. Although the main forces have retreated, the guerrilla war is moving forward. Although some places have been lost, other places have made progress. The problem is that the level of increase today is far from adequate. Today it is not enough to stop the enemy's offensive, still less will it be sufficient to carry out our counteroffensive in the future. Consequently there has arisen the necessity of exerting widespread and protracted efforts to increase the new forces. What is more, this increase means the greater mobilization of the vital forces in all strata of the whole nation and greater progress in all aspects of the Party, the government, the army, and the people. This is entirely possible, relying on broad and protracted efforts now and in the future. Relying mainly on the growing forces nurtured by ourselves, combined with the increase in the difficulties of the enemy and the enhancement of the international assistance to us, the overall situation between the enemy and ourselves will be changed from the present situation in which the enemy is superior and we are inferior, first to a balance between the enemy and ourselves, and then further to a situation in which we are superior and the enemy is inferior. This is a fundamental problem that must and can be resolved during the long period of stalemate.

14. The Enemy Occupies the Cities and We Occupy the Countryside, so the War Is Protracted, but in the End the Countryside Is Capable of Defeating the Cities

The question is as follows: now that the enemy has occupied China's principal cities and lines of communication, and bases himself on the cities to oppose us, while we base ourselves on the countryside to oppose the enemy, can the countryside defeat the cities? The answer is that it is difficult, but it can be done. The protracted character of the War of Resistance against Japan results not only from the fact that the enemy is an imperialist country, while we are a semicolonial country, but also from the fact that this imperialist country has occupied our cities, and we have to withdraw to the countryside to resist it. Consequently, the war has a protracted character. Here the theory of a quick victory is completely unfounded. At the same time, the problem of China's cities and countryside today is qualitatively different from that of the cities and the countryside in foreign capitalist countries. In capitalist countries, the cities rule the countryside in substance as well as in form, and once the head constituted by the cities is cut off, the four limbs of the countryside cannot continue to survive. It is impossible to conceive of a protracted peasant war in the countryside against the cities in countries such as Britain, America, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy. Such a thing is also impossible in a small semicolonial country. In a big semicolonial country like China, it would also have been very difficult several decades ago. Such a possibility has, however, now emerged in a big semicolonial country such as China, but very obviously three interrelated conditions are required. The first is that it should be a semicolonial country. In a semicolony, although the cities have a leadership function, they cannot rule the countryside completely, for the cities are too small and the countryside is too extensive, and the vast human and material resources are to be found in the countryside, rather than in the cities. The second condition is that it should be a big country. If you lose part of it, there is still another part remaining. The enemy is controlling a big country with few troops, and if you add to this our resolute resistance, the enemy is forced into a situation where he experiences the difficulties of having an insufficient military force and of having this force split up. Thus, not only do we get a main anti-Japanese base area, or a great rear area, including, for example, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, which the enemy cannot capture, but we also obtain large bases for guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear—for example, North China, Central China, and South China—which the enemy is unable to occupy completely. The third condition is given by present circumstances. If China had been conquered militarily by a great imperialist country several decades ago, as England conquered India, we could scarcely have avoided losing our state (*wang guo*).[8] But today things are different, mainly because China has progressed: there are new political parties, new armies, and new people, and this is the basic force for defeating the enemy. Less important is the retrogression of the enemy and the fact that the process of the social and economic development of Japanese imperialism has come to the brink of decline, and the development of Japanese capitalism has created and is still creating the conditions which will send it to the tomb. Still less important is the change in the international situation and the fact that the old world is on the brink of death, and the new world has seen the light of dawn. I have already explained these points in detail in *On Protracted War.* To sum up, in today's big semicolonial countries such as China, there exist many favorable conditions which will help us in organizing a resolute, prolonged, and widespread war of resistance against the enemy who has occupied our cities. If we wage war on many interlocking fronts, encircle the cities and isolate them, meanwhile gradually increasing our own strength over a long period, and so transform the relations between the enemy and ourselves; and if we coordinate these tactics with changes in the international situation—in this case, we will be able to drive out the enemy progressively and regain control of the cities. There is not the slightest doubt that it is difficult, even in China today, for the countryside to oppose the cities, because in general the cities are concentrated, whereas the countryside is scattered. Since the enemy occupied our big cities and important communication lines, our administrative areas and the battlefields have been separated territorially, and this has created many difficulties for us. This determines the protracted and bitter character of the War of Resistance against Japan. Nevertheless, we must state that the countryside can defeat the cities because of the existence of the above-mentioned three interrelated conditions. In the conditions prevailing during the civil war, a very small portion of the countryside carried on a protracted war against the cities, even at a time when all the imperialist countries together were opposing communism. Who would venture to say that under the conditions of the national war, and, moreover, at a time when the imperialist camp is divided, the greater part of the Chinese countryside cannot carry on a protracted war against the enemy in the cities? There is not the slightest doubt that this is possible. Moreover, there is a great difference between what we call the countryside today and the countryside at the time of the civil war. Not only is the area much greater, but we still possess, in the broad rear area made up of provinces such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, a number of cities and industrial enterprises, we still have contacts with foreign countries, and we can still engage in construction. Relying on the maintenance of the broad rear and the building of base areas for guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, nurturing our forces over the long term, and weakening the forces of the enemy, and, in addition, coordinating our actions with favorable future international conditions, we will be able to launch a counteroffensive and take back the cities. In his open letter to the citizens of last December, Chairman Chiang pointed out: "The heart of China's protracted war of resistance, the source of its ultimate victory, is to be found neither in Nanjing nor in any other big city, but lies in reality in the villages of the whole country and in the firmness of heart of the people." This is absolutely correct; although the war is difficult, a victorious future awaits us.

15. The Crisis of Compromise Exists in Grave Form, Yet It Can Be Overcome

We said a long time ago that some of the people who are affected by an irrational fear of Japan have been attempting all the time to shake the determination of the government in the War of Resistance and advocate so-called peaceful compromise. In the past, this tendency appeared after the fall of Nanjing, and now they are ready to start something again. This is a reflection of the enemy's conspiracy within the anti-Japanese front. This threat exists seriously, and our compatriots must pay full attention to it and not let the pro-Japanese faction take advantage of it to carry out their conspiracy. What the pro-Japanese elements are attempting and what the enemy is attempting is the same and is necessarily concentrated on opposition to Chiang and to the Communists. If they are allowed to take advantage and to carry out their conspiracy, the future of the Resistance War will be called into question. Therefore, the whole nation should be on guard against the enemy's conspiracy and the threat of sowing dissension among ourselves, automatically and consciously oppose this conspiracy, and not relax our vigilance for a moment. Can this crisis be overcome? Yes, it can. After the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and all the patriots have united as one, made the necessary efforts, overcome the danger of compromise, expelled the demons and ghosts who are helping the enemy, and resolutely pursued the War of Resistance, this is not only absolutely necessary, but absolutely possible as well. Because in the final analysis, the pro-Japanese faction does not have a great deal of strength, and the strength of the anti-Japanese faction is greater than that of the pro-Japanese faction.

16. The New Situation of Guerrilla Warfare During the Stage of Stalemate

During the new stage, while the main forces are defending the front, guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear will temporarily become the major form. Yet the guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear during the new stage of stalemate between ourselves and the enemy will be developing in a new form. Then what is the new form of guerrilla warfare? First, it will still develop extensively in vast areas. This is because we have a great deal of territory, and as regards the enemy, his troops are insufficient and dispersed. So long as we can persist in the orientation of developing guerrilla warfare and guide it correctly, it is impossible for the enemy to restrict our development fundamentally. But, second, in some of the important strategic regions, for example, in North China and the lower reaches of the Yangzi, we will meet with a savage offensive from the enemy, and it will be very difficult for us to maintain large bodies of troops in the plains. Accordingly, the hilly regions will become our major base areas, and the guerrilla troops in some regions will have to reduce their numbers temporarily. We should begin to prepare now for the arrival of this situation. At the moment, in order to support the fighting of the main forces at the front, and prepare for the transition to the new stage, we should divide the guerrilla warfare generally into two regions. One is the region in which the guerrilla warfare has been fully developed, as in North China, where the major orientation is to consolidate the foundations that have already been built to get ready to defeat the enemy's cruel attack in the new stage and sustain the base area. The other is the region in which guerrilla warfare has not yet been fully developed or is just beginning to develop, for example, in Central China, where the major orientation is to develop guerrilla warfare as quickly as possible to avoid the difficulty in developing guerrilla warfare after the enemy swings back. In the future, in order to coordinate with the defense at the front, and to give the main forces a chance for rest and reorganization, in order to nurture our forces and prepare for the strategic counteroffensive, we must try our best to sustain the guerrilla warfare to defend the base areas. During the long period of holding out, train our guerrilla troops into an active and strong army, pin down the enemy, and help the battle at the front. Generally speaking, the guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear in the new stage will be much more difficult compared with the previous period. We must first see this difficulty, admit this difficulty, and never lose our heads because of the easy development in the previous period, since the enemy will surely turn back to attack the guerrilla forces. It can, however, be sustained. Every leader working in the enemy's rear must have such self-confidence, because the condition of guerrilla warfare in a national war, no matter how strong the enemy is, is far better than that during the civil war. Here, winning over and disintegrating the puppet troops to isolate the Japanese bandits is a very important task.

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[8] The threat of "losing one's state" (*wang guo*) and becoming "slaves without a country" had been eloquently denounced by Li Dazhao, one of the two principal founders of the Chinese Communist Party (see *Marxism and Asia,* pp. 206–8), and was often mentioned by Mao in the 1920s and 1930s.

17. The New Stage in the Development of the War of Resistance Against Japan Is at the Same Time the New Stage in the Development of the Anti-Japanese National United Front

The above remarks have been devoted entirely to the problem of the form of the War of Resistance against Japan. In what follows I am going to talk about the situation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

The time when the War of Resistance against Japan has developed to a new stage is simultaneously the time when the Anti-Japanese National United Front has developed to a new stage. Because more difficulties will be encountered in the new stage than before, the Anti-Japanese National United Front should also adapt to accommodate this situation and show its great strength in fighting against all difficulties and defeating them. So that, during the present transitional period and in the new stage in the future, the Chinese national united front does not show its inability to deal with difficulties but shows, instead, its great power in overcoming difficulties, we must earnestly consolidate as well as enlarge the united front. A protracted war can be sustained only with a lasting united front; the protracted character of the war and that of the united front can never be separated.

18. The Guomindang Has a Bright Future

The Guomindang and the Communist Party are the foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, but of these two it is the Guomindang that is the first great party. Without the Guomindang, it would have been inconceivable to launch and sustain the War of Resistance. The Guomindang has its own glorious history, of which the main achievements are the overthrow of the Qing; the establishment of the Republic; opposition to Yuan Shikai; the establishment of the Three Policies of uniting with Russia, with the Communist Party, and with the workers and peasants; and carrying out the great revolution of 1926–1927. Today it is once more leading the great War of Resistance against Japan. It enjoys the historic heritage of the Three People's Principles; it has had two great leaders in succession—Mr. Sun Yatsen and Mr. Chiang Kaishek; and it has a great number of loyal and patriotic party members. All this should not be underestimated by our compatriots and constitutes the result of China's historical development.

In the conduct of the War of Resistance against Japan and the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Guomindang occupies the position of leader and backbone. During the past fifteen months all the anti-Japanese parties in the nation have made progress, and the progress of the Guomindang is also outstanding. It called together the Provisional Representative Assembly,[9] issued the Program for the War of Resistance and Building the Country,[10] summoned the People's Political Consultative Conference, began to organize the Three People's Principles Youth League, recognized the legitimate existence of all parties and factions, and their joint [participation in] resisting the Japanese and building the country, instituted democratic rights to a certain extent, carried out some reforms in military affairs and in the political institutions, adapted foreign policy to meet the demands of the War of Resistance against Japan, and so on. These are all major events with historical significance. Provided only that it acts in accordance with the great premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, one can foresee a bright future for the Guomindang.

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[9] The reference is presumably to the gathering of over four hundred leading figures at a conference at Lushan summoned by Chiang Kaishek in the spring of 1937.

[10] Cited above by Mao in section II.4.

Until the present, however, many people still have an incorrect perception of the Guomindang. They are suspicious of the future of the Guomindang. The issues which arouse their suspicion of the Guomindang are whether it can continue the War of Resistance, whether it can continue to progress, and whether it can become a national union in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the country. These three questions are closely linked and cannot be separated. Then what are our views? We think that the Guomindang has a bright future. On the basis of all the subjective and objective conditions, it can continue the War of Resistance, continue to progress, and become a national union in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the country.

The political orientation of all China and of the Guomindang has basically been determined by the firmness of the enemy's offense, the serious blows and looting inflicted by the enemy on every stratum in China, the anger of armies throughout the country against the enemy and their courage in the War of Resistance, the upsurge of the anti-Japanese movement of the people in the whole country, the existence of a favorable international situation, and other facts. First, any party or faction, including the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the other anti-Japanese political parties and groups, cannot do otherwise than to continue the War of Resistance. Whoever does not pursue the War of Resistance will have one way out—to become a Chinese traitor. There is no other way out but this. Second, any party or faction, so long as it continues the War of Resistance, must continue to make progress. It is true that political progress in our country is neither rapid nor universal, and as a result we have suffered losses in the war. On the other hand, precisely because of the losses we have suffered, we cannot do otherwise than seek progress in politics, military affairs, culture, Party affairs, people's movements, and every other domain in the future, so that we can resist the enemy and regain the lost territory. Whether it be the ruling party, the Guomindang, or any other party or faction, they will all have to continue to make progress. Third, one of the important links in progress within the country is the democratization of the organizational form of the Guomindang, in order that it may itself be transformed into a national alliance for resisting Japan and building the country, and the best organizational form for the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Does this possibility exist? I think it does. Given the general trend of the War of Resistance against Japan, if the Guomindang refuses to open its doors to the broad popular masses, and to accept all the patriotic parties and factions, as well as the patriotic individuals, in a great organization, it will be impossible for it to fulfill the difficult task of continuing the War of Resistance and defeating the enemy. In its history of more than fifty years, whenever the Guomindang has encountered a great revolutionary struggle, it has always changed itself into a revolutionary national union. Two instances of this are the most striking and the most endowed with historical significance. In the first instance, from the founding of the Tongmenghui to the 1911 Revolution for the purpose of opposing the Qing dynasty and setting up a republic, Mr. Sun Yatsen united all the anti-Manchu revolutionary parties and factions (from the Restoration Society to the Gelaohui [Elder Brother Society]). During this period its party members accomplished many heroic deeds; they worked ceaselessly and unremittingly and were full of vigor, and as a result they were successful in the 1911 Revolution. The second time, from 1924 to 1927, for the purpose of opposing the imperialists and the warlords, they united with the workers and the Communist Party within the country, and with the socialist Soviet Union abroad, established the well-known "Three Great Policies." As a result they founded the Huangpu Academy, established the party's army, and achieved victory in the Northern Expedition. All of these things manifested not only the development of the united front policy of the Guomindang but the development of the Three People's Principles. Today is the third historical opportunity for the Guomindang to become a revolutionary national union, in order to fight against Japanese imperialism and establish a republic of the Three People's Principles. It can and must change itself into a national alliance to resist Japan and build the country. This great movement is already beginning. [The Guomindang] has recognized the legal existence of the Communist Party and the other parties and factions, admitting the Eighth Route Army to the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army, and proclaimed explicitly in the program for resisting Japan and building the country: "In striving for victory in the War of Resistance and success in building the country, it is true that we must rely on the efforts of our party members, but we must particularly rely on the hard work and unanimous sharing of the burden by all the people of the nation." These facts, in addition to the convocation of the People's Political Consultative Conference and the organization of the Three People's Principles Youth League, have all shown the beginning of its efforts in turning itself into a national alliance in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the country. The question now is: what attitude should the Communist Party adopt toward this movement of the Guomindang to enlarge its organization? Should we approve or disapprove? We say that at any time we will support the Guomindang in expanding and developing itself into a revolutionary national alliance. In 1924, when the Guomindang was reorganizing, we adopted a policy of support. Today, when the national crisis is far more serious, we will do all we can to assist them. The reason is that the larger the friendly armies resisting Japan, the better, for the development and progress of the Communist Party alone is insufficient to repel Japanese imperialism. Although the Communist Party, which is in the position of the number-two party, has launched and persisted in the united front of all parties and armies, and has in addition opened its doors wide to all the revolutionary comrades, in order that all may strive to win victory in the anti-Japanese war, if the Guomindang, which occupies the position of the number-one party, remained in its old state as in the past, it would be extremely harmful to the War of Resistance and to the united front. We would not be able to win victory in the War of Resistance, the whole nation would be in danger, and the Communist Party and the proletariat would not be able to escape this danger either. Consequently, the Communist Party not only will not oppose but places strong hopes in and resolutely assists the efforts of the Guomindang to enlarge and consolidate its organization, carry out inner-Party democracy, and change itself into a revolutionary national alliance, in order to benefit the continuation of the War of Resistance, and gain final victory.

19. Yet There Are Still Obstacles in the Future Prospects of the Guomindang, and They Must Work Hard to Overcome Them Before Any Progress Can Be Made

The bright future of the Guomindang exists, and its progress and development are possible. Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the majority of the Guomindang are leading the Guomindang and pushing it forward. As everyone knows, however, there are still a few conservative elements in the Guomindang who are obstructing the speed and extent of the progress of their party. Because of the existence of these elements, and their collusion with many conservative elements in society, they have created a countercurrent in the mainstream of the national-revolutionary war and are stubbornly resisting the vessel of progress, forcefully obstructing the democratization of the country, obstructing the carrying out of all the necessary progressive causes of the War of Resistance, obstructing the carrying out of many of the very good orientations and methods proposed by Mr. Chiang Kaishek in his past declarations, talks, speeches, and orders, obstructing the application of the Guomindang's program for the War of Resistance and building the nation, obstructing the application of the laws and decrees of the National Government, and obstructing the development of the movements of the popular masses. These are all facts and are all major reasons why the progress of the Guomindang is neither rapid nor universal and why the War of Resistance has met with so many disadvantages. They are opposed to the progress and development of the Guomindang, and even advocate compromise. If these elements get the upper hand, the cause of national liberation in China will suffer a very great setback. Thus we must pay serious attention to the matter. Nonetheless, we firmly believe that this conservative force cannot persist forever, that it has not obtained and is unlikely to obtain the upper hand. Such people are a countercurrent and by no means the main stream. Under the leadership of Chairman Chiang, with the efforts of the majority of the Guomindang and the support of all the people of the country, this conservative tendency can be overcome. The Communist Party resolutely supports the progress of the Guomindang, and, as far as the conservative elements obstructing progress are concerned, we hope that they will turn over a new leaf and make progress together with us. We hope these people will change. "The faults of the superior man are like the eclipses of the sun and the moon"; when they have changed back, all will be well.[11] Actually we have seen many conservative elements making progress in the process of the War of Resistance. In the future there are sure to be many more people awakened by the lessons of the War of Resistance and making progress together with the broad masses. This is the character of being able to change of the conservative elements in the War of Resistance against Japan. But there might also be a few people who will become even worse and are willing to be washed away by the gigantic waves of the War of Resistance. This is another aspect of their changeable nature. Toward people of this kind, we should show no pity at all.

20. The Other Parties and Factions Also Have a Bright Future

Under the general premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, all those parties and factions that have joined the Anti-Japanese National United Front have a future of further development. We are willing to establish lasting cooperation with all of them and to help them as much as possible. This applies equally to the Third Party, the National Youth Party, the National Social Party, the National Salvation Association, and any other groups, parties, and factions. Clearly, when we say that, under the general premise of persistence in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, all parties will have a bright future, this includes efforts to overcome the conservative tendency in every party. If there exists a conservative tendency which will harm the War of Resistance and the united front, and it is allowed to develop, that will present a danger that we might forfeit our bright future. This applies in the same way to the Guomindang, the Communist Party, or any other party; we must all pay full attention to it.

21. The Characteristics of China's Anti-Japanese National United Front

For reasons rooted in Chinese history, today's Anti-Japanese National United Front in China is different from any of the united fronts in foreign countries, such as the Popular Front. Nor is it the same as the united front in Chinese history, such as the First United Front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. It has the characteristics of today's China. To understand these characteristics is of the very greatest significance as regards consolidating and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

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[11] The quotation is from the Confucian *Analects*, Book XIX, Chapter XXI (Legge, Vol. I, p. 346). In the clause which follows, Mao summarizes the sense of the second sentence in the original, which continues, "He has his faults, and all men see them; he changes again, and all men look up to him." Mao made use of the same passage from the *Analects* in a speech of 1959 after the Lushan Plenum, to illustrate the point that all men make mistakes, but these can be corrected. See S. Schram (ed.), *Chairman Mao Talks to the People* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), pp. 153–54.

What, then, are these characteristics? To sum up, there are eight in all, namely: the entire nation is resisting Japan; the long-term nature [of the united front]; [its] imbalance; the existence of armies; fifteen years of experience; the fact that the majority of the popular masses are still not organized; the Three People's Principles; and new international circumstances.

First of all, there is the fact that the entire nation is resisting Japan. This characteristic determines the basic nature of our united front. On the one hand, the objective for which our united front was established and developed is to fight the invasion of our national territory by an alien race, Japanese imperialism. On the other hand, our united front is a vast organization comprising all the different parties and factions, all the different classes, all the different armies, and all the different nationalities making up our nation. It is because it is directed against invasion by an alien race that the components of this organization could be so extensive. Because the composition of this organization is so extremely broad, it has great strength; but at the same time there is inevitably considerable friction between participants in this united front, and this must be properly adjusted before the goal of uniting against the foreigners can be achieved. These most fundamental characteristics of our united front—resistance to invasion by an alien race as the political purpose and the extremely large size of the components of the organization—are different from the popular front in France and Spain, nor were they to be found during the national front during the first great revolution (the cooperation at that time between the Guomindang and the Communist Party). As a result, today's united front has developed many special contents and results. This is the first characteristic and strong point of today's united front, although at the same time, its complex organization inevitably embodies some defects.

The second characteristic is its long-term nature. This results from the first characteristic. Since this united front makes use of national war to fight against Japanese imperialism, and since Japanese imperialism is a strong imperialism, this gives rise to the long-term character of the War of Resistance against Japan and also to the long-term character of the united front. I will deal further with this in section V of my report, for it is the point of departure for all our policies. This point, too, differs from the first period of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party.

The third characteristic is imbalance. For historical reasons, there is an imbalance of political power between all the parties and factions and between all the classes and strata. At the same time, this imbalance is reflected in the distribution of regions. The Guomindang is the first big party that has real strength; the Communist Party comes second, and the other parties follow. This phenomenon has resulted in many special things.

The fourth characteristic is that there are armies. Both the Guomindang and the Communist Party have armies—this is the result of the special historical conditions, and it is not a defect but an advantage. The fact that the two parties have armies creates the best possible basis for the two parties to fulfill their responsibilities of division of labor and cooperation in the course of the anti-Japanese war, and there will also be more benefits in observing and emulating one another's work. This point is similar to [the situation in] Spain, but different from [that in] France, nor is it the same as in the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. It is also one of the factors that make possible long-term cooperation between the two parties.

The fifth characteristic is the fifteen years of experience. The conclusion from the four years of the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist party from 1924 to 1927, the nine-year split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party from 1927 to 1936, and now the renewed cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, from these fifteen years of experience of cooperation, split, and then again cooperation, has taught a profound lesson to both the Guomindang and the Communist Party, to the other parties and factions, and to the people of the whole country. The conclusion is: they should only cooperate, and not split. This is also one of the foundations for long-term cooperation. No other country in the world has had this kind of valuable experience, nor did we have it during the first period of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party.

The sixth characteristic is that the majority of the popular masses are not yet organized. This is a Chinese peculiarity; the various countries in the West are not like this. It is a defect, because as a result the united front lacks an already existing organized mass foundation. But at the same time, all the parties can, on the basis of a division of labor, set out to organize the popular masses. They should not always crowd together and create friction, for some of the as-yet unorganized popular masses are just waiting to be organized to meet the urgent demands of the War of Resistance.

The seventh characteristic is the Three People's Principles. The Three People's Principles are the political foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. They are the basis, not only for cooperation against Japan but also for cooperation to build the country. The nationalism of the Three People's Principles will lead this cooperation to strive for the liberation of the whole nation; their People's Rights will lead this cooperation to the establishment of a thoroughly democratic country; their people's livelihood is even more capable of leading this cooperation for a very long time. The political program and political thought of the Three People's Principles guarantee the lasting character of the united front.

The eighth characteristic is to be found in new international circumstances. The political and economic conditions in the world today are different from those in the first period of cooperation and in the period of civil war between the two parties. Today only some imperialist countries, such as Japan, Germany, and Italy, are against the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The other imperialist countries, because of the contradictions between them and Japan, are not at all opposed to our united front at present but, on the contrary, adopt an attitude of help and support.

All the progressive people in every country support and assist us, and the Soviet Union supports and assists us even more sincerely. This kind of new international environment has a great impact upon our long-term cooperation.

Only if we profoundly study and understand the above-mentioned characteristics can we adopt a proper attitude in politics, in policy, and in our work. We should not deal with political problems and problems in our work by treating the head when the head aches and treating the foot when the foot hurts. Instead we should solve the problems correctly on a scientific basis. Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, and the strengthening and enlargement of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, requires this kind of scientific foundation.

22. The New Situation of the United Front

In the new period of the War of Resistance against Japan the Anti-Japanese National United Front must appear with a new look in order to deal with the new prospect of the war. This new look refers to the extensive development and high degree of consolidation of the united front. The lessons of uniting for the War of Resistance in the past fifteen months will make every party understand the necessity of this kind of development and consolidation. As regards development, it is to enlarge the organizations of all the parties and of the popular masses. As regards consolidation, it means that every party adopts new policies and new work to reduce the friction between one another, to achieve true and sincere unity, and to go together to the aid of the country. There are many difficulties in the new period of the Resistance War. Only if every party in the united front enlarges and develops its organization, and consolidates to a high degree its internal relationships as well as the relationships between different parties, will it be possible to carry out new political tasks, overcome new difficulties, and achieve the goal of stopping the enemy's offensive and preparing for our counteroffensive. This is the new situation of the united front in the new situation of the War of Resistance against Japan. Thanks to the joint efforts of every party, and the ardent support of the people of the whole country, it is absolutely possible that such a new situation will arise.

IV. The Current Urgent Task of the Whole Nation

According to the summary of the War of Resistance in the past and the predictions regarding the current War of Resistance and the new stage in the development of the united front, what should the current urgent tasks facing the whole nation be? How should they differ from those in the past?

The general tasks should be: persist in the War of Resistance and in the protracted war, consolidate and enlarge the united front in order to overcome the difficulties, stop the enemy's offensive, prepare forces, carry out our counteroffensive, and achieve our goal of ultimately driving the enemy out of our country.

To take them separately, there are the following concrete tasks. Every component in the organization of the Anti-Japanese National United Front should support the government, and, moreover, under the leadership of the government, mobilize the entire nation to carry them out. Communist Party members should become models in carrying out these tasks.

1. Highly Encourage National Self-Esteem and Self-Confidence, Persist in the Resistance War to the Very End. Overcome Pessimistic Sentiments, Oppose the Attempt at Compromise

We reckon that, under the new situation in the War of Resistance, there must be some people among whom, because of the losses of major big cities and communication lines, the financial and economic difficulties, and the delay in receiving international assistance, there arises and grows a pessimistic sentiment regarding the future of the War of Resistance. What is more, the Japanese bandits, Chinese traitors, and pro-Japanese elements will surely take advantage of this sentiment and spread the atmosphere of peace and compromise, attempting to shake our determination to resist. Therefore, the first task of the whole nation is to display national dignity and national self-confidence to a high degree, overcome the pessimistic sentiment among some of the people, resolutely support the government's policy of continuing the War of Resistance, oppose any attempts at surrender and compromise, and persist in the Resistance War to the very end. This task is more important than in any of the past periods.

For this aim, we must mobilize the newspapers, magazines, schools, propaganda organs, cultural and artistic societies, the political organs in the military, the popular masses, and all other possible forces to carry out extensive propaganda and agitation among the officers and soldiers at the front, the service troops in the rear, the people in the occupied territories, and the popular masses in the whole nation. We must firmly carry out this policy as planned, advocate a War of Resistance to the very end, oppose surrender and compromise, clean up pessimistic sentiments, repeatedly point out the possibility and certainty of a final victory, point out clearly that compromise means subjugation, but resistance is our only way out, and call on the entire nation to unite together, fearing neither difficulties nor death. We are determined to achieve freedom, we are determined to win victory, to achieve the objective of the pursuit of the War of Resistance by the whole nation, united as one.

For this purpose all the propaganda and agitation should deal with the following aspects. On the one hand, use the models already created and being created in the national revolution (heroic resistance, laying down one's life for the nation, [the Battle of] Pingxingguan, the Battle of Tai'erzhuang, the eight hundred brave soldiers, the progress of guerrilla warfare, generous donations, patriotism of the overseas Chinese, etc.), and make them known far and wide to the front and the rear region, within the country and abroad. On the other, expose, clean up, and eliminate the negative characteristics which exist and grow within the national front (compromising tendencies, pessimistic sentiments, the phenomenon of corruption, etc.). On yet another hand, make public to the whole nation the specific examples of all the enemy's cruel and brutal behavior, denounce them to the whole world, to achieve the objective of raising the national consciousness and carrying forward national dignity and confidence. We must be aware that the deficiency of this kind of consciousness and self-confidence will greatly affect the primary task of overcoming the difficulties and preparing for a counteroffensive.

2. Support Chairman Chiang, Support the National Government, Support Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, Oppose Discord and Splits, Oppose Any Government of Chinese Traitors

In the new environment, the enemy's policy is sure to concentrate on opposing Chiang and opposing communism, setting up a nationwide government of Chinese traitors, attempting to overthrow Chairman Chiang and the National Government, and sabotaging the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and national unity. To counter this policy of the enemy, the second task of the entire nation is to call on the whole country unanimously and truly to support Chairman Chiang, support the National Government, support the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, support national unity, oppose any of the deeds of the enemy that will hurt Chairman Chiang, the National Government, cooperation between the Guomidang and the Communist Party, or national unity. Oppose the rule of China by any government of Chinese traitors.

For this purpose, we must adjust the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, adjust the relationship between the center and the localities, adjust the relationships between different armies in the War of Resistance, and adjust the relationship between the government and the people. Among these relationships, we should encourage the spirit of justice and fair and mutual assistance and love, reduce friction and the phenomenon of disagreements, oppose the behavior of using difficulties to make trouble for the government. Call on the whole nation to pay serious attention to the instigation of discord among us by the enemy, Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements, and their plots and conspiracy to create complaints and disagreements and to encourage friction among us. We must make sure that the prestige of Chairman Chiang and the National Government is not affected, make sure that the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and the unity of the entire country become closer day by day, set up a firm and strong center that will continue the resistance in a difficult environment to confront the enemy and the government of Chinese traitors, overcome difficulties, and prepare for the counteroffensive.

3. Increase the Fighting Capacity of the Main Forces, Defend Central China, South China, and the Northwest, and Stop the Enemy's Offensive

In order to counter the enemy's current attack on Wuhan and his attempt to continue to attack South China and the Northwest, the third task of the whole nation is to raise the fighting capacity of the main forces, reorganize the troops we now have, organize and add new troops, fight for the purpose of defending Central China, South China, and the Northwest, and stop the enemy's offensive. To achieve this goal, as regards China's main forces, they must first develop mobile warfare accompanied by necessary and possible positional defense, resist the enemy bit by bit, and drain the enemy's strength. Second, we must set up possible military factories in the rear area, and also increase our manufacturing capacity, to provide the front with weapons and ammunition. Third, we must conscientiously carry out in the military the political work of the national revolution, carry out education in politics, culture, and entertainment, and raise the brave and enduring fighting spirit of the whole army. Fourth, improve the lives of the soldiers on the basis of the present material conditions, set up economic committees in the companies, and let the soldiers manage the mess. Fifth, encourage self-discipline, eliminate the system of beating and cursing, and encourage friendship and unity between the officers and the soldiers to improve relations between the officers and the soldiers. Sixth, carry out fair trade, treat people politely, do not collect grain by force, do not force people to become porters or soldiers; instead, use the method of political mobilization to solve the problems of grain, porters, and new recruits, in order to improve relations between the army and the people. Seventh, between the different armies at the front, between the different armies at the front and in the rear, we should enhance the spirit of friendship and mutual assistance, help and collaborate with one another in wartime, inspect and learn from one another at work, eliminate such bad phenomena as looking on at one another and envying one another, in order to improve relations among different armies. Eighth, reorganize the troops we have now, reinforce them where there are vacancies; meanwhile, organize and add new troops and speed up education and training to help in the protracted war. Use all these methods to raise the fighting capacity of the principal forces, to fight for the defense of Central China, South China, and the Northwest, and to strive to stop the enemy's offensive and prepare for our counteroffensive.

4. Develop the Guerrilla Warfare Extensively in the Enemy's Rear, Establish and Consolidate Our Base Areas, Reduce the Enemy's Base Areas, and Cooperate in the Fighting of the Main Forces

In the light of the fact that the enemy's goal is to continue to attack us, while at certain times it will divert some of its troops to launch guerrilla attacks in an attempt to strengthen its occupied territory, and make the Chinese counteroffensive very difficult, the fourth task of the whole nation is to develop guerrilla warfare in a broad area in the enemy's rear, to establish many base areas, and consolidate the existing bases; use them to restrict the area occupied by the enemy; at present, to fight together with the main forces to halt the enemy's advance, and in the future to fight to carry out the counteroffensive in coordination with the main forces. One of the important characteristics of the national War of Resistance against Japan in semicolonial China is the popularity and protractedness of guerrilla warfare. Without this kind of guerrilla warfare, we will not be able to pin down large numbers of the enemy's troops and forcefully assist the fighting of the main forces at the front to stop the enemy's offensive, nor will we be able to restrict the enemy's occupied territory within a certain region so that it cannot occupy the entire area completely. We will not be able to set up many anti-Japanese strongholds in the enemy's rear, persist in guerrilla warfare, and further cooperate with the counteroffensive of the main forces in the future. Hence, we must first develop guerrilla warfare broadly in all the areas in the enemy's rear, set up many base areas for guerrilla warfare, and strengthen those that have already been set up. Second, we must learn from the example in North China and leave behind or send enough regular troops to every strategic region in the enemy's rear, and use them as the backbone in sustaining long-term guerrilla warfare. These troops should gradually master the tactics of guerrilla warfare, strengthen the political work, develop the movements of the popular masses, and establish base areas. Furthermore, they should help the popular masses and guerrillas in the enemy's rear and gradually raise them to the path of the regular army and regular warfare. Third, every war zone and every rear area of the enemy must mobilize all the men and women and their enthusiasm in defending the nation and their native *xian.* Apart from mobilizing them in large numbers to join the guerrillas not participating in production, and to serve as reinforcements for the regular army units left behind in the enemy's rear, we should organize them into semimilitary people's anti-Japanese self-defense units. The people's anti-Japanese self-defense units should become the universal and regular militia system in every war zone and in the enemy's rear area. They are not withdrawn from production. Fourth, we must help the people to organize large numbers of guerrillas. These are withdrawn from production. Every *xian* and every district should have them, and they will become widespread small armies that make surprise attacks on the enemy and defend the locality. Fifth, we must set up political work in the guerrilla units and strengthen their political, cultural, and entertainment education to increase their fighting capacity. Sixth, we must set up correct military and political systems in the guerrilla units, carry out the policy of equal treatment for officers and soldiers, and of economic openness. Seventh, reform the bandit troops and let them join the anti-Japanese war; eliminate the bandits in the rear of our armies which are being used by the enemy. Eighth, the supply of arms and ammunition in the guerrilla war is a very important problem. On the one hand, in the great rear area we must try our best to help [the guerrillas]; on the other hand, every base area for guerrilla warfare must try by every possible means to set up small military factories, to the point that they can make their own ammunition, rifles, and hand grenades, so that guerrilla warfare need not worry about the lack of arms and ammunition. Ninth, on the basis of the enemy's situation and our strategic requirements, divide up once again the war districts and political districts in the enemy's rear, so that they will suit the new war situations. Tenth, on the basis of the strategic requirements, we must unify the leadership of the various units and administrative areas in the enemy's rear, in order to concentrate the forces resisting the enemy, and eliminate internal contradictions; but at the same time, we should oppose the warlord behavior of mutual annexation.

5. *Raise the Level of Military Technology, Set Up a Mechanized Corps, and Prepare Strength for the Counteroffensive*

The main reason the enemy could gradually enter deep into our country with an army smaller than ours, apart from political causes on our side, is our technological backwardness. In light of the enemy's strength and our weakness [in this domain], the fifth task of the whole nation is to raise the level of our military technology, increase the number of planes, cannons, tanks, and so on, and the number of persons trained to use them, in order to prepare strength for the counteroffensive. For this purpose, we should, on the one hand, start this work now, using the productive capacity that we have now, and which we can increase in the future, beginning with partial manufacture and repairs, and doing this work conscientiously. On the other hand, try by every possible means to import weapons of a new type from foreign countries and to use them to improve gradually the equipment of the army and set up a real modern mechanized corps. Without any doubt, we should look at the problem from a realistic point of view. At present, the weapons that are actually in use are large numbers of primitive weapons. Consequently, we should call on all the troops and the armed people in the country to believe that primitive weapons can also defeat the enemy, enhance their political spirit, improve their tactics, and develop guerrilla warfare to compensate for the lack of new technology. If we do not work especially hard on this aspect, we will be neglecting the practical problem at present and will not be able to overcome the current difficulties. In the future, in preparing for the strategic counteroffensive, this cannot be done unless we raise the new technology and build new-type armies. We should be aware that, without a sufficient number of troops equipped with modern new technology, it is impossible to carry out the counteroffensive and regain our lost territory. Moreover, if we do not draw attention to this point and begin applying it seriously on a feasible scale, we will see only the present and forget the future, and will not be able to overcome the difficulties on our way to the future. In a country like China that is rich in manpower and material resources, provided only that the political conditions are improved, and the method of mobilization is progressive, and there is help from foreign countries, it is never impossible to improve technological equipment gradually.

6. Carry Out Democratic Politics Under Centralized Leadership, Establish Close Relations Between the Government and the People, and Bring into Full Play the Utmost Capacity of the Anti-Japanese Political Régime

The enemy is taking advantage of our weakness, not only in military matters but also in the political domain; it is taking advantage of the fact that our political system has not been democratized, so that it cannot establish close links with the broad masses of the people. In order to remedy this weakness, the sixth task of the whole nation is to establish a democratic system under centralized leadership. If there is no progress in this respect, it will be impossible ultimately to achieve final victory over the Japanese bandits. Democratic politics is the locomotive that mobilizes all the vital forces of the nation. With this system, the enthusiasm of the people throughout the country for resisting Japan will be mobilized to an incalculable extent and will become an inexhaustible source of power. The completion of the great process of thorough unification and unity of our whole nation can take place only on the basis of the establishment of a democratic system. As regards this point, we should have plans based on the reality in every field. First, the meeting of the People's Political Council has already taken the first step toward democratization of the state. Afterward, we should guarantee that the work of this council will proceed openly and smoothly, and that all its resolutions and decisions will be carried out. In addition, on the basis of the scheme already approved by this council, we should conscientiously set up local political councils in every province and at all levels, to push forward democratic politics. Second, guarantee the full implementation of the people's freedom of speech, freedom of publication, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of belief which are laid down in the Guiding Principles for the War of Resistance and Building the Country. This kind of freedom is within the sphere of the War of Resistance and Building the Country. Only if we fully guarantee this freedom will it contribute to bringing into play universally the forces for resisting Japan and building the country. The problem here is to assure the application of the laws and decrees of the central government in every locality without any arbitrary restrictions by the locality. The freedoms that should be restricted are only those which will harm the War of Resistance against Japan and the building of the country, for example, the freedom of the Chinese traitors and the pro-Japanese elements. The freedom of all others should not be restricted. Third, put into effect as many democratic systems as possible from the war zones and the enemy's rear. For instance, popularly elect the local governments at all levels before the appointment by the higher levels. Governments at every level in the war zones adopt the democratic centralized committee system. In addition, we should set up people's representative organs at all levels.

The governments in the war zone can add some necessary departments; change the form of government documents; eliminate embezzlers, the corrupt, and the incompetent; recruit activists in the War of Resistance against Japan; and reduce salaries and encourage simple livelihood, in order to adapt ourselves to the difficult, complex, and fluid environment in the war districts. Under the unified leadership of the central government, the local governments in the war zones have the right to issue special laws that apply only to the particular locality. All the male and female citizens in the war zones except the Chinese traitors have the right to vote and to be elected. They all have freedom of speech, freedom of publication, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of armed resistance to Japan. All the anti-Japanese parties and factions in the war zones have open and legal status, and so on. In the war zones, especially in the enemy's rear, it is impossible to sustain the long and bitter War of Resistance against Japan without these political reforms. All the above methods are for the purpose of linking the government intimately with the people and increasing the strength of the government, so that it can play the greatest possible role in the War of Resistance against Japan. Without a doubt, all local governments in the country should be under the leadership of the central government. They should not show any sign of disrespect toward the central government because of the geographic separation of the administrative area by the enemy. The entire nation should carry out the democratic system according to the laws of the central government, and at the same time the entire nation should be unified around the central government.

7. Enlarge the Unified Movement of the Popular Masses, Make Every Effort to Assist the War

The seventh task of the whole nation is to enlarge all kinds of movements of the popular masses, unify them, and make every effort to assist the war. Everything in this long and difficult War of Resistance against Japan comes from the popular masses. Without a widely developed united nationwide movement of the popular masses, it is impossible to sustain the war for a long period. This is especially the case in the war zones and in the enemy's rear. Just now, the War of Resistance against Japan is meeting with new difficulties, and only by mobilizing the popular masses can we overcome these difficulties. In the whole country, particularly in the war zones and in the enemy's rear, we should speedily do the following. One, guarantee the freedom of all anti-Japanese organizations and movements of the popular masses, establish the legal position of movements of the popular masses. Two, give material help to the organizations of the popular masses, and respect their independence. Three, set up earnestly all kinds of national salvation leagues of workers, peasants, young people, women, merchants, professionals, intellectuals, and children which are participated in by the broad masses. Moreover, on the basis of region and profession, let them establish unified organizations. Four, mobilize the popular masses and let them take part actively all kinds of work in the

War of Resistance, actively assisting the government and the army. This is particularly urgent and cannot be delayed in the war zones.

8. Improve the Livelihood of the People, Stimulate the Enthusiasm of the People in the Resistance War and Production

In the past we were very weak in dealing with the problem of improving the livelihood of the popular masses, and consequently we were unable to stimulate the enthusiasm of the broad masses of the toiling people for the Resistance War and for production. This was extremely disadvantageous to perseverance in a protracted war. Therefore, in the future, the eighth task of the whole nation is to carry out the following policies, which are intended to improve the livelihood of the popular masses. First, give preferential treatment to the family members of the anti-Japanese soldiers and the disabled anti-Japanese soldiers. Second, assist the refugees from natural disaster and war, and the unemployed workers in the war zones. Third, start an appropriate campaign to reduce rent and interest in the war zones and in the enemy's rear. Fourth, redistribute grain and important daily necessities. Fifth, make an appropriate increase in wages, and improve the benefits of the workers and employees. Sixth, admit the right of the workers and peasants to collective contracts with their employers and landlords. Seventh, stop the abuse, beating, and cursing of the workers and apprentices by the employers, landlords, masters, and overseers. These preliminary improvements in their lives should definitely increase the support of the poor workers and peasants for the government and their enthusiasm for joining the war and for taking part in production. Not only will the mobilization and support for the war be greatly improved, but the quantity and quality of the industrial and agricultural production and the circulation of commerce will be greatly increased and raised, and the national financial budget will be satisfactorily resolved on the new agricultural, industrial, and commercial foundations.

9. Carry Out the New Wartime Financial and Economic Policies, Tide Over the Difficulty in the War

After the fall of the major big cities and lines of communication, there will necessarily be great difficulties for the national finances and economy. Without new and effective methods, we cannot pull through this difficult moment in the war. Nevertheless, provided that we carry out the new policy, and mobilize the strength of the people, we will be able to overcome any difficulties. Accordingly, the ninth task facing the whole nation is to carry out a new wartime financial and economic policy. Its main points are as follows. First, the purpose of the new policy is to guarantee all the necessary supplies for the anti-Japanese armed forces, meet the people's demand for daily necessities, and struggle against the enemy's economic blockade and economic sabotage. Second, reestablish national defense industries in the interior in a planned way, starting from the small-scale and most urgent branches, and gradually developing and improving them, and drawing in the capital of the government, the people, and foreign countries. In addition, mobilize the workers politically, guarantee their minimum material benefits, and improve the system of factory management, so as to increase productivity. This is not only necessary but possible. Third, using a combination of political mobilization and government decrees, develop national agricultural and handicraft production, organize spring plowing and autumn harvest campaigns, and thus cause the national agriculture and handicraft to develop in a new guise. We should take care to protect agricultural tool, livestock, and handicraft workshops, and guarantee the economic self-sufficiency of the separated districts. Fourth, protect the free operation of private industrial and commercial enterprises, and at the same time pay attention to developing cooperative ventures. Fifth, on the basis of the principle of "those who have money give money," revise all the old taxes into a unified progressive tax and abolish the vexatious system of apportionment, in order to ease the burden on the people and increase the revenue. Sixth, using a combination of political mobilization and government decrees, collect [contributions to] national salvation bonds and public grain for national salvation. In addition, mobilize the people to donate funds and grain for the combat troops to complement their financial income. Seventh, fight in a planned way against the enemy's policy of issuing puppet currency and sabotaging the national currency; allow the separated districts to set up their local banks and issue local paper currency. Eighth, strenuously encourage the movement for honesty and cleanliness, revise the method for paying soldiers, and, on the basis of the minimum standard of living, establish a payment system which will be broadly egalitarian. Ninth, the national bank should start giving out low-interest loans to help develop the production and circulation of goods. Tenth, restore and develop the postal and communication services in the war zones. The above are only general indications. We must have the determination to reform the old system carefully and apply the new system, and persist in this. Only thus can we eliminate the new difficulties and sustain the protracted war. The heart of the matter lies in organizing the activism of the broad masses of the ordinary people and allowing them to contribute to the victory of the war. China's War of Resistance is proceeding under special circumstances. The major big cities and lines of communication have been occupied by the enemy, and the main support of the War of Resistance is the countryside and the peasants. The peasants have great strength to support the war, but we should carry out the necessary political and economic reforms. The various new policies we are talking about here are being proposed on the basis of this special situation.

10. Carry Out a Resistance War Education Policy, and Let Education Serve the Protracted War

Under the principle that everything serves the war, we should make all the cultural and educational institutions meet the demands of the war. Hence, the tenth task of the whole nation is to carry out the following cultural and educational policies.

First, revise the school system, eliminate courses that are neither urgent nor necessary, and change the system of management on the basis of the principle that teaching should focus on the courses that are needed in the war, and bring into play the students' enthusiasm in their study. Second, establish, enlarge, and strengthen all kinds of cadre schools to train large numbers of anti-Japanese cadres. Third, extensively develop education for the popular masses, organize a variety of continuation schools, literacy campaigns, drama campaigns, singing campaigns, and sports campaigns. Publish all kinds of popular local newspapers at the front and in the enemy's rear, to raise the national culture and national consciousness of the people. Fourth, organize free primary education, in order to educate the next generation in our national spirit. All the above should be carried out through a combination of political mobilization and government decrees. The emphasis should be on mobilizing the people to educate themselves, but the government should give proper guidance, regulation, and possible material assistance. It is far from sufficient to fulfill the great task of raising the national culture and national conscientiousness simply to depend on a few schools and newspapers run by the government with a limited budget. Ever since the War of Resistance began, the educational system has been undergoing changes. Especially in the war zones, striking progress has been made. In spite of that, there have still been no changes in the overall system adequate to the demands of the War of Resistance. This is not a good thing. The great War of Resistance must be accompanied by a great Resistance War education movement. The phenomenon of a lack of cooperation between the two must be eliminated as soon as possible.

11. Strive to Obtain International Assistance, Concentrate All Our Strength to Fight Against Japanese Imperialism

Starting from the principles of protracted war and concentrating all our strength to fight against Japanese imperialism, we cannot neglect organizing all possible foreign aid. Therefore, the eleventh task at present is as follows. First, resolutely oppose the views of some people who advocate the so-called policy of following the German and Italian line, for this is in fact a kind of procedure for preparing to surrender to the enemy. Second, strive to increase the material assistance to us from the democratic countries and the Soviet Union, and at the same time do our utmost to induce all the countries in the League of Nations to approve the resolution imposing sanctions against Japan. Third, set up certain agencies to collect systematically information regarding the atrocities of the enemy armies, prepare specific documents and reports, and publicize them abroad to arouse the attention of the whole world, and induce them to take action to punish the Japanese fascists. Fourth, select representatives from all the parties, factions, and popular bodies, organize them into international propaganda groups, and let them travel from country to country to arouse the sympathy of the people and governments of every country, and induce them to cooperate with the diplomatic activities of our government. Fifth, protect all those foreigners in China whose countries are sympathetic to us, and their peaceful business and missionary activities. Sixth, take care to protect the interests of the overseas Chinese, and, moreover, through the efforts of the overseas Chinese, push forward in every country the movement to oppose Japan and aid China. We must do all these things energetically, regardless of the level of assistance from these countries, of whether it may temporarily not have increased or even have partially decreased, or of whether the resolution of the League of Nations remains just a few good-sounding words. In accordance with the long-term nature of the War of Resistance, our foreign policy orientation should also be focused on the long term, emphasizing not our immediate interests, but assistance in the future. Such a far-sighted view is essential.

12. Establish an Anti-Invasion United Front of the Chinese and Japanese Soldiers and People, and of the Oppressed Nations in Korea, Taiwan, and Elsewhere, to Fight Together Against Japanese Imperialism

The war of aggression by Japanese imperialism does not threaten only the Chinese people. At the same time, it threatens all the soldiers and people of Japan and the oppressed nations of Korea and Taiwan. If we want to cause the Japanese invasion to fail, the broad masses of soldiers and people of the two great nations of China and Japan and the oppressed nations of Korea and Taiwan should undertake vast and persistent common efforts, and establish a joint anti-invasion united front. In pursuit of this objective, the twelfth task facing the whole nation is as follows. First, put forward this orientation of an anti-invasion united front to the great masses of people and soldiers in the two countries, and the nations of Korea and Taiwan, and call on them to struggle for it. Second, the government should issue an order to the effect that all the officers and soldiers in the anti-Japanese armies and the anti-Japanese guerrilla units should learn the necessary number of appropriate Japanese words. Senior political departments should prepare and send out Japanese teachers to different armies to teach, start from a few words to being able to lecture the Japanese officers and soldiers on some principles. Teach all the anti-Japanese officers and soldiers to make oral propaganda to all the enemy soldiers and junior officers, supplemented by propaganda through writing and pictures. Gradually help them to change by persuasion, make them agree to setting up a joint anti-invasion united front, turn the million-strong Japanese invading army into an army friendly to us, which will withdraw from China and overthrow Japanese fascism. Third, respect and give preferential treatment to enemy captives, educate them, through them influence the others to work hard for the establishment of an anti-invasion united front. Fourth, find a way to organize anti-invasion cultural workers within Japan to come to China and join this struggle. Fifth, protect the honest Japanese residents in China. Sixth, teach the great masses of soldiers and people. On the one hand, we should raise our national dignity. On the other hand, we should correct some of the wrong ideas in the army as well as among the people, distinguish Japanese imperialism from the Japanese people, distinguish enemy officers from the soldiers, and also distinguish the senior officers from the junior officers. After we have carried out the above orientation and methods, and made extensive and resolute efforts, this anti-invasion united front can be established. China's victory will depend mainly on the increase in its own strength; but, at the same time, the enemy's difficulties and international assistance must be obtained to supplement this. As regards the enemy's difficulties, apart from the gradual drain resulting from our persistence in the protracted war, and the gradual isolation of the enemy resulting from our strenuous diplomatic activity, the policy of building a joint anti-invasion united front with the Japanese soldiers and people and the nations of Korea and Taiwan is a part that cannot be omitted. The longer the Japanese war of aggression lasts, the more likely there will be a foundation to set up such a united front.

13. Unite All China's Nationalities, Stand Together Against Japan

Our Anti-Japanese National United Front does not consist only of all the parties and factions and all the classes in the country; it also includes all the nationalities in the country. In response to the enemy's conspiracy to split all the minority nationalities in our country, which has already been carried out and will continue to be carried out, the thirteenth task at the moment is to unite all the nationalities as one and resist the Japanese bandits together. For this purpose, we must pay attention to the following points. First, give the Meng [Mongolian], Hui [Muslim], Zang [Tibetan], Miao, Yao, Yi, Fan, and all the other nationalities equal rights with the Han. Under the principle of joint resistance to Japan, they have the right to manage their own affairs, while at the same time uniting with the Han to establish a unified state. Second, in the regions where various minority nationalities live together with the Han, the local governments should set up committees made up of members of the local minority nationalities as one department of the provincial and *xian* governments. These committees manage the affairs concerning them, mediate in relations among different nationalities, and have some seats in the provincial and *xian* governments. Third, respect the culture, religion, and customs of all the minority nationalities. Not only should we not force them to learn to read and write Chinese, but we should support and assist them in developing their own culture and education in their own languages and using their own form of writing. Fourth, correct the existing Han chauvinism, and encourage the Han to deal with the other nationalities on an equal basis, so that all the nationalities will daily become more friendly and intimate with one another. At the same time, forbid any insulting and contemptuous language, literature, and behavior directed at them. As regards the above policy, on the one hand, the various minority nationalities should unite among themselves and strive to bring about its realization, and, on the other hand, the government should spontaneously carry it out. Only thus can the relations among all the nationalities in the country be thoroughly improved, and the goal of uniting to fight against the intruders be truly achieved. The old hesitant and slow method will not work.

14. Rigorously Carry Out the Campaign Against Traitors, Strengthen Both the Front and the Rear

In the new situation, Chinese traitors, enemy spies, Trotskyites, and pro-Japanese elements will surely be even more rampant than before and carry out their conspiracies of spreading rumors, insults, division, and sabotage. Hence the fourteenth task at present lies in applying the following methods to carry out resolutely the campaign against traitors. First, arouse the vigilance of all the soldiers and people at the front as well as in the rear, and watch closely the activities of Chinese traitors, enemy spies, Trotskyites, and pro-Japanese elements. In accordance with the laws of the government, execute them without the slightest mercy. Second, be careful to protect state secrets. Execute for high treason those renegades who leak state secrets. Third, add a chapter on treason to the school textbooks, carry out the education to raise the level of vigilance. Fourth, set up counterespionage departments at all levels to manage the work of counterespionage in the military; set up counterespionage small groups in the organizations of the popular masses and in the people's self-defense teams. Emphasize education in counterespionage among the national police forces so that, under the close watch of the people, these traitors and spies have nowhere to hide. Ever since the War of Resistance began, we have suffered countless losses because of these traitors and spies. The generals and soldiers at the front are amazed at the large number of Chinese traitors and the magnitude of the losses caused by them to the war effort and long ago unanimously demanded such a policy. Even in the rear, the leaking of national secrets and guiding in of the cruel bombardments by enemy planes have already aroused the anger and hatred of Heaven and man. If the traitors and spies are not eliminated in a protracted War of Resistance, we can hardly expect this war to be victorious. To mobilize the national revolutionary vigilance of the broad popular masses, forcefully carry out the above methods for combating treason, and turn it into a vast campaign is a serious task that is indispensable in gaining final victory. We should point out: the campaign against traitors must take care to distinguish the ringleader from the subordinate, the conscious participant from one who has been deceived, and those who are resolute from those who are wavering. They should be treated differently, the former more severely, the latter let off more lightly. In addition, we should pay attention to winning the latter over and persuading them to turn toward the good. We must absolutely not treat everyone in the same way. We must also pay attention to the reliability of the evidence, not make use of inquisition by torture, and be strictly on guard against framing a case against anyone. The goal of the campaign against traitors is to eliminate the real traitors and spies, and this goal can be attained only through correct policies and methods.

15. Develop the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as Well as All Anti-Japanese Parties; Strengthen the United Front, and Support a Protracted War

All the urgent tasks dealt with above require that the various parties belonging to the Anti-Japanese National United Front propel the whole nation forward, to carry them out resolutely under the unified leadership of Chairman Chiang. It is impossible to attain this goal without developing the organizational capacity of all the parties participating in the united front. The present force of all parties without exception is too small, and to develop greatly the Guomindang and the Communist Party in particular is an urgent task at present. In this task of development, every party should support and assist the development of the other parties, instead of envying one another and obstructing one another. We must be aware that so long as it is an anti-Japanese party, the development of any party will benefit the War of Resistance against Japan. Without a doubt, the Guomindang and the Communist Party constitute the basis of the united front, and, of these two parties, the Guomindang is the backbone. We recognize this fact. Therefore, we firmly support Chairman Chiang and the National Government and Guomindang under his leadership. Moreover, we call on the whole nation to give him their unanimous support. To recognize and support this backbone but, at the same time, to develop every party are related and not conflicting policies.

In terms of the number, I think that the Guomindang should expand to over five million, while the Communist Party plus the other parties should expand to over one million. In a great nation with a population of 450 million people, during the great period of the War of Resistance, it is not only necessary but entirely possible to attract several million outstanding elements to join these anti-Japanese parties. If this really happens, the Anti-Japanese National United Front will be expanded, and as a result will be further consolidated, and there will be ample guarantees for carrying out all the tasks to defeat the enemy. We will not need to worry any more about achieving the fundamental objective of sustaining the protracted war and long-term cooperation, to expel the Japanese invaders and build a new China of the Three People's Principles.

V. The Protracted War and Long-Term Cooperation

Let us now focus on the question of the long-term characteristics of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and give those who are especially concerned about relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and who have already have had many questions, a complete answer. This has great significance in terms of strengthening and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front, strengthening and expanding cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, carrying out smoothly the current urgent tasks, and tiding over a difficult moment in the war.

This problem includes the following points: the protractedness of the war determines the protractedness of cooperation; cooperation during the war determines cooperation after the war; the contents and major conditions of long-term cooperation; the Three People's Principles and communism; the organizational form of long-term cooperation; the policy of mutual assistance and mutual accommodation in long-term cooperation; and the problem of a democratic republic. All these are questions that many people are concerned about, and we must give explicit answers to all of them.

1. The Protracted Character of the War Determines the Protracted Character of Cooperation

Because the War of Resistance against Japan is protracted, the entire Anti-Japanese National United Front can and must be long-lasting. In this process, cooperation between the two major parties—the Guomindang and the Communist Party—also can and must be long-term. This is the starting point for all our policies. Therefore, whatever happens, our policy is to demand a long-term national united front and long-term cooperation. Whatever happens, we demand unanimous support for a unified government and oppose discord and division. Only such policies will help us pull through the difficulties of the war, face up to the enemy's sabotage, beat back Japanese imperialism, and, finally, after the war is over, carry out the task of building a new China. This is fundamentally different from the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party from 1924 to 1927. At that time, it was short-term cooperation; this time it is long-term cooperation.

2. Cooperation During the War Determines Cooperation After the War

What we call long-term cooperation means cooperation not only during the war but also after the war. The War of Resistance against Japan is protracted, and the cooperation during the war can already be described as long-term. Yet it is not enough that we hope to continue this cooperation; we definitely must continue this cooperation. What guarantees do we have? The guarantee is that cooperation during the war determines cooperation after the war. The major parties in the anti-Japanese united front—the Guomindang and the Communist Party—must share the difficulties as well as a common fate and strive to make progress. Moreover, only after long-term efforts can they defeat Japanese imperialism; otherwise they cannot. When the war is over, these two parties that have shared adversities and made progress together will have a basis for continued cooperation. It can already be predicted that domestic and international conditions then will be more favorable for cooperation. Without a doubt, cooperation during the war must have different contents at different periods, and cooperation after the war will have even more new contents. But the cooperation during the war will determine that they can cooperate after the war. This is not a groundless prediction.

3. The Content and Major Conditions for Long-Term Cooperation

So-called long-term cooperation means the long-term national united front. Every class, from capitalists to workers, every political party, from the Guomindang to the Communist Party, every nationality, from the Han nationality to the small nationalities like the Miao and Yao, every army, from the Central Army to the Eighth Route Army, every government, from the National Government to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government—with the sole exception of the national traitors—all of these are included and, moreover, are always included. In the national united front during the protracted war, some people certainly cannot survive the hard struggle, and when personal interest surpasses the national interest they will become national traitors. Thus the national united front must continuously exclude these national traitors. Yet, after the exclusion of these, it still remains the national united front. The reason lies in the major conditions of long-term cooperation and in the first instance in the barbarism and protracted character of the war. Because the barbarism of the enemy's war gravely threatens the survival of every class of the whole nation, this forces the upper classes to resist Japan together with the other classes. It is inevitable that some among the upper class will withdraw from the anti-Japanese front, but broadly speaking, the remainder of the upper class are oppressed and have no way out but to revolt. Besides, because this barbaric war is long, it determines that cooperation will also be long-term. These facts constitute one aspect that determines the long-term cooperation. Yet there is a second aspect, which requires all the parties to the cooperation, first of all, the Guomindang and the Communists Party, to adopt correct policies and conduct necessary work. What kind of policies and work? They should be the policies and work that are decided and carried out on the basis of the long-term war and long-term cooperation. They should be the policies and work that take account of the present as well as the future, take account of this class as well as that class, take account of this party as well as that party, take account of this army as well as that army, take account of this nationality as well as that nationality. Otherwise, the policies are wrong, and the work is poorly done, everything is in a mess from within the united front itself, and the cooperation will not last long. So, on the one hand, the barbarism and long-term character of the enemy's war and, on the other hand, the correct policies and necessary work in the united front will ensure that the Chinese national united front not only should be, but also can be long-term. It is a national front and not a people's front. It includes cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party during and after the war, instead of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party that is expected to split and lead to a civil war after this war is over.

4. The Three People's Principles and Communism

The Three People's Principles are the political foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. But what is the relationship between the Three People's Principles and communism? What kind of attitude should Communist Party members adopt toward the Three People's Principles? Even down to the present day, some people are still not clear about this, so it is necessary to explain the matter once again.

Already in May 1936 at our Party's provisional congress we adopted the following outline on "resolutely carrying out the Three People's Principles":[12]

> Does the Communist Party agree with the Three People's Principles? Our answer is: "Yes, we do." The Three People's Principles have undergone changes in the course of their history. The revolutionary Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yatsen won the people's confidence and launched the great victorious revolution of 1924–1927 because they were resolutely applied as a result of cooperation with the Communist Party. On the other hand, as a result of turning on the Communist Party (during the party purge) and pursuing an opposite policy, the people's confidence was lost, the revolution was defeated. . . . Now that there are extremely grave national and social crises . . . , the people of the whole country and the patriots within the Guomindang are urgently demanding cooperation between the two parties. Consequently, it is completely in keeping with the historical requirements of the Chinese revolution that the essence of the Three People's Principles should be revived and restored; that the two parties should resume their cooperation, in accordance with the principle of Nationalism, or the struggle for national independence and liberation in dealing with foreign countries, the principle of People's Rights, or the attainment of internal democracy and freedom, and the principle of People's Livelihood, or the promotion of the people's welfare, and that they should lead the people to put these principles resolutely into practice. This ought to be clearly grasped by every member of the Communist Party. Communists will never abandon their ideal of socialism and communism, which they will attain by going through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Communist Party has its own party and political program. Its party program is one of socialism and communism, which is different from the Three People's Principles. Even its democratic revolutionary political program is more thorough that that of any other party in China, although it is basically not in conflict with the Three People's

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[12] The reference is to point 11 of Mao's "Outline of a Political Report at the Party Congress of the Soviet Regions," entitled "The Tasks of the Chinese National United Front Against Japan at the Present Stage," delivered not in May 1936 but on May 3, 1937. We reproduce the relevant passages from Volume V, pp. 644–45, as Mao delivered them at that time, indicating omissions by ellipses. For the variants between this text and the revised version which appears in the *Selected Works*, see the full text in Volume V.

> Principles as proclaimed by the Guomindang at its first and second congresses. Therefore, far from rejecting the Three People's Principles, we are ready staunchly to put them into practice; moreover, we ask the Guomindang to implement them together with us, and we call upon the entire nation to put them into effect, so that the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country shall unite and fight for these three great objectives of national independence, people's rights and freedom, and the livelihood and happiness of the people. ("The Tasks of the Chinese National United Front Against Japan at the Present Stage," p. 11)[13]

On September 22 last year, in the declaration of the establishment of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party by our Party's Central Committee, we stressed: "Mr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization."[14]

Why does a Communist political party adopt such an attitude? Clearly, national independence, democratic freedom, and the happiness of people's livelihood are precisely the general objectives the Communist Party wants to realize in the national-democratic stage of the revolution. They are also the general objectives the people of the whole country want to realize instead of the things that are demanded by a certain party alone. If you will just have a look at the documents and political guiding principles of the Communist Party since its foundation, you will understand this. Therefore, in the past, not just during the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party from 1924 to 1927, our Communist Party resolutely carried out the Three People's Principles. Even after the unfortunate breakup of the cooperation between the two parties in 1927, none of our deeds violated the Three People's Principles. At that time, we were firmly opposed to imperialism, and this was in conformity with nationalism; we carried out the political system of people's representative congresses, and this corresponded to democracy; we also applied the agrarian system of land to the tillers, which fitted in with the people's livelihood. At that time, none of our actions went beyond the fundamental concept of private ownership of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In order to carry out thoroughly this task of the democratic stage, all Communist Party members should, without the slightest doubt, in accordance with their own consistent revolutionary general principles, and their own resolutions and declarations, earnestly and sincerely carry out the Three People's Principles, together with the Chinese Guomindang, the other parties in the country, and all the people of the country. Whoever does not loyally believe in and carry out the Three People's Principles is saying one thing and meaning another, or thinking in one way and behaving in another, and is not a loyal Marxist. In China, all loyal Marxists have at the same time the two responsibilities of current practical tasks and great future ideals. Furthermore, we must be aware that only when the present assignments are fulfilled as thoroughly as possible will we have the basis and foundation for developing into the future period of great ideals. The so-called great future ideals refer to communism, which is the perfect social system for mankind. Mr. Sun Yatsen once believed that only when it was realized could the social problems of the future be resolved. "Present practical tasks" refers to the Three People's Principles. This is the basic task in the current stage of "seeking equal international status, equal political status, and equal economic status." It is the common demand of the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country. Therefore, just as they study communism, Communist Party members should carefully study the Three People's Principles. They should study the theory of the Three People's Principles from a Marxist perspective, study how the Three People's Principles can be concretely applied, study how to use the authentic ideas of the Three People's Principles to teach the popular masses about the Three People's Principles, teach them so that they will proceed from understanding to active application, and struggle hard to defeat Japanese imperialism and build a new China of the Three People's Principles.

5. The Organizational Form of Long-Term Cooperation

To guarantee long-term cooperation, we must also solve the problem of the organizational form of the cooperation. We have already refuted the doctrine of a single party. No matter whether in terms of past history, the present tasks, or the nature of Chinese society, the doctrine of a single party is groundless. It can never be carried out and will not work. It violates the great objective of uniting as one to resist Japan and build the country; it produces much harm but no benefit. Well, then, does the coexistence of all the parties and their mutual union in an Anti-Japanese National United Front require a kind of common organization? Yes, it does. The absence of such a unified common organization will be disadvantageous to resistance against Japan, and even more disadvantageous to long-term cooperation. Hence every party should study it carefully and find a unified common organizational form that best fits in with long-term cooperation. Let us now consider this.

Because of the historic peculiarities of Chinese politics and economics, as well as of the various parties, it appears from today's perspective that the Anti-Japanese National United Front may have the following three organizational forms.

In the first kind, the Guomindang itself becomes a national league. Every party joins the Guomindang, while maintaining its independence, but this is different from the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. If the Guomindang agrees that Communists can join it, what should be our attitude?

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[13] As can be seen from the previous note, the title of Mao's report of May 3, 1937, is given correctly here, but the reference at the end should be to section 11, not page 11.

[14] The declaration in question was, in fact, drafted by the Chinese Communist Party on July 4, 1937. September 22 is the date on which the Guomindang finally agreed to publish it. The next day, Chiang Kaishek made a statement recognizing the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party. The appearance of these two documents marked the formal beginning of Guomindang-Communist collaboration. The text of the Communist statement can be found in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 147, where it is quoted in an editorial written by Mao dated October 5, 1943.

First, we approve of this method because it is one of the best unified organizational forms of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and will benefit resistance to Japan and the building of the country. Not only the Communist Party but also any other anti-Japanese party or faction can join the Guomindang. If the Guomindang approves, we will certainly never object. If the matter is handled in this way, we may adopt a method different from that in the cooperation in the year 13 [of the Republic]. To begin with, all those Communist Party members who join the Guomindang should do so openly, and a list of their names should be handed over to the leading organs of the Guomindang. Second, do not accept any Guomindang members into the Communist Party. If there are some people who want to join, they should be persuaded not to do so, taking into account the situation as a whole. Third, if our young Party members are allowed to join the Three People's Principles Youth League with the approval of the Guomindang, we would do the same thing, not organizing secret groups in the league, and not admitting nonmembers of the Communist Party into our Party. With this method, everybody will live in peace, and this will be beneficial rather than harmful. This is the first kind of organizational form of the united front.

The second kind of organizational form of the united front is that all the parties together organize a national union and support Mr. Chiang Kaishek as the supreme leader of this union. Every party will send its representatives on a basis of equality to form central as well as various local joint committees to work hard to carry out the common guiding principles and deal with matters of common interest. This is another very good organizational form, which we approve. We proposed it long ago, but unfortunately it has not been adopted.

The third kind of organizational form of the united front is the present method. There are no written regulations, nothing is fixed, but when something occurs the parties discuss it together to solve the problems concerning them both. But this form of organization is not sufficiently close, and many problems cannot be properly and promptly solved. For instance, the application of many overall political policies and the adjustment of friction at the lower levels are all delayed because there is no fixed organization, so these problems persist. Hence this method is not advantageous for long-term cooperation. Nevertheless, if the first and second methods are impossible, this method will have to be continued temporarily.

In sum, the problem of the form of organization for long-term cooperation during the protracted war is an important issue. We strongly support a kind of unified form so that it will benefit long-term cooperation.

6. The Policy of Mutual Assistance and Mutual Accommodation in Long-Term Cooperation

We have said already that a protracted war requires a long-term united front. This is the starting point for all our policies. Consequently, in their work, and in their relations with allied parties, Communist Party members should pay attention everywhere and at all times to this long-term characteristic. They should resolutely and bravely perform all work which will benefit long-term cooperation and absolutely never do anything which will harm long-term cooperation.

Here there arises the problem of mutual assistance and mutual accommodation among different parties. As regards mutual assistance, for example, every party wants to develop and be strengthened, but apart from developing and strengthening itself, every party should support and assist the development and strengthening of its allied parties. What kind of attitude should Communist Party members adopt toward the development and strengthening of the Guomindang? In a word, to support and assist. The reasons are that the development and strengthening of the Guomindang will benefit the War of Resistance against Japan, benefit the whole nation, and consequently benefit the toiling people and the Communist Party as well, as I have already said. Now that the Guomindang is organizing the Three People's Principles Youth League, what attitude should Communists take toward this? Without a doubt, we will adopt the attitude of support and assistance. We hope that the Three People's Principles Youth League will develop extensively on the basis of Mr. Chiang Kaishek's declaration about it, and that the development of this league will have a bright future. Precisely because of [our] support and assistance, we hope that there will be some revision and adjustment regarding certain articles in its present rules. Otherwise good motives will not necessarily lead to good results. The Three People's Principles Youth League should become a unified organization for all the masses of young people throughout the country to unite in and save the country. It should absorb individual young people and youth groups of every party, every faction, and every sphere, so that it becomes a vast body in which the entire younger generation will receive education and training for the national revolution. Therefore, organizationally it should be democratized, politically it should bring into play the spontaneous and conscious spirit of the league members, bring into play the initiative of the masses of young people. This is our attitude toward and understanding of the Three People's Principles Youth League.

Mutual assistance is not mutual harm. Hurting others to benefit oneself is wrong in terms of individual morality, and even more wrong in terms of national morality. Therefore, unreasonable friction, even going so far as to seize and kill people, is absolutely wrong under any circumstances. Communist Party members must absolutely never treat our allied parties in this way. Moreover, if our allied parties treat us like this, we will never remain silent. It is only right and fair to oneself as well as to others if a serious attitude is adopted in dealing with irrational actions. To point out one another's mistakes is virtue between friends, and it is also the style that should be encouraged between political parties.

Are there any mutual accommodations in the united front? Yes, there are. We once made some political concessions, that is, we stopped confiscating the land, reorganized the Red Army, changed the system in the soviet areas. These were a kind of political concessions, a necessary step in order to set up the united front and to unite all the people to fight against the enemy together. Our allied parties made some concessions, too, such as recognizing the legitimate status of the Communist Party and so on. This kind of policy of mutual accommodation for the purpose of united resistance to Japan and long-term cooperation is very good and very correct. Only those who are politically muddle-headed or people with something else in their minds could say the Communist Party surrendered to the Guomindang or vice versa.

Now we also advocate that all the parties in the united front will not recruit party members, organize branches, or conduct secret activities in the other parties. We consider that such a policy is necessary. Naturally it is different now from the past. Previously, in the period of civil war, apart from the open war between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, they both used secret means to conduct activities to sabotage each other. After the establishment of cooperation, there certainly should not be any motives or actions for sabotaging each other, but the method of secretly recruiting party members and organizing branches in the other's party must also be terminated, in order to reassure both sides. Only this is compatible with the goal of long-term cooperation in a protracted war. Now we formally declare to our comrades of the Guomindang: we will halt all activity to recruit party members and organize branches in your party, and we will continue this policy no matter what kind of common organizational forms the united front may take. But meanwhile, we hope that you will do the same. After the two sides have come to an agreement, if any lower-ranking party members violate it, the leading institutions of the violator are responsible for dealing with the matter.

Apart from this, in communications between the comrades from the two sides, they should adopt the attitudes of modesty, respect, and discussion instead of arrogance, contempt, and arbitrary action to improve bilateral relations. This is also necessary.

Communist Party members should be the first to carry out all these things which we have said. Even though some people on the other side may not have treated us in accordance with the same policy, methods, and attitude, we will proceed with our policy. After we have done so for some time, those on the other side who fail to understand for a time will be able to see.

Communist Party members should persist in their stands regarding all the causes on behalf of the country and the people. From beginning to end, they should walk consistently in the direction of defeating the Japanese bandits and building a new China. Whoever violates this stand, this orientation, no longer qualifies as a Communist Party member. But Communist Party members must also have the spirit of mutual assistance and mutual accommodation; they must have the spirit of respecting our allied parties and solving problems with the comrades of our allied parties by negotiating with a modest and amiable attitude. Wherever there are comrades of our allied parties, we should solve the relevant problems through negotiations with them, instead of being arbitrary and dictatorial. Without this spirit, we will not be able to strengthen unity and solidarity, nor will it be possible to achieve the so-called cause of the country and the people and the objective of defeating the Japanese invaders and building a new China. Consequently, we should never regard the necessary policy of mutual accommodation as negative behavior. Not only is mutual assistance positive, but mutual accommodation is positive as well, for necessary accommodation is the indispensable condition for strengthening the cooperation between the two parties and seeking better unity and greater progress.

7. The Question of a Democratic Republic

Although our Party published the resolution on founding a democratic republic as early as September 1936, and although the comrades of the Central Committee have repeatedly explained this matter, many people outside our Party still do not understand our proposal. This is a question related to the future of the War of Resistance. What will be the outcome of the War of Resistance? In the last analysis, what does the so-called War of Resistance and building the nation mean in the view of the Communist Party? What kind of country do we want to build? This is a real question. To explain it again will help to strengthen the confidence of all the parties and factions in long-term cooperation.

What kind of country do we want to build? To answer in a single sentence, we want to build a republic of the Three People's Principles.

What we call a democratic republic is actually a republic of the Three People's Principles; its nature is that of the Three People's Principles. According to Mr. Sun Yatsen's formulation, it is a country "that seeks equal international status, equal political status, and equal economic status." First, this country is a nationalist country. It is an independent country, which will not tolerate any foreign interference and, at the same time, will not interfere in any foreign countries. That is to say that China's original semicolonial status will be changed, and it will become independent. At the same time, no matter how strong and prosperous it has become, it will never become imperialist, but it will have peaceful relations in a spirit of equality with all the friendly countries that respect the independence of China, on a basis of coexistence and mutual benefit. As regards the nationalities within the country, it will give them equal rights and set up a unified government based on the principle of voluntariness. Second, this country is a country of people's rights.[15] All the people in the country have equal political status; all the government officials and civil servants are elected by the people. The political system is one of democratic centralism. A national assembly and local assemblies made up of the people's representatives will be established. Regardless of class, sex, nationality, belief, and cultural level, all citizens over eighteen except criminals have the right to vote and to stand for election. The state gives the people freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, belief, residence, and migration, and further protects them politically and materially. Third, this is a country of people's livelihood. It does not deny private ownership. Yet it guarantees that workers have jobs and their working conditions are improved; peasants have land, and heavy taxes and high rent and interest rates are abolished; students can go to schools, and the poor people will have a chance to receive education; all the other classes have work to do, so they will be able to show their talents. In a word, the state will see to it that everybody has clothing, food, a chance to receive education, and work. What we call a democratic republic is such a country, a genuine Republic of China of the Three People's Principles. It is not a soviet, nor is it socialism.

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[15] Mao here uses Sun Yatsen's term of *minquan* ("people's rights"), which can equally well be translated "democracy" or "democratic."

Against whom must we struggle if China wants to become such a country? We must struggle against Japanese imperialism. Japanese imperialism has deprived us of our independence, and we must demand our independence from it. Japanese imperialism treats us as slaves, and we must demand freedom from it. Japanese imperialism makes us suffer from hunger and cold, and we must demand food from it. How shall we make these demands? Use guns against them. In short, when we have driven out Japanese imperialism, we will have an independent, free, happy new Republic of China of the Three People's Principles.

VI. China's War to Resist Invasion and the World Antifascist Movement

1. China and the World Cannot Be Separated

China is already closely united with the world. The Sino-Japanese war is one part of the world war, and the victory of the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan cannot be considered independently, apart from the world. In the new situation of the War of Resistance, it is possible that part of foreign assistance may be temporarily reduced. This increases the significance of Chinese self-reliance. At all times China must depend primarily on self-reliance. But China is not and never can become isolated. The fact that China is intimately linked with the world is also our standpoint, and it must be our standpoint. We are not and never can be isolationists. China could not have been isolated a long time ago, and now that a worldwide imperialism has intervened in China by war, all the people of China are concerned about the relationships between the world and China. They are particularly concerned about the changes in the situation in Europe. Therefore, it is quite meaningful for us to analyze the current international situation.

2. The Second World War to Redivide the World Has Already Begun

The nature of capitalist imperialism is not only in contradiction with the broad masses of the people in their own countries, but is in contradiction with the colonies and semicolonies and with the socialist countries, and, moreover, there are contradictions between the various imperialist countries themselves. The most acute expression of this last type of contradictions in history was the world war twenty years ago. The consequence of that war between two groups of imperialist countries was the birth of a new international situation. As a result of the new political and economic developments in the world after that war, the world has been brought again to the brink of a new great war. After the invasion of the Four Eastern Provinces by the Japanese bandits in the East, and Hitler's rise to power in the West, a new war to redivide the world has already begun. The slogan "Fascism means war" is absolutely correct. Under these circumstances, on the one hand, Japan, Germany, and Italy have set up an invasion front, carrying out invasions on a large scale. On the other hand, the democratic countries are preparing for a war in the name of peace to protect the advantages they have already obtained, but as yet they have not been willing to use force to stop the invaders. In particular, the appeasement policy of Great Britain has helped the invaders. Under these circumstances, China's Four Eastern Provinces were first sacrificed, then Abyssinia was conquered by Italy, and Spain encouraged the arrogance of the rebel army. China is again facing a new large-scale invasion by the Japanese bandits, and then very recently Austria and Czechoslovakia were sacrificed to Hitler one after the other. Six hundred million people in the entire world have been drawn into this war, and its scope has been extended to Asia, Africa, and Europe. This is the current situation of the new world war.

3. The Characteristics of the World War at Present

As a result, on the one hand, of the resolute determination of the fascist countries—Japan, Germany, and Italy—to carry out invasions and, on the other hand, of the reluctance of the democratic countries to impose sanctions by force, especially the British policy of appeasement, the current situation of the new world war exhibits characteristics different from those of the First World War, namely, the invasion of the neutral countries first and the adoption of different forms of war. China, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia are either semi-independent or small countries. Japan, Germany, and Italy first chose these fat little morsels and swallowed them. In their invasion of these neutral countries, the invaders used three particular forms of war. The first kind was that of Japan's war against China and Italy's war against Abyssinia. These were open and large-scale wars, yet they were carried out without a declaration of war, thus opening a new era in the history of war. The purpose of using this method of undeclared war lies in the fact that the invaders, taking advantage of the reluctance of the democratic countries to impose sanctions, and particularly Britain's policy of appeasement, temporarily avoided direct clashes, thus facilitating their operations to capture the neutral countries first. The second kind is the form of invasion of Spain by Italy and Germany. They adopted the method of assisting the rebel army. This is a repetition of an old method in history; there were such examples in history. The third kind is the form Hitler used to invade Austria and Czechoslovakia; there was no appearance of war (there was no shooting), but there was the reality of war. He sent out large and strong military forces, and they occupied all of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia. In addition, he brought the rest of Czechoslovakia under his control. This is the best method for subjugating a people's country without fighting a war. The adoption of these three methods results entirely from the fact that, on the one hand, the aggressors themselves do not have sufficient strength, so it is wise to avoid direct conflict with the big powers. Consequently, they use clever methods of waging war, in an attempt to first make themselves stronger, while simultaneously the great powers are being weakened, after which they will fight against them. On the other hand, it was the result of the fact that none of the democratic countries was willing to stop the aggressors, and especially of British cowardliness and appeasement. In reality, this kind of policy assisted the aggressors, and made it easier for them to invade the neutral countries.

4. British Appeasement Will Lead the Fascist Countries to Carry Out Larger-Scale Wars

Just now, the British conservative cabinet headed by [Neville] Chamberlain is gradually carrying out its so-called policy of the cooperation of the four big powers. After the Munich Agreement, it is possible that the political situation in Europe may temporarily take a turn for the worse. The policies of the majority of the British Conservative Party have always been based on the principle of rejecting the Soviet Union and appeasing Germany and Italy, because they fear the strength and prosperity of the Soviet Union and fear that they themselves may become involved in the war too soon. They fear the movements of their own people and the independence movements in the colonies, and they had long ago resolved to sacrifice Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to fulfill their goal of excluding the Soviet Union and appeasing Germany and Italy. In the past, because of the lack of unity within the Conservative Party itself, the active policy of the French Popular Front, and the criticism by both domestic and international public opinion, they did not succeed in this. Now, taking advantage of the reluctance of the people of Britain and of all Europe to fight wars, and of the rightism of the French Flandin faction,[16] under Hitler's threat of force, the Munich Agreement was signed. This agreement is the consequence of British appeasement. If Britain does not change its policy, it will inevitably lead the fascist countries to launch adventurist wars on an even larger scale. Although war between the big powers may not break out immediately, the process, restricted for the time being to the invasion of neutral countries, is still continuing. Ultimately it will certainly lead all the big powers into an unprecedented cruel war. There can be no doubt as to this future prospect.

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[16] The reference is to the partisans of Pierre-Etienne Flandin, a rightist political figure of this period.

"To lift a stone only to drop it on one's own foot"—this is the inevitable consequence of Chamberlain's policy.

5. The Majority of Humanity Throughout the World Is Gradually Being Mobilized

As regards all of the capitalist countries, because of the general economic crisis, capitalism has entered a dead end from which there is no escape. The war involving 600 million people affects the whole world, and new and larger wars are threatening mankind. As regards the socialist country, on the other hand, everything looks bright, progressive, strong, and prosperous. In the contrast between these two opposites, the majority of the human race in this world have gradually found the direction to protect and liberate themselves. They are gradually uniting on an unprecedentedly large scale and in unprecedented depth and are preparing to fight. World War I, the strength and prosperity of the socialist country in the past twenty years, the decline of the capitalist countries, the wars of aggression by the fascist countries in the past six or seven years, China's great War of Resistance against Japan, the people's war in Spain, and even Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and so on, gradually taught Great Britain, France, and other countries, and the people of the whole world a lesson. These events made them understand that organizing and fighting is the only way out, that only by uniting as one all the people in the world who are seeking liberation for themselves, only if there is a united front between the people of the world and the oppressed nations will there be a way out. This great process of awakening the people of the world, organizing them, fighting, and forming a united front is moving forward, but it can succeed only after great and arduous efforts. The war threat of fascism and the appeasement of Chamberlain will, in the end, encounter great resistance. This is undoubtedly also a future prospect; it is an inevitable consequence of the fascist war and Chamberlain's policy as well.

6. Cooperation Between the Chinese Resistance to the War of Aggression and the Worldwide Antifascist Movement

Everyone is aware of what has happened in the past. To some extent, all the democratic countries are assisting China, mainly because of their people's sympathy for China. The assistance from the Soviet Union is especially active. Now, because of the deep penetration by the offensive of the Japanese bandits, the contradictions between Britain, America, France, and the Soviet Union, on one side, and Japan, on the other, have deepened. Although Britain may practice appeasement in the East as it has in the West, in an attempt to preserve more or less its commerce with the Japanese-occupied territory, and under the illusion that Japan will reduce its threat to Southeast Asia, compromise to some extent with Japan, a fundamental compromise will be very difficult, at least for the time being. This is because of the

Japanese policy of unilateral occupation, as a result of which the problem of the East differs to some degree from the problem of the West in terms of the specific current situation. The deep penetration of Japan's offensive has deepened the contradictions between Japan and America, the friendship between the Soviet Union and China is increasing, and there is a possibility of further intimacy between China, America, and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, we must, first, not forget the differences between the capitalist countries and the socialist countries. Second, we must not forget the differences between the government and the people in the capitalist countries. Third, it is even more important not to forget the differences between the present and the future, and we should not expect too much from the former. We should strive to win every possible assistance at present, and, to some extent, this is not only a possibility but a reality. But it is not appropriate to expect too much. The coordination between the Chinese national liberation movement and foreign assistance is mainly coordination in the future with the progressive nations and the people's antifascist movements in the entire world. While taking self-reliance as the principle policy, we should not abandon the effort to win foreign aid. Such should be the basis on which we place ourselves.

VII. The Place of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War

1. The Nature of the Question

Comrades, the prospects ahead of us are bright. China[17] must defeat Japanese imperialism and can defeat it.[18] There is, however, a difficult road ahead between the present and that bright future. We, and the entire nation,[19] who are fighting for a bright China, must fight *the dark forces of* the Japanese bandits step by step and can defeat them only after a long struggle. *What is the role of Communist Party members in this war? In what way should they act so that they may truly be said to have exerted their utmost efforts?*[20] We have also summed up the experience gained since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, appraised the present situation, and defined the urgent tasks confronting the whole nation. We have also discussed the theory[21] of sustaining a long war by means of long-term cooperation,[22] as well as the methods for doing so, and we have analyzed the international situation. What

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[17] China → We

[18] And can defeat it → And must build a new China, and we can definitely achieve this goal

[19] We, and the entire nation → The Chinese Communist Party and the people of the whole country

[20] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the following sentence: "We have already said a good deal about problems relating to various aspects of this war."

[21] Theory → Reasons

[22] Cooperation → The Anti-Japanese National United Front

then remains? Comrades, there is one more point,[23] namely, the question of what role the Chinese Communist Party should play in the national war, or how Communists should understand their own role, strengthen themselves, and close their ranks, for only thus can they be considered to have done their utmost in the national war.[24]

2. Patriotism and Internationalism

Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? He can be, and should be,[25] depending on the historical conditions.[26] There is the patriotism[27] of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our patriotism. With respect to the Japanese aggressors and Hitler,[28] Communists resolutely oppose *this so-called patriotism.* The Japanese Communist Party and the German Communist Party are all defeatists with regard to the war[29] and use every possible means to bring about the defeat of the wars of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler,[30] the more complete the defeat the better. This is what the Japanese and German Communists should be doing, and it is precisely what they are doing. The reason is that the wars launched by the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are harming their own people as well as the people of the world. For us, patriotism and internationalism are closely linked.[31] Our slogan is: "Fight to defend the motherland against the aggressors." For us defeatism is a crime and *to go all out to assist Chairman Chiang and the National Government*[32] *is a sacred duty,* an inescapable duty. *Here, there cannot be the slightest bit of negativism.* The reason is that only by fighting in defense of the motherland can we save the whole nation from flood and fire.[33] And only by achieving national liberation will there be emancipation for the proletariat and other working people.[34] Patriotism is the application of internationalism in national revolutionary wars. For this reason, Communists must use their initiative to the full, march bravely and resolutely to the battlefront of the national revolutionary war, and train *every* gun on the Japanese aggressors. *Not the slightest negativism is permitted. It is imperative that we exert ourselves to the utmost to assist friendly parties and friendly forces. There must be no inclination to sit and observe the course of victory and defeat.* For this reason, immediately after the September Eighteenth Incident, 1931, our Party issued the slogan of[35] resisting the Japanese aggressors by a war of national defense, and later proposed *and upheld* an Anti-Japanese National United Front, ordered the Red Army to reorganize as part of the anti-Japanese National Revolutionary Army and to march to the front, and instructed Party members to take their place in the forefront of the war and defend the motherland to the last drop of their blood. *Such actions,* such patriotism, are all legitimate; *they are appropriate and necessary.* Far from running counter to internationalism, they are precisely its manifestation[36] in China. Only those who are politically muddle-headed or have ulterior motives *close their eyes and* talk nonsense about our having made a mistake and abandoned internationalism.

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[23] Point → Question

[24] For only thus can they be considered to have done their utmost in the national war → For only thus can they lead this war to victory and not to defeat

[25] He can be, and should be → We hold that he not only can be but should be

[26] Depending on the historical conditions → The specific content of patriotism is determined by the historical conditions

[27] Patriotism → "Patriotism"

[28] Hitler → Hitler's so-called patriotism

[29] To the war → To the war waged by their countries

[30] Here the revised version inserts: for this is in the interest of the Japanese and German peoples

[31] For us, patriotism and internationalism are closely linked → China's case is different, because it is the victim of aggression. Chinese Communists must therefore combine patriotism with internationalism. We are at once internationalists and patriots

[32] To go all out to assist Chairman Chiang and the National Government → To strive for victory in the War of Resistance

[33] Save the whole nation from flood and fire → Defeat the aggressors and achieve national liberation

3. *Communists Should Set an Example in the National War*

For the above reasons, Communists should show a high degree of initiative in the national war and show it concretely, that is, they should play an exemplary vanguard role in every sphere. *This* war of ours is being waged under adverse circumstances. *The reason for the emergence of such adverse circumstances lies in the fact that up until this moment the extensive dynamic forces of our nation have only just begun to be mobilized.* National consciousness, national self-respect, and national self-confidence are not sufficiently developed among the majority of the popular masses, the majority of the popular masses are unorganized, our military power is weak, the economy is backward, the political system has not been democratized,[37] phenomena of corruption and pessimism exist, and a lack of unity and solidarity is to be found within the united front; *all these* are *the main reasons* for the formation of such adverse circumstances. For these reasons, Communists must consciously shoulder the great responsibility of uniting the entire nation so as to achieve progress.[38] Here the exemplary vanguard role of the Communists is

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[34] Will there be emancipation for the proletariat and other working people → Will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the overthrow of the invading imperialists will, at the same time, aid the people of foreign countries

[35] Slogan of → Call for

[36] Manifestation → Realization

[37] Has not been democratized → Is undemocratic

[38] Achieve progress → Put an end to all such undesirable phenomena

of vital importance. In the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, they should set an example in fighting bravely, carrying out orders, observing discipline, doing political work, and fostering internal unity and solidarity. In their relations with friendly parties and armies, Communists should take a firm stand of unity and solidarity,[39] uphold the program of the united front, and set an example in carrying out the tasks of resistance. They should be true in word and resolute in deed, free from arrogance and sincere in consulting and cooperating with the friendly parties and armies, and should be models in interparty relations within the united front. Every Communist engaged in government work should set an example of absolute integrity, of freedom from favoritism in making appointments, and of hard work for little remuneration. Every Communist working among the popular masses should be their friend and not a boss over them, an indefatigable teacher and not a bureaucratic politician. At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place his personal interests first; he should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight, and so on, are most contemptible, while selflessness, working with all one's energy, whole-hearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work, *among other things, are examples which* will command respect. Communists should work in harmony with all progressives outside the Party and endeavor to unite the entire people to do away with whatever is undesirable. It must be realized that Communists form only a small section of the nation and that there are large numbers of progressives and activists outside the Party with whom we must work. It is entirely wrong to think that "we alone are good and no one else is any good." As for people who are [politically] backward, Communists should not slight or despise them, but should *respect them,* befriend them, unite with them, convince them, and encourage them to go forward. The attitude of Communists toward any person who has made mistakes in his work should be one of persuasion in order to help him change and start afresh and not one of exclusion, unless he is incorrigible. Communists should set an example in being practical as well as farsighted, because it is only by being practical that they can fulfill the appointed tasks, and only farsightedness can prevent them from losing their bearings in the march forward. Communists should therefore set an example in study; at all times they should learn from the masses as well as teach them. Only by learning from the people, from actual circumstances, and from the friendly parties and armies, and by knowing them well, can we be practical in our work and farsighted as to the future. In a long war and in adverse circumstances, the dynamic energy of the whole nation can be mobilized in the struggle to *raise the level of the backward,* to overcome difficulties, defeat the enemy, and build a new China only if the Communists play an exemplary vanguard role to the best of their ability together with all the advanced elements among the friendly parties and armies and among the masses.

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[39] Solidarity → Resistance to Japan

4. Unite the Whole Nation and Combat Enemy Agents in the National Front[40]

The one and only policy orientation in order to carry out the central task of overcoming difficulties and defeating the enemy[41] is to unite the whole nation, consolidate and expand the united front,[42] and mobilize the vital forces of *the various strata of* the whole nation. However, there are enemy agents already playing a disruptive role *or who seek to sneak in and do so* within our national united front, namely, the Chinese traitors, Trotskyites, and pro-Japanese elements *who are hidden, but publicly appear to resist Japan.* Communists must always be on the lookout for such agents, expose their criminal activities on the basis of factual evidence, *in view of the concrete circumstances*, and *at the same time* warn the *friendly parties and armies and the broad masses of the* people not to be duped by them. Communists have an important responsibility to sharpen[43] their political vigilance toward these national [i.e., Chinese] agents. The expansion and consolidation of the national united front is inseparable from the exposure and weeding out of enemy agents.[44]

5. Expand the Communist Party and Prevent Infiltration by Enemy Agents

To overcome the difficulties, and defeat the enemy,[45] the Communist Party must expand its organization and become a great mass party by opening its doors to the masses of workers, peasants, and young activists who are truly devoted to the revolution, who believe in the Party's ideology, support its policies, and are willing to observe its discipline and work hard. Here no tendency toward closed-doorism should be tolerated. But, at the same time, there must definitely be no slackening of vigilance against infiltration by enemy agents. The Japanese imperialist secret services are ceaselessly trying to disrupt our Party and to smuggle undercover traitors, Trotskyites, pro-Japanese elements, degenerates, and careerists into its ranks in the guise of activists. Not for a moment should we relax our vigilance and our strict precautions against such elements. We must not close the doors to our Party for fear of enemy agents, our set policy being boldly to expand our Party. But, at the same time, while thus boldly expanding, we must not relax our vigilance against enemy agents and careerists who will avail themselves of this opportunity to sneak in.[46] Our general policy in developing the Party[47] is: "Expand the Party boldly but do not let a single undesirable make his way in."

6. Maintain Both the United Front and the Independence of the Party

If there were only one class, one party in China, then there would no longer be the need for the so-called united front. The so-called united front is predicated on the existence of more than two classes and parties. It is only by firmly maintaining the *Anti-Japanese* National United Front that we can defeat the enemy.[48] *Moreover, this policy must be adhered to over a long period.* This is our firmly established orientation.[49] But, at the same time, every party and group in the united front must preserve its ideological, political, and organizational independence; this holds good for the Guomindang, the Communist Party, or any other party or group. *What is* the Principle of People's Rights in the Three People's Principles? In interparty relations, it permits both alliance and unity of the various parties and factions, and their independent coexistence.[50] To speak of unity alone while denying independence is *an idea* which abandons the Principle of Democracy, and to this neither the Communist Party nor any other party would agree. There is no doubt that *within the united front independence cannot exceed union but has to give way to union,* and that independence within the united front is *only and can only be a* relative *thing.* Otherwise, *it cannot count as maintaining a united front.* It would undermine the general policy of unity against the enemy. But, *at the same time,* this relative independence must not be denied; ideologically, politically, and organizationally, each party must have its relative freedom.[51] Also, unity against the enemy[52] and the united front would be undermined if this relative *independence or* freedom were denied or voluntarily abandoned. This should be clearly understood by all members of the Communist Party as well as of the friendly parties.

The same is true of the relationship between the class struggle and the national struggle. It is an established principle that in the War of Resistance everything must be subordinated to the interests of resistance, and that class struggle must be subordinated to the interests *and requirements* of the national struggle but absolutely should not run counter to them. But, *at the same time,* under conditions of the existence of class society, you cannot eliminate class struggle; there is no way to eliminate it.[53] The theory which seeks to deny *fundamentally* the existence of class struggle is a distorted theory.[54] We do not deny the class struggle; we adjust it. The policy of mutual help and mutual concessions which we advocate is applicable not only to relations between parties and factions but *basically* also to class relations. In order to unite against Japan, we must carry out an appropriate policy of adjustment in class relations, a policy which does not leave the toiling masses without political and material safeguards, but also gives consideration to the interests of the rich, thereby meeting the *general* demand of solidarity against the enemy.[55]

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[40] National front → Nation

[41] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "and building a new China"

[42] United front → Anti-Japanese National United Front

[43] Have an important responsibility to sharpen → Must understand the importance of sharpening

[44] Here the *Selected Works* version adds the following sentence: It is entirely wrong to pay attention only to one aspect and forget the other.

[45] Defeat the enemy → Defeat the enemy, and build a new China

[46] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: If we pay attention only to one aspect, and forget the other aspect, we will commit errors.

[47] Our general policy in developing the Party → The only correct policy

[48] That we can defeat the enemy → That we can overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy, and build a new China

[49] This is our firmly established orientation → This is beyond all doubt

[50] Both alliance and unity of the various parties and factions, and their independent coexistence → Both the mutual union of the various parties and factions, and their independent existence

[51] Each party must have its relative freedom → Each party must have its relative independence, that is, relative freedom

[52] Unity against the enemy → The overall policy orientation of unity against the enemy

7. Consider the Situation as a Whole, Think in Terms of the Majority, and Work Together with Our Allies

In leading the masses, *participating in the united front, and* waging a struggle against the enemy, Communists must *not ignore the spirit of* considering the situation as a whole, thinking in terms of the majority, and working together with their allies. They should grasp the necessity[56] of subordinating the needs of the part to the needs of the whole. If a proposal appears feasible for a partial situation but not for the situation as a whole, then the part must give way to the whole. Conversely, if the proposal is not feasible for the part but is feasible in the light of the situation as a whole, again the part must give way to the whole. This is what is meant by considering the situation as a whole. Communists must never detach themselves from the majority of the masses or neglect them by leading only a few progressive contingents in an isolated and rash advance. *This cannot succeed.* Instead, they must *at all times* forge close links between the progressive elements and the broad masses. This is what is meant by thinking in terms of the majority. Wherever there are allies,[57] in handling matters, they should cooperate with the allies.[58] It is wrong to indulge in arbitrary decisions and peremptory actions and to ignore our allies. *All these are things that cannot be ignored in the art of leadership and the spirit of work of the Communist Party member.* A good Communist should[59] be good at considering the situation as a whole, good at thinking in terms of the majority, and good at working with his allies. He who violates these points is not a good Party member.[60]

8. Cadre Policy

The Chinese Communist Party is a party leading a great revolutionary struggle in a nation several hundred million strong, and it cannot fulfill its historic task without a large number of leading cadres who combine ability with political integrity. In the last seventeen years our Party has trained a good many talented leaders, so that we have core cadres in military, political, cultural, Party, and mass work; all honor is due to the Party and to the nation for this achievement. But, *at the same time,* the present core is not yet strong enough to support the vast edifice of our struggle, and it is still necessary to train people of ability on a large scale. Many talented people and leaders[61] have come forward, and are continuing to come forward, in the great *national revolutionary* struggle. We have the responsibility for organizing and training them, for taking good care of them, and for making proper use of them. "Once the political line has been laid down, cadres are the decisive factor."[62] *We should not forget this truth. Here, it is imperative to rely on the original cadre basis, but not to be complacent about it.* Therefore, it should be our fighting task to train large numbers of new cadres in a *persistent and* planned way.

Our concern should extend to non-Party cadres as well as to Party cadres. There are many capable people outside the Party whom we must not ignore. The duty of every Communist is to rid himself of aloofness and arrogance and to work well with non-Party cadres, sincerely unite with them,[63] *while offering them well-intentioned assistance*, have a warm, comradely attitude toward them, and enlist their initiative *and talents* in the great cause of resisting Japan and reconstructing the nation. *It is wrong to be conceited and to look down upon other people.*

We must be good at judging cadres. *In judging the strengths and weaknesses and the good and bad qualities of a cadre, we must not just observe his performance but also his essence.* We must not confine our judgment to a short period or a single incident in a cadre's life, but should consider his life and work as a whole. This is the correct[64] method of judging cadres. *Here, carelessness or willfulness cannot resolve the problem.*

We must be good at using cadres. In the final analysis, the leaders' responsibilities *and work* consist of two things: to supply ideas, and to use cadres well. Such things as drawing up plans, making decisions, giving orders and directives, *drafting*

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[53] You cannot eliminate class struggle; there is no way to eliminate it → The existence of the struggle of one class against another is a fact; there are some people who deny this fact, deny the existence of class struggle, but this is erroneous

[54] Is a distorted theory → Is utterly wrong

[55] Here the *Selected Works* text adds the following sentence: It is bad for the War of Resistance to pay attention only to one side and neglect the other.

[56] Necessity → Principle

[57] Allies → Democratic parties or individuals willing to cooperate with us

[58] In handling matters, they should cooperate with the allies → The proper attitude for Communists is to talk things over with them and work together with them

[59] Should → Must

[60] He who violates these points is not a good Party member → We have had serious shortcomings in this respect, and we must still make an effort to do better

[61] Talented people and leaders → Activists

[62] The formula is Stalin's.

[63] Sincerely unite with them → Give them sincere help

[64] Correct → Principal

announcements, writing books, and making speeches are all in the category of "supplying ideas." To put the ideas into practice, we must unite the cadres and push them to go into action; this comes into the category of "using the cadres." *These two things are known in Chinese custom as "employing people in the administration."* Throughout our national history there have been two sharply contrasting lines on the subject of the use of cadres, *reflecting the opposition between the depraved and the upright,* one being to "appoint people on their merit," and the other to "appoint people by favoritism." The former was the policy of sagacious emperors and worthy ministers in making appointments; the latter was that of despots and traitors.[65] *Today, when we talk about the question of making use of cadres, it is from a revolutionary standpoint, fundamentally different from that of ancient times, and yet there is no getting away from this standard of "appointing people on their merit." It was utterly wrong in the past, and is still utterly wrong today, to be guided by personal likes and dislikes, to reward fawning flatterers and to punish the honest and forthright.* The criterion Lenin and Stalin[66] apply in cadres policy is whether or not a cadre is resolute in carrying out the Party line, submits to Party discipline, has close ties with the masses, has the ability to work independently, and is active, hardworking, not concerned with personal gain, *and so on.* This, and nothing else.[67] *Here,* the cadres policy of Zhang Guotao was the exact opposite. In Zhang Guotao's domain, he adopted precisely the policy of rewarding those who curried favor with him and penalizing those who were upright.[68] He gathered a personal clique around himself *and harbored ulterior motives. His petty factional activities had a long and deep history. But it is this cadres policy of his which treats the individual instead of the political principles of the party as the center which turned to its opposite in achieving its goals. All the cadres left him. In the end Zhang Guotao was the only one who remained.* He betrayed the Party[69] and decamped.[70] This is an important lesson for us. *The political and economic backwardness of a semicolonial, semifeudal society, as reflected within the Party, are the sources of the evil tendencies of liberalism, self-aggrandizement, and factional activity. Taking into consideration the existence of such sources, upholding the organizational line and cadres policy of Lenin and Stalin,* opposing the dishonest and unfair *evil* tendencies, and consolidat-

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[65] The former was the policy of sagacious emperors and worthy ministers in making appointments; the latter was that of despots and traitors → The former is the honest and the latter the dishonest way

[66] Lenin and Stalin → The Communist Party

[67] This, and nothing else → This is what "appointing people on their merit" means

[68] In Zhang Guotao's domain, he adopted precisely the policy of rewarding those who curried favor with him and penalizing those who were upright → He carried out the line of "appointing people by favoritism"

[69] He betrayed the Party → He formed a small clique and, in the end, betrayed the Party

[70] Regarding Zhang Guotao, see Volume V, *passim,* and section IV of the Introduction to this volume. As indicated there, he fled to Hankou in April 1938 and placed himself under the protection of the Guomindang.

ing the unity of the Party on the basis of the *correct line*—these are the responsibilities of the Central Committee as well as comrades of the whole Party.[71]

We must know how to take good care of cadres. *The cadres who have emerged through the fostering of the Party and hard struggle are the treasure of the nation and the pride of the whole Party and should be respected and taken care of by comrades of the whole Party. The various levels of leading organs on the other hand have the responsibility to realize the goal of taking care of them by concrete methods. What are such methods?*[72]

First, give them guidance. This means allowing them a free hand in their work so that they have the courage to assume responsibility *and are not afraid of making mistakes, but,* at the same time, giving them timely *and appropriate* instructions *concerning the work environment, orientation, and methods* so that, guided by the Party's political line, they are able to make full use of their initiative.

Second, raise their level. This means giving them the opportunity to study *theory and methods, and* educating them so that they can enhance their ideological[73] understanding and their leadership[74] ability *compared with the past.*

Third, check up on their work, *not doing it every day, but doing it at the right moment,* and help them sum up their experience, correct their mistakes, *and expand on their achievements. This is necessary.* To assign work without checking up and to take notice only when serious mistakes are made—that is not the way to take good care of cadres.

Fourth, *transform them. This means* with regard to those cadres who *have shortcomings,* have made mistakes, *or have incorrect ideas,* use primarily the method of persuasion, and the method of struggle when there is no alternative, so as to help them change their ways.[75] Here patience is essential. *In cases of mistakes which do not involve major principles, but must be pointed out or they will not be overcome,* it is wrong to adopt the methods of inappropriately and lightly applying to people labels such as "opportunists," *"petty-bourgeois consciousness," and so on,* or to begin "waging struggles" against them.

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[71] Opposing the dishonest and unfair *evil* tendencies, and consolidating the unity of the Party on the basis of the *correct line*—these are the responsibilities of the Central Committee as well as comrades of the whole Party. → Taking warning from this and from similar historical lessons, the Central Committee and the leaders at all levels must make it their major responsibility to adhere to the honest and fair way in cadres policy and reject the dishonest and unfair way, and so consolidate the unity of the Party.

[72] What are such methods? → There are several ways of doing so.

[73] Ideological → Theoretical

[74] Leadership → Working

[75] Use primarily the method of persuasion, and the method of struggle when there is no alternative, so as to help them change their ways. → In general, use the method of persuasion with cadres who have made mistakes, and help them correct their mistakes. The method of struggle should be confined to those who make serious mistakes and nevertheless refuse to accept guidance.

Fifth, help them with their difficulties. When cadres are in difficulty as a result of problems such as illness, straitened circumstances, or domestic or other troubles,[76] *the leading organs of the Party should show warm and kind comradely concern toward them. It is wrong to adopt an apathetic and cold attitude. In cases of illness, they must be given treatment and nursed back to health. As for their circumstances, try to make them compatible with the requirements of work. Even in the case of domestic troubles, to the extent possible efforts should be made to help them seek a resolution. To give priority to the cadres in all these areas to the extent permitted by material resources and the environment has great significance for realizing the goal of enhancing the work spirit of the cadres and achieving the unity of the whole Party.*

9. Party Discipline

The Party's experience of struggle during the past seventeen years, particularly since the Fifth Plenum, demonstrates the necessity of continuing to uphold iron discipline within the Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. Discipline is the guarantee that the line will be carried out. Without discipline, the Party will be unable to lead the masses and the army in victorious struggle. In the past, as a result of overcoming tendencies disruptive of discipline such as that of Zhang Guotao, the smooth pursuit of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the War of Resistance were assured. In the future, this order must also be firmly upheld. Only thus will it be possible to unite the whole Party, overcome new difficulties, and obtain new victories. Here, it is intolerable to ignore several fundamental principles:[77]

1. the individual is subordinate to the organization;
2. the minority is subordinate to the majority;
3. the lower level is subordinate to the higher level;
4. the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee.

These principles constitute the concrete application of the Party's system of democratic centralism. Whoever violates them violates *the Party's democratic centralism and does great damage to* Party unity *and the Party's revolutionary struggle. Because of this, the various leading organs at the different levels of the Party should provide the necessary education on discipline to the whole Party and particularly to new Party members in accordance with the above basic principles. Past* experience proves that some people violate Party discipline through not knowing what it is. Some others, like Zhang Guotao *and his ilk*, violate it knowingly, and take advantage of some[78] Party members' ignorance to achieve their treacherous purposes. Hence it is necessary to educate members in Party discipline so that the rank-and-file Party members will not only get into the habit of observing discipline themselves but also exercise supervision over the leaders so that they, too, observe it.[79] *Party discipline is compulsory in nature. But at the same time, it must be formulated on the basis of the political awareness of Party members and cadres. It is by no means one-sided commandism.* For this reason, leading organs, from the Central Committee level to the local level, should draft certain Party rules which will be treated as part of the Party's law and discipline.[80] *Once they are formulated, they must be strictly applied,* so as to unify the actions of the leading bodies at all levels *and to become examples for the whole Party.*

10. Party Democracy

Finding itself confronted as it is by the present great struggle, the Chinese Communist Party demands that all its leading bodies and all its members and cadres should give the fullest expression to their initiative, which alone can lead the struggle to victory. What we call giving expression to their initiative *cannot be just an empty phrase,* but must be demonstrated concretely in the creative capacity of the leading bodies, the cadres, and the Party rank and file, in their readiness to assume responsibility, in the exuberant vigor they show in their work, in their courage and ability to raise questions, voice opinions, and criticize defects, and in the comradely supervision that is maintained over the leading bodies and the leading cadres *and so on and so forth.* Otherwise, the so-called initiative will be an empty thing. But the exercise of such initiative depends on the democratization of the inner-Party life *and system. If such democratic life is absent or deficient,* it is impossible to reach the goal of bringing initiative into play. Only in an atmosphere of democracy can large numbers of able people be brought forward.

Because our country down to the present still does not have democratic life, and this is reflected within the Party, there has arisen the phenomenon of inadequate democratic life.[81] This phenomenon *truly* hinders the entire Party from exercising its initiative to the full. Similarly, it has led to insufficient democratization[82] in the united front and in the mass movements. For these reasons, education in democracy must be carried on within the Party so that members can understand what is meant by democratic life, what is meant by the relationship between democracy and centralism, and the way in which democratic centralism should be put into practice. Only in this way can we really extend democracy within the Party, and at the same time avoid ultrademocracy and laissez-faire.[83]

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[76] Here the *Selected Works* text adds the following two sentences: We must be sure to give them as much care as possible. This is how to take good care of cadres.

[77] In the *Selected Works* version of this text, the preceding paragraph set in italics is replaced by a single sentence: In view of Zhang Guotao's serious violations of discipline, we must affirm anew the discipline of the Party.

[78] Some → Many

[79] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: thus preventing the recurrence of cases like Zhang Guotao's.

[80] For this reason, leading organs, from the Central Committee level to the local level, should draft certain Party rules which will be treated as part of the Party's law and discipline. → If we are to ensure the development of inner-Party relations along the right lines, besides the four most important articles of discipline mentioned above, we must work out a set of fairly detailed inner-Party rules.

[81] Because our country down to the present still does not have democratic life, and this is reflected within the Party, there has arisen the phenomenon of inadequate democratic life. → Ours is a country in which small-scale production and the patriarchal system prevail, and taking the country as a whole, there is as yet no democratic life; consequently, this state of affairs is reflected in our Party by insufficient democracy in Party life.

It is also essential to extend democracy in our Party organizations in the army to the degree necessary to stimulate the initiative of the Party members and increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. *At the same time*, however, there should be somewhat less democracy in the Party organizations in the army than in the local Party organizations; it is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them.[84] *The local Party, too, should also benefit from the consolidation of Party discipline and the enhancement of the Party's combat effectiveness, and not the reverse.*

The extension of inner-Party democracy should be seen as an essential step in the consolidation and development of the Party, and as a *useful and* important weapon enabling it to be lively and dynamic in the great struggle, to be more than equal to its tasks, to develop new strength, and to surmount the difficulties of the war.

11. Our Party Has Consolidated Itself and Grown in Strength Through the Struggle on Two Fronts

Broadly speaking, in the last seventeen years our Party has learned to use *this* Marxist weapon[85]—*the method of struggle on two fronts in ideology, in politics, and in work,* opposing Right opportunism, on the one hand, and opposing Left opportunism, on the other.

Before the Fifth Plenum,[86] our Party fought Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism and Li Lisan's Left opportunism.[87] It made great progress thanks to the victories in these two inner-Party struggles. After the Fifth Plenum, there were two further historic inner-Party struggles, namely, at the Zunyi Conference and in connection with the expulsion of Zhang Guotao.[88]

Because the Zunyi Conference corrected serious errors of a Left-opportunist character—errors of principle committed in the fight against the enemy's Fifth Encirclement and Suppression campaign—and united the Party and the Red Army, it enabled the Central Committee and the main forces of the Red Army to bring the Long March to a triumphant conclusion, to advance to a forward position in the resistance to Japan, and to carry out the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. By combating Zhang Guotao's Right opportunism, the Baxi and Yan'an Meetings[89] (the fight against the Zhang Guotao line began at the Baxi Meeting and ended at the Yan'an Meeting) succeeded in bringing all the Red forces together and in strengthening the unity of the whole Party for the heroic struggle against Japan. Both kinds of opportunist mistakes arose during the civil war,[90] and their characteristic was that they were errors committed during the war.

What are the lessons which have been derived from these two inner-Party struggles? They are:

1. The tendency to Left impetuosity, which disregards both the subjective and the objective factors, is extremely harmful to a revolutionary war and, for that matter, to any revolutionary movement—it was among the serious errors of principle which were manifested in the struggle against the enemy's Fifth Encirclement and Suppression campaign, and which arose from ignorance of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war. *It should be pointed out that the errors made then were not errors in the general line, but errors of principle of a serious nature, involving the carrying out of the general line in the tactics and pattern of the war.*

2. The opportunism of Zhang Guotao, however, was Right opportunism in the revolutionary war and was a combination of a retreatist line, warlordism, and anti-Party activity. It was only with the overcoming of this brand of opportunism that the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army and *especially* its large numbers of cadres and Party members, men of intrinsically fine quality and with a long record of heroic struggle, were able to free themselves from its toils and return to the correct line of the Central Committee.

3. Striking results were achieved in the great organizational work of the period of the Central Soviet Area[91]—in army building, government work, mass work, and Party building. Had it not been for the support rendered by such organizational work to the heroic fighting at the front, we could not have kept up the bitter

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[82] Democratization → Democratic life

[83] Laissez-faire → Laissez-faire, which destroys discipline

[84] It is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them. → Both in the army and in the local organizations, inner-Party democracy is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them.

[85] Marxist weapon → Marxist-Leninist weapon of ideological struggle

[86] Fifth Plenum → Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee

[87] Li Lisan's Left opportunism → Comrade Li Lisan's "Left" opportunism. Regarding the rivalry and conflict between Mao and Li in 1930, see the Introduction to Volume III, *passim.*

[88] Regarding the Zunyi Conference, see the Introduction to Volume V, pp. xxxvii–xxxix.

[89] Regarding Mao's negotiations with Zhang Guotao during a halt in Baxi in early September 1936, at a difficult moment in the Long March, see the Introduction to Volume V, pp. xlv–xlvii. (Zhang and his armies remained farther south, and there was no face-to-face contact on this occasion.) After Zhang came to Yan'an and met with Mao in 1937, he became vice-chairman of the Border Region government but had no real power. As noted above, he sought refuge with the Guomindang in the spring of 1938.

[90] During the civil war → During the revolutionary civil war

[91] Organizational work of the period of the Central Soviet Area → Organizational work of the ten years of the Agrarian Revolutionary War

struggle.[92] At that time,[93] however, serious errors of principle were made in the Party's cadre policy and organizational principles, errors which showed themselves in the tendency toward sectarianism, in punishmentism, and in excesses in the policy of ideological struggle. They resulted both from our failure to eliminate the vestiges of the former *Li* Lisan line and from the political mistakes in matters of principle committed at the time. These errors, too, were corrected at the Zunyi Meeting, and the Party was thus able to make the turn to a *wholly* correct cadre policy and organizational principles. As for Zhang Guotao's organizational line, it violated all Party principles, disrupted Party discipline, and carried factional activity to the point of opposition to the Party, the Central Committee, and the Communist International. The Central Committee did everything possible to overcome Zhang Guotao's evil line and to frustrate his anti-Party activity, and also tried to save Zhang Guotao himself. But as he stubbornly refused to change,[94] resorted to double-dealing, and subsequently even betrayed the Party,[95] firm measures had to be taken to expel him. This expulsion[96] won the support not only of all Party members but of all people loyal to the cause of national liberation. The Communist International has already endorsed[97] the decision and denounced Zhang Guotao as a deserter and renegade.

These lessons and achievements have furnished us with the prerequisites for uniting the whole Party now and in the future, for strengthening its ideological, political, and organizational unity, and for successfully waging the War of Resistance and *constructing the Anti-Japanese National United Front.* Our Party has consolidated itself and grown strong through the struggle on two fronts.

12. The Present Struggle on Two Fronts

From now on, it is of paramount importance to wage a political struggle against Rightist pessimism in the *new* circumstances of the War of Resistance, although it is still necessary to keep an eye on "Left" impetuosity. On questions of the united front and of Party and mass organization, we must continue the fight against the "Left" tendency toward closed-doorism if we are to achieve long-term cooperation,[98] expand the Party, and broaden the movement of the popular masses. At the same time, we must also pay attention to[99] the Right opportunist tendency toward

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[92] Bitter struggle → Bitter struggle against Chiang Kaishek

[93] At that time → In the latter part of that period

[94] To change → To correct his mistakes

[95] Even betrayed the Party → Even betrayed the Party and threw himself into the arms of the Guomindang

[96] Expulsion → Disciplinary action

[97] Already endorsed → Also endorsed

[98] If we are to achieve long-term cooperation → If we are to achieve cooperation with the various other anti-Japanese parties and groups

[99] Pay attention to → Take care to combat

unconditional cooperation and expansion, or otherwise they will hinder cooperation and development, or turn them into capitulationist cooperation and unprincipled expansion.

Struggle on two fronts[100] must suit the concrete circumstances of *the reality of* each case, and we must never approach a problem abstractly.[101] *There is a difference between pointing things out in a general way and concrete application.* The bad old habit of "putting hats" on people, that is, the abstract application of this method, is no good.[102]

In the struggle against deviations, we must give serious attention to opposing two-faced behavior. As Zhang Guotao's career shows, the greatest danger of such behavior is that it may develop into factional activity. To comply in public but oppose in private, to say yes and mean no, to say nice things to a person's face but play tricks behind his back—these are the essence of[103] double-dealing. Sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior is an important requirement for strengthening Party discipline.[104]

13. Study

Generally speaking, all Communist Party members who have a certain capacity for study should study the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, study the history of our nation, and study the circumstances and trends of current movements; moreover, they should serve to educate members with a lower cultural level. The cadres in particular should study these subjects carefully, while the Central Committee and senior cadres should give them even more attention. It is not possible to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless there is revolutionary theory, a knowledge of history, and an understanding of the practical movement.[105]

The theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are universally applicable. We should not regard their theories as dogma but as a guide to action. We do not study struggle.[92] At that time,[93] however, serious errors of principle were made in the Party's cadre policy and organizational principles, errors which showed themselves in the tendency toward sectarianism, in punishmentism, and in excesses in the policy of ideological struggle. They resulted both from our failure to eliminate the vestiges of the former *Li* Lisan line and from the political mistakes in matters of principle committed at the time. These errors, too, were corrected at the Zunyi Meeting, and the Party was thus able to make the turn to a *wholly* correct cadre policy and organizational principles. As for Zhang Guotao's organizational line, it violated all Party principles, disrupted Party discipline, and carried factional activity to the point of opposition to the Party, the Central Committee, and the Communist International. The Central Committee did everything possible to overcome Zhang Guotao's evil line and to frustrate his anti-Party activity, and also tried to save Zhang Guotao himself. But as he stubbornly refused to change,[94] resorted to double-dealing, and subsequently even betrayed the Party,[95] firm measures had to be taken to expel him. This expulsion[96] won the support not only of all Party members but of all people loyal to the cause of national liberation. The Communist International has already endorsed[97] the decision and denounced Zhang Guotao as a deserter and renegade.

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[100] Struggle on two fronts → Ideological struggle on two fronts

[101] Abstractly → Subjectively

[102] The bad old habit of "putting hats" on people, that is, the abstract application of this method, is no good. → We must absolutely not approach a problem subjectively or permit the bad old habit of "putting hats" on people to continue.

[103] The essence of → All forms of

[104] Sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior is an important requirement for strengthening Party discipline. → Only by sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior can we strengthen Party discipline.

[105] It is not possible to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless there is revolutionary theory, a knowledge of history, and an understanding of the practical movement. → No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory and a knowledge of history, and has a profound grasp of the practical movement.

These lessons and achievements have furnished us with the prerequisites for uniting the whole Party now and in the future, for strengthening its ideological, political, and organizational unity, and for successfully waging the War of Resistance and *constructing the Anti-Japanese National United Front.* Our Party has consolidated itself and grown strong through the struggle on two fronts.

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[98] If we are to achieve long-term cooperation → If we are to achieve cooperation with the various other anti-Japanese parties and groups

[99] Pay attention to → Take care to combat

unconditional cooperation and expansion, or otherwise they will hinder cooperation and development, or turn them into capitulationist cooperation and unprincipled expansion.

Struggle on two fronts[100] must suit the concrete circumstances of *the reality of* each case, and we must never approach a problem abstractly.[101] *There is a difference between pointing things out in a general way and concrete application.* The bad old habit of "putting hats" on people, that is, the abstract application of this method, is no good.[102]

In the struggle against deviations, we must give serious attention to opposing two-faced behavior. As Zhang Guotao's career shows, the greatest danger of such behavior is that it may develop into factional activity. To comply in public but oppose in private, to say yes and mean no, to say nice things to a person's face but play tricks behind his back—these are the essence of[103] double-dealing. Sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior is an important requirement for strengthening Party discipline.[104]

13. Study

Generally speaking, all Communist Party members who have a certain capacity for study should study the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, study the history of our nation, and study the circumstances and trends of current movements; moreover, they should serve to educate members with a lower cultural level. The cadres in particular should study these subjects carefully, while the Central Committee and senior cadres should give them even more attention. It is not possible to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless there is revolutionary theory, a knowledge of history, and an understanding of the practical movement.[105]

The theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are universally applicable. We should not regard their theories as dogma but as a guide to action. We do not study the letter of Marxism-Leninism but, rather, the standpoints and methods by which Marx and Lenin observed and resolved problems.[106] *Only this guide to action, these standpoints and methods, constitute revolutionary science and the only correct policy which leads us to recognize the objects of the revolution and guide revolutionary movements.* The Chinese Party's[107] mastery of Marxism[108] is now much better[109] than it used to be, but can still not be called extensive or deep. *In this regard, we appear inadequate compared to some fraternal parties abroad. Yet* ours is the task of leading a great nation of 450 million in an unprecedented and historic struggle. For us, therefore, the task of spreading and deepening the study of theory[110] presents a big problem demanding an early solution, which can be resolved only through concentrated effort. Let us exert ourselves. Following[111] this Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, there will be an all-Party emulation in study which will show who has really learned something, and who has learned more and learned better. *Our work has not been done too badly. But if we do not deepen our study of theory, we will not be able to do an even better job, and only if we do an even better job will we be victorious. Therefore the study of theory is the condition for victory.* As regards those who shoulder the main responsibilities of leadership, if in China there are one or two hundred comrades with a grasp of Marxism which is systematic and not fragmentary, genuine and not hollow, that will be tantamount to defeating Japanese imperialism.[112] Comrades, we must definitely study Marxism.

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[100] Struggle on two fronts → Ideological struggle on two fronts

[101] Abstractly → Subjectively

[102] The bad old habit of "putting hats" on people, that is, the abstract application of this method, is no good. → We must absolutely not approach a problem subjectively or permit the bad old habit of "putting hats" on people to continue.

[103] The essence of → All forms of

[104] Sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior is an important requirement for strengthening Party discipline. → Only by sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members against such behavior can we strengthen Party discipline.

[105] It is not possible to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless there is revolutionary theory, a knowledge of history, and an understanding of the practical movement. → No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory and a knowledge of history, and has a profound grasp of the practical movement.

Another of our tasks is to study our historical heritage and use the Marxist method to sum it up critically. The history of this *great* nation of ours goes back several thousand years. *It has its own laws of development,* its own *national* characteristics, and many precious treasures. As regards all this, we are mere schoolboys. Today's China is an outgrowth of historic China. We are Marxist historicists; we must not mutilate history. From Confucius to Sun Yatsen, we must sum it up critically, and we must constitute ourselves the heirs to this precious legacy. *Conversely, the assimilation of this legacy itself becomes a method that* aids considerably in guiding the present great movement. A Communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be put into practice.[113] *There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used.* If a Chinese Communist, who is a part of the great Chinese people, bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty abstraction. Consequently, the *sinification of Marxism*[114]—that is to say, making certain that in all its manifestations it is imbued with Chinese characteristics, using it according to Chinese peculiarities—becomes a problem that must be understood and solved by the whole Party without delay. We must put an end to foreign formalism. There must be less repeating of empty and abstract refrains; we must discard our dogmatism and replace it with a new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people. To separate internationalist content from national form is the way of those who understand nothing of internationalism, and we must link the two inseparably. As regards this question, serious shortcomings still persist in our ranks and must be resolutely eliminated.

What are the characteristics of the present movement? What are its laws? How is it to be directed? These are all *the most* practical questions. To this day we do not yet understand everything about Japanese imperialism or about China. The movement is developing, new things have yet to emerge, and they are emerging in an endless stream. To study this movement in its entirety and in its development is a great task to which we should pay constant attention *with our eyes wide open.* Whoever refuses to study these problems seriously and carefully is *nothing but a Spanish Don Quixote plus a Chinese Ah Q,*[115] but no Marxist. *How shall we study? We should use the Marxist tool—dialectical materialism. With whom do we study? We have many teachers—the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the capitalists, the landlords, Japanese imperialism, and the whole world. They are all the objects of our study and, at the same time, our teachers. We should learn something, more or less, from them.*

Complacency is the enemy of study. We cannot really learn anything until we rid ourselves of complacency. Our attitude toward ourselves should be "to learn without satiety," and toward others "to instruct without being wearied."[116]

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[106] We do not study the letter of Marxism-Leninism but, rather, the standpoints and methods by which Marx and Lenin observed and resolved problems. → Studying it is not merely a matter of learning terms and phrases but of learning Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution. It is not just a matter of understanding the general laws derived by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin from their extensive study of real life and revolutionary experience, but of studying their standpoint and method in examining and solving problems.

[107] The Chinese Party's → Our Party's

[108] Marxism → Marxism-Leninism

[109] Much better → Somewhat better

[110] Theory → Marxist-Leninist theory

[111] Let us exert ourselves. Following → I hope that following

[112] That will be tantamount to defeating Japanese imperialism → Our Party's fighting capacity will be much greater and our task of defeating Japanese imperialism will be more quickly accomplished

[113] Marxism must take on a national form before it can be put into practice → We can put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and acquires a definite national form. The great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its integration with the concrete revolutionary practice of all countries. For the Chinese Communist Party, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of China.

[114] The sinification of Marxism → Applying Marxism concretely in China

[115] Ah Q was the central character in the most celebrated of Lu Xun's short stories. In a series of episodes, he is repeatedly worsted but persuades himself that he was the victor because of his moral superiority.

[116] The quotations are from the *Analects* of Confucius, VII, II (Legge, Vol. I, p. 195).

14. From Uniting the Whole Party to Uniting the Whole Nation

Great struggle requires great strength. It is our established policy orientation to unite the whole nation and to mobilize all the dynamic forces of the whole nation to join this struggle. In order to reach this goal, unity within the Chinese Communist Party *plays a major role* and is the most fundamental prerequisite.[117] *After the Zunyi Meeting and the correction of Zhang Guotao's mistakes, our Party has now entered the period of greatest unity since the meeting of its Sixth National Congress. Now, within our Party, there is identity of views, both within the Central Committee and in the whole Party, whether it be regarding the political line, strategic policy, the estimate of the current situation, or the formulation of our tasks. This identity of views on political principles is the basic condition for unity. With regard to the mutual relations between Party members, cadres, and leaders, which are customarily called personnel matters, we have also learned many correct and appropriate methods. We have created an atmosphere of working together with one accord under correct political principles and established better mutual relations. Because of the vastness of the territory, the complexity of the circumstances, and the differences among the departments, it is difficult to avoid having differing views, and there should be differing views. The true practice of inner-Party democracy permits the putting forth and discussion of all sorts of different viewpoints. It is also precisely the democratic method which assures an exchange of views and leads to the summarizing of these views to form a conclusion, thereby bringing about a unified policy orientation of the whole Party. Here, we have also gradually learned the Marxist method of looking at questions in an objective and many-sided way, but not with subjectivity, prejudice, willfulness, or partiality. This also assures the unity of the Party. We are scientific Marxists. The style of conceit and willfulness is a useless thing.* Seventeen years of tempering have enabled the Chinese Communist Party *and its leaders* to acquire a thoroughly seasoned style.[118] *All these things can assure the unity of the Central Committee and of the whole Party.* Thus we are able to form a unified[119] nucleus and *center of gravity* for the whole nation[120] to push the Resistance War to victory.[121] Comrades, let the whole Party unite! Let the whole nation unite! Victory will certainly be ours![122]

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[117] Is the most fundamental prerequisite → Is the most fundamental prerequisite for uniting the whole nation to win the War of Resistance and build a new China

[118] Seventeen years of tempering have enabled the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders to acquire a thoroughly seasoned style. → Seventeen years of tempering have taught the Chinese Communist Party many ways of attaining internal unity, and ours is now a much more seasoned Party.

[119] Unified → Powerful

[120] For the whole nation → For the people of the whole country

[121] To push the Resistance War to victory → In the struggle to win victory in the War of Resistance and to build a new China

[122] Let the whole Party unite! Let the whole nation unite! Victory will certainly be ours! → So long as we are united, we can certainly reach this goal.

VIII. Summoning the Seventh National Congress of the Party

Now I will talk about the last issue, the question of summoning the Seventh National Congress.

Comrades, for reasons determined by the circumstances, it is already ten years since the Sixth National Congress of our Party in 1928. The Politburo meeting last December decided to prepare for the Seventh Congress, but the preparatory work has not yet been completed, and consequently it will be difficult to hold it this year. The present enlarged plenum should discuss the question of speeding up this preparatory work and decide to summon the congress in the not-too-distant future. The political significance of this congress will be great. It will summarize the experience of the past, especially the experience of the War of Resistance throughout the country, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It will discuss the domestic and international political situations. It will discuss how to take another step forward in uniting the entire nation, uniting the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as all the other parties, and further enhancing and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It will discuss the policies, methods, and plans for winning final victory in the War of Resistance, in the context of a protracted war and long-term cooperation. It will discuss how to mobilize the working class and the toiling people throughout the country to take part more actively in the War of Resistance. Furthermore, we should discuss how the Party, in the new circumstances, will further unite and strengthen itself, and consolidate its links with the Guomindang, the other parties, and the people of the whole country, in order to carry out smoothly the general orientation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Apart from these political and organizational problems, the Seventh Congress should elect the new Central Committee, elect numerous leading comrades enjoying the highest prestige in the entire Party to the Central Committee, and strengthen the leadership over the work of the whole Party. Comrades, the significance of this congress is so great that when this Enlarged Sixth Plenum is over and you go back to your places of work, you must, on the basis of efforts at greatly enlarging and strengthening the Party, according to democratic methods, choose the proper time to carry out the elections, so that the best cadres and Party members and those most trusted by the Party members and the masses, will have the opportunity to be elected as delegates to this congress. As a result, the Seventh Congress will be able to gather together the best representatives of the Party in one hall, thereby guaranteeing the success of this congress. We are confident that this national congress will definitely be able to succeed, and to inflict on the war of aggression of Japanese imperialism the most solemn and serious, most forceful answer. Let Japanese imperialism tremble before our national congress, let it tumble into the Eastern Sea. The Chinese nation will definitely be victorious.

That is all for my report.

Undertake Long-Term, Arduous Struggle to Create the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Base Area

(October 15, 1938)

To the comrades in the Hebei-Rehe Region, as well as Comrades Song and Deng:[1]

1. You should persevere in the hard struggle in the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Border Region, create a base area, train backbone troops, be prepared for a protracted [struggle], overcome all the difficulties you meet with in the course of development with the greatest determination, and fight to the end for the accomplishment of the above tasks.

2. Consolidate the troops, use all effective methods to raise the confidence of victory of the troops in a protracted War of Resistance, raise their conscious political discipline, and raise the political activism of the commanders. Establish the work of the national salvation office and strengthen its leadership, accept the participation of all the soldiers in the company so that they will be able to assist in work such as the management of education, enforcing discipline, and eliminating the bad elements.

3. Develop the Party on a big scale, recruit progressive elements into the Party, and set up Party branches and Party activity in the company, so that it becomes the core leading the struggle in the company. Any neglect of the development and work of the Party is most harmful to the current task of stabilizing and raising the fighting capacity of the forces.

4. Under the present circumstances of a lack of cadres, you may transfer more than one-third of the new troops to the area of eastern and western Zaitang[2] and Wei *xian,* and assign them to the units of Yang Chengwu and Wang Zhen,[3] who will be responsible for consolidating and reorganizing them. Nie [Rongzhen] should designate Yang and Wang's troops to take responsibility for screening during the transfer, and Song and Deng should send out troops to cover and escort them.

5. Song and Deng's units, as well as the local forces left in eastern Hebei, should be commanded and led by Song and Deng. On the basis of the aforementioned tasks and principles of consolidation, you should sustain the long-term hard struggle in the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Border Region and create base areas. We may send a few battalion and regimental commanders and ten company commanders to work with you there.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De]
Peng [Dehuai] Wang [Jiaxiang]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 414–15, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Song and Deng are Song Shilun and Deng Hua, who were at this time the commander and political commissar of the Fourth Column of the Eighth Route Army.

[2] These districts have now been incorporated into the city of Beijing.

[3] Yang Chengwu and Wang Zhen were at this time commander and political commissar respectively of the First Branch Army of the Eighth Route Army in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Base Area, and of the Thirty-fifth Brigade of the 120th Army of the Eighth Route Army.

To Liu Yi[1]

(October 30, 1938)

Comrade Liu Yi:

I am replying only today to your letter of August, and I don't know whether it will still be of any help in dealing with your problem. Are you still in the Third Brigade? Because I have been busy, I have put off replying until today. I am sorry!

You were sincere in your intentions. If it is true that, as the Party comrades in the Northern Shaanxi Public School and the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University have said, your behavior satisfies the qualifications for Party membership, and it is merely that you have no one to serve as your witness for your joining and then leaving the Guomindang, while, on the other hand, you have been here in Yan'an for as long as nine months and have no other problems that can possibly prevent you from joining the Party, then in my opinion you should be allowed to join the Party. The way to resolve this problem is for you to take this letter to the responsible comrades of the Third Brigade and discuss the matter with them. Show them your original letter too, and ask that they give final consideration to your problem. If the problem still cannot be solved, you may take this letter to Director Zhang of the Political Department.[2] There are reasons for the defects you pointed out, and you can send your letter to the Political Department for their reference. Finally, I must inform you that only Party members and those whose level of study and cultivation are relatively high can be admitted to the Academy of Marxism-Leninism. Here I conclude my reply, with

Salutations

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 130–31, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Liu Yi (1913–), a native of Zhejiang, was at this time a clerical worker in political instruction in the First Detachment of the Sixth Brigade of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University.

[2] The reference is to Zhang Jichun (1900–1968), a native of Hunan, who at this time was head of the Political Department at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University.

The Question of Independence and Autonomy Within the United Front[1]

(November 5, 1938)

Help and Concessions Should Be Positive, Not Negative

For the sake of long-term cooperation, it is necessary for all political parties and groups in the united front to help each other and make mutual concessions, but such help and concessions should be positive, not negative. We must consolidate and expand our own Party and army and, at the same time, should assist friendly parties and armies to consolidate and expand; the people want the government to satisfy their political and economic demands, and, at the same time, give the government every possible help to prosecute the War of Resistance; the factory workers demand better conditions from the owners, and, at the same time, work hard in the interests of resistance to Japan; for the sake of unity against foreign aggression, the landlords should reduce rent and interest, and, at the same time, the peasants should pay rent and interest. All these are principles and policies of mutual assistance; they are positive, not negative or one-sided. The same holds true for mutual concessions. Each side refrains from undermining the other and from organizing secret [party] branches within the other's party, government, and army. For our part, we organize no secret [party] branches inside the Guomindang and its government or army, thereby setting the Guomindang's mind at rest, to the advantage of the resistance to Japan. The saying "Refrain from doing some things in order to be able to do other things" exactly meets the case.[2] A national war of resistance against Japan would have been impossible without the reorganization of the Red Army, the change in the administrative system in the Red areas, and the abandonment of the policy of armed insurrection. By giving way on the latter we have achieved the former; negative measures have yielded positive results. "To

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Our source for this document is the 1991 revised edition of *Mao Zedong xuanji,* Vol. 2, pp. 537–40. No contemporary text is available.

[1] This is an extract from Mao Zedong's concluding remarks at the Sixth Plenum.

[2] This is a slightly modified citation of a line from *Mencius,* IV, II, III, 8 (Legge, Vol. 2, p. 321). Legge renders the original: "Mencius said, 'Men must be decided on what they will not do, and then they are able to act with vigour *in what they ought to do.*'"

fall back the better to leap forward"—that is Leninism.[3] To regard concessions as something purely negative is contrary to Marxism-Leninism. Indeed there have been instances of purely negative concessions—the Second International's doctrine of collaboration between labor and capital resulted in the betrayal of a whole class and a whole revolution. In China, Chen Duxiu and then Zhang Guotao were both capitulators; we must strenuously oppose capitulationism. When we make concessions, fall back, turn to the defensive, or halt our advance in our relations with either allies or enemies, we should always see these actions as part of our whole revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line, as one turn in a zigzag course. In a word, they are positive.

The Identity Between the National and the Class Struggle

To sustain a long war by long-term cooperation or, in other words, to subordinate the class struggle to the present national struggle against Japan—such is the fundamental principle of the united front. Subject to this principle, the independent character of the parties and classes and their independence and initiative within the united front should be preserved, and their essential rights should not be sacrificed to cooperation and unity but, on the contrary, must be firmly upheld within certain limits. Only thus can cooperation be facilitated, indeed only thus can there be any cooperation at all. Otherwise cooperation will turn into amalgamation, and the united front will inevitably be sacrificed. In a national struggle, the class struggle takes the form of national struggle, thus demonstrating the unanimity between the two. On the one hand, for a given historical period the political and economic demands of the various classes must not be such as to disrupt cooperation; on the other hand, the demands of the national struggle (the need to resist Japan) should be the point of departure for all class struggle. Thus in the united front unity and independence, the national struggle and the class struggle, become as one.

"Everything Through the United Front" Is Wrong

The Guomindang is the party in power and so far has not allowed the united front to assume an organizational form. Comrade Liu Shaoqi has rightly said that if "everything through" were simply to mean through Chiang Kaishek and Yan Xishan, it would mean unilateral submission, and not "through the united front" at all. Behind the enemy lines, the idea of "everything through" is impossible, for there

we have to act independently and with the initiative in our own hands while keeping to the agreements that the Guomindang has approved (for instance, the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction). Or we may act first and report afterward, anticipating what the Guomindang might agree to. For instance, the appointment of administrative commissioners and the dispatch of troops to Shandong Province would never have occurred if we had tried to get these things done "through [the united front]." It is said that the French Communist Party once put forward such a slogan, but that was probably because in France, where a joint committee of the parties already existed and the Socialist Party was unwilling to act in accordance with the jointly agreed program and wanted to have its own way, the Communist Party had to put forward such a slogan in order to restrain the Socialist Party, and certainly it did not do so to shackle itself. In the case of China, the Guomindang has deprived all other political parties of equal rights and is trying to compel them to take orders from itself alone. If we raise this slogan as a demand that "everything" done by the Guomindang must go "through" us, it would not work, and would be ridiculous. If we have to secure the Guomindang's consent beforehand for "everything" we do, what if it does not consent? Since the policy of the Guomindang is to restrict our growth, there is no reason whatever that we should propose such a slogan, which simply binds us hand and foot. At present there are things for which we should secure prior consent from the Guomindang, such as the expansion of our three divisions into three army corps—this is to report first and act afterward. There are other things that the Guomindang can be told after they have become accomplished facts, such as the expansion of our forces to over 200,000 men—this is to act first and report afterward. There are also things, such as the convening of the Border Region assembly, which we shall do and not report for the time being, knowing that the Guomindang will not agree at present. There are still other things which, for the time being, we shall neither do nor report, for they are likely to jeopardize the whole situation. In short, we certainly must not split the united front, but neither should we allow ourselves to be bound hand and foot, and hence the slogan "everything through the united front" should not be put forward. If "everything must be subordinate to" is interpreted as "everything must be submitted to" Chiang Kaishek and Yan Xishan, then that slogan, too, is wrong. Our policy is one of independence and initiative within the united front, a policy both of unity and of independence.

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[3] This is a quotation from Lenin's "Conspectus of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*." See Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), pp. 279–80. In fact, Lenin is here discussing not politics, but the process of cognition. This is reflected in the fact that immediately after the words just quoted, he cites the more familiar French version of this maxim, *"Reculer pour mieux sauter,"* adding in parentheses after *"sauter," "savoir."*

Problems of War and Strategy[1]

(November 6, 1938)

I. China's Characteristics and Revolutionary War

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and all other countries.

But while the principle remains the same, its application by the party of the proletariat finds expression in varying ways according to the varying conditions. Internally, capitalist countries practice bourgeois democracy, not feudalism, when they are not fascist or not at war; in their external relations, they are not oppressed by, but themselves oppress, other nations. Because of these characteristics, it is the task of the party of the proletariat in the capitalist countries to educate the workers and build up strength through a long period of legal struggle, and thus prepare for the final overthrow of capitalism. In these countries, the question is one of a long legal struggle, of utilizing parliament as a platform, of economic and political strikes, of organizing trade unions and educating the workers. There the form of organization is legal and the form of struggle bloodless (nonmilitary). On the issue of war, the Communist Parties in capitalist countries oppose the imperialist wars waged by their own countries; if such wars occur, the policy of these parties is to bring about the defeat of the reactionary governments of their own countries. The one war they want to fight is the civil war for which they are preparing. But such insurrection and war should not be launched until the bourgeoisie becomes really helpless, until the majority of the proletariat is determined to rise in arms and fight, and until the rural masses are giving willing help to the proletariat. And when the time comes to launch such an insurrection and war, the first step will be to seize the cities, and then advance into the countryside, and not the other way around. All this has been done by Communist Parties in capitalist countries, and it has been proved correct by the October Revolution in Russia.

China, however, is different. The characteristics of China are: that it is not an independent and democratic country, but a semicolonial and semifeudal country; that internally it has no democratic system, but is under feudal oppression; and that in its external relations it has no national independence, but is oppressed by imperialism. It follows that we have no parliament to make use of and no legal right to organize the workers to strike. Here, the basic task of the Communist Party is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but the reverse.

When imperialism is not making armed attacks [on our country], the Chinese Communist Party either wages civil war jointly with the bourgeoisie against the warlords (lackeys of imperialism), as in 1924–1927 in the wars in Guangdong Province and the Northern Expedition, or unites with the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie to wage civil war against the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie (also lackeys of imperialism), as in the Agrarian Revolutionary War of 1927–1936. When imperialism launches armed attacks, the Party unites all classes and strata in the country opposing the foreign aggressors to wage a national war against the foreign enemy, as it is doing in the present War of Resistance against Japan.

All this shows the difference between China and the capitalist countries. In China war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organization. Other forms such as mass organization and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. Before the outbreak of a war all organization and struggle are in preparation for the war, as in the period from the May Fourth movement of 1919 to the May Thirtieth movement of 1925. After war breaks out, all organization and struggle is coordinated with the war either directly or indirectly, as, for instance, in the period of the Northern Expedition, when all organization and struggle in the rear areas of the revolutionary army were coordinated with the war directly, and that in the northern warlord areas was coordinated with the war indirectly. Again in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War all organization and struggle inside the Red areas was coordinated with the war directly, and outside the Red areas indirectly. Yet again in the present period, the War of Resistance, all organization and struggle in the rear areas of the anti-Japanese forces and in the areas occupied by the enemy is directly or indirectly coordinated with the war.

"In China armed revolution is fighting armed counterrevolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."[2] This thesis of Comrade Stalin's is perfectly correct and is equally valid for the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War, and the present War of Resistance

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Our source for this document is the 1991 revised edition of *Mao Zedong xuanji,* Vol. 2, pp. 541–57. No contemporary text is available.

[1] This is another portion of Mao's concluding remarks at the Sixth Plenum, delivered on November 6, 1938.

[2] The quotation is from Stalin's speech to the Chinese Commission of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist International on November 30, 1926, which appears under the title "The Prospects of the Revolution in China," in Stalin, *Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), Vol. 8, p. 379. The "armed revolution" hailed by Stalin in 1926 was, of course, as Mao goes on to state, the Northern Expedition, under the command of Chiang Kaishek, against the Northern warlords.

against Japan. They are all revolutionary wars, all directed against counterrevolutionaries, and all waged mainly by the revolutionary people, differing only in the sense that a civil war differs from a national war, and that a war conducted by the Communist Party differs from a war it conducts jointly with the Guomindang. Of course, these differences are important. They indicate the breadth of the main forces in the war (an alliance of the workers and peasants, or of the workers, peasants, and bourgeoisie) and whether our antagonist in the war is internal or external (whether the war is against domestic or foreign foes, and, if domestic, whether against the Northern warlords or against the Guomindang); they also indicate that the content of China's revolutionary war differs at different stages of its history. But all these wars are instances of armed revolution fighting armed counterrevolution; they are all revolutionary wars, and all exhibit the specific features and advantages of the Chinese revolution. The thesis that revolutionary war "is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution" fits China's conditions perfectly. The main task of the Party of the Chinese proletariat, a task confronting it almost from its very inception, has been to unite with as many allies as possible and, according to the circumstances, to organize armed struggles for national and social liberation against armed counterrevolution, whether internal or external. Without armed struggle the proletariat and the Communist Party would have no standing at all in China, and it would be impossible to accomplish any revolutionary task.

Our Party did not adequately understand this point during the five or six years from its foundation in 1921 to its participation in the Northern Expedition in 1926. It did not then understand the supreme importance of armed struggle in China or seriously prepare for war and organize armed forces, or apply itself to the study of military strategy and tactics. During the Northern Expedition, it neglected to win over the army but laid one-sided emphasis on the movement of the popular masses, with the result that the whole mass movement collapsed the moment the Guomindang turned reactionary. For a long time after 1927 many comrades continued to make it the Party's central task to prepare for insurrections in the cities and to work in the White areas. It was only after our victory in repelling the enemy's Third "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign in 1931 that some comrades fundamentally changed their attitude on this question. But this was not true of the whole Party, and there were other comrades who continued as they had in the past, and did not think along the lines presented here.

Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be settled without armed force. An understanding of this point will help us in successfully waging the War of Resistance against Japan from now on. The fact that the whole nation is rising in armed resistance in the war against Japan should inculcate a better understanding of the importance of this question in the whole Party, and every Party member should be prepared to take up arms and go to the front at any moment. Moreover, our present session has clearly defined the direction for our efforts by deciding that the Party's main fields of work are in the battle zones and in the enemy's rear. This is also an excellent antidote to the tendency of some Party members to be willing only to work in party organizations and in the movements of the popular masses, but to be unwilling to study or participate in warfare, and to the failure of some schools to encourage students to go to the front, and other such phenomena. In most of China, Party organizational work and popular mass work are directly linked with armed struggle; there is not, and cannot be, any Party work or mass work that is isolated and stands by itself. Even in rear areas remote from the battle zones (such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan) and in some enemy-occupied areas (such as Beiping, Tianjin, Nanjing, and Shanghai), Party organizational work and work with the popular masses are coordinated with the war, and can and should exclusively serve the needs of the front. In a word, the whole Party must pay great attention to war, study military matters, and prepare to fight.

II. The War History of the Guomindang

It will be useful for us to look at the history of the Guomindang and see what attention it pays to war.

From the start, when he organized a small revolutionary group, Sun Yatsen staged armed insurrections against the Qing dynasty. The period of the Tongmenghui was replete with armed insurrections, right up to the armed overthrow of the Qing dynasty by the 1911 Revolution. Then, during the period of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, he carried out a military campaign against Yuan [Shikai]. Subsequent events such as the southern movement of the naval force, the northern expedition from Guilin, and the founding of the Huangpu Military Academy were also among Sun Yatsen's military undertakings.

After Sun Yatsen came Chiang Kaishek, who brought the Guomindang's military power to its zenith. He values the army as his very life and has had the experience of three wars, namely, the Northern Expedition, the civil war, and the War of Resistance against Japan. For the last ten years Chiang Kaishek has been a counterrevolutionary. He has created a huge "Central Army" for counterrevolutionary purposes. He has held firmly to the vital point that whoever has an army has power and that war decides everything. In this respect we ought to learn from him. In this respect both Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek are our teachers.

Since the 1911 Revolution, all the warlords have clung to their armies for dear life, setting great store by the principle "Whoever has an army has power."

Tan Yankai, a clever bureaucrat who had a checkered career in Hunan, was never a civil governor pure and simple but always insisted on being both the military governor and the civil governor. Even when he became president of the National Government first in Guangdong and then in Wuhan, he was concurrently the commander of the Second Army.[3] There are many such warlords who understand this peculiarity of China's.

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[3] Regarding Mao's fluctuating assessment of Tan, from the May Fourth period to the late 1920s, see Volumes I and II of this edition, *passim*.

There have also been parties in China, notably the Progressive Party, which did not want to have an army; yet even this party recognized that it could not get government positions without some warlord backing. Among its successive patrons have been Yuan Shikai, Duan Qirui,[4] and Chiang Kaishek (to whom the Political Science Group, formed out of a section of the Progressive Party, has attached itself).

A few small political parties with a short history, such as the Youth Party,[5] have no army, and so have not been able to get anywhere.

In other countries there is no need for each of the bourgeois parties to have an armed force under its direct command. But things are different in China, where, because of the feudal division of the country, those landlord or bourgeois groupings or parties which have guns have power, and those which have more guns have more power. Placed in such an environment, the party of the proletariat should see clearly to the heart of the matter.

Communists do not fight for personal military power (they must under no circumstances do that, and let no one ever again follow the example of Zhang Guotao), but they must fight for military power for the Party, for military power for the people. As a national War of Resistance is going on, we must also fight for military power for the nation. Where there is naïveté on the question of military power, nothing whatsoever can be achieved. It is very difficult for the laboring people, who have been deceived and intimidated by the reactionary ruling classes for thousands of years, to awaken to the importance of having guns in their own hands. Now that Japanese imperialist oppression and the nationwide resistance to it have pushed our laboring people into the arena of war, Communists should prove themselves the most politically conscious leaders in this war. Every Communist must grasp this truth: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."[6] Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful Party organizations which the Eighth Route Army has created in northern China. We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create movements of the popular masses. Everything in Yan'an has been created from the barrels of guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army. Some people ridicule us as advocates of the "omnipotence of war." Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad; it is Marxist. The guns of the Russian Communist Party created socialism. We shall create a democratic republic. Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the laboring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords; in this sense we may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed. We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun.

III. The War History of the Chinese Communist Party

Our Party failed to grasp the importance of engaging itself directly in preparations for war and in the organization of armed forces for a period of three or four years, that is, from 1921 (when the Chinese Communist Party was founded) to 1924 (when the First National Congress of the Guomindang was held), and it still lacked adequate understanding of this issue in the 1924–1927 period and even later; nevertheless, after 1924, when it began to participate in the Huangpu Military Academy, it entered a new stage and began to see the importance of military affairs. Through helping the Guomindang in the wars in Guangdong Province and participating in the Northern Expedition, the Party gained leadership over some armed forces. Then, having learned a bitter lesson from the failure of the revolution, the Party organized the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and the Guangzhou Uprising, and entered on a new period, the founding of the Red Army. That was the crucial period in which our Party arrived at a thorough understanding of the importance of the army. Had there been no Red Army and no war fought by the Red Army in this period, that is, had the Communist Party adopted Chen Duxiu's liquidationism, the present War of Resistance against Japan would have been inconceivable or could not have been sustained for long.

At its emergency meeting held on August 7, 1927, the Central Committee of the Party combated Right opportunism in the political sphere, thus enabling the Party to take a great stride forward. At its fourth plenary session in January 1931, the Sixth Central Committee nominally combated "Left" opportunism in the political sphere, but in fact itself committed the error of "Left" opportunism anew. The two meetings differed in their content and historical role, but neither of them dealt seriously with the problems of war and strategy, a fact which showed that war had not yet been made the center of gravity in the Party's work. After the central leadership of the Party moved into the Red areas in 1933, this situation underwent a radical change, but mistakes in principle were again committed on the problem of war (and all other major problems), bringing serious losses to the revolutionary war. The Zunyi Meeting of 1935, on the other hand, was mainly a fight against opportunism in the military sphere and gave top priority to the question of war, and this was a reflection of the war conditions of the time. Today we can say with confidence that in the struggles of the past seventeen years the Chinese Communist Party has forged not only a firm Marxist political line but also a firm Marxist military line. We have been able to apply Marxism in solving not only political but also military problems; we have trained not only a large core of cadres capable of running the Party and the state, but also a large core of cadres capable of running the army. These achievements are the flower of the revolution, watered by the blood of countless martyrs, a glory that belongs not only to the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people but also to the Communist Parties and the peoples of the whole world. There are only three armies in the whole world that belong to the proletariat and the laboring people, the armies led by the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, of China, and of Spain, and as yet Communist Parties in other countries have had no military experience; hence our army and our military experience are all the more precious.

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[4] Duan Qirui was the leader of the Anfu clique.

[5] The Chinese Youth Party, or *Étatistes.* Regarding the *Étatistes,* see Volume II, pp. 268 and 304.

[6] This maxim, which is often thought to date from 1938, had in fact been put forward by Mao in slightly different words at the "August 7 Emergency Conference" in 1927. See Volume III, pp. 31 and 36.

In order to carry the present War of Resistance against Japan to victory, it is extremely important to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all the guerrilla forces led by our Party. Acting on this principle, the Party should dispatch a sufficient number of its best members and cadres to the front. Everything must serve victory at the front, and the organizational task must be subordinated to the political task.

IV. Changes in the Party's Military Strategy in the Civil War and the National War

The changes in our Party's military strategy are worth studying. Let us deal separately with the two processes, the civil war and the national war.

The civil war can be roughly divided into two strategic periods. Guerrilla warfare was primary in the first period and regular warfare in the second. But the regular warfare was of the Chinese type, regular only in its concentration of forces for mobile warfare and in a certain degree of centralization and planning in command and organization; in other respects, it retained a guerrilla character and, as regular warfare, was on a low level and not comparable with the regular warfare of foreign armies or, in some ways, even with that of the Guomindang army. Thus, in a sense, this type of regular warfare was only guerrilla warfare raised to a higher level.

The process of the War of Resistance against Japan can also be roughly divided into two strategic periods, so far as our Party's military tasks are concerned. In the first period (comprising the stages of the strategic defensive and strategic stalemate), it is guerrilla warfare which is primary, while in the second (the stage of strategic counteroffensive) it is regular warfare that will be primary. The guerrilla warfare of the first period of the War of Resistance, however, differs considerably in content from that of the first period of the civil war, because the dispersed guerrilla tasks are being carried out by the regular (regular to a certain degree) Eighth Route Army. Likewise, the regular warfare of the second period of the War of Resistance will be different from that of the second period of the civil war because we can assume that, given up-to-date equipment, a great change will take place both in the army and in its battle operations. Our army will then attain a high degree of centralization and organization, and its operations will lose much of their guerrilla character and attain a high degree of regularity; what is now at a low level will then be raised to a higher level, and the Chinese type of regular warfare will change into the general worldwide type. That will be our task in the stage of the strategic counteroffensive.

Thus we see that the two processes, the civil war and the War of Resistance against Japan, and their four strategic periods contain three changes in strategy. The first was the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the civil war. The second was the change from regular warfare in the civil war to guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance against Japan. And the third will be the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the War of Resistance against Japan.

The first of the three changes encountered great difficulties. It involved a twofold task. On the one hand, we had to combat the Right tendency of localism and guerrillaism, which consisted in clinging to guerrilla habits and refusing to make the turn to regularization, a tendency that arose because our cadres underestimated the changes in the enemy's situation and our own tasks. In the Central Red Area it was only after much painstaking education that this tendency was gradually corrected. On the other hand, we also had to combat the "Left" tendency of overcentralization and adventurism, which put undue stress on regularization, a tendency that arose because some of the leading cadres overestimated the enemy, set the tasks too high, and mechanically applied foreign experience regardless of the actual conditions. For three long years (before the Zunyi Conference), this tendency imposed enormous sacrifices on the Central Red Area, and it was corrected only after we had learned lessons for which we paid in blood. Its correction was the achievement of the Zunyi Conference.

The second change in strategy took place in the autumn of 1937 (after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident), at the juncture of the two different wars. Our enemy was a new one, Japanese imperialism, our ally was our former enemy, the Guomindang (although it still harbored feelings of hostility toward us), and the theater of war was the vast expanse of North China (which was temporarily our army's front but would soon be the enemy's rear, and would remain so for a long time). In this special situation, our change in strategy was an extremely serious one. In this special situation we had to transform the regular army of the past into a guerrilla army (as regards its dispersed operations, and not as regards its organized and disciplined character), and transform the mobile warfare of the past into guerrilla warfare, so that we could adapt ourselves to the kind of enemy facing us and to the tasks before us. But this change was, to all appearances, a step backward and therefore necessarily very difficult. Both underestimation and morbid fear of Japan, tendencies likely to occur at such a time, did actually occur among the Guomindang. When the Guomindang changed over from civil war to national war, it suffered many needless losses mainly because of its underestimation of the enemy, but also because of its morbid fear of Japan (as exemplified by Han Fuqu and Liu Zhi).[7] On the other hand, we have effected the change fairly smoothly and, instead of suffering losses, have won big victories. The reason is that the great majority of our cadres accepted the correct guidance of the Central Committee in good time and skillfully sized up the actual situation, even though there were serious arguments between the Central Committee and some of the army cadres. The extreme importance of this change for persevering in, developing, and winning the War of Resistance against Japan as a whole, as well as for the future of the Chinese Communist Party, can be seen immediately if we think of the historic significance of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in determining the fate of the national liberation struggle in China. In its extraordinary breadth and protractedness, China's anti-Japanese guerrilla war is without precedent, not only in the East but perhaps in the whole history of mankind.

The third change, from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare against Japan, belongs to the future development of the war, which will presumably give rise to new circumstances and new difficulties. We need not discuss it now.

V. The Strategic Role of Guerrilla Warfare Against Japan

In the anti-Japanese war as a whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, for only regular warfare can decide the final outcome of the war. Of the three strategic stages (the defensive, the stalemate, and the counteroffensive) in the entire process of the war in the country as a whole, the first and last are stages in which regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. In the intermediate stage, guerrilla warfare will become primary and regular warfare supplementary because the enemy will be holding on to the areas he has occupied and we will be preparing for the counteroffensive but will not yet be ready to launch it. Although this stage will possibly be the longest, it is still only one of the three stages in the entire war. If we take the war as a whole, therefore, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. Unless we understand this, unless we recognize that regular warfare will decide the final outcome of the war, and unless we pay attention to building a regular army and to studying and directing regular warfare, we shall be unable to defeat Japan. This is one aspect of the matter.

All the same, guerrilla warfare has its important strategic place throughout the war. Without guerrilla warfare and without due attention to building guerrilla units and guerrilla armies and to studying and directing guerrilla warfare, we shall likewise be unable to defeat Japan. The reason is that, since the greater part of China will be converted into the enemy's rear, in the absence of the most extensive and persistent guerrilla warfare the enemy will entrench himself securely without any fear of attacks from behind, will inflict heavy losses on our main forces fighting at the front, and will launch increasingly fierce offensives; thus it will be difficult for us to bring about a stalemate, and the very continuation of the War of Resistance may be jeopardized. But even if things do not turn out that way, other unfavorable circumstances will ensue, such as the inadequate building up of strength for our counteroffensive, the absence of supporting actions during the counteroffensive, and the possibility that the enemy will be able to replace his losses. If these circumstances arise and are not overcome by the timely development of extensive and persistent guerrilla warfare, it will likewise be impossible to defeat Japan. Hence, though guerrilla warfare occupies a supplementary place in the war as a whole, it does have an extremely important place in strategy. In resisting Japan it is undoubtedly a grave error to neglect guerrilla warfare. This is the other aspect of the matter.

Given a big country, guerrilla warfare is possible; hence there was guerrilla warfare in the past too. But guerrilla warfare can be persevered in only when led by the Communist Party. That is why guerrilla warfare generally failed in the past and why it can be victorious only in modern times and only in big countries in which Communist Parties have emerged, as in the Soviet Union during its civil war and in China at present. Considering the present circumstances and the general situation with respect to the war, the division of labor between the Guomindang and the Communist Party in the anti-Japanese war, in which the former carries on frontal regular warfare and the latter carries on guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, is both necessary and proper, and is a matter of mutual need, mutual coordination, and mutual assistance.

It can thus be understood how important and necessary it was for our Party to change its military strategy from the regular warfare of the latter period of the civil war to the guerrilla warfare of the first period of the War of Resistance. The favorable effects of this change can be summed up in the following eighteen points:[8]

1. Reduction of the areas occupied by the enemy forces;
2. Expansion of the base areas of our own forces;
3. In the stage of the defensive, coordination with operations at the regular front, so as to pin down the enemy;
4. In the stage of stalemate, maintenance of a firm hold on the base areas behind the enemy lines so as to facilitate the training and reorganization of troops at the regular front;

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[7] Han Fuqu (1890–1938), who had served under Feng Yuxiang (regarding Feng, see Volume V, p. 460, note 1) until May 1929, was governor of Shandong from 1930 to 1938. Liu Zhi (1892–1971) was governor of Henan from 1930 to 1935. After the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, Han was appointed deputy commander of the Fifth War Zone and commander of the Third Group Army. Liu became deputy commander of the First War Zone and commander of the Second Group Army, made up of Chiang Kaishek's personal forces. Both of them fled without offering any resistance in the face of the Japanese invasion of Shandong. Han Fuqu was arrested and executed on January 24, 1938.

[8] In the Chinese text, these eighteen points make up a single paragraph; we have separated them for the sake of readability.

5. In the stage of the counteroffensive, coordination with the regular front in recovering lost territory;
6. The quickest and most effective expansion of our forces;
7. The widest expansion of the Communist Party, so that a Party branch may be organized in every village;
8. The broadest development of the movements of the popular masses, so that all the people behind the enemy lines, except for those in his strongholds, may be organized;
9. The most extensive establishment of organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power;
10. The widest development of anti-Japanese cultural and educational work;
11. The most extensive improvement of the people's livelihood;
12. The most effective disintegration of the enemy troops;
13. The most extensive and enduring impact on popular feeling and stimulation of morale throughout the country;
14. The most extensive impetus to progress in the friendly armies and parties;
15. Adaptation to the situation in which the enemy is strong and we are weak, so that we suffer fewer losses and win more victories;
16. Adaptation to the fact that China is large and Japan small, so as to make the enemy suffer more losses and win fewer victories;
17. The quickest and most effective training of large numbers of cadres for leadership; and
18. The most effective solution to the problem of provisions.

It is also beyond doubt that in the long course of struggle the guerrilla units and guerrilla warfare will not remain as they are but will develop to a higher stage and evolve gradually into regular units and regular warfare. Through guerrilla warfare we shall build up our strength and turn ourselves into a decisive element in the crushing of Japanese imperialism.

VI. Pay Attention to the Study of Military Matters

All the issues between two hostile armies depend on war for their solution, and China's survival or extinction depends on its victory or defeat in the present war. Hence our study of military theory, of strategy and tactics, and of army political work brooks not a moment's delay. Although our study of tactics is still inadequate, our comrades who are engaged in military work have achieved a great deal in the past ten years and, on the basis of Chinese conditions, have brought forth much that is new; the shortcoming here is that there has been no general summing up. But so far only a few people have taken up the study of the problems of strategy and the theory of war. First-rate results have been achieved in the study of our political work, which, in wealth of experience and in the number and quality of its innovations, ranks second only to that of the Soviet Union; here, too, the shortcoming is insufficient synthesis and systematization. The popularization of military knowledge is an urgent task for the Party and the whole country. We must from now on pay much attention to all these things, but most important of all is the theory of war and strategy. I deem it imperative that we arouse interest in the study of military theory and call upon the whole Party to study military matters attentively.

Zhang Yunyi May Lead Two or Three Battalions to Cross the River and Operate on the Other Side

(November 10, 1938)

To Xiang [Ying], and to be forwarded to Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:

1. Bai Chongxi has allowed Comrade Zhang Yunyi[1] of the New Fourth Army to lead a battalion to the north of the Yangzi River to operate within Anhui. Has he been sent out or not?

2. Central Anhui is now most convenient for our army's operations. Could the New Fourth Army send two or three battalions to join with Comrade Zhang Yunyi and cross the river under his command? From now on, which unit will provide for the expenses of the third and fourth detachments and the Eighth Regiment? How will the money be delivered to them? Under which unit's command will they be? What will their relationship with the Central Plains Bureau[2] be?

We look forward to your response by telegraph to the above points.

Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 434–35, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Zhang Yunyi was at this time chief of staff of the New Fourth Army, and commander of the Third Detachment.

[2] The Central Plains Bureau was established on November 9, 1938, with Liu Shaoqi as its secretary.

Persist in Long-Term Guerrilla Warfare in the Daqing Mountains

(November 24, 1938)

To Zhou [Shidi] and Gan [Siqi], and for transmittal to Li Jingquan:

1. The Daqing mountain range is not far from Outer Mongolia to the north, and the enemy regards it as important.[1] Since guerrilla warfare has yet to commence in Chahar and Rehe, it is also isolated. We would like to establish a base area of the Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi type there, and although this is not possible today, if we persist in long-term guerrilla warfare, it will become entirely possible to establish a guerrilla base area, and, moreover, this is a central task.

2. Therefore, every policy there should take as its starting point the characteristics of long-term guerrilla warfare.

a. In organizing defections of puppet-régime troops, we should avoid scattered outbursts that are too early or unnecessary. Only when it is estimated that sentiment in favor of defection is irrepressible, or when it has already broken out, or in case of military necessity, should you resolutely proceed. In general, though, work should conform to the principle of long-term thinking.

b. Before and after troops defect, you should make them aware of the difficulty of material conditions as well as the arduous nature of the struggle. After troops defect, generally strive to bring them nominally under the command of the Eighth Route Army, and then transform or reorganize them during a process of struggle. It is best to strive to bring them close to northwestern Shanxi or the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, but do not insist. Doing favors for others will end up increasing our difficulties in the future.

c. Toward large groups of bandits or spontaneous anti-Japanese armed troops of a semibandit nature, you should adopt the approach of having high-level contacts and influencing, motivating, and helping them to progress. Do not create antagonisms and thus increase the difficulties of the guerrilla teams

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 436–38, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The Daqing mountain range is roughly a hundred miles south of Outer Mongolia, but to the Japanese that no doubt appeared close in strategic terms.

and local work. In dealing with scattered bandits, you may eliminate them, but you must still be courteous to them; do not kill people indiscriminately.

d. Toward Yu Jingyi's self-defense force,[2] out of consideration for his relationship with Fu [Zuoyi], you should adopt the approach of having high-level contacts and helping and encouraging them to progress. Do not adopt an orientation of splitting and undermining.

3. On Suiyuan matters, you must pay attention at all times to the united front with Fu Zuoyi. Regarding the united front with the local upper strata of Suiyuan, tactics to use against puppet régimes and such, you must not act contrary to this characteristic of the long-term guerrilla war.

4. Another basic task is to unite the Mongol and Han peoples together in resistance to Japan. Use our correct minority nationalities policy to change China's traditional erroneous policy. Make ourselves into a model with which to push forward and influence the Guomindang. The first thing is to turn Fu Zuoyi around.

a. Out of consideration for the national consciousness of the Mongols, and the Mongols' faith in the nobility, toward Prince De[3] we should still adopt the tactic of trying to win him over, and continue to carry out the slogan of asking Prince De to turn around and resist Japan.

b. Toward Mongols who request the return of land invaded and occupied by Han, you should make the Han set up a contract to buy the land at a commensurate price or pay rent on it as leased land. Local government should handle each case separately and justly in light of the specific circumstances, according to the principle of uniting the Mongols and the Han together in resistance to Japan.

c. Respect the customs, habits, and religion of the Mongols, and develop their culture; do not violate the interests of the Mongols, especially in buying horses. You must conscientiously educate the troops on this.

d. Recruit the intellectuals among the Mongols, train Mongol cadres; work on the Mongol people.

5. You should develop and conduct work in the direction of the Suiyuan-Chahar border region as well as the area south of the railway. Multiply local guerrilla teams as much as possible, and cultivate local cadres as well as leaders of the masses.

Mao [Zedong]   Wang [Jiaxiang]
Yang [Shangkun]   He [Long]
Guan [Xiangying]

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[2] Yu Jingyi (also known as Yu Cunhao) was at this time deputy commander of the Guomindang's Suiyuan Anti-Japanese Self-Defense Army of the Popular Masses.

[3] Regarding Demchukdonggrub (1902–1966), commonly known in Chinese as De Wang or Prince De, see above, the relevant note to the text of November 16, 1937.

Central Tasks of the Central Hebei Region

(November 24, 1938)

1. According to our assessment of the future development of the situation in North China, the central task of the Central Hebei region is to consolidate the existing armed forces, rely on the power of the masses, and persist in protracted guerrilla warfare.

2. In order to carry out the above tasks, we have made the following decisions:

a. We will send Comrade Cheng Zihua to lead a group of cadres to Central Hebei; Zihua will serve as political commissar of the Lü column.[1] Strengthening the regularization of this unit is a central task at this time.

b. We have decided to send He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying], leading one unit, to Central Hebei, to strive to expand the 120th Division.

3. Upon arrival in Central Hebei, one unit of the 120th Division can push forward and influence the process of regularization of the local forces in particular, and the Party in Central Hebei should devote its utmost strength to helping expand the 120th Division. The specific plan will be decided on according to the actual situation after Guan has arrived at Wutai and discussed it with Nie [Rongzhen] and Peng [Zhen].

4. After He and Guan have arrived in Central Hebei, Lü's unit will come under their command, but the organizational system will still be under the supervision of the Nie region.[2]

Mao [Zedong]   Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 439–40, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] The reference is to the Third Column of the Eighth Route Army in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Area, commanded by Lü Zhengcao.

[2] The reference is to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Area, of which Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar.

Opinions Concerning Work in the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Area

(November 25, 1938)

We have the following opinions concerning work in the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar area:

1. The Song [Shilun] and Deng [Hua] columns have penetrated deeply into eastern Hebei for several months of bitter fighting; they have coordinated and encouraged the eastern Hebei uprising led by the local Party organizations, restored a Chinese régime in eastern Hebei, aroused the masses, and set up the eastern Hebei guerrilla area. They have expanded our army's political influence in the far rear of the enemy and dealt a blow to the enemy; thus generally speaking they have registered achievements. But they did not protect and develop this victory to the full extent possible; they did not unite very well with the local Party organizations and military units; they did not handle the situation there very calmly. This resulted in withdrawal from the area and rather heavy losses to the army and the armed units of the masses.

2. Having assessed the military and political circumstances of the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar area, we believe that area enjoys many favorable conditions, which can support guerrilla warfare, and make it possible to create guerrilla bases. But there are also numerous difficulties, and [these goals] can be achieved only through protracted and arduous struggle. It has therefore been decided to organize a Hebei-Rehe-Chahar assault force of the Eighth Route Army, to send Comrade Xiao Ke to take up this work, and to establish a military-political committee exercising unified leadership over the army and over the work of the local Party and government. The military-political committee must have the participation of the leaders of the local Party and army. The Northern Bureau is to propose a name list after Xiao Ke and Peng Zhen arrive in the Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi [area] and then submit it to the Center for approval.

3. Xiao will set out from Yan'an in the next few days and go to the Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi command organ via northwestern Shanxi. He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying] will be responsible for establishing it [the committee] with a set of cadres sent from Yan'an.

Our source for this document is *Wenxian he yanjiu,* no. 3, 1985, p. 15.

4. At present, the two detachments should each choose an appropriate location south of the Ping-Sui road for reorganization, training, and recruitment, the main tasks being the following:

   a. Strengthen political work, boost troop morale, and make a work review, mainly based on our assessment of Song and Deng's work, the main point being to review the lessons of our experience.
   b. Intensify cadre education, collect some veteran soldiers and have them run instruction teams, and have cadres among the troops do mobile training classes or temporary group training.
   c. Tighten military and political organization, rectify discipline, and eliminate the habits of guerrilla warfare.
   d. Send political-work staff to carry out recruitment and expansion work in nearby areas and to purchase weapons, especially ammunition.
   e. During this period of rest and reorganization, you should avoid combat when it is unnecessary or when there is no assurance of victory. If the enemy attacks, use mountainous areas to counterattack when conditions are favorable; if absolutely necessary, you may approach the Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi border.

5. The two detachments should unite as one; when they are close together, there should be centralized command. They should set up collective leadership so as to complete the task of rest and reorganization.

6. You must keep in touch with eastern Hebei; if the local cadres of eastern Hebei cannot deal with this, you must immediately send a unit back there for this work.

From Mao [Zedong], Wang [Jiaxiang], and Yang [Shangkun] to Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Nie [Rongzhen], and to be transmitted to Song [Shilun] and Deng [Hua]

It Is Appropriate That Chen Guang and Luo Ronghuan Should Lead the Division Headquarters and the Main Forces of Chen Guang's Brigade to Shandong and Northern Anhui

(November 25, 1938)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

The result of our consideration is that we think it suitable for Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan][1] to lead the division headquarters as well as the main force of the Chen brigade (the two main-force regiments) to Shandong and northern Anhui. For the time being, the Chen brigade's supplementary regiment will be left in the area of southwestern Shanxi; also, all the guerrillas will be brought together, organized into one regiment, and put under the command of Chen Shiju,[2] following which a detachment from the 129th Division will be transferred to relieve them. While moving east, Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan] should spread out in the large area between the old and new beds of the Yellow River, including to the east and west of the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway line and to the north and south of the Jiao[zhou]-Ji[nan] railway line. [Yang] Shangkun and [Deng] Xiaoping believe this to be feasible. What is your opinion? Please let us know.

Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang] Teng [Daiyuan]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 441–42, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

[1] Chen Guang and Luo Ronghuan were at this time the acting division commander and political commissar of the 115th Division.

[2] Chen Shiju was the chief of staff of the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division.

To Deng Baoshan[1]

(December 5, 1938)

My dear friend Baoshan:

In recent days, word has again been spreading of an invasion of the Northwest by the enemy; I expect that you, sir, have already learned of this. The enemy's planned invasion will come sooner or later, so not the least negligence in preparation may be countenanced. I expect that a wise man such as you, sir, must have the same feeling. We are sending Comrade Chen Qihan[2] specially to report to you, general, on our defense plans and to submit to you the report, resolutions, declaration, and such documents of our humble Party's Sixth Plenum, for your reference. I entreat you please to convey to Qihan any instructions you may have.

I respectfully wish you serenity in times of war.

Submitted by your younger brother, Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 132–33, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Deng Baoshan (1896–1968) of Tianshui, Gansu Province. During the War of Resistance against Japan, he was commander of the Guomindang Twenty-first Army Group, as well as commander of the New First Army, and commander-in-chief of the Shanxi-Shaanxi-Suiyuan Border Region.

[2] Chen Qihan (1897–1981) was born in Xingguo, Jiangxi Province. At the time he was the Suide garrison commander in the rear army corps of the Eighth Route Army.

Appeal at the Evening Meeting for Cadres Doing Inspection Work in the Yan'an Party, Government, Army, and Mass Associations

(December 13, 1938)

(Special report by our correspondent:) The Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held an evening meeting on the 13th for cadres doing inspection work in the Party, government, army, and mass organizations in Yan'an. Comrade Mao Zedong attended and led [the meeting], and delivered a report on behalf of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He called upon every organ to overcome all the present difficulties, add new forces, and halt the enemy assault under the circumstances of the new stage of the War of Resistance, so as to prepare to carry out our counteroffensive. He asked all agencies working in the rear to delve deeply into the work of inspection with a fighting spirit, in order to take on the work tasks of each agency. He also pointed out five aspects of our work of inspection:

1. Each agency should stand at its own post, shouldering its own tasks. Work spirit should be given more urgency.
2. Study harder, studying Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary movement, and the history of China, from the cadres at the various levels of the Central Committee studying relatively advanced theories to the staff members of all organs learning to read and write.
3. Actively promote the production movement. Everyone in every administrative organ, every army unit, and every association must participate in the production movement in order to overcome the present difficulties.
4. Strengthen and consolidate united front work.
5. Make life within the whole Party healthier.

Next, he explained that the purposes of our inspection work are:

(1) To sum up past work, expand on the achievements of past work, and correct shortcomings. (2) To determine future tasks.

He called on all agencies to begin the inspection from the bottom up on the 15th of this month and to finish it on January 15, and conduct a general inspection before January 25.

This document first appeared in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* December 29, 1938. Our source text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 9, pp. 371–72, which reproduces this version.

Finally, Comrade Mao Zedong presented concrete methods for the inspection. It is reported that, over the past few days, all administrative organs, associations, and army units have been applying themselves to carrying this out, responding to Comrade Mao Zedong's call!

To Yang Lingde[1]

(December 14, 1938)

Mr. Lingde:

I have received both your letters. This reply was delayed by the convening of the Sixth Plenum; I would like to convey my apologies for this. I did, however, instruct Comrade Gao Gang[2] some time ago to order that the organ involved release Mr. Yuan Chenying,[3] and I expect that you have already received word of this. Not only did I not know about this matter, but Gao Gang and [Cheng] Fangwu[4] did not know either. I deeply apologize for the way that the organ involved handled this so hastily based on material from northwestern Shanxi. If in the future you learn of any shortcomings on our part, I entreat you to inform us, so that we may make improvements; I earnestly pray you will do so. This reply is made with respectful salutations.

Submitted by Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 134–35, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Yang Lingde (1905–) was a native of Inner Mongolia. He was then a reporter for *Dagongbao* stationed at Yulin, Shaanxi Province.

[2] Gao Gang (1905–1954) was at this time in charge of the Chinese Communist Party's Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Committee.

[3] Yuan Chenying, Yang Lingde's nephew, went to study at the Northern Shaanxi Public School at the beginning of 1938. He was wrongly arrested that year, but was soon released.

[4] Regarding Cheng, see, above, the relevant note to the text of April 1, 1938.

Part IIA: Lectures

On Dialectical Materialism (Lecture Notes)

Chapter 1: Idealism and Materialism

This chapter will discuss the following questions:

1. the struggle between two armies in philosophy;
2. the difference between idealism and materialism;
3. the source of the emergence and development of idealism;
4. the source of the emergence and development of materialism.

1. The Struggle Between Two Armies in Philosophy

The whole history of philosophy is the history of the struggle and development of the two mutually opposed philosophical schools of idealism and materialism. All philosophical trends of thought and schools are metamorphoses of these two fundamental schools.

All the various philosophical theories have been created by persons belonging to a definite social class. The ideas of these people have, moreover, been historically determined by a particular social life. All philosophical doctrines express the needs of a given social class and reflect the level of development of the productive forces of society and the historical stage in humanity's knowledge of nature. The fate of a philosophy is determined by the degree to which it satisfies the needs of a social class.

Our primary source for chapter 1 and for chapter 2, sections 1 through 10 of this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 6, pp. 265–305, which reproduces the earliest available version, published in April and May 1938 in *Kangzhan daxue*. For chapter 2, section 11, and chapter 3, we have followed *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 5, pp. 220–280. In a few instances, we have made use of other sources, cited in the notes, which contain variants of particular interest, but we have made no attempt at a systematic comparison of the available versions of this text. The translation in Nick Knight (ed.), *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism. Writings on Philosophy, 1937* (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 84–229; contains very detailed notes regarding the differences between the various sources. With the kind permission of Nick Knight, we have based our translation of chapter 2, paragraphs 7 to 10, of "On Dialectical Materialism," and of the ensuing sections, subsequently revised by Mao and published under the titles "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," on his versions in the work just cited, with some modifications by the editors of the present series. The translation of Chapter 1 and of Chapter 2, paragraphs 1 to 6, takes as its starting point a version prepared some years ago by Stuart Schram, but the text has been revised substantially, taking Nick Knight's rendering into account.

The social origins of idealism and materialism lie in a social structure marked by class contradictions. The earliest appearance of idealism was the product of the ignorance and superstition of a primitive and barbaric human race. Subsequently, the forces of production developed, thereby spurring the development of scientific knowledge as well. Logically, idealism should then have declined, and materialism should have risen to replace it. And yet, from ancient times to the present, idealism has not only not declined but, on the contrary, has developed and carried on a struggle for supremacy with materialism, from which neither side has emerged the victor. The reason lies in the fact that there are class divisions in society. On the one hand, the oppressing classes, in pursuit of their own interests, cannot but develop and consolidate their idealist doctrines. On the other hand, the oppressed classes, likewise in their own interest, cannot but develop and consolidate their materialist doctrines. Both idealist and materialist doctrines exist as weapons in the class struggle, and, so long as classes have not been eliminated, the conflict between idealism and materialism cannot be eliminated. Idealism, in the process of its historical development, represents the ideology of the exploiting classes and serves reactionary purposes. Materialism, however, is the worldview of the revolutionary class; it has grown and developed in the midst of an incessant struggle against the reactionary philosophy of idealism. Consequently, the struggle between idealism and materialism in philosophy has reflected from beginning to end the struggle of interests between the reactionary classes and the revolutionary classes. Whether or not the philosophers are aware of it, a given philosophical tendency always approximates the political orientation of their own class. Any philosophical tendency always directly or indirectly fosters the fundamental political interests of the class to which its authors belong. In this sense, a given philosophical tendency is, in the final analysis, a manifestation in a particular guise of the policy of the social class to which the philosophers belong.

The distinguishing characteristic of Marxist philosophy—that is, of dialectical materialism—is its effort to explain clearly the class nature of all social consciousness (including philosophy). It publicly declares a resolute struggle between its own proletarian nature and the idealist philosophy of the propertied classes. Moreover, it subordinates its own special tasks to such general tasks as overthrowing capitalism, organizing and building a proletarian dictatorship, and building a socialist society. The tasks of philosophy during the present stage in China are subordinate to the general tasks of overthrowing imperialism and the semifeudal system, the thorough realization of bourgeois democracy, the establishment of a completely new Chinese democratic republic, and preparing the transformation by peaceful means to a socialist and a communist society. Philosophical theory and political reality must be closely linked.

2. The Differences Between Idealism and Materialism

Wherein lies the basic difference between idealism and materialism? It lies in the opposite answers given by the two to the fundamental question in philosophy, that of the relationship between spirit and matter (that of the relationship between consciousness and existence). Idealism considers spirit (consciousness, concepts, the subject) as the source of all that exists in the world, and matter (nature, society, the object) as subordinate to it. Materialism recognizes the independent existence of matter apart from spirit and considers spirit subordinate to it. A confusing variety of opinions on all questions arises from the opposite answers given to this basic question.

According to idealism, the world is either a synthesis of our perceptions of all kinds or the spiritual process created by our reason or the world's reason; it regards the external material world either as a completely fabricated illusion or as the material external trapping of spiritual elements. Idealism regards the knowledge of humankind as emanating spontaneously from the subject and as the product of spirit itself.

Materialism, on the contrary, considers the unity of the universe to derive from its materiality and holds that spirit (consciousness) is one of the natural characteristics of matter which emerges only after matter has developed to a certain stage. Nature, matter, and the objective world exist apart from spirit and are independent of it. Human knowledge is a reflection of the objective external world.

3. The Source of the Emergence and Development of Idealism

Idealism regards matter as the product of spirit, thus turning the real world upside down. What is the source of the emergence and development of such a philosophy?

As stated previously, the earliest occurrence of idealism was a product of the ignorance and superstition of a primitive and barbaric human race. But afterward the development of production brought about the conditions for the primacy of idealism among the various currents of philosophical thought, namely, the division between manual and mental labor. With the development of the productive forces of society, the division of labor appeared; the further development of the division of labor saw the emergence of persons devoting themselves entirely to mental labor. But during the period when the forces of production were weak, the division between the two did not reach the stage of complete separation. When classes appeared, private property emerged, and exploitation became the foundation for the existence of the ruling class, a great transformation occurred. Mental labor then became the privilege of the ruling class, while manual labor became the fate of the oppressed classes. The [members of the] ruling class began to examine the relationship between themselves and the oppressed classes in an upside-down fashion; it was not the laborers who furnished them with the means of existence but, rather, they who provided the laborers with those means. Hence, they despised manual labor and developed idealist conceptions. To eliminate the distinction between manual labor and mental labor is one of the preconditions for eliminating idealist philosophy.

Among the social roots which have made possible the development of idealist philosophy, the principal one was the conscious expression of the interests of the ruling class by that philosophy. The dominance of idealist philosophy in all spheres of culture must be explained in the light of this. The final elimination of idealist philosophy can come only after the elimination of classes and the establishment of communist society.

The source which has enabled idealism to develop and deepen, and given it the capacity to struggle with materialism, must be sought in the process of human cognition. When humans employ concepts to think, there exists the possibility of drifting into idealism. Humans cannot but use concepts when thinking, and this can easily lead us to divide our knowledge into two aspects. One aspect relates to individual and particular things, and the other relates to generalized concepts (such as the conclusion "Yan'an is a city"). The particular and the general are inseparably linked; once separated, they depart from objective truth. Objective truth is expressed in the unity of the general and the particular. Without the particular, the general could not exist, and without the general, there could be no particular. To separate the general from the particular, that is, to treat the general as an objective entity and to regard the particular only as a form of existence of the general—such is the method adopted by all idealists. All idealists substitute consciousness, spirit, or concepts for objective entities which exist independently of human consciousness. Starting from this premise, idealism stresses the dynamic role of human consciousness in social practice. The idealists cannot point out the materialist truth that consciousness is limited by matter, but maintain that only consciousness is active, whereas matter is merely an inert composite entity. Urged on, moreover, by their own class nature, the idealists then use every method to exaggerate the dynamic role of consciousness. They develop this aspect one-sidedly, expanding it without limit so that it becomes the dominant aspect of intelligence. They conceal the other aspect, leaving it subordinate. This artificially expanded role for consciousness is established as a general worldview to the extent of transforming it into a god or an idol. Idealism in economics greatly exaggerates an inessential aspect of exchange, raising the law of supply and demand to the status of the fundamental law of capitalism. Many people have observed the active role that science plays in the life of society, but they fail to realize that this role is determined and limited by definite social relations of production and come to the conclusion that science is the motive force of society. Idealist historians regard heroes as the makers of history. Idealist statesmen regard politics as something omnipotent. Idealist military strategists practice the methods of desperate combat [*pinmingzhuyi zuozhan*]. Idealist revolutionaries advocate Blanquism.[1] The diehards say that the only way to revive our nation is to restore the old morality.[2] All this results from the excessive exaggeration of conscious activity (*zhuguan nengdongxing*). Our thought cannot reflect a phenomenon in its entirety at one stroke, but is constituted of knowledge which, in a dialectical process, approximates reality and is lively and infinitely variegated. Idealism is founded on the specific properties of thought and has exaggerated this individual aspect; it is thus unable to achieve a correct reflection of this process and only succeeds in distorting it. Lenin said: "Human knowledge is not a straight line, but a curve. Any segment of this curve can be transformed into an independent, complete, straight line, and this straight line may lead to confusion. Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, to see the trees and not the forest, woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness—such are the epistemological roots of idealism." "Philosophical idealism is a one-sided exaggeration of one of the fragments or aspects of knowledge until it becomes a deified absolute, divorced from matter, from nature. Idealism is thus a religious doctrine. This is very true."

Pre-Marxist materialism (mechanistic materialism) did not stress the thought process in the development of knowledge, but attributed to thought merely a passive role, as the mirror that reflects nature. Mechanistic materialism adopted an unreasonable attitude toward idealism, ignoring the causes of its epistemology and, consequently, was incapable of overcoming it. Only dialectical materialism correctly points out the active role of thought and, at the same time, points out the limitation imposed upon thought by matter. It points out that thought arises from social practice and, at the same time, actively shapes practice. Only this kind of dialectical theory of "the unity of knowledge and action" can thoroughly overcome idealism.

4. The Origins of the Emergence and Development of Materialism

The recognition that matter exists independently and apart from consciousness in the external world is the foundation of materialism. Humanity created this foundation through practice. Through the practice of productive labor, class struggle, and scientific experiment, humanity gradually broke away from superstition and wishful thinking (idealism), gradually recognized the essence of the world, and in so doing arrived at materialism.

Obliged to submit to natural forces, and capable of using only simple tools, primitive humans could not explain changes in the environment and, consequently, sought help from the gods. This was the origin of religion and idealism.

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[1] Blanquism refers to the political doctrine of Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805–1881), who held that the majority of the people were incapable of recognizing their true interests, because of prolonged subjection to class society and religion. Revolution must therefore take the form of an insurrection carried out by a small elite, which would subsequently educate the people.

[2] This sentence does not appear in the version as published in *Kangzhan daxue*. We have taken it from the text in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 5. It is also found in the text of Mao's lectures as published in a slim volume entitled *Bianzhengfa weiwulun* (n.p.: Zhongguo chubanshe, March 1946). The Red Guard version in *Mao Zhuxi wenxuan* replaces "The diehards say" with "Chiang Kaishek says."

But in the lengthy process of production, humans came into contact with the natural world surrounding them, acted upon it, and, in transforming nature, created things to be used for clothing, food, and shelter, adapting the natural world to the interests of humanity, and causing humans to believe deeply that matter exists objectively.

In the social existence of humanity, reciprocal relations and influences arise between individuals, and in class society class struggle also takes place. The oppressed class considers the situation, estimates its own strength, and makes plans. When their struggle is successful, this makes them confident that their views are in no sense the product of an illusion, but the reflection of an objectively existing material world. The fact that the oppressed class fails when it adopts the wrong plans, and succeeds when it corrects those plans, makes this class understand that it can achieve its goal only when its subjective plans are based on a correct understanding of the material nature of the objective world and the fact that it is governed by laws.

Scientific history has proved to humans the material nature of the world and the fact that it is governed by laws, made them aware of the futility of the illusions of religion and idealism, and led them to materialist conclusions.

In sum, the history of humanity's practice over a long period comprises the history of its struggle with nature, the history of class struggle, and the history of science. Because of the necessities of life and struggle, humans have reflected on the reality of matter and its laws, demonstrated the correctness of materialist philosophy, and discovered the ideological instrument for their own struggle: materialist philosophy. The higher the level to which social production develops, the greater the development of the class struggle, and the more scientific knowledge reveals the "secrets" of nature, the greater the development and consolidation of materialist philosophy. Thus humanity can be liberated gradually from the twofold oppression of nature and society.

The bourgeoisie, during the period of its struggle against the feudal classes and at a time when the proletariat did not yet constitute a threat, had already discovered and, moreover, employed materialism as an instrument in its own struggle; it was already convinced that objects in the environment were material products and not spiritual products. It was only when the bourgeoisie itself became the ruling class and the struggle of the proletariat threatened it that it abandoned this "useless" instrument and took up once again another—the philosophy of idealism. Living evidence of this is the change in thought before and after 1927—from materialism to idealism—by the spokesmen of the Chinese bourgeoisie, Dai Jitao and Wu Zhihui.[3]

The gravediggers of capitalism, the proletarians, "are intrinsically materialist." But because the proletariat is the most progressive class in history, its materialism is different from that of the bourgeoisie. It is more thorough and profound, and it alone is dialectical and not mechanistic. The proletariat has assimilated the entire practice of humanity throughout its history, and through its spokesmen and leaders Marx and Engels, it has created dialectical materialism, which maintains not only that matter is divorced from human consciousness and exists independently of it but also that matter changes. Dialectical materialism has become a thoroughly systematic and completely new worldview and methodology. This is the philosophy of Marxism.

Chapter 2: Dialectical Materialism

Within this general topic I intend to discuss the following issues:

1. the revolutionary weapon of the proletariat—dialectical materialism;
2. the relationship between the philosophical heritage of the past and dialectical materialism;
3. the unity of worldview and methodology in dialectical materialism;
4. the question of the object of philosophy;
5. on matter;
6. on motion;
7. on time and space;
8. on consciousness;
9. on reflection;
10. on truth;
11. on practice.

In what follows I shall give a summary account of my views on these questions.

1. Dialectical Materialism Is the Revolutionary Weapon of the Proletariat

This question has already been discussed in chapter 1; here I shall discuss it once again in simple terms.

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[3] This last sentence is absent from the version in *Kangzhan daxue*. It appears in the *Bujuan* text, as well as in the 1946 Zhonghua chubanshe text, in an undated pamphlet published in Dalian at about the same time, and in the Red Guard version. Mao is here using the "change in thought from materialism to idealism" to connote the break between the Marxist materialism of the Communists and the "idealism" of the Guomindang which culminated in the rupture of 1927. Dai Jitao (1891–1949) had shown some sympathy for Communism in 1919–1920, and in 1923 Wu Zhihui (1864–1953) had taken the side of science in the controversy between science and philosophy raging at that time. Both men had been very close to Sun Yatsen and had been among the witnesses to Sun's deathbed testament in 1925. During Sun's life, they had tolerated the Guomindang-Communist alliance, but after Sun's death, both attacked the Communists, and Wu Zhihui participated in the Anti-Communist Western Hills Conference of late 1925.

Dialectical materialism is the worldview of the proletariat. The proletarians then proceed to use dialectical materialism as a mental weapon in their struggles and as the philosophical foundation for all of their views. Only when we adopt the standpoint of the proletariat in order to understand the world can we correctly and completely grasp the worldview of dialectical materialism. Only when we start from such a standpoint can we achieve true and objective knowledge of the real world. This is because, on the one hand, only the proletariat is the most progressive and most revolutionary class; on the other hand, only dialectical materialism is a most authentic and most revolutionary worldview and methodology, uniting a high level and rigorous scientific nature and a thorough and uncompromising revolutionary nature.

The Chinese proletariat, having assumed at the present time the historical task of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, must make use of dialectical materialism as its mental weapon. If dialectical materialism is used by the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the broad revolutionary elements consisting of all those who are prepared to adopt the standpoint of the proletariat as a most correct and most revolutionary worldview and methodology, they will then be in a position correctly to understand the changes which emerge in the course of the revolutionary movement, to put forward revolutionary tasks, to unite their own ranks and those of their allies, to defeat reactionary theories, to adopt a correct line of action, to avoid errors in their work, and to achieve their aims of liberating China and building up China. The study of dialectical materialism is even more indispensable for the cadres who lead the revolutionary movement because the two erroneous theories and methods of work of subjectivism and mechanism frequently subsist among the cadres and, as a result, frequently cause the cadres to go against Marxism and to lead the revolutionary movement onto the wrong path. If we wish to avoid or correct such deficiencies, the only solution lies in conscious study and understanding of dialectical materialism, in order to arm one's brain anew.

2. The Relationship Between the Philosophical Heritage of the Past and Dialectical Materialism

Modern materialism is not simply the successor of the various philosophical doctrines of the past. It was born and developed in the struggles against the dominant philosophies of the past, and the struggles for the elimination of idealism and superstition. Marxist philosophy—dialectical materialism—is not only the successor to the highest product of idealism—the doctrine of Hegel; at the same time, it has also overcome the idealism of the latter doctrine and transformed its dialectics in a materialist direction. Nor is Marxism simply the continuation and completion of the materialist developments of the past. At the same time, it opposes the narrowness of all the materialist doctrines of the past, that is, mechanistic and intuitive materialism (mainly French materialism and Feuerbach's materialism).[4] Marxist philosophy—dialectical materialism—continues the heritage of the scientific culture of the past. At the same time, it causes this heritage to undergo a revolutionary transformation in order to form a most correct, most revolutionary, and most complete philosophical science, such as has never existed in history.

After the May Fourth movement in China in 1919, as a consequence of the conscious appearance of the Chinese proletariat on the political stage, and the raising of its scientific level, a Marxist philosophical movement arose and developed in China. In its first period, however, the level of understanding of materialist dialectics within the materialist current of thought was rather weak, and mechanistic materialism, influenced by the bourgeoisie, as well as the subjectivism of the Deborin clique,[5] were its principal components. After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the level of understanding of Marxism-Leninism progressed, and dialectical materialist thought gradually developed. Just recently, because of the severity of the national and social crisis, and also because of the influence of the movement to expose and criticize [deviations] in Soviet philosophy, a broad movement of materialist dialectics has developed in China's intellectual circles.

Because of the backwardness of the evolution of Chinese society, the philosophical current of dialectical materialism developing in China today has resulted not from taking over and reforming our own philosophical heritage, but from the study of Marxism-Leninism. Nevertheless, if we wish to make the dialectical materialist current of thought penetrate deeply and continue to develop in China, give firm direction to the Chinese revolution, and lead it onto the road of complete victory, then we must struggle with all the outworn philosophies now existing in China, raise the flag of criticism on the ideological front throughout the whole country, and thereby liquidate the philosophical heritage of ancient China. Only thus can we attain our goal.

3. The Unity of Worldview and Methodology in Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical materialism is the worldview of the proletariat. At the same time, it is the method of the proletariat for taking cognizance of the surrounding world and the method of revolutionary action of the proletariat. It is the unity of worldview and methodology. The idealists of the revisionist faction of Marxism hold that the whole substance of dialectical materialism lies in its methodology. They divide methodology from the view of philosophy in general. They divide the dialectical method from materialism. They do not understand that Marxist methodology—dialectics—is not like idealist dialectics such as that of Hegel, but is materialist dialectics, and that Marxist methodology cannot be separated, even to the slightest degree, from its worldview. For their part, the mechanistic materialists simply take Marxist philosophy and regard it as a worldview like that of philosophy in general, separate it from dialectics and, moreover, hold that this worldview corresponds to the various conclusions of the physical sciences. They do not understand that Marxist materialism is not simple materialism, but dialectical materialism. These two fragmentary viewpoints regarding Marxist philosophy are both erroneous. Dialectical materialism is the unity of worldview and methodology.

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[4] Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) was a materialist philosopher whose view that religion was a projection of human wishes and a form of alienation attracted much attention. His critique of Hegel and of religion had a significant influence on the young Marx, reflected in the "Theses on Feuerbach" of 1845.

[5] Abram Deborin (1881–1963) was the leading figure in Soviet philosophy from the death of Lenin in 1924 until Stalin replaced him with M. Mitin in 1931. He was greatly influenced by Hegel's *Philosophical Notebooks,* and as a result was denounced following his fall as a Menshevik idealist. For a delayed echo to these attacks, see, below, note 105, on p. 619.

4. The Question of the Object of Materialist Dialectics—What Does Materialist Dialectics Serve to Study?

Lenin regarded materialist dialectics (looked at from the standpoint of the science of Marxist philosophy) as the science dealing with the principles of the development of the objective world (as reflecting this objective universe in the various domains of dialectics) and of the principles of the development of knowledge. He said, logic is not a science which deals with the external forms of thought, but it is a science which deals with the principles of development of all material, natural, and spiritual phenomena. In other words, it is a science which deals with the principles of the development of the concrete content of the whole universe and with the development of the knowledge of this content. That is to say, logic is the content, summation, and conclusion of the history of our knowledge regarding the world. Although Lenin emphasized the significance of materialist dialectics considered as the methodology of all science, this is because dialectics has emerged from the history of the knowledge of the world. Because of this he said, "Dialectics is the history of knowledge."

I have just presented Lenin's definition of materialist dialectics considered as a science, and of its object. What he means by this is, first, that materialist dialectics, like any other science, has its object of study, and this object is the most general principles of the development of nature, history, and human thought. Moreover, in carrying out such studies, the task of materialist dialectics is not to proceed from the thoughts in our heads regarding the relationship between various existing phenomena, but to derive the relationship between phenomena from observations of these phenomena themselves. There is a fundamental difference between this conception of Lenin's and the approach of the Menshevik idealists, who viewed the study of categories (in fact, divorced from concrete science and concrete knowledge) as the object of materialist dialectics. Because the Menshevik idealists endeavor to set up a compartmentalized philosophical system divorced from the knowledge of historical and social science, and from recent developments in the natural sciences, in this way they have in reality abandoned materialist dialectics. Lenin's second point is that each branch of science (mathematics, mechanics, chemistry, physics, biology, economics, and the other natural and social sciences) constitutes a particular aspect of the study of the development of the material world and of the knowledge of this world. As a result, the principles of each branch of science are narrowly limited by each concrete object of research. This is not true of the principles of materialist dialectics, which correspond to all that is valuable and general in the content of all the concrete sciences—that is, the sum, conclusion, further elaboration, and generalization of all mankind's other scientific knowledge. Thus the concepts, judgments, and principles of materialist dialectics consist in various extremely broad laws and rules (including in themselves the most general principles of all sciences and therefore applicable to the nature of the material world). This is one aspect, and in this perspective materialist dialectics constitute a worldview, but in another perspective materialist dialectics are the foundation of the logic and epistemology of all true scientific knowledge emancipated from utopianism, clericalism, and metaphysics. Hence it is the only correct and objectively based methodology for the study of the concrete sciences. Our statement that materialist dialectics, or dialectical materialism, represents the unity of worldview and methodology thus receives further elucidation. Thus we can also understand the errors of the distorters and vulgarizers of Marxist philosophy who deny the right of philosophy to exist.

As regards the question of the object of philosophy, Marx and Lenin both opposed turning philosophy into something detached from actual reality and making it into a thing endowed with its own independent nature. They pointed out the necessity of a philosophy derived from the analysis of real life and real relationships. They opposed the methods of the Menshevik idealists based purely on theoretical concepts and theoretical studies. What we refer to as the philosophy which has developed from the analysis of real life and of real relationships is precisely the theory of development known as materialist dialectics. Marx, Engels, and Lenin all explained materialist dialectics as the theory of development. Engels called materialist dialectics the theory "which deals with the general laws of development of nature, society, and thought." Lenin regarded materialist dialectics as "the most many-sided, the richest in content, and the most profound theory of development." They all considered that "apart from this theory, all formulations of the principles of development are narrow, impoverished in content, and cut in two the concrete development of nature and society." (Lenin) As for the reason materialist dialectics can be called the most many-sided, the richest in content, and the most profound of all theories of development, this is because materialist dialectics reflects most many-sidedly, with the richest content, and most profoundly the contradictions and discontinuities of the process of natural and social transformation, and for no other reason.

Under the heading of the object of philosophy we must still solve another problem, namely, the problem of the unity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology.

Lenin emphasized the unity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology, saying that "the principal questions dealt with by them show that the three names are superfluous, and that we are really dealing with one thing." He was fundamentally opposed to the practice of the Marxist revisionists, who dealt with the three as completely separate and independent theories.

Materialist dialectics is the only scientific epistemology, and it is also the only scientific logic. Materialist dialectics studies the origin and development of our knowledge of the outside world. It studies the transition from not knowing to knowing, and from incomplete knowledge to more complete knowledge; it studies how the laws of the development of nature and society are daily reflected more profoundly and more extensively in the mind of humanity. This is precisely the unity of materialist dialectics with epistemology. Materialist dialectics studies the most general laws of the development of the objective world. It studies the reflection and representation of the most highly developed aspects of the material world in thought. Thus, materialist dialectics studies the principles governing the appearance, development, diminution, and reciprocal transformations of all the processes and phenomena of real things. At the same time, it studies the representations in human thought which reflect the principles of development of the objective world. This is precisely the unity of materialist dialectics and logic.

If we wish to understand thoroughly why dialectics, logic, and epistemology are all one thing, let us now consider how materialist dialectics solves the problem of the relationship between things logical and things historical, and we will then see this clearly.

Engels said: "The superiority of Hegel's method of thought, as compared to the methods of thought in philosophy in general, lies fundamentally in its greater feeling for history. Although its form is abstract and idealist, the development of his thought often parallels the development of world history. Moreover, history is by the nature of things the confirmation of thought." History often advances in a discontinuous and confusing fashion. Because such circumstances occur, if one wants to follow history, then not only must one frequently pay attention to many unimportant materials but the process of thought may be unavoidably interrupted. In such cases, the only appropriate method is the logical method, but in science this logical method is also the historical method; it has merely been relieved of its historical expression and the chance nature inherent in history, that is all. A full measure of attention was accorded by Marx, Engels, and Lenin to such thinking, marked by "the unity of logical development and historical development." "The sphere of logic is outwardly determined by innumerable particular contingencies of life." A sphere is a distinct stage. This will help us to take cognizance of this linkage between two nets. "The practical activity of humanity? If we take the consciousness of humanity and employ it millions of times in complex and increasing fashion, in all different sorts of logical forms, these forms will then take on so-called universal significance." "Only when the practice of the human race is repeated many millions of times can it constitute the theoretical form as determined by the consciousness of humanity. These forms will have the tenacity of prejudices because they reflect the conclusions of many millions of experiences, and only then do they attain universality." The above words of Lenin make clear the peculiarities of the logic of materialist dialectics. It is not like formal logic, which unreservedly regards its laws as empty forms existing independently of their content, and without any regard for their content; nor is it like Hegelian logic, which regards its laws as existing independently from the material world. The essence of the concept of development consists in regarding laws as the reflection in and transplanting to our minds (moreover, further elaborated in our minds) of the manifestations of the movement of matter. Hegel took his stand on the unity of existence and thought. He regarded the unity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology as the unity of idealism. In Marxist philosophy, on the contrary, the unity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology is founded on a materialist basis. Only by using materialism to arrive at a solution of the problem of the relations between existence and thought, only by taking one's stand on the theory of the reflection, can one arrive at a thorough solution to the problems of dialectics, logic, and epistemology.

Marx's *Capital* must be accounted the best example of the use of dialectical materialism to solve the problem of the interrelationship between theoretical and historical things. *Capital* includes the first explanation of the historical development of capitalist society; at the same time, it also contains the logical development of this society. What is analyzed in *Capital* is the dialectics of the development of all economic patterns as reflected in the birth, development, and decay of capitalist society. The materialist nature of the solution to this question lies in the use of objective material history as a basis, and in treating concepts and categories as a reflection of this real history. The unity of the theory and history of capitalism, the unity of the logic and epistemology of capitalist society, are expressed in exemplary fashion in *Capital*. From this we can understand a little of the path followed by the unity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology.

5. On Matter

The materialist line whereby Marxism has continued and developed philosophy has correctly solved the problem of the relationship between thought and being and, in a consistently materialist manner, has pointed out the material nature of the world, the real objective existence of matter, and the fundamental nature of matter as compared to consciousness (or the dependent relationship between consciousness and being).

The material nature of the world and its objective existence is a premise for the recognition of the fundamental nature of matter in relation to consciousness. The very first condition for belonging to the materialist camp consists in recognizing the independent existence of the material world, separate from human consciousness—the fact that it existed before the appearance of humanity and has continued to exist since the appearance of humanity, independently and outside human consciousness. To recognize this point is a fundamental premise of all scientific research.

How shall we demonstrate this? The proofs are extremely numerous. Humanity is constantly in contact with the external world and must, moreover, struggle fiercely against the pressure and resistance of the outside world (nature and society). Moreover, we not only must but can overcome this pressure and resistance. All these real circumstances of the social practice of humanity, as manifested in the historical development of human society, are the best proof [of the existence of the material world]. Throughout the course of the 10,000-*li* Long March, the Red Army had no doubts about the objective existence of the regions it traversed, the Yangzi and Yellow Rivers, the snow-covered mountains, and the grasslands, or the enemy armies which did battle with it, and so on; neither did it doubt the objective existence of the Red Army itself.[6] China doubts neither the objective existence of Japanese imperialism which has invaded our country, nor that of the Chinese people themselves. The students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University also do not doubt the objective existence of this university and of the students themselves. All these things are material things which exist objectively and independently, separate from our consciousness. This is the fundamental viewpoint of all materialism, and it is also the materialist viewpoint of philosophy.

The materialist viewpoint of philosophy is not the same as the materialist viewpoint of the natural sciences. If we say that the materialist viewpoint of philosophy consists in pointing out the objective existence of matter, what we call matter refers to the whole world existing independently outside (this world acts on people's senses, stimulates their consciousness, and is, moreover, reflected in consciousness). This formulation is not subject to change throughout all eternity; it is absolute. The materialist viewpoint of the natural sciences consists in the study of the structure of matter such as, for example, the previous theory of the atom and the more recent theory of the electron. These formulations change in accordance with the progress of the natural sciences. They are relative.

To distinguish the materialist view of philosophy from the materialist view of the natural sciences, in accordance with dialectical materialism, is a necessary condition for thoroughly realizing the materialist line in philosophy, and has great significance in the struggle against idealism and mechanistic materialism.

On the basis of the discovery of the theory of the electron, the materialists have exploded the false theory of the annihilation of matter. The partisans of this latter theory do not know that the progress of scientific knowledge regarding the structure of matter has demonstrated the correctness of the theory of dialectical materialism regarding matter. Because certain attributes of matter expressed in the old concept of matter (weight, hardness, impenetrability, inertia, etc.), following the discoveries of modern natural science, that is, the discovery of the theory of the electron, have been shown to be applicable only to certain forms of matter and do not exist in other forms of matter. Facts such as these have done away with the superficiality and narrowness of the concept of matter as formulated in the old materialism and serve precisely to demonstrate the correctness of a concept of matter which recognizes the existence of the world. Originally, the view of matter of dialectical materialism saw the unity of the material world as the unity of the multiplicity of matter. There is not the slightest contradiction between this view of matter and the fact of eternal and universal movement by which matter is transformed from one form to another. The ether, electrons, atoms, molecules, crystals, cells, social phenomena, the phenomena of thought—all these are various stages in the development of matter. They are all temporary forms in the history of the development of matter. Scientific research penetrates profoundly into the discovery of various forms of matter (the discovery of the multiplicity of matter). This merely enriches the content of the concept of matter of dialectical materialism. Where can there be any contradiction in this? It is necessary to distinguish the view of matter of philosophy from the view of matter of the natural sciences, because they are not of the same breadth or narrowness, but they are not mutually contradictory because matter in the broad sense includes matter in the narrow sense.

The view of matter of dialectical materialism does not recognize all those things in the world which are called immaterial (independent spiritual things). Matter exists eternally and universally, it is limited neither in space nor in time. If we say that there exists in the world a thing "which was like this in the past and which is like this everywhere" (referring to its unity) it is nothing but the objectively existing matter spoken of in philosophy. If we consider this thing known as consciousness in the light of thoroughgoing materialism (that is, in the light of materialist dialectics), then what we call consciousness is nothing but a form of the movement of matter, a particular characteristic of the material brain of human beings; it is that particular characteristic of the material brain which causes the material processes outside consciousness to be reflected in consciousness. From this we see that when we distinguish matter from consciousness and when, moreover, we oppose them one to the other, this is only conditional; that is, it has meaning only from the standpoint of epistemology. Because consciousness or thought is only a property of matter (of the brain), the opposition between knowledge and existence, that is, between matter that knows and matter that is known,[7] cannot be much greater. Thus the opposition between the subjective and the objective has not the slightest meaning, apart from epistemology. If, apart from epistemology, we oppose idea and matter, this is nothing else but a betrayal of materialism. In the world there is nothing but matter and its various manifestations. This finds expression in the fact that the subject itself is also material, in the so-called material nature of the world (matter is eternal and universal), the objective reality of matter, and the fundamental character of matter as compared to consciousness. In a word, matter is everything in the universe. "All power belongs to Sima Yi."[8] We say, "All power belongs to matter." This is the source of the unity of the world.

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[6] This long sentence, absent from the text of Mao's lectures as published in *Kangzhan daxue*, appears in the two pamphlet editions cited above, and also in the Red Guard version.

[7] This phrase does not appear in the text as published in *Kangzhan daxue*. We have taken it from the version in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 5, p. 204; it also appears in the two brochures cited above and in the Red Guard collection.

The above is the theory of matter of dialectical materialism.

6. On Movement (on Development)

The first fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its view of matter, that is, in the recognition of the material nature of the world, of the objective reality of matter, and of the fundamental character of matter, as opposed to consciousness. This principle of the unity of the world has already been explained above in discussing matter.

The second fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its theory of movement (or theory of development). This means the recognition that movement is the form of existence of matter, an inherent attribute of matter, a manifestation of the multiplicity of matter. This is the principle of the development of the world. The combination of the principle of the development of the world with the principle of the unity of the world, set forth above, constitutes the whole of the worldview of dialectical materialism. The world is nothing but a material world in a process of unlimited development (or the material world is developing without limit).

Dialectical materialism's view of movement can admit neither (1) thinking about movement apart from matter, nor (2) thinking about matter apart from movement, nor (3) simplifying the movement of matter. Dialectical materialism's theory of movement has been established in a clear and resolute struggle against these idealist metaphysical and mechanistic viewpoints.

Dialectical materialism's theory of movement is in opposition first of all to philosophical idealism, and to the theological concepts of religion. The fundamental nature of all philosophical idealism and religious theology derives from their denial of the unity and material nature of the world, and in imagining that the movement and development of the world takes place apart from matter, or took place at least in the beginning apart from matter, and is the result of the action of spirit, God, or divine forces. The German idealist philosopher Hegel held that the present world results from the development of the so-called world idea.[9] In China the philosophy of the *Book of Changes,* and the metaphysics of the Song and the Ming, all put forward idealist views of the development of the universe. Christianity says that God created the world; Buddhism and all of China's various fetishist religions attribute the movement and development of all the myriad phenomena of the universe to spiritual forces. All these doctrines which ponder movement apart from matter are fundamentally incompatible with dialectical materialism. Moreover, not only idealism and religion but all forms of materialism prior to Marx, and all the present-day anti-Marxist mechanistic materialists, in discussing natural phenomena are partisans of a materialist theory of movement, but as soon as they talk about social phenomena there is none that does not abandon material causation and have recourse to spiritual causation.

Dialectical materialism resolutely condemns all these erroneous views of movement and points out their historically limited nature—limitations of class status and limitations imposed by the level of scientific development—and establishes its own conception of movement on the basis of a consistently materialist position, founded on a proletarian class stand and the highest level of scientific development. Dialectical materialism first points out that movement is a form of the existence of matter, that it is a category inherent in matter (it is not set in motion by outside forces). To imagine movement without matter is quite as unthinkable as to imagine matter without movement. This sharply opposes the materialist conception of movement to the idealist or spiritualist conception of movement.

To consider[10] matter separately from movement corresponds to the metaphysical concept of the immobility of the universe or absolute equilibrium. Such people imagine that matter is eternally unchanged, that matter exhibits no such thing as progress. They imagine that absolute immobility is the normal or original state of matter. Dialectical materialism resolutely combats such ideas. It holds that movement is the most universal state of matter, that it is an inherent and inseparable attribute of matter, and that movement is thus absolute. Dialectical materialism recognizes that all forms of matter have the possibility of relative rest or equilibrium; moreover, it considers that this is the most important condition for distinguishing matter and, hence, for distinguishing life (Engels).[11] But dialectical materialism also considers that rest or equilibrium are merely one element of movement, that they are merely one particular circumstance of movement. The error of thinking about matter separately from movement consists in exaggerating this component of rest or equilibrium, of using it to hide or replace the whole, of generalizing a particular circumstance of movement and transforming it into an absolute. A sentence which the metaphysical thinkers of ancient China loved to repeat—"Heaven changes not, likewise the Way changes not"[12]—corresponds to such a theory of the immobility of the universe. These thinkers also recognized movement in the universe and in social phenomena, but they did not recognize transformations in their basic nature. In their view, the basic nature of the universe and of society was eternally unchanging. The reason they adopted this attitude is to be found primarily in their class limitations. If the feudal landlord class had recognized that the basic nature of the universe and of society is subject to movement and development, then most certainly they would have been pronouncing in theory a death sentence on their own class. The philosophies of all reactionary forces are theories of immobility. Revolutionary classes and the popular masses have all perceived the principle of the development of the world and consequently advocate transforming society and the world. Their philosophy is dialectical materialism.

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[8] The best-known figure in Chinese history named Sima Yi was Cao Cao's famous general in the era of the Three Kingdoms, but we have not been able to find any reference to this particular saying.

[9] Here Mao employs the Chinese expression *li'nian*, formerly used in translating Plato, Kant, and Hegel, in the sense of "idea" in rendering Hegel's term *Weltgeist*.

[10] The text as published in *Kangzhan daxue* has "think and investigate" (*si kaocha*), and the 1946 brochure published by the Zhongguo chubanshe repeats this rather odd formulation, which has been changed or corrected in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 6, p. 285, to read simply "investigate" (*kaocha*). The version in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 5, p. 206, has simply "consider" (*sikao*), and this reading appears in the brochure published in Dalian, as well as in the Red Guard text. We follow this latter version.

[11] The reference is to Engels's *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 92–93.

Apart from this, dialectical materialism also does not recognize a simplified view of movement, that is to say, reducing all movement to a single form, namely, to mechanical motion. This is a peculiarity of the old materialist view of the universe. The old materialism (French materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the nineteenth century German materialism of Feuerbach) did, in fact, recognize the eternal existence and eternal movement of matter (they recognized the unlimited character of movement), but they nevertheless did not find a way out of the metaphysical view of the universe. This is not to say that their explanations in the domain of social theory also corresponded to an idealist theory of development, but in the theories of the natural sciences they reduced the unity of the material universe to a certain superficial category; they reduced it to one form of movement, mechanical movement, and they saw the cause of this type of movement in outside forces, just as a machine is set in motion by outside forces. They did not explain matter and movement, and the complexity of their interrelationships, whether from the standpoint of their nature or from the standpoint of internal causality. Moreover, they explained things on the basis of simplified externally perceived forms, and on the basis of causes relating to external forces, and in this way they, in reality, lost sight of the multiplicity of the world. They reduced all movement in the world to displacement from one point to another and to quantitative increase and decrease. A given material object is at a certain point at a certain instant, and at another instant it is at another point. This is called movement. If there is transformation, this transformation is merely the transformation of quantitative increase or decrease. There is no qualitative change. Change is cyclical. It is the result of recurrent birth. Dialectical materialism, on the contrary, does not regard movement simply as displacement or as cyclical movement, but regards it as of unlimited complexity, regards it as a transformation from one form to another, as the unity and movement of the matter in the world. Engels said, "Each of the higher forms of motion is necessarily connected with mechanical (external or molecular) forms of motion. For example, just as chemical action is not possible without change of temperature and electric changes, so too is organic life impossible without mechanical (molecular), thermal, electric, chemical, etc., changes. This naturally cannot be denied. But the presence of these subsidiary forms does not exhaust the essence of the main form in each case."[13] These words are absolutely in conformity with reality. Indeed, even simple mechanical movement cannot be explained from a metaphysical viewpoint, for we must know that all the forms of movement are dialectical, although the profundity and complexity of their dialectical nature varies greatly. Mechanical movement is also dialectical movement. In reality, when a certain material object is at a certain point at a certain time, it both is and is not at a certain point; what we call being in a certain place, what we call rest, is merely a certain circumstance of motion and remains fundamentally motion. A material object moves in a limited time in a limited space. All material objects are constantly overcoming such limitations, emerging from the bounds of time and space, and engaging in endless movement. Moreover, mechanical movement is merely one form of the movement of material objects. In the present real world, it never exists in absolute independence, but is always linked to other forms of movement. Heat, chemical reactions, light and electricity, and so on down to organic and social phenomena are all qualitatively different forms of the movement of matter. The epoch-making great achievements of the natural sciences at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century lay precisely in the discovery of the laws of transformation and movement. It was shown then that the movement of matter in general consists in transformation from one form to another, this new transformed aspect being fundamentally different from the old aspect. The cause of the transformation of matter is to be found not without, but within. It is not because of the impulsion of external mechanical forces, but because of the existence within the matter in question of two components different in their nature and mutually contradictory which struggle with each other, thus giving an impetus to the movement and development of the matter. As a result of the discovery of the laws of such movement and transformation, dialectical materialism is capable of enlarging the principle of the material unity of the world, extending it to the history of nature and society. Thus, not only is it possible to investigate the world considered as matter in perpetual motion, but the world can also be investigated as matter endlessly in motion from a lower form to a higher form. That is, it is possible to investigate the world as development and process. To

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[12] The quotation is from Dong Zhongshu, a scholar of the second century B.C. who wrote on the *Spring and Autumn Annals.*

[13] The quotation is from Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 328.

sum up in a single sentence, "the unified material world is a process of development." Thus the cyclical theory of the old materialism is smashed. Dialectical materialism has profoundly and comprehensively observed the forms of movement of nature and society. It holds that the process of development of the world, taken as a whole, is eternal (it has no beginning and no end), but at the same time each concrete historical form of movement is temporary (having a beginning and an end). That is, it appeared under certain conditions and will disappear under certain other conditions. Dialectical materialism holds that the process of development of the world proceeds by a lower form of movement giving birth to a higher form of movement, thus demonstrating its historical nature and temporary nature, but, at the same time, no form of movement participates in an eternal flux (a flux without beginning or end). In accordance with the principle of the struggle of opposites (the cause whereby objects cause themselves to move), in general, any given form of movement reaches a higher stage than its predecessors. It continues to move forward, but, at the same time, as far as each form of movement is concerned (as far as each concrete process of development is concerned), transformations or movements both forward and backward may occur. Movements forward and backward are linked and, taken as a whole, they constitute a complex and cyclical movement. Dialectical materialism holds that a new form of movement comes into being as the antithesis (the opposite) of the old form of movement, but, at the same time, the new form of movement necessarily preserves many elements of the old form of movement. A new thing is born out of an old thing. Dialectical materialism holds that the appearance of a new form, a new characteristic, or a new category of things arises from a rupture in the continuity and the passage through a leap resulting from a clash and a breakthrough, but, at the same time, the continuity and the reciprocal links between things can definitely not be absolutely demolished. Finally, dialectical materialism holds that the world is inexhaustible (unlimited), and this is true, not only of the world as a whole but also of its parts. Are not electrons, as well as atoms, manifestations of a complex yet inexhaustible world?

The fundamental forms of the movement of matter also determine the various basic disciplines of the natural sciences. Dialectical materialism investigates the development of the world as a progressive movement from the inorganic to the organic, and from thence to the highest form of the movement of matter (society). The relationships between the categories of these forms of movement have become the corresponding sciences (this is the basis for the relationship between the categories of the inorganic sciences, the organic sciences, and the social sciences). Engels said, "*Classification of the sciences*, each of which analyzes a single form of motion, or a series of forms of movement that belong together and pass into one another, is therefore the classification, the arrangement, of these forms of movement themselves according to their inherent sequence, and herein lies its importance."[14]

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[14] Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 330. Emphasis in original.

The world as a whole, including human society, embraces various qualitatively different forms of matter in movement. Because of this we must not forget the question of the various concrete forms of matter in movement. There are no such things as so-called matter in general and movement in general. In the world there are only many different forms of concrete matter and movement. "Expressions like matter and movement are nothing but *shorthand expressions* in which we comprehend many different sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties" (Engels).[15]

What we have just discussed is the theory of the movement of the world, or the principle of the development of the world, in accordance with dialectical materialism. This doctrine is the essence of Marxist philosophy. It is the worldview and methodology of the proletariat. If the proletariat and all revolutionaries take up this consistently scientific weapon, they will then be able to understand this world and transform this world.

7. *On Time and Space*

Motion is a form of the existence of matter, and space and time are also forms of the existence of matter. Matter in motion exists in space and time, and, moreover, the motion of matter is itself the premise for these two forms of existence of matter, space and time. Space and time cannot be separated from matter. The sentence "matter exists in space" says that matter itself possesses the capacity of expansion; the material world is a world in which the capacity of expansion exists internally. It does not suggest that matter is situated in a space which is a nonmaterial void. Neither space nor time are independent nonmaterial things; neither are they subjective forms of our perceptions. They are forms of existence of the objective material world; they are objective and have no existence apart from matter, nor does matter exist apart from them.

The view that sees space and time as forms of the existence of matter is the thoroughgoing materialist viewpoint. This conception of time and space is in fundamental opposition to the various idealist conceptions of time and space listed below:

1. The Kantian conception of time and space, which considers that time and space are not objective realities but forms of intuition of humankind.
2. The Hegelian conception of time and space, which incorporates a conception of time and space as developing, increasingly approaching the absolute Idea.
3. The Machian conception of time and space,[16] which considers that time and space are "categories of sense perception" and "instruments for the harmonization of experience."

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[15] Ibid., p. 313.

[16] Ernst Mach (1838–1916) was an Austrian physicist and philosopher, who developed the concept of empiro-criticism.

None of these idealist viewpoints recognizes the objective reality of time and space or recognizes that, in their own development, the concepts of time and space reflect materially existing forms. These incorrect theories have all been refuted one by one by dialectical materialism.

On the question of time and space, dialectical materialism not only struggles against these idealist theories listed above, it also struggles against mechanical materialism. Of particular note is Newtonian mechanics, which treats space and time as unrelated and static insubstantial entities and which situates matter within this insubstantial context. Dialectical materialism, in opposition to this theory of mechanics, points out that our conception of time and space is a developmental one. "There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time. Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but these relative conceptions go to compound absolute truth. These relative conceptions, in their development, move toward absolute truth and approach nearer and nearer to it. The mutability of human conceptions of space and time no more refutes the objective reality of space and time than the mutability of scientific knowledge of the structure and forms of matter in motion refutes the objective reality of the external world" (Lenin).[17]

This is the conception of time and space held by dialectical materialism.

8. On Consciousness

Dialectical materialism considers consciousness to be a product of matter, that it is one form of the development of matter and a specific characteristic of a definite form of matter. This materialist and historicist theory of consciousness is in fundamental opposition to the viewpoint of all idealisms and mechanical materialisms on this question.

According to the Marxist viewpoint, consciousness originated in the development from the inorganic world without consciousness to the animal world possessing rudimentary forms of consciousness; there then developed humankind which possessed high-level forms of consciousness. Such high-level forms of consciousness not only cannot be separated from the advanced nervous systems which came with physiological development; they cannot be separated from the labor and production which come with the development of society. Marx and Engels have emphatically pointed out the dependent relationship which consciousness has to the development of material production and the relationship between consciousness and the development of human language.

So-called consciousness is a particular characteristic of a definite form of matter; this form of matter is composed of a complex nervous system, and this type of nervous system can occur only at a high stage in the evolution of the natural world. The entire inorganic world, plant kingdom, and rudimentary animal kingdom—none of these has the ability to comprehend those processes which occur either within or without them; they are without consciousness. It is only the animal being that possesses an advanced nervous system that has the ability to comprehend processes; that is, which has the ability to reflect internally or comprehend these processes. The objective physiological processes of the nervous system of human beings function in line with the subjective manifestation of the forms of consciousness that they adopt internally; these are themselves all objective things, are certain types of material process; however, these simultaneously also constitute subjective psychological functions in the substance of the brain.

There is no such thing as a special mind devoted exclusively to thought, there is only thinking matter—the brain. This thinking matter is matter of a particular quality, matter which has developed to a high degree following the development of language in human social life. This matter possesses the particular characteristic of thought, something possessed by no other type of matter.

Vulgar materialists, however, consider thought to be matter secreted from within the brain; this viewpoint misrepresents our conception of this problem. It must be understood that the behavior of thought, emotion, and will is weightless, nor does it possess the capacity to expand; and yet consciousness, together with weight, the capacity to expand (*shenzhangxing*), and so on are all matter with different characteristics. Consciousness is an intrinsic condition of matter in motion; it reflects the particular characteristics of the physiological processes which occur with matter which is in motion. These particular characteristics cannot be separated from the objective processes of nerve function, but they are not identical with such processes. The confusion of these two and the repudiation of the particularity of consciousness—this is the viewpoint of vulgar materialists.

Similarly, the mechanistic theory of sham Marxism echoes the viewpoint of certain bourgeois right-wing schools of thought within psychology; this in actuality has also completely overturned consciousness. They understand consciousness as a physicochemical physiological process and consider that the study of the behavior of this advanced substance can be carried out through the study of objective physiology and biology. They do not understand the qualitatively particular characteristics of the essence of consciousness and do not recognize that consciousness is a product of the social practice of humanity.[18] For the concrete historical identity of object and subject, they substitute the equality of object and subject and the one sided mechanistic objective world. These viewpoints, which confuse consciousness with a physiological process, are tantamount to the abolition of the fundamental question of philosophy of the relationship between thought and existence. The idealism of the Mensheviks' attempts to employ a compromise theory, one which reconciles materialism and idealism, as a substitute for Marxist epistemology. They oppose the principle of dialectics through the principles of the "synthesis" of objec-

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[17] Lenin, *Materialism and Empirocriticism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), p. 203.

[18] The last two sentences are from the version in *Bujuan* (Knight, note 65, p. 130).

tivism and subjectivism and the "mutual assistance" of these two methods, but this principle of dialectics is both nonmechanistic objectivism and nonidealist subjectivism and represents the concrete historical identity of objective and subjective.

Finally, there is another singular ideology, Plekhanov's animist view on the problem of consciousness, which is fully expressed in his celebrated dictum "a stone also possesses consciousness." According to this viewpoint, consciousness does not occur in the process of development of matter, but exists in all matter from the very beginning; there is only a difference of degree between the consciousness of humans, low-level organisms, and a stone. This antihistorical viewpoint is fundamentally opposed to the viewpoint of dialectical materialism, which considers consciousness the ultimately occurring particular characteristic of matter.

Only dialectical materialism's theory of consciousness is the correct theory on problems of consciousness.

9. On Reflection

To be a thoroughgoing materialist, it is insufficient simply to acknowledge the material origins of consciousness; the knowability of matter by consciousness must also be acknowledged.

The question of whether or not matter can be known is a complex one; it is a question which all philosophers of the past have felt powerless to deal with. Only dialectical materialism is able to provide the correct solution. On this question, the standpoint of dialectical materialism has been in opposition to agnosticism and is different from straightforward realism.

The agnosticism of Hume and Kant isolates the subject of knowledge from the object and considers that it is not possible to transcend the limits which isolate the subject; between the "thing-in-itself" and its outward form exists an impassable chasm.

The straightforward realism of Machism equates the object with sense perceptions and considers that the truth is already established in final form in sense perceptions. At the same time, Machism not only does not understand that sense perceptions are a result of the effects of the external world, it, moreover, does not understand the active role of the subject in the process of cognition, namely, the transformative work of the sense organs and thinking brain of the subject, on the effects of the external world (such that two forms—impressions and concepts—are made manifest).

It is only the theory of reflection of dialectical materialism which has positively answered the problem of knowability to become the "soul" of Marxist epistemology. This theory has clearly demonstrated that our impressions and concepts not only arise from objective things but also reflect them. It demonstrates that impressions and concepts are neither a product of the spontaneous development of the subject as the idealists suggest nor the label given objective things as suggested by the agnostics; they are, rather, the reflection of objective things, a photographic image and sample copy of them.

Objective truth exists independently and does not depend on the subject. Although it is reflected in our sense perceptions and concepts, it achieves form gradually rather than instantaneously. The viewpoint of straightforward realism, which considers that objective truth achieves final form in sense perceptions and that we gain it thus, is a mistaken one.

Although objective truth does not achieve final form at once in our sense perceptions and concepts, it is not unknowable. The reflection theory of dialectical materialism opposes the viewpoint of agnosticism and considers that consciousness can reflect objective truth in the process of cognition. The process of cognition is a complex one; in this process, when the as-yet unknown "thing-in-itself" is reflected in our sense perceptions, impressions, and concepts, it becomes a "thing-for-us." Sense perceptions and thought certainly do not, as Kant has stated, isolate us from the external world; rather, they are what links us with it. Sense perceptions and thought are reflections of the objective external world. Mental things (impressions and concepts) can be no other than "material things, altered and transformed, within the brain of humanity" (Marx). In the process of cognition, the material world is increasingly reflected in our knowledge more closely, more precisely, more multifariously, and more profoundly. It is the task of Marxist epistemology to carry on a struggle on two fronts against Machism and Kantianism, and to expose the errors of strident realism and agnosticism.

The reflection theory of materialist dialectics considers that our capacity to know the objective world is limitless; this view is in fundamental opposition to the viewpoint of the agnostics who consider the human capacity for knowledge to be limited. However, there are definite historical limits on each approach we make to absolute truth. Lenin referred to it thus: "The *limits* of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is *unconditional* and the fact that we are approaching near to it is also unconditional. The contours of the picture are historically conditional, but the fact that this picture depicts an objectively existing model is unconditional."[19] We acknowledge that human knowledge is subject to the limitations of historical conditions and that truth cannot be achieved at once. But we are not agnostics and recognize that truth becomes complete in the historical movement of human knowledge. Lenin also stated: "The reflection of nature in man's thought must be understood not 'lifelessly,' not 'abstractly,' *not devoid of movement, not without contradictions*; but in the eternal *process* of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution."[20] The movement of knowledge is complex and replete with contradictions and struggle. This is the viewpoint of the epistemology of dialectical materialism.

The antihistorical standpoint of all those philosophies which, epistemologically, do not treat knowledge as a process is consequently a narrow one. This narrow viewpoint in the empiricism of sensationalism[21] has created a deep chasm between sense perceptions and concepts; in the rationalist school, it has caused concepts to become divorced from sense perceptions. It is only the epistemology of dialectical materialism (reflection theory) which treats knowledge as a process and, in so doing, thoroughly eliminates this narrow viewpoint; it does so by attributing to knowledge a material and dialectical status.

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[19] The quotation is from Lenin, *Materialism and Empiro-Criticism*, pp. 152–53.

[20] Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*," *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 195.

Reflection theory points out: The process of reflection is not limited to sense perceptions and impressions and exists in thought (in abstract concepts); knowledge is a process of motion from sense perceptions to thought. As Lenin has said: "Knowledge is the reflection of nature. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation of concepts, laws, etc."[22]

At the same time, Lenin has pointed out: "The process of knowledge involving a movement from sense perceptions to thought is accomplished through a leap." Lenin, here, has clearly expounded the dialectical materialist viewpoint of the interrelationship between experiential and rational elements in cognition. Many philosophers do not comprehend the sudden change that occurs within the process of the movement of knowledge, that is, the process of movement from sense perceptions to thought (from impressions to concepts). Consequently, to understand this transformation, which is produced by contradiction and adopts the form of a leap, namely, to comprehend that the identity of sense perceptions and thought is a dialectical identity, is to have comprehended the most important element of the essence of Lenin's reflection theory.

10. On Truth

Truth is objective and relative; it is also absolute—this is the viewpoint on truth of materialist dialectics.

First of all, truth is objective. To have recognized the objective existence of matter and the origin of consciousness in matter is to recognize the objective character of truth. So-called objective truth, that is, the objectively existing material world, is the only source of the content of our knowledge or concepts; there is no other source. It is only idealists who deny that the material world exists independently of human consciousness—this fundamental principle of idealism maintains that knowledge or concepts emerge subjectively and spontaneously and without any objective content. Because of this, it acknowledges subjective truth and rejects objective truth. This is, however, at odds with reality, for any knowledge or concept which fails to reflect the laws of the objective world is not scientific knowledge or objective truth; it is superstition or wishful thinking which subjectively engages in self-deception and the deception of others. All practical activity of humanity which has as its purpose the transformation of the environment is subject to the direction of thought (knowledge), regardless of whether it be productive activity, activity involving class struggle or national struggle, or any other forms of activity. If this thought does not conform to objective laws, that is, if objective laws are not reflected in the brain of the person undertaking the action and do not constitute the content of his thought or knowledge, then that action will certainly not be able to achieve its purpose. The errors made by so-called subjective guidance within the revolutionary movement are indicative of this sort of situation. Marxism became revolutionary scientific knowledge precisely because it correctly reflected the actual laws of the objective world; it is objective truth. All thought that opposes Marxism is therefore incorrect because it is not founded on correct objective laws and is completely subjective wishful thinking. There are those who say that what is universally accepted is objective truth (the subjective idealist Bogdanov[23] stated this view). According to this viewpoint, then, religion and prejudice are also objective truth because, although religion and prejudice are in fact erroneous views, they are frequently widely accepted by a majority of people, and sometimes correct scientific thought cannot overturn these erroneous widely held beliefs. Materialist dialectics is fundamentally opposed to this viewpoint; it considers that it is only scientific knowledge which correctly reflects objective laws which can be designated as truth. All truth must be objective. Truth and falsity are absolutely in opposition. The only way to determine whether any knowledge is truth is to see whether it reflects objective laws. If it does not conform to objective laws, even though it is acknowledged by the general populace or by certain wildly extravagant theories within the revolutionary movement, it can only be treated as erroneous.

The first problem of the theory of truth of materialist dialectics is the question of subjective and objective truth. Its response is to deny the former and recognize the latter. Its second problem is the question of absolute and relative truth. Its response is, while recognizing both, it does not one-sidedly accept or reject either aspect; moreover, it points out that the relationship between them is correct, that it is dialectical.[24]

It is absolute truth it acknowledges when materialist dialectics acknowledges objective truth. This is because when we say the content of knowledge is a reflection of the objective world, that is the same as acknowledging the object of our knowledge is that external absolute world. "All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and hence essentially absolute" (Engels).[25] However, objective absolute truth does not instantaneously and completely become the knowledge that we have; rather, through the introduction of countless relative truths in the limitless process of development of our thought, absolute truth is arrived at. The sum total of these countless relative truths is the manifestation of absolute truth. By its very nature, human thought can provide us with absolute truth. Absolute truth can come about only from the accumulation of many relative truths. Each stage of the development of science adds a new dimension to the sum total of absolute truth. However, the limits of the truth of each scientific principle are invariably relative; absolute truth is manifest only in countless relative truths; and if it is not so manifest through relative truth, absolute truth could not be known. Materialist dialectics certainly does not deny the relativity of all knowledge; but in doing so it is only indicating the historically conditional character of the limits of our knowledge's approximation to objective absolute truth and not suggesting that knowledge itself is only relative. All inventions of science are historically limited and relative. But scientific knowledge is different from falsehood; it displays and depicts objective absolute truth. This is the dialectical viewpoint on the interrelationship between absolute and relative truth.

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[21] Sensationalism (*ganjuezhuyi*) is the doctrine that knowledge is derived solely from the senses.

[22] Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*," in *Collected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), Vol. 38, p. 182.

[23] Regarding Bogdanov, see, below, the relevant note to the "Notes on a Course of Dialectical Materialism" by Shirokov and others.

[24] We have taken this paragraph from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 218.

There are two viewpoints, both of which are incorrect, on the question of the interrelationship between absolute and relative truth. One is metaphysical materialism, the other is idealist relativism. [In the Chinese, this is run on with what follows.]

On the basis of their fundamental metaphysical principle of "the unchangeable material world," metaphysical materialists consider that human thought is also unchanging; that is, they consider that this unchanging objective world can instantaneously and in its entirety be absorbed in human consciousness. That is, they acknowledge absolute truth, but for them it is acquired only once by humans; they regard truth as immobile and lifeless, something that does not develop. Their error resides not in acknowledging that there is absolute truth—to acknowledge this point is correct. It is, rather, in their failure to understand the historical character of truth and in their not perceiving the acquisition of truth as a process of cognition. It resides also in their not understanding that absolute truth can only come to fruition little by little in the process of development of human knowledge and that every step forward in knowledge expresses the content of absolute truth; that, in relation to complete truth, however, such knowledge possesses only relative significance and certainly cannot instantaneously achieve the completeness of absolute truth. The viewpoint on truth of metaphysical materialism is an expression of one extreme of epistemology.

The other extreme within epistemology on the question of truth is idealist relativism. People of this persuasion deny that knowledge is characterized by absolute truth, only acknowledging its relative significance. They consider that all scientific discoveries contain no absolute truth; they are thus not objective truth. Truth

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[25] Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 310.

is only subjective and relative. Consequently, all erroneous viewpoints have the right to exist. Where imperialism invades a weak and small nation, where a ruling class exploits the laboring masses, this doctrine of invasion and system of exploitation are also truth, since truth is only subjective and relative in any case. The result of the rejection of objective and absolute truth inevitably leads to this conclusion. Moreover, the purpose of idealist relativism is actually to present the case for the ruling class; for example, the purpose of relativist pragmatism (or experimentalism) is just that.

It can therefore be seen that neither metaphysical materialism nor idealist relativism can correctly solve the problem of the interrelationship between absolute and relative truth. Only materialist dialectics can provide the correct answer to the problem of the relationship between thought and existence and consequently determine the objectivity of scientific knowledge; furthermore, it provides at the same time a correct understanding of absolute and relative truth. This is the theory of truth of materialist dialectics.

11. On Practice (On the Relationship Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Theory and Reality, Between Knowing and Doing)[26]

Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart from the social nature of man and apart from his historical development and was therefore incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on production and on class struggle.

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[26] In his version of this text, Nick Knight has omitted the sections on practice and on contradiction from the lecture notes on dialectical materialism and has presented them separately under the titles "On Practice" and "On Contradiction." We have left the revised texts in the place they originally occupied. As regards form, Knight has adopted different practices in dealing with these two texts, using bold for those passages from the earliest versions omitted in the *Selected Works* in the case of "On Practice" and for those passages retained in the case of "On Contradiction." It would scarcely have been possible to follow him in this respect while presenting both of these essays as parts of an integrated whole. We have therefore retained the procedure employed throughout this edition: setting in italics those passages omitted from the *Selected Works*. It must be acknowledged, however, that the case of "On Contradiction" is a very special one. In all the other texts revised in the early 1950s for inclusion in the official edition of Mao's writings, including "On Practice," the changes consist in the omission of viewpoints inconsistent with post-1949 orthodoxy and of historical references no longer judged appropriate, together with some modifications in style and vocabulary. The text of "On Contradiction" was, in contrast, the object on Mao's part of a detailed and time-consuming revision which led to its being held over to Volume 2 of the first Chinese edition of his writings and turned it into a substantially new work. That being the case, some readers may prefer to consult the revised version as it appears in the *Selected Works*, as the latest expression of Mao's thought on this question. Nevertheless, the differences between the 1937 lectures and the 1951 essay, as documented here, remain of interest.

Above all, Marxists regard man's activity in production as the most fundamental practical activity, the determinant of all his other activities. Man's knowledge depends mainly on his activity in material production, through which he comes gradually to understand natural phenomena, the properties of nature (the laws of nature),[27] and the relationship between himself and nature; and through his activity in production he also comes at the same time to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between man and man.[28] None of this knowledge can be acquired apart from activity in production. Every person,[29] as a member of society, joins in common effort with the other members,[30] and engages in production to meet man's material needs.[31] This is the primary source from which human knowledge develops.

Man's social practice is not confined to activity in production, but takes many other forms—class struggle, political life, scientific[32] pursuits; in short, as a social being, man participates in all spheres of the practical life of society. Thus man[33] comes to know the different relations between man and man, not only through his material life but also through his political and cultural life (both of which are intimately bound up with material life). Of these other types of social practice, class struggle in particular, in all its various forms, exerts a profound influence on the development of man's knowledge. The reason for this is that in class society[34] every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class.[35]

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[27] The properties of nature (the laws of nature) → The properties of nature, the laws of nature

[28] Comes at the same time to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between man and man → Gradually comes to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between man and man

[29] Every person → In a classless society, every person

[30] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "enters into definite relations of production with them."

[31] In the *Selected Works* version, the following sentence is added here: "In all class societies, the members of the different social classes also enter, in different ways, into definite relations of production, and engage in production to meet their material needs."

[32] Scientific → Scientific and artistic

[33] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts "in varying degrees."

[34] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "everyone lives as a member of a particular class."

[35] Here the following paragraph has been added in the *Selected Works* version:

> Marxists hold that in human society activity in production develops step by step from a lower to a higher level and that, consequently, man's knowledge, whether of nature or of society, also develops step by step from a lower to a higher level, that is, from the shallower to the deeper, from the one-sided to the many-sided. For a very long period in history, men were necessarily confined to a one-sided understanding of the history of society because, for one thing, the bias of the exploiting classes always distorted history and, for another, the small scale of production limited man's outlook. It was not until the modern proletariat emerged along with immense forces of production (large-scale industry) that man was able to acquire a comprehensive, historical understanding of the development of society and turn this knowledge into a science, the science of Marxism.

Because of this, Marxists hold that man's social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that man's knowledge is strengthened[36] only when he achieves the anticipated results in the process of social practice (material production, class struggle, or scientific experiment). *Why is it that peasants are unable to harvest their crops, workers are unable to use their tools, there are strikes and struggle, troops go to war, and the national revolution has not achieved victory? It is because man's knowledge has not faithfully reflected the regularities of the processes of the external world, and therefore cannot achieve the anticipated results in his practical activities.* If a man wants to succeed,[37] that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world and can thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by "failure is the mother of success" and "a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit." The dialectical materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice and repudiating all the erroneous theories which deny the importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice. Thus Lenin said, "Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality."[38] The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding characteristics. One is its class nature: It openly avows that dialectical materialism is in the service of the proletariat. The other is its practicality: It emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice, emphasizes that theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice. The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective feelings but by objective results in social practice. Only social practice can be the criterion of truth. The standpoint of practice is the primary and basic standpoint in the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge.

But how then does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice? This will become clear if we look at the process of development of knowledge.

In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance, the Guomindang Central Investigation Team[39] comes to Yan'an on a tour of observation. In the first day or two, they see its topography, streets, and houses; they meet many people; attend banquets, evening parties, and mass meetings; hear talk of various kinds; and read various documents—all these being the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in Yan'an act on the sense organs of the gentlemen of the Investigation Team, evoke sense perceptions, and give rise in their brains to many impressions together with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw theoretical[40] conclusions.

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[36] Strengthened → Verified

[37] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "in his work."

[38] Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*," p. 213.

[39] In the *Selected Works* version, both here and in the following paragraph, the Guomindang Central Investigation Team becomes "some people from outside." For Mao's address of welcome on the occasion of this visit, see Volume V, pp. 673–74.

As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change[41] takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects, and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality, and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further by means of judgment and inference, one is able to draw theoretical[42] conclusions. The expression in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms,*[43] "knit the brows and a stratagem comes to mind," or in everyday language, "let me think it over," refers to man's use of concepts in the brain to form judgments and inferences. *This is the rational stage of knowledge, otherwise known as its logical stage.* This is the second stage of cognition. When the gentlemen of the Investigation Team have collected various data and, what is more, have "thought them over," they are able to arrive at the judgment that "the Communist Party's policy of the national united front against Japan *and cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party* is thorough, sincere, and genuine." Having made this judgment, they can, if they too are genuine about uniting to save the nation, go a step further and draw the following conclusion: "Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party can succeed."[44] This stage of conception, judgment, and inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing a thing.[45] *The real task of knowing is not perceptual knowledge but rational knowledge.* The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive[46] at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws and of the internal relations between one process and another, *of the internal relations between objective processes*, that is, to arrive at theoretical[47] knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena, and the external relations of things, whereas logical knowledge takes a big stride forward to reach the totality, the essence, and the internal relations of things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world. Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal relations of all its aspects.

This dialectical materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, was never worked out by anybody before the rise of Marxism. Marxist *dialectical* materialism solved this problem correctly for the first time, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the deepening movement of cognition, the movement by which man in society progresses from perceptual knowledge to logical knowledge in his complex, constantly recurring practice of production and class struggle. Lenin said, "The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short, all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly, and completely."[48] Lenin also pointed out[49] that each of the two stages in the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that what is perceived cannot at once be comprehended and that only what is comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem of phenomena; comprehension[50] alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these problems is not separable in the slightest degree from practice. Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is, by living (practicing) in its environment. In feudal society it was impossible to know the laws of capitalist society in advance because capitalism had not yet emerged; the relevant practice was lacking. Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society. In the era of laissez-faire capitalism, it could not know[51] certain laws peculiar to the era of imperialism beforehand, because imperialism[52] had not yet emerged and the relevant practice was lacking; only Leninism[53] could

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[40] Theoretical → Logical

[41] Sudden change → Sudden change (leap)

[42] Theoretical → Logical

[43] *Sanguo yanyi*, commonly translated as *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, was one of Mao's favorite Chinese classical novels. It deals in large part with war and strategy during the era of the Three Kingdoms (A.D. 221–264).

[44] "Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party can succeed" → "The national united front against Japan can succeed."

[45] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the sentence: "It is the stage of rational knowledge."

[46] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts "step by step."

[47] Theoretical → Logical

[48] Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*," p. 171.

[49] Lenin also pointed out → Marxism-Leninism holds

[50] Comprehension → Theory

[51] In the era of laissez-faire capitalism, it could not know → Marx, in the era of laissez-faire capitalism, could not concretely know

[52] Imperialism → Imperialism, the last stage of capitalism,

[53] Leninism → Lenin and Stalin

tion, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in Yan'an act on the sense organs of the gentlemen of the Investigation Team, evoke sense perceptions, and give rise in their brains to many impressions together with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw theoretical[40] conclusions.

As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change[41] takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects, and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality, and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further by means of judgment and inference, one is able to draw theoretical[42] conclusions. The expression in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms,*[43] "knit the brows and a stratagem comes to mind," or in everyday language, "let me think it over," refers to man's use of concepts in the brain to form judgments and inferences. *This is the rational stage of knowledge, otherwise known as its logical stage.* This is the second stage of cognition. When the gentlemen of the Investigation Team have collected various data and, what is more, have "thought them over," they are able to arrive at the judgment that "the Communist Party's policy of the national united front against Japan *and cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party* is thorough, sincere, and genuine." Having made this judgment, they can, if they too are genuine about uniting to save the nation, go a step further and draw the following conclusion: "Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party can succeed."[44] This stage of conception, judgment, and inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing a thing.[45] *The real task of knowing is not perceptual knowledge but rational knowledge.* The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive[46] at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws and of the internal relations between one process and another, *of the internal relations between objective processes*, that is, to arrive at theoretical[47] knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena, and the external relations of things, whereas logical knowledge takes a big stride forward to reach the totality, the essence, and the internal relations of things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world. Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal relations of all its aspects.

This dialectical materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, was never worked out by anybody before the rise of Marxism. Marxist *dialectical* materialism solved this problem correctly for the first time, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the deepening movement of cognition, the movement by which man in society progresses from perceptual knowledge to logical knowledge in his complex, constantly recurring practice of production and class struggle. Lenin said, "The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short, all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly, and completely."[48] Lenin also pointed out[49] that each of the two stages in the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that what is perceived cannot at once be comprehended and that only what is comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem of phenomena; comprehension[50] alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these problems is not separable in the slightest degree from practice. Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is, by living (practicing) in its environment. In feudal society it was impossible to know the laws of capitalist society in advance because capitalism had not yet emerged; the relevant practice was lacking. Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society. In the era of laissez-faire capitalism, it could not know[51] certain laws peculiar to the era of imperialism beforehand, because imperialism[52] had not yet emerged and the relevant practice was lacking; only Leninism[53] could

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[40] Theoretical → Logical

[41] Sudden change → Sudden change (leap)

[42] Theoretical → Logical

[43] *Sanguo yanyi*, commonly translated as *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, was one of Mao's favorite Chinese classical novels. It deals in large part with war and strategy during the era of the Three Kingdoms (A.D. 221–264).

[44] "Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party can succeed" → "The national united front against Japan can succeed."

[45] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the sentence: "It is the stage of rational knowledge."

[46] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts "step by step."

[47] Theoretical → Logical

[48] Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*," p. 171.

[49] Lenin also pointed out → Marxism-Leninism holds

[50] Comprehension → Theory

[51] In the era of laissez-faire capitalism, it could not know → Marx, in the era of laissez-faire capitalism, could not concretely know

[52] Imperialism → Imperialism, the last stage of capitalism,

[53] Leninism → Lenin and Stalin

undertake this task. *Marxism-Leninism also could not have been produced in the economically backward colonies because, although they were contemporaneous with them, there was a difference in location.* Leaving aside their genius, the reason Marx, Engels, and Lenin[54] could work out their theories was mainly that they personally took part in the practice of the class struggle and the scientific experimentation of their time; lacking this condition, no genius could have succeeded. The saying "Without stepping outside his gate the scholar[55] knows all the wide world's affairs" was mere empty talk in past times, when technology was undeveloped. Even though this saying can be valid in the present age of developed technology, the people with real personal knowledge are those engaged in practice the wide world over. And it is only when these people have come to "know" through their practice, and when their knowledge has reached him through writing and the transmission of technology, that the "scholar" can indirectly "know all the wide world's affairs." If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in practice[56] to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in practice[57] to change reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge which every man actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters, argue to the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the world is the "know-it-all" who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and proclaims himself "the world's number one authority"; this merely shows that he has not taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is definitely the reverse—honesty and modesty. If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must make the experiments of the chemist[58] to change the state of the atom. If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. But one cannot have direct experience of everything; as a matter of fact, most of our knowledge comes from indirect experience, for example, all knowledge from past times and foreign lands. To our ancestors and to foreigners, such knowledge was—or is—a matter of direct experience, and this knowledge is reliable if, in the course of their direct experience, the requirement of "scientific (*correct, serious, not absurd*) abstraction," spoken of by Lenin, was—or is—fulfilled,[59] otherwise, it is not reliable. Hence a man's knowledge consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that which comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what is indirect experience for me is direct experience for other people. Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any kind is inseparable from direct experience. All knowledge originates in perception of the objective external world through man's physical sense organs. Anyone who denies such perception, denies direct experience, or denies personal participation in the practice that changes reality is not a materialist. That is why the "know-it-all" is ridiculous. *Chinese merchants have a saying, "If you want to profit from household animals, you must live with them." This holds true for the profit-making of the merchant,*[60] and also holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.

To make clear the dialectical materialist movement of cognition arising on the basis of the practice which changes reality—to make clear the gradually deepening movement of cognition—a few additional concrete examples are given below.

In its knowledge of *the process of* capitalism,[61] the proletariat was only in the perceptual stage of cognition in the first period of its practice, the period of machine-smashing and spontaneous struggle; it knew only some of the aspects and the external relations of the phenomena of capitalism. The proletariat was then still a "class-in-itself." But when it reached the later[62] period of its practice, the period of conscious and organized economic and political struggles, the proletariat was able to comprehend the essence of capitalist society, the relations of exploitation between social classes,[63] *and create the theory of Marxism*; and it was able to do so because of its own practice and because of the *lessons taught it through* experience of prolonged struggle.[64] It was then that the proletariat became a "class-for-itself."

Similarly with the Chinese people's knowledge of imperialism. The first stage was one of superficial, perceptual knowledge, as shown in the indiscriminate anti-foreign struggles of the movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Yihetuan [Boxer] movement, and so on. It was only in the second stage that the Chinese people reached the stage of rational knowledge, saw the internal and external contradictions of imperialism, and saw the essential truth that imperialism had allied itself with China's feudal classes[65] to oppress and exploit the great masses of the Chinese people. This knowledge began about the time of the May Fourth movement.

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[54] Marx, Engels, and Lenin → Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin

[55] The term here translated "scholar" is *xiucai*, the lowest rank in the former imperial examination system.

[56] Practice → The practical struggle

[57] Practice → The practical struggle

[58] The experiments of the chemist → Physical and chemical experiments

[59] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "and objective reality scientifically reflected"

[60] In the *Selected Works* text, this saying of Chinese merchants is replaced with: "There is an old Chinese saying, 'How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger's lair?' This saying holds true for man's practice."

[61] Capitalism → Capitalist society

[62] Later → Second

[63] Here the *Selected Works* version adds "and its own historical task,"

[64] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "which Marx and Engels scientifically summed up in all its variety to create the theory of Marxism for the education of the proletariat."

[65] Feudal classes → Comprador and feudal classes

Next, let us consider war. If those who lead a war lack experience of war, then at the initial stage they will not understand the profound laws pertaining to the directing of a specific war (such as our Soviet War[66] of the past decade). At the initial stage they will merely experience a good deal of fighting and, what is more, suffer many defeats. But this experience (the experience of battles won and especially of battles lost) enables them to comprehend the inner thread of the whole war, namely, the laws of that specific war, to understand its strategy and tactics, and consequently to direct the war with confidence. If, at such a moment, the command is turned over to an inexperienced person, then he too will have to suffer a number of defeats (gain experience) before he can comprehend the true laws of the war.

"I am not sure I can handle it." We often hear this remark when a comrade hesitates to accept an assignment. Why is he unsure of himself? Because he has no systematic understanding of the content and circumstances of the assignment or because he has had little or no contact with such work, and so the laws governing it are beyond him. After a detailed analysis of the nature and circumstances of the assignment, he will feel more sure of himself and do it willingly. If he spends some time at the job and gains experience, and if he is a person who is willing to look into *objective* matters with an open mind and not one who approaches problems subjectively, one-sidedly, and superficially, then he can draw conclusions for himself as to how to go about the job and do it with much more courage. Only those who are subjective, one-sided, and superficial in their approach to problems will smugly issue orders or directives the moment they arrive on the scene, without considering the circumstances, without viewing things in their totality (their history and their present state as a whole) and without getting to the essence of things (their nature and the internal relationship between one thing and another). Such people are bound to trip and fall.

Thus it can be seen that the first step in the process of cognition is contact with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgment, and inference. It is only when the data of perception are very rich (not fragmentary) and correspond to reality (are not illusory) that they can be the basis for forming correct concepts and theories.

Here two important points must be emphasized. The first, which has been stated before but should be repeated here, is the dependence of rational knowledge upon perceptual knowledge. Anyone who thinks that rational knowledge need not be derived from perceptual knowledge is an idealist. In the history of philosophy there is the "rationalist" school that admits the reality only of reason and not of experience, believing that reason alone is reliable while perceptual experience is not; this school errs by turning things upside down. The rational is reliable precisely because it has its source in sense perceptions; otherwise, it would be like water without a source, a tree without roots, subjective, self-engendered, and unreliable. As to the sequence in the process of cognition, perceptual experience comes first; we stress the significance of social practice in the process of cognition precisely because social practice alone can give rise to human knowledge and it alone can start man on the acquisition of perceptual experience from the objective world. For a person who shuts his eyes, stops his ears and totally cuts himself off from the objective world there can be no such thing as knowledge. Knowledge begins with experience—this is the materialism[67] of knowledge.

The second point is that knowledge needs to be deepened,[68] needs to be developed to the rational stage—this is the dialectics of the theory of knowledge. To think that knowledge can stop at the lower, perceptual stage and that perceptual knowledge alone is reliable while rational knowledge is not would be to repeat the historical theory[69] of "empiricism." This theory errs in failing to understand that, although the data of perception reflect certain realities in the objective world (I am not speaking here of idealist empiricism which confines experience to[70] introspection), they are merely one-sided and superficial, reflecting things incompletely and not reflecting their essence. Fully to reflect a thing in its totality, to reflect its essence, to reflect its inherent laws, it is necessary through the exercise of thought to reconstruct the rich data of sense perception, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside, in order to form a system of concepts and theories—it is necessary to make a change[71] from perceptual to rational knowledge. Such reconstructed knowledge is not more empty or more unreliable; on the contrary, whatever has been scientifically reconstructed in the process of cognition, on the basis of practice, reflects objective reality, as Lenin said, more deeply, more truly, more fully. As against this, vulgar "practical men" respect experience but despise theory and therefore cannot have a comprehensive view of an entire objective process, lack clear direction and long-range perspective, and are complacent over occasional successes and glimpses of the truth. If such persons direct a revolution, they will lead it up a blind alley.

Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge—this is the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. In philosophy, neither rationalism nor empiricism understands the historical or the dialectical nature of knowledge, and, although each of these schools contains one aspect of the truth (here I am referring to materialist, not to idealist, rationalism and empiricism), both are wrong on the theory of knowledge as a whole. The dialectical materialist movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational holds true for a minor process of cognition (for instance,[72] a single thing or task) as well as for a major process of cognition (for instance, a whole society or a revolution).

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[66] Soviet War → Agrarian Revolutionary War

[67] Materialism → Materialism of the theory

[68] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the words "that the perceptual stage of knowledge"

[69] Theory → Error

[70] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the expression "so-called"

[71] Change → Leap

But the movement of knowledge does not end here. If the dialectical materialist movement of knowledge were to stop at rational knowledge, only half the problem would be dealt with. And, as far as Marxist philosophy is concerned, only the less important half at that. Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem lies not in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."[73] *Each of man's actions (practice) is guided by his thought, so naturally without thought there can be no action whatsoever.* But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it, and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no use.[74] Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return to practice. Not only does the active function of knowledge manifest itself in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge but—and this is more important—it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of *the reality of* the world must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied anew in the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle and in the practice of scientific experiment. This is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition. The problem of whether theory *or rational knowledge* corresponds to objective reality is not, and cannot be, completely solved in the movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, mentioned above. The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect rational knowledge to social practice, apply theory to practice, and see whether it can achieve the objectives one has in mind. Many theories of natural science are held to be true not only because they were so considered when they were discovered,[75] but because they have been verified in subsequent scientific practice. Similarly, Marxism[76] is held to be true not only because it was so considered when it was scientifically formulated by Marx[77] but because it has been verified in the subsequent practice of revolutionary class struggle.[78] Whether or not dialectical materialism is the truth depends on whether[79] it is impossible for anyone to escape from its domain in his practice. The *practice of* the history of[80] knowledge tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous, and it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected. That is why "practice is the criterion of truth" and why "the standpoint of practice[81] should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge."[82] Stalin has well said, "Theory which departs from practice is empty theory; practice which departs from theory gropes in the dark."[83]

When we get to this point, is the movement of knowledge completed? Our answer is: it is, and yet it is not. When men in society throw themselves into the practice of changing a certain objective process (whether natural or social) at a certain stage of its development, they can, as a result of the reflection of the objective process in their brains and the exercise of their subjective activity, advance their knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, and create ideas, theories, plans, or programs which correspond in general to the laws of that objective process. They then apply these ideas, theories, plans, or programs in practice in the same objective process. And if they can realize the aims they have in mind, that is, if in that same process of practice they can translate, or on the whole translate, those previously formulated ideas, theories, plans, or programs into fact, then the movement of knowledge may be considered completed with regard to this particular process. In the process of changing nature, take, for example, the fulfillment of an engineering plan, the verification of a scientific hypothesis, the manufacture of an implement or the reaping of a crop; or, in the process of changing society, take, for example, the victory of a strike, victory in a war, the fulfillment of an educational plan, *the establishment of an organization to save the nation.* All these may be considered the realization of aims one has in mind. But generally speaking, whether in the practice of changing nature or of changing society, men's original ideas, theories, plans, or programs are seldom realized without any alteration. This is because people engaged in changing reality are usually

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[72] For instance, → For instance, knowing

[73] Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), ch. 1, section 4, p. 41; idem, *Collected Works* (Moscow, 1961), Vol. 5, p. 369.

[74] Use → Significance

[75] When they were discovered → When natural scientists originated them

[76] Marxism → Marxism-Leninism

[77] Marx → Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin

[78] Revolutionary class struggle → Revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle (This addition can also be found in the 1946 edition of Mao's lecture notes.)

[79] Whether or not dialectical materialism is the truth depends on whether → Dialectical materialism is universally true because

[80] Of → Of human

[81] Of practice → Of life, of practice

[82] Lenin, *Materialism and Empiro-Criticism,* p. 141.

[83] Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," in *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 31. The *Selected Works* text contains a slightly different Chinese translation of this well-known quotation from Stalin.

subject to numerous limitations; they are limited not only by existing scientific and technological conditions but also by[84] the degree to which this process has become manifest (the aspects and the essence of the objective process have not yet been fully revealed). In such a situation, ideas, theories, plans, or programs are usually altered partially and sometimes even wholly because of the discovery of unforeseen circumstances in the course of practice. That is, it does happen that the original ideas, theories, plans, or programs fail to correspond with reality either in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect. In many instances, failures have to be repeated many times before errors in knowledge can be corrected and correspondence with the laws of the objective process achieved, and consequently before the subjective can be transformed into the objective or, in other words, before the anticipated results can be achieved in practice. But when that point is reached, no matter how, the movement of human knowledge regarding a certain *definite* objective process at a certain *definite* stage of its development may be considered completed.

And yet, as regards the progression of the process, the movement of human knowledge is not completed. Every process, whether in the realm of nature or of society, progresses and develops by reason of society's[85] contradictions and struggles, and the movement of human knowledge should also progress and develop along with it. As far as social movements are concerned, valuable[86] revolutionary leaders must not only be good at correcting their ideas, theories, plans, or programs when errors are discovered, as has been indicated above; but when a certain *definite* objective process has already progressed and changed from one *definite* stage of development to another, they must also be good at making themselves and all their fellow-revolutionaries progress and change in their subjective knowledge along with it, that is, they must ensure that the proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working methods[87] correspond to the new changes in the situation. In a revolutionary period, the situation changes very rapidly; if the knowledge of revolutionaries does not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will be unable to lead the revolution to victory. It often happens, however, that thinking lags behind reality; this is because man's cognition suffers from numerous limitations.[88] *Many humans are limited by class conditions (the reactionary exploiting class has no capacity for knowing any truth and, as a result, has no capacity for transforming the universe; on the contrary, they have become the enemy which obstructs knowledge of the truth and the transformation of the world). Some humans are limited by the division of labor (the division between mental and manual labor and divisions among the various industries), while*

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[84] Here the version in the *Selected Works* inserts: "the development of the objective process itself and"

[85] Society's → Its internal

[86] Valuable → True

[87] Methods → Programs

[88] Suffers from numerous limitations → Is limited by numerous social conditions

some are limited by originally erroneous ideas (idealism and mechanism and so on; many are exploiting elements, but there are also exploited elements because of education by the exploiting elements). A general reason is, however, the limitation which results from the historical condition of the level of technology and science. The proletariat and its political party should utilize their own naturally superior class conditions (which no other class possesses), utilize the new technology and science, and employ Marxism's worldview and methodology, and, closely relying on revolutionary practice as its basis, ensure that their knowledge changes with changes in the objective situation, and that the logical keeps pace with the historical, so that they attain the goal of completely changing the world.

We are opposed to diehards in the revolutionary ranks whose thinking fails to advance with changing objective circumstances and has manifested itself historically as Right opportunism. *The Chen Duxiuism of 1927 in China, and Bukharinism in the Soviet Union, were of this type.* These people fail to see that the struggle of opposites has already pushed the objective process forward while their knowledge has stopped at the old stage. This is characteristic of the thinking of all diehards; their thinking is divorced from social practice, and they cannot march ahead to guide the chariot of society; they simply trail behind, grumbling that it goes too fast and trying to drag it back or turn it in the opposite direction.

We are also opposed to "Left" phrasemongering. Li Lisanism in China in 1930, and Trotskyism in the Soviet Union, at the time when it could still be regarded as a Communist faction (now it has already become an extremely reactionary faction), and ultraleft thought in all the countries of the world are all of this sort. The thinking of "leftists" outstrips a given stage of development of the objective process; some regard their fantasies as truth, while others strain to realize in the present an ideal which can only be realized in the future. They alienate themselves from the current practice of the majority of the people and from the realities of the day, and show themselves adventurist in their actions.

Idealism and mechanistic thinking,[89] opportunism and adventurism, *are none of them based on the epistemology of dialectical materialism* and are all characterized by the breach between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from practice. The Marxist[90] theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies. Marxists recognize that, in the absolute and general process of development of the universe, the development of each particular process is relative and that hence, in absolute truth,[91] man's knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of development is only relative truth.[92] The development of an objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in knowledge.[93] In practice,[94] the process of developing and passing away[95] is endless, and so is the process of coming into being, developing, and passing away in human knowledge. As man's practice, which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas,[96] plans, or programs, advances further and further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never–ending, and so is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism[97] has in no way exhausted truth, but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing and doing, and we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether "Left" or Right, which depart from concrete history.

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[89] Mechanistic thinking → Mechanical materialism

[90] Marxist → Marxist-Leninist

[91] In absolute truth → In the endless flow of absolute truth

[92] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the following sentence: "The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth."

In the whole universe, in the present epoch of the development of *nature and* society, the responsibility for correctly knowing the world and changing the world has been placed by history upon the shoulders of the proletariat and its Party. This process, the practice of changing the world, which is determined in accordance with scientific knowledge, has already reached a historic moment in the world and in China, a great moment unprecedented in human history, that is, the moment for completely banishing darkness from the world and from China and for changing the world into a world of light such as never previously existed. The struggle of the proletariat and the revolutionary people to change the world comprises the fulfillment of the following tasks: to change the objective world and, at the same time, their own subjective world—to change their cognitive ability and change the relationship between the subjective and the objective world. Such a change has already come about in one part of the globe, in the Soviet Union. There the people are pushing forward this process of change, *for themselves and the world*. The people of China and the rest of the world are either *just beginning to* go through, or will go through, such a process. And the objective world which is to be changed also includes all the opponents of change, who, in order to be changed, must go through a stage of compulsion before they can enter the stage of voluntary, conscious change. The epoch of world communism will be reached when all mankind voluntarily and consciously changes itself and the world.

Produce[98] the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form develops[99] in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing.

Chapter 3: Materialist Dialectics

The two questions of "Idealism and Materialism" and "Dialectical Materialism" have been briefly dealt with above. We come now to a systematic discussion of the problem of dialectics, which has been mentioned only in outline.

The Marxist world (or universal) view is dialectical materialism; it is not metaphysical materialism (also called mechanistic materialism). This distinction is a major issue of the utmost importance. What is the world? From ancient times until the present, there have been three major responses to this question. The first is idealism (either metaphysical or dialectical idealism), which states that the world is created by the mind or, through extension, by the spirit. The second is mechanistic materialism, which denies that the world is a product of the mind; the world is a material world, but matter does not develop and is unchanging. The third is the Marxist response, which has overturned the two previous responses; it states that the world is not created by the mind, nor is it matter which does not develop; rather, it is a developing material world. This latter position is dialectical materialism.

Is not this Marxist conception of the world, which has revolutionized the perception of the world previously held by humanity, a discourse of earthshaking significance? There were those in the West's ancient Greece who espoused the view that the world is a developing material world; but, because of the limitations of the era, it was discussed only in simple and general terms, and their view is described as naive materialism. It did not have (indeed, could not have had) a scientific base. However, its viewpoint was basically correct. Hegel created dialectical idealism, stating that the world is developmental, but is created by the mind. He was a developmental idealist. His theory of development (that is, dialectics) was correct, but his developmental idealism was erroneous. In the West during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the bourgeois materialism of Germany, France, and other countries was mechanistic materialism. They asserted that the world is a material world, and this is correct; however, they stated that the world is machinelike in its movement, with only changes involving quantitative increase and decrease or in place, there being no qualitative change—an incorrect view. Marx inherited the naive dialectical materialism of Greece, transformed mechanistic materialism and dialectical idealism, and created dialectical materialism, which hitherto had not been placed on a scientific basis and which became the revolutionary weapon of the entire world proletariat and all oppressed peoples.

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[93] Knowledge → Human knowledge

[94] Practice → Social practice

[95] Developing and passing away → Coming into being, developing, and passing away

[96] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the word "theories."

[97] Marxism → Marxism-Leninism

[98] Produce → Discover

[99] Develops → Repeats itself

Materialist dialectics is the scientific methodology of Marxism; it is the method of knowledge and logic, and yet it is a worldview. The world is actually a developing material world: This is a worldview. This worldview becomes a method if used to observe the world, to study, think about, and resolve the problems of the world, to lead a revolution, to do work, to engage in production, to direct warfare, and to discuss a person's strengths and weaknesses; this is a methodology. There is no other single methodology apart from this; therefore in the hands of Marxists, worldview and methodology are a single entity, and so too are dialectics, epistemology, and logic.

We will systematically discuss materialist dialectics and its many issues—its numerous categories, laws, and principles (these several terms have one meaning).

What actually are the laws of materialist dialectics? And, of these, what are the fundamental laws and which are the subordinate laws which constitute the aspects, features, and issues of the theory of materialist dialectics which are indispensable and must be resolved? Why are all these laws inherent in the objective world and not created subjectively? Why study and understand these laws?

The complete revolutionary theory of materialist dialectics was created by Marx and Engels and developed by Lenin. At present, with the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union and the period of world revolution, this theory has entered a new stage of development which has enhanced and enriched its content. The following categories included in this theory are, first:

- the law of the unity of contradictions;
- the law of the transformation of quality into quantity and vice versa;
- the law of the negation of the negation.[100]

These are the basic laws of materialist dialectics. Apart from the naive materialism of ancient Greece, which simply and unsystematically pointed out some of the significance of these laws, and Hegel who developed these laws in an idealist manner, they have been repudiated by all metaphysical philosophies (the so-called metaphysical philosophies are theories opposed to the theory of development). It was only with Marx and Engels, who transformed these laws of Hegel from a materialist perspective, that they became the most fundamental part of the Marxist worldview and methodology.

Apart from the basic laws outlined above, and related to these basic laws, materialist dialectics includes the following categories:

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100. See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 83–91.

- essence and appearance
- form and content
- cause and effect
- basis and condition
- possibility and reality
- chance and necessity
- necessity and freedom
- chain and link, and so on.

Of these categories, some were previously studied in depth by metaphysical philosophies and idealist dialectics, some were studied only one-sidedly by philosophy, and some were put forward for the first time by Marxism. In the hands of Marxist revolutionary theorists and practitioners, these categories have stripped away the idealist and metaphysical husk of former philosophies, overcome their one-sidedness, and discovered their authentic form; moreover, as the era progressed, they greatly enriched their content to become an important component of revolutionary scientific methodology. The combination of these categories and the basic categories mentioned above forms a complete and profound system of materialist dialectics.

None of these laws and categories is created by human thought itself; they are the actual laws of the objective world. All idealisms assert that spirit creates matter, and, from this perspective, the tenets of philosophy, its principles, laws, and categories, are naturally created by mind. Hegel, who developed the system of dialectics, perceived dialectics in this manner. He saw the laws of dialectics not as being abstracted from the history of nature and society but as a logical system in pure thought. After human thought has created this system, it imposes it on nature and society. Marx and Engels stripped away Hegel's mystical shell, discarded his idealism, and placed his dialectics on a material basis. Engels stated, "It is, therefore, from the history of nature and humankind that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development. And indeed they can be reduced to three fundamental laws: the transformation of quality into quantity and vice versa, the unity of contradictions, and the negation of the negation."[101] While being laws of the objective world, the laws of dialectics are also laws of subjective thought, and that is because the laws of human thought are none other than the laws of the objective world reflected in the brains of humans through practice. As was discussed previously, dialectics, epistemology, and logic are one and the same.

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101. See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 83. Knight points out that Mao here leaves out a significant clause in this quotation from Engels. In the original, the second sentence reads: "For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, *as well as of thought itself.*" Mao proceeds, however, to state the same point at greater length in his own words.

Why do we study dialectics? We study it for no other reason than to change this world, to change the age-old relationships in this world between humans and between humans and matter. The lives of the vast majority of this world's humanity are filled with misery and suffering as a result of the oppression of the political and economic systems dominated by a minority. The people who live in this China of ours suffer a twofold cruel and inhuman oppression—national oppression and social oppression. We must change these age-old relationships and strive for national and social liberation.

Why is it necessary to study dialectics to achieve the objective of changing China and the world? It is because dialectics is made up of the most general laws of development of nature and society; when we comprehend dialectics, we have gained a scientific weapon and, in the revolutionary practice of changing nature and society, possess a theory and method suited to this practice. Materialist dialectics is itself a science (a philosophical science); it is the starting point for all sciences, and it is also a methodology. Our revolutionary practice is itself also a science, called social or political science. If we don't understand dialectics, our affairs will be badly handled; mistakes made within the revolution are those that violate dialectics. However, if dialectics is understood, immense results can be achieved; and if all things done correctly are investigated, it will be found that they conform with dialectics. Consequently, all revolutionary comrades and, above all, cadres should diligently study dialectics.

There are those who say: many people understand practical dialectics and, moreover, are practical materialists; and although they have not read books on dialectics, things that they do are done correctly and, in fact, conform with materialist dialectics. They surely have no particular need to study dialectics. This sort of talk is incorrect. Materialist dialectics is a complete and profound science. Although revolutionaries who really do possess materialist and dialectical minds learn a great deal of dialectics from practice, it is not systematized and lacks the completeness and profundity already achieved by materialist dialectics. Therefore, they are unable to see clearly the long-term future of the movement, unable to analyze a complex process of development, unable to grasp important political links, and unable to handle the various aspects of revolutionary work. Because of this, they still need to study dialectics.

There are others who say that dialectics is abstruse and difficult to fathom and that ordinary people have no possibility of mastering it. This is also incorrect. Dialectics encompasses the laws of nature, society, and thought. Anyone with some experience of society (experience of production and class struggle) actually understands some dialectics. Those with even more experience of society actually have a greater understanding of dialectics, although their understanding remains in the chaotic state of common sense and is neither complete nor profound. It is not difficult to bring order to this commonsense dialectics and deepen it through further study. The reason why people feel dialectics is difficult is that there exist no books which explain dialectics well. In China, there are many books on dialectics which, while not incorrect, are explained poorly or none too well and which

frighten people off. Books which are good at explaining dialectics employ everyday language and relate moving experiences. Sooner or later, such a book must be put together. This talk of mine is also far from adequate since I myself have only just begun to study dialectics. There has been no possibility of writing a useful book on the subject as yet, although perhaps the opportunity may present itself in the future. I wish to do so, but this will be decided by how my study proceeds.

In the next section, various laws of dialectics will be discussed.

I. The Law of the Unity of Contradictions[102]

This law is the basic law of dialectics. Lenin said: "Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradictions in the very essence of objects." *Consequently*, Lenin often called this law the essence of dialectics; he also called it the kernel of dialectics. *Because of this, in our study of dialectics, discussion should commence from this problem, which should moreover be discussed in somewhat greater detail than other problems.*

This question includes many problems, and these are:

The two views of development;
the law of identity in formal logic and the law of contradiction in dialectics;[103]
the universality of contradiction;
the particularity of contradiction;
the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction;
the identity and struggle of a contradiction;[104]
the place of antagonism in contradiction.[105]

These problems will be explained in sequence below.

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[102] The portion of these lectures which became "On Contradiction" begins here.

[103] In the *Selected Works* version, the two preceding points are replaced by the following passage:

> In studying this law, therefore, we cannot but touch upon a variety of questions, upon a number of philosophical problems. If we can become clear on all these problems, we shall arrive at a fundamental understanding of materialist dialectics. The problems are:

[104] Of a contradiction → Of the aspects of a contradiction

[105] The *Selected Works* text here adds the following paragraph:

> The criticism to which the idealism of the Deborin school has been subjected in Soviet philosophical circles in recent years has aroused great interest among us. Deborin's idealism has exerted a very bad influence in the Chinese Communist Party, and it cannot be said that the dogmatist thinking in our Party is unrelated to the approach of that school. Our present study of philosophy should therefore have the eradication of dogmatist thinking as its main objective.

A.M. Deborin had been extremely influential in Soviet philosophical circles in the late 1920s, but in December 1930 Stalin denounced him as a "menshevizing idealist."

A. The Two Views of Development

Throughout the history of human thought,[106] there have been two conceptions concerning the development of the world,[107] the metaphysical view of development, and the dialectical view of development. *What are the differences between these two views of development?*[108]

1. The Metaphysical View of Development

Another name for metaphysics is xuanxue, *and this occupied a dominant position in the thought of former times. The content of this philosophy was an explanation of those things supposedly outside experience, that is, a theory which discussed absolutes and essences, etc. In modern philosophy, so-called metaphysics is a method of thought which employs a static viewpoint to observe things, and which holds that all the different things in the world and all their characteristics have been forever unchanged. This type of thought prevailed in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe.*

With the arrival of the present era, namely, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, because of the results of the class struggle and the development of science, dialectical thought rapidly strode onto the world stage. But metaphysics, in the form also of vulgar evolutionism (vulgar, that is, superficial, simple), stubbornly opposed dialectics.

In summary, the view of development of so-called metaphysics and vulgar evolutionism is that development is a quantitative increase or decrease, that the motive force is external, involves a change in place in all things, and that the reflection of the things in man's thought is eternally of this nature. The special characteristics of a thing are present in that thing from its beginning and remain thus from its state of germination in inception right through to the zenith of its development. They ascribe social development to the growth and repetition of certain special characteristics, the nature of which remains forever unchanged. For example,[109] capitalist

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[106] Thought → Knowledge

[107] World → Universe

[108] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "Lenin said: 'The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, *and* development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).' Here Lenin was referring to these two different world outlooks."

[109] In the *Selected Works*, the foregoing passage is replaced by the following text:

> In China another name for metaphysics is *xuanxue*. For a long period in history, whether in China or in Europe, this way of thinking, which is part and parcel of the idealist world outlook, occupied a dominant position in human thought. In Europe, the materialism of the bourgeoisie in its early days was also metaphysical. As the social economy of many European countries advanced to the stage of highly developed capitalism, as the forces of production, the class struggle, and the sciences developed to a

exploitation and competition, individualism and so on, can all be found in ancient slave society or even in primitive *savage* society. They ascribe the causes of social development to factors external to society, such as geography and climate. This view of development searches[110] outside a thing for the causes of its development and opposes[111] the theory which holds that development arises from the contradictions inside a thing; it can thus explain neither the qualitative diversity of things nor the phenomenon of one quality changing into another. *In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this mode of thinking existed as a theory of unchangeable natural absolutes (mechanical materialism)—and in the twentieth century as vulgar evolutionism (the theory of equilibrium of Bukharin and others) and so on.*[112]

2. The Dialectical View of Development

This holds that, in order to understand the development of a thing, we should study it internally and in its relation with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal, necessary, and independent self-movement; that is, the automaticity of things.[113] The fundamental cause of the

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> level unprecedented in history, and as the industrial proletariat became the greatest motive force in historical development, there arose the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. Then, in addition to open and barefaced reactionary idealism, vulgar evolutionism emerged among the bourgeoisie to oppose materialist dialectics.
>
> The metaphysical or vulgar evolutionist world outlook sees things as isolated, static, and one-sided. It regards all things in the universe, their forms and their species, as eternally isolated from one another and immutable. Such change as there is can only be an increase or decrease in quantity or a change of place. Moreover, the cause of such an increase or decrease or change of place is not inside things but outside them, that is, the motive force is external. Metaphysicians hold that all the different kinds of things in the universe and all their characteristics have been the same ever since they first came into being. All subsequent changes have simply been increases or decreases in quantity. They contend that a thing can only keep on repeating itself as the same kind of thing and cannot change into anything different. In their opinion . . .

[110] Searches → Searches in an oversimplified way

[111] Opposes → Denies

[112] In the *Selected Works* version, this passage is replaced by the following text:

> In Europe, this mode of thinking existed as mechanical materialism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and as vulgar evolutionism at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. In China, there was the metaphysical thinking exemplified in the saying "Heaven changeth not, likewise the Dao changeth not," and it was supported by the decadent feudal ruling classes for a long time. Mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism, which were imported from Europe in the past hundred years, are supported by the bourgeoisie.

[113] That is, the automaticity of things → While each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it

development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development.

Thus, the dialectical view of development[114] combats the theory of external causes or of an external motive force, advanced by metaphysics and vulgar evolutionism. It is evident that purely external causes can give rise only to mechanical motion, that is, to changes in scale or quantity, but cannot explain why things differ qualitatively in thousands of ways. As a matter of fact, even mechanical motion under external force occurs through the internal contradictoriness of things. Simple growth in plants and animals *is not only quantitative increase, it is at the same time the emergence of qualitative change*; *simple growth* is likewise[115] the result of development arising from contradictions. Similarly, social development is due chiefly not to external but to internal causes. Countries with almost the same geographic and climatic conditions display great diversity and unevenness in their development. Moreover, great social changes may take place in one and the same country although its geography and climate remain unchanged, *and this condition exists in many countries around the globe.* Old Russian imperialism[116] changed into the socialist Soviet Union, and a purely feudal Japan, which had locked its doors against the world, changed into imperialist Japan, although no change occurred in the geography and climate of either country. China changed very little during the several thousand years of the feudal system, but recently there have been great changes, and it is just now changing into a new China, liberated and free. Is it conceivable that there are any differences between the geography and climate of China today and of several decades ago? It is quite evident that it is due not to external reasons but to internal reasons.[117] Changes in nature result chiefly from the development of the contradictions *within things* in nature. Changes in society result[118] from the development of the internal contradictions in society, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production

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[114] The dialectical view of development → Materialist dialectics

[115] Likewise → Chiefly

[116] Old Russian imperialism → Imperialist Russia

[117] In the *Selected Works* version, the preceding three sentences are replaced by the following text:

> Long dominated by feudalism, China has undergone great changes in the past hundred years and is now changing in the direction of a new China, liberated and free, and yet no change has occurred in its geography and climate. Changes do take place in the geography and climate of the earth as a whole and in every part of it, but they are insignificant when compared with changes in society; geographic and climatic changes manifest themselves in terms of tens of thousands of years, while social changes manifest themselves in thousands, hundreds, or tens of years, and even in a few months in times of revolution.

[118] Here the *Selected Works* adds the word "chiefly."

and the contradiction between classes,[119] and it is these that push society forward. Does dialectics[120] exclude external causes? Not at all. The external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, the external causes become operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken *because the basis of the internal causes is different. The pressure of imperialism accelerated change in Chinese society, and these changes were effected through the inner regularities of China itself.* In battle, one army is victorious and the other is defeated; both the victory and the defeat are determined by internal causes. The one is victorious either because it is strong or because of its competent generalship, the other is vanquished either because it is weak or because of its incompetent generalship; it is through internal causes that external causes bring about change. In 1927, the defeat of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie came about through the opportunism then to be found within the Chinese proletariat itself (inside the Chinese Communist Party).[121] To lead a revolution to victory a class or a political party must rely on its own political line having no mistakes and on the solidity of its own political organization. *In China, the loss of Manchuria and the crisis in North China are due principally to China's weakness (because of the defeat of the 1927 revolution, the people lost political power, and this produced civil war and a dictatorial system). Japanese imperialism took advantage of this situation and invaded. In order to drive out the Japanese robbers, we must rely principally on the national united front to carry out a determined revolutionary war. "Insects will appear only after things are rotten; a man will speak evil of others only after he becomes suspicious." This is a saying by Su Dongpo.*[122] *"When internal examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be anxious about, what is there to fear?"*[123] *This is also a correct saying of Confucius. If a person strengthens himself in his youth, he does not easily catch cold; to this day, the Soviet Union has not suffered attack by Japan, and this is entirely because of its strength. "When Lord Lei beat the bean curd, he chose a weak object to bully."*[124] *Things under heaven depend solely on one's strength, so it is no use blaming heaven or other people*; *man is the master of*

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[119] The *Selected Works* texts adds here: "and the contradiction between the old and the new."

[120] Dialectics → Materialist dialectics

[121] Here the *Selected Works* version adds the following passage: "When we liquidated this opportunism, the Chinese revolution resumed its advance. Later, the Chinese revolution again suffered severe setbacks at the hands of the enemy, because adventurism had arisen within our Party. When we liquidated this adventurism, our cause advanced once again. Thus it can be seen that . . ."

[122] This is a quotation from an essay by Su Shi (Su Dongpo) (1037–1101), one of the greatest poets of the Song dynasty, entitled "Fan Zeng lun" (On Fan Zeng).

[123] *Analects*, XII, IV, 3 (Legge, Vol. 1, p. 252).

[124] Mao also used this quotation in the original version of *On Protracted War*. See above, p. 385.

his own fate, difficulties can be overcome, and external conditions can be changed; this is our philosophy.

We oppose the metaphysical view of development and advocate the dialectical view of development. We are advocates of the theory of change and oppose the theory of immutability; we are advocates of the theory of internal causation and oppose the theory of external causation.

B. The Law of Identity in Formal Logic and the Law of Contradiction in Dialectics

We have discussed above the metaphysical and dialectical views of development. The struggle between these two ways of looking at the world constitutes the struggle in methods of thought between formal logic and dialectical logic.

Bourgeois formal logic has three fundamental laws: the first is called the law of identity, the second the law of contradiction, and the third the law of the excluded middle. What is the law of identity? The law of identity states: In the process of thought, a concept remains unchanged throughout, being forever equal to itself. For example, a chemical element is forever equal to that chemical element; China is forever equal to China, and a certain person is forever equal to that certain person. Its formula is A equals A; this law is metaphysical. Engels says that it is the fundamental law of the old view of the universe. Its mistake lies in "not recognizing contradiction and change within a thing, and because of this, removing temporariness and relativity from a concept, attributing permanence and absoluteness to it. It does not understand that a thing and the concept that reflects a thing are both relative and changeable; a certain chemical element is certainly not forever equal to that certain element, and all forms of chemical elements are changing. China also will not forever be equivalent to China, for China is changing; the age-old feudal China of the past and the free and liberated China of the future are two things. A certain person is also not forever equal to that certain person; a person's physique and thought change. Concepts in thought are reflections of objective things, and objective things are changing; the content of a concept is also changing. In fact, there is no such thing as a concept which is forever equivalent to itself.

What is the law of contradiction? The law of contradiction states: A concept itself cannot at the same time contain two or more mutually contradictory meanings; if a concept contains two contradictory meanings, that is regarded as a logical error. A contradictory concept cannot simultaneously have both sides correct or both sides incorrect, and the correct one can only be one of those two. Its formula is A is not equal to not-A. Kant has enumerated the four following antinomies: The world's time has a beginning and an end, and is limited in space; the world has no beginning or end in time, and also is limitless in space. This is the first of them. In the world, everything consists of simple matter (cannot be further divided); in the world, there are no simple things, everything is complex (can be further divided). This is the second of them. In the world there exists free causation; in the world, there is no freedom, everything is inevitable. This is the third of them. In the world there exists a certain inevitable essence; in the world, nothing is inevitable, everything is accidental. This is the fourth of them. Kant gave these irreconcilable and mutually opposed principles the one title of "The Second Law of Contradiction." He stated, however, that these were only contradictions in man's thought; in the real world they really did not exist. According to the law of contradiction in formal logic, these contradictions were thus a mistake and had to be rejected. But, in reality, thought is a reflection of things. There is not one thing which does not contain contradiction, and, because of this, there is no concept which does not contain contradiction. This is not an error in thought but precisely where thought is correct, and the law of the unity of contradictions of dialectical logic is founded on this base. It is only with formal logic's rejection of the contradictory law of contradiction that it becomes really incorrect thought. The law of contradiction in formal logic is only a manifestation of the negative of the law of identity, and it functions as a supplement to the law of identity, the purpose of which is to consolidate the law of identity's so-called a concept is equal to itself, A is equal to A.

What is the law of the excluded middle? The law of the excluded middle states: Of the two opposite meanings of a concept, the correct one must be one or the other, for it is not possible for both to be incorrect or to rush to a third as the correct meaning. Its formula is "A is equal to B, or not equal to B, but cannot be equal to C." They do not realize that things and concepts are developing, and, in the process of development of things and concepts, not only are their internal contradictory elements made manifest but these contradictory elements can be removed, negated, and resolved to become a third thing which is not-A and not-B; change to become a new and higher thing or concept. Correct thought should not exclude the third factor, should not exclude the law of the negation of the negation. According to the law of the excluded middle, in the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the correct one is either the former or the latter. It cannot be a society without classes. However, it is a fine thing that the process of social evolution does not stop at class struggle, but progresses toward a proletarian society. China and Japanese imperialism are in a state of contradiction. We oppose the invasion of Japanese imperialism, but we do not agree that a postindependence China must remain forever in a state of hostility with Japan. We maintain that, through national revolution and revolution within Japan, the two nations will reach a stage of free association. The same applies to the opposition between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy; a higher stage for both of them will be the epoch in which there are no states and no governments, and this will be arrived at through proletarian democracy. The law of the excluded middle in formal logic also supplements its law of identity, which recognizes only the fixed condition of a concept and which opposes its development, opposes revolutionary leaps, and opposes the principle of the negation of the negation.

It can be seen, therefore, that all the laws of formal logic oppose contradictoriness and advocate the characteristic of identity, oppose development and change *of concepts and things, and advocate their solidification and immobility. This is in direct opposition to dialectics.*

Why do formal logicians advocate these things? Because they observe things separate from their continual mutual function and interconnections; that is, they observe things at rest rather than in movement, and as separate, rather than in connection. Therefore it is not possible for them to consider and acknowledge the importance of contradictoriness and the negation of the negation within things and concepts, and so they advocate the rigid and inflexible law of identity.

Dialectics, in contrast, observes things in movement and in connection and is in direct opposition to the law of identity of formal logic, advocating instead the revolutionary law of contradiction.

Dialectics considers that the contradictions in thought are none other than the reflection of objective external contradictions. Dialectics does not ritualistically adhere to two principles which appear externally to be in a state of mutual conflict (for example, the many antinomies raised by Kant in his four contradictory principles to which I referred above), but sees through to a thing's internal essence. The task of dialecticians is to perform the task that those formal logicians have not carried out—study of an object—to concentrate attention on finding out the strength of its contradictions, the tendency of the contradictions, the aspects of the contradictions, and the fixed nature of the contradictions' internal relations. The external world and man's thought are both in motion and are dialectical; they are not static and metaphysical. For this reason, the revolutionary law of contradiction (namely, the principle of the unity of contradictions) therefore occupies the principal position in dialectics.

The entirety of formal logic has only one nucleus, and that is the reactionary law of identity. The entirety of dialectics also has only one nucleus, and that is the revolutionary law of contradiction.

Does dialectics oppose the identity of things or concepts? It does not. Dialectics recognizes the relative identity of things or concepts. Why then does dialectics oppose the law of identity of formal logic? It is because the law of identity of formal logic is an absolute law which rejects contradictions. Dialectics acknowledges the identity of things or concepts, but asserts that they simultaneously contain contradictions and are interconnected; this kind of identity indicates the interconnection of contradictions; it is relative and temporary. Since the law of identity of formal logic is an absolute law which rejects contradictions, it cannot but advance the law of the excluded middle, which opposes one concept changing into another concept or one thing changing into another thing. Dialectics, however, regards the identity of a thing or concept as temporary, relative, and conditional; because the struggle of contradictions guides the regularities of change and development of a thing or a concept, such struggle is forever absolute and unconditional. Because formal logic does not reflect a thing in its true condition, dialectics cannot allow its existence. There is only one scientific truth, and that truth is dialectics.

C. The Universality of Contradiction

This problem has two aspects, the first part of which is that contradiction exists in all processes; the second is that in every process the movement of contradiction exists from start to finish. This is called the universality or absoluteness of contradictions.[125]

Engels said, "motion itself is a contradiction." Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as "the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all natural phenomena and processes (including mind and society)." Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward.[126] Without contradiction nothing would exist. *As a result, this law is the most universal law, applicable to all phenomena of the objective world and also applicable to the phenomenon of thought. Within dialectics, it is the most fundamental law having decisive significance.*

Why do we say that contradiction is motion? Haven't there been those who have disputed Engels's assertion? This is because the theory of contradiction discussed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin has become the most important theoretical

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[125] In the *Selected Works* version, this brief paragraph is replaced by the following long passage:

> For convenience of exposition, I shall deal first with the universality of contradiction and then proceed to the particularity of contradiction. The reason is that the universality of contradiction can be explained more briefly, for it has been widely recognized ever since the dialectical materialist world outlook was discovered and materialist dialectics applied with outstanding success to analyzing many aspects of human history and natural history and to changing many aspects of society and nature (as in the Soviet Union) by the great creators and continuers of Marxism—Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin; whereas the particularity of contradiction is still not clearly understood by many comrades, and especially by the dogmatists. They do not understand that it is precisely in the particularity of contradiction that the universality of contradiction resides. Nor do they understand how important is the study of the particularity of contradiction in the concrete things confronting us for guiding the course of revolutionary practice. Therefore, it is necessary to stress the study of the particularity of contradiction and to explain it at adequate length. For this reason, in our analysis of the law of contradiction in things, we shall first analyze the universality of contradiction, then place special stress on analyzing the particularity of contradiction, and finally return to the universality of contradiction.
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> The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.

[126] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the words: "There is nothing that does not contain contradiction."

base of the proletarian revolution. This has led to all-out attacks by bourgeois theorists who constantly hope to overturn Engels's law that "motion is contradiction." Raising aloft their obstreperous refutations they have, moreover, produced the following reasons: the motion of things in the real world is in different instances of time and through different points in space; when a thing is positioned at a certain point, it occupies that point, and when it moves to another point, it occupies that other point. In this way, the motion of things in time and space is divided into many sections; there are no contradictions, for if there were contradictions there could be no movement.

Lenin has pointed out the absurdity of this reasoning, pointed out that this reasoning in fact, by observing continual motion as many sections in time and space and as many static conditions, results in denying motion. They do not know that when a thing occupies a new position, it is because the thing has moved in space from one point to another; namely, as a result of motion. Without the contradiction in so-called motion in which a thing occupies a point and at the same time does not occupy a point, and, without this continuous and interrupted unity, the unity of motion and rest, inaction and action, motion would be fundamentally impossible. To deny contradiction is to deny motion. All motion in nature, society, and thought is this motion of the unity of contradictions.

Ceaseless contradiction is the basis of the simple forms of motion (for instance, *the* mechanical motion *discussed above*) and is, moreover, the basis of all complex forms of motion.

There is an indivisible relationship between the process of life and the opposing process of death, and this regardless of whether it is in the various forms of organic life, or within the life of cells within an organism. The supersession of the old by the new, the succession of life and death—this motion of the unity of opposites is the necessary condition for all organic life and development. Without this contradiction, the phenomenon of life is unthinkable.[127]

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[127] Instead of this paragraph, the *Selected Works* version continues:

> Engels explained the universality of contradiction as follows:
>
> If simple mechanical change of place contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. . . . [L]ife consists precisely and primarily in this—that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also in the sphere of thought we could not escape contradictions, and that for example the contradiction between man's inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is—at least practically, for us—an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.
>
> . . . [O]ne of the basic principles of higher mathematics is the contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be the same. . . .
>
> But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions.

Within mechanics, any "action" contains internal contradictoriness and leads to "reaction"; without "reaction," there could be no discussion of action.[128]

In mathematics, any number contains internal contradictoriness and can become a positive or negative number, a whole number, or a fraction. Positive and negative, whole number and fraction, constitute the movement of contradictions within mathematics.

The law of the unity of opposites of dissociation and combination in chemistry constitutes the countless motion of chemical change; without this contradiction, chemical phenomena could not exist.

In social life, any phenomenon contains class contradictions. The buying and selling of labor, the organization of the state, and the content of philosophy are like this. The fundamental law of class society is class struggle.

In war, offense and defense, advance and retreat, victory and defeat are all contradictory phenomena. One cannot exist without the other. The two aspects are at once in conflict and in interdependence, and this constitutes the totality of war and pushes its development forward.[129]

Every difference in men's concepts should be regarded as reflecting an objective contradiction. Objective contradictions are reflected in subjective thinking, and this process constitutes the contradictory movement of concepts and pushes forward the development of thought.[130]

Opposition and struggle between ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the Party; this is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes in society. If there were no contradictions in the Party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the Party's life would come to an end.

Contradiction[131] exists universally and in all processes, whether in the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological phenomena.

At this point there are those who say that, although they can admit the principle of Engels and Lenin that contradiction is motion and that contradiction exists in all processes, isn't it unnecessary for the movement of contradictions within all processes to exist from beginning to end? Was it not Deborin and others who clearly asserted that there is no such thing as the so-called motion of contradictions from

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[128] This and the next three paragraphs have been replaced in the *Selected Works* text by a direct quotation from Lenin:

> Lenin illustrated the universality of contradiction as follows:
> In mathematics, + and –. Differential and integral.
> In mechanics, action and reaction.
> In physics, positive and negative electricity.
> In chemistry, the combination and dissociation of atoms.
> In social science the class struggle.

[129] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "and solves its problems."

[130] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "and ceaselessly solves problems in man's thinking."

[131] Contradiction → Thus it is already clear that contradiction

beginning to end in every process? According to Deborin, contradictions exist, but not at the inception of a process, only when it has developed to a certain stage. According to Deborin, the development of a process follows on from this stage; at its inception, there are simple differences. There subsequently emerge opposites which finally become contradictions. Is this formula correct or mistaken?[132]

It is mistaken. The so-called universality of contradictions exists not only within all processes but at each stage of development of every process. Only this is the revolutionary law of contradictions of Marxism. According to the Deborin school,[133] contradiction appears not at the inception of a process but only after it has developed to a certain stage. If this were the case, then the cause of the development of the process before that stage would be external and not internal. Deborin thus reverts to the metaphysical theories of external causality and of mechanism. Applying this view in the analysis of concrete problems, the Deborin school sees only differences but not contradictions between the workers and the peasants[134] under existing conditions in the Soviet Union, thus entirely agreeing with Bukharin. In analyzing the French Revolution, it holds that before the revolution there were likewise only differences but not contradictions within the Third Estate, which was composed of the workers, the peasants, and the bourgeoisie *(Gorev's explanation).*[135] This school does not understand that each and every difference already contains contradictions and that difference itself is contradiction. Labor and capital have been in contradiction ever since the two classes came into being, only at first the contradiction had not become intense. Even under the conditions[136] existing in the Soviet Union, the difference between workers and peasants is a contradiction, although, unlike the contradiction between labor and capital, it will not become intensified into antagonism or assume the form of class struggle.[137] The question is one of different kinds of contradiction, not of the presence or absence of contradiction. Contradiction is universal and absolute; it is present in the process of development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end. What is meant by the emergence of a new process? The old unity with its constituent opposites yields to a new unity with its constituent opposites; a new process emerges to replace the old.[138] The new process contains new contradictions and begins its own history of the development of contradictions.

As Lenin pointed out, Marx in his *Capital* made a model application[139] of this principle of the movement of opposites which runs through a process[140] from beginning to end. He pointed out that this is the method which must be employed in studying any process:

> In his *Capital*, Marx first analyzes the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday *relation* of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz., the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this "cell" of bourgeois society) analysis reveals *all* the contradictions (or the germs of *all* the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (*both* growth *and* movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the [sigma] (summation) of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.

Lenin added, "Such must be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general."

Very good; we do not need to study the *guwen* content and method (*yifa*) of the Tongcheng school,[141] for Lenin has informed us of an even better content and method (*yifa*), and that is the Marxist scientific method of study.[142]

D. The Particularity of Contradiction

Contradiction is present in all processes; it permeates each and every process from beginning to end. This is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction which we have discussed above. Now let us discuss the particularity and relativity of contradiction. This problem should be studied on several levels.

First, the contradiction in each form of motion of matter has its particularity. Man's knowledge of matter is knowledge of its forms of motion because there is nothing in this world except matter in motion.[143] In considering each form of motion, we must observe the points which it has in common with other forms of motion. But what is especially important, constituting as it does the foundation of our knowledge of a thing, is to observe what is particular to this form of motion or

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[132] In the *Selected Works* version, this paragraph is replaced by the following two sentences: "But does contradiction also exist at the initial stage of each process? Is there a movement of opposites from beginning to end in the process of development of every single thing?"

[133] The beginning of this paragraph is replaced in the *Selected Works* text with the following passage: "As can be seen from the articles written by Soviet philosophers criticizing it, the Deborin school maintains that . . ."

[134] The workers and the peasants → The kulaks and the peasants

[135] This name, rendered *Guoliefu* in Chinese, may refer to Gorev, a Russian Marxist under Stalin.

[136] Conditions → Social conditions

[137] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "the workers and the peasants have established a firm alliance in the course of socialist construction and are gradually resolving this contradiction in the course of the advance from socialism to communism."

[138] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "The old process ends, and the new one begins."

[139] Application → Analysis

[140] Process → Process of development of things

[141] The Tongcheng school of the Qing dynasty advocated writing in the old literary style (*guwen*) in accordance with the content or values (*yi*) of the Confucian tradition and using the form or methods (*fa*) of the major writings of classical antiquity.

[142] In the *Selected Works* version, this reference to the Tongcheng school is replaced by the following: "Chinese Communists must learn this method; only then will they be able to analyze correctly the history and present state of the Chinese revolution and infer its future."

[143] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "and this motion must assume certain forms."

matter, namely, to observe the qualitative difference between this form of motion and other forms. Only when we have done so can we distinguish between things. *Materialist dialectics indicates clearly:* Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another.[144] There are many forms of motion in nature—mechanical motion, sound, light, heat, electricity, dissociation, combination, and so on. All these forms are interdependent, but in its essence each is different from the others. The particular essence of each form of motion is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds true not only for nature but also for social and ideological phenomena. Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence.

The sciences are differentiated precisely on the basis of the particular contradictions inherent in their respective objects of study. Thus the contradiction peculiar to a certain field of phenomena constitutes the object of study for a specific branch of science. For example, positive and negative numbers in mathematics; action and reaction in mechanics; positive and negative electricity in physics; dissociation and combination in chemistry; forces of production and relations of production, and class struggle, in social science; offense and defense in military science; idealism and materialism, the metaphysical outlook and the dialectical outlook, in philosophy; and so on—all these are the objects of study of different branches of science precisely because each branch has its own particular contradiction and particular essence. Of course, unless we study[145] the universality of contradiction, we have no way of discovering the universal cause[146] for the movement or development of things; however, unless we study the particularity of contradiction, we have no way of determining the particular essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things, no way of discovering the particular cause for the movement or development of a thing, and no way of distinguishing one thing from another or of demarcating the fields of science.[147]

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[144] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "It is the internal cause or, as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world."

[145] Study → Understand

[146] Universal cause → Universal cause or universal basis

[147] Here the following passage is inserted in the *Selected Works* version:

> As regards the sequence in the movement of man's knowledge, there is always a gradual growth from the knowledge of individual and particular things to the knowledge of things in general. Only after man knows the particular essence of many different things can he proceed to generalization and know the common essence of things. When man attains the knowledge of this common essence, he uses it as a guide and proceeds to study various concrete things which have not yet been studied, or studied thoroughly, and to discover the particular essence of each; only thus is he able to supplement, enrich, and develop this knowledge of their common essence and prevent such knowledge from withering or petrifying. These are the two processes of cognition; one, from the particular to the general, and the other from the general to

It is necessary not only to study the particular contradiction and the essence determined thereby of every great system of the forms of motion of matter but also to study the particular contradiction and the essence of each process in the long course of development of each form of motion of matter. In every form of motion, each process of development[148] is qualitatively different; *in the entire world* (tianxia) *there are no identical contradictions, and* our study must emphasize[149] this point.

Qualitatively different contradictions can be resolved only by qualitatively different methods. For instance, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is resolved by the method of socialist revolution; the contradiction between the colonies and imperialism is resolved by national[150] war; the contradiction between the great masses of the people and the feudal system is resolved by the method of democratic revolution;[151] the contradiction between the proletariat[152] and the peasantry[153] is resolved by the socialization[154] of agriculture; contradiction within the Communist Party is resolved by the method of ideological struggle;[155] the contradiction between society and nature is resolved by developing the productive forces. Processes change, old processes and old contradictions disappear, new processes and new contradictions emerge, and the methods of resolving contradictions differ accordingly. In Russia, there was a fundamental difference between the method used for resolving the contradictions of the February Revolution and that

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> the particular. Thus cognition always moves in cycles and (so long as scientific method is strictly adhered to) each cycle advances human knowledge a step higher and so makes it more and more profound. Where our dogmatists err on this question is that, on the one hand, they do not understand that we have to study the particularity of contradiction and know the particular essence of individual things before we can adequately know the universality of contradiction and the common essence of things and that, on the other hand, they do not understand that, after knowing the common essence of things, we must go further and study the concrete things that have not yet been thoroughly studied or have only just emerged. Our dogmatists are lazybones. They refuse to undertake any painstaking study of concrete things, they regard general truths as emerging out of the void, they turn them into purely abstract unfathomable formulas and thereby completely deny and reverse the normal sequence by which man comes to know truth. Nor do they understand the interconnection of the two processes in cognition—from the particular to the general and then from the general to the particular. They understand nothing of the Marxist theory of knowledge.

[148] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "which is real (and not imaginary)"

[149] Emphasize → Emphasize and start from

[150] National → National revolutionary

[151] This and the preceding clause are inverted in the *Selected Works* version.

[152] Proletariat → Working class

[153] Peasantry → Peasant class in socialist society

[154] Socialization → Method of collectivization and mechanization

[155] Ideological struggle → Criticism and self-criticism

used to resolve the contradictions of the October Revolution.[156] *It is a principle to use different methods to cope with different contradictions.*

In order to reveal the particularity of the contradictions in any process,[157] in their totality or interconnections, that is, in order to reveal the essence of the process, it is necessary to reveal the particularity of the two aspects of each of the contradictions in that process; otherwise, it will be impossible to discover the essence of the process. This requires the utmost attention in the study of problems.[158]

A major process contains many contradictions.[159] For instance, in the course of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, where the contradictions are exceedingly complex, there exist the contradiction between imperialism and the entire Chinese society, the contradiction within Chinese society between the feudal system and the great masses of the people, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie,[160] on the one hand, and the bourgeoisie, on the other, the contradiction between the various ruling groups,[161] and so on. These contradictions cannot be treated in the same way, since each has its own particularity; moreover, the two aspects of each contradiction cannot be treated in the same way, since each aspect has its own characteristics. We who are engaged in the Chinese revolution should not only understand the particularity of these contradictions in their totality, that is, in their interconnections, but should also study the two aspects of each contradiction as the only means of understanding the totality. When we speak of understanding each aspect of a contradiction, we mean understanding what specific position each aspect occupies, what concrete forms it assumes in its interdependence[162] with its opposite, and what concrete methods are employed in the struggle with its opposite, when the two are both interdependent, and also after the interdependence breaks down. It is of great importance to study these problems. *The principal feature of Leninism is that it is the science which studies the various forms of struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.*[163]

In studying a problem we must shun subjectivity, one-sidedness, and superficiality. To be subjective means not to look at problems objectively, that is, not to use the materialist viewpoint in looking at problems. *This has already been discussed in Chapter 2, and I will return to it at the end of this section. Now I come to a discussion of one-sidedness and superficiality.*[164] To be one-sided means not knowing how to look at problems from all sides, for example, to understand only China but not Japan, only the Communist Party but not the Guomindang, only the proletariat but not the bourgeoisie, only the peasants but not the landlords, only the favorable conditions but not the difficult ones, *only the gentleman but not the scoundrel*, only the present but not the future,[165] *only oneself but not others, only pride but not modesty*,[166] only the defects but not the achievements, only the plaintiff's case but not the defendant's, only underground work but not open work, and so on. In short, it means not to understand the characteristics of both aspects of a contradiction. That is what we mean by looking at a problem one-sidedly. Or it may be called seeing the part but not the whole.[167] That way it is impossible to find the method for resolving a contradiction, it is impossible to accomplish the tasks of the revolution, to carry out assignments, or to develop inner-Party ideological struggle correctly. When Sunzi said in discussing military science, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat,"[168] he was referring to the two sides in a battle. Tang Taizong[169] also understood the error of one-sidedness when he said, "Listen to both sides and you will be enlightened, heed only one side and you will be benighted." But our comrades often look at problems one-sidedly, and so they often run into snags. *In the countryside, if two families or clans are engaged in conflict, the mediator must recognize the reasons for the conflict on both sides, the bone of contention, the present situation, demands, and so on; only then will he be able to think up a method of resolving the dispute. There are such people in the countryside who are good at mediation, and they are constantly invited to mediate when a dispute arises; these people actually understand the dialectic of which we speak, the need to understand the particular characteristics of the various aspects of a contradiction.* In the novel *Shuihu zhuan*, Song *Gongming*[170] thrice attacked the Zhu family village. Twice he was defeated because he was ignorant of the local conditions and used the wrong method. Later he changed his method; first, he investigated the situation and familiarized himself with the maze of roads, then he broke up the alliance between the Li, Hu, and Zhu villages and sent his men in disguise into the enemy camp to lie in wait.[171] And on the third occasion he won. There are many examples of materialist dialectics in *Shuihu zhuan*, of which the episode of the three attacks on Zhu village is one of the best. *On several occasions Lenin spoke of the need to observe a problem from all sides, resolutely opposing one-sidedness.*[172] We should remember his words. To be superficial means to consider neither the characteristics of a contradiction in its totality nor the characteristics of each of its aspects; it means to deny the necessity for probing deeply into a thing and minutely studying the characteristics of its contradiction but, instead, merely to look from afar and, after glimpsing the rough outline, immediately to try to resolve the contradiction (to answer a question, settle a dispute, handle work, or direct a military operation). This way of doing things is bound to lead to trouble.[173]

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[156] Here the *Selected Works* text adds:

> The principle of using different methods to resolve different contradictions is one which Marxist-Leninists must strictly observe. The dogmatists do not observe this principle; they do not understand that conditions differ in different kinds of revolution and so do not understand that different methods should be used to resolve different contradictions; on the contrary, they invariably adopt what they imagine to be an unalterable formula and arbitrarily apply it everywhere, which only causes setbacks to the revolution or makes a sorry mess of what was originally well done.

[157] Process → Process in the development of a thing

[158] In the study of problems → In our study

[159] A major process contains many contradictions. → There are many contradictions in the course of development of any major thing.

[160] Petty bourgeoisie → Urban petty bourgeoisie

[161] Ruling groups → Reactionary ruling groups

[162] In its interdependence → In its interdependence and in its contradiction

[163] In the *Selected Works* version, this last, italicized sentence is replaced by the following text:

> Lenin meant just this when he said that the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions. Our dogmatists have violated Lenin's teachings; they never use their brains to analyze anything concretely, and in their writings and speeches they always use stereotypes devoid of content, thereby creating a very bad style of work in our Party.

[164] In the *Selected Works* version, these last two sentences are replaced with: "I have discussed this in my essay 'On Practice.'"

[165] Only the present but not the future → Only the past but not the future

[166] Here the *Selected Works* text inserts: "only individual parts but not the whole"

[167] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "seeing the trees but not the forest"

[168] As indicated above in a note to "On Protracted War," this often-repeated formulation of Sunzi's maxim does not correspond exactly to what he actually wrote, but the meaning is essentially the same; the key sentence reads: "In a hundred battles you will never be in peril."

[169] In the *Selected Works* version, the name of Tang Taizong, the founding emperor of the Tang dynasty, has been replaced by that of Wei Zheng (580–643), a statesman and historian of the period.

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[170] Song Jiang (here called by his *hao*, Gongming, which is replaced with his ordinary name in the *Selected Works* version) was the leader of a band of heroic outlaws in the traditional novel *Shuihu zhuan*, translated into English as *Water Margin, Outlaws of the Marshes*, and (by Pearl Buck) *All Men Are Brothers*. The episode summarized here is one of the best known in this long work.

[171] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "using a strategem similar to that of the Trojan Horse in the foreign story."

[172] In the *Selected Works* text this sentence is replaced with the following: "Lenin said, . . . in order really to know an object we must embrace, study, all its sides, all connections and 'mediations.' We shall never achieve this completely, but the demand for all-sidedness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity."

[173] Here the following passage is added in the *Selected Works* text:

> The reason the dogmatist and empiricist comrades in China have made mistakes lies precisely in their subjectivist, one-sided, and superficial way of looking at things. To be one-sided and superficial is at the same time to be subjective. For all objective things are actually interconnected and are governed by inner laws but, instead of undertaking the task of reflecting things as they really are, some people only look at things one-sidedly or superficially and know neither their interconnections nor their inner laws, and so their method is subjectivist.

Not only does the whole process of the movement of opposites,[174] both in their interconnections and in each of the aspects, have particular features to which we should give attention, but each stage in the process has its particular features to which we must give attention too. The fundamental contradiction in a process and the essence of the process determined by this fundamental contradiction will not disappear until the process is completed; but the conditions usually differ at each stage of development of a process. The reason is that, although the nature of the fundamental contradiction in a process and the essence of the process remain unchanged, the fundamental contradiction becomes more and more intensified as it passes from one stage to another. In addition, among the numerous major and minor contradictions which are determined[175] by the fundamental contradiction, some become intensified, some are temporarily or partially resolved or mitigated, and some new ones emerge; hence the process is marked by stages.[176]

For instance, *when imperialism differed from nonmonopoly capitalism,*[177] there was no change in the nature of the two classes in fundamental contradiction, namely, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or in the capitalist essence of society; however, the contradiction between these two classes became intensified, the contradiction between monopoly and nonmonopoly capital emerged, *the contradiction between the various monopoly cliques emerged, the contradiction between the export of capital and the export of commodities emerged,* the contradiction between the colonial powers and the colonies became intensified, the contradiction among the capitalist countries resulting from their uneven development intensified,[178] and thus arose the special stage of imperialism.[179]

Take the process of China's democratic revolution,[180] which began with the Revolution of 1911; it, too, has several distinct stages.[181] *Perhaps there are still*

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[174] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "in the development of a thing"

[175] Determined → Determined or influenced

[176] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "If people do not pay attention to the stages in the process of development of a thing, they cannot deal with its contradictions properly."

[177] In the *Selected Works* version, the clause in italics is replaced with: "when the capitalism of the era of free competition developed into imperialism"

[178] Intensified → Manifested itself with particular sharpness

[179] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution precisely because Lenin and Stalin have correctly explained these contradictions and correctly formulated the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution for their resolution."

[180] Democratic revolution → Bourgeois-democratic revolution

[181] Here the *Selected Works* version introduces the following paragraph:

> In particular, the revolution in its period of bourgeois leadership and the revolution in its period of proletarian leadership represent two vastly different historical stages. In other words, proletarian leadership has fundamentally changed the whole face of the revolution, has brought about a new alignment of classes, given rise to a tremendous upsurge in the peasant revolution, imparted thoroughness to the revolution against imperialism and feudalism, created the possibility of the transition from

several stages through which it must pass before this revolution will be completed. Although no change has taken place in the nature of the fundamental contradiction in the process as a whole, that is, in the anti-imperialist, antifeudal, democratic-revolutionary nature of the process (the opposite of which is its semicolonial and semifeudal nature), China has nonetheless[182] passed through four or five[183] stages of development in the course of more than twenty years; during this time, many great events have taken place—the failure of the Revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the régime of the Northern Warlords, the formation of the first national united front and the Great Revolution,[184] the breakup of the united front and the desertion of the bourgeoisie to the side of the counterrevolution, the wars among the warlords,[185] the war of the soviets,[186] the loss of Manchuria, *the ending of the war of the soviets, the transformation of the Guomindang policy,* the establishment of the Second United Front,[187] *and so on.* These stages are marked by particular features such as the intensification of certain contradictions (e.g., the contradiction between China and Japan),[188] the partial or temporary resolution of other contradictions (e.g., the destruction of the Northern Warlords and the confiscation of the lands of the landlords *in the soviet areas*), and the emergence of yet another contradiction (e.g., the conflicts among the new warlords and the landlords' recapture of the land after the loss of the soviet areas).[189]

In studying the particularities of the contradictions at each stage in a process,[190] we not only observe them in their interconnections or their totality but also observe the two aspects.[191]

For instance, consider the Guomindang and the Communist Party. In the period of the First United Front, the Guomindang[192] was revolutionary and vigorous, and it was an alliance of various classes for the democratic revolution. After 1927, it changed into its opposite.[193] After the Xi'an incident, it began to change in the

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> the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, and so on. None of these was possible during the period when the revolution was under bourgeois leadership.

[182] China has nonetheless → Nonetheless this process has

[183] Four or five → Several

[184] Great Revolution → Revolution of 1924–1927

[185] Warlords → New warlords

[186] War of the soviets → Agrarian Revolutionary War

[187] The Second United Front → The Second National United Front and the War of Resistance Against Japan

[188] The contradiction between China and Japan → The Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Japanese invasion of the four Northeastern Provinces

[189] The soviet areas → Our revolutionary base areas in the south

[190] A process → The process of development of a thing

[191] Two aspects → Two aspects of each contradiction

[192] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "carried out Sun Yatsen's Three Great Principles of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers; hence it was"

[193] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "and became a reactionary bloc of the landlords and big bourgeoisie"

direction of a new phase.[194] Such have been the particular features of the Guomindang in the three stages. Of course, these features have arisen from a variety of causes. Now take the other aspect, the Communist Party. In the period of the First United Front, the Chinese Communist Party was in its infancy; it led the first Great Revolution[195] but revealed its immaturity in its understanding of the character, the task, and the methods, and so forth, of the revolution. Because of this, Chen Duxiuism emerged.[196] After 1927, the Communist Party *led the war of the soviets, steeling itself in this struggle with its international and internal enemies, and established the soviets and the Red Army;*[197] however, it committed political and military errors.[198] Since 1935, the Party has again been[199] leading a new united front,[200] and has raised the slogan of anti-Japanese national war and a democratic republic. These have been the particular features of the Communist Party during *one stage.* These features, too, have arisen from a variety of causes. Without studying both these sets of features, we cannot understand the particular relationship between the two parties during the various stages of their development, namely, the united front,[201] the breakup of the united front, and a further united front. What is even more fundamental[202] *than the relationship between* the two parties is the resultant contradictions which have arisen between each party and other forces.[203] For instance,[204] the Guomindang stood in contradiction to foreign imperialism[205]

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[194] After the Xi'an incident, it began to change in the direction of a new phase → After the Xi'an incident in December 1936, it began another change in the direction of ending the civil war and cooperating with the Communist Party for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism

[195] It led the first Great Revolution → It courageously led the revolution of 1924–1927

[196] Because of this Chen Duxiuism emerged. → And consequently it became possible for Chen Duxiuism, which appeared during the latter part of this revolution, to assert itself and bring about the defeat of the revolution.

[197] In the *Selected Works* version, the words in italics are replaced with: "The Communist Party courageously led the Agrarian Revolutionary War and created the revolutionary army and revolutionary base areas."

[198] It committed political and military errors → It committed adventurist errors which brought about very great losses both to the army and to the base areas

[199] Again been → Has corrected these errors and has been

[200] Here the following text has been added in the *Selected Works* version:

> for resistance to Japan; this great struggle is now developing. At the present stage, the Communist Party is a party that has gone through the test of two revolutions and acquired a wealth of experience. Such have been the particular features of the Chinese Communist Party in the three stages.

[201] The united front → The establishment of a united front

[202] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "for the study of the particular features of the two parties is the examination of the class basis of the two parties and the . . ."

[203] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "at different periods"

[204] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "in the period of its first cooperation with the Communist Party"

[205] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "and was therefore anti-imperialist"

(*sometimes adopting compromise*), and in contradiction to the great masses of the people within the country.[206] The Communist Party has stood in contradiction to foreign imperialism,[207] and in contradiction to internal exploiting classes.[208] *Because of these contradictions, there has been created both struggle and alliance between the two parties.*[209] If we do not understand the particular features of both aspects of the contradiction, we shall fail to understand not only the relationship of each party with other forces but also relations between the two parties; *why is there the possibility of new cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party? It is because of internal changes within the Guomindang which have emerged as a result of the people's dissatisfaction over Japanese oppression.*

It can thus be seen that, in studying the particularity of any kind of contradiction—the contradiction in each form of motion of matter, the contradiction in each of its processes of development, the two aspects of the contradiction in each process, the contradiction at each stage of a process, and all the aspects of the contradiction at each stage—in studying the particularity of all of these contradictions, we must not be subjective and arbitrary but must analyze it concretely. Without concrete analysis there can be no knowledge of the particularity of any contradiction.[210]

Marx and Engels[211] have provided us with excellent models of such concrete analysis.

When Marx and Engels applied the law of *the unity of* contradictions[212] to the study of the sociohistorical process, they discovered *the basic causes of social development to be* the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction of class struggle,[213] and also the resultant contradiction between the economic base and its superstructure (politics, ideology).[214] When Marx applied this law to the study of the economic structure of capitalist society, he discovered that the basic contradiction of this society is the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of ownership. This contradiction manifests itself in the contradiction between the organized character of production in individual enterprises and the anarchic character of production in society as a whole. In terms of class relations, it manifests itself in the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.[215]

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[206] Here the *Selected Works* version adds the following passage:

> —although in words it promised many benefits to the working people, in fact it gave them little or nothing. In the period when it carried on the anti-communist war, the Guomindang collaborated with imperialism and feudalism against the great masses of the people and wiped out all the gains they had won in the revolution and thereby intensified its contradictions with them. In the present period of the anti-Japanese war, the Guomindang stands in contradiction to Japanese imperialism and wants cooperation with the Communist Party, without, however, relaxing its struggle against the Communist Party and the people, or its oppression of them.

[207] The Communist Party has stood in contradiction to foreign imperialism → As for the Communist Party, it has always, in every period, stood with the great masses of the people against imperialism and feudalism

[208] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "but in the present period of the anti-Japanese war, it has adopted a moderate policy toward the Guomindang and the domestic feudal forces because the Guomindang has expressed itself in favor of resisting Japan."

[209] In the *Selected Works* version, the preceding sentence has been replaced with the following: "The above circumstances have resulted now in alliance between the two parties and now in struggle between them, and even during the periods of alliance there has been a complicated state of simultaneous alliance and struggle."

[210] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "We must always remember Lenin's words, the concrete analysis of concrete conditions."

[211] Marx and Engels → Marx and Engels were the first to

[212] Contradictions → Contradictions in things

[213] The contradiction of class struggle → The contradictions between the exploiting and exploited classes

[214] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "and they discovered how these contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social revolution in different kinds of class society."

[215] Here the *Selected Works* version adds the following long passage:

> Because the range of things is vast and there is no limit to their development, what is universal in one context becomes particular in another. Conversely, what is particular in one context becomes universal in another. The contradiction in the capitalist system between the social character of production and the private ownership of the means of production is common to all countries where capitalism exists and develops; as far as capitalism is concerned, this constitutes the universality of contradiction. But this contradiction of capitalism belongs only to a certain historical stage in the general development of class society; as far as the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society as a whole is concerned, it constitutes the particularity of contradiction. However, in the course of dissecting the particularity of all these contradictions in capitalist society, Marx gave a still more profound, more adequate, and more complete elucidation of the universality of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society in general.
>
> Since the particular is united with the universal, and since the universality as well as the particularity of contradiction is inherent in everything, universality residing in particularity, we should, when studying an object, try to discover both the particular and the universal and their interconnection, to discover both particularity and universality and also their interconnections within the object itself, and to discover the interconnections of this object with the many objects outside it. When Stalin explained the historical roots of Leninism in his famous work *The Foundations of Leninism*, he analyzed the international situation in which Leninism arose, analyzed those contradictions of capitalism which reached their culmination under imperialism, and showed how these contradictions made proletarian revolution a matter for immediate action and created favorable conditions for a direct onslaught on capitalism. What is more, he analyzed the reasons why Russia became the cradle of Leninism, why tsarist Russia became the focus of all the contradictions of imperialism, and why it was possible for the Russian proletariat to become the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. Thus, Stalin analyzed the universality of contradiction in imperialism, showing why Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution and, at the same time, analyzed the particularity of tsarist Russian imperialism within this general contradiction, showing why Russia became the birthplace of the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution and how the universality of contradiction is contained in this particularity. Stalin's analysis provides us with a model for understanding the particularity and the universality of contradiction and their interconnection.

On the question of using dialectics in the study of objective phenomena, Marx and Engels were not in any way[216] subjective and arbitrary but, from the concrete conditions in the actual objective movement of these phenomena, discovered their concrete contradictions, the concrete position of each aspect of every contradiction and the concrete interrelations of the contradiction, *and so on*.[217] We must study this attitude, which is the only correct one in study.

The relationship between the universality and the particularity of contradiction is the relationship between the general character and the individual character of contradiction. By the former, we mean that contradiction exists in and runs through all processes from beginning to end; motion, things, processes, the world, and thinking—all are contradictions. To deny contradiction is to deny everything. This is a universal truth for all times and all countries, which admits of no exception. Hence the general character, the absoluteness of contradiction. But this general character is contained in the[218] individual character, *the general character is made manifest in each individual character*; without individual character, there can be no general character. If all individual character were removed, what general character would remain? It is because each contradiction is particular that *not one thing in the whole universe is the same, change is limitless, and its existence is temporary and therefore relative.*[219] *Su Dongpo stated, "If we look at things through the eyes of change, there's not an instant of stillness in all creation." In modern terms, it could be said that what he was speaking of was the particularity of contradiction, its relativity. "But if we observe the changelessness of things, then we and all beings alike have no end."*[220] *This speaks of the universality of contradiction, its absoluteness.* This truth concerning general and individual character, concerning absoluteness and relativity, is the quintessence of the theory of contradiction.[221] If this is understood, then anything can be mastered; what the ancients called "to be familiar with the Dao" (*wen Dao*), viewed from today's perspective, is to be familiar with the Dao of contradiction.

E. The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction

There are still two points in the problem of the particularity of contradiction which must be singled out for analysis, namely, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction.

There are many contradictions in a complex process,[222] and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.

For instance, in capitalist society the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie forms the principal contradiction. The others—such as those between the remnant feudal forces[223] and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, between the proletariat and the peasant petty bourgeoisie, between non–monopoly capitalists and finance[224] capitalists, between bourgeois democracy and fascism,[225] among the capitalist countries and between imperialism and the colonies—are all determined or influenced by this principal contradiction.

In a semicolonial country like China, the relationship between the principal contradiction and the non–principal contradictions presents a complicated picture. *Before a semicolony suffered from imperialist oppression, its principal contradiction was the contradiction between the feudal or semifeudal system and the broad masses of the people. All other contradictions are determined by this principal contradiction. However, when such a society suffers under imperialist oppression, the internal principal contradiction temporarily changes into a non–principal contradiction, and the contradiction between imperialism and the entire, or almost entire, semicolonial society becomes the principal one, determining the development of all other contradictions. The status of the principal or non–principal contradiction changes at this time according to the extent of imperialist oppression and the extent of the people's revolution of the semicolony.*

For instance, when imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a country, all its various classes[226] can temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism. At such a time, the contradiction between imperialism and the country concerned becomes the principal contradiction, while all the contradictions among the various classes within the country (including what was the principal contradiction, between the feudal system and the great masses of the people) are temporarily relegated to a secondary and subordinate position. So it was in China in the Opium War, the Boxer War, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894,[227] and so it is now in the present Sino-Japanese War. *Externally, the American War of Independence, the war between England and South Africa, the war between Spain and the Philippines, and so on have all been like this.*

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[216] Marx and Engels were not in any way → Marx and Engels, and likewise Lenin and Stalin, always enjoin people not to be

[217] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "Our dogmatists do not have this attitude in study and therefore can never get anything right."

[218] The → Each

[219] In the *Selected Works* version, the clauses beginning "Not one thing in the whole universe is the same" are replaced with: "It is because each contradiction is particular that individual character arises. All individual character exists conditionally and temporarily, and hence is relative."

[220] In a particularly striking instance of the context in which Mao felt obliged to revise his earlier writings in the early 1950s, he here replaced this reference to the eminent eleventh-century poet Su Dongpo by fulsome praise of Stalin in the new passage which appears just above. The translation quoted above is that of Burton Watson in *Su Tung-p'o, Selections from a Sung Dynasty Poet* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 89. For another translation of the lines from Su's prose poem "The Red Cliff," quoted here, see Cyril Drummond Le Gros Clark, *The Prose-Poetry of Su Dongp'o* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1931), p. 128, where the two sentences quoted above are rendered: "If we regard this question as one of impermanence, then the universe cannot last for the twinkling of an eye. If, on the other hand, we consider it from the aspect of permanence, then you and I, together with all matter, are imperishable."

[221] Quintessence of the theory of contradiction → Quintessence of the problem of contradiction in things; failure to understand it is tantamount to abandoning dialectics.

[222] Complex process → In the process of development of a complex thing

[223] Forces → Classes

[224] Finance → Monopoly

[225] Fascism → Bourgeois fascism

[226] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "except for some traitors."

But in another situation, the contradictions change position. When imperialism carries on its oppression not by war but by milder means—political, economic, and cultural—the ruling classes in semicolonial countries capitulate to imperialism, and the two form an alliance; *opposition changes to unity between the two* for the joint oppression of the masses of the people. At such a time, the masses often resort to civil war against the alliance of imperialism and the feudal classes, while imperialism often *gives secret assistance to the internal ruling strata to repress the internal revolutionary war, and so avoids direct action.*[228] Thus the internal contradictions become particularly sharp. *For instance, in China, the Taiping War, the revolutionary war of 1911, the Great Revolution of 1925–1927, the war of the soviets after 1927; externally, there were the February and October revolutions in Russia (Russia too had had many semicolonial characteristics), the revolutionary characteristics of the numerous civil wars in Central and South America, and so on. Wars among the various ruling groups in the semicolonies also manifest the intensification of internal contradictions; there have been many of these in China, and Central and South America, which fall into this category.*[229]

When a civil war[230] develops to the point of threatening the very existence of imperialism and its running dogs, the domestic rulers,[231] imperialism often adopts other methods in order to maintain its rule; it either tries to split the revolutionary front from within, *for example, the treachery of the Chinese bourgeoisie in 1927,* or sends armed forces to help the domestic rulers directly, *for example, the latter period of the civil war in the Soviet Union, and the present war in Spain.* At such a time, imperialism and the domestic feudal classes[232] *and even the bourgeoisie* stand completely[233] at one pole while the masses of the people stand at the other pole. *It is clearly evident at such a time that the principal external contradiction between imperialism and the semicolony, and the principal internal contradiction between the feudal forces and broad masses of people, almost merge to form a principal contradiction which determines the development and status of the other contradictions.*[234]

But whatever happens, there is no doubt at all that at every stage in the development of a process, there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading role.

Hence, if in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principal contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. Therefore, in studying any process,[235] *we must, first, ascertain clearly whether it is a simple or a complex process.* If it is a complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to finding its principal contradiction. Once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved. This is the method Marx taught us in his study of capitalist society. *Likewise Lenin in his study of imperialism, and Lenin and Stalin in their study of the economics of the transitional period in the Soviet Union, have taught us this method.*[236] There are thousands of scholars and men of action who do not understand it, and the result is that, lost in a fog, they are unable to get to the heart of a problem and naturally cannot find a way to resolve its contradictions.

As we have said, one must not treat all the contradictions in a process as equal, but must distinguish between the principal and the secondary contradictions and pay special attention to grasping the principal one. But, within a contradiction, whether principal or secondary, should the two contradictory aspects *or sides* be treated as equal? Again, no. In any contradiction, *and at whatever time,* the development of the contradictory aspects or sides is uneven. Sometimes they seem to be in equilibrium, which is however only temporary and relative, while unevenness is basic; *that*

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[227] In the *Selected Works* version, the references to the Boxer War and the Sino-Japanese War are inverted, so as to place them in the proper chronological order, and the dates of 1840 and 1900 are added after the Opium War and the Boxer War.

[228] In the *Selected Works* version, the words in italics are replaced with: "while imperialism often employs indirect methods rather than direct action in helping the reactionaries in the semicolonial countries to oppress the people."

[229] In the *Selected Works* version, the passage beginning with the words "For instance, in China" is replaced with the following two sentences: "This is what happened in China in the Revolutionary War of 1924–1927, and the ten years of Agrarian Revolutionary War after 1927. Wars among the various reactionary ruling groups in the semicolonial countries, e.g., the war among the warlords in China, fall into the same category."

[230] Civil war → Revolutionary civil war

[231] Rulers → Reactionaries

[232] Imperialism and the domestic feudal classes → Foreign imperialism and domestic reaction

[233] Completely → Quite openly

[234] In the *Selected Works* version, the preceding passage in italics is replaced with the following text:

> thus forming the principal contradiction which determines or influences the development of the other contradictions. The assistance given by various capitalist countries to the Russian reactionaries after the October Revolution is an example of armed intervention. Chiang Kaishek's betrayal in 1927 is an example of splitting the revolutionary front.

[235] Process → Complex process

[236] In the *Selected Works* version, the preceding sentence is replaced with: "Likewise Lenin and Stalin taught us this method when they studied imperialism and the general crisis of capitalism and when they studied the Soviet economy."

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is, when they seem to be in equilibrium, there is in fact no absolute equilibrium. Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction.[237]

But this situation is not static; the principal and the nonprincipal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other.[238] In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the nonprincipal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed—a change determined by *the strength of the struggle between the two sides.*[239]

For instance, for a long period the bourgeoisie has occupied the principal position in capitalist society, playing the leading role, while the proletariat remained subordinate to it. However, before and after the revolution, the proletariat changes into the principal position and plays the leading role, while the bourgeoisie changes in the opposite direction. The Soviet Union on the eve of the October Revolution was like this.[240]

In capitalist society, capitalism has changed its position from a subordinate force *in the feudal society of the past to the principal force*, while the feudal forces changed from their principal position to a subordinate one;[241] *but how do we explain Japan and prerevolutionary Russia? In these cases, the feudal forces still enjoyed superiority, and capitalism was still not performing the function of deciding everything. This was because their contradictory aspects had not yet completed their decisive change. Because of the era, this change could not travel the*

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[237] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position."

[238] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "and the nature of the thing changes accordingly."

[239] Here the *Selected Works* version replaces the italicized words with: "the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing."

[240] In the *Selected Works* version, the preceding paragraph has been deleted and replaced with the following one:

> We often speak of "the new superseding the old." The supersession of the old by the new is a general, eternal, and inviolable law of the universe. The transformation of one thing into another, through leaps of different forms in accordance with its essence and external conditions—this is the process of the new superseding the old. In each thing there is contradiction between its new and its old aspects, and this gives rise to a series of struggles with many twists and turns. As a result of these struggles, the new aspect changes from minor to major and rises to predominance, while the old aspect changes from major to minor and gradually dies out. And the moment the new aspect gains dominance over the old, the old thing changes qualitatively into a new thing. It can thus be seen that the nature of a thing is mainly determined by the principal aspect of the contradiction, the aspect which has gained predominance. When the principal aspect which has gained predominance changes, the nature of a thing changes accordingly.

[241] Here the *Selected Works* version replaces the clause in italics with: "in the old feudal era to the dominant force, and the nature of society has accordingly changed from feudal to capitalist. In the new, capitalist era, the feudal forces changed from their former dominant position to a subordinate one, gradually dying out."

old historical road, but was change which came into being under other historical circumstances; that is, in which the landlord class and the bourgeoisie changed entirely to a position of being dominated and in which the proletariat and the peasantry rose to occupy the leading position. At present, all countries which have still not yet completed a capitalist transformation (including China) will follow this new road, although they do not leap over the stage of the democratic revolution; however, this revolution will be led and carried out by the proletariat.[242]

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[242] In the revised version which appears in the *Selected Works*, this paragraph and the next four paragraphs are replaced by the following text:

> Such was the case, for example, in Britain and France. With the development of the productive forces, the bourgeoisie changes from being a new class playing a progressive role to being an old class playing a reactionary role, until it is finally overthrown by the proletariat and becomes a class deprived of privately owned means of production and stripped of power, when it, too, gradually dies out.
>
> The proletariat, which is much more numerous than the bourgeoisie and grows simultaneously with it but under its rule, is a new force which, initially subordinate to the bourgeoisie, gradually gains strength, becomes an independent class playing the leading role in history, and finally seizes political power and becomes the ruling class. Thereupon the nature of society changes and the old capitalist society becomes the new socialist society. This is the path already taken by the Soviet Union, a path that all other countries will inevitably take.
>
> Look at China, for instance. Imperialism occupies the principal position in the contradiction in which China has been reduced to a semicolony, it oppresses the Chinese people, and China has been changed from an independent country into a semicolonial one. But this state of affairs will inevitably change; in the struggle between the two sides, the power of the Chinese people, which is growing under the leadership of the proletariat, will inevitably change China from a semicolony into an independent country, whereas imperialism will be overthrown and old China will inevitably change into New China.
>
> The change of old China into New China also involves a change in the relation between the old feudal forces and the new popular forces within the country. The old feudal landlord class will be overthrown, and from being the ruler it will change into being the ruled; and this class, too, will gradually die out. From being the ruled the people, led by the proletariat, will become the rulers. Thereupon, the nature of Chinese society will change and the old, semicolonial and semifeudal society will change into a new democratic society.
>
> Instances of such reciprocal transformation are found in our past experience. The Qing dynasty, which ruled China for nearly three hundred years, was overthrown in the Revolution of 1911, and the revolutionary Tongmenghui under Sun Yatsen's leadership was victorious for a time. In the Revolutionary War of 1924–1927, the revolutionary forces of the Communist-Guomindang alliance in the south changed from weak to strong and won victory in the Northern Expedition, while the Northern warlords who once held sway were overthrown. In 1927, the people's forces led by the Communist Party were greatly reduced numerically under the attacks of Guomindang reaction, but with the elimination of opportunism within their ranks they gradually grew again. In the revolutionary base areas under Communist leadership, the peasants have been transformed from the ruled to the rulers, while the landlords have undergone a reverse transformation. It is always so in the world, the new displacing the old, the old superseded by the new, the old eliminated to make way for the new, and the new emerging out of the old.

In the contradiction between imperialism and the entire Chinese society, the former occupies the principal aspect, and it enjoys superiority in the struggle between the two sides. But in this situation of mutual opposition, this state of affairs is in the process of changing; China, on the one hand, is changing from being oppressed to being free and independent; imperialism, however, is moving toward a position at which it will be overthrown.

In China, the antagonistic situation existing internally between the feudal forces and the broad masses of the people is also changing. The people will rely on revolutionary struggle to transform themselves into the leading and dominant force. There has already been illustration of this in the past; the southern revolutionary forces changed from a secondary to the principal position, and the Northern warlords changed in the opposite direction; and there was a similar situation in the soviet areas, in which the peasants changed from the ruled to the rulers, and the landlords changed in the opposite direction.

In the relationship in China between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, because the bourgeoisie has retained the means of production and sovereignty, to the present it still occupies the leading position. However, in terms of leadership of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution, the proletariat occupies the leading position because of its level of consciousness and revolutionary thoroughness as compared to the vacillation of the bourgeoisie. This point will influence the future of the revolution in China. Only if the proletariat allies itself with the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie will it be able to occupy politically and materially the leading position. If it can do this, the proletariat will assume the decisive leading function of the revolution.

As regards the contradiction between the peasantry and the workers, the workers have changed from their former subordinate position to their present leading position, and the peasantry have changed in the opposite direction. In the contradictions between the industrial workers and the handicraft workers, skilled and unskilled workers, town and countryside, mental and manual labour, materialism and idealism, all have made the same sort of change.

At certain times in the revolutionary struggle, the difficulties outweigh the favorable conditions and so constitute the principal aspect of the contradiction, and the favorable conditions constitute the secondary aspect. But through their efforts the revolutionaries, *by utilizing their favorable conditions as a base*, can overcome the difficulties step by step and open up a favorable new situation; the difficulties which made up the principal position will change so that favorable conditions become principal.[243] This is what happened after the failure of the revolution[244] in 1927 and during the Long March of the Red Army. In the present Sino-Japanese War, China is again in a *very* difficult position, but we should and can exert ourselves to change that situation. Conversely, favorable conditions can be transformed into difficult ones if the revolutionaries make mistakes. Thus the victory of the revolution of 1925–1927[245] turned into defeat. *The victory of the Central Soviet in smashing the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Encirclement Campaigns changed into the defeat of the Fifth Encirclement Campaign.*[246]

When we engage in study, the same holds good for the contradiction in the passage from ignorance to knowledge. For those who have not studied Marxism, ignorance or scanty acquaintance is the principal aspect of the contradiction, while the depth and extensiveness of Marxism is the other aspect of the contradiction.[247] But by assiduous study, ignorance can be transformed into knowledge, and scanty knowledge into substantial knowledge.[248] *Many of our comrades are moving in that direction. The opposite situation is the same; if one refuses to progress when only half the distance has been covered, lets one's thoughts become confused, or takes the wrong path, then one's knowledge can change to ignorance and correctness change to error. Kautsky, Plekhanov, Chen Duxiu, and others have taken this road. Some conceited types within our ranks are also in a similar danger if they don't change.*

I regard all principal and nonprincipal positions of the aspects of a contradiction as involved in this mutual change.

Some people think that this is not true of certain contradictions. For instance, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions.[249] *It should be realized that under normal conditions, and viewed from a materialist point of view, they really are unchanging and absolute things; however, there are historically many particular situations in which they do change.* The productive forces, practice, and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that sometimes[250] such aspects as the relations of production, theory, and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves

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[243] In the *Selected Works* version, the preceding clause is replaced with a terser statement: "thus a difficult situation yields place to a favorable one."

[244] Revolution → Revolution in China

[245] 1925–1927 → 1924–1927

[246] In the *Selected Works* version, the preceding sentence becomes: "The revolutionary base areas which grew up in the southern provinces after 1927 had all suffered defeat by 1934."

[247] In the *Selected Works* version, this sentence has been recast to read: "At the very beginning of our study of Marxism, our ignorance of or scanty acquaintance with Marxism stands in contradiction to knowledge of Marxism."

[248] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "and blindness in the application of Marxism into mastery of its application."

[249] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "This is the mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist conception. True."

[250] Sometimes → In certain conditions

in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role. The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." When a task, no matter which, has to be performed, but there is as yet no guiding line, method, plan, or policy, the principal and decisive thing is to decide on a guiding line, method, plan, or policy. When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental.[251] We also recognize—and indeed must recognize—the reaction of mental on material things.[252] This does not go against materialism; on the contrary, it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism.

In studying the problem of the particularity of contradiction, unless we examine these two facets—the principal and the nonprincipal contradictions in a process, and the principal and the nonprincipal aspects of a contradiction—that is, unless we examine the distinctive character of these two facets of contradiction, we shall get bogged down in abstractions, be unable to understand contradiction concretely, and consequently be unable to find the correct method of resolving it. The distinctive character or particularity of these two facets represents the unevenness that is[253] in contradiction. Nothing in this world develops absolutely evenly, *hence the world as it is*; we must oppose the theory of even development (or the theory of equilibrium).[254] The study of the various states of unevenness in contradictions, of the principal and nonprincipal contradictions and of the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction constitutes an essential method by which a revolutionary political party correctly determines its strategic and tactical policies in political affairs (the same applies to military affairs). *Therefore this question cannot be overemphasized.*[255]

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[251] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "and social being determines social consciousness."

[252] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "of social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base."

[253] Unevenness that is → Unevenness of the forces that are

[254] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "Moreover, it is these concrete features of a contradiction and the changes in the principal and nonprincipal aspects of a contradiction in the course of its development that manifest the force of the new superseding the old."

[255] Therefore this question cannot be overemphasized. → All Communists must give it attention.

F. The Identity and Struggle of[256] a Contradiction

When we have resolved the problem of[257] the universality and the particularity of contradiction, we must proceed to study the problem of the identity and struggle of[258] a contradiction; *only by doing so can the study of the law of the unity of contradiction be completely resolved.*

Identity, unity, coincidence, interpenetration, interpermeation, interdependence (or mutual dependence for existence), interconnection, or mutual cooperation—all these different terms mean the same thing and refer to the following two points: first, the existence of each of the two aspects of a contradiction in a process[259] presupposes the existence of the other aspect, and both aspects coexist in a single entity; second, in given conditions, each of the two contradictory aspects transforms itself into its opposite. This is the meaning of identity.

Lenin said:

> Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical—under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another—why the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another.

What did Lenin mean by this?

The various contradictory aspects in every process[260] are in opposition to each other, *are in mutual disharmony, unequal in strength, at odds with one another, and in dispute; all are permeated with hostile antagonists. Such antagonistic aspects are contained in all processes, phenomena, things, and thought in the world without exception.*[261] A simple process contains only a single pair of antagonistic aspects,[262] while a complex process contains two or more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites become mutual antagonists.[263] That is how all processes, phenomena, and things[264] are constituted and set in motion.

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[256] Here the *Selected Works* version adds "the aspects of."

[257] When we have resolved the problem of → When we understand

[258] Struggle of → Struggle of the aspects of

[259] A process → The process of the development of a thing

[260] Here the *Selected Works* version inserts, "exclude each other, struggle with each other, and."

[261] In the *Selected Works* version, this passage in italics is replaced with a single sentence: "Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought."

[262] Here and subsequently, as well as in the immediately preceding italicized passage, Mao frequently used in the 1937 version of his discussion of contradictions the term *yuanjia* (enemy, antagonist, adversary) to characterize the opposites making up a contradiction. This is a very vivid expression in Chinese, and we have therefore retained it, even though the impersonal or abstract opposites in some contradictions cannot strictly speaking be characterized as "enemies."

This being so, there is an utter lack of identity or unity. How then can one speak of identity or unity? *In this do the strangeness and wonder of the world find themselves.*

The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its antagonistic aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? It cannot. Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without " above," there would be no "below"; without "below," there would be no "above." Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty, there would be no facility.[265] Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without colonies[266] there would be no imperialist oppression; without imperialist oppression, there would be no colonies. It is so with *the opposition of both sides in all processes, phenomena, and things*;[267] in given conditions, on the one hand, they are opposed to each other, and, on the other, they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating, interdependent, *and in alliance—both in contradiction and in union*—and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictions[268] possess the character of nonidentity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies how there can be identity.[269] This is the first meaning of identity.

But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them, and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. In given conditions each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.

Why is there identity here, too? You see, *in the relationship between life and death, whether within an organism or in cellular life within an organism, life is transformed into death; life can never last indefinitely, and under certain conditions it moves toward its opposite and changes into death. Death? Under certain*

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[263] The pairs of opposites become mutual antagonists → The pairs of opposites are in contradiction to each other

[264] Here the *Selected Works* inserts: "in the objective world and all human thought"

[265] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "Without landlords there would be no tenant peasants; without tenant peasants, there would be no landlords."

[266] Colonies → Colonies and semicolonies

[267] In the *Selected Works* version, the italicized phrase is replaced with "all opposites."

[268] Contradictions → Contradictory aspects

[269] How there can be identity → How opposites can be and how they become identical

conditions, death too can produce new life, and death is transformed into life; it is not something which comes to an end with death. One could ask: if there is between life and death no connection, no involvement or relationship, that is, no identity, why is it that the two opposed entities of life and death are capable of changing into each other?

The oppressed and deprived proletariat moves toward a dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, it changes to no longer being oppressed or deprived; the bourgeoisie, however, through the collapse of its class, changes to the point where it comes under the rule of the proletarian state.[270] This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnections and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?

Neither imperialist oppression of the colonies nor the fate of the colonies to suffer under that oppression can last forever. The imperialists will be overthrown by the revolutionary efforts of their own peoples and the peoples of the colonies and will come under the rule of the people. How about the peoples of the colonies and the imperialist countries? The day will come when oppression will be discarded and freedom and liberation (the opposite aspect to oppression) will be achieved; because of certain conditions, there are identity and common characteristics between the two aspects.

The regular warfare of the Great Revolution of 1927 changed into soviet guerrilla war, which commenced the period of soviet guerrilla war which again changed subsequently into regular warfare. From now on, it will change again from soviet war into anti-Japanese national war. There emerged an identity in these periods because of certain conditions, an interpenetration, an interpermeation and alliance between the two opposite things.

Because of its class character and imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions), *the Guomindang's revolutionary Three People's Principles changed after 1927 into a reactionary policy*; but it has been compelled to *change to one of resistance to Japan and saving the nation*[271] because of the sharpening of the contradiction between China and Japan and because of the Communist Party's policy of the united front (these being the conditions). Things in contradiction change into one another, and herein lies that kind of identity.[272]

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[270] In the *Selected Works* version, the whole of the previous paragraph, beginning with "You see . . . ," and the first sentence of this paragraph are replaced with the following sentence: "You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite."

[271] In the *Selected Works* version, the first few lines of this paragraph have been replaced with the following text:

> The Guomindang, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, became a counterrevolutionary party after 1927 because of its inherent class nature and because of imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions);

[272] That kind of identity → A definite identity

The agrarian revolution *of the soviet areas* has been a process in which the landlord class owning the land is transformed into a class that has lost its land, while the peasants who once lost their land are transformed into small holders who have acquired land, and it will be such a process once again. In given conditions, having and not having, acquiring and losing, are interconnected to give identity.[273] Under socialism, private peasant ownership is transformed into the public ownership of socialist agriculture; this has already taken place in the Soviet Union, and *we will be able to do the same.*[274] There is a bridge leading from private property to public property, which in philosophy is called identity,[275] or interpenetration.

Bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy are in opposition, but the former inevitably changes into the latter; under certain conditions there are complementary elements produced between things in opposition.

To raise the national culture is in fact to prepare the conditions for changing to an international culture; *to strive for a democratic republic is in fact to prepare the conditions for abolishing the democratic republic and changing to a new state system*; to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat[276] is in fact to prepare the conditions for abolishing this dictatorship and advancing to the elimination of all state systems.[277] To establish and build the Communist Party is in fact to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the Communist Party and all political parties. To build a revolutionary army[278] and to carry on revolutionary war is in fact to prepare the conditions for the permanent elimination of war. These opposites are at the same time complementary.

There are those who say that the Communist Party is internationalist, so it is absolutely incapable of being at the same time patriotic. We declare, however, that we are internationalists but, at the same time, because we are a political party of a colony (the condition), we struggle for the protection of the motherland and in opposition to imperialist oppression. Only when we have first escaped from imperialist oppression can we participate in a world Communist society. It is this that allows the two to constitute an identity. Under certain conditions, patriotism and internationalism are both in opposition and complementary. Why is it that the Communist parties of imperialist countries resolutely oppose patriotism? It is because patriotism in that context has identity only with the interests of the bourgeoisie and is fundamentally opposed to the interests of the proletariat.

There are those who say that the Communist Party cannot also believe in the Three People's Principles at the same time. But we declare that, at the present stage, while adhering firmly to the Party's Communist program, the Communist movement cannot do other than resolutely lead the anti-imperialist, antifeudal national democratic revolution (this is the condition). Therefore, not only do we not oppose the Three People's Principles, we previously carried out the true program of the Three People's Principles (anti-imperialist nationalism, the democratic principle of soviets of workers and peasants, and the principle of people's livelihood through agrarian revolution). Moreover, during the past decade, the tradition of the true Three People's Principles has remained only with the Communist Party. Apart from a few elements such as Song Qingling, He Xiangning, and Li Xijiu, the Guomindang has discarded this tradition.[279] *The political program of the Communist Party for the democratic revolution is not in conflict with the true Three People's Principles; on the contrary, it corresponds to the thoroughgoing and progressive Three People's Principles. When we have passed through the democratic stage, we will change to communism. The Three People's Principles and communism are not a single entity, and the two are in contradiction; in the present and future stages, they are not a single entity, and they are in contradiction. They are, however, both in opposition and complementary; under certain conditions, identity can be created.*

We can also speak of something that is happening at this very moment. War and peace are in contradiction, but they are also connected;[280] war is transformed into peace (for instance, World War I was transformed into the Treaty of Versailles;[281] China's civil war was transformed into internal peace following the Xi'an incident).[282] Peace is transformed into war (*the present world peace is temporary* and will be transformed into the second world war; *the peace following Japan's invasion of the Four Northeastern Provinces was temporary and has now begun to change into a continental war*).[283] Why is this so? Because they have[284] an identity in given conditions. *The Chinese proletariat and bourgeoisie have agreed upon an*

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[273] To give identity → There is identity of the two sides

[274] We will be able to do the same → As it will take place everywhere else

[275] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "or transformation into each other."

[276] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "or the dictatorship of the people."

[277] The elimination of all state systems → The higher stage when all state systems are eliminated

[278] Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "under the leadership of the Communist Party."

[279] Song Qingling (1893–1981), Sun Yatsen's widow, a member of the left wing of the Guomindang, and He Xiangning (1878–1972), the widow of Liao Zhongkai, assassinated in 1925, had both been in contact with Mao Zedong for some time. (For further details, see the biographical notes regarding them in Volume V, pp. 365 and 682, accompanying letters addressed to them by Mao.) Li Xijiu (1872–1952), a native of Hebei, had been a member of the Tongmenghui in her youth and had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. At this time, she was a member of the Guomindang Central Disiplinary Committee for Public Servants. In 1949, all three women were appointed to the Central People's Government Council, the most important government organ of the People's Republic at that time. Song Qingling was vice president, and the other two were among the fifty-six members.

[280] War and peace are in contradiction, but they are also connected → War and peace, as everyone knows, transform themselves into each other

[281] The Treaty of Versailles → The postwar peace

[282] China's civil war was transformed into internal peace following the Xi'an incident → And the civil war in China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace

[283] The present world peace is temporary and will be transformed into the second world war; the peace following Japan's invasion of the four Northeastern Provinces was temporary and has now begun to change into a continental war. → For instance, the Guomindang-Communist cooperation was transformed into war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a second world war.

[284] They have → In class society, such contradictory things as war and peace have

anti-Japanese united front; this is one aspect of the contradiction. The proletariat must raise its political consciousness and pay close attention to the bourgeoisie's political vacillations, and its corrupting and destructive effect on the Communist Party, in order to guarantee the independence of Party and class; this is the other aspect of the contradiction. A united front of the various political parties with independence for those parties are the two aspects of the contradiction constituting the present political movement. There would be no united front if one of these two aspects, the Party's right to determine its own policies, was removed. We give the people freedom; this is one aspect. We also suppress the Chinese traitors and wreckers; this is the other aspect. Because of certain conditions, these two, freedom and unfreedom, are connected, and it won't do to be without either of them; this is the unity or identity of opposites. The organizational form of the Communist Party and the soviets, as well as the anti-Japanese government which we advocate, is democratic centralist; they are democratic but also centralist, and the two are in contradiction and unity because, under certain conditions, they have identity. The proletarian democratic dictatorship in the Soviet Union, and our democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants of the past decade, are democratic toward the revolutionary classes; they are also dictatorial (or despotic) toward counterrevolutionary classes. There is identity between the two extremes of these opposites.

The resting and training of troops is at the same time a condition for victory in battle; "troops are trained for a thousand days" in order to "use them for one morning." To separate and advance is at the same time a condition for a combined attack (develop to attack jointly); retreat and defense are at the same time in order to counterattack and take the offensive (retreat to advance, and defend to attack). There is no reason for being devious other than that it is the most effective method of wiping out the enemy (be devious to be direct); in order to succeed in the west, make a thrust toward the east (cause an uproar in the east, and strike in the west).[285] *Divide the soldiers to win over the masses, in order to facilitate centralization to wipe out the enemy; centralize to wipe out the enemy in order to facilitate the division of the soldiers to win over the masses. Orders should be resolutely enforced, but, at the same time, freedom of action should be permitted in the context of a unified plan; discipline must be strictly applied, but, at the same time, conscious activity should be promoted; the statement of individual interest is permissible, but in the end it must be subordinated to the group decision; work at the front is important, but work at the rear cannot be discarded or ignored; if one's health is poor one must think of convalescence, but in times of urgency, one also must think of sacrifice; everybody wants life to be easy, but when economic difficulties arise, one has to suffer; military training is important, and without it we could not smash the enemy, but political work is also of importance, for without it we would be defeated; the abundant experience of the old soldiers and cadres is worthwhile and valuable, but if there are no new soldiers and cadres, the war and our work cannot be continued; courage is important, but there must be a strategem; although Zhang Fei was not bad, in the last analysis he was not as good as Zhao Zilong;*[286] *the part of the work which we lead is important, but that part led by others and the entire work is also important if not more important; small group mentality is incorrect, and when one's own opinion and that of the group or higher authorities are in contradiction, one's opinion can and should be explained; it is, however, impermissable freely to express that opinion to any other member at a time when the group or higher authorities have not yet given approval, still less to instigate the subordinate members to oppose the higher authorities; the discipline of the minority subordinating itself to the majority, and the lower level subordinating itself to the higher level, is the minimum discipline of the Communist Party and the Red Army. "Good medicine is bitter to the taste but beneficial for the sickness." "Sincere advice is not pleasant to hear, but it is beneficial for one's conduct."*[287] *"It is on disaster that good fortune perches; it is beneath good fortune that disaster crouches."*[288] *"To love yet know their bad qualities, to hate and yet know their excellences."*[289] *To glance ahead but not behind is called being a boorish oaf; to know one but not two is he who is not yet a wise man.*[290]

All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the unity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he talked of how they happen to be identical, under what *kind of* conditions they become identical, transforming themselves into one another.

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[285] The injunction in parentheses is a well-known maxim from the commentaries to Sunzi's *The Art of War*, frequently cited by Mao. See the relevant passage in Volume V, p. 503.

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[286] Zhang Fei and Zhao Zilong are characters from the novel *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. Although Zhang was one of the hero Liu Bei's original two companions and had many good qualities, he is depicted in the novel as impetuous and easily angered; Zhao appears as a more prudent and calculating and therefore more successful commander.

[287] Although Mao has separated these two sentences with quotation marks, they are part of the same quotation from the *Kongzi jiayu*, Book VI. [The *Kongzi jiayu (Home Sayings of Confucius)* is a Confucian text of the second century.]

[288] This quotation is from Chapter 58 of the *Laozi*. We follow the translation of D.C. Lau, *Tao Te Ching* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 119.

[289] This quotation is from the *Daxue*, Chapter VIII, commentary of the disciple Zeng (Legge, Vol. I, p. 369). The full passage, which provides the context for the words cited by Mao, reads as follows:

> What is meant by "The regulation of one's family depends on the cultivation of his person," is this: Men are partial where they feel affection and love; partial where they despise and dislike; partial where they stand in awe and reverence; partial where they feel sorrow and compassion; partial where they are arrogant and rude. Thus it is that there are few men in the world who love [*hao*; Mao uses *ai*] and at the same time know the bad qualities of the object of their love, or who hate and yet know the excellence of the object of their hatred.

[290] This is a popular Chinese saying and is not from a classical source.

Why is it that the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into each other? Because this is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid; but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary, and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite.[291]

Why can an egg but not a stone be transformed into a chicken? Why is there identity between war and peace and none between war and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings and not to anything else? The sole reason is that the identity of opposites exists only in given conditions. Without these necessary given conditions there can be no identity whatsoever.

Why is it that in Russia the democratic[292] revolution was directly linked with the socialist[293] revolution, while in France the democratic[294] revolution was not directly linked with a socialist revolution and the Paris Commune[295] ended in failure? Why is it, on the other hand, that the nomadic system of Mongolia and Central Asia has been directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism and avoid the old historical road of *England, America, France, etc?*[296] *Why is it that the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Chinese Revolutions of 1911 and 1927 were linked not with revolutionary victory but with failure? Why is it that, for his entire life, most of Napoleon's wars were linked to victory, while at the one battle of Waterloo, he was roundly defeated, his army beaten and himself taken prisoner? Why is it possible to build a railroad to Xinjiang and not to the moon? Why have the cordial relations between Germany and the Soviet Union turned into enmity, while the enmity between France and the Soviet Union turned temporarily into cordial relations? In all these questions*, the sole reason is the concrete conditions of the time. When certain necessary conditions are present, contradictions arise in processes[297] and, moreover, the opposites contained in them are interdependent and become transformed into one another; otherwise none of this would be possible. *It is for this reason that none of the following can become an identity of opposites, or a concrete contradiction, and merely add to the material for annoyance and amusement among men: Don Quixote's mighty battle with the windmill, Sun Wukong's somersault of one hundred and eight thousand* li *over the clouds, Alice's journey through Wonderland, Robinson's wanderings on his lone island, Ah Q's spiritual victory, Hitler's world domination, Hegel's absolute spirit, Bukharin's theory of equilibrium, Trotsky's permanent revolution, the ideological unity of the emperor's scholars, Chen Duxiu's opportunism, the pro-Japanese faction's theory that weapons decide everything, and including from among ancient China's legends, "the man of Qi's concern that the sky might fall," "Gua Fu's race with the moon," and so on.*[298]

Such is the problem of identity. What then is struggle? And what is the relation between identity and struggle?

Lenin said:

> The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.

What does this passage mean?

All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but[299] the transformation of one process into another is absolute. *The unity, identity, consistency, constancy, and union of contradictions are contained within the struggle of contradictions and become an element in the struggle of contradictions. That is the meaning of Lenin's statement.*

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[291] Here the *Selected Works* text adds the following paragraph:

> Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling class of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile, and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule. The task of Communists is to expose the fallacies of the reactionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution.

[292] In Russia in the democratic → In Russia in 1917 the bourgeois-democratic

[293] Socialist → Proletarian socialist

[294] Democratic → Bourgeois-democratic

[295] Paris Commune → Paris Commune of 1871

[296] Of England, America, France, etc. → Of the Western countries, without passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship

[297] Processes → Processes of the development of things

[298] In the *Selected Works* version, this brief reference to "ancient China's legends" is replaced with the following text:

> In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another. There are innumerable transformations in mythology, for instance, Gua Fu's race with the sun in the *Book of Mountains and Seas*, Yi's shooting down of nine suns in *Huai Nanzi*, the Monkey King's seventy-two metamorphoses in *Journey to the West*, the numerous episodes of ghosts and foxes metamorphosed into human beings in the *Strange Tales of Liao Zhai*, and so on. But these legendary transformations of opposites are not concrete changes reflecting concrete contradictions. They are naive, imaginary, subjectively conceived transformations conjured up in men's minds by innumerable real and complex transformations of opposites into one another. Marx said, "All mythology masters and dominates and shapes the forces of nature in and through the imagination; hence it disappears as soon as man gains mastery over the forces of nature." The myriads of changes in mythology (and also in nursery tales) delight people because they imaginatively picture man's conquest of the forces of nature, and the best myths possess "eternal charm," as Marx put it; but myths are not built out of the concrete contradictions existing in given conditions and therefore are not a scientific reflection of reality. That is, in myths or nursery tales the aspects constituting a contradiction have only an imaginary identity, not a concrete identity. The scientific reflection of the identity in real transformations is Marxist dialectics.

[299] Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "the mutability manifested in."

That is, it is insufficient simply to acknowledge that contradiction leads to movement; it must also be understood under which conditions contradiction gives rise to movement.

The first condition of unity (identity) in which contradiction gives rise to movement is the particular condition of movement. In daily life it is called rest, constantly unchanging, immobile, death, at a standstill, deadlock, stalemate, peaceful state, equilibrium, balance, harmony, compromise, union, and so on; these are all relative, temporary, and conditional. The second condition of unity in which contradiction gives rise to movement must also be recognized, that is the general condition of movement. This is the splitting of a unified entity, its struggle, life, movement, impermanence, liveliness, change, unpeaceful state, disequilibrium, disharmony, intransigence, and even conflict, antagonism, or war; this is absolute. The relative condition of contradiction of identity, unity, rest, death, and so forth, is contained in the condition of contradiction which is absolute and in struggle. Because struggle permeates a process from beginning to end, permeates all processes, it becomes that which is absolute in them. Not to understand this principle is metaphysical and mechanistic and actually means rejecting dialectics.

International peace treaties are relative, while international struggle is absolute. A united front between classes is relative, while class struggle is absolute. Unanimity in intraparty ideology is relative, while struggle in intraparty ideology is absolute. Equilibrium, cohesion, attraction, and association, and so on in natural phenomena are relative, while disequilibrium, dispersion, rejection, dissociation, and so forth are absolute. When a process is in a condition of peace treaty, united front, unity and solidarity, equilibrium, cohesion, attraction, association, and so on, contradiction and struggle still exist, but they have not adopted an acute form; it is certainly not a case of there being no contradictions or of a cessation of struggle. Struggle ceaselessly destroys one relative condition and transforms it into another relative condition, destroys one process and transforms it into another process, and this ubiquitous character of struggle is the absoluteness of contradiction.[300]

When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they cannot constitute a contradiction, cannot coexist in the same entity, and cannot transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add that struggle[301] permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.

The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things.

So that this point may be clearly understood, we again utilize as examples the relationship between life and death and the relationship between labor and capital.

Within an organism, the death of old cells is the precondition for the production of new cells and is the precondition for the process of life. The two contradictory aspects of life and death are united within an organism and also change into each other; live cells change into dead cells, and dead cells change into live cells (live cells emerge from dead cells). But this unity of life and death, their coexistence within an organism, is conditional, temporary, and relative. From start to finish, however, the incompatibility of life and death, their mutual rejection, struggle, negation, and transformation, is unconditional, eternal, and absolute. The absoluteness of struggle is indicated by live elements within an organism ceaselessly triumphing over dead elements and, moreover, controlling the dead elements. Under given conditions, life changes into death and death into life; such conditions allow an identity between life and death and enable them to change into each other. Because of the mutual struggle of these two contradictory entities, life and death, life is inevitably transformed into death and death is inevitably transformed into life. This inevitability is unconditional and absolute. From this it can be seen that at a certain stage in development there must be a certain condition of temperature and environment, and so on for life and death to change from one to

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[300] In the *Selected Works* version, the three preceding paragraphs are replaced with the following text:

> There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, cohesion, attraction, and so on as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. And yet, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, cohesion, and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states, but the contradiction is resolved though the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.

[301] Struggle → The struggle between opposites

another and for there to be an identity between them. This is one problem. The reasons for the so-called temporariness and relativity of life and death, that is, where the conditions do not change and are unable to lengthen life or death, are to be found in the struggle, negation, and mutual rejection between the two. This situation is eternal and absolute. This is the other problem.

The proletariat produces surplus value for the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie exploits the proletariat's labor power. This is a unified process which determines the survival of capitalism. Labor and capital are each a condition for the other's existence. However, this condition has a given limit, and capitalist development must remain within this given limit; if it is exceeded, ruptures emerge in the unified process, and a socialist revolution arises. These ruptures emerge abruptly, but also emerge gradually in that preparations for their emergence commence from the day the two classes come into existence; the struggle of both sides is continual, and it is this which lays the ground for a sudden change. From this it can be seen that the coexistence of the two classes is preserved as a result of given conditions; this coexistence under given conditions produces a unity or identity between the two classes. Under given conditions, the two classes also change from one to the other, such that the exploiters change into the exploited and the exploited change into the exploiters, and capitalist society is transformed into a socialist society. The two contradictory entities have an identity under given conditions. This is one problem. The two sides are in constant struggle. Not only is there struggle within an entity, but in particular there is a revolutionary struggle. This unavoidable condition is unconditional, absolute, and inevitable. This is the other problem.[302]

In identity there is struggle.[303] To quote Lenin, "there is an absolute in the relative." *Because of this, the unity of opposites is itself a manifestation or an element of the struggle of contradictions. This is our conclusion with regard to this problem.*

According to this conclusion, it is perfectly evident whether or not the so-called theories of class harmony and the unity of ideology still have any standing. The theory of international class harmony becomes the opportunism of the workers' movements in every country, and they have no function other than simply to serve as the running dogs of the bourgeoisie. China too has a so-called theory of class harmony, but this is a tune sung by bourgeois reformism. It has no purpose other than specifically to swindle the proletariat so that it will remain forever the slave of the bourgeoisie. The meaningless clichés of the so-called theory of the unity of ideology directly or indirectly depend on the nonsense spewed out by officialdom that it is "the learned opinion of the scholars." Its purpose is nothing but the suppression of the truth and the obstruction of the progress of the revolution. True scientific theory is the law of the unity of opposites of materialist dialectics, and not these other melodies.

G. The Place of Antagonism in Contradiction

The question of the struggle of opposites includes the question of what is antagonism. Our answer is *that contradiction exists in all processes from beginning to end, and that there is a struggle between the two sides of a contradiction from start to finish.* Antagonism is one form of struggle, *but not all contradictions have it.*[304] *When certain contradictions in a certain process of development adopt a form in which force becomes overt and there is mutual conflict, the struggle of contradictions manifests itself as antagonism.* Antagonism is[305] a particular manifestation of the struggle of opposites.

For instance, consider the contradiction between the exploiting and the exploited classes. Such contradictory classes coexist for a long time in the same society, be it slave society, feudal society, or capitalist society, and they struggle with each other, but it is not until the contradiction between the two classes develops to a certain stage that it assumes the form of open antagonism, *and it is then that society ruptures and revolution and war are engendered.*[306]

The explosion of a bomb, the hatching of a chicken from its egg, and the emergence of animals from the womb are all contradictory things coexisting in a single entity and which, at a certain moment, adopt the form of conflict, disruption, and rupture.

In the peaceful coexistence between countries, including that between socialist and capitalist states, contradiction and struggle exist without ceasing; only at a certain stage in development does war emerge. In the Soviet Union, the New Economic Policy permitted a considerable development of capitalist elements. Lenin considered that at that time there was a possibility of utilizing state capitalism under the dictatorship of the proletariat; that is, the utilization of certain bourgeois elements to develop the forces of production, simultaneous with their control by Soviet laws, following which they could be limited and prohibited. At this time

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[302] This whole section has been replaced in the *Selected Works* version with the following paragraph:

> We Chinese often say, "Things that oppose each other also complement each other." That is, things opposed to each other have identity. This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. "Oppose each other" refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of two contradictory aspects. "Complement each other" means that, in given conditions, the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet struggle is inherent in identity, and without struggle there can be no identity.

[303] In identity there is struggle. → In identity there is struggle, in particularity there is universality, and in individuality there is generality.

[304] In the *Selected Works* text, the preceding two sentences are replaced by a single sentence: "Our answer is that antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites."

[305] Antagonism is → In human history, antagonism between classes exists as

[306] And it is then that society ruptures and revolution and war are engendered → And develops into revolution. The same holds for the transformation of peace into war in class society.

the two contradictions of socialism and capitalism coexisted within socialist society in mutual struggle and interconnection; it was only after the task of eliminating the rich peasantry and capitalist remnants had been put forward that the existence of both elements became an impossibility, and a life and death struggle of overtly antagonistic form emerged.[307]

The First United Front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party was also like this.

However, the contradictions in many processes, phenomena, and things do not develop into antagonistic ones.

Take, for example, the contradictions between correct and incorrect ideas within the Communist Party, between the advanced and the backward in culture, between town and country in economics, between the forces and relations of production, between production and consumption, between exchange value and use value, between the various technical divisions of labor, between workers and peasants in class relations, between life and death in nature, between heredity and mutation, between cold and hot, between day and night—none of these has an antagonistic form of existence.[308]

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[307] In the *Selected Works* version, the preceding two paragraphs are replaced with the following text:

> Before it explodes, a bomb is a single entity in which opposites coexist in given conditions. The explosion takes place only when a new condition, ignition, is present. An analogous situation arises in all those natural phenomena which finally assume the form of open conflict to resolve contradictions and produce new things.
>
> It is highly important to grasp this fact. It enables us to understand that revolutions and revolutionary war are inevitable in class society and that, without them, it is impossible to accomplish any leap in social development and to overthrow the reactionary ruling classes and therefore impossible for the people to win political power. Communists must expose the deceitful propaganda of the reactionaries, such as the assertion that social revolution is unnecessary and impossible. They must firmly uphold the Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution and enable the people to understand that social revolution is not only entirely necessary but also entirely practicable and that the whole history of mankind and the triumph of the Soviet Union have confirmed this scientific truth.
>
> We must, however, make a concrete study of the circumstances of each specific struggle of opposites and should not arbitrarily apply the formula discussed above to everything. Contradiction and struggle are universal and absolute, but the methods of resolving contradictions, that is, the forms of struggle, differ according to the differences in the nature of the contradictions.
>
> Some contradictions are characterized by open antagonism, others are not. In accordance with the concrete development of things, some contradictions which were originally nonantagonistic develop into antagonistic ones, while others which were originally antagonistic develop into nonantagonistic ones.

[308] Although at the time when Mao originally gave these lectures on dialectical materialism, Stalin himself was emphasizing that certain types of contradictions in the Soviet Union, such as those between the workers and the peasants, were no longer antagonistic, the list of nonantagonistic contradictions given here is remarkably sweeping, and it is not surprising

Bukharin regarded contradiction and antagonism as one and the same thing. He therefore considered that in a society in which socialism had been accomplished there were neither antagonisms nor contradiction. Lenin said: "*This is extremely incorrect*, antagonism and contradiction are not at all one and the same. Under socialism, the first will disappear, the second will remain."[309] *Bukharin is an advocate of the theory of equilibrium, which refuses to recognize that the development of a thing results from the movement of internal contradictions and which considers that society will continue to develop even though there are no contradictions under socialism.*

Trotsky sets out from a different extreme, but also regards contradiction and antagonism as one and the same thing. As a result, he considers that under socialism a contradiction between workers and peasants not only exists but will develop into an antagonism like the contradiction between labor and capital, which can be resolved only by employing revolutionary methods. The Soviet Union, however,

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that, in revising the text for publication in the *Selected Works*, Mao should have eliminated this paragraph, replacing it with the following text:

> As already mentioned, so long as classes exist, contradictions between correct and incorrect ideas within the Communist Party are reflections within the Party of class contradictions. At first, with regard to certain issues, such contradictions may not manifest themselves as antagonistic. But, with the development of the class struggle, they may grow and become antagonistic. The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union shows us that the contradictions between the correct thinking of Lenin and Stalin and the fallacious thinking of Trotsky, Bukharin, and others did not at first manifest themselves in an antagonistic form, but that later they did develop into antagonism. There are similar cases in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. At first, the contradictions between the correct thinking of many of our Party comrades and the fallacious thinking of Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, and others also did not manifest themselves in an antagonistic form, but later they did develop into antagonism. At present the contradiction between correct and incorrect thinking within our Party does not manifest itself in an antagonistic form, and if comrades who have committed mistakes can correct them, it will not develop into antagonism. Therefore, the Party must, on the one hand, wage a serious struggle against erroneous thinking and, on the other, give the comrades who have committed errors ample time to wake up. This being the case, excessive struggle is obviously inappropriate. But if the people who have committed errors persist in them and aggravate them, there is the possibility that this contradiction will develop into antagonism.
>
> Economically, the contradiction between town and country is an extremely antagonistic one, both in capitalist society, where under the rule of the bourgeoisie the towns ruthlessly plunder the countryside, and in the Guomindang areas in China, where under the rule of foreign imperialism and the Chinese big comprador bourgeoisie the towns most rapaciously plunder the countryside. But in a socialist country and in our revolutionary base areas, this antagonistic contradiction has changed into one that is nonantagonistic; and when Communist society is reached it will be abolished.

[309] Here the version in the *Selected Works* adds: "That is, antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites; the formula of antagonism cannot be arbitrarily applied everywhere."

has used the method of the socialization of agriculture to resolve it and, moreover, has resolved it under the conditions of socialism in one country, without having to wait for the international revolution alleged to be necessary by the Trotskyites.

Bukharin has reduced contradiction to the point of elimination, while the Trotskyites have elevated contradiction into antagonism; neither of the two extremes of the Right or Left wing understands the problem of contradiction.

The method for resolving an ordinary contradiction is fundamentally different from the method for resolving antagonism; this is the particularity of contradictions and the particularity of the method for resolving contradictions. This is a problem which should be given specific recognition. Whatever is antagonistic contains contradictoriness, but not all contradictions necessarily adopt an antagonistic form, and here we have a general distinction.

The law of the unity of contradictions is the fundamental law *of the universe*, and the fundamental law *of the method of thought* (sixiang fangfa).[310] *Lenin called it the kernel of dialectics, and it stands opposed to the metaphysical view of development. It is opposed to the absolute law of identity of formal logic. Contradiction exists in all objective and subjective processes of things, and throughout all processes* from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. The aspects of contradiction and the universe each have their respective characteristics; *people's minds are all different, just like their faces, and contradictions likewise all differ in the form they take.* This is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. In given conditions, opposites possess identity and consequently can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other; this again is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. But the struggle of opposites is ceaseless: it goes on both when the opposites are coexisting and when they are transforming themselves into each other and becomes especially conspicuous when they are transforming themselves into one another; this again is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. In studying the particularity and relativity of contradiction, we must be attentive to the distinction between the principal aspect and the non–principal aspect of the contradiction. *When studying the struggle of contradictions we must give attention to the general and the particular forms of the struggle of contradiction—that is, the distinction in which contradiction develops into antagonism. This is what we know of the law of the unity of contradictions.*[311]

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[310] In the *Selected Works* version, the portion of the text beginning here is included in a final section entitled "Conclusion." This first sentence has been replaced with the following three sentences:

> We may now say a few words to sum up. The law of the contradictions in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of nature and society, and therefore also the fundamental law of thought. It represents a great revolution in the history of human knowledge.

[311] In the *Selected Works* version, this last sentence is replaced with the following text:

> In studying the universality of contradiction and the struggle of opposites in contradiction, we must be attentive to the distinction between the different forms of struggle. Otherwise we shall make mistakes. If, through study, we achieve a real understanding of the essentials explained above, we shall be able to demolish dogmatist ideas which are contrary to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and detrimental to our revolutionary cause, and our comrades with practical experience will be able to organize their experience into principles and avoid repeating empiricist errors. These are a few simple conclusions from our study of the law of contradiction.

Part IIB: Commentaries

Notes on A Course in Dialectical Materialism *by M. Shirokov and Others*

(November 1936–April 1937)

Mao made these annotations between November 1936 and April 1937. The text he was commenting on appears in the right-hand column, in the form of an English translation of the Chinese version he read. The left-hand column contains his observations.

Mechanism means to yield to blind nature, it is the separation of theory from practice, and is division in epistemology.

The struggle between the theory of letting things take their course and revolutionary ideology.

Preface: The Party Nature of Philosophy

. . .

2. Philosophy Is a Partisan Science

. . .

In Il'ich's dialectical doctrine viewed as epistemology, theory and practice are indissolubly combined to conquer blind necessity; this is its only task. "The unification of theoretical thought (cognition) and practice—this is the unity of epistemology"—This is how Il'ich[1] forcefully made clear one of the central ideas of his own critique of Hegel's dialectics.

Bernstein[2] wants to use the theory of his own creation that capitalism would develop through peaceful evolution to confront the theory of leaps, the revolutionary theory of dialectics.

The revision of materialistic dialectics takes place with reference to the

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji,* pp. 1–136, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten annotations to Shirokov's book.

most important aspects of materialism—its active and revolutionary quality. This kind of revision is an attempt to break the unity of theoretical and practical activity, but in materialist dialectics the unification between these two is "internally and indissolubly combined." Instead of raising the initiative and enthusiasm of the proletariat in its struggle, Bernstein preaches the impossibility of changing the reality of capitalism.

Though Plekhanov[3] . . . exposed Bernstein's theory of concepts, he failed to shatter the foundation from which the revisionists misinterpreted Marxism as regards the problem of dialectics. In particular, he never even bothered about the fact that the revisionists abandoned the "decisive thing in dialectics"—the unity of opposites. Bernstein and his faction set up a theory of class compromise to replace the law of the unity of opposites. . . . Finally, the most extreme instance of failure to understand the essence of dialectics is that displayed by Plekhanov and the other Mensheviks at the time of the imperialist war of 1914, when they openly came out with the bourgeois slogan: "Defend the fatherland."

The essence of dialectics is precisely the law of the unity of opposites.

3. The Struggle Waged Between Il'ich and the Mensheviks to Carry Out a Partisan Philosophy

. . .

The Mensheviks' view about practice is the opportunistic way of compromising practice in order to fit the reality, this kind of view about practice produces a picture which is completely different from reality and a completely different theory as well. The Mensheviks

. . . finally excluded from the specific images in reality those which would give reality specific characters, that is, the revolutionary actions of certain classes are excluded. Il'ich thought about how we were going to proceed and in which direction we were going to proceed in order to push forward the forces of various classes better and more concretely. Nevertheless, the Mensheviks are different; they only record those things already in existence, rather than pointing out what might happen in the course of the active revolutionary tasks of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The Anti-Japanese National United Front will be able to push forward better and more concretely the forces of the various classes.

"Instead of making it clear how the proletariat should proceed to 'push forward the development of the revolution' during a certain period of time, they only record the actual happenings and never mention our specific tasks relative to reality. If we look at how the new Iskra faction expresses its thought, we cannot help thinking of Marx's criticism of the old materialism, which has nothing to do with the concepts of dialectics. Marx said the philosophers only explained the world in various ways, but the crucial thing is to change the world. Although the new Iskra faction elements tried their best to record and explain the struggle process that was taking place before their eyes, they were quite incapable of putting forward a correct slogan for this struggle. They carried on in a disordered manner, and the instructions they gave were really clumsy and inferior. They neglected the work that the Party can and must do in history—actively directing and guiding in the role of an instructor, that is, changing the material conditions, and standing at the head of the party that represents the vanguard of the class.

The correct slogan for the present struggle is the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and, most important of all, domestic peace, that is, the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, is the top priority.

Thus they degraded the materialist view of history" (Il'ich).

At the hands of the Mensheviks, Marx's revolutionary theory was separated from the specific conditions resulting from the real foundation of Russia since 1905. On the one hand, the principle has become an empty and general topic—formalized; on the other hand, it is separated from the records of new facts and presents us with a theory of experience in a roundabout way. This is the kind of theory that easily becomes satisfied even when being presented with the various loose and unorganized facts that are beyond the reach of generalization.

There are some people who are quite satisfied at present with the various loose and unorganized facts which are not associated through generalization.

In accordance with the principles of dialectical materialism, instead of starting from general propositions, Il'ich set out from the objective and real movement, set out from the investigation and examination of every aspect of objective reality, and set out from the analysis of the status and tasks of various classes. . . .

Instead of setting out from concrete reality, the Mensheviks set out from empty theoretical formulae. As a consequence, they violated the first and most essential requirement of the worldview of materialism. How the violation of dialectics and that of materialism are associated with each other may be seen from the actual examples of the Mensheviks. The Mensheviks took as their object lifeless abstractions separated from concrete development. They thus created a domain which could be used as an arbitrary, subjective, and nonmaterialist method to explain things.

Both Li Lisanism and the military adventurism and military conservatism which came after committed this error of setting out not from the specific reality, but from empty theoretical propositions. Not only is this not dialectics, it is not materialism either.

It laid bare the military adventurism and conservatism of Li Lisanism.

The subjective and nonmaterialistic stand is even worse; they accidentally separate the fact from reality and often unify them superficially and mechanically. Under such circumstances, a foundation is set up to explain that fact independently. This is called eclecticism. Under eclecticism, the connection between the overall basis and the various events is lost. The overall basis that connects various facts and various aspects is exactly the specific reality, that is, a certain society. If we do not start with the specific reality, but start with the extremely abstract and theoretical topic instead, under such a circumstance we will lose all the foundations—and because of the existence of this foundation, various facts have to be unified in a certain manner. When the general foundation is lost, the connection becomes a manmade and arbitrary product; the various important facts are deserted. Il'ich said, "In the field of social phenomena, the most popular and least beneficial method is to separate every minor fact and play with actual cases. In order to lay the foundation in reality, without exception one must understand and control the general structure of the facts which are associated with the issue under investigation rather than every individual fact. Otherwise one would arbitrarily select and gather facts, would ignore the objective and interdependent relationship of the entire historical phenomena, and one would adopt a 'subjective' solution for the purpose of emphasizing meaningless things."

We should pay particular attention to this.

Such as the semifeudal Chinese society that is subject to the domination of Japanese imperialism.

Instead of the various independent facts such as attacking major cities and blockhouseism, one must, without any exception, understand and control the general structure of the facts which are associated with the soviet war in China, that is, the characteristics of a revolutionary war; this kind of general structure of facts is the general foundation that connects every individual fact and every individual aspect.

The anti-Japanese war and the war against Chiang Kaishek can exist side by side—said Sun Mingjiu[4]

. . . Amid sophistry, the famous slogan to defend the motherland established by the Mensheviks and people of the same ilk to defend their betrayal combines the movement to defend the motherland with internationalism. It is by no means impossible for internationalism and the movement to defend the motherland to exist side by side—talk of this kind came out of the camp of the Second International. . . .

Chapter I. Materialism and Idealism

1. The Essence and Origins of Materialism and Idealism

. . .

In the process of labor, human beings act upon nature and, moreover, change nature directly, so that matter is affected by human beings; under such circumstance, human beings firmly believe that matter exists objectively.

While they are building socialism, bringing about industrialization and electrification, transforming the strata of the peasantry, and carrying on a class struggle against the rich peasants, the laboring classes in the Soviet Union have no doubt about the fact that the Soviet Union exists independently and objectively apart from their consciousness. They firmly believe that in daily practice the Soviet Union really does exist, and that the struggle of the proletariat fighting for socialism really does exist.

Does China exist?

. . .

5. Kant and the Neo-Kantian Revision of Marxism

. . .

This is similar to the capitalists in the colonies.

. . . The relative primitiveness of the development of the bourgeoisie in Germany as well as its dependence on the feudal system determined the dual nature of their attitude toward the bourgeois revolution. On the one hand, the German bourgeoisie dreamed about revolution, dreamed about abolishing the feudal shackles; on the other hand, they were afraid of revolution, threw themselves entirely on the feudal lords, and compromised with them.

6. Neo-Kantianism

. . .

. . . then, what dominates social life? It is precisely the answer to this question which reveals the characteristics of the idealist philosophy of Rickert.[5] Value rules in society. This value is not at all the yardstick human beings use in their practical activity to evaluate various events and phenomena. Rickert said this value is subjective and relative; it depends on the consciousness of every individual. The value that rules society does not depend on each individual; in this sense, it is "objective." Afterward Rickert gave a very confusing description, showing that he was unable to define value. . . .

7. Hegelianism and Idealism with a Menshevist Stamp

. . .

. . . The characteristic of Plekhanov is that he does not understand the key point of dialectics, which is the breakup of unity; he is unable to find the essential thing which leads to contradictions; he tries to reconcile contradictions; he does not understand the dialectical unity between dialectics and epistemology. . . .

Chapter II. Dialectics Viewed as Epistemology

1. Knowledge and Practice, the Unity Between the Subject and Object

Materialist dialectics is the decisive element in Marxism.

As we said in the previous chapter that materialistic dialectics is the decisive factor in Marxism; according to the definition by Engels, dialectics is a doctrine about the general development rule of nature, society and thought. Unlike metaphysics, which regards things as well as the understanding of them (that is, concepts) as constant and unchangeable, dialectics controls things as well as the understanding of them (that is, concepts) on the basis of their interrelations, their mobility, their birth and elimination. Dialectics teaches us that it is not only objective reality which develops, but knowledge also develops.

The objective world develops, and subjective knowledge also develops.

After the July Revolution, the objective situation developed, so subjective knowledge had to develop as well. [He came to] know the new contradictions and new relations in the new situation.

After the July Revolution in 1917, . . .

Il'ich pointed out quite clearly: we should understand how a changed reality makes people learn new contradictions and new relations. He raised the slogan "All power to the soviets"; until the July Revolution, it correctly reflected the interrelations between the class strength and the party in the revolution in 1917. At a certain stage in the revolution in 1917, the slogan of all power to the soviets was the slogan that "moved one step forward toward a path of peaceful development and it was a slogan that can be realized. It was a slogan of revolution and peaceful development, and it was possible from February 27 to July 4, and it was, of course, the most promising thing as well. Today, however, it has become impossible under any circumstances." Il'ich pointed out that fundamental changes had taken place in the arrangement of class strength; he also wrote like this. Such a slogan is no longer correct today. Because it is only possible to transfer power by an open revolution under a new circumstance.

As reality changes and develops, our knowledge of reality changes accordingly. Nevertheless, we should never conclude that our knowledge only passively reflects reality, should never believe that our knowledge is like a camera, which unconditionally reflects all the targets that our eyes catch. Human knowledge is an active process that is included in various social practices. In production as well as class struggle, human knowledge is manifested in the form of an active factor that plays a part in the transformation of the world.

Reflection does not consist in passively copying the object; it is an active process. In production as well as in class struggle, knowledge is an active factor; it plays a role in transforming the world.

For instance, when Il'ich raised the question of how the slogan of all power to the soviets had changed, he never regarded it as something that passively reflects the revolutionary reality; instead, he regarded it as the force that determines the direction of the progress of the general public as well as the force that unites them. . . . As Il'ich pointed out, the changed reality led to new slogans and new knowledge; moreover, the new knowledge actively reflects the new contradictions in reality, and this in itself is a path to the change of the reality. "Look forward, and do not look backward. Do not use the old concepts of classes and parties; use the new ones, the concepts after the July Revolution."

New situations lead to new slogans, and new slogans reflect the new contradictions of the situation. Furthermore, they guide the masses in uniting to fight in order to change such situations.

The situation, as it changed once more after September, again called forth soviet slogans, but the contents of such slogans were quite different from the soviets in the past.

The changed class relationship and the changed revolutionary practice during the period from July to September enabled Il'ich to raise the issue of the soviet again, which was treated as a means to take over state power in a class struggle. . . . This new slogan is not a repetition of the slogan which had the same contents before the July Revolution; it is something that has been enriched due to the new contents of the revolutionary practices. The soviet in the new stage is completely different from the old ones, whether in terms of the class component or its role in the revolutionary changes.

The realization of the dialectical unification of the subject and the object in practice.

[They] change the outside world, while at the same time changing themselves.

Feuerbach: neither the subjective nor the objective are things that emerge and develop in history; knowledge is the unchanging reflection of unchanging nature. The unification of the two is the unification of unchanging states.

The sense organs of human beings are developed and differentiated in the process of labor.

It is Marx who first made clear the dialectics in the process of knowledge and that reality and knowledge are motions full of contradictions. Marx pointed out that the dialectical unification between reality and knowledge—between object and subject—is realized in the historical development of social practice. Not only objective knowledge but also subjective knowledge changes in the process of social practice. As Marx said, the action of human beings on external nature, on the one hand, changes it but, on the other hand, changes their own nature. . . . As with metaphysical materialism, Feuerbach[6] did not regard knowledge as a historical process. To him, knowledge is the reflection of the unchangeability of the unchangeable nature. In his opinion, it is the same to know the subject as it is to know the object, they are unchangeable and nondeveloping things, they are controlled outside the process of practice. To him, the unification of the subject and the object is not something that takes place in the social activities of mankind; instead, it is unchangeable and eternal. He was unable to see that social practice changed the object of knowledge. . . . He does not understand at all that the material = the emotional mankind, together with his organs, are the products of world history. He does not understand that in the process of labor of mankind and in the historical development of practice of mankind, the sense organs of mankind are not something that never changes; on the contrary, they are something that is always in the process of development and division. . . . In the mind of Feuerbach, mankind is not the subject that actively changes the world due to social activities; instead, it is a concrete reality. While criticizing Feuerbach, Marx said: "He refused to examine mankind by leaving the abstract theoretical sphere and by putting mankind into certain social relationships from which mankind evolved, and he refused to examine mankind in the living atmosphere around him. As a result, he could never arrive at the conclusion that living human beings exist in reality; instead, he would stop at the abstract state of so-called "mankind." He could only know a little bit in terms of feelings about the 'real, individual, flesh-and-blood mankind.'". . .

The abstract man and the real man

The changes in subjective and objective knowledge are extremely strong in a revolution, such as the Russian proletariat and the Chinese peasants.

Marx once said that the changes in subjective and objective knowledge are extremely strong and obvious in a revolution. This can be proved with revolutionary examples. In the revolutionary process in Russia, on the one hand, the proletariat changed reality, while they were changing their own characters fundamentally. . . .

. . . Hegel is an idealist; he refused to recognize the truth of the real world which exists independently of the consciousness, hence he believes that the activity of knowledge lies, first, in thought or in the fact that absolute spiritual activity will create such a spiritual nature that exists "somewhere." According to Hegel, things that can fulfill their own development can only be active thoughts. The various stages of development in nature are all attributed to spirit. Although the active knowledge of nature by thought and "the subjective spirit" are developing, they themselves do not develop. Active spirit, in Hegel's opinion, while learning about nature, that is, while learning about the objective world, is actually learning about its own "existence," that is, learning about itself. By the same analogy, the active subject of knowledge as well as its object turn into a common thing and same thing in absolute spirit. Instead of using this to solve the problem about the relationship between the subject and object of knowledge, Hegel dissolved the object in the subject of concept, which is even farther away from its solution.

Hegel dissolved the objective into the subjective and confused subject with object.

Feuerbach exposed the nature of the idealism that regards the subjective and the objective as the same. He said, to regard the knowledge of the subjective and that of the objective as the same makes all knowledge impossible, because knowledge is not the same thing as reality; it is the reflection of reality in the sensory organs and in the thought of mankind. Feuerbach declared that learning about the object is different from learning about the subject; it is the nature that exists independently of the consciousness of mankind. Nevertheless, for some reason, Feuerbach was unable to understand the dialectical character of the unity between the subject and the object; this has been made clear in the previous part.

Feuerbach does not understand the dialectical character of the unity between the subject and the object.

Plekhanov's understanding of the theory of knowledge failed to acknowledge Marx and Engel's profound criticism of Feuerbach; hence he did not go beyond Feuerbach. Like Feuerbach, Plekhanov failed to understand the character of dialectics and the rule of the unity of opposites, therefore he did not test and examine the theory of knowledge in dialectics. He was unable to explain the contradictory characters of knowledge, unable to explain the combination of knowledge with social practice; in terms of the unity of the subject and object, he was still on the same ground as Feuerbach. Like Feuerbach, though he clarified the character of unification of subject and object of a thing, this kind of unification, in his opinion, had the characteristic of concrete reality that had nothing to do with practice. Like Feuerbach, he believed in the unification between the subject and object, and such a unification should be given to the individual who was the subject of himself but the object to others. He never criticized Feuerbach. Furthermore, he was a follower of Feuerbach: he repeated that the essence of the human being is his own body and that he had never seen that the essence of the human being is not his body but the character of the society. The antihistorical approach in Plekhanov's epistemology originated from here.

Plekhanov thought that the unity of the subject and the object had the quality of being directly perceived, without relation to practical activity. This is because he did not understand the essence of dialectics (the law of the unity of opposites), and therefore could not have a dialectical understanding of epistemology. His antihistorical approach is the same as that of Feuerbach.

. . . The mechanicist Axel'rod[7] could not understand the essence of the dialectics of the unity of opposites. She examined mechanically the relationship between the subject and the object. That is, in this kind of relationship she is only able to see the mutual relationship, but is unable to see the unification of the dialectics of the two when they mutually affected each other in the process of historical practice.

Mechanicalism sees only mutual interrelations, but not mutual interpenetration.

Deborin does not know that the interpenetration between the subject and the object takes place in social practice; there is only mechanical

. . . Deborin[8] often talks about the dialectics of the subject and object, talks about the interpenetration between these two. However, he never understands

character (external and visible), but no dialectical character; knowledge is separated from practice.

that such interpenetration is realized in practice, therefore it is proved that he actually does not have the capability to understand such dialectics. To Deborin, the contradictory interpenetration does not have dialectical but only external character, and it ends with the pure movement of the subject and object. He says that the subject changes into object and vice versa. As a consequence, based on the wrong cases of Plekhanov and his followers we see the following facts. That is, separating knowledge from practice, failing to understand the role of dialectics in knowledge, when the time comes to solve the problem concerning the unification of the subject and object, it is certain that one will arrive at an intuitionist position, arrive at Feuerbachism.

2. The Various Stages and Exciting Causes in the Process of Knowledge

No question regarding knowledge of the external world can be solved apart from practice.

The route of the movement of knowledge

As we said previously, the unification between the subject and the object is realized on the basis of the development of practice; the issue of how mankind learns about his surrounding world cannot be solved outside practice. Now let us study carefully the route of movement of knowledge; explain what stages the movement of knowledge undergoes in its development and explain the incentives that make up this movement.

The subject of cognition is social class.

As we said in the previous paragraph, that which appears as the subject that learns about material reality is not the individuals who break away from the society but, rather, mankind and social classes. In a class society the knowledge of the surrounding world has class character. In the process of class struggle, the development of the knowledge of the proletariat, which was transformed from “a class-in-itself” to “a class-for-itself,” has become an example of the movement of the knowledge of classes. . . .

The process of development of the knowledge of the proletariat is an example of the learning movement of classes.

Nevertheless, how does the knowledge of the proletariat develop? And what is more, what are the various stages it undergoes?

The land question

The question of the Chinese revolutionary war[9]

Against ships and cars

The first stage: extremely shallow, do not understand the essence of capitalism, adopted a wrong method of struggle, still in the stage of “a class-in-itself.”

In the earliest period of its development, the proletariat is not fully aware of what is happening around it. This could be seen clearly during the industrial revolution in Britain. Back then, the proletariat's understanding of capitalism is really shallow, though with the introduction of machinery the workers have become reserve forces for industrialization and are abandoned on the street; in the capitalist production relationship they are unable to see the reason behind their own poverty; instead, they try to find the reason in the machines. They did not want to launch an ideological class struggle against the bourgeoisie; instead, they launched uprisings against the machinery . . . because of the movement against machinery, the proletariat has already fought against the capitalists and the bourgeoisie, who have become a class, only because they failed to see the nature of capitalism they chose the wrong method of struggle. At that time, although the proletariat failed to see the nature of exploitation of capitalism, they do feel and are aware of all the exploitation and oppression they have suffered. They suffer from hunger, nor are they able to secure the urgent daily necessities of life, so they are placed in the situation that either today or tomorrow, together with their spouses and children, they will suffer from hunger. Because of this, the workers only know to hate their own employers, they do not know that their employers are the representatives of the exploiting class. The proletarians spontaneously stand up and resist; their struggle is based not on a scientific understanding of the development of capitalism, but on their own experience and consciousness obtained in living under conditions of slavery. But their daily struggle against the entrepreneurs, their interaction with the workers in the other enterprises, and the repeated fact of the capitalists' mutual support and so on—all of these enabled the workers to understand the nature of capitalism (the struggle between hired labor and capital), taught them to see from their own masters alone an exploiting class, the bourgeois class. The daily practice of class struggle enabled the proletarians to upgrade their knowledge about the surrounding reality from the stage of natural feeling and experience to the revolutionary level of reforming the reality. Therefore, for the broad toiling masses, the Marxist theory which explains the contradictions as well as the inevitability of the decline of capitalism enables them to understand it according to their own practice of class struggle. The revolutionary proletarians are no longer blindfolded. As a result, a class war begins with the present world as the stage.

China's knowledge of imperialism

The second stage: the practice of daily struggle and the development of the reality of capitalism lead the proletariat to understand the essence of capitalism (relations of exploitation and of class struggle), Marxism appears, and the prolatariat attains the stage of a "class-for-itself."

The route of the proletariat to the understanding of the reality of capitalism moved from the stage of direct vision of feeling, impression, and targets to a relatively higher stage of understanding of the reality; afterward they will move from this relatively higher stage to the revolutionary practice, move to the stage of wanting to realize those things which only existed in the mind in the past. "From vivid direct vision to abstract reasoning, from abstract reasoning to practice, this is the dialectical route to know the truth, it is the route to reach the knowledge of the objective reality" (Il'ich).

From the perceptual stage advance to the rational stage, and then advance again from the rational stage to revolutionary practice.

From direct perception to thought

From thought to practice

These words contain profound thought about the dialectical route of development of our knowledge. The key point of knowledge, as well as its ultimate goal, lies in the discovery of the rules of the surrounding reality, lies in the theoretical understanding of the materials we received from our feeling, consciousness, and impression. Nevertheless, the theoretical understanding from our knowledge is the result of the entire process of knowledge. The difference of which incentive is in an advantageous position also determines the difference in the development stage of knowledge itself. Therefore, the stages in the process of knowledge cannot be distinguished by unreachable limits.

The purpose of knowledge is to achieve logical understanding from perceptual data; the two stages are distinct, but cannot be separated.

In the development stage, when the proletarians are struggling spontaneously against some of the individual phenomena in the capitalist reality, the proletarians once attempted to know and understand these phenomena by using one method. Their own development was still in a primitive state, they were not capable of exposing the nature of capitalism—this is because, to a certain extent, the reality itself had not fully exhibited its own inner contradiction, and this, as a result, made all the knowledge of the proletarians about reality exhibit only in the form of perceptual knowledge which only aims at understanding the various aspects and phenomena.

Perceptual knowledge: one-sided, superficial, external connections.

Rational knowledge: totality, essence, internal connections.

Nonetheless, the capitalist reality as well as the development of class struggle made the proletarians feel that it was necessary to know the various phenomena in terms of their internal connection and entirety, made them regard capitalism as a special social system, and made them understand it as a means of production based on exploitation. To the proletarians, perceptive understanding does not explain the contradiction of capitalism, nor does it expose the contents of that "contradiction." Since the workers do not understand the contradiction within capitalism (the relationship of exploitation), they are unable to explain how and why each aspect of the capitalist reality combines with the others. . . . In their knowledge, each and every one of the individual phenomena of capitalism is only externally associated. However, when class struggle develops to a relatively higher level leading to a transformation into a "class-for-itself," the proletarians will begin to regard and master the whole of the previously disordered phenomena of capitalism as internally associated things. The reason theoretical knowledge is different from perceptual knowledge is that it first exposes the internal contradiction of the surrounding world; furthermore, it can control the reality as a whole as well as in terms of the association of every aspect.

Concept is more profound than feeling; it is more advanced, [dealing] for example with such things as commodity and value.

Il'ich developed the interrelationship between perceptual knowledge and theoretical knowledge. Furthermore, he made it clear that the concept, comparative feeling, and impression we gained in the process of knowing the material world are more profound. He said: "It is not difficult for us to illustrate the

speed of movement of three hundred thousand meters per second. However, we are unable to understand the fact that light travels at such a rapid speed."[11] In trying to understand the internal association of the various phenomena, it is far from sufficient to rely only on feelings. Along the same lines, while talking about value Marx once also said that value is the category which exhibits the relationship between the owners of commodity. This kind of relationship cannot be mastered through feeling. Things that can be seen and touched are only individual commodity rather than value; it is not the relationship between the owners of commodity, nor is it capitalism viewed as a whole. These things are not reflected in the "naked eye." Regarding this point, Marx once said straightforwardly: "The substance of the value of a commodity differs in this respect from Falstaff's mistress, Mistress Quickly,[12] that we don't know where to find it. . . . No matter how repeatedly you handle every individual commodity, you are still unable to grasp its value."

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Perceptual knowledge cannot be separated from rational knowledge; perceptual knowledge already contains within it the sprouts of rational knowledge. The general is already contained in the concrete, but what is contained is only the external and not the internal connections. It is only thought based on practice that can successfully proceed from the shallow to the profound, from the outside to

The passage from perceptual knowledge to theoretical knowledge is actually the passage from the understanding of each individual aspect and phenomenon to a law; that is, the understanding of the linkages within reality. Perceptual knowledge is not separate from theoretical knowledge. Already in the state of infancy, it contains the popularization which we will implement with the help of the strength of concept.

The so-called popularization of Feuerbach has already given rise to the kind of thought of the perceptual feeling about reality, and Il'ich expressed his

the inside, from the particular to the general. Such is the movement of the deepening of knowledge; it is a sudden change in cognition. Only with this deepening and sudden change can nature be reflected relatively correctly and completely.

approval. Il'ich quoted Feuerbach's words "can only see the leaves but not the tree." Although Feuerbach once made the profound remark that the sensory organs of human beings are often associated with thought, he never made any strong argument that this kind of association is only the external and orderly association; the laws of reality can be discovered only on the basis of thought based on practice. Feuerbach regarded the association of direct perception and ideas as theoretical knowledge. On the other hand, Il'ich spoke forcefully of the movement of the deepening of knowledge, and of the movement from perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge. He wrote as follows: "the abstractness of matter, the laws of nature, the abstractness of value, and so on, that is, all scientific abstractions (correct, important, and not nonsensical) are relatively profound, relatively correct, and reflect nature more completely."

Both stages are individual stages in a unitary process of knowledge; they are not separated from each other.

Il'ich regarded perceptual knowledge and theoretical knowledge as two different stages in the process of man's knowing the surrounding world. In addition, he also made clear the characteristics of mastering the process of perceptual feeling and reasoning. At the inferior stage, knowledge appears in the form of perceived things; at the superior stage, knowledge appears in the form of theoretical things. Nevertheless, at whatever stage, they are the individual stages in a unitary process of knowledge, rather than being separated from each other by insurmountable borders. As proved by practice, it is not true that whenever we see something we will begin to understand it; conversely, it is not true either that whenever we understand something we will not be able to feel it; it is only when we understand something that we will be able to feel it more correctly and profoundly. When we struggle against those people who misunderstand the general policy of the party, it is not necessarily true that we have controlled the nature of that fact at the beginning. At first we only feel that we are wrong in some places, and we are often unable to prove it. It is only in the process of practice that we begin to understand the erroneous system of our opponents. Although that is the case, we still understand at the beginning, in terms of a certain issue, how the left wing or the right wing depart from the general policy of the party. When the party led by the Central Committee headed by Il'ich was struggling against the Trotskyite faction and the rightist faction, though the majority of party members knew about the individual mistakes of the two factions, they were unable to know the entire system of the mistakes of the two factions. Only in the process of practice, that is, only when the misunderstanding by the Trotskyite faction and the rightist faction is finally crystallized will we be able to understand the antiparty views of the Trotskyite faction and the rightist faction as a whole and in terms of their internal association.

Practice proves that things perceived cannot be understood immediately at once; only things that have been comprehended can be more deeply and correctly perceived. Perception solves the problem of phenomena; understanding solves the problem of essence. It is only in the process of practice that the essence of a thing can be revealed and understood.

This is a very good example.

When we understand something, we certainly not only try to explain it but also feel sad, angry, and indignant. . . .

The unity between thought and feeling.

One striking characteristic of the members of the Bolshevik Party is that, among them, their emotional thought and interest do not contradict. In order to accomplish the great tasks the social revolution has imposed upon us, they struggle against the enemy like a forceful torrent.

Perceptual knowledge and theoretical knowledge develop mutually, and they mutually enrich each other's content; this can be illustrated by concrete examples. Let's suppose that there is a middle peasant who has just entered a factory in the city. He brings with him petty-bourgeois ideology when he comes, he is suspicious about the new daily happenings; sometimes he feels disgusted. He begins to have new feelings and experiences after he is personally involved in the productive activity in the factory. When he takes part in socialist construction, he is affected by the popular mood and fashion among his fellow workers. This mood and fashion produce new ideas, which enable him gradually to understand the great cause the proletarians are creating. As a consequence, rapid transformation from petty-bourgeois ideology to that of the builders of socialism occurs among the peasants. Nevertheless, together with the peasants' new understanding of reality, and with the maturity of their proletarian ideology, they have new feelings. The past pleasure he enjoyed in the great construction is meaningless to him. As a result, work does not suit him any more. To him, work is only "sweating," is only exploitation. What happens next then? Such understanding and feeling about the reality lead to corresponding actions; that is, to try his best to kill time, to hope to end the day's work as early as possible, to go and make money if possible. The new feelings he gained from his life in the factory are often overcome by his petty-bourgeois understanding of reality. Nonetheless, after becoming a worker, he begins to see and understand reality differently from before. As a result, he begins to have feelings different from those he had before. In consequence, he begins to manifest different habits, different experiences, and even different perceptions of reality. After he reaches the level of a conscientious builder of socialism, he will feel the richness of life and the greatness of the cause he is creating. By then work is no longer a burden to him; instead, it has gradually become "reputation, courage, and glorious cause."

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This example is not all that clear.

Perceptual knowledge and theoretical knowledge only reflect the different stages of the objective reality which exists independently outside our consciousness. Feeling is the result of the impact of the external world on the sensory organs. As for concepts, they are the result of the experience of perception. Concept refers to the materials collected by the subject of knowledge in the process of perceiving or learning about the reality and these materials have been reformed and popularized.

Correct

Both perception and concept are images of the targets, that is, they are copies of the process which exists independently of our ideology.

Correct

Are our perceptions and concepts correct reflections of objective reality? It is practice which gives the answer to this question. "The question of whether the truth about the target reaches the thought of people is not a theoretical issue; rather, it is an issue about practice. Human beings have to prove the truth in practice, that is, to prove the practicability and strength of their thought, to prove its opposite characteristic. The dispute as to whether the thought that breaks away from practice is the reality

Very well put

It is practice that proves whether or not it is the truth.

is purely a complicated issue about philosophy" (Marx).[13]

To carry out theory in practice is to experiment with theory. If practice is the criterion of truth, this does not at all mean that truth advances before it, stops there for the effort of testing it, and then goes on to another stage. Practice is not a kind of "decoration." Unlike a piece of mat, social life is not sewed together from separate pieces of cloth. Practice, which is the criterion of truth, is the theme which runs through the entire process of our cognition. The entire revolution has carried out Marxism-Leninism, so only revolution corrects and recognizes the misunderstandings of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism.

Practice is the theme that runs through the entire process of our cognition.

Theory emerges from practice. If it correctly reflects the process of development of the objective external world, and if subsequently this theory is once again applied in practice, then this theory can be made manifest in practice, thus completing the process of cognition. Therefore, it is the insight of materialist dialectics to accept the insight about life and practice as the first and fundamental insight of epistemology.

The process through which practice, as the criterion of truth, completes our knowledge should be understood in the sense that theory is realized in practice. However, the theory which can be realized in practice must come from the present social practice. In addition, it must be the kind of theory which correctly reflects the process of development of the reality of nature and society.

As stated above, materialist dialectics firmly believes that "the insight about life and the insight about practice is the first and fundamental insight of epistemology."

Nonetheless, the anti–Marxist-Leninist doctrine also relies on practice. How indeed do they explain practice?

The bourgeoisie's view of practice—the pragmatist view of practice—is a view of practice that takes into consideration only the present but not the future. Their so-called truth is subjective and partial truth, without objectivity and inclusiveness.

Take bourgeois pragmatism, which is "popular" in capitalist America, for example. . . . The pragmatist view about practice is to go back to the past class and egoistic view of the propertied class, which fits the bourgeoisie's understanding. The capitalists are not farsighted. Their lust for profit prevents them from foreseeing the future. "Seize the moment!"—this is the slogan of the American enterpreneurs. This is the practice view of a typical pragmatist.

As a matter of fact, the Mensheviks also support such a view of practice. "The movement is everything, the goal is nothing"—this famous formula by Bernstein showed the same crude realism, blind utilitarianism, and surrender to the limited capitalist present.

Characteristics of the opportunists' view of practice: 1. covering up weaknesses; 2. failing to grasp the development as a whole, while yielding to every individual fact; 3. being incapable of seeing through the present contradictions in depth.

The bourgeoisie's view of practice, which is the same as that of the Mensheviks, also exists among our Trotskyite faction and the rightists. Cover up weaknesses; fail to grasp the development as a whole, but yield blindly to every individual fact; be incapable of seeing through the present contradictions in depth—such are the characteristics of the opportunists' view of practice. Such an explanation of practice separates action from scientific understanding—only scientific understanding can enable people to control as well as understand reality as a whole and the movement of the entire process.

The practice view of Marxism is the practice that accompanies insight into the ultimate goal.

The view of practice in Marxist-Leninist doctrine is just the opposite. The practice referred to in Marxism-Leninism is the practice which accompanies insight and the understanding of the ultimate goal; it amounts to the practice of the class struggle that has spread.

Like idealist epistemology, materialist epistemology before Marx tries to solve the problem of the path of knowledge outside material practice, outside social, that is, historical, practice. Therefore there is a lack of connection between the various stages and factors of knowledge (between the sensory organs

Empiricism and rationalism

and thought). This sort of separation moves in the direction of separating perceptual knowledge from theoretical knowledge. Among the philosophers, there are people who believe that perceptual experience is the true source of knowledge and who consequently look down upon the significance of thought; on the other hand, there are also some philosophers who recognize only thought as something real, and who are suspicious of the philosophers of perceptual experience. The former are called "empiricists," from the Greek word *empiria,* meaning "experience"; the latter are called "rationalists," from the Latin word *ratio,* meaning "reason."

Empiricism—the difference between Bacon, on the one hand, and Berkeley and Hume, on the other.

The founder of empiricism is the English philosopher Bacon. His theory did not, however, contain clumsy aspects such as those of his successor Locke, as well as the representatives of the theory of subjective idealism Berkeley and Hume, nor did he separate the conceptual aspect from the rational aspect. As far as the philosophy of Berkeley and Hume is concerned, they set out from extreme empiricism, set out from recognizing consciousness alone; they deny the significance that rational concepts have on knowledge, and consequently they see rational concepts as a product which is introduced into our knowledge by understanding.

The defects of rationalism

Rationalism has two major defects. First, it denies that concepts are the product of experience, so it is unable to explain how, indeed, people can set out from the first concept and arrive at the concept of truth. Second, rationalism sets out in a similar way from the denial of the truth of empirical knowledge, and so it is unable to make the transition from abstract thought to the perceptual knowledge of each individual subject. These defects of rationalism are exhibited in the process of its own development.

The nature of the source

Knowledge begins with practice and ends with it.

. . . Il'ich said: "Mach[14] is well aware of the fact that in practice people will inevitably become materialists. In social activities, human beings are directly associated with nature, for in order to accomplish something, human beings must start with the materials nature provides, that is, in practice they must recognize the primary nature of matter and become materialists. Therefore, by using all the force of rationalism, Mach wants to exclude practice from epistemology. Because this is the only way to change epistemology into rationalism." . . . According to Il'ich, if dialectics is to be regarded as epistemology, it must include practice. . . .

Plekhanov looks down on practice.

. . . Plekhanov rarely goes beyond the limits of rational proof, but he looks down on practice. For instance, the essence and source of the misunderstanding of reality by idealism in its separation of practice from the process of knowledge lies in giving up practice, which is the criterion of truth. Plekhanov made little effort to explain these points.

4. The Theory of Truth

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. . . It is impossible that all the infinite associations of the knowledge of mankind in every given historical moment be explained. Therefore the knowledge obtained from every given historical moment is limited. Absolute knowledge is impossible, yet it is indeed possible for knowledge to be gradually becoming perfect and profound.

In his book *Materialism and Empiro-criticism,* Il'ich developed the theory of absolute truth and relative truth. (The quotation above is an excerpt from that book.) This theory is exactly the same thing as the topic of dialectics which Il'ich regards as the theory of knowledge, which is not difficult to understand. . . . There is apparently no contradiction between the topic of regarding dialectics as the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth elaborated in *Materialism and Empiro-criticism*; these two are complementary and help each other in their development.

. . . The process of knowledge begins with direct observation, though this kind of direct observation is something specific; it only grasps the surface and the superfacial connection of the reality—this has been made clear. The second incentive in the process of knowledge is abstract thought. Things which add characteristics to abstract thought are actually the specific analysis about the completeness of the target, and they examine and study the association between every one of them. Metaphysics cannot go beyond this motive. Therefore, metaphysics separates every aspect of reality. Under such a circumstance, the completeness and specificity of the target is ignored. Hence we know that metaphysics is only abstract knowledge, and it arrives only at abstract truth. However, thought does not stop at the stage of abstract concept. Because of dialectical thought, specific objects will reappear in our process of knowledge and arrive at specific concepts. . . .

We advocate participation in the antifascist war.

. . . There is even more treacherous sophistry. Plekhanov and Kautsky cited the theory of Marx and Engels that, under specific circumstances, workers should participate in certain wars, in support of the Second International's betrayal of the international labor movement. For instance, in 1848 Marx advocated that the people in Western Europe participate in the war against Russia. In 1859 Engels also expressed his approval of Germany's war against France. Why did Marx and Engels express such ideas back then? This is because back then in 1848 feudal Russia acted as the international police. It carried the task of suppressing the revolutions in Poland and Hungary. Back in 1870 Germany's war against France was significant in the sense that it was a war against the world empire of Napoleon III, and also signified the unification of the German people. . . . Only specific truth can become a real weapon in practical activities. For example, if one only knows about the necessary things in building socialism, socialism will not be established. In order to build socialism, one must know how socialism is realized. In different motives and under different conditions, there are many different forms of realization. . . .

Chapter III. The Fundamental Law of Dialectics—The Law of Change from Quality to Quantity and Vice Versa

1. The Compulsory Characteristic of the Quality of Development

. . . The task of scientific knowledge lies in penetrating into the depth of the process, exposing the reasons the process happens, learning about the fundamental contradictions of the process as well as the laws of its internal characteristics, and on this basis being able to explain various phenomena as well as the mutual association between these phenomena. Nevertheless, we are quite incapable of knowing about the law all at once; rather, it is only after many stages that we begin to know it. In social practice we first encounter the extreme phenomena of mutual association. When our thinking is concentrated on these phenomena, we must first determine the difference between one phenomenon and another, the difference between this object and that one.

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Study begins with the distinguishing of differences.

When we are observing the interaction between a certain thing and another thing or phenomenon, we must first determine the difference between one thing and the other, the difference between one process and another.

In knowing a process, we must first determine its quality, and the differences between it and other processes, that is, know its special characteristics.

In the final analysis, what are the differences between the soviet economy and the capitalist economy? What are the differences between the socialist stage of the Soviet Union and the preliminary stage of the New Economic Policy? The first priority in learning about any process is to determine its special characteristic. This is to expose the "quality" of that process. The category of the so-called quality has been known since the beginning of history. The ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, first demanded that the quality of any process be studied.

Learn about its simplest and most fundamental quality, and from there go deeper.

To expose the quality of the process means to point out the purest and most fundamental rules. Once we expose the quality of the process, we are on the way to the first stage of knowledge. After learning about the special characteristics of the quality of the process, we will go deeper into the depth of the process.

The simple characteristic of the process is the initial category of materialist dialectics; it exists objectively.

Quality is the initial category of materialistic dialectics. The quality of the process, contrary to the view taken by the mechanist Sarab'ianov,[15] and by all the subjectivists, is not only the product of our ability to think; it is something that exists in the real world and is reflected by the human consciousness. The uniqueness of entering the stage of socialism is not something determined by the human brain; it exists in reality whether or not human beings are conscious of it.

We should first analyze the characteristics of a war. This applies also to the united front, of which the characteristics are the contradiction between China and Japan as well as the contradictions within the country.

Capitalist society is a reality, and it has many special characteristics which distinguish it from the other social systems before it. These include highly developed commodity exchange, possession of surplus value, a reserve labor force for industry, capitalist enterprises and profit, commercial interests, interest rate, currency and rent, cartels, trusts, financial companies, industrial panic, and so on. When we carefully investigate capitalist development, we see that these phenomena are present throughout the time of free competition as well as every stage of imperialism. In the age of imperialism, free competition and monopoly coexist, individual enterprise, trust, cartel, and financial company coexist, export of commodity and capital coexist, and so on.

Then we may ask where, in the final analysis, does the quality of capitalism reside? In order to determine its quality, is it enough simply to count all the manifestations of capitalism?

Many of the characteristics of the process are fundamental characteristics; for instance, the buying and selling of labor power are the fundamental

We have said in the previous part that quality is the fundamental and primary determining characteristic of a certain process. If we want to determine the

characteristics of capitalism, which determine many other characteristics in this society.

It is necessary to point out all the characteristics of a process, especially the fundamental peculiarities. Only then is it possible to know the laws of development of the process because laws are contained in the development of the contradictions of the fundamental peculiarity. For example, the laws of capitalism are included in the development of the contradiction of the buying and selling of labor—the fundamental peculiarity.

When the process develops, so will the fundamental characteristic (the law); it gains special characteristics at every stage of development until the process is over. For instance, the character of those who sell their labor (the workers).

quality of capitalism, we cannot simply list all the special characteristics of capitalism. In addition, it is necessary to elucidate its primary determining characteristic. The primary determining characteristic of capitalism can be seen as the result of the process of the development of commodity exchange, and of the separation of the producers from the means of production, and of the appearance and existence of that special commodity known as labor power. The other special characteristics of capitalism are completely determined by this fundamental peculiarity. **(The so-called purest and most basic determining characteristic, primary determining characteristic, and basic characteristic constitute the so-called basic nature. Apart from the basic nature, there are many other characteristics, which are determined by the basic nature.)**[16] If we merely list all the marks of a certain process, we will still be unable to discover the law of development of that process. For example, an empiricist like Bacon, when analyzing a certain thing or a certain process, would list all the marks of that process. Assuredly, this kind of work is necessary, but by doing only this, it will not be possible to learn about the laws governing the movement of a certain process. **(The error in Bacon's research method).**[17] On the contrary, when the purest determining characteristic is revealed, we will be able to determine the law of movement. Because the law itself is included in the development of the contradictions of this sort of primary and most pure determining characteristic.

If we adapt to the degree of development of capitalism, that purest characteristic of law will develop correspondingly, it will take on new aspects, and, what is more, it will enrich its content. The more developed and expanded the exchange of commodities, the better the quality of the labor sellers. This purest law of capitalist development is preserved after gaining special characteristics at every stage, no matter what stage capitalism passes through. Within the limit of existing in a certain process without being eliminated, the characteristic of that process is preserved.

Although there are many different characteristics between the imperialist stage and that of liberalism, throughout this period the quality of capitalism always remains and develops.

Although the stage of imperialism and that of liberalism have many different peculiarities, the capitalist nature remains from beginning to end. [Mao's note in the margin of the page.]

We must know not only about the basic characteristics of the entire process but also about the qualitative differences between the various stages of the process.

In the three stages of the Soviet economy, not only have the fundamental characteristics of the Soviet system been developed and strengthened, but in addition, each of the stages has a different nature.

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All the stages in the process are united, but in each stage, the fundamental peculiarity experiences a new

The concrete study of any process requires not only the study of the nature of the process as a whole but also study of the various stages of development of this process on the basis of the qualitative differences between them.

Take the Soviet economy, for example. Its development has gone through two or three stages. That is, it went through the stage of war communism, the period of revival under the New Economic Policy, and now it has entered the era of socialism. Each of these stages has developed and enhanced the fundamental characteristics of the Soviet system as a whole; at the same time, each period has its own unique nature.

Although it is true that there is no insurmountable barrier between the various stages of development, and the

development, and it is necessary to know the characteristics of every stage.

preceding stage is the preparation for the stage that follows, nonetheless, each stage uniquely develops the peculiar characteristics of the Soviet system, that is, its "nature." We must remember this before we investigate the special characteristics of each stage.

Nature is manifested in many specific characteristics.

The nature of every developing process and stage is manifested in many specific characteristics.

The nature of the event that we have entered the age of socialism is manifested in various specific characteristics, that is, it is manifested in the elimination of unemployment, the socialist form of work, socialist avoidance of waste, brave model laborers, the development of Soviet business, and so on. The nature of this age is characterized by the fundamental victory of socialist relations of production in the Soviet Union.

Every process has many special characteristics which are determined by its fundamental nature.

Not only are social processes like this, but all processes in the objective world possess many special characteristics that are fixed by the development of their own nature; they all have many intrinsic attributes.

Every process is associated with the others in certain respects. For example, the Soviet Union and foreign countries are associated on the basis of treaties and military preparedness. These aspects are basically determined by the nature of the process.

We know that there is no such a thing as a so-called isolated process; every process is associated with other processes. For instance, the Soviet Union finds itself associated with world capitalism. This association is manifest in many intrinsic attributes. These intrinsic attributes include the many treaty relationships which are aimed at the monopoly of foreign trade and the strengthening of the Soviet Union, as well as the armament necessary to strengthen and defend the Soviet Union.

The association between each process is manifested in many of the intrinsic attributes which are determined by the nature of those processes.

Qualitative developments during the process lead to the development of the intrinsic attributes of the process. For example, panic increases as the fundamental characteristics of capitalism develop.

The development of the nature of the process determines the development of the intrinsic attributes of the process. For example, with the development of the fundamental characteristic of capitalism, panic grows and sharpens; each industrial cycle appears in a new and special form. For example, during the age of postwar imperialism, the time of panic and recession is extended, and the time of prosperity is greatly shortened.

There are essential and nonessential intrinsic attributes.

There are essential and nonessential intrinsic attributes. For example, the replacement of the industrial cycle is the essential thing for capitalism; but it will be nonessential when panic in a certain area increases during a period of prosperity. As far as each stage in the movement process is concerned, though a certain intrinsic attribute is innate, under certain conditions, though it may not be an essential thing during the stage of previous development, it becomes an essential thing at a certain stage. This applies to quite opposite situations. . . .

The process of development has its origin in the change of intrinsic attributes to nonintrinsic attributes, in the change of nonintrinsic attributes to intrinsic attributes. This distinction is essential; otherwise, there will be errors.

If there is no capacity to distinguish the intrinsic attitudes of the essential things from the intrinsic attributes of the nonessential things, this will lead to an incorrect conclusion.

It is only through the intrinsic attributes of each stage that the nature of the process will develop.

The fundamental and determined character of any process, that is, its nature, can only develop with the development of the intrinsic attributes of each stage.

The development of the intrinsic attributes encourages the change from one stage to another.

Maintain the change of the intrinsic attributes of the nature of the entire process, and promote the development of that process, thus leading to the change from one stage of development to another.

Processes have common characteristics, and at the same time they have various aspects, all of which have their own peculiarities.

Every stage is different in nature. At the same time, it has many aspects which are connected by one regularity. For example, in a capitalist society, production, distribution, and consumption are all different aspects of the nature of one mode of production.

"Materialist dialectics requires that we study the nature of various aspects in many processes as much as possible"—Il'ich.

To deal with any aspect of the reality, to understand and control any problem, we must first determine its characteristic and nature. To expose the nature of the entire process as well as its various intrinsic attributes, to study the qualitative peculiarities of the nature of its aspects, form, and stages, study as many different qualities as possible—this is one of the basic requirements of the dialectics in dealing with any process.

A process has both qualitative and quantitative aspects.

The stipulative attributes of the nature only give us one aspect of knowledge about a process. After determining the nature of the process as well as its intrinsic attributes, our knowledge will move further forward to the next stage—the knowledge of the stipulative attributes of the quantity of the process.

2. The Stipulative Attributes of the Quantity of the Development

. . .

There is nothing in the world that does not have quantity.

We are in touch with the stipulative attributes of the quantity in every process. The stipulative attributes of the process are not the creation of our brain. They are not, as the skeptics and subjectivists think, our ideas, but exist in objective reality. There is not a single

thing that does not have the stipulative attributes of quantity; furthermore, there is not a single process which does not accomplish the quantitative development of its own factors and aspects according to a specific method.

Make the factors and aspects of a process fulfill the development of its quantity according to a specific method.

Quantity and quality are not things which exist independently.

Quantity and quality exist and develop simultaneously (not separately); they are unitary. [Mao's note in the margin.]

Different processes have different quantities. The quantitative development of cloth, human life, capitalism, and socialism is different in each case.

The speed of development of the quantity varies according to the quality; quality determines quantity.

. . . Different processes have different stipulative attributes of quantity. Cloth cannot be measured in liters; the life of human beings cannot be measured in kilograms. Capitalism develops on a decaying contour; the soviet system develops on a rising contour. The time and speed of the stipulative attributes of the quantity of the process depend on the fundamental characteristics of the process and are determined by its nature—this is not hard to understand on the basis of the description of nature in the previous part.

The special development of any process is determined by its special quality.

The special stipulative attributes of the quantity of any object and any process are determined by the nature of that object.

Quality changes at different stages of the process; it determines that quantity will change as well.

The change of the special and determined quantity arises from the development of the process in every stage.

The special character of the nature of the Soviet economy at various stages in its development determines the various increasing quantitative indicators. . . .

The development and strengthening of the planned economy, the superiority of socialist relations, the entry of more than half of agriculture into socialist relationships—all these things

Quantitative change also promotes qualitative change.

made it possible for the speed of reaching socialism to increase strikingly, so that it surpassed the speed in the period of reconstruction and revival, led to qualitative changes in the economy, and promoted the completion of the basic economic foundation of socialism. Such a rate of growth along the accelerating contour has become a regular development phenomenon of the Soviet economy.

It is one of the most important tasks to learn about the indispensability of the connection between quality and quantity and to learn about the specific properties of the development of quantity.

It is one of the most important requirements of materialist dialectics to determine the indispensable connection between quantity and quality and to determine the special stipulative attributes of the quantity of the process.

Inability to understand the fact that both the quality and the quantity of the process are special and assume that different qualities have the same quantity

One of the theoretical bases of the views of the right wing, the left wing, and harmful insects in general is that they are unable to understand the special determining attributes of quantity.

The Red Army and the White Army are qualitatively different, and also quantitatively different in quantity—marching speed, the degree to which it can endure hardships, and fighting capacity.

The Guomindang and the Communist Party are qualitatively different and also different in quantity.

Distance tests a horse's stamina. The horse's stamina is the quality, and the distance is the quantity.

Kondratiev, Groman, Chayanov,[18] and the other harmful insects all thought that the Soviet economy would not be able to surpass the speed of the capitalist economy. They took it for granted that, like the latter, the former would also develop along a contour. Where does this theory of speed originate? Such a theory of speed is the result of the idea which regards the Soviet economy as a variety of capitalism; . . . it is because they failed to understand that in principle the capitalist system and the socialist system are two different systems. The right opportunists also propagated the same theory of decaying contour. The five-year plan drafted under the leadership of Rykov[19] starts with the assumption that the total production output in the major productive sectors will decline each year at an accelerating rate. In observing the development of the Soviet economy, the Trotskyites also supported the theory of a downward curve. Neither of them understood that the special characteristic of the Soviet system is cultivating the possibility of a previously unprecedented speed of development of productivity. Both of them mechanically transferred the development speed of capitalist industry to Russia, where conditions are qualitatively different.

An oppressive policy greatly reduces the students' activism in studying, but this is not the case in our school.

Deep sleep *[shuide si]* leads to increased capability; spiritual exhaustion leads to decreased output.

New quality determines the development of new quantity.

The nature of the policy for distributing land among the peasants determines the increase of the peasants' activism, the great expansion of the Red Army, and the development of the agricultural economy and of the cooperatives.

From 1928 to 1929, when Bukharin,[20] Rykov, Tomskii,[21] and the like wanted to reduce the speed the party had announced, the mechanist standpoint of the right wing was particularly apparent. They thought that the development of the Russian economy should proceed at basically the same speed as during the last few years of the period of recovery. They could not understand the fact that a new quality gives development new quantitative attributes; they could not understand that entering the period of reconstruction meant a new speed of development. This lack of understanding was the basis for their methodology. Today, when the Soviet Union has entered the socialist era, the speed of development adopted by the right wing, as well as by the opposition parties of the left and right factions, and the arguments they use in opposition, are also characteristic of this same methodology.

The result of peace and democratic policy led to the rapid increase of the anti-Japanese forces.

If China adopts a democratic system, the development in every respect in the whole nation will be unlimited;

This failure to understand the special determining characteristics of the process of development and its various stages is particularly apparent when Trotsky was involved. Before the Fifteenth Party Congress, Trotsky had

hence, quantity and quality must be linked.

already demanded excessive industrialization in the country. But when Russia entered the era of socialism and was developing forward at an amazing speed, Trotsky was unable to understand the special character of this period, and, on the contrary, opposed it and claimed that it went too far.

Mechanists do not recognize quality; they only recognize quantity and forget the other side.

Mechanists do not regard exposing the nature of the process as their task. They believe that the only task of science lies exclusively in explaining the pure quantity of the phenomena.

It is necessary to set all qualitatively different phenomena against one another.

. . . In his *Historical Materialism,* Bukharin claimed that "it is meaningless to oppose mechanical phenomena to the organic phenomena." Mechanists only want to study the quantitative aspect of the process.

Because quantitative change leads to qualitative change, in return qualitative change brings about quantitative change.

Engels criticized the mechanist thought which denies the association between quality and quantity. He said, "The idea of mechanism is to try to explain all changes from shift in geographic location, and to try to explain all qualitative differences from the differences in quantity; as far as all the relationships between quality and quantity, the change from quality to quantity, the change from quantity to quality, and their mutual impact are concerned, all these things are ignored. If all qualitative differences and changes must necessarily be attributed to differences and changes of quantity, then we will inevitably arrive at the following conclusion. That is, all objects are made up of the same tiny particles; all the qualitative differences in the chemical elements making up matter originate from the difference in number and assembly in space of these tiny particles when they are united in the atom."

In their works almost all the ordinary representatives of Menshevik idealism neglected the necessity to study and understand "quality." As a matter of fact, on their side, this dialectical requirement is only an abstract requirement dangled overhead. Wherever they are, they never raise the issue of adopting the stand of recognizing the differences in the process and studying the quality of every aspect of the process. Their explanations about political as well as economic phenomena are only abstract and general studies and cannot expose the fundamental characteristics of these phenomena. For instance, as far as the fundamental process is concerned, Deborin never said a word about it. As for the process for eliminating the contradiction between mental and manual labor, his description is as follows: there will be a growth of shock work and socialist competition, a system of education in the crafts, higher industrial schools, and participation in the state administration by millions of people, and so on. On the one hand, he called loudly for an attention to quality, but as a matter of fact when the time came to analyze specific issues, he forgot quality completely. This is exactly where the danger of the theory spread by the Deborin faction lies.

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3. The Law of Change from Quantity to Quality and Vice Versa

Quality develops in the midst of quantity.

As we said above, there is no quality without quantity, nor is there any quantity without quality—the two aspects of quality and quantity are given in the process of unity in objective reality. Quality develops within quantity, that is, certain special and determined processes grow bigger in quantity, so that every

Quantity develops into new quality, and with the birth of new quality there comes new quantity; quality becomes quantity.

Qualitative change can occur only after quantitative change. It is also true that quantity changes only after quality has changed.

When people are numerous a king emerges. The rise and fall of the temperature leads to solid, liquid, or gas. Like chopsticks, kings also rise and fall. Small space limits the ability to maneuver; large space does not have such problems. A hero with no space to display his prowess. Organic object. Imperialism. The economy of the Soviet Union. The democratic movement. The anti-Japanese movement. Those with long sleeves are good at dancing, rich people are good businessmen. Han Xin commanded soldiers.[22]

The second kind of understanding

aspect or major factor of them develops. Quantity is specially determined. As the process develops every aspect of it turns into its opposite. The increase in the quantity of the process results in its transformation into a new quality. Quantity turns into quality.

On the other hand, the birth of new quality means the birth of new quantity at the same time. Quality becomes quantity.

Engels regarded the change from quality to quantity and from quantity to quality as one of the three fundamental laws of dialectics. He said: "For our purposes, this law can be expressed in the following way. In the natural world, qualitative change can only occur according to the correct and determined methods on each occasion—the increase and decrease as well as the movement of matter."

No matter what process one is observing, the increase of the quantity of the process will lead to a new quality. Under conditions of constant pressure, water freezes when the temperature falls to zero degrees centigrade; water vaporizes when the temperature rises to one hundred degrees centigrade.

As Darwin has proved, gradual quantitative change in an organic object leads to qualitative change. The increase and expansion of the quantity of capitalist monopoly goes hand in hand with the increase in other aspects of capitalist reality, which leads to the development of the new stage of capitalism, that is, imperialism. In the Soviet Union, the growth of the socialist factors which are present in every part of the national economy led to the change from the period of revival to the period of reconstruction.

Correct

The increase of quantity of each process is determined by the structure of that process. Each expresses it in its own special way. The movement of the Soviet Union to socialism and its transition to the era of socialist transformation—both express themselves in their own unique way.

Correct

The so-called transformation of quantity into quality actually refers to the simultaneous change of the determining attributes of a certain nature and its quantity to the determining attributes of a different nature with different quantity.

Correct

It is necessary to distinguish the change of one process from that of the other as well as the change within the process, and to distinguish the change of one kind of nature and quantity from that of the other as well as the change within the nature and quantity.

During the process of the democratic revolution—from the 1911 Revolution to Yuan Shikai, the May Fourth movement, the Great Revolution [of 1924-1927], the soviet war, and the democratic republic—every stage is different, and there are some ministages within each stage—for example, the effort to obtain peace, to obtain democracy, and to carry out the War of Resistance. [Mao's note in the margin of the page.]

The difference between the process and the stages

The transition from one quality and quantity to another, such as the change from capitalism to socialism, is actually a regular change to a new form. On the contrary, the change within the nature and quantity, such as the change from pure capitalist cooperation to handicraft industry in factories, and the further change to mechanical means of production, is a special development of quality and quantity. Each stage brings about the quantitative development of the various aspects of the previous stage, while adding a few new aspects and characteristics, and differing qualitatively from the previous stage; however, until a certain instant, it has not resulted in a complete transition of the quality to a new quality.

Continuous ruptures

Any quality, when reaching a certain stage of development, will interrupt its certain process of development and be transformed into a different quality.

Manifested through leap or revolution

The transition from one nature to another, the transition from one quality to another, is manifested through a leap. For instance, the change from capitalism to socialism is manifested through revolution.

It is one of the central characteristics of dialectical materialism to recognize development through leaps.

It is one of the central distinctive traits of dialectical materialism to recognize the path of development through leaps.

Nature, society, thought, all have leaps.

At the instant of the leap, the old quality is eliminated, and a new quality is created (with the old quality as its basis).

The quality and quantity of the old object are broken off, and the new quality and quantity begin to emerge.

In every field, whether of objective reality or thought, leaps occur. The change from one nature to another is absolutely a leap. This is because in that instant, the instant of the leap, the old nature loses its efficacy, and new nature that grows up on the basis of the old one begins to develop. All leaps are "continuous breaks." This is because, in that instant, the quantitative development of the old object is interrupted, and the development of the new thing, that is, the new quality, as well as of the determining attributes of the new nature, begins.

The old process is the preparation for the new process, the old stage is the preparation for the new stage.

The new quality does not appear all of a sudden. The whole of the previous development of the old quality is the preparation for the new quality. The mechanical method of production was prepared by the development of handicraft industry in factories; the detailed division of labor in the handicraft industry prepared the development to machines. Socialism is prepared by the complete implementation of capitalist development, by the accumulation and concentration of capital, the maturing of the proletariat, and so on.

The new process or stage retains remnants of the old quality, and while for quite some time the new and the old are intricately intermingled, one is the leading factor.

The new quality grows out of the old one. Moreover, for quite some time it maintains some characteristics and aspects derived from the old quality. During an extended period, capitalism still maintains in pure form commodity relationships and some of the feudal legacies.

Whenever there is a change in the quality, not only of the process but also of the stage, it is a leap.

We not only have to investigate the leap from one process to another, the leap from one quality and quantity to another, for example, from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to socialism; we must also investigate the leap within the process or within the quality. In capitalism as well as in the Soviet economy, the transition from one stage of development to another is a leap. This is because it has moved to a new stage of development in terms of quality.

This understanding is critical.

This kind of leap differs from the leap from one quality to another because viewing the process as a whole, it is a leap which occurs within the range of a certain regularity of the process.

As we know, capitalism as well as various aspects of the Soviet economy develop in terms of quantity on the one hand, while at the same time they go through various states of a new quality, that is, a leap.

All objective processes are like this.

The leap within the quality, and the road of development of the leap in various aspects, are present in the development of every process in objective reality. In the organisms of animals as well as human beings, myriad leaping changes are manifested; the seeds in biology change through numerous leaps; the elements in chemistry as well as their formation and dispersal all involve leaps.

Each leap has its own unique way.

Every quality is transformed into another quality in its own particular way. Materialist dialectics demands that one know about the particularities and the stipulative attributes, demands that one know about the change and the leap.

Examples

The leap from the reconstruction period of the New Economic Policy to the era of socialism is completely different in nature from the change in the period of transition to capitalism.

The character, form, speed, and degree of leap vary because of the difference in process, which is to say, it is determined by the character of the old nature.

Example

Dialectics must pay attention to the characteristics of leap.

The uniqueness and form, the period, speed, and intensity of the leap are all determined by the uniqueness of the old quality—its composition and the peculiarities of the new growing quality. The leap from water to ice takes place in a very short period of time; but the leap from capitalism to socialism must pattern itself on the long time required for various leaping aspects in the internal development of capitalism. Materialist dialectics requires that one understand the nature of the process, requires that one grasp the uniqueness of the leap.

Deborin breaks away from the reality. He does not know about the internal leap of the process either.

Although in the past the Deborin faction once did pay attention to the uniqueness of the leap, nonetheless, none of them is able to prove this kind of uniqueness with specific examples. Still less has the Deborin faction raised the question of leaps within quality.

Trotsky does not understand either.

Inability to understand the nature and uniqueness of leap is the characteristic of Trotsky, who treats the leap of different times and different processes as the same thing.

Mechanism

It is the characteristic of mechanists to negate the developmental method of the leap. Mechanists negate quality and recognize only the development of quantity. Hence they naturally deny leaps, too.

Regarding the leap as mysterious

Theory of gradual advance

Vulgar evolutionism

Bogdanov[23] heaped derision on the mysterious leap of dialectics. Some of the contemporary mechanists believe that leaps exist only in our brains. Things that exist in reality are only the constant development of quantity. The mechanists stand on the ground of gradual development and the gradual increase and decrease of the process. This kind of theory of gradual advance is precisely the basis of all revisionism. . . .

The theory of gradual advance is vulgar empiricism. It forgets the basic advantages and disadvantages to classes.

. . . the understanding of the theory of gradual movement has fallen to the contemptible level of empiricism and money-worship; it has lost sight of the fundamental interest of the class, leading to the bad practices of the guilds.

The above referred to the peculiarities of the quality and the quantity of the process.

4. The Contradictory Unity and Struggle Seen as the Nature of Dialectics

What follows discusses the regularities within the development of the process.

Above, we determined the uniqueness of the process, and the specific properties of its quality and quantity. Let us now investigate further the regularities within the development of the process.

Two viewpoints

In the history of thought of mankind there are two basic kinds of explanations regarding development. According to the first explanation, so-called development consists in the simple increase and decrease of a substance. . . .

The second explanation holds that all things develop because of the struggle of opposites and the splits of a unitary object.

. . .

The first viewpoint, the mechanistic view of development, is that

The first explanation is mechanical. Starting from the surface of the

development results from an increase or decrease in quantity. It sees problems only one-sidedly and from the outside, not comprehensively and from the inside, and cannot explain the reasons for the development of a thing.

The second viewpoint, the dialectical materialist view of development, reveals the source of movement within the process itself. What we call knowledge of a process is the revelation of the various aspects of the process, which are full of contradictions, the determination of the mutual relationships between these aspects, and the search for the movement of the contradictions of a process.

When we understand a process while it is undergoing splits, investigating those parts of the process which are full of contradictions as well as the mutual relationship between these parts, we can then know about the development of the process from emergence to elimination. Consequently, Lenin said knowledge of the splits in a unified entity and of its parts which are full of contradictions is the essence of dialectics.

phenomenon, this explanation can only record from the outside the increase and decrease of the process and is unable to explain the reason within the movement of the process, unable to explain how a certain process develops and why it does so. . . .

The second explanation does not stop at the surface of the phenomena; instead it goes deep to the bottom of the process, reveals the law of development within the process, determines the reason behind the development of a given process, and in these circumstances discovers the reason of development from the inside rather than the outside of the process, giving major attention to the exposure of the source of "self-movement" of the process. Based on such an explanation, the so-called process of knowledge is to expose the various aspects of the process which are full of contradictions, determine the mutual relationship among these aspects, and seek to grasp the contradictory movement of the process. . . .

The second explanation is that of dialectical materialism.

Il'ich said that the split of a unitary object and the knowledge of its various parts, which are full of contradictions, comprise the essence of dialectics. That is, when learning about the process through its splits and investigating its parts, which are full of contradictions, as well as the relations among them, we will be able to know about the development of the process from its appearance to its elimination. This law is always present in objective reality, as well as in every aspect of our thought.

It is necessary but insufficient to know only the many mutually distinct and mutually opposed aspects and attributes of the process, as well as to know the mutual connections of these aspects and attributes. We must also know the fundamental contradiction that causes the development of the process, for that is the source of movement of the process itself.

One cannot know the developing regularities of the process without first learning about the contradictions.

The difference between the old economics and the new economics

Revealing nature and quantity, as well as quality, makes us aware of the fact that every process has many aspects which are mutually different and mutually contradictory. Each process has all kinds of contradictory aspects which are internally associated and mutually dependent on each other. But to answer the question why all things develop it is far from enough simply to determine certain aspects and characteristics of the process and the pure combination of these aspects and characteristics. We must expose the basic contradictions in any phenomenon that determine its development.

Nevertheless, Plekhanov only stopped at the pure determination of the opposing aspects; he failed to expose the source of movement of the process itself.

5. The Split of a Unitary Object, the Revelation of the Opposing Essences

Bourgeois economics before and after Marx believes that the bourgeois system not only exists now, but will also exist forever in the future; that kind of economics does not understand the historical character of capitalist development and does not know the internal contradictions that lead capitalism to its extinction. Even progressive scholars such as Adam Smith and Ricardo, though they admitted that value is human labor expressed as a commodity, were still unable to expose the fundamental developing regularities of capitalism. This is because they failed to see the contradictions of capitalism. Marx used the real dialectics of capitalism to deal with the metaphysics of bourgeois economics. He said: "Only by discarding the contradictory monopoly, and replacing it with the basic contradictory facts and the real contradictions which are hidden by that monopoly, can economics be turned into a science based on real facts."

Marx exposed the major contradictions of the bourgeois methods of production, and thus explained the laws of capitalist development.

In the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of ownership can be seen the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, and this is the fundamental contradiction. From this fundamental contradiction emerge all other contradictions, because this fundamental contradiction determines the development of capitalism.

In *Capital,* Marx pointed out the major source of development of the capitalist system and "self-movement," proved that the contradiction between the capitalist productive forces and the relations of production determines the development of capitalism. This contradiction lies in the fact that the development of the productive forces is manifested in the name of the production of surplus value, which in turn becomes the means to produce surplus value. The development of capitalist productive forces clashes with the increasingly uncompromising contradictions of that narrow goal, that is, the production of surplus value.

In the increasingly acute contradictions between the social character of production and the form of private ownership which is expressed in successive, periodic, and repeated panics, Marx saw the principal contradiction of the bourgeois system. Today this major contradiction results in the ordinary crisis capitalism is undergoing at present. Marx analyzed and proved that this contradiction would inevitably lead to a proletarian revolution and to a period of transition to socialism. In addition, he also demonstrated that all the other contradictions in bourgeois society originate from this fundamental contradiction.

Il'ich pointed out that in the final period of its development, capitalism would change into imperialism, which is part of the capitalist system and whose major contradiction has become extremely acute. Starting by analyzing the major contradiction of the era of financial capitalism, starting from the law of uneven development of imperialism in each country, Il'ich analyzed the likelihood that the weakest link in the capitalist chain would be broken and proved scientifically the possibility of a victory of the revolution in one country and of socialist construction.

Uneven development is the primary contradiction of capitalism.

After the September 18 incident, the contradiction between China and Japan became the principal contradiction. We demonstrated the feasibility of a national united front, and proved the possibility of a democratic republic. This is how we are going to resolve this principal contradiction. [Mao's note in the margin.]

The principal contradiction during the transitional period in the Soviet Union is the contradiction between socialism and capitalism. The foundation on which this contradiction continues to emerge is the existence of the rich peasants. All the other contradictions are determined by this principal contradiction. Only industrialization and the socialization of agriculture can solve this major contradiction, but the possibility of solving this contradiction with internal force exists.

In their works, Il'ich and Stalin pointed out and criticized the major contradictions during the transitional period, the struggle between socialism and capitalism, and they further proved that the foundation which continuously reproduces this contradiction is the contradiction between large-scale socialist industry and scattered petty-bourgeois agriculture, the contradiction between the main proletarian class and the peasant stratum. The hard workers among the peasants are the allies of the proletariat, but the smallholders among the peasants are constantly creating capitalism. They pointed out how the opposition (the irreconcilable contradictions) between the proletarians and the major factors of capitalism are born and how they develop.

All the other contradictions that are developing in the transitional system are determined by the aforementioned major contradiction. Because of the present industrialization in the Soviet Union, however, the exposing and criticizing of the rich peasant class because of the collectivization of the farms in the entire nation, and the growth of the construction of state-owned farms, this major contradiction is in the middle of being solved.

They exposed the major contradictions in a transitional economy and proved that the Soviet Union is absolutely capable of solving this contradiction with its internal strength on a socialist basis. That is, they proved the possibility of a complete victory of socialism in the Soviet Union.

All objective processes develop from internal contradictions.

Internal contradictions make it possible not only for the social phenomena, but also for all the phenomena of objective reality to develop.

The internal contradictions of an atom determine its physical as well as its chemical properties.

The development of a chemical element results from its internal contradictions.

Modern science stopped regarding the atom as the ultimate division limit of a substance in physics a long time ago. Modern science discovered that the atom is the unity of positive and negative particles; in addition, it made it clear that the interpenetration of these two positive and negative particles determines the physical as well as the chemical character of the atom. That is not all! Twenty to thirty years ago physics as well as chemistry were regarded as unchanging things. It is quite a recent thing to examine the character of chemical elements from a historical perspective. Chemical elements are developing. The internal basis for the development of chemical elements is the movement of contradictions within the element.

Life and death, generation and elimination, assimilation and differentiation, are all developments of an organism determined by its internal contradictions.

The dialectical quality of the natural processes of biological phenomena is extremely apparent. Whether in the life of an organic object or in the life of every cell, life and death, generation and elimination, assimilation and differentiation (the metabolism of a substance and capacity) are all given internal unities.

The contradictory unity between variability and the hereditary features is the major reason behind the development of an organism.

The unity of variability and hereditary character in the struggle for survival, which is filled with contradictions, is the main motive force behind the development of the organism.

The unity of contradictions and their dissociation is also a law of thought.

The unity of opposites and the split of a unitary object is the general law of development of our thought. As stated above, our knowledge of the objective world moves in the contradiction between relative truth and absolute truth; though we are aware of absolute truth, during every specific stage of development, our knowledge is relative.

Knowledge is determined by the situation of practice, as well as by social history.

Our knowledge is determined by the state of our practice and the history of all societies in human history.

The split of a unified entity is the universal law of development of all objective reality and thought processes.

The split of a unified entity is the universal law of development of objective reality and all thought processes. Dialectical materialism, Il'ich said, "regards development as the unity of opposites (a unified entity splits into two mutually exclusive opposites, as well as the mutual relationship between these opposites)," and observes it. Therefore, "major attention should be devoted to the understanding of the source of one's own movement." The split of a unified entity correctly reflects the process itself, the content and contradiction of the process, and the major contradiction of the source of the process's own movement.

The so-called unity of opposites is the dissociation of a unified entity to become mutually exclusive opposites, and includes the mutual connections

between these opposites. This is the source of the so-called principal contradiction, and of so-called self-movement.

The particularity of contradictions, the contradiction in every different process is different from that in every other.

There are no contradictions of the same nature. Qualitatively different contradictions require different methods for their resolution.

The contradiction within a process is different in nature from the contradiction within a different process. The contradiction in capitalism, which can only be solved by a socialist revolution, is different from the contradictions in transitional economies.

The peculiarity of Trotskyism is its inability to understand the uniqueness of the contradiction in each process. Trotsky was unaware of the peculiarities of the development of the primary contradictions of capitalism in the era of imperialism, unaware of the law of uneven development. His first argument against the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country originated from here. In Trotsky's opinion, the contradiction between the proletariat and the peasantry in the Soviet Union is the same type of contradiction as that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in a capitalist economy. Both the former and the latter can be solved only by an international revolution. This is where his second argument against the victory of socialism in one country originated. Practice refuted Trotsky's theory and proved that contradictions of a different nature should be solved by different means. The contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie under capitalist conditions is solved by a revolution, by a socialist revolution led by the proletariat, but the contradiction between the proletariat and the peasant strata under Soviet conditions is solved by domestic industrialization as well as the collectivization of agriculture. Practice has proved precisely the theory that the victory of socialism in one country is possible.

The national contradiction between China and Japan should be solved by a united front organized jointly with the bourgeoisie. The internal contradiction after 1927 was, however, resolved by a united front organized only with the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. In normal times, the contradiction between labor and capital should be solved by a workers' united front. In the contradiction between the correct line and incorrect tendencies within the Party and within the revolutionary ranks, use the method of ideological struggle for its resolution. In the international domain, revolution should be employed to resolve the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In the case of the contradiction between the proletariat and the peasantry in the Soviet Union, industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture should be used to resolve it. The contradiction between society and nature should be resolved by developing the productive forces. As the contradictions in different processes vary, so also do the methods for their resolution. [Mao's comment written across the page.]

In looking at a problem from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism, it is necessary to expose the particularity of contradictions within any process. At the same time, it is necessary to know the particularity of the contradictions of various aspects of the process. Of the two opposing aspects, what is the specific status of each aspect? That is, what is the peculiarity of each aspect, in what concrete form does each aspect establish relations of interdependence with the other side, and in what form do they struggle against each other once the relationship of interdependence is broken? It is our task to study these questions. Leninism is a science which studies the various concrete forms in which the proletariat struggles against the bourgeoisie.

The topic of fighting against Trotskyism and the right-wing opportunists teaches us that it is necessary to expose the uniqueness of the internal contradictions in any process. At the same time, it is necessary to expose the particularity of the contradictions in those aspects of the process which are determined by the contradictions of the entire process. In *The Holy Family* Marx made the following comments:

"The proletariat and wealth are two mutually restricting opposites. Moreover, the two form a totality; both are the products of the world of private property. The question then is, of these two opposites, what is the special status of each of them in the contradiction? Merely to explain that this is a composite entity, of which the whole has these two aspects, is far from sufficient."

In order to understand the principal contradiction of capitalism, one must know the peculiarities of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; one must know their mutual relations, as well as their concrete relationship of interdependence, one must know the mutual restrictions which are determined by the capitalist mode of production.

6. The Interpenetration of Opposites

Opposing aspects are conditions for one another's existence; only if one aspect exists can the other exist.

Internal opposites combine with each other; one aspect of the opposites cannot exist without the other.

The New Economic Policy has internal contradictions. Stalin said: "In the New Economic Policy, we must preserve two aspects—on the one hand, to stand in opposition to War Communism and to take as the goal to guarantee a certain freedom of buying and selling; on the other hand, to oppose the complete freedom of buying and selling, with the goal of fulfilling the task of a national market monopoly. If either of these two aspects is eliminated, there will be no new economic policy under our rule.

There are many examples of the unity of opposites between the national monopoly and the freedom of businessmen. They all have two inseparable aspects which are mutually associated.

Precisely for this reason, our Party is against and will fight against any attempt that tries to abolish either of the two aspects of the New Economic Policy.

All processes are like this; they all have to fight struggles on two fronts.

Such inseparable association of the aspects which are full of contradictions can be seen in all the processes of objective reality.

The two opposing aspects combine with each other, and they change further into new opposites, that is, the so-called mutual penetration.

Opposites exist not only in inseparable association; what is more, one opposite may change into another opposite, and they can penetrate each other.

One aspect of the contradiction is the premise of the other and is transformed into it. The capitalist productive forces change and restrict the development of the capitalist relations of production; however, the latter themselves change and restrict the development of the capitalist productive forces. The production process in the workshops of the capitalists expresses the overall structure of the relations of capitalist production. At the same time, the relationship between the capitalists and the workers expresses the overall structure of the productive forces (labor power and methods of production). The development of the methods of production from handicrafts in factories to machinery constitutes both the development of the productive forces and the emergence of new production relations. The unity of labor power and production methods represents both the association of the productive forces and the association of people in the productive process, that is, the relations of production. The division of handicraft work in the factories is part of the relations of production, but it also belongs to the productive forces. Based on this—that is, based on the interpenetration of the productive forces and the relations of production—the intense and contradictory process between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie begins.

Interpenetration in the antagonistic relationship between productive forces and relations of production

Guerrilla war and regular war preserve the guerrilla character and overcome the guerrilla character; private land ownership in land distribution and preparation for the transition to socialism; the national character and international character of the Communist Party; democratic revolution and socialist revolution; patriotism and internationalism; war and peace,

The mutual penetration of opposites, the transformation of one opposite into the other, is present in every process. In order to expose and point out this character of mutual penetration, one must analyze the process concretely.

We have entered the socialist age, yet we are experiencing the last stage of the new economic policy—this is a contradiction. We are strengthening the

peace and war; alliance with the bourgeoisie and overcoming the bourgeoisie's vacillation and betrayal; the compromise with the Guomindang by the Communist Party is precisely to strengthen the independence of the Communist Party; the rest and training of the military forces serve at the same time to enhance their fighting capacity; retreat and the defensive simultaneously serve to prepare for the offensive; good medicines with bitter flavor are good for curing diseases; honest advice, though unpleasant to the ear, benefits conduct; though mutton is delicious, it is inevitably extremely hot; though roses are lovely flowers, they have thorns and will hurt your hands; beauties can overturn the country;[24] good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good[25]—all of these refer to the interpenetration and mutual transformation of opposites. All opposites are like this.

monetary system as well as the credit organizations [**banks**—word inserted by Mao between the lines], carrying out the policy of saving unnecessary spending and controlling the ruble, and developing commerce in the Soviet Union on the basis of saving unnecessary spending. The enhancement of the monetary system as well as the banks is also the creation and enhancement of socialist accountancy and planned training; the implementation of the policy of saving unnecessary spending is also the extension of socialist planning to the workshop and work group, as well as the collective department store. The development of Soviet commerce is at the same time the route of the factors in socialist distribution which created the products. The collective farm is a cartel that distributes its interest internally and, at the same time, a model socialist enterprise. Furthermore, such enterprises will soon become completely socialist enterprises. In matters concerning the state, there are also such cases of the interpenetration of opposites. Socialism is a system of which the goal is to eliminate the state. But right now we are trying to enforce the dictatorship of the proletariat. The reason we want the state to develop is that we want to create the conditions which will lead to the elimination of the state. "The supreme development of state authority is aimed at preparing conditions which will lead to the elimination of state authority"—this is the Marxist formula. Is it "contradictory"? Yes, it is. Nonetheless, this contradiction is in the midst of being created, it reflects completely Marxist dialectics" (Stalin).

In problems concerning the interrelationship between national culture and international relations there is also such interpenetration. We are developing our national culture, but that sort of development is an effort to eliminate it and to prepare the conditions to merge national cultures into one common international socialist culture. The unity of opposites and mutual penetration "make it possible for the Bolsheviks to establish unshakably firm fortresses in the field of national issues; it reflects vivid truth."

The above are eight examples drawn from the Soviet Union. [Mao's comment at the bottom of the page.]

The central task of dialectics is to study the interpenetration of opposites, that is, the identity of opposites.

It was precisely this interpenetration of opposites which Il'ich named the identity of opposites. It is the central task of our knowledge and our dialectics to expose the interpenetration and identity of any process.

Il'ich said: "Dialectics is a theory about how opposites can be identical. And in what way are they identical (how did they become identical)? Under what conditions can opposites become identical and begin to be mutually interchangeable? Why does the consciousness of human beings not regard these opposites as dead and frozen objects to observe, and instead treat them as vivid, conditional, changeable, and mutually transformable things to observe?"

Change from opposite to identity; in a war two sides oppose each other, and identity means that the two sides are at peace; state means two sides oppose each other, while identity means the elimination of the state. Since opposites involved in a process are conditions for one another, after going through a struggle the opposition can be overcome and become identity. Under the condition of an acute national contradiction, the opposition between the Guomindang and the Communist Party becomes identity and is transformed into the united front. The confrontation between the united front and the invading front, on condition that the people stand up and there is a world revolution, will change into identity and will be trans-

formed into world peace. Because all the processes of objective reality result from the opposition of contradictions and their transformation into identity, their transformation into the negation of the negation. They themselves are vivid, conditional, changeable, and transform themselves into one another; hence human understanding observes the world in this way.

The opposition between relative truth and absolute truth and its transformation into identity

The interpenetration of opposites, identity, is also a feature of our process of cognition. One of the major contradictions in cognition by human beings is, as discussed above, the contradiction between relative truth and absolute truth. Relative truth reflects absolute truth in a great many forms; absolute truth is made up of orderly relative truths.

Without concrete study of a process, there is no way the identity of opposites, that is, their interpenetration, can be understood.

The revelation of the identity of the opposites and their interaction is possible only after concrete study of the process, that is, after concrete study of the aspects of the process which are full of contradictions, and of the association of these aspects as well as the particularity of their mutually restraining attributes. . . .

The identity of the confrontation in the process of knowledge (or mutual penetration) is actually the movement of the contradictory aspects in the process of cognition (that is, the movement of the two sides in the principal contradiction and some lesser contradictions), the restraints on those aspects, the flexibility of the limits on those aspects, as well as the reciprocal transformation of the limits of those aspects. All of these numerous things which are studied by dialectics correspond to the identity or interpenetration of opposites.

The study of the interpenetration and identity of opposites means knowing the movement, development, and restraining attributes of the aspects of the process which are filled with contradictions, as well as the flexibility of its limits in all stages, and the mutual transformation of these limits.

In Bukharin's opinion, mutually independent forces exist; they affect each other. Moreover, movement is caused by the external clash of forces in different directions. Il'ich demanded that one should first learn about the contradictions within the process of cognition and discover the source of one's own movement. But Bukharin wanted to determine the mutually conflicting external forces. Il'ich demanded that one demonstrate the split of a unitary object and reveal the identity of the opposites, that is, that one determine the inseparable association of the opposing aspects; but Bukharin wanted only to examine the mutually independent forces, the kind of force which is able to survive alone. Bukharin had a mechanical understanding of the law of the unity of opposites. This is because he began with the concepts of mechanics and the simple clash of mutually independent forces.

Instead of the split of a unitary object, it is two kinds of forces that exist independently; instead of internal contradictions, it is external contradictions; instead of the inseparable association of two conflicting aspects, it is that each of two forces can survive independently—this is antidialectical metaphysics.

Well-organized capitalism

In the study of modern imperialism, starting with the mechanical explanation about the mutual penetration of opposites, one will arrive at the following conclusion, that is, instead of regarding the domestic contradictions in each nation as the fundamental and well-organized capitalist theory in the age of imperialism, some people treat the external contradictions outside each nation in the world market as the fundamental and well-organized capitalist theory in the age of imperialism.

Although contradiction exists universally, antagonism occurs only when the contradictions in certain processes have developed to a certain stage. The contradictions between oppressing and oppressed classes, between oppressing and oppressed nations, between one state and another, between one party and another, and all sorts of contradictions like this, all may develop into situations of antagonism. Such antagonism within a social process takes the form of oppression and war; antagonism within natural processes takes the form of conflicts and clashes. Fighting and murderous plots between individuals also fall into this category. Many contradictions do not develop in such a way as to take on an antagonistic form: within the Communist Party, the contradiction between correct and incorrect; in the domain of culture, the contradiction between the advanced and the backward; in the economic domain, the contradiction between the cities and the countryside, between value and use value, between mental and manual labor, between production and consumption; in class relations, the contradiction between workers and peasants; under socialism, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production; in the natural world, between life and death, positive and negative, between heredity and variation, attraction and repulsion, cold and warm, and sea and land. None of these contradictions has reached, or has yet reached, the conditions under which it bursts asunder. None of these contradictions is antagonistic. The method for resolving contradictions is different from that for resolving antagonism. This is the particularity of contradiction and the particularity of the method for the resolution of contradiction, a question which requires distinctions to be made.

Like all mechanists, Bukharin regarded contradiction and antagonism as the same thing. This is incorrect. Antagonism is a struggle between opposites which can be resolved through revolutionary means. For example, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie has an antagonistic character. But not all contradictions are antagonistic. For example, in the contradiction between use value and value there are not two opposing forces. The relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry does not have an antagonistic character. These two classes share many common interests. To regard contradiction and antagonism as identical would lead us, on the one hand, to become like the Trotskyites, who believe that since there is contradiction between the proletarians and the peasant class, this contradiction has the same character as that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, that is, to think that this contradiction amounts to a relationship of class antagonism. On the other hand, this view will make people become like the Right opportunists, who believe that since the proletariat and the peasantry share a lot of common interests, there are no contradictions between these two classes.

In a society of developed socialism, there is neither class struggle nor class antagonism. Nevertheless, Bukharin regarded contradiction and antagonism as identical and believed that in a developed socialist society, there would be no contradictions at all. When responding to such views, Il'ich made the following comment:

"This is extremely incorrect. Antagonism and contradiction are completely different. Under socialism, the former is eliminated, but the latter remains" (Il'ich's comments on Bukharin's *Economics of the Period of Transition*).

This refers to the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, between the advanced and the backward, between human beings and nature, and so on. [Mao's comment on the bottom of the page.]

7. The Significance of the Dominant Aspect of the Contradiction

Having determined the contradiction within the process as well as the inseparable association between the various conflicting aspects of the process, we must proceed to discover the dominant aspect of this contradiction. In *Capital*, Marx pointed out that in the inseparable association between conflicting aspects such as between the value and use value of a commodity, value has a dominant impact; he pointed out that, in the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production, productive forces have a dominant impact.

As regards the mutual relationship between theory and practice, materialist dialectics, having elucidated the contradiction between the two, takes as its starting point the recognition that in the end practice is, after all, the dominant aspect of this contradiction.

. . .

Zinoviev[26] failed to understand these two opposing aspects, the capitalist factors and the socialist factors, and how, under the dominant impact of the socialist factors, they developed so fast. Therefore, treating the New Economic Policy as the development of the capitalist factors alone, he concluded that it was a retreat.

Plekhanov never raised the issue of exposing the primary contradiction in the process. As for the dominant aspect of the contradiction, still less did he mention it. Plekhanov never departed from his stand of the so-called combination of the characters of the opposites. . . . Present-day social democracy, in dealing with the problem that society equals the economy, instead of exposing the primary and decisive contradictions, as well as the dominant aspect of each contradiction, adopts the so-called idea of pure combination of the opposites.

Though Deborin and his followers admit superficially the law of the unity of opposites, as a matter of fact, they have changed to the Menshevik view regarding the objective combination of the opposites.

Deborin and his followers never talked in any of their essays about the necessity of revealing the principal contradiction. They not only failed to devise a formula regarding this aspect of the law of the unity of opposites, they simply ignored it; this is apparent in all their works. As for Luppol,[27] he thought that theory determines practice, practice determines theory. He failed to make clear the dominant function of practice, believing that these two factors alternately exercised influence on one another. Deborin defined the New Economic Policy as the struggle between capitalist factors and socialist factors, but he did not make clear the leading role of socialist relations, nor did he point out the fact that the New Economic Policy was marching toward a socialist victory.

There are many contradictions in a complex process. Among these, one is the principal contradiction, while the others are secondary contradictions. Because the development of the principal contradiction determines the development of the various secondary contradictions, if one cannot distinguish between the principal contradiction and secondary contradictions, between the determining contradiction and those that are determined, one cannot seek out the most essential thing in a process (provide examples). Within a contradiction, however, regardless of whether it is principal or secondary, the two aspects of the opposites not only oppose and struggle against each other, they are also mutually dependent upon the opposing aspect, with which they carry on opposition and struggle. As a result of the struggle between the two aspects, there arises a change characterized by mutual interpenetration, that is, a transformation resulting in identity, a transformation into the opposite aspect, which amounts to the inseparable association of the two opposing aspects. And yet it would be a great error to regard the two aspects of any contradiction as equal. Of the two aspects, one must necessarily be the principal aspect and the other the secondary aspect, and it is the former which plays the contradiction's so-called guiding role. This book has already given four examples: as between value and use value, value is the principal aspect; as between productive forces and the relations of production, productive forces are the principal aspect; as between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; as between socialism and capitalism in the Soviet Union, socialism is the principal aspect. All of these prove the determining function of the principal aspect in relation to other aspects. It is not simply a case of mutual combination, as Plekhanov's mistaken explanation has it, nor is it, as in Luppol's formulation, mutual determination, that is, alternating action; on the contrary, one aspect plays the principal and decisive role. Which, then, is the principal aspect? It depends on the circumstances of the development of the process, and will be determined under definite conditions. For a long period in capitalist society the bourgeoisie was the principal aspect, but by the eve of the revolution and after it, the proletariat becomes the principal aspect. In a capitalist state, capitalism is the principal aspect, while the feudal forces are the secondary aspect. But in prerevolutionary Russia, feudal forces were still the primary aspect, as they are in present-day Japan, with capitalism playing only a secondary role. In Chinese society, dominance belongs to imperialism and the feudal forces, and they exercise a determining effect on everything else. The invasion by Japanese imperialism has determined all sorts of changes. Thus, in the vigorous development of the Great Revolution from 1925 to 1927, in the confrontation between the southern revolutionary forces and the Beiyang warlords, the position of the southern forces changed from secondary to dominant, while the power of the Beiyang warlords changed in the opposite direction. As regards the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, since the bourgeoisie controls the economic lifelines, it still occupies the dominant position to this day; however, as far as the revolutionary leadership is concerned, because of the level of consciousness and the thoroughness of the proletariat, as contrasted with the vacillation of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat occupies the dominant position. This particularity affects the future of the Chinese revolution. If the proletariat is to occupy the dominant position politically and militarily, it must unite with the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. If the majority of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie can become conscious and get organized, then the proletariat will assume the determining and dominant role in the revolution. In the situation of antagonism between China and Japan, the Chinese elements are just now in the middle of changing from a secondary to a principal position, and that is because if the national front is established broadly and is consolidated, and with the addition of international factors (the Soviet Union, the Japanese masses, and other peaceful states), there will be created a superiority over the Japanese aspect. In the contradiction between the peasantry and the proletariat, the proletariat is dominant. In the contradiction between industrial workers and handicraft workers, industrial workers are dominant. In the contradiction between skilled workers and unskilled workers, skilled workers are dominant. In the contradiction between the cities and the countryside, the city is dominant. In the contradiction between the economic basis and the superstructure, the economic basis is dominant. In the contradiction between perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge, perceptions are dominant. In the contradiction between the main forces of the Red Army and the guerrilla units, the main forces of the Red Army are dominant. In the contradiction between offensive tactics and defensive tactics, offense is dominant. In the contradiction between strategy and tactics, strategy is dominant. In the contradiction between mobile warfare and positional warfare, mobile warfare is dominant. Of the various arms of the services, the infantry is dominant. In the contradiction between mental and manual labor, manual labor is dominant. And who is to decide? When the development of a process reaches a definite stage, the strength of the two sides in the struggle will determine it. The dominant and the nondominant change from one to the other.[28]

8. The Contradictory Movement of the Process from Beginning to End

. . .

Il'ich continued: "This is precisely the general expository or research method of dialectics" (*Collected Works of Il'ich*, Vol. 12). Discover the purest and most fundamental relations in a process; reveal the major contradiction in such relations; study the development and struggle of the major contradictions, as well as all the contradictions resulting from the major contradictions, those aspects that are filled with contradictions, the developing tendencies—the

development of the process from start to finish; study the change in the nature of the various stages in the developing process, the relative uniqueness of the movement of various aspects that are full of contradictions, and their mutual association and interchangeability—this is the road that must be taken in studying any process.

Such is the principle of research

9. Unity of Opposites: Identity Is Relative, the Struggle of Opposites Is Absolute

. . .

There is nothing that never changes. One kind of state may change into another anywhere and at any time; every process has its beginning and end. Every process changes into its own opposite. The permanence of any process is relative, but the change from one process to another is absolute, and the struggle between opposites is absolute. Il'ich talked at great length about the absolute attributes of struggles and the relative attributes of unity; furthermore, he gave an extremely clearcut definition. He said:

Our united front with the Chinese bourgeoisie is relative, and so is the peace diplomacy between China and some of the peace-loving countries. The Soviet Union's coexistence and treaties of alliance with various other countries are also relative. It is the same with unanimity within the Party, and the unanimity in all processes is relative.

Ideological struggle is therefore a regular method.

"The unity of opposites (unanimity, identity, balance) is conditional, instant, temporary, and relative. The struggle between the mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, development and movement is absolute" ("On Questions of Dialectics").

Two very good examples.

The identity, agreement, unity, and permanent presence of the opposites are included in the struggle of opposites; it is no more than one of the motive forces in the struggle of the opposites. Motion contains motionlessness, which is one of the motive

In a bourgeois-democratic revolution, the proletariat and all the peasants, among whom are also the rural bourgeoisie, fight together against the relationship of peasant slaves. This kind of cooperation of activity between the proletariat and the rural bourgeoisie as well as the correspondence between their interests have a rela-

forces of movement. Recognizing identity, permanence, and motionlessness is a condition for distinguishing struggle or motion and therefore necessary; yet it is temporary and relative and is one of the motive forces of struggle and motion.

tive, temporary, and conditional nature. The struggle between them is absolute, including their identity as motivation. During the French Revolution, the interests of the primitive proletariat and bourgeoisie supported one another and established their unity and identity. But this kind of unity has a relative, temporary, and conditional nature; with the development of capitalism, this nature soon surfaced, exposing the absolute nature of the class struggle and the incompatibility between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. [Here Mao has inserted the following comment between the lines: "**not the same, not compatible**."] The identity between the two simply hides the absolute struggle between them.

In the motion of contradictions in all processes, identity is relative, struggle is absolute; all processes are like this. But because the nature of the contradictions is different in each process, and the internal structure of each process is different, the way in which absoluteness and unity are manifested is different. This must be understood.

All the processes in the objective world are like this, the only difference is that in each process, the absolute attributes and unity of struggle between opposites are manifested in their own unique ways, and they are determined by the nature of the process as well as its internal structure.

It is correct to recognize that contradiction leads to motion, but that is not enough; it is also necessary to understand under what kind of conditions contradiction gives rise to motion. In a condition of unity, although contradiction is in motion, it is a particular state of motion, namely, a relative state. This is commonly called rest, invariability, immobility, death, stopping, standstill, deadlock, stalemate, peace, and harmony and is relative, temporary, and conditional. It is necessary to recognize the general condition of motion, that is, the dissociation of a unified entity, its struggle, clashes, movement, changeability, life, action, dynamism, warfare, and competition, and this is absolute. Identity, unity, rest, death, peace, and the other relative conditions of contradiction are contained within the absolute condition of contradiction. Not to understand this is metaphysical and mechanistic and in fact is a rejection of dialectics.

The difference between Marxism-Leninism and social democracy lies in understanding the absolute character of struggle and the relative character of unity. All social democratic theorists, whether Kautsky or Plekhanov, though they opposed Bernstein's revision of Marx's dialectics and recognized that contradiction leads to movement, in the final analysis failed to understand that the split of a unitary object leads to movement, failed to understand the absoluteness of the struggle between opposites and the relativeness of unity. If, as a result, Kautsky recognized dialectics only in form, but never understood it, what does this imply? This is because Kautsky [here Mao added "merely"] believed that contradiction leads to motion, which is revolutionary metaphysics; in fact, he rejected dialectics.

There may be some reconciliation, compromise, and accommodation, and this is absolutely necessary in a certain state during the development of the process. A truce, peace negotiations, ending a strike, a temporary united front, and some cooperation have existed in the class struggle, and may exist, but they are not the overall tactics. The contradictions, which cannot be reconciled and compromised, must ultimately be solved by revolution. These are the overall tactics.

The overall political tactics of the fascists in contemporary society are all based on the foundation of the reconciliation of opposites. They abandon Marx's proposition that class struggle cannot be reconciled and instead advocate compromise between the interests of the proletariat and those of the bourgeoisie, an accommodation between the two classes to assist the rationalization of the property of the capitalists, assist the struggle of the national bourgeoisie in its struggle to take over the market, and lure the proletarian to join the bourgeois state.

The Bolsheviks understand the absoluteness of the struggle between opposites, as well as the relativity of their unity and identity, but the Mensheviks talk glibly about the theory of the eternalization of unity. These two different views constitute the theoretical foundation of the various divergences in their strategy and tactics in class struggle.

Lenin's party also had a period of cooperation with the bourgeoisie; they put forward the slogan of advancing separately but attacking jointly. The cooperation between the Chinese

The tactics the Bolsheviks used to deal with the liberal bourgeoisie were expressed in the slogan of "Advancing separately but attacking jointly" during the election campaign for the zemstvos.[29]

[Communist] Party and the Guomindang is also in principle advancing separately and attacking jointly, but it does not manifest itself in the same way. Advancing separately corresponds to the political independence of the class and the Party; attacking jointly is the united front.

This joint action by the liberal bourgeoisie at a certain stage and in a certain state is the relative, temporary, and conditional motivation of the tactics of social democracy. The Mensheviks have given this relative motivation an absolute significance, so as to use it as the foundation of all of their own tactics; as a result, the Mensheviks have become the lackeys of the bourgeoisie. In 1917, the Mensheviks, led by Plekhanov, supported the victorious bourgeoisie,
At a certain other stage and
made propaganda in favor of
in a certain other state, joint
reconciling interests, and called
action with the bourgeoisie.[30]
loudly for the continuation of the
Chen Duxiu loudly proclaimed that
imperialist war, but they were
one should not oppose the national
desperately against anything that
revolution, or do anything that would
would prevent the strengthening of
hinder the strengthening of the
capitalism, and particularly opposed
Guomindang Especially the land
to a socialist revolution. After the
revolution
October Revolution, they directly
supported the white party. The
Now they directly support Japanese
expulsion of capitalist elements from
aggression
the Soviet Union made the Mensheviks ally themselves with the bourgeois political parties which hindered the revolution. The broad socialist attack along the entire front drove the Mensheviks to assist the international bourgeoisie who were preparing to intervene in the Soviet Union.

These two sentences refer to Chen Duxiuism.

It is an alliance that has taken into consideration the irreconcilable conflict of interest between the proletariat and the rich peasants. This is the case in the democratic revolution in China, let alone the Soviet Union after the October Revolution.

If one advocates the unity of opposites without understanding the absoluteness of struggle, he will inevitably end up by reconciling the opposites. The theory of the reconciliation of opposites is the characteristic of the stand of the right wing. The right wing ignored Marx and Il'ich's proposition that class struggle cannot be reconciled, established the so-called organized capitalist theory, believed that the internal contradictions within a capitalist country can be taken away and moved to a space of struggle in the exterior—the world market. In the Soviet Union they established the so-called theory that the bullies would grow peacefully into socialism. They used the theory of natural elimination and peaceful dying out of class struggle to replace Il'ich's theory that class can be eliminated only through fierce social revolution. The right-wing faction forgot the internal contradictions within the peasant stratum. In their opinion, the peasants are a group painted in gray. They never noticed that our alliance with the peasants is an alliance which has taken into consideration the irreconcilable conflict of interest between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Hence it is an alliance that would struggle against the capitalist elements among the peasants. "Bukharin, a theorist without dialectics, and a theorist of pedantic philosophy," did
The essence of dialectics is the problem of the struggle between contradictions[31]
not understand the theory that the struggle between opposites is absolute and the unity of opposites
Pedantic philosophy is metaphysics. Once again, Chen Duxiu does not understand this.
is relative.

The theory of reconciliation between opposites is a metaphysical theory, because this theory did not find a way out from one state to another. The theory of reconciliation between opposites failed to notice the emergence of new things, and did not pay attention to the fact that the premise, possibility, and condition of new phenomena and of their development were produced on the basis of the development of a certain process. This kind of theory pays no attention to the development of the contradictions of a given process, and fails to investigate how a given condition is changed into another. . . .

And yet the essence of dialectics resides in this.

What is called taking the development of a certain process as the foundation refers to the change from one state of the process to another; it is the development of contradictions, that is, the so-called leap or sudden change. With this as the foundation, the premises, possibilities, and conditions for the creation of a new process, as well as its actual emergence, result.

It is not the unity of opposites that is the essence, but the struggle between opposites.

The viewpoint of the reconciliation between opposites has become the foundation of the Deborin faction's Menshevik-idealist revision of Marx's dialectics. . . . In none of their works have they ever criticized the theory of the reconciliation between opposites. On the contrary, it would be more accurate to say that they simply started with this theory. Deborin sought the essence of dialectics not in the struggle between opposites but in the identity of opposites; . . . Deborin's characteristic trait lies in the fact that he failed to understand Il'ich's thought—as Il'ich said, the identity of the opposites is merely one of the motive forces in the unity of opposites which are full of contradictions.

10. The Theory of Balance

[He] believed that the balance of opposites is absolute, but the struggle between opposites is relative, and the so-called opposites are external opposites, and the opposition between systems; the interior of the system is made up of a group of mutually associated factors. There are contradictions between each of the factors, but they are in a subordinate position; the major contradiction is external, and it plays a decisive role in terms of the internal contradiction.

. . . In Bukharin's view, it is necessary to translate Hegel's dialectics into the terminology of modern mechanics. Bukharin is faithful to his own question. He believed that what Hegel and Marx called contradiction leading to movement was actually the conflict between two opposite forces; the mutual conflict of external forces temporarily forms a movable balance, which is disturbed afterward, and balance will be restored on a new basis. . . . Bukharin wrote that everything is a kind of overall entity that is made up of a group of mutually associated factors, which become a certain system. All such "systems," together with the other systems which form their own environment, combine with each other. The environment and system contradict each other. Such a contradiction between the environment and the system is, in Bukharin's opinion, the foundation of all development.

Bukharin does not deny internal contradictions. For instance, he admits the existence of the many internal contradictions in a society, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, and the contradictions between the different classes and so on. But according to Bukharin, these internal contradictions are the result of the environment and the contradictions outside the system and are determined by that kind of external contradiction. In this case, the class struggle within society, according to Bukharin, is determined by the contradiction between society and nature. . . .

Bukharin learned from Spencer, Schelling, and Bogdanov.

This kind of theory of balance arbitrarily labeled Marxism by Bukharin is not something new. This kind of theory of balance is widely and popularly used in bourgeois sociology and economics.

The bourgeois philosopher and sociologist Spencer[32] built his mechanical theory of evolution on the basis of this kind of theory of balance. . . . Schelling,[33] who had been opposed to the dialectics of Hegel and Marx before Spencer, spoke of it in these terms:

"The conflict of the mutually competing forces in opposite directions is also the fundamental form of nature as well as that of the role of its own discovery."

In the *Anti-Dühring,* Engels severely criticized this kind of understanding. It is Bogdanov who made balance the perfect form. Bogdanov translated dialectics into the "terminology of mechanics" before Bukharin. . . . Bogdanov defined dialectics as: "the organizational process that is expressed through the struggle of opposing forces." In his opinion, movement resulted from equilibrium with no contradictions at all; afterward, this balance was disturbed by the struggle between two opposing forces and later restored on new foundations. The things which Bogdanov regarded as fundamental and prescribed are external things which would restrain the internal contradictions. He believed that the principal contradiction is the contradiction between the environment and the system. Thus we see that the source of Bukharin's great wisdom is bourgeois sociology and the idealist philosophy by which it was influenced, the philosophy of Bogdanov, the eclecticist.

No balance of any contradiction has ever happened.

Question: why did the contradiction between China and Japan become the principal contradiction?

The theory of balance is very well received by all harmful organizations and has become the foundation of their methodology in their understanding of theory. The leader of the Party of the Working Peasants, Kondratiev, starts with the theory of balance in all his works, whether in those discussing the situation of the capitalist economy and that in the Soviet Union, or those dealing with the speed of development. Kondratiev's colleague, thinker of the kulaks, Vishnevskii,[34] said: "In all complicated and creative work, one cannot dispense with the general idea which serves as the foundation of the theme of all the other parts and which may be used as the 'condiment.' When setting up a clearly thought-out national economic plan, this kind of 'condiment,' in my opinion, is precisely the principle of balance."

That is, the general idea[35]

Is nothing possible except this? Fortunately, it is possible [to approach the problem from] another aspect. Instead of holding back the high to compensate the low, one should overcome backwardness, and raise the low and backward to an advanced level. Instead of the advanced looking to the backward, the backward should move forward and catch up. Bukharin's idea is precisely to cut the feet to fit the shoes when they do not fit each other. Is this possible? Never. Is it possible to compensate for weaknesses? The method of tending to the head when there is a headache and the feet when they hurt will eventually lead to a fiasco of the whole. This is not the method of expanding the contradiction in order to solve it and resolving the contradiction starting from the basis; it is smothering the development of the

"In the entire system, which is made up of a series of mutually associated and indispensable chains, the one with decisive significance is the weakest link. For instance, iron is important to every department in the social economy. If the production of iron falls below the standard, one must shut down every department and specialize in the exploration and production of iron until there is enough to use; otherwise it will be impossible" (Bogdanov, *General Organizational Theory*).

All the followers of the theory of balance and all mechanists propagate the idea of compensating for weaknesses. Kondratiev, copying Bukharin's "An Economist's Outline,"[36] repeats the same slogan. At the budget meeting in the People's Committee of Finance, he said: "Without bricks there will be no houses. As far as this is concerned, I

contradiction to seek internal stability, in order to achieve so-called balance. In the end, it will do no good. This is the method used by the bankrupt to help the poor. To form an external balance in order to seek internal balance, this is Bukharin's fundamental method.

Rely on struggle, rely on the struggle between a socialist agriculture and an agriculture which, because it is dispersed, is free and inclined toward capitalism, to overcome the contradiction between the dispersed character of agriculture (which is incompatible with a socialist economy, but encourages the growth of the sprouts of capitalism) and socialism.

Very clear

agree with Bukharin, yes, we should compensate for weaknesses. In my opinion, there is nothing to be done except this."

All the problems of the Right opportunists arise from the theory of balance and the idea of compensating for weaknesses. For example, when the production of construction materials falls behind the production in the other departments, instead of overcoming this state of backwardness, they believe that it is capital construction which should be slowed down.

The weakest chain in the development of the Soviet economy is the dispersal of petty commodity agriculture. Followers of the theory of balance believed that this contradiction cannot be overcome by leading agricultural development to the level of a big enterprise—which is possible only if agriculture undergoes a socialist transformation; otherwise, they believe that it can be achieved only by slowing down the developing speed of the enterprises. Followers of the theory of balance believed that the possibility of the solution to the above contradiction lies in maintaining these two opposing aspects, namely, big socialist enterprises and petty commodity agriculture, and in taking advantage of the mechanical relationship between these two aspects to bolster the weak side and to maintain balance between them.

The external contradiction and the internal contradiction of the process mutually influence and penetrate each other, yet they are not the major and decisive factors; they can only affect the development of the process through the internal regularities of the process. They are not the major and decisive things; the major and decisive contradictions are within the process.

Examples

The contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, that is, society's internal contradictions, have a decisive influence on the contradiction between society and nature, that is, on what is called man's mastery over nature. It has been like this ever since the production of tools for labor. The examples cited here are a feature of advanced society.

The dialectics of Marx and Il'ich by no means denies the function of external contradictions, that is, the influence of a certain process on other processes. On the contrary, it would be more accurate to say that they start from the idea that all the processes in the real world are indissolubly linked to each other and require the mutual action, mutual influence, and mutual penetration of the processes of knowledge. Their major attention is focused on exposing the internal contradictions, determining the identity of opposites, and learning about the source of movement of the process of knowledge itself. It is only through the internal regularity of the development of the process that external contradictions will have an impact on the development of the process. The dialectics of Marx and of Il'ich does not deny the contradictions between society and nature, but it does not agree that external contradictions are the major and decisive thing. In historical studies we find that the geographic conditions, climatic conditions, topography, animals and plants, and natural resources in many countries have not changed for a long time, but the social relationships have changed, that is, the feudal system has changed into capitalism.

In the development of social components, for example, during the development of capitalism, what dialectics sees as the major and decisive thing is the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production. Needless to say, the contradiction between society and nature also has an impact on the development of capitalism, but its action is not direct. Instead, its action is effective only through the development of the major contradictions of capitalism. When the geographic environment becomes the obstacle in social development, society, on the basis of its own internal laws, will develop its social productive forces to change the geographic environment. If forests are rare, it will think before cutting any forest and plan its growth. If there is not enough coal, it will use charcoal. If there is not enough natural leather, sheep's wool, and silk, manmade leather, wool, and silk will be produced. If there is a decline in the area of arable land, irrigation equipment will be used. Because of the development of the productive forces, humanity will change the animals and plants, create new animals and plants, and use them to its own advantage.

The sayings "Insects will appear only after things are rotten; a man will speak evil of others only after he becomes suspicious" and "It is because Heaven would destroy me, not because I have committed any fault in battle"[37] are wrong. We were defeated in [resisting] the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression partly because the enemy was big and powerful, but our mistakes in strategy, cadre policy, foreign relations, and military adventurism were the main reasons. Opportunism is the main reason for the failure of the revolution. The seduction of imperialism and the betrayal of the Guomindang are certainly among the reasons the revolution was a failure. External forces can only exert their influences tortuously or indirectly through internal patterns (such as opportunism). Running water is never filthy, but stagnant water is; a door-hinge is never worm eaten, but a piece of wood not from a door hinge will be.[39] The situation of the object itself is the primary cause. The Guomindang was able to smash the soviet areas and defeat the Red Army because the soviet areas and the Red Army had their own weaknesses which could not be overcome. Had they been able to overcome their own weaknesses and strengthen themselves, nobody would have been able to sabotage them. This is the reason why the Red Army has not been destroyed until today. The destruction of the Central Soviet Area and the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area was caused mainly by internal factors. This applies to the failure of the western expeditionary army. "When internal examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be anxious about, what is there to fear?"[40] The failure of resistance on September 18, 1931, should be traced back to the failure in 1927. Whether the nation can be rescued from the present disaster depends on the development and enhancement of the united front rather than on Japan. The reason that the Guomindang cannot survive without making any changes should be attributed to its policy and weaknesses in its organization. The reason capitalism will certainly die out should be attributed to its internal contradictions. The rise and fall of classes and political parties depend on their own conditions. The health, sickness, life and death of man depend on his own condition. Mechanical forces push objects into motion through the capacity of the objects themselves to move.

The contradiction between the capitalist system and the Soviet system will certainly have an impact on the development of socialist relations in the Soviet Union. The economic and financial blockade, the refusal of credit loans, the "dumping" struggle aimed at the Soviet Union, the direct attack, and the preparation of interference and so on—though all of these are reflected in the socialist development in the Soviet Union, they are reflected tortuously through the internal laws of socialism in the Soviet Union. The degree to which international capital tries to impede socialist development depends on the degree of socialist development and strengthening. The stronger Soviet socialism, the more advanced the domestic industrialization and collectivization of the farms, the wider our attack on the capitalist factors, the more consolidated the socialist headquarters, the less influential the rich peasants, new capitalists, harmful insects, and the bureaucrats, particularly the opportunists in our camp, the less likely the possibility that international capital will be able to impede our movement. International capital is trying to shatter the Soviet attempt to get out of a desperate situation. Is this attempt successful? Or is it not?—The degree is completely dependent on the strength of the Soviet Union. International capital develops according to its internal contradictions. How acute these contradictions become depends to a certain degree on the Soviet Union. The growth of Soviet socialism intensifies the internal contradictions in the capitalist system and consequently encourages the world revolution of the proletariat. The reason is that the success of Soviet socialism is extremely significant in terms of the ultimate victory of socialism.

This is the main thing[38]

Thus we see that external contradictions can only have a tortuous impact upon the development of the process through the development of the internal regularities of the process. Only by a concrete analysis of the two processes which influence one another will we be able to expose the nature, degree, and strength of the influence.

Only if we analyze the two processes concretely will we be able to find out the nature, degree, and force of the reciprocal influence, and how the situation of each process differs from that of other. [This is Mao's comment on the above paragraph.]

External forces do have an influence, and even an important influence, but they can only act through internal situations. The decisive thing is the internal forces.

The theory of balance neglected the necessity to expose the specific contents of the process and the "source of its own movement." Therefore, on the one hand, it deals with philosophical issues in the way it treats abstract theory. It starts

Not concretely[41]

with the so-called "general," and

Not specific or individual

consequently it arrives at an empty formalism; on the other hand, it

Formalism

arrives at empiricism, which neglects the most basic and concrete things.

Shortsightedness and triviality

Examples of specific solutions

This kind of dual character is also characteristic of the right wing, in dealing with the economic problems of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, they try to solve them in an abstract way without analyzing the concrete conditions, situation, and stages; they are unable to reveal how the conditions and possibilities for the change from a new transformation to a new prospect are created; they fail to note that new stages of development raise new questions, and

This is rationalism.

new contradictions must be solved. On the other hand, they start from the theory of remedying weaknesses and creating a situation of equilibrium, and hence they arrive at the worship

This is empiricism.

of money. For example, their tactics for getting out of the difficulties—install balance as quickly as possible between

the big socialist enterprises and the agriculture of petty commodity production—was possible in 1928–1929 only on the basis of the growth of individual agriculture. Because of this, the policy aimed at the development of the individual economy (mainly the rich peasant economy),

A policy which assists the development of the rich peasants

which supplies the majority of marketable grain, was born, and this avoided the fundamental and decisive line which should be used to solve the difficulties—the change of a peasant economy to a pattern of socialist agriculture.

In the stage at that time, the conditions for such a transformation already existed and made it possible.

There is no such process in the world, it is only a fantasy of the mechanists—a bourgeois utopia, on the one hand, to comfort themselves and, on the other, to confuse the toiling masses.

The theory of balance does not recognize the fact that the development of a process always depends from beginning to end on the developing contradictions. Starting from this theoretical view, so-called balance is an instant in the process that is without contradictions. As a result, before the instant when contradictions are discovered, the movement of the process is only possible as a result of external causes.

The theory of balance, like the revision of Marx's dialectics by social democracy, conceals the internal contradictions of the process; hence, from the point of view of its class nature, it is the revival of a capitalist theory.

The Deborin faction made a criticism about the theory of balance that was behind the times; it was unable to strike a decisive blow against this theory. This kind of criticism by the Deborin faction is really general and abstract. They were unable to seize the most important theme in the theory of balance to criticize it—the theory of balance refuses to admit that from beginning to end the development of the process depends on the contradiction and the split of a unitary object, that is, the point that the theory of balance reconciles opposites. This is because their own understanding of the law of the unity of opposites fits into the theory of balance. As with the theory of balance, they believe that contradiction does not exist in a process from the beginning, but instead emerges at a certain stage in the development of the process. In this way, they arrive at a conclusion which they themselves dread, that is, the conclusion that the process develops as a result of external factors until the time when contradictions emerge. Moreover, like the followers of the theory of balance, they support the social democratic theory of the reconciliation of opposites. One extreme and the other are linked.

Words that hit the nail on the head

Deborin refuses to admit that the movement of contradictions exists from beginning to end.

The similarity between the leftists and the rightists results from the fact that both are divorced from a correct understanding of a process and reach an abstract, general, and empty understanding which ignores the contents of the process and fails to analyze the concrete stages, conditions, possibilities, and so on. As a result, these two extremes join at one point. [Mao's comment at the bottom of the page.]

11. The Law of the Negation of the Negation

From the above description we can already see what the dialectical process is in the final analysis. It is carried out through the development of quality and quantity and is based on the dialectical process of transition through leaps in the movement of opposites. But the reality as well as the process of dialectics we know is far more than the law of change from quality to quantity or vice versa, or the law of the unity of opposites. Parallel to the aforementioned two fundamental laws of dialectics, Marx and Engels established the foundation of the third fundamental law of dialectics—the law of the negation of the negation.

The so-called dialectical process of the development of reality and knowledge is precisely the process of mutual transformation of quality and quantity, the process of the unity of contradictions, and the negation of the negation.

What is the main point of this law?

In Volume 1 of *Capital,* in the chapter on the historical trend of capitalist accumulation, Marx made quite clear the process of development of private ownership of the means of production from its first instant until its inevitable elimination in history, that is, until it has changed into its opposite, collective ownership by society.

Private ownership by the majority of the toilers—private ownership by the minority of capitalists—collective ownership by society

An example of the negation of the negation

"Unlike the ownership of a social group, private ownership exists only on occasions where the means and outward conditions of production belong to individuals. The private ownership of the means of production by the toilers is the foundation of petty production; petty production becomes the necessary condition for social production and the free development of the personality of individuals. . . .

. . . After reaching a certain level of development, this kind of mode of production will itself create the material means for its own destruction. . . . Such destruction is the result of the change from individual and scattered means of production to social and collectivized means of production, so that ownership

?

Engels's statement on the law of the three stages is correct.

Such a statement is incorrect. Arbitrarily to insert everything into this formula is external association, superficial phenomena, formalism, rather than internal association and the natural development of things. The law of the negation of the negation is a theory regarding internal connections.

by the majority of the populace changes to ownership by a few giants. . . .

. . . Private ownership by capitalists is the first negation of individual private ownership based on the labor of the producers themselves. But on the basis of the inevitability of the natural process, capitalist production negates itself. This is the negation of the negation. Instead of reviving the private ownership of the laborers, this negation produces private property on the basis of the fruits of the capitalist era, that is, on the basis of collective ownership of the means of production resulting from cooperative enterprises, land, and other means of production produced by labor. This is quite clear."

. . . Engels said: The negation of the negation "is, in reality, an extremely simple and constantly continuing sequence. If the shabby clothes of the old idealist philosophy which is used to conceal the secret is removed, even a three-year-old will be able to understand it." . . . Believers in metaphysics present the law of the negation of the negation in terms of a formalistic "three-stage method," and they argue that Marxists unreasonably put the development of a specific reality into the "three-stage method." But there is one point that must be made clear here. Hegel himself, especially in his *Philosophy of Law,* provided a basis: that is, not to explain the nature of the "three-stage method" as one aspect of the law of the negation of the negation but, rather, as the law of development itself. For instance, Hegel examined crime as the negation of law and punishment as the negation of crime, that is, the negation of the negation. Here, as a matter of fact, the three-stage method has become the external form into which real phenomena are inserted. . . .

Hegel himself was also guilty of formalism.

Horizontal and vertical associations. A horizontal association is the relationship of mutual dependence and mutual struggle between the two sides of the contradiction in its development. Vertical association is the relationship of forward development of the process after the leap. Both are internal associations.

The result of the second negation restores the original thing, but the quality and quantity have changed. Since the change in grains is very slow, the change in quality can hardly be seen, yet there are many things or processes from which the qualitative change can be seen. Examples.

It is self-evident that one cannot explain development in such a way as to inscribe phenomena into the three-stage method.

What Marx and Engels forcefully made clear while explaining the law of the negation of the negation is not the "nature of the three-stage method" of this law but, rather, the internal association of the phenomena which mutually develop and mutually evolve. In the above we have already cited Marx's analysis of the historical tendency of capitalist development; in that quotation the nature of the law of the negation of the negation is forcefully expounded.

In *Anti-Dühring*, Engels used the grain of wheat as an example. Under proper conditions, the grain of wheat which is dropped into the earth will germinate. "The grain of wheat is eliminated and negated. The plant which comes out of that grain of wheat appears as the negation of that grain of wheat. What then is the normal life of this plant? It grows, blossoms, and bears fruit before finally giving birth to new grains of wheat. Moreover, when the grains of wheat are ripe, the trunks become dry and die, and are negated one after the other. As a result of the negation of the negation, we get the grain of wheat we had at the beginning, but this is not a single grain of wheat; it is ten, twenty, or thirty times that grain of wheat."

Furthermore, Engels pointed out beforehand that the issue here is not the quantity of the development alone. "The change in the variety of grain is extremely slow. Consequently barley today is almost exactly the same as a hundred years ago. But let us examine sticky ornamental plants such as peonies or orchids. If we take the seeds, as well as the plants that grow out of the seeds, and add human labor, as a result of this negation of the negation, we have not only *more seeds* but also seeds which can produce more beautiful flowers and whose quality has been improved; moreover, in every repetition of this process, every new negation of the negation, this improvement is enhanced."

Instead of a pure cycle of pure quantity, there is a qualitative change every time.

The question is obvious; the law of the negation of the negation deals with the internal linkage among the phenomena that arise from the same law. There are only two negations in its course; the view of multiple negations such as silkworm–chrysalis–fly, trunk–flower–fruit, young–strong–old, and so on is wrong. Because they are all phenomena which have originated from the same law, and even though they have undergone various stages of change, they are still completing the continual process of one species category and still fall under the same law. Mikhailovskii's mistake lies in the fact that, instead of looking at the entire process from beginning to end, he sees only the quantitative change. But the important thing is precisely not the quantity but the course of qualitative development. Only the starting point of a new life, that is, only the negation of a certain process which constitutes the starting point of new laws, constitutes the real meaning or essence of the law of the negation of the negation. Otherwise it is merely a game of empty concepts. Plekhanov is right about this. The stages in a process may manifest themselves in the form of the negation of the negation; there are many instances of this sort in dealing with social phenomena. Nonetheless, not everything is expressed in the negation of the negation, such as the life of animals and plants.

The populist Mikhailovskii[42] explained Engels's example of the grain of wheat in his own way. He said: The trunk negates the seed, the flower negates the trunk, and the fruit negates the flower. If so, where is the three-stage method? Here, instead of two, there are three negations. It seems that Engels anticipated such a "refutation." In his *Anti-Dühring*, he wrote: "Like the case of the grain of wheat, such processes also appear in the case of many insects, such as the butterfly. As a result of the negation of its egg, the butterfly is born out of the egg and goes through many stages of change until it attains sexual maturity, has intercourse, and is then negated once again. That is, after fulfilling their obligatory duty of the breeding process and giving birth to many eggs, female butterflies will die.

In cases where other plants and animals are involved, such a process is not so easily solved. Before it dies, it produces seeds, eggs, or babies not once but many times, though this fact does not concern us here. Here it is enough to prove that the law of the negation of the negation is truly manifested in the two fields of the organic world."

In this case, the important thing is not the quantity of negation, but the whole course of development, which treats its own negation as a transition toward a new law—the negation of the negation—included in itself. Not all of the phenomena and stages in the development of the process are expressed in the form of the negation of the negation.

"The flower is an organ of the plant. Moreover, flowers seen in this manner do not negate plants, just as the head of Mikhailovskii does not negate Mikhailovskii the person himself. Fruits, however, or to put it more correctly, zygotes, seen as the starting point of the development of a new life, are the negation of a certain organism. Engels examined the life of the plant from the beginning of the development of the plant born from the zygote until the plant reappears in the form of a zygote" (Plekhanov, *The Monistic View of History*). In this way, Plekhanov responded to Mikhailovskii's attempt to criticize the negation of the negation. Mikhailovskii not only replaced the theory of the three stages with multiple negations, but changed the negation into a cycle outside the phenomenon. Therefore, Mikhailovskii simply could not understand the nature of negation in dialectics and the nature of the negation of the negation. This negation of the negation exists in the problem of the new laws resulting from the development of the contradiction in the process.

Furthermore, Engels pointed out beforehand that the issue here is not the quantity of the development alone. "The change in the variety of grain is extremely slow. Consequently barley today is almost exactly the same as a hundred years ago. But let us examine sticky ornamental plants such as peonies or orchids. If we take the seeds, as well as the plants that grow out of the seeds, and add human labor, as a result of this negation of the negation, we have not only *more seeds* but also seeds which can produce more beautiful flowers and whose quality has been improved; moreover, in every repetition of this process, every new negation of the negation, this improvement is enhanced."

Instead of a pure cycle of pure quantity, there is a qualitative change every time.

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The error of formal logic lies in its perception of negation as an external negation between one process and another, which is, moreover, regarded as an absolute negation. This is a complete misunderstanding of reality. The approach of dialectical materialism, that is, of scientific investigation, is the exact opposite of this. Material reality is self-motion, and moreover, this self-motion is interconnected. Any process moves forward by itself as a result of the struggle between contradictions and moves in the opposite direction after it has been transformed by a leap. The entire course of development of any process is constructed of a thesis, an antithesis which negates the thesis, and a synthesis which is the negation of the negation of the antithesis.[43] The thesis already contains contradictions or the antithesis within it, the antithesis also contains the thesis within it, and the synthesis includes both thesis and antithesis. So-called negation, as Lenin said, "is not complete or random negation, nor is it skeptical or vacillating negation; it is, rather, negation as an element which preserves connection, an element of affirmation, i.e., without any vacillations, without skepticism."[44] Negation does not destroy everything and make a clean break with the past; it is not absolute. Things that come first contain things that come later, and things that come later contain things that come first. Without the motion of negation, there can be no motion of affirmation. All processes are like this. (Examples).

In formal logic, the so-called negation is absolute negation. Formal logic regards negation as complete abolition. For example, in the animal world a certain kind of animal is eliminated by another, and this is called negation. The logic of metaphysics cannot see the development of contradictions within the process and the self-negation of the process; it holds that negation is brought about not by forces within the developing contradictions but, rather, by an external force. Mechanists take precisely such an external understanding of negation as the foundation of their methodology. Therefore in his work *The Materialist Conception of History,* Kautsky attacked the negation of dialectics based on the self-movement of matter. He said that there was no such thing as the self-movement of matter. This is nothing but mysticism borrowed from Hegel, who claimed that the spirit moved by itself and explained nothing about self-movement. On the contrary, the source of movement is the mutual influence of two external forces. Under such mutual influence, one force negates the other. The environment negates an organism—this is the antithesis. The organism conquers the resistance of the environment—this is the synthesis. Here, negation and the negation of the negation are all mutually influential external things. As far as the dialectical view of negation is concerned—the synthesis has already included a contradiction or the antithesis, and the antithesis has also included the synthesis——Kautsky criticized it. Kautsky simply could not understand that the unity of opposites is precisely the source for the development of the process. He said:

"Movement originates from the confrontation or conflict between opposite factors." In this case the reason why Kautsky attacked Engels's example of the grain of wheat is that it does not tell how it negates but simply explains the change of the organism. His argument is quite clear.

Therefore, as with all the other mechanists, the things that make up Kautsky's characteristics are the fact that in his understanding of negation there are the following motivations: 1. the negation, which is regarded as the external motivation of the process, 2. the absolute negation, the negation which is regarded as sabotage.

Nonetheless, a characteristic of believers in dialectics is that they have the following different understanding about negation. Il'ich said: "In the dialectics which regards the factors of negation as the most important factors, its characteristic thing and important thing is not complete or random negation, nor is it skeptical or vacillating negation; instead it is seen as the negation of associated motivation, as the guaranteed motivation of development, that is, without any vacillations, without skepticism."[45]

So-called negation cannot but be one of the motivations of association in the development of the process. When the pure commodity economy changes into a capitalist economy, the former is not absolutely negated by the latter. The capitalist economy grows out of the commodity economy. In a commodity economy, internal contradictions and the development of private ownership are already included. The development of the private ownership of the means of production, the concentration of the means of production and of capital in the hands of a particular class, are motive forces in the negation of the petty commodity producers. And yet, these motive forces of negation are also the motive forces behind the launching of the development of the petty commodity producers. If there is no movement of negation, there will be no movement of affirmation. Without negation, there will be no affirmation. "Dialectical materialism is scientific investigation, which requires that differences, association, and change be made clear. Otherwise, if there are only pure and positive ideas, it is incomplete, lifeless, and stiff" (Il'ich).[46]

The negation of gain is loss. The premise of the advent of gain is loss. There is loss in gain. The gain of the capitalists includes the loss of the workers. The two are combined in a single motion. On the contrary, the negation of loss is gain. The premise of the advent of loss is gain. There is gain in loss. There is gain by the capitalists in the loss of the workers; the motion of these two is combined.

An analysis of the capitalist system should first expose its major contradiction and explore the "negative attributes" which become the source of self-movement of the capitalist system. The opposite of the capitalists' private ownership is the fact that the proletarians do not have private ownership of any means of production whatsoever. These "negative attributes" and the positive things are, however, closely combined. These two opposite sides serve as each other's premise. The private ownership of the capitalists contains its own "negation" and the negation of the private ownership of the workers; in addition, on the other hand, the concentration of the means of production in the hands of the capitalists is the premise of the workers' not having the private ownership of any means of production.

Il'ich said: "The motivation of dialectics requires that the 'unity' between the negative and positive, that is, their association, be pointed out, and that the positive things in the negative things be revealed. From affirmation to negation, and from negation to 'unity,' which includes affirmation—without which dialectics will become complete negation, a game or a skeptical theory."[47] So-called negation cannot be anything but the specific negation which denotes the developing association in the process.

Maxim

"In dialectics, negation does not mean a simple 'no,' nor does it mean to declare that things do not exist, nor does it mean to eliminate things arbitrarily. . . . Here, the methods of negation should be determined, first, by the generality of a certain process, second, by the special quality of this process. Thus, I have to make the second negation possible or likely possible in order to build the first negation. Nevertheless, how can one accomplish it? This depends on the special quality of each occasion. If we have ground the grain of wheat or stepped on and killed an insect, I certainly have completed the first action of negation. This, however, also makes the second action impossible. Therefore in each and every category of the target there are different forms of negation which are the results of negation and which are special and are inborn.

Maxim

Complete negation might lead to the collapse of a dynasty.[48]

Negation is the development of the process to a higher level.

To cut off completely and to eliminate and kill once and for all is not the negation of dialectics.

The first negation made the second negation possible.

There is sister in the body of the brother and vice versa.

In the example about a grain of wheat we quoted from Engels, the plant is not the complete negation of the grain of wheat; instead, it is the development of the grain of wheat to a higher level. The simple death and elimination of the grain of wheat, and the destruction of insects by birds, do not denote such an association, and do not constitute a dialectical

A dialectical negation is the motive force of a process of development. Such a negation manifests itself in two aspects. One aspect manifests itself as sublation, that is, the overcoming of those major elements in the old thing that are not suitable for preservation; the other aspect manifests itself as affirmation, that is, to grant legitimate status to some of the elements in the old thing which it is appropriate to preserve for the time being, give them legitimate status, and preserve them. In the period of a regular Red Army, what is being negated is guerrillaism; what is being preserved is the guerrilla style in waging war, light and swift organization, and so on.

negation. On the contrary, on the occasion when plants are born and at certain stages of development, the death and elimination of the grain of wheat are preserved in the plants, which will produce other grains of wheat. Negation is, at the same time, affirmation, and "death and destruction" is, at the same time, preservation. A dialectical negation is one of the motive forces in the development of the process. On the one hand, it is manifested in the form of "sublation," that is, the discarding of the old things. On the other hand, the old things are preserved as supplementary motive forces. In the system of private ownership of the means of production under capitalism, petty private ownership is being discarded as an independent law and is being preserved as the subordinate and "sublated" form of the capitalist laws.

The result of the resolution of the contradictions in the process is actually the resolution of the contradictions between a certain law and another law that is contained within it. That is, the old law collapses, and the new law is born.

There are all kinds of connections such as relevant, family-related, cause-effect, predecessor-successor, and new stage–old stage. That is, the process of the development of the negation of the negation is not the artificial connection between two unrelated laws, nor is it the childish game of three-stage methodology; instead, it is the development toward a certain direction. This is the essence of the negation of the negation.

Negation cannot but manifest the connection between the present stage and the past stage in the development of the process. By the same token, the negation of the negation cannot but be the result of the resolution of the contradictions in the process, that is, the transformation from a certain law to another.

In the negation of the negation, we cannot but emphasize very strongly the connection between the new stage and previous stages, that is, the process of development. Engels once criticized the view which attributed the law of the negation of the negation to the supersession of something outside the phenomenon. Such a view reduced the law of the negation of the negation to the "three-stage methodology" which made up one "external and superficial aspect" (Il'ich) of the process of dialectics. It reduced the law of the negation of the negation to a childish game of "three-stage methodology"—"write interlocking A's and then erase them, or the childish game about roses which believed that they may be roses or may not be."

After writing these words, Engels pointed out the following facts: "Apart from the stupidity of the boring writers, nobody can learn anything from this kind of negation of the negation. But metaphysicists want to persuade us that if we are going to practice the negation of the negation, we must follow the aforementioned method."[49] Development in a given direction—it is precisely at this point that the essence of the negation of the negation lies.

The negation of the negation denotes the end of one cycle in the development of the process; another cycle begins.

In the development of a plant, fruit and the birth of seeds are the negation of the plant and the negation of the negation. Nevertheless, seeds are born from the development of the plant; they form one motivating component of the plant, and, what is more, it is the motivating factor which indicates the end of the development of the plant. The plant dies, but the seeds remain. One cycle of development is over.

But the essence of negation, and the essence of the negation of the negation, all lie in the fact that they are the motivating factor in the development of the process which is full of contradictions.

Chapter IV. Nature and Appearance, Form and Content[50]

Notes

1. Lenin's original name was Vladimir Il'ich Ulianov. Early in his career, he signed his writings Nikolai Lenin. Subsequently, he combined his name and patronymic with the new surname, becoming Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. To call him Il'ich, as Shirokov does throughout this text, is a mark of affection and respect.

2. Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) was a leading figure in the German Social Democratic Party who had broken with Marxism in 1896–1899.

3. Georgii Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856–1918) began his career as a populist. In 1882 he translated the *Communist Manifesto* into Russian and became the leading Marxist theorist in Russia, but from 1905 onward, his influence declined. Although he was a supporter of the war in 1914, and in 1917 denounced the Bolshevik seizure of power as premature, Lenin continued to have a high regard for his materialist writings.

4. Sun Mingjiu (1909–), a native of Liaoning, was a battalion commander under Zhang Xueliang at the time of the Xi'an incident. He was one of those who judged that it was not contradictory to oppose Chiang Kaishek and at the same time to resist Japan.

5. The reference is to H. Rickert (1863–1936), a German neo-Kantian philosopher and sociologist.

6. Regarding Ludwig Feuerbach (1802–1872) see, above, note 4 to "On Dialectical Materialism."

7. L.I. Axel'rod (1868–1946) was a woman philosopher who became a member of the Menshevik Central Committee in 1917. She was the author of a book on Hegel's idealism and Marx's materialism.

8. Regarding Deborin, see above, note 105 to "On Dialectical Materialism," on page 619.

9. Mao underscored the comments here set in boldface by drawing a square around them, which is reproduced in the Chinese text.

10. Here Mao has emphasized the question mark by writing over it with a black pencil, a red pencil, and a pen.

11. The quotation is from Lenin's commentary on Hegel's *Logic*.

12. In the passage from Marx's *Capital* referred to here, there is no mention of Falstaff. No doubt the Soviet author, or perhaps the Chinese translator, thought readers were more likely to have heard of him than of Mistress Quickly.

13. The quotation is from the "Theses on Feuerbach."

14. Ernst Mach (1838–1916) was an Austrian physicist and philosopher, who developed the concept of empiro-criticism.

15. V.N. Sarab'ianov (1886–1952) was a Soviet philosopher and the author of books on historical materialism.

16. The material in parentheses and set in boldface is a note added here by Mao Zedong between the lines.

17. Once again, the words in parentheses represent Mao's note between the lines.

18. N.D. Kondratiev, V.G. Groman, and A.V. Chayanov were among nine leading economists arrested in September 1930 as counterrevolutionaries. They had earlier been Mensheviks or liberals.

19. The First Five-Year Plan was drafted under the leadership of A.I. Rykov only in the formal sense that in 1929 he was chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. He was, however, regarded by Stalin as a Rightist and was removed from his post in December 1930.

20. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin (1898–1938) joined the Bolsheviks in 1906. After a period abroad, he returned to Moscow in May 1917 and, despite earlier disagreements with Lenin, became a member of the Central Committee from then until 1937 and edited *Pravda* from December 1917 to April 1929. At that time, because of his opposition to Stalin's new policy of rapid industrialization, he was removed from most of his posts and was expelled from the Party in 1937. In 1938, during the third Moscow Trial, he was sentenced to death for treason and executed.

21. Mikhail Pavlovich Tomskii (1880–1936) was a leading figure in the Soviet trade unions in Lenin's day. He was executed during the Moscow Trials in 1936.

22. Han Xin (d. 196 B.C.) was one of Liu Bang's principal generals until he was executed in 196 B.C. for plotting to seize the empress.

23. A.A. Bogdanov (1873–1928) was a Russian social and economic thinker who had been close to the Bolsheviks, but subsequently differed from Lenin. He had been able to express himself in 1925, but in October 1929, on the eve of collectivization, *Pravda* denounced the "mechanist survivals of Bogdanovism."

24. Mao here uses the term employed in several classical poems, notably in Bai Juyi's "Chang hen ge" (Song of Everlasting Regret), to evoke women whose beauty brought disorder to the state.

25. This is a quotation from Chapter 58 of the *Laozi*.

26. Grigorii Evgenevich Zinoviev (1883–1936) was Lenin's close collaborator during the First World War and returned to Petrograd with Lenin in the sealed train in April 1917. In 1923 and 1924, during Lenin's illness and after his death, he became the leading figure in the Party, but his influence rapidly declined. He was executed in 1936 in the course of the Moscow Trials.

27. I.K. Luppol (1896–1943) was a Soviet philosopher.

28. Because these comments are so long, and would take up a great deal of space if printed in the narrow column on the left, we present them here across the entire page.

29. The zemstvos were the elected district councils set up in Russia under the reforms of 1864.

30. This and the following three comments in boldface were inserted by Mao between the lines of the Russian text roughly at the points indicated.

31. This and the following two comments printed in boldface were written by Mao between the lines of the text.

32. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903).

33. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854).

34. We have not been able to identify this man.

35. These words were written here by Mao between the lines.

36. The reference is to an article by Bukharin published in *Pravda* on September 30, 1928.

37. This comment was written by Mao between the lines.

38. The first quotation is from an essay entitled "Fan zeng lun," by Su Shi (Su Dongpo), a celebrated poet of the eleventh century. The second is attributed to Liu Bang's rival Xiang Yu in the biography of the latter in the *Shiji* (Records of the Historian).

39. This quotation is from the *Lu shi chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Lu), c. 240 B.C.

40. This quotation is taken word for word from the *Analects*, VII, IV, 3 (Legge, Vol. 1, p. 252).

41. This and the ensuing six phrases in boldface are Mao's comments written between the lines.

42. N.K. Mikhailovskii (1842–1904) was a populist intellectual hostile to capitalist development.

43. It would seem that there must be an error here; the synthesis should be characterized either as the negation of the antithesis or as the negation of the negation of the thesis. The editors of the volume containing Mao's annotations have not, however, commented on this point, so we have translated the printed Chinese text as it stands. It is possible, of course, that the lapse was Mao's own and the editors did not wish to call attention to it.

44. Knight footnotes this quotation to Lenin's "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*," in *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 226, while observing that the Chinese translation used by Mao does not reflect the original very faithfully.

45. See Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*."

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. This is a quotation from the *Zhou yi* (Book of Changes).

49. The quotation is from Engels's *Anti-Dühring*.

50. Mao's annotations to this chapter, and to a few fragments of chapters that follow in the Chinese edition, are limited to a few question marks in the margin. We have therefore omitted this portion of the text.

Annotations on Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism *by M.B. Mitin and Others (Volume 1)*

Translated by Shen Zhiyuan

(Annotations made before July 1937)

Chapter 3. Dialectical Materialism

. . .

Section 5. Social Practice as the Criterion of Knowledge

. . .

Now we would like to ask the question: why is it only practice that can prove the reality of the cognition of us humans—why there is nothing else beside practice that can be used as the criterion of truth? This is because human consciousness is only one aspect of social life, and it is utterly meaningless apart from practice. Once the production of those material goods which human beings need for daily survival stops, the conscious activity of human beings will stop immediately. The basis of all kinds of social life is material production; in Marx's words, it is the activity of the human sensory organs directed toward a goal.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji*, pp. 137–89, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten annotations to Mitin's work.

Practice is the criterion of truth.

The birth and development of a concept

Therefore, it is only in the process of social practice, first of all in the process of material production, when human beings reach the results anticipated in their thinking, that human consciousness can truly manifest its force. If the understanding of human beings does not reflect the processes of what is actually happening in the external world, then in their practical activities people will not be able to achieve the various results of this activity as they have anticipated. Moreover, without practical activity, the survival of human society would not be possible; if the concept of human beings about the world around them is unfounded, this kind of practical activity can change this fabricated concept. Consequently, the practice of human beings in society, and their purposeful activities, constitute the criterion of the truth of human concepts regarding the external world. In the process of the development of the material production of society, the various concepts which can correctly reflect the objective world are being fostered and developed. Society by its practice influences nature and changes its form. At the same time, it changes itself as well as its conception of the external world. As a result of the purposeful activities of human beings, material things are created, and these things are inseparable parts of the material real world.

Practice is superior to knowledge.

As Ulianov[2] put it, "Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also the dignity of immediate actuality."[3] Humanity's theoretical knowledge of the external world, as well as of the processes which arise in the external world, reveals the regularities and tendencies of historical development. But only social practice can thoroughly prove theory and understand the real object from its historical concrete nature. . . . We should not forget that the purposeful activity of mankind in material production is the most basic form of practical activity, which determines everything else. Nevertheless, social practice is not restricted to this form of activity alone; it is comprehensive. The members of society participate in the class struggle, live political lives, and are engaged in scientific creation—to put it simply, they participate in every field of the real life of society. Therefore, the criterion of the truth of our knowledge is the summation of all social practice.

There is more than one form of practical activity.

Correct theory actively guides practice.

Human knowledge is, however, one of the many aspects of social life, one of the factors of social life. So long as it is correct, it will have extreme significance for humanity's practical activity. Correct knowledge points the way to human activity in practice. If the theory is true theory, it will confer on those who practice it the strength to determine the operational policy, and clearly point out to them the exact future, so that they will be confident about their own causes. Nevertheless, in order for the knowledge of theory to be correct, it must rely on practice and be intimately linked with practice.

Practice develops; theory, too, should develop.

It is not true that the practice of socialized human beings itself never changes; every step of its development requires new thinking and study. As a result, under the circumstances in the present Soviet Union, for example, if one scientific theory is unable to meet the requirement of the practice of socialist construction, this theory does not have any positive impact and will inevitably become the weapon of the enemies of the working class.

The social character of human beings

He who understands material reality is not the individual isolated from society, but the socialized human being linked to society and who relies on society. Human nature is endowed with a social character. The life of every individual is completely determined by social life, determined by the struggle between social groups in social life. The life of every individual is always closely associated with the life of a certain social class. Individuals are the real social entities; hence, any manifestation of their lives, from practical activity to theoretical activity, is in the final analysis the special manifestation of social life. . . .

Perceptions and thoughts are products of social life. As social life changes, perceptions and thoughts also change.

Material production is the foundation of the multifaceted life of humanity.

All knowledge is the result of the struggle for production and class struggle.

Not only the ability to feel but the ability to think are both special characteristics of superior and organized matter. Only the brain of the socialized individual has such special characteristics. Humans develop their sensory activities and intellectual activities only in society. Consequently, the perceptions and thoughts of people are not eternally unchanging. As the products of social life, perceptions and thoughts must change as the society itself develops. But society is also a part of nature. As it changes nature, it is itself changed at the same time. The activities of humanity in practice and the production of the materials which are necessary for the survival of humanity are the foundations of the multifaceted life of humanity (including knowledge). All the knowledge human society has about the surrounding world should be attributed to the history of the development of material production, and to the class struggle that pushed forward this development in a class society.

All the materialisms before Marx looked at the problem of knowledge while ignoring the social nature of human beings, ignoring the historical development of human beings in society; consequently, they were unable to understand the relationship of dependence between knowledge and social practice.

As far as the issue of understanding is concerned, Feuerbach also developed a metaphysical view. According to his point of view, the nature of a human being resides in the capacity of his body, his organism, his feelings, and his thoughts. Feuerbach failed to understand that human beings endowed with sensory organs and thought are the products of the historical development of society. In observing human beings, he ignored the relationship between the individual and society. As a result, he failed from beginning to end to understand the real individual engaged in activity, but always understood human beings abstractly. Because Feuerbach ignored the social nature of human beings, he could not understand the relationship of dependence between knowledge and social practice. According to Mr. Feuerbach, knowledge is the unchanging reflection of an equally unchanging nature. Here we must point out that it is not only the fundamental shortcoming of Feuerbach's materialism to look at the issue of knowledge by ignoring the practice activity of mankind and its historical development, but also the fundamental shortcoming of all the materialisms before Marx.

Nevertheless, in accordance with the view of materialist dialectics, we should look at knowledge in terms of its relationship of dependence with the development of material production in society and the social struggle that pushes forward this development. To

The viewpoint of practice is the primary viewpoint of epistemology.

put it concisely, we should look at knowledge in terms of its dependent relationship with social practice. Only for this reason, views of life and practice should be regarded as the first and fundamental view of epistemology.

The real task of knowledge lies in thought.

The unity between perception and thought

Man's knowledge of material reality begins with the perception of the sensory organs. This kind of perception is aroused by the action of external things on the human sensory organs. Nevertheless, sensory knowledge gives to us humans only contingent and experiential knowledge of the closest perceptual environment and of limited relations with the exterior. Nor can it enable us to know the external world in terms of the relations between its various aspects, its internal linkages, and in its entirety. But the real task of knowledge lies in the understanding of the laws of reality. This understanding is achieved through the generalization[4] of those feelings we have had in the process in which we and reality mutually affect each other. After being transformed and generalized in the human brain, direct feelings will lead to concepts. This is already an element of logical knowledge. Naturally, the sensory and the logical aspects of knowledge are not separated from each other; more often than not, both are expressed simultaneously. Moreover, thought originates from concepts, and thought cannot survive or develop if it is alienated from the relationship of thought and concept. The content of our knowledge is the objective world. Our feelings make it possible for us to be directly linked with this objective world. Therefore it is only on the basis of sensory concepts that logical knowledge (that is, thought) is possible.

Perception and thought cannot be equated.

The differences and unity between perception and thought

Nevertheless, we cannot regard the sensory elements and understanding elements of knowledge as the same thing. Sensory knowledge cannot go beyond the reflection of individual things, and of the external connections between these things, but the knowledge resulting from thought grasps the internal connection of these things and reflects these things in their objective unity.

The two cannot be equated, yet thought relies on perception.

"A concept cannot grasp movement as a whole; for instance, it cannot grasp movement at 300,000 kilometers a second. Thought can, however, and should grasp it." In his notes on Hegel's *Logic*, Mr. Ulianov pointed out the dependent relationship between thought and feeling. He was well aware of the differences between intuition and thought.

The dialectics of the mutual relationship between elements of experience and theoretical elements

He said: "Thought ascends from the concrete to the abstract, it does not depart from truth—if it is correct—but, instead, it approaches truth. The abstract view of matter, the laws of nature, the law of value, and so on—in sum, all the abstract concepts of science—reflect nature more profoundly, more accurately, and more objectively. From living and direct perception to abstract thinking, from abstract thinking to practice—this is the dialectical way to learn about truth, about objective reality."[5] In this perspective, the two elements of perception and understanding are two different elements in the objectively unified process of knowledge of human beings reflecting objective reality. This is the dialectical understanding of the mutual relationship between the factors of experience and theory in the process of knowledge.

Marxist theory pays great attention to the decisive significance of practice as compared to theoretical knowledge. It is, however, absolutely contrary to pragmatism—an idealist thought current of modern bourgeois philosophy, especially in America. Pragmatism, founded by William James, is based on the subjective idealist view of truth. According to the idea of the pragmatists, truth is not something that reflects the real situation of objective reality; instead, it is that which is beneficial to our practical activities and fits our objectives. That which is beneficial to practice is true. Being beneficial and being useful are the criteria of truthfulness. Based on this, pragmatism came out with a relativist doctrine of the diversity of truth. Several different opinions may be equally true so long as they serve the interests of a certain age, a certain people, a certain social group, or a certain individual. According to this theory, truth is not objective but subjective. Moreover, based on the differences and similarities of every subjective interest, there may be many truths. Thus, truth is no longer unique. . . .

Usefulness is the criterion of truth—pragmatism.

Many truths

A single truth

The Marxist standpoint is quite the opposite of that of pragmatism. Marxist philosophy takes objective truth as its starting point. It refutes relativism and holds that what is beneficial is not necessarily true, but that truth is beneficial. In the process of material and revolutionary criticism of practice, objective knowledge of the world will be produced and tempered. Moreover, such knowledge will in turn promote the continuous transformation of the world.

Usefulness does not in itself mean truth, but truth must be useful.

Once separated from revolutionary practice, Marxist theory becomes meaningless. Meanwhile, the vulgar pragmatism that looks down upon theory and "brainless routinism" are both unacceptable to Marxism. The revolutionary theory that arises and grows up in the process of practice is the guide of practice. "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" (see Ulianov's work, *What Is to Be Done?*). Only revolutionary practice under the guidance of the theories of Marx and Lenin has confidence, broad vision, accuracy, profundity, as well as swiftness in the application of tactics.

Oppose vulgar pragmatism.

The greatest triumph of Marx and Engels is that they applied the knowledge of materialism in the study of human society. Before Marx, not even those relatively thorough materialists applied materialism to the understanding of social development. From beginning to end, they remained materialists only in philosophy and the natural sciences. This is by no means an accidental phenomenon of history, but is determined by the class nature of the old materialists. Exploring the truth of social life, exposing its profound contradictions and driving forces—this is not a task that thinkers from the exploiting classes will be able to undertake, no matter how revolutionary they are. This task—to turn the history of human society into a science, to turn it into the object of understanding by materialism—can be realized only by the creators of the philosophy of the working class.

The dialectical materialist view of society

Opposing religion

The materialist view of history raises the struggle against religion to an extremely high level. Marxism will never tolerate compromise of any form or degree with religion, never tolerate any direct or indirect negligence in dealing with religion, nor will it stand for any tolerance of religion. . . .

From a passive and intuitive view of the world to an active and dialectical view of the world

The purpose of studying philosophy is not to satisfy one's curiosity but, rather, to change the world.

Learn about the regularities of the world; look for the correct theory, for the purpose of effectively guiding practice, and changing the world.

All the points mentioned above are the basic guiding principles of modern materialist philosophy. This kind of materialist philosophy is totally different from the passive and intuitive worldview. In his "Theses on Feuerbach," Marx wrote: "The philosophers have only explained the world in various ways, but the problem lies in changing the world." This is Marx's comment on the philosophy which had preceded him. Since dialectical materialism is the philosophy of the revolutionary working-class organizations, and the philosophy which regards changing the world as its duty, it is a philosophy of action. In the view of a Marxist, philosophy is not a quiet and peaceful monastery, but a fighting camp, one of the camps of the social struggle which pushes forward social development. Knowledge of reality does not originate from curiosity, but serves the purpose of changing reality. In order to change reality, one must learn about the laws of reality. Practice guided by true theory is the most perfect practice. Furthermore, the most perfect theory, which correctly reflects the objective reality, is the theory which has the greatest practical effect.

Neither Marxism nor Leninism would tolerate unprincipled routinism or an intuitionism detached from the practice of social struggle. In Marxism and Leninism, theory and practice are closely bound up with each other in their development and mutually reinforce each other. But in this unity, the primary role belongs to practice. The unity of theory and practice is realized on the basis of revolutionary practice. "Theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory" (*Problems of Leninism* by Josef [Stalin]).[6]

Famous quotation from Stalin

Only the theory which goes shoulder to shoulder with the practice of struggle of the working-class organizations deserves the name of Marxist theory. In the capitalist countries, such a theory will strengthen the will of the working-class organizations to overthrow capitalism and establish a workers' dictatorship and to arm the working class with the enemy's knowledge and point out the road to victory.

The history of knowledge is not over.

The theory of Marx and Engels is by no means lifeless dogma. It did not end the history of knowledge. On the contrary, it has opened a great and promising future for the history of knowledge.

Chapter 4. The Various Laws of Dialectical Materialism

Section 1. The Law of the Unity of Opposites

Engels outlined the three great laws.

In his book *The Dialectics of Nature*, Engels wrote: "the laws of dialectics are drawn from the history of nature and human society. They are nothing but the most general laws in the historical development of these two realms. In essence, they can be reduced to the following three laws:

the law of the change from quality to quantity and vice versa;

the law of the interpenetration of opposites;

the law of the negation of the negation."

Hegel

Engels went on to point out that all these laws had been elaborated by Hegel, but in the manner of idealism. That is to say that Hegel never derived these laws from nature and history, but imposed them on nature and history, considering that nature and history must be dominated by these laws. As a result, Hegel's system is really hard to understand.

The so-called unity between dialectics and epistemology

Nevertheless, so long as we examine these laws in materialist terms, everything will become simple and easy to understand. The three aforementioned basic laws of dialectics are the real laws of development of the objective world. At the same time, they are also the laws for learning about the world, if the law of knowledge is the reflection of the world itself in the mind of man.

Now let us study the basic law of materialist dialectics—the law of the unity of opposites.

The metaphysical view of development

There are two major views of development in the history of human thought. One of them believes that development means increase or decrease; it is increase in quantity and the repetition of the same object.

metaphysics[7]

According to this view, everything **(no matter how it happened in the first place),** as well as its reflection in the thought of the human brain, has become and will remain the same thing.

formal logic

Once something happens, its basic character will remain the same, it goes

around the same unchangeable circle and travels along the same road of movement forever. The development of everything, the development of plants, animals, and human beings, is actually the extension in length and increase in quantity of every aspect and various characteristics, but these characteristics of the thing or the human being have been there from the very beginning. The only difference is that they were in the state of "tiny" sprouts. There is no real and historical understanding of the development of things among these ideas; this is the so-called metaphysical view of development. . . .

Heaven changes not, the *dao* changes not.[1]

On the basis of this view of development, the first thing that cannot be explained are the different reasons of various things human beings see and the reason new things happen and old things are replaced. The second and most important thing is that the origin of movement and development cannot be explained. The metaphysical view fails to see that the internal forces give stimulus and impulsion to development. Hence it has to look for the origin of development in the exterior (that is, the reason for movement). It sometimes uses material, metaphysical "essence" and "force" to explain the reason for movement. At other times, it makes use of an extraterrestrial spirit to explain it!

In reality, these two points are one.

Lenin criticized the theory of evolution.

Ulianov pointed out that, from the end of the nineteenth century to the twentieth century, everyone "supported" the principle of development. Nevertheless, this kind of external and superficial "support" distorted and confused true understanding of development. Mr. Ulianov said, "If everything develops, then everything passes from one into another, for development, as is well known, is not a simple, universal, and eternal growth, enlargement (or diminution), etc. If that is so, then in the first place, evolution has to be understood more exactly, as the arising and passing away of everything, as mutual transitions."[8] The vulgar theory of evolution does not understand this basic fact of development. It is not clear about the road of development of human thought, which reflects the development of existence. It does not understand the objective significance and role of the dialectics of knowledge. It fails to link the principle of development with the principle of universal materialism.

What is development, how to develop.

Repetition

The vulgar view of development of the bourgeoisie fails to understand the fact that the development of everything (and of every phenomenon) is the change from one thing to another of the thing itself, as determined by the internal characteristics of the thing itself. This view of development does not understand that development is the movement of the thing itself. In Hegel's words, it is the self-movement of the thing. Bourgeois evolutionists hold that the development of plants, animals, the human race, and human society merely adopts the form of repeated increases. It is simple increase, it is the expansion and growth of some of the never-changing characteristics such plants, organic objects, and society have had from the very beginning. But somehow at first, these characteristics are concealed and do not show up; they take the form of sprouts. According to these theorists, this kind of increase of theirs should be attributed to the "transfer of strength." It is the result of the nutrition plants, animals, and human beings get from the external world under the influence of external environmental conditions. In their view, the development of human society consists in the repetition and increase of some kind of forever unchanging characteristics of human society—all the various characteristics of bourgeois society, such as capitalist exploitation, struggle, individualism, and so on. They thought that these characteristics could be found in ancient slave society, or even in a primitive savage society. Therefore, as far as the reason, origin, and force behind the development of society is concerned, the bourgeois thinkers either do not give them any serious thought or explain them in terms of the progress of human intelligence (they say that, as a result of extensive repetition, the human race is gradually learning about all the eternal and natural characteristics of human beings living together). Or they explain the reason behind social development in terms of the external living conditions of geography and climate and of the "balance" between society and the external environment.

The dialectical view of evolution

Dialectics takes a view of evolution which is the opposite of this one. It advocates studying things "from among the things themselves" and in terms of their relationships with other things. It sees the development of things as their own spontaneous development; that is, it sees the movement as internally necessary, inevitable, and independent movement of the thing itself, that is, the self-movement of the thing.

Marx and Hegel

On Hegel's doctrine regarding the development of self-movement, Ulianov wrote the following: "Movement and self-movement are (watch out) arbitrary (independent), spontaneous, internally necessary movement; 'change,' 'movement and vitality,' 'the principle of all self-movement,' 'impulse' to 'movement' and to 'activity'—whoever would believe that this is the core of Hegelianism, of abstract and abstruse Hegelianism? This core had to be discovered, understood, rescued, laid bare, refined, which is precisely what Marx and Engels did."[9] Marxism clearly pointed out the rational core in Hegel's idealistic doctrine of spontaneity eliminated his mysterious view about the development of pure logic; Marxism understood it as the development of the objective world.

External causes can lead only to mechanical movement.

Pure increase is also dialectical development.

Pure external causes, as far as they themselves are concerned, can only lead to the mechanical change of a certain thing and the increase or decrease of its scope and measurement. But even the spontaneous growth of any organism such as plant or animal is not restricted merely to increases in quantity; at the same time, it will inevitably lead to a spontaneous qualitative change in the organism, which will change from one state into another.

Examples

For many centuries, Europe was under the influence of almost the same geographic and climatic conditions, but it is obvious that the social development of Europe can by no means be explained by these conditions. Although it is true that in the case of many races in Africa and Asia, the same geographic conditions encouraged the duplication of a unitary system of social relations, as well as of the same manner of laboring, the situation in Europe was completely different. Under almost the same conditions as regards the geographic environment, the difference and imbalance in the historical development of each country is very great. Obviously, after going through the internal characteristics of a given social formation, the impact of the external conditions is complicated as a result. Only when we have understood the motive forces within the development, and laid bare the internal impulses promoting the unfolding of life itself, will we be able to understand the real nature of development—the spontaneity of the various phenomena of nature and society, as well as of human thought.

External forces cannot develop unless they are channeled through the internal forces and complicated by them.

Do not eliminate external forces, but internal forces are dominant. Without understanding the internal forces, there is no way one can understand development.

Spontaneity studies the object starting from its own self-movement without introducing any mysticism or idealism.

What, then, in the final analysis is spontaneity? Is there any mystical thought such as that imagined by Bukharin, or anything resembling Hegel's idealism in the concept of the self-movement of things? Absolutely not, so long as we do not observe movement and development in a purely mechanical way and do not regard movement as simple displacement or increase in quantity. At the same time, if we do not try to understand self-movement idealistically, do not regard it as a development of pure logic, and do not regard it as the self-production of concepts, but try to understand self-movement as the self-movement of the objective world, we can grasp it. Self-movement refers to the movement of things themselves. It is brought about by internal and, at the same time, by external conditions. Nevertheless, the appearance of this kind of movement also depends on the internal laws of the things themselves. Self-movement also refers to changes in things which are brought about by internal clashes, by the change from one thing to another. To study any object beginning with self-movement will help us avoid such idealist views as believing in a supreme external power (God, the *Weltgeist*, and so on), or believing in the supreme internal spiritual nature. At the same time, this kind of study (that is, to study an object by beginning with its self-movement) by no means excludes the role of the external conditions in addition to the internal causes of development. The idea of regarding development as the self-movement of a thing makes us pay attention to the knowledge of the internal and true origin of development of a thing. Materialist dialectics thinks that this origin, this force, lies in the contradictions internal to every existence and the movement and development of the internal contradictions. The contradictions in things themselves, the force and tendency of the internal contradictions of any natural and social phenomena, are the basic factors upon which the view of development of materialist dialectics is based.

It is the contradictory nature of any phenomenon that leads to the development of the thing. This is a key element of the view of development of materialist dialectics.

According to the view of metaphysics and formal logic, contradictions can occur only in human thought; there cannot be contradictions in objective reality. Yet, according to the views of formal logic, such logical contradictions are a defect which we should try our best to avoid. In the view of formal logic, contradiction expresses the mistakes of thought and the incorrectness of the thought process, and it hinders the correct development of thought. If the capitalists consider that "working-class dictatorship conflicts with democracy," then in their eyes to affirm both of these things would definitely become a logical contradiction; if we say, "working-class dictatorship is the highest form of democracy," in their eyes this is talking nonsense. Viewed from the perspective of dialectical logic, contradictions in thought are the reflection of real, objectively existing contradictions; dialectical logic does not rigidly adhere to the apparent superficial mutual conflict of the two principles. Materialist dialectics sees through the internal nature of the object of study. It finds out from the object of study itself the internal connection between the force of the contradiction, the tendency of the contradiction, the aspects of the contradiction, and the characteristics of the contradiction. In objective reality itself, Marxism discovered the particular contradiction it possesses, as well as the contradiction that pushes it forward. The negation of the old bourgeois democracy and the establishment of the new proletarian democracy (in the form of the working-class dictatorship) are real and dual contradictory processes. Mr. Ulianov said, "Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects."[10]

What formal logic calls mistakes are in fact correct, and what it calls correct is in fact wrong.

Thought truly has a contradictory nature; it is correct to affirm both simultaneously.

The difference between dialectical logic and formal logic

Lenin's definition of dialectics talks about contradictions.

In the view of the metaphysicians, it is impossible to recognize the contradictions of a thing because they observe a certain thing and its appearance outside the connection between the thing and its appearance and outside their endless mutual impact.

Quite right. It looks at a thing at rest instead of in motion, in isolation instead of in association.

"Nonetheless," Engels pointed out, "position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influences on one another. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction, . . ."[11]

Movement is contradiction—Engels

. . . Many many "critics" of Marxism have tried repeatedly to overthrow the aforementioned principle of Engels that

Movement is contradiction, that is, it is the unity between continuity and

interruption. Trotsky only admits continuity but refuses interruption; Struve and the others accept interruption but refuse continuity. All of them are wrong. There is unity between movement and stillness, between continuity and interruption, between today and tomorrow, between up and down, between life and death, and between democracy and autocracy. Contradiction is movement.

"movement is contradiction." The "reasons" they give are that, in the real world, things in motion pass different points in space at different instants. These "critics" (such as Struve, Chernov,[12] and the like) said, if the line things passed in space is divided into many small segments and "interruptions" in space, then at a certain instant things will be at a certain position, a certain point in space, the point that just fits right into the space segment we divided.

Lenin's words

. . . Such "critics" do not understand that what is called motion means to be simultaneously at and not at a certain point; motion itself would be impossible without this contradiction, without the unity between this continuity and interruption. They do not know that the negation of contradiction means obliteration of motion. Mr. Ulianov said, "Motion is the unity between continuity (time and space) and interruption (also refers to time and space). Motion means contradiction, means the unity between contradictions."

Contradictions in every process have their own specific characteristics.

But contradiction is not only the basis for the simplest and most common form of the motion of manner. In the special manner of motion and development of various things and processes, all kinds of dialectical contradictions are displayed.

It is not difficult for us to point out the various contradictions which push forward the development of different phenomena in any field—nature, society, and thought.

Engels once pointed out that the process of birth is inseparably linked to its opposite process, death: old cells keep dying out, and new cells keep being born (this is a contradiction!), and this is the prerequisite condition for the survival and development of all organisms. In mechanics, every action has its own internal contradiction, which brings about a reaction; without this reaction, it would be impossible to explain the original action. Any quantity in mathematics also has an internal contradiction, since it can become either a positive or a negative quantity. Any phenomenon in the social life of today's society is permeated with class contradictions and conflicts; whether it is the selling and buying of labor or the most excellent philosophical doctrine, no such phenomenon lacks this kind of class contradiction.

Each different process has its own peculiar contradictions.

Mutually exclusive and mutually linked, mutually hostile and a condition of one another's existence

Then where, actually, are the internal contradictions of an object (and phenomenon)? They are the opposite characteristics which exist in a unified object (process, phenomenon, and so on); they are, at the same time, mutually exclusive and mutually linked together. In development these conflicting sides are mutually associated with each other internally; one is the condition of existence for the other, but at the same time each side is hostile to the other and is struggling against it.

The idea of dividing a unity into two is the basic characteristic of dialectics.

This view, which divides a unity into two and sees the internal contradictions in any phenomenon of natural, historical, and spiritual life, has drawn the attention of thinkers ever since Heraclitus, the ancient Greek philosopher. Ulianov made it clear that this idea is the essence of dialectics and its basic characteristic. The materialist dialectics of Marx, Engels, and Ulianov regard the unity of opposites as the basic law of dialectical development. The special manifestations of this law are to be found in the various contradictions in all forms of motion.

The various different forms of motion result from the fact that there are different qualities and different contradictions.

Knowledge of matter is knowledge of the form of motion of matter.

Knowledge of the different forms of the unity of opposites in the phenomena of a certain domain constitutes the object of a certain science.

Differences in the varieties of matter should be attributed to the peculiarities of various forms of motion. Among these diverse forms of motion, each one expresses the special quality of a specific thing. We can see many forms of motion in nature, such as mechanical movement, giving out light, emitting heat, electrical current, chemical combination and decomposition, and so on. All of these forms of motion are mutually dependent and mutually inclusive. The knowledge of humans about matter is actually knowledge about the form of motion of matter because apart from objects in motion, there is nothing else in nature. With regard to each form of motion, we should pay attention to its special characteristics and to the qualitative differences between it and other forms of motion. Materialist dialectics makes clear that every form of motion has its own internal special contradictions, has its own special unity and struggle of opposites. Knowledge of a certain special kind of unity of opposites peculiar to the phenomena in a certain domain constitutes the object of a certain science. For example, the principal pairs of opposites studied by mathematics are the opposition between positive quantity and negative quantity, and that between fractions and integers. The basic opposites in mechanics are action and reaction. In physics there is the opposition between the negative pole and the positive pole. In chemistry there is the opposition between combination and decomposition. And in human society and the social sciences there is class struggle.

Correct

The difference between the theory of evolution and dialectics as regards their view of the similarities and peculiarities of the new and the old

Good

The dialectical view of development understands that development refers to "the division of a unitary object into two mutually exclusive opposites, as well as their mutually dependent relationship." This kind of "mutual relationship" between the two opposing sides is precisely the internal motive force of movement. According to this view of development, the principal center of attention should be placed on understanding the sources of spontaneous movement. The distinguishing feature of this view of development is that it accepts the fact that the struggle between internal opposites leads to the process of the supersession of the old by the new. Although none of the bourgeois theories of evolution denies the possibility of the birth of new things, they lay the emphasis on the common qualities shared by new and old things (or phenomena in a process) and regard new things as the increase or repetition of old things. The dialectical theory of development is quite different; it stresses rather the characteristics and peculiarities of new things. The defect of all the bourgeois theories of evolution, which are contrary to the dialectical theory of development in principle, is that after all they regard the new as the old and treat the former as the latter. As a matter of fact, however, the new, which was born to replace the old, is called new because of the peculiarities of its nature. According to the dialectical view of development, development inevitably promotes the transformation of things and the transition from one substance to another.

According to Ulianov's definition, the law of the unity of opposites means "the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)."[13]

Mutually exclusive as well as mutually dependent

The mutual linkage (or mutual dependence) and struggle between the opposites (or contradictory tendencies) in a thing determines its life, gives it a spontaneous push, a push toward its development. It is always like this, so the law of the unity of opposites and the linkage of opposites becomes the most basic and important law, and the law which has decisive significance. Mr. Ulianov says, "The splitting of single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts . . . is the essence of dialectics." In his *Philosophical Notebooks*, Mr. Ulianov called the unity of opposites the core of dialectics.

It is a universal law of the objective world and of knowledge, and there can be no exception for any process.

The law of the unity of opposites is the most universal law of the objective world and of knowledge. Mr. Ulianov says, "The condition for the knowledge of all processes in the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites."

In this perspective, the law of the unity of opposites is the basic law of dialectics. Since the law of the unity of opposites is the most universal law, it is applicable to every phenomenon in the objective world and also to the process of knowledge. In one of his short essays on dialectics, Mr. Ulianov pointed out that Plekhanov's mistake lay in the fact that he did not understand the universal and decisive significance of this law—a law of knowledge and of the objective world, and he explained this law as the "sum of many examples."[14]

The universal and decisive significance of this law

The differences between Engels, Lenin, and Plekhanov

Plekhanov is an eclectic.

In his book *Anti-Dühring,* Engels gave many examples of this law for the purpose of popular explanation. At the same time, he regarded the mutual interaction between opposites as the most universal law of development (this view was most fully explored in Engels's book *The Dialectics of Nature.*) But Plekhanov simplified this universal law in terms of particular occasions and expressions. Plekhanov paid attention only to the law of the change from quantity to quality and to the contradiction between content and form. Although Plekhanov often criticized Ulianov for not understanding dialectics, in many of his writings he himself did not know how to grasp the core and essence of this dialectics. He was not even capable of understanding the theoretical significance of Hegel's logic, although this law is employed on a subjective basis in logic. Plekhanov frequently revealed an eclectic understanding of this law; he understood the unity of opposites as the "combination of opposites."

Dialectics is hostile to eclecticism, and it gives an accurate and definite answer regarding the nature of a thing. Consequently, it can become the guide to action. This nature refers to the law of the unity of contradictions.

Dialectics is basically hostile to all forms of eclecticism. If Marxism-Leninism cannot give an accurate and definite answer that will explain the essence of a thing or a process (no matter how complicated this thing or process), then it cannot become the leader of the thing or process. Therefore, in materialist dialectics, it is extremely important to understand correctly the relationship between opposites. At the same time, the unity of opposites is linkage of the opposites, their unity as well as their mutual exclusion, mutual negation, and struggle.

Change from one characteristic to another—the opposite of itself. This is most important.

Ulianov explained that "things (phenomena and so on) are the sum and unity of opposites."[15] While deciding

Ordinary concepts are different and contradictory, but they are not transformed.

Mutual dependence, mutual exclusion, and mutual transformation

Under certain conditions

Unity is relative, struggle is absolute.

?

on this definition, he wrote: "It is not only the unity of opposites, but the transition of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite]."[16] Elsewhere he wrote: "The ordinary concepts include differences and contradictions, but they do not include the change from one to the other, yet this is the most important."[17] Hence, "The doctrine called dialectics is to discuss how opposites can be unified, and under what conditions they will be unified and change from one to the other. Why should human reason not regard these opposites as dead, fixed but, instead, treat them as live, conditional, mobile, and changing from this to that?"

The unity of opposites (that is, agreement), their mutual inclusion and interchangeability—these are the most important things in understanding the essence of dialectics. Meanwhile, we should emphasize the conditional character of this unity of opposites. The unity of opposites will be possible only under certain conditions. We should especially make clear that the agreement of the opposites is relative, while their struggle is absolute. We mentioned above that in terms of certain relations the processes of birth and death are mutually continuous: the death of the old cells of an organism is the prerequisite condition for the birth of new cells; it is the prerequisite condition for the life process. Here, the two opposites—birth and death—are mutually united as well as mutually interchanging. In spite of that, the conditional character of this pair of united opposites is extremely obvious: after all, birth is birth and not death. In this process, the factors of life defeat the components of death and, moreover, rule over the components of death.

Life and death

Production and consumption

The unity of opposites between classes

The reference here to linkage is relatively concrete.

Marx pointed out that production and consumption are not only two opposite things but also mutually inclusive in many relations. Consumption is possible only when there is production. Production creates the materials for consumption and confers on consumption a certain character. On the other hand, consumption completes the production process of the products, creates the demand for production, and is therefore a component of production. Nevertheless, this by no means implies that we should regard production and consumption as the same thing. Marx said that their direct agreement does not at all reduce their directly divided character.

In capitalist society, capitalists and proletarians are two mutually hostile groups. And yet these two classes are inseparably associated with each other in the capitalist economic structure, and the existence of one class is also the condition of the existence of the other. Without the working class, there could be no capitalism; similarly, there could be no capitalism without the bourgeoisie. The working class, which has lost the means of production, creates surplus value for the bourgeoisie, which pays for its labor, and the bourgeoisie, which possesses the means of production, exploits the labor of the working class—this is a unitary process, a unitary process that determines the survival of capitalist society. At the same time, the conditional character of the "linkage" of this unity (identity) is very obvious: in the interests of the two classes, there is no unity worth speaking of; moreover, not only

The unity of opposites in the survival and elimination of a country

is there no unity of class interest, but, on the contrary, it is, rather, the struggle between the classes that is the locomotive behind social development. Labor constitutes the strength and stability of these countries and, at the same time, creates the conditions for their future decay and elimination. Nevertheless, we would be making a big mistake if we forgot the conflicting characteristics of these two stages, treated the two processes as the same thing, and believed that the strength and stability of a country of the toilers was, at the same time, the process of its decay and elimination.

Contradictions are not the same as antagonism or conflict.

Contradictions after classes are eliminated

Present-day mechanism and Menshevizing idealism totally distort the concept of the identity and mutual linkage of opposites of Marx and Ulianov. From Dühring to Bukharin, the mechanists regard all linked opposites as two kinds of external, mutually conflicting forces. Mechanists regard all instances of the identity of the opposites and all contradictions as external contradictions, and as the clash between hostile forces; at the same time, they explain the coexistence of these conflicting forces and the maintenance of the contradictions as the balance between the opposites. Engels once mocked Dühring for his understanding of contradictions as conflicting forces. While reading Bukharin's book *The Economy of the Transition Period,* Ulianov pointed out to Bukharin that it was wrong to treat contradiction and conflict as the same thing. In socialism, for instance, the conflict between classes will be eliminated, yet the contradictions between nature and society, between the forces of production and the means of production, will remain.

Conflict is a particular and special situation.

Conflict is a particular and special occasion of contradiction, which occurs when all opposing things, in their processes of development, have reached the point at which they make use of external material forces and engage in mutual clashes.

Diagram theory: difference, opposition, and contradiction

Each and every difference contains contradictions.

Restrictions on the universality of contradictions

. . . Menshevizing idealists have departed from Ulianov's understanding of the law of the unity of opposites. They painted a completely mechanical pattern, according to which we first run into simple differences, then confrontations, and afterward contradictions. They did not understand that contradictions are already contained in each and every difference. Like Plekhanov, they restrict the universal character of the law of the development of contradictions.

Mutual dependence is a manifestation of the struggle of opposites, and the absolute exists in the relative.

Within the relative there exists the absolute—this is a sentence from Ulianov instructing us. In the mutual linkage of opposites, we should also be able to see their struggle: the unity of opposites itself, the linkage of opposites itself, we should regard as the expression of the struggle between opposites.

The occurrence of new things is the resolution of former contradictions; the former confrontation as well as the unity is eliminated simultaneously; new contradictions begin to develop.

The occurrence of new things is the resolution of former contradictions; in this resolution, the former unity, together with those opposites that form this unity, is eliminated. New phenomena replace the former phenomena and begin their own history. From now on, the internal part of this new phenomenon (or thing, or process) itself contains new contradictions, contradictions that will push it to continue forward.

The task of scientific research in any domain consists in studying the concrete nature of the development of the contradictions in a certain natural phenom-

Two kinds of research methods: concrete research and abstract research

enon or social phenomenon, relying on this general rule of materialist dialectics (which constitutes the summing up of the history of development of knowledge of the whole of humanity) and on the basis of the factual materials. None of the principles of dialectics can be turned into an abstract formula (or diagram). The idea of working out an answer to a specific question according to such an abstract formula in a purely logical way is impossible, because materialist dialectics demands that we study all the processes occurring in nature, society, and human thought conscientiously and realistically.

Both the points in common and the special points are important, but the latter are more important.

Materialist dialectics does not teach us only to grasp the common and general characteristics in everything as well as those at every stage of its development; it also teaches us to seize the special characteristics in the development of the unique contradictions in a certain thing or at a certain stage.

. . .

Hegel broke away from the concrete.

It was Hegel who first developed the law of the unity of opposites, but he idealistically misinterpreted this law. Hegel thought that the object of knowledge was the stages in the development of thought. It was not the actual things existing in the real world, but only the abstract things existing in thought. Consequently, Hegel's law of the unity of opposites is the most universal law of thought. Such a law departs from the concrete, real development of nature and history.

Concrete analysis is the true basis.

The concrete analysis of the development of real phenomena should be used as the true basis of this law (the law of the unity of opposites), which can be applied to everything.

The contradictions in society

Marx and Engels turned Hegel's idealist doctrine of the identity of opposites upside down, transformed it in a materialist direction, and changed it into a universal law of the development of the objective world and of the thought that reflects the objective world. When they applied this law to the knowledge of the historical process, they perceived that the basic cause of social development lay in the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradictions of social struggle, as well as the contradictions between the basis resulting from these contradictions and the superstructure in politics and thought. When Marx applied materialist dialectics to the understanding of the economic structure of capitalist society, he revealed the basic contradiction of this society—the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of ownership, which is manifested in the contradiction between the organized character of production in the individual enterprises, and the anarchy of production in society as a whole. The manifestation of this in terms of class is the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the workers.

Ulianov raised Marx's law of the unity of opposites to an even higher stage. He paid special attention to clarifying the entire significance of the fact that this law is the essence and core of dialectics. . . . On the basis of the inseparable unity between theory and revolutionary practice, Mr. Ulianov explained and developed the essence of such dialectics. He applied this law to the analy-

Lenin's analysis of the Russian revolution. We should also deal with the Chinese revolution in the same way.

sis of every important stage in the social struggles of the workers. The knowledge of the nature of the contradictions within development is very important in Mr. Ulianov's analysis of the development of the Russian Revolution, as well as in his doctrine of the transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a socialist revolution. Bolsheviks regard bourgeois-democratic revolution and socialist revolution as "two links in the same chain, as a single and integral picture of the sweep of the Russian revolution."[18] Mr. Ulianov and his followers paid special attention to all the characteristics of Russian "warlords and feudal imperialists." These characteristics promoted the historic development of the bourgeois-democratic anti-imperialist revolution under the leadership of the organizations of the toilers, and it also made it possible to combine it with the anticapitalist social revolution of the working class.

Under the developing historical conditions in China

The struggle on two fronts

Ulianov opposed the Right opportunists of the time, such as Kamenev and Zinoviev. He emphatically pointed out the unity between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution in the developing historical conditions in Russia, but at the same time he also struggled against Trotsky, since Mr. Trotsky did not understand the stages in the development of the revolution and did not understand what attitude the working class should adopt toward the peasants at each stage of the revolution.

Lenin on imperialism

The agreement between the general and the particular

Ulianov again used the law of the unity of opposites as the basis for analyzing imperialism. He saw imperialism as a new and special stage in the development of capitalism. Here he discovered the unity between the general and the particular and exposed the general rule and contradictions of capitalism and the unity of all the special characteristics that occurred at different stages of imperialism. He pointed out that these special traits (special characteristics) of imperialism not only will not be eliminated but will enhance the expression of the general capitalist contradictions; the unity and combination between monopoly and competition not only will not reduce the acuteness of the capitalist contradictions but will greatly enhance them, and greatly accentuate the depth and acuteness of capitalist competition.

The dual character of the New Economic Policy

The dual process

Ulianov again exposed the dual character of the New Economic Policy. This policy allows the struggle between capitalist elements and socialist elements, which in turn will spur on the inevitable victory of the socialist elements. It is "the dual process of capitalist and socialist development, it is the contradictory process of struggle between the socialist elements and the capitalist elements; in addition, it is also the process in which the capitalist components are overcome by the socialist components."

The contradiction between two worlds

The sharpening of the contradictions of capitalism has already reached a new era, and at present a new contradiction has emerged as the times demand. This new contradiction is no longer a contradiction within capitalism but, rather, a contradiction between the whole of capitalism and the countries which are building socialism. Starting from this basis, this contradiction leads to all the other contradictions of capitalism, ties them all together, and turns them into an issue of life and death of the capitalist system itself.

Section 2. The Law of the Change from Quantity to Quality and Vice Versa

Extremely significant

Another law of materialist dialectics is the law of the change from quantity to quality and vice versa. This law is extremely significant in understanding the process of development because the transition, in the form of a revolutionary leap, from one quality to another is manifested through this dialectical law.

Quality determines the character of a phenomenon, it determines the individual character of the phenomenon. As a result, it distinguishes one phenomenon from another.

Scientific research must begin with learning the distinguishing characteristics of quality.

The various different forms of movement of matter. Each object has a definite pattern of movement, and some have several patterns, but there must be one form of movement that reflects the special characteristics of this thing. Different patterns of movement express different special qualities or chemical composition.

What is called quality should be understood as that which determines the nature of the phenomenon. All the various phenomena differ from one another because of the qualities which determine their nature and thereby make them what they are. Scientific studies can be successful only when they begin by observing a certain object in the light of the different peculiarities of other bodies. The characteristics that determine the nature of a thing are its qualities. The complexity of the quality of various things in the objective world should be attributed to the different forms of movement of the objects existing in the world around us. Everything which exists is in a certain state of material movement. Of course, it is also true that some things have not one form of movement but many. The human organism, for example, has several kinds of material movement, from mechanical movement to thought. For every special and specific thing, there must, however, be a kind of form of movement that expresses its special quality and is of decisive importance for it. Consequently, when we talk about "quality," we are not talking about the existence of the various qualities which have nothing to do with the objective world but, rather, about things or phenomena themselves which have one kind of quality or another. Quality has an objective character; the determination of the quality of things in nature exists independently of thought. Human thought only reflects the confirmation of the quality of the objective process.

Quality or characteristics are objective.

Things are different from one another because of the differences in their quality, but there is no absolute boundary. There are no absolutely independent things in the world; everything has something in common with the other things, and maintains an inseparable relationship with them.

The determination of quality develops and changes, and it is wrong to deny the change.

Because of the differences in quality, things are different from one another and separated from one another. Of course, the criteria for this kind of division and distinction are not absolute, since there are no absolutely specific and absolutely single things in nature. Everything always contains some similar or common characteristics with everything else. It constantly maintains an inseparable connection with this common point. Contrary to what the representatives of scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages had assumed, the determination of the quality of something is not at all fixed and unchangeable. The determination of the quality of real phenomena is always developing, always changing, and becoming more and more complicated.

Quality is the inherent character of the process; peculiarities, on the other hand, express the nature of this thing in its relationship with other things. The determination of the quality of a thing is expressed in its many characteristics. For example, in the determination of the quality of the roses, it is expressed in sweetness, color, and the other peculiarities of roses.

If one wants to understand correctly the category of quality, one must first explore the problem of quality and nature (quality and property).[19] In his *Wissenschaft der Logik* Hegel talked about this. He wrote: "Quality, that is, nature, refers first and primarily to the following idea: its relations with the outside world reveal its own inherent nature."[20] Here Hegel meant to say that quality shows the internal character of certain phenomena, processes, or things, but natural tendencies or distinguishing characteristics express such a qualitative analysis of the relationship between this thing and all other things. Take the flower rose, for example. As a plant, it has certain qualities of the plant family, but it also has peculiarities that set it apart from all other forms of plant. Moreover, its distinctive nature is manifested in many of its characteristics—sweetness, color, and so on.

The indissoluble relationship between quality and the thing itself. Even if a thing loses some of its characteristics, it will not lose its essential nature, but if it loses its essential nature, it will become something else.

The determination of quality is manifested in special regularity.

Quality and the existence (being)[21] of an object are indissolubly linked. If an object loses this or that property, it does not lose its nature. If, however, it loses its essential nature, it will no longer be itself and has become something else. The determination of the quality of a thing is expressed in the form of special regularities and in the certainty of its development. In terms of the scientific definition of a thing, it will become a reality only when it controls the determination of the qualities of the thing.

Only when one has understood the determination of quality, that is, the special regularities, can one be said to have understood a certain thing.

The knowledge of a thing must absolutely not, however, be restricted to the control of quality alone; at the same time, it also includes determining the quantity of the thing being observed. What is quantity? Let us first look at the definition of quantity given by Hegel.

Hegel wrote, "Generally speaking, quality is united with existence and directly determines existence. It is different from the quantity which is investigated subsequently. Quantity is also a determinant of existence, but it is not directly linked to existence, and its character has little or no influence on existence. It is external to the determination of existence."[22]

The determination of quantity

In this perspective it seems that Hegel decided that quantity is an external characteristic that has little or no influence on existence. In this definition, the kernel of truth is: within a certain period of time, the change of quantity is, indeed, external to quality. Although quantity changes, quality remains the same. Nevertheless, this only concerns a period before a certain instant, and, from that instant onward, a change in quantity will lead to a change of quality.

Within a certain period of time, though quantity changes, quality does not change.

Quality is a direct determinant that is identical to the process. Quantity is a determinant of the process, but it is not directly identical to the process. Instead, it is an external determinant that has little or no influence on the process during a certain period of time. Although the quantity may increase or decrease, the quality remains the same. But, after a certain period, things will undergo a transformation, and the change in quantity will lead to a change in quality. [Comment by Mao at the bottom of the page.]

The determination of the quantity of a phenomenon, like the determination of quality, also has an objective character. The concept of quantity is similar to the reflection in our human consciousness of those relationships the phenomena themselves actually have with one another. Therefore, scientific knowledge should grasp and reflect it not only in terms of the differences in the quality of objective reality but also in terms of the complexity of its quantity. The determination of the quantity of an object does not exist outside the determination of its quality, and the determination of the quantity is regularly associated with the determination of its quality. When we talk about the increase or decrease of the quantity of a thing, for instance, we refer to the increase or decrease of its quality. Meanwhile we should also point out that a certain quality must have a certain level of the special quantity.

Quantity too is objective, and the concept of quantity is a reflection in the human consciousness of those quantitative relations within the phenomena themselves. Scientific research should come to know it [objective reality] not only in terms of qualitative differences but also in terms of quantitative complexity.

Quantity and quality constantly appear together.

A certain special quality must have a certain special quantity; pure quality and quantity do not exist.

For example, there are no pure qualities and quantities in nature, only objects

Within an object, quality and quantity constitute an indivisible unified entity; this is a unity of different natures, that is, a unity of opposites.

Nevertheless, the quantitative change of an object can take place only on the basis of a certain quality compatible with it; within a definite period of time, quality restricts the development of quantity. The feudal system, imperialism, and socialism are three examples.

Quantitative change takes place on the basis of the qualitative nature, and is therefore restricted by it, but at the same time quantitative change also has an influence on quality. That is, an object that is determined by a certain quality will remain so only up to the moment at which quantitative change reaches a definite qualitative limit. Quantity will then demand a change of quality. At the same time, this change is a change from quality to quantity. Once the old quality has passed away, a new quantity can then move forward in its development.

Only through quantitative change can qualitative change emerge.

The pure increase or decrease of quantity of the same chemical substance leads to the difference in quality.

Within certain limits, the change of quantity involves the continual increase in the dimensions of things of the same character. That is, within certain limits, though quantity changes, the thing remains the same thing. It is only at a certain stage and under certain conditions that the development of quantity will lead to a change in quality. At this time, things

with a definite qualitative and quantitative nature. The characterization of the quality and quantity of an object forms an inseparable unity. But such a unity is a unity of different natures, a unity of opposites. . . . Moreover, the quantitative change in the object occurs on a certain appropriate basis of the quality. Within a certain period of time, quality sets limits to the quantitative change of the object. Take the feudal mode of production, for example. It restricts to an extreme degree the possibilities for the development of the productive forces and of material wealth and restricts the level of social development as a whole. These feudal relationships were swept away by the bourgeois revolution, and the capitalist mode of production (or capitalist relations of production) arose to replace them. Capitalism once played a progressive role in history, but when it developed to reach the age of imperialism, it became an extreme obstacle to the continued advance of society. Consequently, under the socialist dictatorship of the workers, the development of every aspect of social life reached an unprecedented speed. This is because, as regards the relations of production in the Soviet Union, they represent an entirely new quality.

In short, quantitative change is based on and limited by the determination of the nature of reality. At the same time, quantitative change of an object will, in return, have an impact on its quality. A certain object becomes what it is only before a certain moment. When the process of quantitative change reaches a certain limit of quality, and, under certain conditions, it will require a qualitative change. At the same time, this will also be a change from quality to quantity, because once the old quality is eliminated, the forward development of new quantity takes place. . . .

. . . Engels wrote, "For our own purposes, we can express this law in the following way: that is, in nature qualitative change will occur only through the increase or decrease of the quantity of a material or movement (that is, what is called force). Every particular occasion changes in a certain manner.

"All qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e., without quantitative alteration of the body concerned.[23]

For the purpose of proving this idea, Engels gave many examples in *Anti-Dühring* and *Dialectics of Nature* to show how the increase or decrease of the pure quantity of the same chemical substance would lead to differences in quality.

According to the above explanation, we know that within certain limits a change in the quantity of the phenomenon has the same character of continual growth as things of the same quality. Those things whose quantities are changing within certain limits will not cease to be themselves. It is only at certain stages of development and under certain conditions that things will lose

will lose their old quality and become things of a new quality. Such a process of qualitative change is just the opposite of the process of quantitative change. Quantity changes gradually, but quality changes by leaps.

their original quality and become something else, things of a new quality. The change from one quality to another is just the opposite of the process of continual quantitative change. Instead of occurring gradually, it is completed in leaps. Once an object changes to a new quality, it only shows all sorts of different properties and aspects. Before the struggle between various opposing sides leads to any change in quality, it remains a thing of this quality forever. A leap, and the interruption of a continual process, is the turning point of change from one quality to another.

Engels gave a thorough and severe refutation of the mechanical view of the universe. At the same time, he pointed out that "if all differences and changes of quality are to be reduced to quantitative differences and changes, to mechanical displacement, then we inevitably arrive at the proposition that all matter consists of *identical*, smallest particles, and that all qualitative differences of the chemical elements of matter are caused by quantitative differences in number and by the spatial grouping of those smallest particles to form atoms.[24]

Notes

1. This is a quotation from Dong Zhongshu; it appears in his biography in the *Han shu* (History of the Han Dynasty).

2. Lenin's name was originally Vladimir Il'ich Ulianov. Early in his political career he adopted the pen name Nikolai Lenin; subsequently, while continuing to use the surname Lenin, he replaced the first name Nikolai with his original name and patronymic, becoming Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. While the author of the previous text referred to him familiarly by his patronymic, Il'ich, in this text he is commonly called Ulianov.

3. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's Science of Logic," in *Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works*, 4th ed., vol. 38, p. 213.

4. The word "generalization" appears in parentheses after its Chinese equivalent.

5. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, p. 171.

6. See J.V. Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," in *Problems of Leninism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), p. 20.

7. The two interpolations in bold were added by Mao between the lines; the words in parentheses were inserted by him in the text.

8. See Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*," pp. 255–56.

9. Ibid., p. 141.

10. The quotation is from Lenin's commentary on Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, cited above in note 8, pp. 253–54.

11. The quotation is from Engels, *Anti-Dühring*. See *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 132.

12. The reference is to P.B. Struve (1870–1944) and V.M. Chernov (1873–1952).

13. See Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, "On the Question of Dialectics," in *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, pp. 359–60.

14. Ibid.

15. See Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*," p. 221.

16. Ibid., p. 222.

17. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, p. 109.

18. See Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," p. 30.

19. The words "quality and property" in parentheses are inserted here in the Chinese text.

20. On p. 107 of the 1982 Chinese edition of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*.

21. The English word "being" is inserted here in parentheses in the Chinese text.

22. The quotation is from Hegel's *Small Logic*.

23. See Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (New York, International Publishers, 1940), translated and edited by Clemens Dutt, with a preface and notes by J.B.S. Haldane, p. 27.

24. Ibid., p. 321.

Annotations to Li Da's Outline of Sociology

Part 1: Materialist Dialectics

Chapter 1: Materialist Dialectics as an Overview of the History of Human Understanding

Section 1: The Prehistory of Materialist Dialectics

1: Human Understanding in Primitive Times

Society—a developing organism

The study of a given society's relations of production and the laws of their development

The only scientific method of sociology is materialist dialectics. This scientific method interprets society as a constantly developing living organism. The analysis of such an organism requires objective analysis of the various relations of production that make up a specific society, and an exploration of the special laws of action (governing its functioning and development, i.e., its progress from one kind of organism to another, higher kind of organism).[1] This is a necessary precondition for the function of consciousness in the historical process. Simply laying bare the above laws, however, is not adequate. What is necessary is to indicate the practical methods whereby the transformation from one kind of societal organism to another, higher kind of societal organism may be facilitated.

Finding laws, indicating practice, transforming society—this is the fundamental argument of the book.

Social ideology is the reconstruction in theory of actual societies.

The above is, first of all, the fundamental thesis that this book puts forward and is also the entire backbone of the book.

Concerning the exposition of this argument, it should be divided into the following five major parts: . . . (5) Explaining society's ideology and its correct relationship to economic structure, and then reconstructing, in theory, a concrete outline of all kinds of actual societies.

Use historicism to look at the process of the generation and development of materialist dialectics

Materialist dialectics is the only scientific worldview. This worldview is something that is actively created through the assimilation of the fruits of the entire history of human understanding. So, in studying the general principles of materialist dialectics, we must take a historicist stance, explain the process of gestation, birth, and development of materialist dialectics, and point out that this philosophy is truly the sum total, the summation, and the conclusion of the history of human understanding.

The views of humanity in primitive times regarding the objective world.

The history of human understanding includes the process of mankind's understanding of the objective world from primitive times down to the present. Therefore, when we seek the roots of the historical background of materialist dialectics, we cannot but trace them all

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji,* pp. 205–31.

Li Da (1890–1966) was a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party and the first head of its Propaganda Department. He broke with the Party in 1923, while remaining a Marxist, because of his opposition to an excessively submissive attitude toward the Guomindang. For a concise but clear and comprehensive account of his life, see the first chapter of Nick Knight's extremely valuable work, *Li Da and Marxist Philosophy in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

Mao's annotations to Part 1, Chapter 1 of Li Da's most important theoretical work, *Outline of Sociology,* are substantial. Beginning with Part 1, Chapter 2, and for all of Part 2 and the brief fragment of Part 3 included in the published version of this document, his annotations are limited to a few characters and, for the most part, consist simply of question marks in the margin. We have therefore included only Part 1, Chapter 1.

the way back to human understanding during primitive times.

On the one hand, the long-term process of labor transformed nature; at the same time, it transformed human beings themselves (physiology and character).

Language is a result of labor, a means of communication, and the precondition for understanding. Only with the appearance of the concept of speech could thought begin.

Primitive human beings, having evolved upward from the condition of animals, in the process of their long-term struggle with nature (i.e., a labor process), transformed nature, and, at the same time, transformed their own physiological organs and basic nature. The exertions of their shouts while laboring became reflected in their respiratory organs and vocal organs; it stimulated the development of the throat cavity, and they were gradually able to emit speech with a certain tonality. Speech is a result of the laboring behavior of human beings. It was also the means by which humans communicated with one another and, at the same time, the precondition for their beginning to understand nature.

The development of the brain is a result of labor.

In the process of laboring, the nervous system of human beings became complex, and their brains became greatly enlarged. At the same time, mutual interaction developed among humanity in economic life and psychological life. Owing to the appearance of speech, humanity was able to use speech to describe the appearance of objects in the external world, attach names to actions and objects, and thereby create the concept of speech. Once human beings had the concept of speech, they were then able to begin the activity of thought.

Two special characteristics of primitive thinking: (1) Nature and humans are both living. (2) Nature and humans are interchangeable. This is primitive dialectics and formed the animism of primitive systems of thought.

There are two characteristics of primitive thinking. The first is that primitive human beings saw natural objects or natural phenomena as living things the same as they were. . . . The second is the idea of transforming one object into another object, and the idea of transmitting the innate nature of animals to be manifested in humans. . . . Although we regard this thinking of primitive humans as extremely infantile and ludicrous, they saw nature as a living thing, an interchangeable world, and it can be said that this was the first rudiment of a dynamic worldview. It can also be called "primitive dialectics." It can be said that the animism of primitive systems of thought was formed on the basis of the characteristics described above.

All creatures are the result of the movement of spirits.

Animism is a relatively high stage in the development of primitive thought. Previously, human beings and things could not be separated; now human beings and things could be distinguished, and this was the result of labor.

Conscious struggle against nature

Animism is the belief of primitive human beings that all creatures have a soul, and consequently it is one interpretation which has the result that all creatures are seen as spiritually alive. Animism is a relatively highly developed phase of primitive thinking. Previously, primitive humans had not been able to separate nature from themselves; now, humans could distinguish themselves from the natural world. This was entirely the result of humanity's struggle with nature.

Because new aspects of nature were continually being understood during the production process, the way of the struggle with nature could be changed, as well as the way of living. As a result, there were surplus products, improvements in technology, and increased control of human beings over nature. During such times, animism appeared in the system of thought, and it was possible to separate the world into the material and the spiritual. This was the earliest attempt by the human race to understand nature, and it became the start of the conscious struggle with nature.

Animism separates the world into body and soul (that is, the material and the spiritual). This was the earliest attempt by humans to try to understand the outside natural world, and it was the first inkling of a conscious human struggle against nature. During the process of production, human beings constantly understood new aspects of nature, changed their methods for the struggle against nature, and, at the same time, also changed their own way of living and gradually moved from nomadic life to settled life. Consequently, surplus products appeared, technology continually improved, and humans increased their control over nature. Therefore, although animism assumes that all creatures have souls, in fact this hypothesis was only established in order to explain the causality of natural phenomena. This indicates the progressive nature of primitive thinking.

Natural distribution, social distribution, and animism are the three origins of primitive religion.

The animism of primitive systems of thought subsequently evolved into the primitive worldview of religion. The origins of the primitive worldview of religion can be divided into three aspects. The first origin is the fact that primitive man was controlled by nature. . . . The second origin is the fact that primitive man was controlled by social relationships. . . . The third origin is the previous existence of animism. This is the ideological origin of religion. . . .

The essence of religion is the worship of supernatural forces, the belief that supernatural forces governed individuals, society, and the world. This development was entirely the result of the fact that natural and social forces were not understood. There were two early forms: The first was ancestor worship, and the second was worship of natural things.

The earliest form of religious belief was worship of the ancestral spirit. There is a close relationship between ancestor worship and productive relationships based on blood relationships. The objects of worship were the clan deities, racial deities, and so on. The second form was worship of natural things, namely, fetishism. Fetishism and the lack of understanding of natural phenomena are closely related. The objects of worship were water, fire, thunder, the sun, and animals and plants, etc.

With the development of production, and the progressively greater understanding of natural forces, the first basis for the appearance of religion gradually disappeared. But with the establishment of the class system in society, social forces were still not understood. Moreover, animist thought pervaded the people's hearts, and religion, therefore, still existed, but the form and content of religion had changed based on each of the defined social patterns. This is one aspect. Another aspect is that philosophy also emerged as a result of the development of production and the gradual understanding of natural and social forces.

As described above, the nature of religion is the worship of supernatural forces, and it is a belief that things happen based on the so-called supernatural forces governing individuals, society, and the world as a whole. The development of religious views began in primitive times. This development was entirely the result of the fact that natural and social forces were not understood. With the development of material production, human understanding of natural phenomena gradually progressed, and the first religious roots—the notion of being under the control of natural forces—gradually disappeared, and religious concepts also began to be undermined. On the other hand, however, the emergence of surplus products as a result of the development of the productive forces, the formation of private property, and establishment of the slave system—social forces that could not be understood—continued to exist. At the same time, the belief in animism in primitive times also still pervaded the hearts of the people and controlled the minds of some people. So, with the switch from primitive society to slave society, primitive religious worldviews developed along another path and became the various religions corresponding to each phase of social development (such as the religion of the ancient slave society, the religions of the feudal society of the Middle Ages, and the religions of present-day capitalist society; see Part 5 [not included here—ed.] for explanation). On the other hand, the formation of philosophical worldviews based on scientific understanding began to emerge. (Conceptual worldviews were, however, still spanning the foundations of animism and religious worldviews.)

2: Materialist Dialectics in Ancient Natural Philosophies

Began as the division of labor, and then turned into opposites.

The stage of development that arose to replace primitive society in history was the society of the ancient slave system. The society of the slave system, as compared to primitive society, was a society with a high level of progress. Because of the development of the material

Without the required leisure time, philosophy could not have emerged. This leisure time, moreover, resulted from the fact that society had moved into the slave system. The productive forces developed, surplus products increased, and society split into slave owners and slaves. Because the former exploited the latter, they could avoid labor. They had time to engage in the pursuit of learning, and only then was philosophy able to emerge. This was an enormous historical leap for human understanding.

Why could materialist philosophy emerge only in the Greek era and not before? Because (1) the understanding of natural laws required progress in production technology. Only then could people gradually understand the character of nature and begin to explain the world with a viewpoint different from that of religion. (2) It was necessary to wait until there was a handicraft industry and commerce. Only when there were commercial slave owners, who had money and time, could the motivation develop to pursue higher learning. (3) It was necessary to wait until there was experience with the exchange of goods, and the cultivation of a capacity for abstract thought. Only then could philosophy be engaged in. (4) There had to be contact with different nationalities and a broader geographical outlook in order to be able to expand the intellectual outlook. (5) Preliminary development of the natural sciences was needed, along with a foundation of knowledge, for only on this basis could universally necessary factors be discovered, and natural philosophy take shape. These things constitute the historical basis of a new antireligious worldview, that is, the historical basis of ancient natural philosophy. Before this, humanity was subject to the oppression of natural forces and social forces, and could only interpret the world in terms of ghosts or spirits, and absolutely could not discover materialist philosophy.

productive forces, and the split between the classes of master and slave, as well as the division of labor between intellectual labor and physical labor, there came to be an opposition between the two. People engaged in intellectual labor were exempt from the labor of material production and relied on the means of subsistence produced by physical labor to live. For this reason, they had the so-called "required leisure time" to do abstract thinking and consider questions such as the origins of the universe and how it took shape. Philosophical worldviews were formed on this premise.

The oldest philosophy is ancient Greek natural philosophy. This was a new worldview that represented an enormous leap forward from primitive religious views. In addition to the opposing premises of intellectual labor and physical labor, the emergence of this new worldview also had a basis in social history.

First, Greece had already moved from a clan society to a slave system society by the tenth century B.C.E. Slave society, in the first period of its existence, was able to promote the development of the forces of production. And the efforts of the slave owners in favor of production improved production technology and raised the productivity of slave labor, thereby allowing the handicraft industry and agriculture to make great strides. Because of the advances in production technology, people were also able gradually to detect the rules governing natural phenomena and to begin to explain the world from a viewpoint different from that of religion.

Second, only as a result of the development in the handicraft industry and agriculture did commerce subsequently develop. The natural philosophers of ancient Greece lived mostly in the commercially developed coastal cities of Anatolia. The merchants who lived in these areas amassed large amounts of property, and they had the necessary free time, means, and motivation to strive for knowledge.

Third, the tradesmen living on the coast of Anatolia often returned to various ports in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea to trade many different types of products. They were careful not about the natural qualities of the products but about the difference between the buying price and selling price. They were accustomed to converting the different quantities of products into currency and comparing the quantities. Therefore, they naturally developed a capacity for dealing with abstractions. As Heraclitus said: "All creatures exchange fire, and fire is exchanged among all creatures. This is the same as the fact that all goods are exchanged with gold, and gold is exchanged for all goods." This then shows the material basis for development of the abstract thinking capability of early natural philosophers.

With the development of commerce, the scope of activity of tradesmen broadened, and their intellectual outlook also broadened. They came into contact with many different nationalities, and acquired knowledge of many different kinds of productive techniques, and of primitive science (such as arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and geography), including knowledge of various kinds of religion, morality, customs, and habits. Consequently, among these various kinds of specialized experience and knowledge, they could find some kind of general and necessary elements, and increase their capacity for abstract thinking.

Such are the historical foundations of ancient natural philosophy. From technology, handicrafts, commerce, and sailing, rapidly expanding their geographical and spiritual horizons, people rejected the misinterpretations inherited from the religion of their former clan societies, and established new views in accordance with the thinking which explains the world in terms of natural realities. Hence, ancient natural philosophy grew out of the history discussed above, and appears as a new antireligious worldview.

The first natural philosopher, Thales, was the first to have given a natural explanation of the creation of the universe. He said that water gave rise to the universe and that water was the source of all creatures and the substance of all creatures. This view holds that all substances are a unitary thing, which can all be transformed into one another. Despite its simplicity, this is the first appearance of materialism and dialectics.

The creator of ancient natural philosophy was the philosopher Thales (624–548 B.C.E.), of Ionia. Thales was called the "father of philosophy." His works have not been passed down to later generations, but his theories were widely spread by later historians and philosophers (mainly Aristotle).

Thales's theory is characterized by the question of how the universe was created, and for this he gave a natural view. He opposed primitive religious views and established a scientific worldview based on a single material beginning. "He said that water gave rise to the universe. He also said that water was the origin and the true essence of all creatures. He believed that water gave rise to all of the other elements (the elements at that time were water, fire, air, and earth)." He even believed that water gave rise to life. The basis of this view was the belief that all substances are a unitary thing, and all substances can be transformed into one another. The philosophical views of Thales, therefore, are actually the earliest materialist worldviews, and at the same time, they encompassed the beginnings of materialist dialectics.

The second great philosopher was Heraclitus. His great achievement was the discovery of the outline of materialist dialectics. He was a materialist, and, like the philosophers who came before him, he held that the world was composed of the four elements: water, fire, air, and earth. Moreover, he named fire as the basic element. This was his monistic materialist view. His principal achievement, however, was his discovery of the two basic dialectical ideas: that all things are constantly changing, and change is the result of internal contradiction. First, from the view that the universe is composed of matter, he arrived at the view that all things are constantly changing. He said: "Earth extinguishes and creates fire, fire extinguishes and creates air, air destroys and creates water, and water destroys and creates earth." He also said, "The universe is an everlasting fire," to make the analogy that all creatures are constantly changing. He also said, "A person cannot cross the same river twice," likewise suggesting that nature and

Next, another major philosopher of nature that we have mentioned is Heraclitus (540–480 B.C.E.). The philosophy of Heraclitus was of the greatest significance; it made known and explained the later so-called outline of dialectics. Like the previous natural philosophers, he took the view that the universe and all creatures were composed of the four elements: water, fire, air, and earth. He took the view that these four elements could be transformed into one another. He said: "Fire is both extinguished and created by earth, air is both extinguished and created by fire, water is both eliminated and created by air, and earth is both destroyed and created by water." He also called the universe the everlasting fire. This is an analogy indicating that fire is the manifestation of a constantly changing process. From the view that the universe is composed of substances, he reached the position that "the myriad of created things is universally changing." On the basis of the correct proposition that "all creatures are constantly changing," he expressed his dynamic view of the universe. He also

society change without ceasing. In his view, the universe is boundless in both time and space and is constantly changing. This is not all; he also points out the reasons for change. He believes that all things are transformed from one form into another as a result of the inner struggles of opposites. All change takes place in the context of struggle. He said, "Struggle is the father of all creatures," and "struggle is everywhere, and truth is disharmony." In this way, he used general methods to demonstrate dialectical thought. This is the first time in history that human beings understood it. He is therefore called the father of dialectics.

used the metaphor "a person cannot cross the same river twice" to explain all the changes in the natural world and the world of human affairs. Such a pattern of thought according to which all things are constantly changing is the basic concept of dialectics. According to his view, the entire universe is infinite and eternal in time and limitless and boundless in space. Such a universe, which is constantly changing, is certainly not a unified thing.

As to why the universe and all creatures are "ever changing," the question can be asked in another way: What is the ultimate reason that the universe and all creatures are changing? His answer to this question is very correct. He held that all changes take place in the midst of contradictions. He said: "Struggle is the father of all creatures, the king of all creatures. Struggle causes certain things to change into spirits and other things to change into people; it causes certain people to change into slaves and other people to change into free men." He also said, "Struggle is everywhere, and truth is not peaceful and inevitably emerges only through struggle. This is a thing which must be known." According to this view, all creatures are transformed from one form into another by the struggle of internal opposites. "It is the struggle of opposites that is the cause bringing about every kind of change and development." This is also the basic thought of dialectics. In sum, he used ordinary methods to express such thought. He also used this kind of thought to deal with the relations between existence and nonexistence. He said that the opposition between the two extremes of existence and nonexistence

Democritus's greatest achievement was his materialist view of atomic theory. Although this was a very primitive and mechanical materialist theory, it had a significant impact on later generations of atomic theory and brought about the guidance of science by philosophy. He opposed idealist philosophy and advocated an entirely materialist philosophy. He believed that all matter was composed of minuscule, indivisible particles called atoms and that their movement was integrated with empty space. The impenetrable atoms move in empty space, and atoms mutually separate and combine, thereby composing the diverse nature of the material world. He saw matter, humans, spirits, and thinking all as various combinations of all atoms that have the same matter and different forms. In this way, he gave all things a relatively unique form. He believed that nothing else exists besides atoms and emptiness, and he completely denied divinity. He believed that motion cannot be separated from matter, but that emptiness is a condition of the movement of matter. His relationship between atoms and emptiness demonstrates the unity of having and not having. Although his view of the movement of matter was mechanical, dynamic movement, he also saw the basic law of changes in matter as an inevitable result of the

was resolved in the concept of generation. That is, the processes and essence of all things lie in the union of two extremes. Among the Greek philosophers, the "great and glorious Heraclitus" was truly "the father of dialectics."

We next speak of Democritus (460–350[2] B.C.E.), the highest pinnacle among ancient materialists. The materialist theory of Democritus is the most outstanding representation of ancient Greek atomic materialist theory. An idealist worldview had already emerged during the era of Democritus. Democritus fervently opposed idealist philosophy and promoted a fundamentally and entirely materialist theory that was his own philosophy. He said: "Matter is eternal," and "nothing can come from nothing." Based on this materialist judgment, matter did not need to be created by any mystical or divine activity because matter exists eternally, and the movement of matter is the result of its own special qualities. Democritus called these special qualities of matter inseparable particles, the integration and separation of atoms, and various types of integration.

Natural philosophy at that time was still in a very immature form, so the worldview of Democritus was still an early and rudimentary thing. He made observations about the composition of the material world such as the following. All matter that exists in the universe—fire and water, earth and sky, matter and humans, plants or human spirits—consists of various combinations of atoms that are the same matter in mutually different forms. Water atoms have one form; earth atoms have another form. When expanded, combi-

universe, and he sought to find the reasons for the movement of matter in the nature of matter itself.

nations of atoms also make up humans and their thoughts, and each has a unique form. In this way, Democritus gave everything in the universe its own correspondingly unique form.

According to the views of Democritus, although each of the various forms of atomic combinations is different, all atoms still have the common characteristics of materiality, inseparability and impenetrability. Since all atoms are impenetrable, the substances that are formed by combinations of atoms (such as water, fire, air, and earth) are also impenetrable. The question therefore arose: how can an impenetrable substance move? He assumed empty space in order to answer this question. He believed that all beings are composed of minuscule, impenetrable particles of matter; these particles move in empty space, and they mutually separate and combine to create all the diversity in the material world. He therefore said: "There is nothing else in current reality other than atoms and empty space."

Democritus saw atoms and emptiness as the basic principle of the material world, and the principle of atoms and emptiness demonstrates comprehension of the unity of having and not having. He held that there are many combinations of atoms that give rise to many types of matter, and emptiness is a condition for the motion of matter. He held that motion is inseparable from matter. The motion of matter that he discussed, however, is mechanical, dynamic motion, and this type of mechanical, dynamic motion is also a law of change of matter and the inevitable result of the universe. Here, he tried to explore the reasons for the matter's own movement in the material world itself.

Although Democritus created a mechanical understanding of matter, he put all things in the universe and their motion in order with his idea of the various combinations of atoms and their transformation and clashes, thereby reaching an abstract concept about matter. We can say that the philosophy of Democritus was a mechanical materialist worldview. Though primitive, this worldview had a significant impact on later development of atomic theory. In this regard, we can see how philosophy tends to lead to scientific development.

3: Dialectics in Ancient Idealist Philosophy

Ancient idealist philosophy represents the ideology of the reactionary aristocracy. There are six historical bases for its development: (1) The profound class divisions and struggles that came as a result of further development of Greece's slave economy spawned a struggle between the ideologies of aristocracy and democracy, and idealist philosophy was the foundation of the former. (2) Because the slave system impeded technological progress, slave owners did not study natural phenomena related to technological improvement; instead, they focused their attention on studying social phenomena, and moral philosophy and state theory emerged. (3) Because free people who were disassociated from physical labor commonly viewed physical labor with contempt, intellectual factors were exaggerated, and idealist philosophy

Ancient idealist philosophy is what replaced materialist philosophy in history. The occurrence and development of ancient idealist philosophy has its own historical roots.

First, by the fifth century B.C.E., development of the Greek slave economy had already reached its pinnacle and begun to decline. During this process, the class antagonism among the free people was continually developing, and the struggle of the class of tradesmen and industrialists against the former landed aristocrats intensified. The attention of each stratum of the free people thereupon became focused on the struggle for political rights, which led to the so-called struggle between democracy and aristocracy.

Second, because the slavery system impeded technological progress, the slave-owning class made no effort to study natural phenomena related to tech-

resulted. (4) Because of this, the aristocracy in ideological realms looked down upon and despised study of the so-called "base material" philosophies. They considered idealist philosophy to be the only truth; (5) As a result of the scientific limitations of the previous period of materialist philosophy, inconsistencies of immaturity and self contradiction could not be avoided, and it was therefore looked down upon by idealist philosophers. (6) Because materialist philosophy was only the dialectics of objective reality, it did not focus on the dialectics of subjective thought. As a result, idealism, which emphasized logic, replaced it. The above six points are the historical reasons ancient idealism replaced ancient materialism and developed.

nological improvement. Instead, they focused their attention on studying social phenomena. So, what is the meaning of good? What is the meaning of bad? How should people live? How should the state be organized? Questions such as how political power should be distributed became the questions they urgently wanted to resolve.

Third, free people all took part as citizens of the state, and citizens could not be people who engaged in physical labor, so free townspeople commonly viewed physical labor with contempt. In ancient times, this scornful view of labor prevailed among all thinking people.

Fourth, in the realm of ideology, this was damaging to the self-esteem of those who had formerly studied natural phenomena, who saw themselves as highly intellectual aristocrats and regarded such studies as base material philosophy. The objects of reflection of the aristocrats and their lackeys therefore shifted from the material world on earth to the intellectual world in the heavens. Moreover, inconsistencies in the substance of earlier materialist philosophies could not be avoided because of the limitations of immature scientific knowledge. In the eyes of the aristocratic scholars, they had become dull and tasteless. In addition, the former materialist philosophy, because it was subject to the limitations of the immature scientific knowledge of that time, unavoidably suffered from internal contradictions, and was dull and tasteless in the eyes of the aristocratic scholars. In addition, the earlier natural philosophies simply asserted the objective reality of materialist dialectics, but dit not address the materialist dialectics of subjectivity, that is, the materialist dialectics of thought. This is yet another reason ancient materialist theory gave way to ancient idealism.

On the basis of the historical basis described above, these ancient idealist theories representing the reactionary aristocratic theory appeared on the stage of philosophy, and struggled against the earlier materialist theories.

Socrates was the first to struggle against materialism and advocate idealist epistemology and ethics. Most significant was that he was the first to advance ethics and epistemology. He brought philosophy into the spheres of society and thought. He initiated the relationship between knowledge and behavior in materialist dialectics on the basis of ethics theory. On the basis of epistemology, he initiated the relationship between general and individual in materialist dialectics. These were his greatest achievements. His thinking, however, was reactionary and idealist. His ethics theory suggested that knowledge determines behavior. He believed that the pursuit of knowledge is the means to attaining ethics, that evil is the product of ignorance, and that good is the result of knowledge. There is an element of truth to this, but first of all, his so-called knowledge is understanding of the customs and habits of the ancestors. He therefore advocated restoration of old customs and traditions and rejection of new knowledge. He advocated traditional aristocracy and rejected the new rising democracy, so he was reactionary. Second, he realized only that knowledge affected behavior and was unaware of

The earliest representative of ancient idealism was Socrates (469–399 B.C.E.). Socrates's main theoretical issue was advocacy of unification of knowledge and ethics. He saw pursuit of knowledge as the means of attaining ethics. In his view, evil was the result of ignorance, and good was a valuable thing. In order to know why good was a valuable thing, its best origin had to be known. The origin is the customs and habits of the ancestors. For this reason, he rejected the newly emerging democracy and upheld the traditional aristocracy.

In the area of epistemology, Socrates was an idealist in his explanation of general philosophical questions. He treated attainment of thought and the existence of generality in thought as the foundations for individual perceptual phenomena. He held that the objective of knowledge is exploration of the general. In idealist epistemology, therefore, Socrates put forward the question of general versus individual dialectics, even though he never resolved this question.

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the origins of knowledge in behavior (practice). Behavior is the foundation that determines knowledge, as well as the standard for examining knowledge. Thus he was an idealist. As for his theory of knowledge, he held that the goal of knowledge was to move from individual perceptions to rational generalities, and this is correct. But his view that the latter is the foundation of the former is idealist.

Plato's thinking was objective idealism, and its entire system was reactionary and incorrect. He believed that ideas were the only eternal truths that existed. Before the existence of the world and of human beings, ideas existed. The world and the thinking of human beings are both products of ideas and the reflections of ideas. This turns the real world upside down into an entirely idealist system. From this, he created an idealist logic and advocated a world in which recognition of an object is an idea and not a feeling, and the method of recognition is to engage in thinking based on concepts that are devoid of content. Plato also played a positive role, however, because his subjective idealism revealed the role of concepts in thought. The impact of this concept on thought had a significant pioneering effect on the history of human understanding.

Next, the philosopher who followed Socrates was the objective idealist Plato (427–347 B.C.E.). Plato was the person most vehemently opposed to materialism, and he advocated burning the works of Democritus on atomic theory. He advocated that the intrinsic quality of worldly objects could not be sought in contemptible matter; it should be sought, rather, in theory. According to his ideas, the world we perceive through feelings does not truly exist; instead, there is an eternally existing theoretical world, the reflection of a conceptual world. He used the following analogies to explain this point. He said we should assume we are sitting in an empty space surrounded by a wall. The four sides of the empty space are all enclosed, and only the top is open. At this time, the empty space above has people walking and stars moving. The reflections of these people and stars are, therefore, on the facing walls. The world of feelings, like these reflections, is therefore on the facing walls. Like these reflections, the world of feelings is also a reflection of ideas that truly exist. Based on Plato's thinking, ideas and concepts are things that existed before the world and above the world, and the thinking of the world and

our thinking are both products of these ideas. Therefore, Plato is an objective idealist.

Plato firmly believed that ideas are the creators of life, the highest single truth of the real world. Hence he held that recognition of an object is in fact such a concept. We can recognize ideas only by thinking of the concept. For this reason, he created conceptual ethics. Plato's concept, however, did not include the concept of the substance of matter and was therefore a dead and motionless concept. Recognition of a concept that is dead, motionless, and devoid of substance is also mysticism that is dead, motionless, and devoid of substance. We are not willing to study his mysticism. Instead, we will simply state the slightly positive significance of his thinking, his view of the logic of ideas. His view of the logic of ideas demonstrated the effect of concepts on thinking.

Section 2: The Coming into Being and Development of Materialist Dialectics

[Subheadings 1 to 3 are missing in the original]

4: Development of Materialist Dialectics

From the explanation in the previous section, we can see that materialist dialectics was forged in the process of philosophical struggle. Philosophical struggle is a reflection of political struggle, and confronting this issue is the key to our understanding the occurrence and development of materialist dialectics. When the precursors first took

Struggle is dialectical.

up a position of radical democracy, they entered the philosophical realm of the Left Hegelian faction in order to reflect the political struggle using the philosophical struggle. From the time they were influenced by Feuerbach, and having decided to become materialists and critically assimilate Hegel's materialist dialectic methods to study all the real social problems, they took further steps to utilize innovative intellectual tools of materialist dialectics to engage in struggles on two philosophical fronts—those of idealism and old materialism, representing the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. This type of struggle reflects the actual struggle between the proletariat, which they represent, and the bourgeoisie.

Notes

1. The passage in parentheses was added by Mao Zedong.
2. As indicated by a note to the Chinese text, the correct date of Democritus's death is 370 B.C.E.

Summary of Philosophy and Life *by Ai Siqi*

(1937)

All the terms (or concepts, categories) we use, such as "absolute," "relative," and so on, are the reflection of real things. It is only because there are real horses in the world that there is the term "horse." The two terms relative and absolute are also not divorced from real things.

Absolutism frequently causes trouble in our daily life.

For example, believing in fate, and thinking that things never change. Or, considering that the circumstances of life in a certain place do not suit one, wanting to go somewhere else, and thinking that circumstances can never change. Or, thinking that the people around one are not awakened, and not knowing that people, too, can change.

Darkness is not absolute, nor is brightness absolute.

To go beyond reality in pursuit of an ideal reality and to try to escape reality are both idealist[1] attitudes. Of all of the forms of idealism, the majority are absolutist.

Leftist infantilism is a kind of absolutism, since it regards the ideal as something absolute and does not know that the ideal can be realized only on the basis of the present situation.

The changing of darkness and the obtaining of brightness are proportional to effort or the lack thereof. Effort will be rewarded with success; lack of effort will lead to failure. The relationship between these things depends on making efforts or not and on timeliness.

Relativism considers that there is no such thing as definite truth. Everybody has his own truth; ten people will have ten truths: "Aren't they almost the same?" This means skepticism, doubting everything, and being able to grasp nothing.

It is right to doubt, but it is wrong to doubt everything.

There are more relativists among the old, and more absolutists among the young.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji,* pp. 191–203, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript of September 1937. For a brief biographical note about Ai Siqi, see Mao's letter of 1937 to him in Part I of this volume, in which he also explained why he was sending this summary to Ai for comment.

[1] The term *guannianlun,* used here, has in recent years sometimes been rendered literally as "conceptualism." In fact it was, in the 1930s, the standard Chinese translation of "idealism."

Relativism exaggerates the relativity of things. The relative nature of change in things should be recognized, but overstating it to the point that nothing can be grasped becomes relativism.

Recognize the changing and relative nature of things, while at the same time recognizing the existence of fixed things in the midst of change and relativity, and of laws in the development of things. Recognize absolute things in the midst of relativity. The absolute is embodied in the relative. Relativism refuses to recognize this regularity.

Relative things include certain absolute things; absolute things are manifested in each inevitable stage of relative things. Such is the relationship between the two.

Sublation is, on the one hand, to reject and negate the negative elements and, on the other, to criticize, transform, and, at the same time, preserve the positive elements; it is not simple rejection. Ye Qing[2] says: "In the past formal logic dominated every field of research, but now it is restricted to states of relative rest." Thus if we want to negate formal logic, we can do it only with reference to the range of its application, not to its essence. What is this if not simple preservation? What is it if not the recognition that, in essence, formal logic and dialectics are of equal significance?

At any point in space all things in motion are both at rest and not at rest at the same time. This is the contradictory unity of movement. Ye Qing says, "Motion is the accumulation of rest, rest is the cessation of motion. These two engender each other and turn into each other, and one is the condition of existence of the other." Rest is only a specific form of motion; it is definitely not the cessation of motion, nor is motion the accumulation of rest. If it is only the accumulation of rest, motion will be totally eliminated in motionlessness (Zhang Youren).[3]

Formal logic and dialectical logic are the most fundamental problems.

Dialectical logic: A is A, but at the same time it is not A; a certain thing is identical to itself, but at the same time it is not. Formal logic can see only the identical aspect. Dialectics, however, sees not only this aspect but also the other aspect (which is not identical); therefore it is able to embody, assimilate, and sublate formal logic. Dialectics can see what formal logic is unable to see. As for what formal logic can see, dialectics not only sees it but transforms and deepens it.

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[2] Ren Zhuoxuan (1896–) was a native of Sichuan. In the early 1920s, as a member both of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Guomindang, he spent five years in France, where he played an important role in the Chinese student movement. In 1925, he was expelled from France because of this activity, and in early 1926 he returned to China. There he led underground Communist activities as a member of the Hunan regional committee. Although arrested and sentenced to death, he somehow escaped execution, but in 1928, when he was arrested again, he renounced his Chinese Communist Party membership, while continuing to write as a Marxist, under the pseudonym of Ye Qing. The works criticized here are those of his period as an anti-Communist Marxist in the mid-1930s. Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, he abandoned socialism for nationalism.

[3] Zhang Youren was a reader of Ai Siqi's *Philosophy for the Masses* who wrote a letter to Ai denouncing Ye Qing's attacks on him.

One cannot say, "On the one hand, I recognize A as A, and, on the other hand, I also recognize that A is not A," and call this dialectics. The relationship between these two propositions is not a case of "on the one hand and on the other." It is, rather, that at one and the same time they permeate each other and are bound together. It is the unity of the whole and not a mechanical combination, nor can they be mechanically broken up. If they are broken up and understood in this way, the result will be eclecticism. Ye Qing's dialectics is such an eclectic distortion.

Ye Qing also recognizes that the methods of induction and deduction are both built on formal logic and must be sublated by dialectics. He also says, however: "In our applications we can regard the methods of deduction and induction as categories, using them as appropriate in the dialectical process of research." In this way he acknowledges that the entire process of research is dialectical, but during this process there are times when the inductive method or the deductive method must be used. The combination of these two methods thus becomes the dialectical process of research as a whole.

The inductive method seeks out the general, pure common points from among a great many complex and particular things. The road taken is analysis. The deductive method is used to explain particular things in terms of general principles. The road taken is synthesis. The former proceeds from the particular to the general and from the concrete to the abstract. The latter proceeds from the general to the particular and from the abstract to the concrete. According to Ye Qing's method, the whole of dialectics is nothing but the mechanical combination of the methods of induction and deduction.

According to Ye Qing, it seems that the study of dialectics is also from the particular to the general and from the general to the particular. Thus it is induction and deduction. Actually this is incorrect.

In dialectics, although at the stage from the particular to the general, ordinary inductive methods such as observation, comparison, and analysis are used, they are used only as one of the essential factors. Because here the inductive method is proceeding only along the path of analysis, it draws only simple and one-sided conclusions from among the complicated things. Dialectics is quite different; it not only analyzes but also summarizes at the same time. That is, it not only grasps simple and one-sided determinations but also strives to seek out determinations that are many-sided and unite the contradictions.

In the process from the general to the particular, will it be all right to use only the deductive method, take the way of synthesis, and apply the general laws to sum up individual things? No, this won't do. If we are going to carry out the dialectical method, not only should we adopt the method and achieve a synthesis, but, while applying and summarizing, we should also analyze the concrete conditions of these individual things and discover the tendencies of new and particular contradictions.

Whether from the general to the particular or from the particular to the general, our method is always basically dialectical. The inductive and deductive methods are both used only as elements in the process of research. Neither can be separated from the other and stand alone. They are not simply rejected or simply preserved. Instead, they are assimilated, digested, and transformed. Dialectics is dialectics as a whole and not the simple piecing together of induction and deduction.

The quality of things will remain unchanged during a process of quantitative change. At this time, from a qualitative point of view, it remains relatively static, but in terms of quantity, it changes from the beginning to the end. Since relative rest is still a particular form of absolute movement, it can be understood clearly only through the study of dialectics. Formal logic can see only the static aspect; moreover, it is likely to exaggerate this aspect and overlook the fundamental movement. Since we have dialectics, which can grasp the overall picture of a thing, including the aspect of formal logic, why should we study the relatively static state with formal logic?

Ye Qing says: "Understanding the nature of the Chinese economy is obviously the study of a state of rest. Consequently, the analysis of this problem should undoubtedly be formulated on the basis of formal logic."

This is wrong—it is eclecticism. In his opinion, only the study of the development of Chinese society is a study of a dynamic state and an issue of dialectics. Form, quality, relationship, and so on are only studies of a state of rest, and they should belong to formal logic. Isn't this obviously eclecticism?

Questions such as those of quality and relations are the starting point for the problem of development. Although we cannot regard them as development itself, if we are faithful to dialectics, we should at least see in them the internal motive force of development, see in them specific contradictions. Can formal logic do this? Formal logic sees only one side; hence it can only become formalism. For example, feudal society needs capitalist revolution; this is a formula. Because the Chinese economy is a feudal economy, some people claim that China needs a capitalist revolution to build a capitalist society. Such a deduction is not incorrect in terms of formal logic; that is all we can say about it, but China's specific conditions are ignored. The specific conditions in China do not allow a restriction to historical capitalist revolutions, nor do they allow the building of a capitalist society. This applies to every problem; since formal logic is unable to solve the problems, the only solution is to go to dialectics for help. From Plekhanov to Ye Qing's formulism, [formal logic] has been unable to solve any problems.

Two thousand years ago, the Greek sophists regarded movement as countless points of rest in space. Hence, they concluded that there were only countless points of rest and no movement at all. Ye Qing says that rest is the cessation of movement, and movement is the accumulation of rest. This is a revival of sophistry.

Lenin says, "Even a simple judgment is also a unity of contradictions. For example, the proposition 'Ivan is a man' has the meaning of 'the particular is equal to the general.'" Formal logic often makes statements such as "young people are shop assistants," rather than "young people are young people," since formal logic itself cannot be strictly bound by the law of identity, or it could not have been established. When formal logic uses this kind of proposition, [those who do so] naturally do not imagine that it contains contradictions, so we cannot say that this is an application of the law of the unity of contradictions. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that propositions of this kind in essence contain a unity of contradictions.

Ai Siqi says: "Different things are not contradictions; for example, pen, ink, and chair are not contradictions. But if one understands the principles of development and change, then it is known that under certain conditions things that are different may turn into contradictions. If two different things are at the same place at the same time and begin to act in a mutually exclusive manner, they become contradictions. For instance, shop assistants and writers have no basic contradictions with one another, but if a certain shop assistant becomes interested in writing and wants to become a writer, the two become mutually exclusive within an entity and, in the end, become contradictory. But if only virtue and vice, man and woman, and so on are recognized as contradictions, and it is thought that other things cannot transform themselves into contradictions, this is a formalistic differentiation, and is no different from the formalism of Zhang Dongsun's[4] approach distinguishing between "opposite" and "contradictory."

The basic principle is correct, but the formulation "difference is not contradiction" is not. What we should say is that, under certain conditions, all things that are different are contradictions. A person sits on a chair and dips a pen into ink in order to write an essay. Just because these two specific conditions of a person and an essay temporarily unite contradictory things, we cannot say that these differences are not contradictions. When a cook prepares food, he takes firewood, rice, oil, salt, soy sauce, vinegar, and tea, and, under certain circumstances, unites them. A shop assistant and a writer may also be united under certain conditions. Part work, part study can unify work and study. Differences are everything in this world, and, under certain conditions they are all contradictions. Hence, differences are contradictions; these are the so-called concrete contradictions. This formulation of Ai's is inappropriate. (Mao Zedong's opinion)

The formula "A is $\bar{B}$ or not B" of the law of the excluded middle actually contains such a contradiction. That is, "A is not A but B," or "B may or may not be B." Hegel criticized this a long time ago.

External factors must not be overlooked, but they cannot determine necessity in things. It is internal causes that determine necessity. Ye Qing says, "We should recognize the mutual influence of the internal and external factors." This is mechanical mutual influence; neither side is winning, and this leads to Ye Qing's eclecticism. Dialectical interaction is not like this, however; the two sides are distinguished by primary and secondary significance.

Recognize Ye Qing's problem: "Machines require external force; water becomes vapor after meeting with external heat; isn't it a fact that the evolution of living things should be attributed to the environment?" Assuredly we do not simply negate his view. At the same time, however, we should also admit the capacity of things themselves to change, which is the decisive factor in the change of a thing. Machines are capable of movement, water has the characteristic of turning into vapor, and living things have the characteristic of evolution. Consequently, force, heat, environment, and other external factors are able to play a role. Internal factors rather than external factors determine the inevitability of changes in a thing.

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[4] Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973) was at this time professor of philosophy at Yanjing University. He characterized his own thought as "epistemological pluralism."

General things always manifest themselves in particular forms, and there are no pure and ordinary things surviving in this world. What is called "the particular is contained in the general" refers to a general thing which manifests itself in particular forms. This does not mean that there is some particular thing that is independent of the ordinary things (such as when Ye Qing said that the theory of internal causes is a general principle, but the uniqueness of China does not fit his view, and China's development does not fit any law). The general and the particular are a unity of contradictions; there is no purely general, nor is there any pure uniqueness that exists independent of generality.

The distinguishing feature of materialist dialectics lies in its grasp of the core and essence of the facts, and the regularity of the internal development of the facts, rather than respecting the appearance of the facts. Mechanical materialists, empiricists, and pragmatists also all respect the facts, but all of them respect only the superficial facts. Respecting the superficial facts is the preliminary stage of knowledge, the initial period of science. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century materialism and mechanical scientific thought are like this. We do not deny that superficial facts can also give people some knowledge. The metaphysical mechanics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has made available many truths. Even pragmatism can see more than the empty boasters who present a false picture of peace and prosperity. It has been able to expose in large measure the crimes of the enemy invader, as well as the error of absolute nonresistance. Nevertheless, the ability to see only the invasion of the enemy and the inability to see the essence of invasion, the ability to see only the mistakes of nonresistance and the inability to see the future of resistance by the popular masses—this kind of respect for the immediate facts before one's eyes is completely different from materialist dialectics. It is only a superficial fact that mechanical motion results from external force; the essential fact is that machines themselves have the ability to move. Science in the mechanical age paid attention only to the study of external force, since science at that time was still in its primitive stage and was unable to penetrate to the essence of movement. The arrival at the higher stage of the theory of relativity made it possible for people to explain mechanical movement in terms of internal factors. As for the movement of the planets, during the era of Newton, people were able to explain this only in terms of gravity (external forces). The theory of relativity, however, explains it in terms of the nature of movement itself.

Part III: Brief Sayings and Inscriptions

Inscription on the Founding of the Anti-Japanese University

(October 23, 1937)

It is said that you have high enthusiasm for the work of building classrooms and dormitories and have achieved initial successes. This is excellent. This provides proof that, before the Communist Party and the Red Army, all ordinary so-called difficulties do not exist, the most severe hardship can also be overcome, and the Red Army is invincible in the world.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 125.

* * *

Commemorating the Second Anniversary of the Anwu Youth Course

(October 1937)

All young people who have joined the revolutionary ranks with fresh blood and vigor are precious, regardless of whether or not they are Party members. Without them, the revolutionary forces cannot grow and the revolution cannot triumph. But the natural weakness of the young comrades is lack of experience, and revolutionary experience must be gained from personal participation in the revolutionary struggle. After working at first from the lowest level in a down-to-earth manner and without any pretentiousness for some years, experience will come to those without it.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 129.

Inscription for Kangda, *the Organ of the Anti-Japanese University*

(1937)

Struggle hard and persevere; a bright future is just ahead.

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 131.

* * *

Inscription on the Tombstone of Comrade Gu Bo

(1937)

My friend Gu Bo, talented and hard-working, devoted his life to the country, and I am extremely grieved over his death. I hope that all fellow countrymen of Mr. Gu will continue the work he has bequeathed to them and achieve together the goal of freedom and liberation.

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 131.

* * *

Inscription

(1937?)

The one and only task today is for members of the Guomindang and the Communist Party to unite like brothers in fighting for the cause of resisting Japan and saving the country, and in striving to attain the goal of national independence, democracy, freedom, people's livelihood, and happiness.

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 131.

Inscription for Kangda

(March 5, 1938)

A firm and steadfast political direction, a work-style of arduous struggle, plus responsive and flexible strategy and tactics.

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 133.

* * *

To Jin Cheng[1]

(March 13, 1938)

Comrade Jin Cheng:

The materials about Guangdong are excellent.[2] Collect more similar materials for me in the future. And you should gather all kinds of information from those coming from outside.

Best wishes!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* p. 125, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1] Jin Cheng (1906–1991) was, at this time, head of the foreign department of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region.

[2] The reference is to materials on the situation of the Guomindang which Jin Cheng had obtained from a local worker on his way from Guangdong to Yan'an.

Inscription for the Special Publication of the Representative Conference of the Women of New China

(March 15, 1938)

Women have shouldered great responsibilities in the War of Resistance. The masses of women must be organized, and there should be large numbers of female cadres to lead the women's work.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* pp. 133–34, where it is reproduced from *Xin Zhonghua bao,* March 15, 1938.

* * *

Couplet for a Mass Meeting Commemorating the Death of Sun Yatsen and Honoring Anti-Japanese Martyrs

(March 1938)

What is the basis for Guomindang-Communist cooperation? Mr. Sun said, "Communism is a good friend of the Three People's Principles." Where does the reason for the victory of anti-Japanese resistance reside? The people of our country all declare, "The front of the aggressors is the mortal enemy of the peace front."

Our source for this couplet is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 134. It was obviously written for the meeting of March 12, 1938, at which Mao delivered the speech translated above in the body of this volume.

Inscription Calling Upon Young People

(April 15, 1938)

Young people are a vital new force in the anti-Japanese war. At present, the task of youth organizations is to unite the young men and women of all social strata in the whole country to go to the battlefields of the anti-Japanese war in great numbers, to strengthen the fighting power of the regular armies and develop a broad guerrilla war. The young people in the rear are also working exclusively for the victory of the war. The liberation of China relies mainly on the young people.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 134. It was published in *Xin Zhonghua Bao* on this date.

* * *

Important Instructions on Culture

(April 1938)

> Statement of Ke Zhongping
>
> The section on "Culture of the Border Regions" in issue no. 430 of *New China* carried my article "The Lu Xun Academy of Arts is a development of Lu Xunism." In it, there were some typographical errors and omissions. I asked *New China* to make corrections in accordance with my original manuscript in issue no. 431, but the paragraph by Mr. Mao Zedong which I quoted contained some errors, for which I am responsible. Because I wrote down this paragraph from memory, I was not able to reproduce it completely. Now, on the basis of corrections made by Mr. Mao himself, I shall carefully reproduce that paragraph of important instructions on culture here:

Sometimes the stuff prepared by the people of the food pavilions is not very tasty, and that prepared by the people on the mountain tops doesn't look very good. Some of the people in the food pavilions say, "This old guy is number one in the world or, at the very least, number two," and those on the mountain tops put on a rough and ready air and say, "This old guy has traveled 25,000 *li.*"

Now we should no longer put up with these things—the things of the past, which can be regarded as things of the period of preparation. We should get rid of a bit of this self-importance. It is essential to organize the cultural achievements of the past decade, train large numbers of cultural cadres, and send them to work on all the battlefronts throughout the country. . . . The work-style should be that of the united front. At the same time, the united front also provides guidance and direction for art.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 167.

* * *

Inscription for the First Issue of Free China

(May 10, 1938)

Let all patriotic people unite and fight for a free China.

Our source for this text is the index volume to *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 135.

* * *

Inscription for Shi Fangbai

(May 12, 1938)

At the present stage, China must certainly complete the national-democratic revolution by defeating the Japanese bandits thoroughly and establishing a new-democratic republic. In a future stage, China will definitely complete the socialist revolution, by setting up a more advanced and successful socialist republic. Accomplishing these two revolutions requires adherence to the policy of the united front. The goal can be reached only if all revolutionary forces are solidly united within the united front.

Respectfully presented to Mr. Shi Fangbai.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 171.

There Are No Strategic Offensives in the Anti-Japanese War, but Only Tactical Counteroffensives and Strategic Counteroffensives[1]

(May 28, 1938)

Of course, the anti-Japanese war does not have so-called strategic offensives. It has only battlefield counteroffensives and strategic counteroffensives, which are positive components of the entire strategic defense and are relied upon for the defeat of Japan. It is, of course, also permissible in popular parlance to call them offensives.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, p. 229.

[1] Mao wrote this letter in his capacity as chief editor of the series *Kangri zhanzheng congshu* (Collected Writings on the Anti-Japanese War). The present text is a reply to Guo Huaruo, one of the authors of *Kangri youji zhanzheng de yiban wenti* (All the Problems of the Anti-Japanese War), the first book in the series, which appeared in July 1938. Mao's own article, "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War," which appears above under the date of its first publication, May 30, 1938, was also included in this volume.

* * *

The Campaign to Write Ten Thousand Letters of Appreciation

(September 18, 1938)

Officers and Soldiers Who Are Fighting Heroically on the Battlefront:

I hope you will continue to maintain your heroic spirit and fight to the bitter end, so as to achieve the goal of expelling the Japanese imperialists and winning final victory. All of your fellow countrymen in the rear area are supporting you.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 183.

Inscription

(September 25, 1938)

"Commemorate the foundation of the Nursery School of the Border Region. Long live the children!"

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 138.

* * *

Inscription for the Lu Xun Academy of Arts

(October 1, 1938)

Anti-Japanese realism, revolutionary romanticism.

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 139.

* * *

Inscription for the Second Congress of the Northwest Youth National Salvation Association

(November 1938)

March forward resolutely, fight Japan, and save China.

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 140. For the Chinese text in Mao's calligraphy, see above the cover and the note on page ii.

Inscription on Publication of the "Special Issue on the Work of Inspection" by the Political Department of the Anti-Japanese Military And Political University

(December 1938)

The more profoundly and thoroughly the inspection is carried out, the easier it is for the academy to achieve more successes and overcome its shortcomings.

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* p. 141.

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